Viewing Month: October 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 02, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 02, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - October 02, 1981
View Text Version (OCR)

.- i TABELL1S MARKET .' , LETTER goe STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYla'ON OF MEMBER HEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMEFueAN STOCK EXCHANGe October 2, 1981 There has been enough apocalyptic comment on the international imancial scene of late that It Is perhaps advisable to restate our own stock-market opinion in as dispassionate a form as possible. That opinion is as follows 1. We do not view the past five months' market weakness as the beginning of the decline of western civilization. 2. We confess to no knowledge whatsoever as to what particular day will turn out to be the worst one of the present decline. 3. We think the stock market Is likely to head lower. The last Item Is the only possibly useful piece of information in the triad. and we have tried to arrive at that conclusion as rationally as possible. It is based on the sort of reasoning we have been setting forth in this space for the past couple of months. This particular hypothesis takes cognizance of the fact that the market Is, by historical standards, in a deeply oversold technical position. It however notes that declines, once they have become severe as this one has, generally signal their effective bottom by producing a selling climax of the classical form. Such a climax remains noticably absent In recent trading, even last Monday's rather bizarre trading session, in which the market reversed directions four different times during the day. It is of course possible, although not, on the record, probable, that the market could bottom without producing the usual climactic symptoms. Evidence that it had done so, however, would come, not in the form of an instant reversal, but out of a long period of base-building and building up of underlying technical strength. We think it advisable at this point, therefore, to maintain a cautious attitude. Readers will note that the above reasoning, along with most of what influences our current thinking. is based on purely statistical grounds, i.e., on technical analysis of the market's recent action. This is the only area of expertise we claim, and it is presumably this expertise for which our clients are paying us. We presume our readers have not the slightest interest in our political views on whether or not equity-market weakness heralds the collapse of Reagan economics. We admit we do not have the slightest Idea of whether or not this Is the case, and we suspect that most of the commentstors who have taken a firm view, pro or con. on the question are reflecting their own bias, rather than any firmlygrounded opinion. In other words, in our view, the recent linkage between politics and the stock market is unfortunate, albeit somewhat amusing. The amusing part lies in the nature of some of the comments arising on the Washington scene. DemOQratic critics of the President, hardly known in the past as avid admirers of Wall Street, seem to have taken to viewing the New York Stock Exchange as the latter-day reincarnation of the Temple of Delphi. Wall Street in its onmlsclent wisdom, we are being told, Is informing us that the Republican economic program is fated to failure. Possibly It is our short memory, but we do not recall any of the gentlemen who are espousing this view telling us, back in 1962, that President Kennedy's economic policy of not allowing the steel industry to raise prices was ill-advised, this policy, of course, being the popularly-accepted reason for that year's market 'collapse. Not that the Republican response has been any more intelligent. Avid supporters of the free market, one would think, could express that support in better ways than petulantly accusing the stock market of lack of patriotism in failing to snap to attention and fall respectfully into line behind the leadership of the new economics. All that this parade of rather vacuous commentary proves, we suspect, Is that the banks of the Potomac continue to be a poor vantage point for viewing what goes on in lower Manhattan. To anyone who has spent a career observing Wall Street, of course, the Idea that it possesses some sort of orscular wisdom Is nothing short of laughable. The market, as technicians have long been aware, Is the distillation of collective emotions, and emotion, however admirable a quality It may be in certain aspects, tends to get in the way when it comes to forecasting. We hsve cited in the past a few previous occasions when Wall Street has unmistskdly expressed its collective wisdom. One such piece of wisdom from the late 1940's was the certainty of s post-war depression, which certainty caused blue- chip stocks to become available at yields three times those offered by marginal bonds. Another brilliant piece of conventional stock-market wisdom was the early-1970's belief that the earnings, and therefore the prices, of