.. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 OIVISION OF MEMBER N!W YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 7, 1981 — We-de\Toten t1iis spacetwo- weeksago -toadlcussiOho(tl1e'rather oi5V-i5us-f9. tnat'the – Dow Jones Industrial Average had, as of last April, entered into an intermediate downtrend. We advanced the argument that, on the last three instances of such a downtrend, the ultimate reversal took the form of a rather obvious selling climax, producing record levels of volume and downside breadth. We went on to suggest that such a denouement was not unlikely this time around. Climax action has been conspicuous by its absence during the past fortnight, and it is perhaps worthwhile at this stage to examine the sort of upside evidence that might accumUlate without an obvious climactic bottom's taking place. The chart at a two-point-unit point-and-figure chart of the Dow Jones Industrial Average since early July suggests the form such constructive action might take. The vertical drop on the left hand side of the chart took place in the first two weeks of July and reached a temporary halt on July 6, when the Dow moved for the first time below 950. As the chart clearly shows, a period of lateral action then took place roughly between 946 and 958 before the 'ISo next phase of the break on July 20. This reached a closing low of 924 on July 22, and, in the two weeks since that time, the market has rallied irregularly, returning once more to the 950 range which held for some two weeks early last month. The most bullish possible action from this point forward would be continued ability to hold at approximately these levels with some fairly fluctuation, the action of ';'0 shoulders pattern, and this sort of action, followed by a penetration above 960 would have, at the very least, optimistic short-term implications. Just where this srt of eventuality difficult, at this point to assess. The chart at right shows the action of the Dow on a much more compressed scale, a 10-point-unit base, in this case going back to the mid-80's. The formation is 1000 the heavy overhead supply from over a year's worth of trading that exists in the upper 900's. It furthermore tends to suggest rather severe downside qOO implications were the Dow to break below the 900 level. We are not sure that this latter vulnerability is as great as widely supposed. An analysis of individual stock patterns shows large numbers of issues close to strong support. It seems axiomatic, however, that a break below 900 could well be accompanied by the sort of climax action suggested in our letter of two weeks ago. – This is why the further development of the pattern in the short-term chart above is of fairly crucial importance. At the moment, the base as shown in the chart suggeats nothing more than a, rally to around 990, precisely the area where overhead supply is the highest. Were that pattern to broaden further, however, into a head-and-shoulders base formation of Significant size, a break above the prior high, around 1024, would at least become a possibility. As is always the case, whether or not such a potential pattern will complete itself is purely conjecture, and the downtrend could be resumed at any time with a new break below 940. Continued firmness at this time, however, would, we think, for the reasons discussed above, have more than usual market significance. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.) 945.59 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 131. 91 Cumulative Index (8/6/81) 1156.62 No stalement or expression of opInion or any other moffer herein contamed 'S, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlreC1tr,' on offer or Ihe ,ollcllollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred 1o or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber Wh, e we believe tke sources of our mfor!T\a lion to be relloble, we 11'1 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statement mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be hosed 01'1 hl own Investlgahon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now ho'e, or may later lake, poslllons or Hodes 11'1 respeo;t loony securities mentioned In thiS or any future ISsue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thr5 or any other 15sue Janney Montgomery Seem, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SfC as on Invostment odvlsor, may gIve adVice to liS II1vestment advisory and othef customers Independently of ony statements mode ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further mformotlon on O'ly iiecuflty mentioned herem IS avoUable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBeR AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGe August 14, 1981 Energyis1les/J.ave .!!ccounJed (Qr.8 Jag P-!\rLf. the..toglLlIl-'!!ket,story for. somethreeYears now, and in many ways they continue to do so. Certainly a large part of the rise from early 1978 through last winter can be accounted for by the action of oil stocks, as can the subsequent weakness from Spring 1981 to date. Unfortunately, recent oil-stock strength has not been able to lift the market out of the doldrums in which it has been drifting for the past couple of months. The table below gives some relevant statistics regarding the price action of the oil stocks in the S 8. P 500 These issues account for more than 20 percent of the weight of that index. -SE-C-U–R-IT-Y- ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CITIES SERVICE CO. CONOCO EXXON CORF. GENERAL AMERICAN OIL OF TEXAS GETTY OIL COMPANY GULF OIL CORP. LOUISIANA LAND EXP. MESA PETROLEUM MOBIL CORP. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM SHELL9IL.Q. STANDARD OIL OF CALIFORNIA STANDARD OIL OF INDIANA SUN CO. SUPERIOR OIL CO. TEXACO INC. UNION OIL OF CALIFORNIA 0) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) PRICE 1980 7. CHANGE 1981 7. CHANGE PRICE 7. CHANGE CHANGE 6/28178 ——- HIGH (1 VS 2) ——– LOW (2 VS 4) 8/12/81 ——– ——- -(2–V–S–6-) (4 VS 6) ——– 24.875 71. 750 188.442 41.625 -41.986 52.875 -26.307 27.027 16.125 60.625 275.969 38.750 -36.083 68.625 13.196 77.097 26.375 72.125 173.460 47.875 -33.622 89.875 24.610 87.729 22.000 43.375 97.159 32.000 -26.225 35.125 -19.020 9.766 27.500 57.750 110.000 34.500 -40.260 47.250 -18.182 36.957 36.375 104.750 187.973 60.875 -41.885 78.375 -25.179 28.747 23.125 51.500 122.703 31.000 -39.806 40.125 -22.087 29.436 21. 750 61.875 184.483 32,250 -47.879 40.125 -35.152 24.419 8.250 33.750 309.091 23.750 -29.630 31. 625 -6.296 33.158 15.625 44,750 186.400 27.375 -38.827 31.250 -30.168 14.155 32.250 60.625 87.985 35.250 -41.856 46.375 -23.505 31.560 29.375 55.000 87.234 30.500 -44.546 35.750 -35.000 17.213 15.25.o61..25Q3j)A.9J 838';0037…65f!—,-MI.250-21. 862—-25. 