Viewing Month: May 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 01, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 01, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - May 01, 1981
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'f / TA'BELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08!S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER New VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 1, 1981 r -! . -……. – Under the impetus of a declining Federal Funds rate, the market turned generally weaker after reaching a new high of 1024.05 on the Dow Jones Industrial Average on Monday. The three days of weakness, however, have not yet destroyed the positive price pattern still implicit in recent trading. The chart below, which will be familiar to our regular readers,shows the action of the Dow since March 27, 1980, together with three trend channels, major, intermediate and minor. These channels are computed mathematically based on trading through Monday's 1024.05 high. The major channel begins on March 27, 1980 at the Silver Thursday low of 759.98, the intermediate on December 11, 1980 at 908.45, and the minor channel at the low of last February, 931. 57. . The analysis of these channels is in no sense predictive, since they describe only past history. However, the market's ability to remain in the various trend channels suggests that current action is at least consistent with the past trend, while a penetration of the channels suggests that new market foreces, of indeterminate nature, may be in effect. COMPUTED MRJOR, INTERMEDIRTE & MINO TRENDS DOW-JONES INDUSTRIRL RVERRGE As the chart shows, the minor–and steepest–channel which marks trading since February 13 was violated slightly, though not decisively, at Thursday's low. However, both the intermediate and major channels remain inviolate. The lower limit of the intermediate channel is now at approximately 970, and the corresponding figure for the major trend is roughly 955. The major trend is rising at approximately .70 points per day, and the intermediate trend at .77 points per day. At the moment, there is no suggestion of market weakness which would cause the lower limits of either of these two channels to be violated. For long as they continue to hold, it is a fair assumption that the market uptrend which began a year ago on a major basis, with an intermediate leg having begun last December, remains in effect. Dow-Jones Industrials (11 00 AM) S & P Composite (11 00 AM) Cumulative Index (4/30/81) AWT It 998.92 133.21 1143.92 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No tolement or expressIon of opinion or any olher mOIler herein contolned is, or 1 10 be deemed to be, dHeC1ly or lndlfettly, on offer or Ihe sollc.tot.on of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convef'lence of the subscriber. While Ne believe Ihe sources of our information 10 be relloble, we In no woy represent or gvarafltee the accvracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgotlon ond Informallon JOnfley Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, position, or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In Ih,s or any future lSue, and luch POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter elpressed III thl or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery coII, Inc, whICh 15 registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry ond othlll customers Independently of any statements mode ,n tnn or III any other ISsue Further information on any secvroty mentioned herein IS availoble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 08, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 08, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - May 08, 1981
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY OBS40 DIYISION Of' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – May 8, 1981 -;0'- -,,,- '!'— .,j; Following a by-and-large satisfactory performance whih carried throught;) just' a fortnight ago, stock market action suddenly turned a bit disappointing. As of April 27, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average had moved ahead to a new 1981 high of 1024.05. In the seven trading days which followed, it managed to shed some 50 points, once more penetrating the 1000 level and reaching a Tuesday closing low of 972.44. A couple of rally attempts, neither of them very im- pressive, on Wednesday and Thursday, left the average around that low as of this writing. The ostensible reason for the past two weeks' weakness has been the behavior of short-term interest rates, and commentators who find it necessary to discover reasons for every market jiggle have once again dragged out this behavior as a rationale for the market's abrupt reversal. There is, of course, an element of justification for this, but it must also be recalled that the relationship between stock-market action and the direction of short rates is a recent one in any case and remains tenuous at best. Bond prices had actually been declining irregularly since midJanuary when the Dow-Jones 2o-Bond Average, now 58.44, was at 65.78, and prior to that, since June, 1980 when it was 76.61. During both of these declining periods, the stock market turned in a relatively respectable performance. This remained the case until two weeks ago, when the dispute between monetarist economists and the Federal Reserve once again surfaced and led to renewed warnings of financial chaos, warnings which have been fairly familiar fare for over a year. – From a technical point of view, the stock-market weakness has altered the picture, albeit not oy all that much. It is very seldom; as