high-grade growth stocks were going to go on compounding forever into the infinite future,thus produaing an elite class of one-decision stocks. When the late Fiorello LaGuardia admitted that when I make a mistake, its a beaut , he could very well have been talking sbout Wall Street conventional wisdom. ' We think the greatest mistake the investor could make at the present juncture would be to pay a great deal of attention to widely-heralded economic forecasts, especially when those forecasts represent some sort of vested political interest. We suspect the very uncertainty of the economic climate at this stage is a major contributor to the stock-market malaise. and, reflecting our own bias as stock-mar'ket technicians, we suspect that the market will. as It has in the past. give Its own signals that this uncertainty has become fully discounted. We will attempt to comment on such signsla as they occur. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 857.12 S P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 118.29 Cumulative Index (l0/1/81) 1016.17 ANTHONY W. TAELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No 51clement or CICpreulol'l of opinion or any other matter here,n tOnlcllned Is, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dHettly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe lollcltollon of on offer 10 bvy or sell onr. SeCUrity referred 10 or mentioned The moiler presented merely for Ihe converlenCE of Ihe ubstrlber Whlle..,e believe Ihe Ol)rces of our Informolion 10 be rehab e, we In no way represent or guarantee the OCturocy thereof nOf of the stolernenls mude herein Any oct.OI'l to be taken by the sub5Cflber should be based on hIS own Investigation ond information Jonl'ley Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as 0 corpO'Ollon, and lIS officers or employees, moy now have, or may 10ler toke, POSitlClI'IS or trades In respect 10 any securnles mentioned In IhlS or ony future ISsue, and suen PO;ltlon may be different from any views now or hereafter c.-pressed In Ihl!. or any other luue Janney Montgomery Sco, Inc, which IS registered With Ihc SEC as on Investment odvisor, may give odvlce 10 lIS Inve!.lment advlsQry and otnel evsl.omers Indendently of any Sloleme'lfs mode It'I 1'IIS or It'I onyother Inlle Fllrt),er mformot,oll on o'lY senmll' mt'nlloned herein U ovolloble on requesl

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 09, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 09, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - October 09, 1981
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER L .' B09 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW .JERSEY 08540 MEMBe NEW VORl( STOCK EXCH.t….QE. INC MEMBER AM ERIC'''' STOCK EXCHANoe October 9, 1981 Saint Paul reminds us that our perception of eschatology is through R glass 1arkly, and so it is with our knowledge of the stock msrket-. If the technician can be of assi!ltance -in the process of thinking about the market, it is often in setting out a few guidepots to help point the way through the rather murky landscape of day-to-day market fluctuations. ' , When the market closed two weeks ago today, it was possible to make one statement with a fair degree of assurance — that we were in a bear market, the eighth cycle bear market, as a matter of fact, in the post-World-War-U- period. This assertion couId be made by virtue of the fact that the DJIA had closed at 824.01, down 19.5 from Its April 27th closing high of 1024.05. Both the extent and the length of the decline qualified it for the bear-market appellation. The percentage drop had been greater than any Intermediate downswing in the past 30 yearll, especially the recent intermediateterm corrections of Fall 1978, Fall 1979, and Spring 1980, which.were 13.5, 11.2 and 16.0 respectively. Those declines had been fewer than 50 days long, while the present drop had gone on, as of a fortnight ago for 106 days. A cycle bear market beginning in 1981, moreover, fit rather neatly into the conventional, long-observed, four-year cycle pattern. This certainty existed two weeks ago. Since that time, the Dow has rallied 5.57 over a nineday period through Thursdays close, and two interpretations become possible. The first is that the aforementioned cyclical downswing came to an end on September 24th, and we now imd ourselves in what history will ultimately identify as a new bull market. The second is that the present rally will eventually run its course followed by the achievement of new lows. In other words. if the bear market which began last April still exists, then the last two weeks constitute part of a bear-market rally. The following table gives some figures on the seven previous bear markets plus the recent one. It can, perhaps. aid us in our thinking. Bear Market Change DJIA Length in Days No. of Rallies Average Rally Length Change in Days Longest RallI Length Change in Days 1/5/53 – 9/14/53 -13.04 176 3 3.88 24 5.27 42 7/12/57 – 10/22/57 -19.39 71 3 2.56 4 3.40 5 12/13161 – 6126162 -27.10 134 4 4.05 