325 19.875 57.750 190.566 36.500 -36.797 44.500 -22.944 21.18 24.000 99.500 314.583 50.750 -48.995 63.375 -36.307 24.877 20.750 58.500 181.928 32.375 -44.658 43.875 -25.000 35.521 10.000 47.125 371.250 36.375 -22.812 43.875 -6.897 20.619 23.875 51.750 116.754 34.000 -34.300 38.500 -25.604 13.235 11.875 54.750 361.053 29.875 -45.434 39.750 -27.397 33.054 As can be seen, oil-stock action between mid-June, 1978 and early 1981 was more or less uni- form. The 19 issues shown appreciated by amounts ranging from almost 100 to well over 300 to their highs, generally scored in November of last year. The- then, again, almost uniformly, underwent sharp corrections to recent lows posted this Spring. Since that time, as the last two columns of the table show, they have posted recoveries of rather widely varying degrees. The extent of recovery from the 1981 lows is sufficient to divide the issues into two groups on purely technical grounds, and it turns out these technical grounds correspond with the fundamental situation. The leading performer has, of course, been Conoco, about to be taken over. Following on its heels are Cities Service, Mesa and Superior, all the subjects of published speculation as possible takeover candidates. The other large companies, generally regarded as possible acquirors rather than acquirees, have shown rather more modest rebounds and remain at substan- tial discounts from their highs of last Fall. Technical potential for the group also seem to divide into two classes. By and large the take- over candidates are approaching what can be regarded as their long-range upside objectives and present a fair degree of downside risk should their projected acquisition fail to materialize. The other issues can, by and large, be said to have reached downside objectives at their 1981 lows, and the rf'coveries from those lows probably, at the very worst, constitute initial attempts at the formation of new bases. What must be emphasized, however, is that, with the lows having been scored only a few months ago, these bases may take time to complete. While any weakness from current prices may put these issues at long-term attractive levels, it is difficult to see them providing the kind of upside leadership that they contributed between 1978 and 1980, at least until such time as the bases are complete. NOTE Comments on individual issues are based on technical factors only. Further information available on request. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 941. 97 S 8. P Composite (1200 p.m.) 133.33 Cumulative Index (8113181 1161. 24 No stalement or expreulon of opinion or any oiner moiler herCln contained Is, or 1510 be deemed to be, directly or md,reC1ly, on oHer or the SOI'Cllollon of on offer to buy or sell ony IWJnly referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informa t,on to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarOfllee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mode herem Any ael,O!) to be Jaken by Ihe subSCriber should be bosed on ,S own inVestigation and tnfarmOlron Jonney Montgomery 5011, Inc, os a corporation, and liS offKers or employees, may now hove, or moy loter lake, position' or trades In reSpect to any seCUrities mentlaned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter exp-essed m I! or an olher luue Janney Monlgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestrnent adVISOry anrl othel customers mdependently of any 51aternel1ls made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on ony SeC\Hlty menTioned herein ,s available on request

.–. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI(. STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – ——Ve'ryI1ffietookPlace during last week's trading!n'-tatherdetory -n'iltureor- the stock-market picture, at least as far as the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is concerned. At its Tuesday close of 924.37, that most widely followed of market indicators reached its lowest level of the year and came within one percent of the December 11, 1980 low, from which the year-end rally which culminated with the April 27th high of 1024.05, began. The signs of a climactic reversal, signs that we have been suggesting investors look for for some weeks now, were notable by their absence. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out, however, as we have often had to do in the recent past, that the Dow is but one facet of an ever-more-diverse market. We have listed in the table below the action of the Dow plus six other major market indicators at various points during 1981. For comparison purposes, we have restated all of them, using the low of last December as a base equal to 100. A glance at the table will show the widely divergent action. DJIA S&P 500 DJ Trans DJ Uti! S&P 400 NYSE ASE Fin'l Mkt Value Early Jan. High 110.59 108.45 108.00 106.28 108.09 114.87 109.03 Mid -Feb. Low Late April High Mid I\lay Low MidJune High Late July Low August High Recent Low 102.55 112.73 106.05 111. 40 101. 78 104.97 101. 75 99.70 106.38 101. 85 104.91 99.82 104.17 102.16 100.67 118.78 108.93 116.28 106.46 108.54 106.02 95.09 96.74 93.81 101. 62 95.86 103.45 101. 99 98.95 105.67 101.15 103.41 98.58 103.77 100.81 105.70 120.21 114.07 130.36 114.04 119.00 116.29 100.81 111. 65 109.15 115.57 109.52 116.07 112.38 –I——The-last-two–of-the-indicator,r,4heNYSE-Finllrrcia1'1md'heASEM1il'kl;t-Viilue-inai,;c'es,——-t afford little hint of the 1981 weakness suggested by the other averages. The former had, as of mid-June, advanced over 30 percent from its December low and remains, at this week's low figure, 16 percent above that low. The ASE index, while not having performed as dynamically, is the only one that suggests a continuous uptrend over the period involved, each successive high and each of the four successive lows having been higher than the previous one. That indicator, at 367.94 as of Tuesday, still remains marginally above its July figure of 358.88, and the up!rend thus remains intact. The Dow Industrials and Transportation along with the S &p 500 exhibit more or less similar patterns. All three indices posted their highs back last April and have remained well below those highs since. The recent action of the 500, though, is marginally superior, reflecting no doubt the recent improvement in energy stocks. It has m8laged to hold above its lows of both May and July, something the two Dow averages have been unable to do. The 400, which peaked back in January, has also managed to remain above its July high so far. By far the most interesting action, however, is that of the Dow-Jones Utilities. Through mid-May, as a comparison of the numbers shows, its action had been dramatically inferior to that of the other indicators, and it was the only one at that point that was substantially below its December figure. Since May, however, it has entered into a vigorous rallying phase. It has posted two successive new highs, both in June and August, and its current level is further above its July low than is the case with any of the other series. Indeed, it remains not too far from its August peak, suggesting that it might be a leader on any market upturn which occurred from these levels. It is interesting to note that this sort of action is taking place within the context of a potentially very strong utility pattern. At its high of last December, the Dow Utility Aver- age had moved out of what was essentially a three-year base suggesting significantly higher levels. All of 1981 action so far can be viewed as a correction, testing the support afforded by that base, and this support, so far, has held very nicely. The ability of this average, now at the 113-114 level, to move above 