Viewing Month: July 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 02, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 02, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - July 02, 1981
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TABELLS MARKET LETTER , -C;;C—;.c—–.–.——- 909 STATE hOAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe — – – – — —.-0'-'-. July .2, 1981 – …' We have been focusing in recent issues of this letter on what seems to us to be one of the great ironies of the stock market forecasting profession over the past half dozen years–its preoccupation with bull and bear markets. The ironic aspect of this particular obsession stems from the fact that, ever since market timing and portfoliO strategy have become buzz words among money managers, there have occurred no bear markets in the traditional sense. The sum total of our downside experience since the 1974 lows were reached has been a two-year period in 1976-1978, when the averages declined a bit more than 20 percent but the secondary stocks rose in abundance, and three sharp declines, which were essentially intermediate in scope, in the fall of 1978, the fall of 1979 and the spring of 1980. Technical analysis provided some, occasionally ambiguous, warnings of these swings prior to their occurrence and they were, indeed, of sufficient magnitude so that the aggressive trader -might profitably have benefited from an attempt to anticipate them. For the longer term investor, however, seven years have now gone by, during which essentially the proper policy was to remain aggressively committed to equities, always providing, of course, that those equities were well chosen. We have tried, in our own forecasting efforts, to suggest that we see nothing in the technical evidence that indicates a change in this basic market environment. However, we have thing of never, we hope, deluded ourselves the past arid that intermediate term into peri thin ods king that of below- amvearrakgeetpvIu'llcneeraacbtiiolni-tcyO\iwldas-.a,…….,,,…i- not, in fact, occur. We raise this point at the moment since the market appears to be approaching a fairly critical stage, with a pattern developing out of which such intermediate term weakness might well arise. To recapitulate recent history. the Dow last achieved a high on April 27th of 1024.05 and, thereafter, reacted to a May 11th low of 963.44. The recent advance to 1011. 99 in mid-June and the subsequent decline, which has reached a low under 970 at this writing, must be regarded as a conventional upside failure. and it is now quite obvious that the May 11th low is being tested. That low may. indeed, hold and ,if it does so, it will have to be construed, in our view, as a bullish portent. Penetration, however, would strongly suggest that further intermediate-term weakness was in store. The key to our own technical interpretation at this point is that we do not think that the distributional top formed between January and April has been broadened by the recent advance-and-retreat cycle. The downside risk at the moment, therefore, seems limited to the original objective of that top, i.e., in the 925-900 area. Individual stock patterns, which have admittedly deteriorated in certain areas; for example, defense and drug issues, do not appear to suggest downside objectives consistent with much lower levels for the averages. In many ways, weakness which might occur from this point could be viewed as an example of rotating leadership. Energy issues, the major drag on the market since last fall, appear to be attempting to form bases. Since many such issues declined as much as 50 percent, further vulnerability from these levels appears limited. It is quite conceivable, however, that energy stocks, in the process of building longer-term base formations, could test their lows of a few weeks ago. This sort of test, coupled with intermediate-term declines in other areas, however, is likely to produce fairly disappointing action on the part of the broad market averages. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12 00 pm) 965.47 S & P Composite (12 00 pm) 129.48 Cumulative Index (7/1/81) 1160.51 AWTjt ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of OPinion or any o'her malter herein (ontolned os, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. on offer or the SOIICI'otlon of an offer 10 buy hOn to or be leI(!!IioCinbr,e security , we In referred no wCly 10 or mentioned The motler IS presented merely represent Of guarantee the accuracy thereof nor for the convel'lenct; of Ihe vbsctlb(!r Whde we believe the sources of our Informa. of the statements mode herem Any actlan to be loken by the subscriber should be based an hi' own inVestigation and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc as 0 corporation, and .ts officers or employees may now hove or moy loler take positions or trodes 11\ respect to ony seCUntles mentioned in Ihls or any future Issue, end such pesI).on may be different from any 'views now 01 h/eafter expressed J th,s or any other ,ssue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its ,Vestment advISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In Ih1 or In any other Issue Further Information on any seCl.mty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 10, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 10, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - July 10, 1981