9 4.87 32 2/9/66 – 1017/66 -25.21 167 5 4.01 11 5.09 26 12/3168 – 5/26170 -35.94 367 11 4.35 15 7.59 40 1/11/73 – 12/6/74 -45.07 481 24 5.73 8 15.86 46 9/21/76 – 2/28/78 -26.87 362 13 3.64 14 8.72 35 4/27/81 – -19.53 106 3 3.57 12 5.04 24 'to date It must be noted first of all that the current downswing is rather short as compared to its predecessors. It has gone on for only 106 days, a shorter period than any bear market since 1957. There Is, moreover, some argument sbout dating the top of that downswing. The sctual Dow high was made in April 1956, and if that top is accepted, the market drop lasted s fun 389 days. History would seem to suggest that the current beast is somewhat short of msturity. The remainder of the table explores past rallies within bear markets. The present downswing has had three intermediate rallies since April, the longest one being the 24-day, May-June advance of just over 5. The present rally, if it Is a bear-msrket advance, will be the fourth. As we have noted in the past, through 1966 the bear-market rally was sort of a mythical beast. For the first four bear markets in the table, there were only between three and five such rallies. Since 1966, however, things have changed. The last three bear markets have hsd 11, 24, and 13 Identifiable rallies. respectively. Rallies of weIl over 5, lasting more than 40 days have not been uncommon. To expect that the current process will complete itself with only three rallies, and relatively short ones at that. would perhaps be unrealistic. What we are saying, of course, is that the current upswing, impressive as it may seem, is not at all Inconsistent with the history of past sdvances within major downswings. It could even progress a bit further, and indeed has the technical potential to do so without exceeding these historical parameters. It is conceivable. of course, that further evidence of market strength might suggest. by hindsight, that a major bear-market low was achieved on September 24th. We do not think, however, that there is evidence for such a suggestion at the present time. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 874.43 S I Com';)osite (1200 p.m.) 121. 85 Cumulative Index (10/8/81) 1068.45 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTors No Itatemen, or expressIon of opInion or any olher matter herem conrolned Is, or 11 to be deemed fa be, d,reC1ly or IndneC1Ir,' on offer or the solleltaf,on of on offer to bvy or sell any, security referred to or mentioned The malter ., prelienied merely for the conver,enn of the lubSCflber Wh, e ….e bel'eve the lOurce, of our Information to be rehab e, we In no way tepresenl or guarantee the accuracy thereaf nor of Ihe slorements mude herein Any oC1lon 10 be laken by the subscriber should be based on h own Inves1igahon and Information Janney MonTgomery ScOl!, Inc, 01 a corporation, and Its off.cers or emplovees, may now have, or may later lake, poslhons 01 trodes In respect To ony curilies menhoned m Thh or any fuTure ,ssue, and such poSlhon may be ddferent from ony views now or hereafter eplessed In Ihls or any other ,ssue Janney Montgomery Scan, Inc, whlOch ' registered w,th the SEC as on ,nyestment odylsor, may g'y!! adVice to liS ,nvestment adVISOry and othel cvllOmerl Independently of any slolements mode In this or In ony other ,nu!! FUrTher Information on ony ,!!curlly menllOned herein 1 available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 16, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 16, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - October 16, 1981
View Text Version (OCR)

,, I TABELL'S QOD STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 081540 DIYle'ON 0 …eMBI! NIW VOJIIK STOCK EXCHANGE,INC. M'''BI'' AMlfltlCAN ITOCK EKCHANQI!! October 16, 1981 We ,used this spsceJast week to try to make a number .of pointll . The first was that .. by a number of measurements, the process which began on April 27th of this year qualified as the eighth cycle bear market in Post-World-War-ll history. We went on to suggest that that bear market, which, through September 25th when It posted a low of 824.01 on the DJIA, had lasted 106 trading days, was, to date, rather short by historical standards. In fsct, we noted, all of the seven bear markets had gone on for considerably longer periods. We further pointed out that the rally which began on September 26th, reaching its high to date in a 6.57 . rise to 878.14 on October 8th, was not inconsistent with rallies which had taken place within the context of previous bear markets. That same point can be made in a number of other ways. By way of proving that technical analysis is not all that complex, bear markets can be defined, quite simply, as strings of consecutive trading days, on which either (a) a new low is made, or (b) a new low ia not made. One way Ten-Days or Longer Periods Bear Market No New Lows 1/5/53 – 9/14/53 5 7/12/57 – 10/22/57 1 12/31/61 – 6126162 2 2/9166 – 1017/66 3 12/3/68 – 5126/70 5 1/11/73 – 12/6/74 7 9121/76 – 2/28/78 8 4/27/81 – 3 Largest No. of Consecutive