119 would confirm this pattern and suggest that utility issues might be leaders in the next upside phase. Despite possible general market weakness, therefore, utility stocks. should be watched closely as potential investment purchases. AWT rs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 925.23 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 129.96 Cumulative Index (8/20/81) 1142.15 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stolement or expreulon of opinion or any other moIler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ,ndlrectly, on offer or the soilcltatlon of on offer to buy or sell any seCUriTy referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenlen, of the subscriber Whllt! Ne believe the sources of our Informalion to be reliable, we In no way represent ar guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any achon to be tal-en by the suoscnber hauld be based on his own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now haye, or may later loke, pasll10ns or trades In respect to any securities menhaned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS of any other Inut! Janney Montgomery Scotl, Inc, whIch IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lIs Investment adVisory anrl other customef5 Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any seCl.lllty mentioned herein 15 available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 28, 1981 . To gee..Ead neys Ol!t.. of th.) y fi!t ,we …..eeno .evidence, based. on-last-week' s .tech- mcal action. that the-intermediate-term market decline. which-began on A'pril-27. 1981 at 1024.05 on the Dow. is yet over. As our readers are aware. we have. since early summer, been pointing to the general deterioration of the stock market picture. As recently as July 24. we expressed the view that the most likely termination for the current stock-market downswing would be a recognizable selling climax. We base this feeling on the most recently available market history. Since the 1974 lows were reached. long. protracted bear markets. such as those which characterized the early 1960's and late 1970's. have been conspicuous by their absence. We have had. in their place. short. but relatively sharp and vicious, intermediatescale declines. Three of these have occurred in the past few years. in the Fall of 1978, the Fall of 1979. and the Spring of 1980. All three were characterized in their termination stages by the same sort of volatile climactic action which we had come to believe was the exclusive property of bear markets much greater in extent. We see no particular immediate evidence of a change in the basic pattern of market behavior typical of the last seven years. Our feeling. therefore. continues to be that the current instance will produce a similar sort of climax. The sort of climax we have in mind would produce certain measurable characteristics. One such characteristic would be the presence of one or more downswing days on which a large percentage of individual issues declined in price. Generally in the past, a day in which 80 percent or more of all issues traded decline has been a reliable indicator of the onset of climax action. The phenomenon is rare enough to stand out. Only 40 such days have taken place in the past 33 years. Such occurrences. however. unfailingly took place around the time of major bottoms starting with .1949 and cmilirurin.ginJ.95.3.-1.95'Z.r-1962,,1-966 .-l-9'10,-and-t-he-t-hree recent downswings referred to above. It is therefore worth noting that we did have such a day this Monday. when the Dow dropped some 20 points and 80.7 percent of allissues traded closed lower. Here. however, a caveat must be noted. It is not at all uncommon for a number of such days to occur on the way down to a climax bottom. In 1978, for example, the low on the Dow was 785.26 on November 14. The two days with 80 declining issues occurred on October 17 and 20, at 836 and 838. Likewise, the 1979 low st 796.67 on November 17 was preceded by three 80-declining days in mid-October. at 857, 849, and 809 respectively. Furthermore, another reliable indicator of a selling climax is, very often, excessive volume. This has been notable by its total absence to date. A measurement we have used with some success to determine evidence of unusually heavy downside volume has been a single day on which volume increased to somewhere between 1. 5 times and 2 times its average for the past 25 days, preferably reaching a high close to the latter figure. This took place both in 1978 and 1979. The average volume for the past 25 days has been approximately 43 million shares. Therefore. it would be reasonable to expect a selling climax to produce minimum volume in the upper 6million-share range and, better still, something well in excess of 80 million. This, of course, has not occurred. Having said all this, we continue to reiterate our belief that the overall scale of this decline is unlikely to prove a great deal different than that of the recent downswings men- tioned above. The 1978 decline was 13.5. the 1979 instance 11. 2 and the Spring-1980 case, 16.0. This one has extended to 13.2 so far. Based on our reading of individual chart patterns, we think a downside objective, in terms of the Dow, of something like 850 is plausible. This would produce a correction on the scale of the drop which ended on Silver Thursday a year ago last Spring. Therefore, although further weakness seems probable, we think that attainment of these levels, especially if accompanied by the sort of climax action referred to above, would provide an above -average buying opportunity. AWT rs ANTHONY W. T ABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 891.36 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 124.07 Cumulative Index (8/27/81) 1086.01 No statemenT or expresSion of opinion or any other moIler here, contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe solicllotlOn of on offer To buy or sell any seCUriTy referred to or menhoned The matter IS presented merely for the convenlenCf of Ihe subSCriber While we believe the sources ef our Informo- han to. be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof ncr of the statements mude herein Any action to. be toen by the subscriber hould be based on his own 'lnvestlgallcn and Information Janney Montgomery SCCII, Inc, cs a corporation, ond Its offlcer or employee, may now have, cr may later toke, pCSlhons cr trades In respect to any seCUrities mentlened In thiS ar any future Issue, and such pasltlan may be different frem any views new er hereafter c1 p ressed ln this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regiSTered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to. Its Investment adVisory anrl at hel customers Independently of any staTements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further ,fermatlon on any seCIJtlty mentlel'led herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 4, 1981 One,of!h. 1JI0resote;j.c, sttistkal ocGuI'.renQesofAhepast w,.eek was that, on Wednesday, a 14-day movmg average of NYSE new lows, expressed as a percentage 'of issues-traded, moved above the five-percent figure. This is a level which, when it has occurred in the past, has possessed a certain amount of significance. This indicator, which we call a new low index, has moved above five percent only thirty previous times in the past 20 years, and it has done so as an accompaniment to every major and intermediate correction that has taken place in those two decades. Like any other indicator, it falls short of perfection, having occasionally moved above five percent when important downswings did not ensue. It has, however, proved to be an index worth watching. , The following table shows all of the occasions since 1962 when this series moved above toe five-percent threshold, together with the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the first day it did so. The next two columns show the subsequent low for toe DJlA and the ultimate high for the new low index. The final column shows the percentage change between toe day the index first moved above five percent and that final low. –…. FH,ST CROSSING THfWUGH 5 HIGH rOR PERCENT NEW LO, EVENTUAL LOW NEW LOW CHANGE — ..D.