we continuous1y remind our readers, that snort term -p…-1 action, in and of itself, changes market perspective. It tends to be rather, a series of short- term rallies and'declines, together with the market's behavior on those swings, which produces changes in the technical outlook. Coincidentally, we discussed the market last week in terms of the major and intermediate trend channels which have been in effect since March, 1980 and Dec- ember, 1980, respectively. At current lows, the Dow has returned to the bottom of the inter- mediate-trend channel. It is also close to the bottom part of the major-trend channel. Quite obviously, the ability to hold approximately around current levels would leave both channels intact and would have to be construed bullishly. Technical patterns for the averages suggest that such might be the case, although further very-short-term weakness remains at least a possibility. With the 990 low which has contained the market since March now decisively broken, it is possible to read downside objectives in the Dow in the 950-935 area. A comparable objective for the S & P 500 would be 128. Attainment of either of these downside objectives, especially if followed by a worthwhile rebound, would not significantly violate the uptrend channels mentioned above. The only sort of development which would call market action seriously into question would be violation of the lows of last fall, moves below 900 on the Dow or 122 on the S & P Composite. There appear to be very few individual stock patterns at the moment which suggest that sort of weakness. As we have noted in the past, the only market area where serious technical vulnerability exists is in the energy stocks, and even these issues ,have moved down sufficiently,so that,a short-term rally would not be surprising. Some small clouds have, indeed, appeared on the stock market sky, but, it seems to us, they would have to darken considerably before a serious market storm could be predicted. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 977.49 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 131. 89 Cumulative Index (5/7/81) 1121. 53 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTsla No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any other motler hereIn contolned 1, or I to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer Of the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter ' presented merely for the corwerlen!;f'! of the subscrrber While we belIeve the lIOurces of our information to be reliable, we m no way represent or guaronlee the ourocy rhereof nor of the statemenTS mode herem Any action fa be token by the subsrlber should be bosed on his own investigation and !nformation Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as ( corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSlhons or trades m respect to any SeCurities mentiOned m thiS or any future InUI!, and suh pOSition moy be different from any views now or hereafter elCpressed In thIS or any oTher Issue Janney Montgomery ScQrt, Inc, whICh IS registered with the SEC 0 an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othe! C\ntomers independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any seuflty mentIOned herem IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 15, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 15, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - May 15, 1981
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 15, 1981 – – – – .- — — –.-As .h-a.s' b.ec-om.e;-a 'May tradition; this letter is being p- -re–p-a-r—e-d-' on -T—uesday, May 12, three days–.-,, — ;.- in advance of its Friday publication date. Each year in mid-May, the writer and the members of his staff who would normally prepare this letter in his absence, find themselves at the annual convention of the Market Technicians Association, which is taking place this year in Sarasota, Florida, This annual gathering of the MTA, an organization with which we are proud to have been associated since its inception, is always interesting and useful. Among its features are, generally, a number of papers on various technical indicators. Such papers, as is proper with material presented before a professional organization, are usually documented in voluminous and, to the uninitiated, boring detail, presenting scrupulous historical evidence for the fact that a given indicator behaves in a certain way. The question of historical evidence, coincidentally, is an interesting one in the present instance. As we write this piece, the market has been trending irregularly downward for some three weeks. During those same three weeks, as we noted in our last issue, short-term interest rates have risen sharply, the last manifestation thereof being the prime-rate increase by Chase Manhattan Bank to 19H. Inevitably, the twin occurrence of rising interest rates together with a declining stock market has been a feature of stories appearing in the financial press. There are a number of very good theoretical reasons as to why the two phenomena might be coincident, and we have no quarrel with those journalists who associate them. At some point, however, it becomes necessary to draw a distinction between journalism and forecasting. The point at which that dis- – –tinctiontendstogetd1Swn-is-in-theprocess-of.accumulating-hsrd ,nllmericaLeY.idenceas.iuQ,1 whether or not rising short interest rates can or should be directly associated with a declining stock market. In the accumulation of this sort of evidence, it is necessary to be rigorously specific, If rising interest rates forecast a stock-market decline. for example, what interest rates are