Days No New Lows 53 17 51 46 87 146 96 36 of viewing market history since September 26th ia as a string of 16 consecutive days which fall into the second category. It 1s the third period of 10 days or longer without a new low since the downswing began, the longest being the 36 t\'ading days from May 12 to July 1. The table at left shows the number of such periods in past bear markets. As can be seen, recent downswings, especially 1973-4 and 1976-8 have had considerably more 1D-day-or-greater inter- ruptions than this market has had to date. Furthermore, the interruptions have tended to be longer. The table also shows the largest number of consecutive days without a new low . in each of the past seven bear markets. With the exception of 1957, each one has featured at least one considerably longer interruption during which time no new low for the downswing was posted. The table at right views past bear markets in another aspect. -It lists, for each downswing, the number of periods of consecutive new lows Posted within that downswing. In the present case, there have been 12 such periods since last . Total Largest Periods of Days-New Swing . Consec. Lows Low-to- Bear Market New Lows Posted Low April. As can be seen; the three most recent bear markets each had more than 20 periods consisting of one or more consecutive days where a new low was posted. The total number of days during the downswing on which a new low was posted 1s also of interest. We have had 26 such days to date ,somewhat less than 1/5/53 – 9/14/53 7/12/57 -10122/57 12113161 – 6126162 2/9166 – 1017/66 12/3/68 – 5126/70 1/11/73 – 12/6/74 9121/76 – 2/28/78 4/27/81 – 12 12 12 14 23 27 29 12 23 -2.19' 28 -4.84 31 -9.94 37 -5.10 59 -7.83 64 -6.80 66 -3.12 26 -3.44 the figure achieved in past market ) drops. Finally, having defined bear I markets as a series of swings to new lows, we can measure the size of each of these swings as t market decline progresses. This size tends to build up as the downswing contines, with the larg est swing almost invariably being posted toward the end of the decline. Through 1974, most be markets produced at least one downswing of 5\-or-greater magnitude during the course of their existence. The biggest downswing, low-to-low, in this bear market has been the 3.44 drop from the. August 31 low of 881. 47 to the September 8th low of 851.12. It would be normal to expect the present decline to terminate with a drop somewhat larger than this It remsins possible, of course. that a major low was made on September 25. and that possi- bility w!ll remsin until such time as a new low is posted. It must, however, be stated, that market action since that date is totally consiatent with an interruption in an ongoing downswing process. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 854.83 S P Composite (1200 p.m.) 119.59 tumulstlve Index (10/15/81) 106.94 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL 'AWTrs No folement or exprelSion of opinion or (lny other maner herein contained I., or to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly. on offer or 1M! lollc,totlon of on offer '0 buy or ,II Clny security referred to or mentioned The motter is presented merely for the converlena of the subscriber. While oNe believe the touttes of our Informo tlon to be reliable, we In nO way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the Slatements mllde herein Any action to be lake by Ihe subscriber .hould be based on his awn Investigation ond i'ormation Janney Mo'gomery Seoll, 'c., 01 a corporoloon, ad Its office or employeu, may now have, or may lofer toke, posilions Of trades In respect to ay secUrities menhoned ' thiS or any future issue, and IVch POSITion may be different from any views now Or hereafter expreued In this or any olher ISlve Janney Montgomery cott, Inc. which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVISor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry Clnd otn anTomers Independently of any Itotement, mode In thll Of In any other Inve. FVMher Information on ony securiTy menhoned herein 15 ovclliable on reqvest

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 23, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 23, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - October 23, 1981
View Text Version (OCR)

f TABELL'S i MARKET … -..,' I LETTER I 809 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. HEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBE' NEW YO STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. ME'BEA AMEfIlICN iIlTOeK f!ItCHAfrtOE October 23. 1981 We have been arguing in this space for the last few weeks that the downswing which has characterized most of 1981 so far probably constitutes the eighth cycle bear market of the post-World-War-II stock-market era. . f we .ar correct. it can then be recognz.ed as the downward phase of a typical four-year stock market cycle which began on March 6. 1978. We first tentatively Identified this date on April 14. 1978. sbout a month after its occurrence, and the chart below is an updated version of one that appeared on June 27. 