-A–T-E—-. INDEX —— –D- -.lIA—– ——D,.H.. l — D.. -J1–A–. -IN-D-E-X- T–O—L-O-W- AF'R 4 1962 OCT –j 1962 JUN 4 1965 .0543 .0557 .O51 69.,.88 5i8.06 900.87 -lUN '26 196'2 28rI) I; , 196. JLlN 1 S'6 535.76 558.06 84('.59 .'289 -3.12 .0726 0.00 .189 -6.69 MAR 3 1966 .O51 9H.J ,55 M.,F' I 5 1966 911.08 .0599 -!. 70 MI'lY 5 1966 Oj4l 899. 77 MAY 17 196. 864. J 4 .lb43 -3.96 JUL '26 1966 .0571 8S!. l7 AUG 29 1966 767.03 .399 -9.99 SEP '29 1966 .0513 77'2.66 OCT 7 1966 744.3; .1539 -3.67 NOV '2 1967 .0500 864.85 N(lV EI 1967 849.7 .0589 .. 1.76 M'R '2 1969 .0516 930.9- APf, '21 1969 917.51 .0741 -1.44 SJUENE..l4611.996.969.. 00552.30.3 928.8 /1 JUL I;-13.\,1-o64(J J – 9 1969 801.96 8 -l.9 69,8 0-.-2-0 .2354 ,0690. .-13.66 il5 DEC '2 1969 .0524' 001;3'; DEC 17 1969 769.93 .149'2 -3.92 ,JAN 28 19/0 .0515 758.84 JAN 30 1970 744.06 .0839 -1.95 Af-'R 14 1970 .0508 780. i1,W 26 1970 (,,31 16 .31'23 –19.14 .JUN 25 1970 .0529 693.!J) JUL 7 1970 669.36 .0970 -3.49 AUG (, 1971 ,05j 850.61 AUl 10 1971 839.59 .Ob08 -1.30 OCT 28 1971 .Oj9 f137 II) NOV 1 Y 1.) I .- i 7 C1 7.97 .0849 –4./3 MAY 4 1972 .0509 937.31 M';Y 9 1972 q!5.12 .0582 -1.30 JUN FEB 15., 197 1973 .0504 .0524 94!J.97 978.40 JUL 20 1'f72 JUN 25 19;'3 '-110.45 809.13 .0675 .1678 3.75 –11.17 AUG 13 1973 .0501 8133.0 AUG 1973 851.90 .')608 -3.54 NOV 16 1973 .0533 B91. n flEC 5 1973 788.31 .1791 -11.56 APR 0 1974 .0533 839.9cl MAY 9 1974 79.37 .1401 -5.31 ,JUN '21 1974 .0543 815.39 OrT 4 1974 584.56 .2209 –8.31 DEC 6 1974 .0605 j77.60 lEC 6 1974 '.l760 .090 0.00 APR 4 1977 .0508 OCT 25 1977 .0529 915. 16 EIO 1 . ',4 Af'f, NOV t;,, 1977 1977 914.7 BOO.B5 .0613 .0591 –0.09 -0.09 OCI 30 1978 .0575 Bl1.85 NOV 14 1978 785.2b .0715 3.28 OCT 19 1979 .0512 814.6H NOV 7 1979 79t,I.IJ7 .0823 -2.21 -3FEB 1980 .0509 SEI' 1981 .0511 8()8.i 884.3 MAR ,7 – ' 1980 ,759.98 .1404 -12.52 As the table shows, the current figure for the new low index was first reached well before the bear-market lows in 1962, 1970, 1974, and most recently in 1980. On other occasions, toe market's decline following the first attainment of five percent has been relatively modest. A key seems to be the ultimate high achieved by the new low ratio. It reached 29 in 1962, 24 in 1966, 31 in 1970, and 22 in 1974. Declines in which the index rose only to around the eight-percent level before its reversal have tended to be mild. Since the index is an average of 14 days, it is possible to make some projections regarding its future behavior. For the next five trading days it includes relatively low readings, taken on days in mid-August when the number of daily new lows ranged around 50. With the exception of last Wednesday, most recent trading days have produced over 100 new lows. If, over the next week, the number of daily new lows can retreat to, and remain below the 100 figure, the index should top out between seven and eight percent and begin to turn down, Should new lows move up to around or through the 150 level, the 14-day average would undoubtedly move up to a figure in excess of eight percent, and we would have action not dissimilar to that which took place on the major declines in the table above. All of this is, we think, more than just statistical mumbo jumbo. It constitutes, ratoer, a quantitative way of expressing the fact that a good deal of downside momentum has now been built up. Until some sort of reversal evidence is seen, that downside momentum suggests—at least over the short term—a continued downward course for the market. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p,m.) 862.54 S & P Composite (12 00 p, m.) 120.43 Cumulative Index (9/3/81) 1066.29 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained 15, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sOI,cltollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matler IS presented merely for the convellenCE of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our Informo lion 10 be rehoble, we In no way represenl or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mlde herein Any acllon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Stott, Inc, as a corporation, and ,ts officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, posillons or trades In respect 10 any secvrttles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be d,ffere'lt from any views now or hereafter expressed H'i thl or any other nsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reglsered With the SEC as on Investmenl adVISor, may give adVice to ,Is Investment odvlOry onr! othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thl5 or In any other Issue Further Information on ony secuTity menTioned herein IS ovodabfe on request

– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMSER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE -,— – – … – It is an appropriate time, we suppose, to drag out once again the old technician's lecture about a stock's' b6ing a moving object. We have voiced this particular reminder a fair number of times over the past couple of decades, usually as an admonition to our fundamentalist brethren who persist in looking at equities largely in terms of their level rather than the direction of their motion. We have drawn the analogy to two airplanes, both at altitudes of 1,000 feet, but with one engaged in a normal takeoff and the other in a steep power dive. Quite obviously, one's level of confidence in these two moving objects is quite different. The same sort of thinking should, of course, apply to the stock market. The essential fact about the Dow Jones Industrial Average at the moment, before which flct all others pale, is that on April 27 it closed at 1024.05, and on Tuesday it closed at 851.12. Direction has been quite clearly established, and that direction is down. There is, therefore, no particular reason to get excited about the prospects for equity prices absent some fairly , clear indication that that direction may have changed. We have spent the last few issues of this letter outlining the form such evidence might take. It is probably well to reiterate that outline at this time. The one thing the market is highly unlikely to do, based on past history, is quietly turn around and begin moving slowly 'upward in an orde'rly