we talking about. what defines a rise or fall. and over how long a stock-market period do they forecast a change It is when we attempt to perform this sort of exercise that the relationship between interest rates and the stock market becomes a bit more fuzzy than journalism would perhaps have us believe. Just as an example. let us try to develop some hard evidence. Let us use 90-day Treasury Bills as a proxy for short-term interest rates. Between April 24 and May 1, 1981, bill rates increased from 14.02 to 15.78, a rise of 12.55. This turned out to be coincident with the recent stock market decline. If we then hypothesize that a rise of more than 12 in 90-day T-Bill rates is a harbinger of decline, we can then inspect the evidence. We find, for example, that the last time such a rise took place was on June 27, 1980, the result being that the stock market was 4 higher 4 weeks later, almost 9 higher 8 weeks later, and 6H higher 13 weeks later. The previous instance was a 13 rise in March, 1980, which resulted in a modestly lower stock market 8 weeks later, and a market that was 5 higher after 3 months. A 12 rate-jump in November, 1978 saw a market that remained essentially flat for the next three months, and the previous instance, in June, 1975, produced short-term strength fOllowed by a mild tailing off. To find cases where a short-term interest rise of greater than 12 led to a severe stock market decline. one has to go back to a couple of instances arising in the advanced stages of the 1974 bear market. None of this is meant to suggest, for a minute, that no relationship between short rates and the stock market exists. Indeed, the historical evidence, especially over recent years, tends to suggest the possibility of such a relationship, but one which is complex, and, at best, somewhat tenuous. The relationship generally involves long periods of rising interest rates (on a 13-week basis, bill rates currently have been rising for only 2 weeks) and is complex in the extreme. In other words, before accepting facile judgments that the current rise in money rates is the precuJ- sor of a market decline, we would demand of the forecaster making such a judgment hard evidence of the sort mentioned above. ' ANTHONY W. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 982.89 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 131. 96 Cumulative Index (5/14/81) 1128.55 AWT sla No stclement or expreulon of opinion or any olher matter herein CaT1lomed IS, or II to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe sOllCltOtion of on offer to bvy Of sell (lny security referred 10 or mentioned The malter IS presented mNely for the converlenn of Ihe subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the occurocy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be oo1ed on hiS own Investlgotlon ond Informohon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corporation, and liS officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, poslhons Of trades In respect to ony U!CUrllie1 menlloned In thiS or on.,. fulure Issue, (lod such POSition may be different from ony views now or hereofter expressed In IhlS or ony olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment odvisar, may give odvlce to It Investment adVISOry ond othel (USlomC!rs Independently of any statements mode In Ihls or In (lny other Issue further Informolion on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 22, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 22, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - May 22, 1981
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1——- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 22, 1981 We seized-,the oPP!'rtunitY'in'this'space-last'week to'commnt on the recent .linkage which exists, at- – andleast in the mind of many analysts, between the stock market 'shortterm interest -rates in- those' remarks, we tried to suggest that this relationship was, first of all, a rather recent one, and secondly, a good deal less simple than the conventional wisdom would have us believe. When one stands back and looks at the long-term relationship between interest-rate levels and the stock market, the whole ques- tion becomes fraught with paradox. The current conventional wisdom is, for example, that rising interest rates are bearish for the stock market and falling interest rates are bullish. This has been an accepted bit of folk wisdom over the entire 27 years of our own career as a stock market observer. What is interesting is that the accepted rationale as to why this should be so has varied widely over the past three decades. Basically what has happened is that analysts over the years seem to have accepted the gospel of rising interest rates bearish — falling interest rates bullish as a matter of faith, and then drawn whatever documentation from the most recently available economic history that seemed necessary to justify that belief. For the benefit of youn-ger readers and those without an historical bent, let us recapitulate the situation of about 30 years ago. At that point, the approximate interest rate for long-term, high-grade corporate bonds was about 3 percent, and yields on such instruments as T-bills were often as low as H percent. By contrast, quality stocks provided yields in the 7-9 percent range. The accepted doctrine of the time viewed this relationship as entirely appropriate, citing the variability of common-stock dividends and the certainty of return provided by high-grade senior securities. The late Dr. Benjamin Graham, the accepted savant of the period, developed something called the central value theory, a theory which suggested that average earnings on the Dow over the prior ten years should be capitalized at twice the available rate On high-grade bonds, thus arriving at a normal or central value for stocks. Indeed, when one stood at the vantage point of the mid-50's and lOOked back as far as the mid-20's, ' tYiis particUl,, theory nandily -expl8ineoagaoCl-deaI'of-Ule-variationof–StocpriceS7'The-only-prob- , ,.