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..- , 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE The last fortnight of stock-market action has been, to say the least, less than encouraging. The Dow most recently reached a closing high of 1011.99 on June 15, this high, as we suggested last week, a probable unsuccessful test of the rally high of 1024.05, posted back in April. Following the mid-June peak, what might be considered a mini-failure took place, as the average rallied to 1006.66 on June 23. This was fOllowed by no fewer than eight consecutive declining days, the closing low so far being Monday's figure of 949.30, completing a 6.2 percent drop from the high of three weeks ago. We mentioned last week that the most plausible downside targets for the Dow appeared to center around the 925-900 area, a target zone which remains 25-50 points below the lowest levels achieved so far. In the absence of evidence that a base attempt was taking place, we would be inclined to continue to use this target zone in our current scenario. It is true that some minor evidence of an oversold condition managed to manifest itself in last week's trading. The period June 29 to July 6, for example, saw five consecutive' days on which more than 1,000 issues showed up in the decline column. This is a fairly rare occurrence which, in fact, has occurred on only five previous occasions in all stock market history. Interestingly enough, the last time it occurred was on the five days ending December 11, 1980. This significantly, turned out to be the precise starting point from which the current intermediate-term rally began and also the starting point for the year-end rally. The previous occurrence was a string of six days with more than 1000 declining issues which ended on March 10, 1980. This was just 2! weeks before the Silver Thursday low on March 27. It was also at a point some 60 point higher than that ultimate low. Likewise, – —–the intermediate-tellil decline-;,rrthe-fatl–of–19'f8-saeparatesimilar–occasionsasthe – – – – — . market moved down. Both of these were on the way to the bottom rather than at the ultimate nadir. Last week's technical action can therefore, it seems to us, logically be viewed as typical of a market which is on its way to a short-term bottom but is unlikely to have actually achieved that bottom. In order for one to assume that a meaningful low took place on July 6, a number of other pieces of evidence would have to fall into place. In classic terms, the most convincing sort of evidence would be a rally attempt accompanied by meaningful breadth and volume — volume returning to, say, above the 60-million share level with advancing stocks consistently running into the four figures -just as declining issues did last week. Such evidence, needless to say, has failed to manifest itself, and it certainly cannot be found in Thursday's rather tepid rally attempt. Meanwhile, outside the main arena, there are a number of interesting sideshows going on. One such subsidiary event has been' the action of the gold market, with the yellow metal, as readers are well aware, having recently moved below 400 in both the European and U.S. markets, a level less than half its high of a year and a half ago. There are, of course, various explanations or, more properly perhaps, rationalizations of this phenomenon. One,of course ,is that record high short-term interest rates makes gold's cost-of-carry prohibitive. We find this explanation unconvincing since money rates were not all that different when the metal was at twice its current level. We think the explanation more probably lies in lessened inflationary expectations on the part of gold market participants. As our long-term readers are aware, this letter has never been accused of excess piety in worshipping at the altar of gold. We have never, however, claimed that, in proper context, it did not provide a longterm store of value and thus a protection against extended periods of inflation. It has of course done this, doubled and in spades, in the 1970s and 1980s. We have, ourselves, never held to the belief that either the inflation or stock-market environments of that decade were permanent phenomena and, as readers know, we count ourselves among the more optimistic observers as far as reduced inflationary prospects are concerned. We find ourselves happy, therefore, that the gold fanatics, a group with whom we have been known to be at odds in the past, seem, in their market action, to show that they share our optimism. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12.00 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (7/9/81) AWT rs 954.62 129.21 1135.51 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or eXpreS5jon of Opinion or any other mafler herein contomed is, or 1 10 be deemed to be, dlrcC'lly or 'nd,reC'!ly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell ony ccunly referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subsmber While we believe the Ources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guoronlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any acTion to be tak.en by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later tok.e, pontlons or trades If! respect to any secur/Ws mentioned 1M thiS or any future Issue, and such POSitIon may be different from ony views now or hereafter e;.pressed In thIS or any other issue Janney Montgomery Scalf, Inc, which .s registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVISor, moy give adVice to Its Investment advlOry and olhel customers .ndependently of any stotemenls mode .n thiS or In any other Issue Furlher information on any security mentioned herein Is available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 17, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 17, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - July 17, 1981 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - July 17, 1981 page 2