fashion. This would be a highly uncommon aftermath in a market 'which has developed the downside momentum which this one already possesses. It is possible, of course, that that momentum could quietly dissipate and the market could form a base around current levels. However, the essential thing to remember about this process is that it would require time, a num ,. all prbility, of-.!.o-to-three months. , -,-, –If-thelrrark-m-tstolmtlom qUIetly, In otlier woras, It wouIa maIl prooaolhe the enaOf 1981 or even later before any meaningful upside move took place. A greater likelihood, of course, is the kind of climactic washout bottom that we have been discussing in this space over the past couple of months. Evidence of a meaningful selling climax would include a number of events so far distinguished by their total absence, including a rise in volume significantly above the 40-million-or-so-share level that has characterized recent trading sessions. About the only comment one can make on the likelihood of a selling climax at this time, is that the preconditions for such action may already be in place. Leaving aside the question of the level at which'Umight occur, it would be entirely consistent with past history for a meaningful low to take place within a matter of a few weeks. We discussed last week the fact that the new-low index had entered into what can historically be considered oversold territory. Such occurrences have preceded lows in the market by an average of 18 trading days in the past. Since the penetration in this case first took place on September 2, an ultimate low for the Dow occuring anytime between now and the end of the month would not be histOrically unusual. Likewise, almost all major market lows in the past 30 years have been preceded by a number of days on which 80 or more of all issues traded declined. The reader should be warned that there have been known to occur as many as three repetitions of such an occurrence. Nonetheless, the first instance of an 80 downside day has invariably been within 30 trading days of the ultimate low. The first such occurrence in this case was on August 24, and thirty trading days from that date again brings us to the end of the month. As far as reversal evidence is concerned, then, the stage has been set but the curtain has not been lifted. It is also worth remembering that preconditions such as these which exist ,at the present time have often occurred at levels considerably higher than the lows ultimately reached.While it is difficult to becomeoptimistic about the near-term prospect for stock prices, a resolution of the current decline could — from a time point-of-view — very possibly not be too far away. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1100 a.m.) 863.11 S & P Composite (11 00 a. m. ) 120.27 Cumulative Index (9/10/81) 1051. 70 No statement or expression of OPiniOn or any other matter herein contOined 1, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the sollcllahon 01 on offer to buy or ,ell any security referred 10 or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convef'U!nCfi 01 the subscrober Whde JIe believe the sources of our mformo lion 10 be reliable, we m no way represent or guorantce the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe slalemenJs mude herem Any acllon to be taken by the suoscnber should be based on hiS own mvestilatlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporallon, and ,ts officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSitions or trades m respect to any securities mentioned HI Ih,s or any fulure Issue, and such position may be different from any VICS now or hereafter exprcss..d 10 thn or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Sott, Inc. which Is reglslered ,th Ihe SEC as on tnvestment adVisor, may gl….e ad….lce 10 Its Investment adVisory ann olhel C'Ustomer Independently of any statements mode, thiS or m any other ISSlJe Further Informotlon on any seOJrlty mentioned herein IS avaIlable on requeSI

., . TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New VORl(, STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANOE September 18, 1981 . One central.fact.of-bear markets-isthat-the.yarenot pleasant-and.,. as- is-the case with any unpleasant experience, their ultimate reversal is a consummation devoutly fo be wished It is not surprising, therefore, that, at this stage of the market downswing, investors spend a good deal of time avidly seeking portents that such a reversal is at hand. The unfortunate absence of such portents has been a recurring theme of this letter in recent weeks. One factor noticeable by its total absence has been increasing volume. There exsists a myth that reduced volume on declines is bullish, and, while this is true in certain cases, it is definitely not the case once a mature downswing is underway. Almost every major market decline in the past has experienced some degree of increasing downside volume before it came to an end. It is such an increase that has completely failed to materialize in the downswing to date. The term increasing volume is slightly difficult to quantify, since, with the increase in shares listed, volume has been in a secular uptrend for years. The almost- 8 million shares traded after the Eisenhower heart attack 25 years ago sent back offices into a dither. Today, this amount is routinely traded in the first hour. A simple tool we have used to make volume statistics comparable over time is something called the volume ratio, which is nothing more than the NYSE volume divided by its own 25-day moving average. By comparing volume with its current normal level — as expressed in the 25-day average — one gets a statistic that remains consistent over time and whose extremes can be identified.—-.Eo.rthisJarticllJarratiQ.,therecQrd,s0r.ed.iJL..May1962.JiT.aL3.19..-Any value over 2 can be considered extreme, and anything over 1. 5 moderately unusual. Yei there is distinct evidence that at least one day with a volume ratio above 1. 5 is a necessary precursor to the end of a significant market decline. If we count all downswings of 10 or more, there have been 23 important bottoms since 1949. Since the Dow is now down almost 18 from its high, whatever low is made on this decline will constitute the 24th. Of the 23 to date, no fewer than 21 have been associated with at least one day, often a number of days, where the volume ratio has risen above 1. 5. In nine cases, usually on the major declines, it rose above 2.0. To date, the highest value has been 1.25 on August 25. It is, on the record, unlikely to be sufficient. In some cases, a downside-volume increase is manifested, not by single days of heavy trading, but by protracted periods where downside volume increases slightly above the current normal level. One way of identifying such periods is to track the average level of the volume ratio for the last ten downside days. This average occasionally reaches extremes above 1.2. It has done so on only 17 occasions since 1949, and it is interesting to note that 11 of these 17 occasions have been associated with the sorts of major bottoms referred to above. The bottoms of 1949, 1953, 1957, 1962, and 1966 were all associated with such a period, and in most cases the actual market lows occurred while the 10-day average was above the 1. 