- lem, of course, is that it hasn't explained them since. Following the middle fifties, as the stock market consistently rose and stocks became more and more over-valued under the theory, Dr. Graham, in successive editions of his book, revised the formula a couple of times. Unfortunately, however, there arrived the point when even revision made it totally useless, and it quietly died a natural death. Were the theory to be applied today, the normal value of the Dow would be calculated at approximately 600, and, while there remain those in the fever swamps who believe such an outcome will eventually transpire, their opinion is not widely heeded. Today we hear very little about the variability of common stock dividends. It is presumed, indeed, that they will follow a gradually rising course, most probably because, over recent years, that is precisely what they have been doing. We are instead informed that rising bond prices are necessary for a rising stock market because current high interest rates provide a sufficiently high totru return to compete with common stocks for investment funds. In order for such competition to cease, we are told, interest rates must come down. Now one would have thought that bonds, having yielded more than stocks for over a decade, had been doing a pretty good job of competing with equities as far as return is concerned. However, we are assured, in an inflationary era such as the present, the real rate of return on bonds is quite different from the nominal one. This is an argument that we ourselves have repeatedly put forth for at least a half-dozen years, and it remains irrefutably true. Its truth, however, has led to the currently vogueish construct of a real interest rate. Money rates, we are told, consist of two components', a real rate and an inflation premium, the real rate being around 3 percent, and the rest compriSing a built-in recompense for expected inflation. This theory explains the past 25 years just about as well as the central value theory explained the 25 years prior to 1955. As Steven Leuthold, in his excellent book, The Myths of Inflation and Investing, has pointed out, it explains almost no other period in economic history . What all this tends to suggest, of course, is that the basic credo of the market technician remains a sound one. That credo states, quite simply, that the prices of financial instruments, both bonds and stocks, are determined by supply and demand. Supply and demand are, in turn, created by the actions of individuals in the market place. Individuals, in turn, have, throughout history, accepted the conventional wisdom of their day, including the real interest rate, the central value theory or –if one goes back far enough — the efficacy of leeches in the cure of disease. This is' not meant to argue that interest rates Or that the valuation of stocks relative to those interest rates should not be considered in their proper context by the investor. It is simply to suggest that investors' ,attitude,S (and technical analysis remains the only tool we possess for diagnosing those attitudes) remain an equally valid consideration. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/21/81) AWTsla 974.24 131. 40 1141. 79 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL NQ slQlemel'll or expreulon of opinion or any other matter hereIn contaIned 1, or 1 to be deemed to be, dIrectly or rndnectly, on offer or the 501lcltot.on of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented mel ely for the convellenCt of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of olir Informa lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guoranlee the aCC\.lrocy Ihereof nor of the statements mode herem. Any cellon 10 be token by Ihe subscrrber should be based on hiS own InvestigatIon and Information Janney Montgomery Seoll, tnc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, posions 01 Irode' In re'pect loony seeun',es menlJoned In thIS or ony future luue, ond svm poslI,on may be d,fferent from ony VIews now or hereoher expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc whIch IS registered With the SEC as on rnvestment adVisor, may give adVIce to lIs Investment adVIsory and other C\.Il10mers Independently of any ctements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securlly mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 29, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 29, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - May 29, 1981