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————————————————————————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANoe,lNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 17, 1981 JheN ew YorkoStock)lxctHl-'lgeJeleaedLetlytheiI' m()nthly figur.sn-.!bel'XE Jirms carrymg customers' stock margin accounts .. Since.figures. have been avSilable, debit baJances of margin accounts in aggregate terms have generally moved in the same direction as stock prices, but at a more exaggerated rate. The chart on the opposite page shows this to be true, until the Dow Jones Industrial Average from its 1976 high declined to its February, 1978 low. Uncharacteristically, since that time, margin debt has increased with minor interruptions to new highs through June of this year. Margin customers of the NYSE member firms added 170 million to their indebtedness bringiIlg the total margin debt to a record of 14,870 million at the end of June. This is the third month in a row customers' margin debt posted an all time high in the series that dates to January, 1965. The NYSE reported that margin accounts totaled 1,320,000 in June, also a record in the series. Because of the speculative nature of the market and the level of the DJIA coupled with the extraordinarily high cost of broker loans used to finance the stock purchases, the number of accounts and the amount of margiIl debt are indeed remarkable. In the following exhibit we will try to put these figures in perspective by comparing the behavior of margin accounts to margin debt. Also, we have taken the highs and lows of the margin accounts /debt and compared them to corresponding major highs and lows of DJIA. EXHIBIT I Margin Debt(mil) Accounts(thou) Ratio Date Dow-Jones June, 1968 High 6690 940 14.05 11729768 985.08 July, 1970 Low 3780 770 20.37 5/26/70 631.16 Dec. 1972 High 7900 Dec —' .-197.41——.r.ow——-391.01-.., 750 9.49 1/11/73 1051.70 625 —…….15 ..98..;1..2.. /6JJ4 -557..7…s011 June, 1981 High 14870 1320 8.88 4/27/81 1024.05' . From 1965 to date the range of this ratio is 20.37 high on July, 1970 and 7.94 low on October, i978. The ratio tends to be high at major market bottoms (July, 1970 and December, 1974) and low at market tops (December, 1972). The relatively high ratio in June, 1968, a market high, can obviously be attributed to the large amount of speculation in the market. Also, the ratio tends to peak before market highs and after a market low. If these observations are valid, the recent or a subsequent high in customer margin debt would iIldicate the DJIA could be higher at a later date. EXHIBIT II June, 1968 July, 1970 Dec. 1972 Dec. 1974 June, 1981 Margin Debt High 6690 Low 3780 High 7900 Low 3910 High 14870 Total Market Value 641037 531077 872000 511054 1225000 Percentage 1.043 .712 .906 .765 1. 214 Date 11/29/68 5/26/70 1/11/73 12/ 6/74 4/27/81 Dow-Jones 985.08 631.16 1051. 70 577.60 1024.05 Another way we are able to analyze the customers' stock market debt is to compare it to the total market value of equities listed on the NYSE. From 1965 to date the range of the percentage of margin debt to total NYSE market value has been 1. 53 percent high on October, 1978 and .597 percent low on January, 1971. The observations seem' to be the same – the higher the percentage of margin debt to market value, the higher the averages, and, conversely, the lower the percentage, the lower the averages. Although the above exhibits would allow for stock prices to go higher, one set of figures released by the NYSE would argue this point. The number of customers carrying margin accounts under 40 percent equities totals 13 percent. This figure represents an alarmiIlg 25 percent of total margin debt, a figure in excess of 3.7 billion. In simplest terms, this means the quality of credit has deteriorated during the month of June, with 25 percent of the debt in accounts in the lowest equity class. It should be remembered that in August-September of 1974, this ratio reached a high of 23 percent, a series record, representing 58 percent of total margin debt and was thought to be a major contribution to the decline in late 1974. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.) 956.62 S & P Composi1e1200 p.m.) 130.66 Cumulative Index (7/16/81) 1141. 51 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL RJS rs No statement or expreSSion of oplOIon or (lny other molter herCln contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the OII(llollon of on off!)! to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the tonvenlence of the subscriber While e believe the sourtes of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the acturacy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any Ottlon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now hOVII, or may loter take, positions Of trodes IfI respect 10 any securlhes mentioned In thiS ar any future luue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIS mvestment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of ony statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformotlon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request .. II . I,, -''J '- , i III II \ I pnn 11l1ll- ,I I I I 1200 1 1100 Innn I v-a -, gOD- Cl 1/ Vvv8nn 7nn ' I V .6nn Ie; 14 11 j) z(f) 11 0 In – -m 9 , mwI- B Cl z 7 -Q a L 6 Ir 5 4 !/rt r V trVI I V- 1000 900 IV BOO I- 700 OJ R . I , 600 j Ii 15 ;A U/J'i 14 I ,I I– 13 12 V'I\! 11 10 1/ I, , 1– 9 B 7 , I )Ir NY E 6 I' 5 4 l MRRGIN DEBT 3 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1\ 197'-1 ,I 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 II'II 3 II I –

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 24, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 24, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - July 24, 1981
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEy 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANoe. INC MEMBE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANoe – July 24, 1981 , .As, .0L a to resist the temptation with. alI!.q!, -than- 3O-Yi'.r…wstorYl…0ften find .itdiffic)llt quote from past issues. We apolog;.ze to our, readers' in. advance -for the fact that this week's issue consists almost entirely of such quotes. The reasons will, however, be apparent. From the issue of November 3, 1978 Monday featured an almost-classic selling climax which totally faIled to follow through in Tuesday's trading as a 17-point decline to 792.45 took place in what may come to be known as the Halloween Horror Story. Then on Wednesday, ostensibly due to President Carter's plan to strengthen the dollar, came a 35-point rally … It is, in sum, an undeniable fact that the sort of condition that the market had reached late last week