1980, just before the major averages moved on to their recent highs. We think that the current version demonstrates how neatly (perhaps too neatly) the recent stock market fits into the four-year cycle pattern. NO 1968 SEP 1976 JRN 1973 J 1953 UL 1957 DEC 1961 FEB 1966 SEP 1 MAR 1 SEP 2 1961 OCT 196CT OCT 1 The chart is drawn to a uniform horizontal scale, and the lower Une shows the recent cycle with its major component swings in the S P 500 from March, 1978 to the low of September 25. The other dsta on the chart attempts to relate the present cycle to previous ones. The horizontal Unes in the middle of the chart, as an example, show the length, in trsding days, of each of the seven previous completed cycles. A comparison of the length of these Unes to the current cycle shows that this one (900 daya through September 25) has already lasted longer than the 1974-78 cycle (863 days) and the 1962-66 cycle (885 days). The others, however, were all considerably longer and the average length for seven previous cycles is 1,043 dsys which would call for the present downswing to bottom sometime in April, 1982. The dates across the top of the chart show the relative position of each high point in the pre- vious cycles. As can be seen, even measured to November 28 when the S P made its high. the preseT cycle has produced a longer advancing phase than either of the last three. The advancing phase turned out to be somewhat shorter than the comparable phase of the four earlier cycles, although less so if one uses the March-April high, when the Dow and a number of other indices in contrast to the S P 500 scored their bull-market pesks. What is germane at the moment of course, is trying to pinpoint the level of the next low. Th. dates at the right hand side of the chart show the relative levels of each of the previous seven lows based on percentage decline from their respective highs. As can be seen, the current decline (19.75) has already exceeded those of 1953 (13) and 1978 (19.4) and is about equal to the 1957 (21.6) and the 1966 (22.1) declines. It stU! falls considerably short of the 1961-62, 1968-70, and the 1973-74 drops. Were one of the three latter declines to be equaled it would be possible for the S P to drop a further 10 or 20 or 35 respectively, from its September 25 low to 101, 90. or 73 versus its recent level arour 11'. .Fo!' various reasons we regard the latter eventuality ss highly unlikely. Something on the order of the 196 or 1970 declines, however,would not, we think, be totally out of the question. Dow-Jones I,ndustrials (1200 p.m. 840.85 S 6 P Composite (1200 p.m.) 1l8.93 Cumulative Index (10/22/81) 1064.52 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No clement Of eJq)reulon of opinion or any other motter here.n contolned b, or Il to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndtrectl'l, on offer or the 1011(11011011 of on offer to hl.Jyor noll anr. leoJflty referred to or menlioned The molter If pre.enled merely for 1M- convleme of Ine Subscnber, Willie He believe the source, of OUf .nformation to be lellob e, we in no way ,epreSl,' or guorol\lee the C1'UrOty thereof nor of the Iloteroel'lh. mude here.n. Any action to be token by the lubCTlber should be bOled on hi' own invetlgaflon ond /nformollotl jann1Y MOlHgomery ScOtf, Inc. 0 (I corpora'ron, and III a/hee or mpJoyeeJ, may ow hov, or mol' loter tDkt!', poSItions or trodes In respett to emy leeulihes mentloed In thIS DI ony fUlure Issue, and Ivth pCSITlon IT'oOy be different from any views nC)W or hereafter expressed In thIS or any OfheI ,uue Janney Montgomery Scooff, (nc , which II registered w.th Ihe SEC OJ on Investment adVisor, may give odvlCe to IfS (fTvestment odw'Ory ond othCr !Vstomer, ITldendently of ony slOlementl mode In thn 01 In ony other .uue FUrlhet ,iormohon on ony setunty mentioned here, I, ovolloble on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 30, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 30, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - October 30, 1981
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVl810N OF MEM9EA NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE ,.,. ………. -, Ootober 30. 1981 One of the less attractive sOcial phenomena of our, time has come to be called psycho- babble. It can be defined as the common usage. by large numbers of people. of the jargon of psychology. despite the fact that these users possess almost no knowledge of the discipline in question and have certainly not taken the time to do ahytJUng so' radical as. say. read Freud. Undeterred by almost total ignorance. psycho-babble addicts go on routinely tossing words like adjustment. crisis. role model. and peer group into everyday conversat10n. Technical analysis of the stock market remains. thank heaven. somewhat less trendy than psychoanalysis. but something which may well be becomingtechm-babble is beginning to emerge. Recent pronouncements on the stock market have not been without reference to selling climaxes. usually without