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,. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANQe – May 29, 1981 For the beleaguered stock-market forecaster, certain markets are more forglVing than others. As -' —1 an exam-pIe of an unforgiVing market we'-reCal1theonewhich'emerge(rin-J.anu'fry- a -few-ye4rs a goT — shortly after we had issued our year-end forecast. In that forecast, one of the less memorable of such efforts, we ventured to suggest that the ensuing year would be an inside year, in which the Dow- Jones Industrial Average would not make a new high. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average did, indeed, make a new high somewhere around the second week in January and proceeded, without pause for breath, to move some 50 points higher. An equally unforgiving market was the period from March through November of last year. Over a six-month times pan , the Dow-Jones Industrial Average moved up some 32 and the S & P 500 by 43. Any forecast issued at the beginning of this period, in order to possess any validity whatsoever, had to be unreservedly optimistic. A prediction of any other type turned out to be extremely difficult to explain away. This was not a particularly uncommon problem, since, as of April 18, 1980, according to one survey, more than 56 of all market forecasters were, in fact, bearish. The market since November, however, has been considerably kinder to those of us in the prediction dodge. Those who were bullish last fall can triumphantly point out that the Dow-Jones Industrials, just a month ago, achieved a new bull-market high. Those who were bearish can trumpet indignantly that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is not the market and that the broader Standard & Poors 500 posted a high, as yet unequaled, back last November. Both, of course, are correct. We doubt that this proves anything other than the fact that the market of the past six months has been a very dif- ferent one than that of the previous six months, and that, as we have often suggested, the temptation to pin a label of bull market or bear market on every stock-market period is one best avoided by those not catering to the simple-minded. For the record, the table below presents the levels of a half a dozen market indices at various atgioints s.ince March.of 1980. In addition,to three widely-followed averages, we have included – .. the'New York Stock Exchange Financial Index, the Sfanaard & Poors Oll-Composite, and a recent con'- struct of our own, the S & P 500 with oils removed, which we charted in this space a few weeks ago. 3/80 Fall/80 12/80 1/80 1-2/81 4/81 5/81 Low High Low High Low High Low Recent Dow-Jones Industrials 759.98 S & P 500 98.22 ASE Index 215.69 NYSE Financial 51.64 S & P Oil Composite 233.7 S & P 500 Ex Oils 87.46 1000.17 908.45 140.40 127.36 370.75333.28 70.7263.74 392.0 344.7 114.81106.20 1004.69 138.12 357.27 73.22 357.9 115.20 932.25 126.91 330.34 67.37 302.4 111.07 1024.05 137.11 368.50 76.62 308.9 123.50 963.46 129.71 349.65 72.79 268.4 111.96 993.14 133.77 379.77 76.64 269.4 122.60 The action, quite clearly, is diverse. The Dow, indeed, shows an unbroken pattern of higher highs and lower lows. The S & P 500, by contrast, peaked last fall and marginally broke its December low in January, remaining today not too far removed from that low. The American Stock Exchange Market Value Index for a while was exhibiting a pattern similar to that of the S & P 500, but has now destroyed that pattern by moving ahead to a decisive bull-market high. Nor has this sort of action been particularly restricted to speculative issues of the ASE stripe. The NYSE Financial Index, for example, generally composed of issues of blue chip quality, has consistently moved higher during the entire period and, in recent weeks, like the AMEX index, has moved into new high ground. The ex-oils Standard & Poors 500, while not yet at a new high, is within pennies of achieving one. As the table quite clearly shows, the stock market villains since last fall have been the oil stocks, with the S & P Oil Composite down 32 at its May low, and having barely advanced since. What are we to conclude from all this First, obviously, that it was a good deal easier to make money in the stock market between March and November of last year than it has been since November. The second conclusion, however, is that an optimistic attitude toward equities over the past six months has, indeed, been proper if duly accompanied by the caveat that it has been necessary to own the right equities. Implementation of such a policy since November has obviously required a relative reduction of exposure to oil-related issues. We think this exercise has some relevance for the future in that we do not see, based on currentlyavailable evidence, the immediate emergence of a market on which it will be easy to hang a bull or bear label. We do, however, see ample justification for the premise that such a market will treat owners of well-selected stocks at least as kindly as the last six months has done. We think, in other words, that a positive attitude toward common stocks is likely to be at least as profitable over the next half-year as it was over the last. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/28/81) AWTsla 994.34 133.18 1164.32 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or (!XprCnlOn of oplnton or any other matter herein contolned IS, or 15 10 be deemed to be, directly or mdlfectly, on offer or Ihe OIlCllollon of on offer to buy or ell ony seCUrity referred 10 or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the conver'lence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our In(ormo hon 10 be reliable, we in no way represent ar guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the s!atemenlS mude herem Any adlon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own inVestigation and InfOrmalion Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporal lon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, paslhons or trades In respect to any secufltles mentIOned In Ihls or any future ISsue, and such pOSItion may be different from ony vIews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other ISlue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whrch IS registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any seCUrltymentloned hereIn IS available on requet

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