and early this week was a rare bird indeed for the post-World-War II period. It is possible to go even further and state that that condition, when achleved in the past 30 years, has been almost universally associated with major market bottoms. Climax lows are not always the actual lows in the averages, and, indeed, they may be followed by new lows often quite some time later. Such climactic troughs, however, have usually tended to pinpoint what may be thought of as the effective bottom. Having said all this, we are compelled to raise a more-than-moderately disquieting point. It all took place at the wrong time. The textbook climax action of last week occurred, not after a major downswing, but very close to a market top scored just last September. This, and the fact cannot be ignored, is totally without precedent for the last 30 years … From the issue of October 19, 1979 We noted last week that on n!onday, October 9, 91.1 of issues traded moved lower in price and pointed out that this was the seventh highest figure since breadth statistics have been maintained. The near record was followed on Tuesday, October 10 by a day on which 86 of all issues traded declined. The relative rarity of such occasions is underscored by the fact that since 1946, there have been only 147 days on which more man 15 of all 19u ….. nanos . The essimtial p'o!'t which we tried to make last week was that these occurrences generally have been of two sorts of occasions 1) the terminal phase of declines, and 2) declines which take place in reaction to sudden and un- expected events, a category which, we think, suitably characterizes Mr. Volcker's bombshell of two weeks ago. The point is that recent action hardly falls into the first category mentioned above, since it took place within a week of the major indices' achievement of new bull-market highs. It seems therefore, highly likely that it must be placed in the second category. It is, therefore, worth noting that most declines of this type were shortly reversed by moves to new highs before too long a time period had elapsed. From the issue of March 28, 1980 If the intervention of precious metal prices into equity trading was a new phenomenon, the effect it produced was an old one … From a technical point of view, Thursday's trading was straight out of the textbooks, constituting the familiar phenomenon known as a selling climax. The occurrence of this particular classic example, We must quickly point out, does not necessarily suggest that the stock market saw its absolute low of 729.95 intraday for the Dow on Thursday afternoon … We have in the past in this letter used the technique of suggesting that an effective bot- tom has been reached … This reminder is, we think applicable in the present instance … Our feeling, however, based on Thursday's action plus the historically oversold condition which preceded it, is that the preliminary stages of a technical rebuilding process have probably begun. And here we go again. Just three months after reaching a rally high of 1024.05 the Dow has declined almost 100 points to a closing low of 924.66 on Wednesday. What has conspicuously failed to occur so far is the sort of selling-climax action which took place on each of the three occasions described above. As the quoted text makes clear, that sort of action,capping short, sharp declines which took place shortly after new highs had been made, at the time, was unexpected. Now, after three repetitlons in tWD and a half years, it would be logical to expect the current declining phase to end with action not dissimilar to the sort of thing described above. Markets, of course, have a tendency to produce surprises, and the present one could sur- prise in one of two ways. First, it could develop into something more than an intermediate-scale decline, on the order of the three discussed above, and ultimately turn out to be of major proportions. As we have noted in the past, we doubt the likelihood of this eventuality based on present technical patterns. A second surprise would be a decline which petered out and which failed to end with the climactic conditions which have now become commonplace. While this is possible, we do not think that climactic action is yet widely enough expected to make its absence a likelihood. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12 00 p. m.) 932.36 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 128.14 CumUlative Index (7/23/81 1126.83 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL ATWrs No slaleml!!nt or c)(prCUlon of Opinion or any other motter herein tonlolned Is, or to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of on oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscrober While we belteve the sourtes of our .nformotlon 10 be reliable, WI! In no way represent or guorontee the occuroty thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any aellon to be IOen by the subscriber shOUld be based on hiS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, lnt , as a corporation, and Its officers or employe!'s, may now have, or may later lake, positions or trades In respect ta any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSllion may be different frOm any vlew now or hereafter exprested In thIS or any other Issue Janney MOl'llgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give adVice to 'IS Investment odvnory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or Hl any other Issue Further information on any serurlly mentioned here'n IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 31, 1981

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 31, 1981

Tabell's Market Letter - July 31, 1981