the betrayal of any awareness of precisely what constitutes such a climax. With the market having behaved as it has over the past month. we are also beginning to hear about tests of the lows. It is therefore possibly worth expanding on what we have been saying on this subject for the past few weeks. Much of the babble about such a test arises from the fact that the Dow Jones Indus- trial Average last posted a new low on September 25 at 824.01 and subsequently rose 6l over a nine-day period to 878.14 on October 8. It then began a decline for which the low. so far. is 830.96 on October 26. This decline was subsequently interrupted by a mild rally. In the Dow. at least. the market again found itself this week moving toward the September 25 low. although it must be noted the Standard Poor 500 at around 119 remains well above its compa- rable figure of 112. 77. Now out of this configuration two sorts of pattern can conceivably emerge. The first. and simplest. is that the Dow will, before too long. move decisively below the 824 level. We can then siinply identify the cycle bear market which began last Spring as an ongoing phe- nomenon. Unplessant as this may be for the investor. it will at least possess the virtue of presenting an orderly and recognized configuration to the market analyst. Paradoxically. from a longer-term point of view. it may also be the most bullish. We have operated for some time on the theory that the potentiality for lower market levels exists. Under such conditions it is often best to get the dreary business over with so that we can. with some confidence. get on to the next bull market. The alternative possibility. of course .is that the lows Df Selltember 25 will continue to hold. This might even be followed by a fairly significant rally attempt. Indeed. the potential currently exists for such a rally to carry as far as the low 900's on the Dow. Emergence of such a rally would undoubtedly be accompanied by an outpouring of techno-babble about a successful test. The trouble is it wouldn't mean very much. Unfortunstely. all that a rally at this stage would do is exhaust the potential of the minor base which currently exists and leave the market vulnerable to further decline. In short. we do not see. at the moment. the sort of pattern Which would support anything other than an intermediate-scale rally within an ongoing cycle downswing. . As we have been pointing out in recent issues. this sort of interruption has become a more and more common happening in recent years. On December 5. 1973. for example. the DJIA reached a low of 788.31. a decline of 25 from its January 1973 high. as compared to the current decline of 19.5 in the Dow to date. By January. 1974 it had rallied almost 100 points to 880. It then declined, exceeded that high in March. 1974 and posted a series of irregular rallies and declines which did not culminate in another new low until July 8. six months after the initial low was posted. From that point, of course. it proceeded to shed another 200 points. Phenomena not unlike the first half of 1973 also took plsce during the 1976-78 and 1968-70 bear markets. In the light of this record. we Imd ourselves unable to wax ecstatic over a test of the lows that has so far remained successful for a bit over one month. nor would we be impres- sed by the sort of rally which might emerge from such a test. A bullish pattern can arise from the current configuration. it seems to us. only by the emergence of a climactic low more clear-cut than that of last September or by a continued prolonged base-building process. one involving a time-frame a great deal longer than a single month. Needless to say. such evidence has not yet evinced itself. '- ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTrs DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 833.52 Sill Composite 12 00 p.m.) 119.69 Cumulative Index (10/29/81) 1062.22 No Itatmel'H or .-preUfOn of opinion or ony other motter hereu'! cMomed IS, or ,s to be deemlld 10 be, dIrectly or Indorec1ly, on offer or the OhCIIllon of on offer to buy or ,ell ony secunty referred 10 or mentioned The motler ., presented merely for the Conver-Iena of Ihe lubs(rtber. While we belle.ve the 5Ourte5 of aUf Informo tlo to be relloble we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe ocwraey Ihereof nor of Ihe slClements mude hereIn Any Cc110rt to be loken by the subTlber should be bo'ed on hIS own',nlle\gohon and InformOllon Janney Montgomery Scott, Ine, 0 a (Orporailon, and ,ts officers or employees, may now halle, or may loter loke, pohonl or Hodes In respec1 to ony secudtles menhoned In thllo or any future litUe, and Iouch pOSItIon may be dIfferent 1rom ony IIlews now or MereD/ter e.-pressed in thl' o. any OlMf alue Janney Monlgo,..,II'y Sectt, Inc, wh,ch II regIstered w,h ,e SEC 01 0'1 .nvellment odv,sor, may give adVice 10 lis mveltmenl odllilory and other tuSlome!S Independently of any S10tetTlenh mode In In or on any olhcr ,Slue ufTner tnformlJllon on ony ecurtly mentioned herein II aVaIlable on reqvest

Download PDF