2 level. Most recently the declines in the Fall of 1978 and in the Spring of 1980 also produced similar rises in downside volume. The average volume ratio for the past 10 downside days through yesterday is only 0.97, well below the level it has tended to reach at major turning points in the past. As investors are well aware, volume has recently been meandering along at around the 40-million-share level, and the 25-day average, as of yesterday, was 42.6 million shares. For the volume ratio to reach 1. 5, some 65 million shares would be necessary, and it would take volume of almost 90 million shares to produce a ratio of 2. Alternatively, it would take a number of downside days with volume well above the 55-60-million-share level to produce a 10-day average of 1. 2. Based on the historical pattern, it is unlikely that a major low will be seen before one of these phenomena occur. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (9/17/81) 841. 51 116.95 1038.26 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opinion or (lny other motter herein contOlned IS, or 15 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe sol1cllatlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referri!'d to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convemenCE of Ihe subscrrber. While we believe the sources of aUf Informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subcrlber should be based on h own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery 5011, Inc, as a corporation, and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, POSitions or trades In respect to any securilles menl10ned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereofter e)'pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery 5011, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give adVice 10 lis Investment odvl!.ofY and othel Ctlstomer Independently of any slotements mode In Ihls or In any other Issue further Information on any seCtlflly menhoned herein IS available on rcquest

'. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRlNCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBIR NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 25, 1981 Most recent issues of this letter have commented on the rather disappointing lack of tech- -'Iifcitl evidence that. thebear rifarJet whicjegah -lasCAprir is appro8.clliilg-rfs naair;- SiiIflce -irto say that no such evidence materialized in last week's trading, thus permitting us to go on to a discussion of a few other topics. It is probably scant comfort, but, in one sense at least, the 1981 weakness is, so far, not all that unusual. Many of the reasons being advanced for the market decline center, rightly or wrongly, around the uncertainties which have been created as a by-product of the new Reagan economic program. The emergence of such uncertainties, along with consequent stock-market disarray, however, is eminently consistent with past history. The market is currently down a bit over nine percent from its level just prior to the election, and, as we demonstrated in this space two weeks prior to that election, this performance is not atypical J)f the 20 years following presidential elections since 1900. The market has been down by an amount greater than nine percent in eight of these years and has been lower or essentially unchanged in eleven. The average performance over oneyear periods following elections is significantly lower than the average for all years, and there is an established tendency for the market to do less well whan a new party is installed in the White House. Since the Reagan ascendency has produced economic policy changes perhaps more radical than previous shifts of the party in power, it is not surprising, except perhaps to certain Senators, that the market's response to these shifts should be accentuated. The most unusual condition accompanying the present economic climate is obviously the record-high level of interest rates. It is of course possible to view these levels as an opportunity as well as a depressant. It is certainly an arguable premise that bonds, at their current bizarre prices, offer the possibility of an unprecendently generous return. Viewed solely in terms of its current level, in comparison with historical figures, the long bond market can certainly be said at .-I-present—toOffer-ne-of–the-more-interesting-opportunities-n–the-presenbfinancial-scene–.– .,—I– We of course cautioned in this space just recently against viewing the price of any financial asset solely in terms of its level. We suspect that part of the present trouble in the bond market is that many participants have learned this lesson the hard way in the past few years. They may indeed have learned it too well. Many bond-market investors appear only to be aware that that market's direction has been due southeast for all too many years and that supposedly safe bond investments have demonstrated a disquieting tendency to produce not safety, but substantial capital losses. This realization may explain the fact that current bond offerings find few takers, despite the prospect that their return, by historical standards, must be considered almost profligate. If the current level of bond prices accomplishes anything, it may be the laying-to-rest of the rather simplistic notion that bond yields consist of some theoretical real interest rate plus a premium for anticipated inflation. The market pricing of bonds just as that of stocks is, we suspect, a great deal more complicated than that. A major factor, just as it is in stocks, is probably investor confidence, and the only way we have discovered of tracing that elusive factor is via technical analysis. In this sort of environment it is probably no accident that, in more rarified investment circles, interest in technical analysis as applied to bonds has been growing by leaps and bounds. We suspect this will be an ongoing trend, regardless of what the bond market may do in the future. As we noted above, it is quite possible to make a bullish case for bonds at current levels. There is only one trouble with this contention. Based on the record, if bond prices are to do better over the rext year or so, the correct investment course is to buy — not bonds but stocks. Of the 452 months since 1944, 193 ended with bonds higher than they had been a year before. However, of these 193 months, stocks were also up over the same one-year period in 154 of them and down in onJy 39. In 139 of these 154 months stocks did better than bonds. Indeed the average change in the Dow Jones Industrial Average for all 12-month periods in which bonds were up was 11. 2, which is almost twice the average change in this century for all one-year periods. Indeed, in the periods in which both bonds and stocks rose, the average change in the Dow-JonesIndustrials was almost 8t times as great as the change in the Dow-Jones Bond Averages. In this sense, at least, the obsession with lower interest rates as a necessary precursor to the end of the stock price decline makes some sense. An improving bond market, if one can be foreseen, would be one of the best arguments for the approach of a stock market bottom. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DBLAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m. ) 825.82 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 113.37 Cumulative Index (9/24/81) 1097.89 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter hereIn contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or 'nd,rectly, an offer or the soliCitatIon of an offer to buy or sell any ecuflty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the ConVellenCe of the subSCriber WhIle lie believe the sources tlf our InformatIon to be rel,oble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stalements mude herem Any actIon to be taken by the subscrIber should be baed on hll own Invesllgallon and informatIOn Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and lIS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later laKe, pOltlons or trades In respect to any sewr,l,es mentIoned In thIS or ony future Issue, and such pOSItIOn may be different /rom ony vIews now or hereofter expressed In thIS or ony other ISlJe Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh 15 reglMered WIth the SEC as an Investment odvlsor, may gIve adVICe to Its Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements made rn th,s or III any other ,ssue Further IIlformotron on any securrty menttaned herem 15 available on rcqvelit

.- i TABELL1S MARKET .' , LETTER goe STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYla'ON OF MEMBER HEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMEFueAN STOCK EXCHANGe October 2, 1981 There has been enough apocalyptic comment on the international imancial scene of late that It Is perhaps advisable to restate our own stock-market opinion in as dispassionate a form as possible. That opinion is as follows 1. We do not view the past five months' market weakness as the beginning of the decline of western civilization. 2. We confess to no knowledge whatsoever as to what particular day will turn out to be the worst one of the present decline. 3. We think the stock market Is likely to head lower. The last Item Is the only possibly useful piece of information in the triad. and we have tried to arrive at that conclusion as rationally as possible. It is based on the sort of reasoning we have been setting forth in this space for the past couple of months. This particular hypothesis takes cognizance of the fact that the market Is, by historical standards, in a deeply oversold technical position. It however notes that declines, once they have become severe as this one has, generally signal their effective bottom by producing a selling climax of the classical form. Such a climax remains noticably absent In recent trading, even last Monday's rather bizarre trading session, in which the market reversed directions four different times during the day. It is of course possible, although not, on the record, probable, that the market could bottom without producing the usual climactic symptoms. Evidence that it had done so, however, would come, not in the form of an instant reversal, but out of a long period of base-building and building up of underlying technical strength. We think it advisable at this point, therefore, to maintain a cautious attitude. Readers will note that the above reasoning, along with most of what influences our current thinking. is based on purely statistical grounds, i.e., on technical analysis of the market's recent action. This is the only area of expertise we claim, and it is presumably this expertise for which our clients are paying us. We presume our readers have not the slightest interest in our political views on whether or not equity-market weakness heralds the collapse of Reagan economics. We admit we do not have the slightest Idea of whether or not this Is the case, and we suspect that most of the commentstors who have taken a firm view, pro or con. on the question are reflecting their own bias, rather than any firmlygrounded opinion. In other words, in our view, the recent linkage between politics and the stock market is unfortunate, albeit somewhat amusing. The amusing part lies in the nature of some of the comments arising on the Washington scene. DemOQratic critics of the President, hardly known in the past as avid admirers of Wall Street, seem to have taken to viewing the New York Stock Exchange as the latter-day reincarnation of the Temple of Delphi. Wall Street in its onmlsclent wisdom, we are being told, Is informing us that the Republican economic program is fated to failure. Possibly It is our short memory, but we do not recall any of the gentlemen who are espousing this view telling us, back in 1962, that President Kennedy's economic policy of not allowing the steel industry to raise prices was ill-advised, this policy, of course, being the popularly-accepted reason for that year's market 'collapse. Not that the Republican response has been any more intelligent. Avid supporters of the free market, one would think, could express that support in better ways than petulantly accusing the stock market of lack of patriotism in failing to snap to attention and fall respectfully into line behind the leadership of the new economics. All that this parade of rather vacuous commentary proves, we suspect, Is that the banks of the Potomac continue to be a poor vantage point for viewing what goes on in lower Manhattan. To anyone who has spent a career observing Wall Street, of course, the Idea that it possesses some sort of orscular wisdom Is nothing short of laughable. The market, as technicians have long been aware, Is the distillation of collective emotions, and emotion, however admirable a quality It may be in certain aspects, tends to get in the way when it comes to forecasting. We hsve cited in the past a few previous occasions when Wall Street has unmistskdly expressed its collective wisdom. One such piece of wisdom from the late 1940's was the certainty of s post-war depression, which certainty caused blue- chip stocks to become available at yields three times those offered by marginal bonds. Another brilliant piece of conventional stock-market wisdom was the early-1970's belief that the earnings, and therefore the prices, of high-grade growth stocks were going to go on compounding forever into the infinite future,thus produaing an elite class of one-decision stocks. When the late Fiorello LaGuardia admitted that when I make a mistake, its a beaut , he could very well have been talking sbout Wall Street conventional wisdom. ' We think the greatest mistake the investor could make at the present juncture would be to pay a great deal of attention to widely-heralded economic forecasts, especially when those forecasts represent some sort of vested political interest. We suspect the very uncertainty of the economic climate at this stage is a major contributor to the stock-market malaise. and, reflecting our own bias as stock-mar'ket technicians, we suspect that the market will. as It has in the past. give Its own signals that this uncertainty has become fully discounted. We will attempt to comment on such signsla as they occur. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 857.12 S P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 118.29 Cumulative Index (l0/1/81) 1016.17 ANTHONY W. TAELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No 51clement or CICpreulol'l of opinion or any other matter here,n tOnlcllned Is, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dHettly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe lollcltollon of on offer 10 bvy or sell onr. SeCUrity referred 10 or mentioned The moiler presented merely for Ihe converlenCE of Ihe ubstrlber Whlle..,e believe Ihe Ol)rces of our Informolion 10 be rehab e, we In no way represent or guarantee the OCturocy thereof nOf of the stolernenls mude herein Any oct.OI'l to be taken by the sub5Cflber should be based on hIS own Investigation ond information Jonl'ley Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as 0 corpO'Ollon, and lIS officers or employees, moy now have, or may 10ler toke, POSitlClI'IS or trades In respect 10 any securnles mentioned In IhlS or ony future ISsue, and suen PO;ltlon may be different from any views now or hereafter c.-pressed In Ihl!. or any other luue Janney Montgomery Sco, Inc, which IS registered With Ihc SEC as on Investment odvisor, may give odvlce 10 lIS Inve!.lment advlsQry and otnel evsl.omers Indendently of any Sloleme'lfs mode It'I 1'IIS or It'I onyother Inlle Fllrt),er mformot,oll on o'lY senmll' mt'nlloned herein U ovolloble on requesl

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER L .' B09 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW .JERSEY 08540 MEMBe NEW VORl( STOCK EXCH.t….QE. INC MEMBER AM ERIC'''' STOCK EXCHANoe October 9, 1981 Saint Paul reminds us that our perception of eschatology is through R glass 1arkly, and so it is with our knowledge of the stock msrket-. If the technician can be of assi!ltance -in the process of thinking about the market, it is often in setting out a few guidepots to help point the way through the rather murky landscape of day-to-day market fluctuations. ' , When the market closed two weeks ago today, it was possible to make one statement with a fair degree of assurance — that we were in a bear market, the eighth cycle bear market, as a matter of fact, in the post-World-War-U- period. This assertion couId be made by virtue of the fact that the DJIA had closed at 824.01, down 19.5 from Its April 27th closing high of 1024.05. Both the extent and the length of the decline qualified it for the bear-market appellation. The percentage drop had been greater than any Intermediate downswing in the past 30 yearll, especially the recent intermediateterm corrections of Fall 1978, Fall 1979, and Spring 1980, which.were 13.5, 11.2 and 16.0 respectively. Those declines had been fewer than 50 days long, while the present drop had gone on, as of a fortnight ago for 106 days. A cycle bear market beginning in 1981, moreover, fit rather neatly into the conventional, long-observed, four-year cycle pattern. This certainty existed two weeks ago. Since that time, the Dow has rallied 5.57 over a nineday period through Thursdays close, and two interpretations become possible. The first is that the aforementioned cyclical downswing came to an end on September 24th, and we now imd ourselves in what history will ultimately identify as a new bull market. The second is that the present rally will eventually run its course followed by the achievement of new lows. In other words. if the bear market which began last April still exists, then the last two weeks constitute part of a bear-market rally. The following table gives some figures on the seven previous bear markets plus the recent one. It can, perhaps. aid us in our thinking. Bear Market Change DJIA Length in Days No. of Rallies Average Rally Length Change in Days Longest RallI Length Change in Days 1/5/53 – 9/14/53 -13.04 176 3 3.88 24 5.27 42 7/12/57 – 10/22/57 -19.39 71 3 2.56 4 3.40 5 12/13161 – 6126162 -27.10 134 4 4.05 9 4.87 32 2/9/66 – 1017/66 -25.21 167 5 4.01 11 5.09 26 12/3168 – 5/26170 -35.94 367 11 4.35 15 7.59 40 1/11/73 – 12/6/74 -45.07 481 24 5.73 8 15.86 46 9/21/76 – 2/28/78 -26.87 362 13 3.64 14 8.72 35 4/27/81 – -19.53 106 3 3.57 12 5.04 24 'to date It must be noted first of all that the current downswing is rather short as compared to its predecessors. It has gone on for only 106 days, a shorter period than any bear market since 1957. There Is, moreover, some argument sbout dating the top of that downswing. The sctual Dow high was made in April 1956, and if that top is accepted, the market drop lasted s fun 389 days. History would seem to suggest that the current beast is somewhat short of msturity. The remainder of the table explores past rallies within bear markets. The present downswing has had three intermediate rallies since April, the longest one being the 24-day, May-June advance of just over 5. The present rally, if it Is a bear-msrket advance, will be the fourth. As we have noted in the past, through 1966 the bear-market rally was sort of a mythical beast. For the first four bear markets in the table, there were only between three and five such rallies. Since 1966, however, things have changed. The last three bear markets have hsd 11, 24, and 13 Identifiable rallies. respectively. Rallies of weIl over 5, lasting more than 40 days have not been uncommon. To expect that the current process will complete itself with only three rallies, and relatively short ones at that. would perhaps be unrealistic. What we are saying, of course, is that the current upswing, impressive as it may seem, is not at all Inconsistent with the history of past sdvances within major downswings. It could even progress a bit further, and indeed has the technical potential to do so without exceeding these historical parameters. It is conceivable. of course, that further evidence of market strength might suggest. by hindsight, that a major bear-market low was achieved on September 24th. We do not think, however, that there is evidence for such a suggestion at the present time. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 874.43 S I Com';)osite (1200 p.m.) 121. 85 Cumulative Index (10/8/81) 1068.45 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTors No Itatemen, or expressIon of opInion or any olher matter herem conrolned Is, or 11 to be deemed fa be, d,reC1ly or IndneC1Ir,' on offer or the solleltaf,on of on offer to bvy or sell any, security referred to or mentioned The malter ., prelienied merely for the conver,enn of the lubSCflber Wh, e ….e bel'eve the lOurce, of our Information to be rehab e, we In no way tepresenl or guarantee the accuracy thereaf nor of Ihe slorements mude herein Any oC1lon 10 be laken by the subscriber should be based on h own Inves1igahon and Information Janney MonTgomery ScOl!, Inc, 01 a corporation, and Its off.cers or emplovees, may now have, or may later lake, poslhons 01 trodes In respect To ony curilies menhoned m Thh or any fuTure ,ssue, and such poSlhon may be ddferent from ony views now or hereafter eplessed In Ihls or any other ,ssue Janney Montgomery Scan, Inc, whlOch ' registered w,th the SEC as on ,nyestment odylsor, may g'y!! adVice to liS ,nvestment adVISOry and othel cvllOmerl Independently of any slolements mode In this or In ony other ,nu!! FUrTher Information on ony ,!!curlly menllOned herein 1 available on request