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBeR New YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMSER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGe … – .– ….. .,. . ….uly2!!–!98 . …,L There -eXists traditionally, in the minds -of most Americans ;-some soreoCtemiolls–relation- ship between the fortunes of Wall Street and those of the Republican Party. This image 'probably goes back to the days of Thomas Nast cartoons depicting bloated capitalists with dollar signs on their vests. There is at least some logical justification for the association in that Republicans have been called the party of business, and it is indeed undeniable that, over the long term, the overall level of business profits constitutes the basic determinant of securities prices. Nonethe- less, attempts to link Republican political fortunes to the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average have, over most of the past century, foundered on the hard rock of statistical fac!. Somehow, the financial community conspicuously fsils to treat Republican successes with the elation that, subconsciously at least, many observers have come to expect. The truth of this particular axiom has been demonstrated once agsin over the past year. Mr. Reagan was nominated last July and elected last November. With the passage of his tax bill in both the House and Senate this week by larger-than-expected margins, coupled with Congress' prior acceptance-in-toto of his budget proposals, he has recorded a political success perhaps un- equaled since the fabled first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration in 1933. The stock market's total response to this phenomenon has been a yawn. On all three of the occasions mentioned above, the Dow Jones Industrial Average remained steadfastly in the low 900's. To those who believe that the market possesses some sort of collective wisdom, the inevitable corollary is that it is sending us some sort of message by its apparent total boredom with the present administration and all its works. Those of a bearish frame of mind, including the pur- veyors of disaster chic, are forced to the conclusion that the message being conveyed is that the administration's economic program, 3t simply, is not going to work. The gloom-and-doom theorists have never been able to any alternative an e\'(jr in 0Jtu.a. 'lIlU SO rnat It Jeaas -me',aau,.r to '. Tney . . a.r ,,,y of the middle ground that the Reagan program purports to offer. Smce most of these oaoao – presumably- emerged from their bomb shelters long enough to vote for Mr. Reagan last November, they must be at least mildly embarrassed at finding themselves in bed with such apostles of the old order as Walter Heller, who are equally vocal in assuring us that no middle ground exists. It has never been the view in this quarter that the market was a sort of Delphic Oracle with the ability to know things that the rest of us don't. Indeed when the market demonstrates such knowledge it is generally and reliably wrong. The last such demonstration of prescience that we can recall was the certainty in 1972 that earnings and prices for the nifty fifty were going to go on increasing forever and ever. Prior examples of the market's wisdom include the inevitability of a post-war depression in the late 1940's and the certainty of continuing prosperity in 1928- 29. With this background, we find ourselves singularly undisturbed by the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the Reagan program. Indeed, we should have found it a great deal more disturb- ing had the market greeted the President's arrival by going on one of its periodic tears and equating his accession with some sort of new version of the Second Coming. One can find ample historical precedent for the present torpor in the year following the election of both prior new Republican presidents. Both in 1952, following the election of General Eisenhower, and in 1968, following that of Mr. Nixon the market did nothing over most of the subsequent twelve months. In the case of Eisenhower, at least, it found itself just about having doubled by the end of his term. In contrast to any oracular quality, we think the market tends, at any given time to reflect the state of conventional wisdom, conventional wisdom that has only slowly and psinfully developed over long years of experience. Since the year-Old Reagan fiscal policy essentially represents a reversal of almost a half century of prevailing wisdom, it is far too early to expect the market to have developed any collective thinking on the subject whatsoever. The current conventional wisdom reflected by the equity market quite obviously centers not around politics but interest rates and the theory that these must in fact come down before stocks can be expected to go up. As is the case with most such widely-held views, we suspect this one may find itself rudely shattered in one way or another over the next few years. By that time, the market may have developed the view of the Reagan economic program which it now resolutely refuses to express. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL – t Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.) 949.58 S & P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 130.61 Cumulative Index (7/30/81) 1142.77 No statement or eprenlon of OpiniOn or any other matter herein contomed IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dHectly or md,redly, on offer or the Ol,c,tollon of on offer to buy Or sell any secunty referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convenlenc of the subsCriber While we believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihc statements mode herein Any octlon to be loen by The subscriber should be bosed On hiS own Inves1tgatlon ond mformotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 1\ offICers or employees, may now hove, ar may later loe. positions or trades In respett to any securities mentIoned m thiS or any future Issue, ond such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter eypressed JIl Ihl5 or any other 'Sue Janney Montgomery Scott. Inc, wh,ch rs reg.stered …. rln the SEC as on InVeStment advisor, may glllt! adVIce /a lis tn ..estment advI50ry ond othel L-ruom.,od.P.Od.OYOIOOy'-o'-.m-.omod.,oth,,o,, ooyoth.,,,,.F'th'Ofo'mot,oooOOOy,,ru,,,ymoOO'dh',OOObO ,,q.,, –,

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