,. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANQe – May 29, 1981 For the beleaguered stock-market forecaster, certain markets are more forglVing than others. As -' —1 an exam-pIe of an unforgiVing market we'-reCal1theonewhich'emerge(rin-J.anu'fry- a -few-ye4rs a goT — shortly after we had issued our year-end forecast. In that forecast, one of the less memorable of such efforts, we ventured to suggest that the ensuing year would be an inside year, in which the Dow- Jones Industrial Average would not make a new high. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average did, indeed, make a new high somewhere around the second week in January and proceeded, without pause for breath, to move some 50 points higher. An equally unforgiving market was the period from March through November of last year. Over a six-month times pan , the Dow-Jones Industrial Average moved up some 32 and the S & P 500 by 43. Any forecast issued at the beginning of this period, in order to possess any validity whatsoever, had to be unreservedly optimistic. A prediction of any other type turned out to be extremely difficult to explain away. This was not a particularly uncommon problem, since, as of April 18, 1980, according to one survey, more than 56 of all market forecasters were, in fact, bearish. The market since November, however, has been considerably kinder to those of us in the prediction dodge. Those who were bullish last fall can triumphantly point out that the Dow-Jones Industrials, just a month ago, achieved a new bull-market high. Those who were bearish can trumpet indignantly that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is not the market and that the broader Standard & Poors 500 posted a high, as yet unequaled, back last November. Both, of course, are correct. We doubt that this proves anything other than the fact that the market of the past six months has been a very dif- ferent one than that of the previous six months, and that, as we have often suggested, the temptation to pin a label of bull market or bear market on every stock-market period is one best avoided by those not catering to the simple-minded. For the record, the table below presents the levels of a half a dozen market indices at various atgioints s.ince March.of 1980. In addition,to three widely-followed averages, we have included – .. the'New York Stock Exchange Financial Index, the Sfanaard & Poors Oll-Composite, and a recent con'- struct of our own, the S & P 500 with oils removed, which we charted in this space a few weeks ago. 3/80 Fall/80 12/80 1/80 1-2/81 4/81 5/81 Low High Low High Low High Low Recent Dow-Jones Industrials 759.98 S & P 500 98.22 ASE Index 215.69 NYSE Financial 51.64 S & P Oil Composite 233.7 S & P 500 Ex Oils 87.46 1000.17 908.45 140.40 127.36 370.75333.28 70.7263.74 392.0 344.7 114.81106.20 1004.69 138.12 357.27 73.22 357.9 115.20 932.25 126.91 330.34 67.37 302.4 111.07 1024.05 137.11 368.50 76.62 308.9 123.50 963.46 129.71 349.65 72.79 268.4 111.96 993.14 133.77 379.77 76.64 269.4 122.60 The action, quite clearly, is diverse. The Dow, indeed, shows an unbroken pattern of higher highs and lower lows. The S & P 500, by contrast, peaked last fall and marginally broke its December low in January, remaining today not too far removed from that low. The American Stock Exchange Market Value Index for a while was exhibiting a pattern similar to that of the S & P 500, but has now destroyed that pattern by moving ahead to a decisive bull-market high. Nor has this sort of action been particularly restricted to speculative issues of the ASE stripe. The NYSE Financial Index, for example, generally composed of issues of blue chip quality, has consistently moved higher during the entire period and, in recent weeks, like the AMEX index, has moved into new high ground. The ex-oils Standard & Poors 500, while not yet at a new high, is within pennies of achieving one. As the table quite clearly shows, the stock market villains since last fall have been the oil stocks, with the S & P Oil Composite down 32 at its May low, and having barely advanced since. What are we to conclude from all this First, obviously, that it was a good deal easier to make money in the stock market between March and November of last year than it has been since November. The second conclusion, however, is that an optimistic attitude toward equities over the past six months has, indeed, been proper if duly accompanied by the caveat that it has been necessary to own the right equities. Implementation of such a policy since November has obviously required a relative reduction of exposure to oil-related issues. We think this exercise has some relevance for the future in that we do not see, based on currentlyavailable evidence, the immediate emergence of a market on which it will be easy to hang a bull or bear label. We do, however, see ample justification for the premise that such a market will treat owners of well-selected stocks at least as kindly as the last six months has done. We think, in other words, that a positive attitude toward common stocks is likely to be at least as profitable over the next half-year as it was over the last. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/28/81) AWTsla 994.34 133.18 1164.32 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or (!XprCnlOn of oplnton or any other matter herein contolned IS, or 15 10 be deemed to be, directly or mdlfectly, on offer or Ihe OIlCllollon of on offer to buy or ell ony seCUrity referred 10 or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the conver'lence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our In(ormo hon 10 be reliable, we in no way represent ar guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the s!atemenlS mude herem Any adlon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own inVestigation and InfOrmalion Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporal lon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, paslhons or trades In respect to any secufltles mentIOned In Ihls or any future ISsue, and such pOSItion may be different from ony vIews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other ISlue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whrch IS registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any seCUrltymentloned hereIn IS available on requet

– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOR' STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE . r – – – ..- June 5, 1981 7, .-.. – We tried to lecture in this space last week on the apparent obsession of many commentators with hanging labels entitled bull market or bear market on almost every stock-market period. This obsession apparent- ly stems from the tendency of many investors to equip themselves impeccably to handle the investment en- vironment of the previous decade along the lines of the accusation often levied at generals, who, it is said, are always superbly prepared to fight the last war. This preoccupation with overall market trends obviously has its roots in 1974, which culminated the second of two bear markets, both more severe than anything that had been seen since the 1930's. Inevitably, one of the by-products of this experience was the emergence of identifying bull markets and bear markets as a growth industry. The fact that there have been, for seven long years now, no bear markets of the 1970 or 1974 stripe — or, for that matter, no bull markets of the pre-1968 variety — has not deterred these savants from continuing to issue their fearless predictions. For so long a such predictions are issued, we would suspect, correctionary market phases will continue to assume unusual shapes as was the case in the long-but-selective decline between 1976 and 1978, and the sharp but extremely short corrections which occurred in the fall of 1978, the fall of 1979, and the spring of 1980. We tried last week, by tracing various market averages, to provide a more accurate description than single-word nomenclature of what has happened over the past year or so. What we tried to suggest was that the period beginning at the end of March of last year and running through last November, and the market from November to date have been two entirely different investment environments. The first period is entitled, at least, to the label of mini-bull-market (the DJIA was up some 30), and the second quite something else again (the 3/26/80- 11/19/80- Dow was up slightly and the S & P 500 down slightly.). Perhaps 11/19/80 4/29/81 a better way than looking at averages of understanding the dif-. .–Decile.,,…;;Change ChangeJ – —–fer-en-ce-is–t-G-eGmpat!e–th)–per-for-maRce-of…Jn-di.vi-d-ualstoGk.sov..er the two periods. This is done in the table at the right which 1 f265 49.2 summarizes the price performance of 514 stocks over the two time 2 77.7 25.1 frames. The stocks selected are those contained in the S & P 3 59.0 18.6 500 plus its ancillary groups throughout the entire period. The 4 45.5 13.2 starting and ending date for each period is selected to coincide 5 36.2 9.1 as closely as possible with recent major turning points in the 6 29.3 4.4 averages. For each period, the 514 stocks are divided into 7 23.0 – 1. 0 deciles, i.e., the 10 of issues performing best, the 10 com- 8 15.9 – 6.3 prising the next best performers, etc., etc. For each decile, 9 9.2 -14.4 the mean percentage change is given. 10 4.0 -31.3 The superiority of the April-November period as an investment environment is an obvious one. The 51 best-acting issues showed an average increase of 128. 495 of the 514 issues were up over the period, and it is necessary to locate the absolutely worst-performing decile to find a group that shows a loss. What, however, of the second period The answer is that when one looks at the breakdown of individual performances, it wasn't all that bad. 329 of 514 issues advanced. It is necessary to get well into the seventh decile before a loss is seen. The performance of the top half of the list is eminently satisfactory considering the fact that it includes appreciation only, not dividends, and the percentage changes shown are for only a six-month period. If one has any faith whatever in the ability of investment managers to select stocks and to avoid, at least in part, those issues which show severe losses, it made sense, during the six months in question, to retain a reasonably agressive exposure to equities. The point is that the period since last November is not at all atypical of the market of the last seven years. Provided that one is willing to adapt a time frame of as long as six months, it would be difficult to find I'eriods over the past seven years, in which the distribution of returns were significantly worse than that shown in the second column of the table. The point we tried to make last week is that we do not see, in the current technical patterns on individual issues, the emergence of any sort of market which would be contrary to the general experience of the past seven years. We think it more sensible to think in these .terms rather than in terms which may have become obsolete a decade ago. Dow-Jones Industrials (1100 AM) 987.39 S & P Composite (11 00 AM) 131. 04 Cumulative Index (6/4/81) 1159.39 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT sla No statement or expression of oplfllOn or any other matter herein tontolned Is, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or ind,rectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motter is presented merely for the convelIence of Ihe subscrlber While -He believe the sources of our informa- tion 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the stotemenls mude herein Any ochon to be token by the subSlrtber should be bOed on hiS own Investlgotlon and InformatIon Jonney Montgomery Scort, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its offIcers or employees, moy now have, or moy tater take, pOSItions or trades In respect to any securitIes mentIoned In thiS or any future lSue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereofter epreed In Ih,s or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS reglllered With the SEC 0 on Investment odvlor, moy give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any slote,en!s made In Ihls or In any other lSue Furlher information on any securlly mentioned herein IS available on request

., TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 12. 1981 -As the-surrifuer montnsbegin .–comments are beginning-to emerge()flthe ex-pectlltins'o-f the traditional summer rally. As long-time readers of this letter are aware. we have examined this phenomenon for some years. The following table.updated through 1980.shows the number of advances and declines for the one- and two-month periods ended each month of each year from 1926 through 1980. together with the average percentage change for the period. One Month Per iods (1926-1980) Two Month Periods (1926-1980.) End Month Advances Declines Average Chg. Advances Declines Average Chg. January February March April May June July August September October November December 36 28 30 31 28 28 36 35 22 28 33 41 19 1.08 27 -0.16 25 -0.11 24 1.12 27 -0.79 27 0.93 19 1. 96 20 1. 42 33 -1. 33 27 -0.58 22 0.56 14 1. 27 – – TOTAL 376 284 0.45 37 18 31 24 26 29 33 22 32 23 26 29 35 20 38 17 32 23 25 30 32 23 38 17 385 275 2.48 0.93 -0.36 1.08 0.55 0.10 2.84 3.53 0.05 -1.87 0.01 –1. 86 — 0.93 A preliminary look at the table. indeed. supports the notion of a probable summer rally. The average monthly advance for the Dow over the period has been .45. whereas the average perform- ance in July is an advance of 1. 96. more than four times as great. Likewise. the average advance of 3.53 for the two months ended August is a good deal larger than the average two-month advance. It would. indeed. appear that the expectation of an advancing market during July and August has some solid grounding in fact. There exist a few reservations. The first factor which needs to be pointed out is that a large part of the high average advance for the summer period rests on the accident of the 1932 bottom's having occurred at the end of June. Thus. July and August of that year produced the largest twomonth advance in stock market history. an astounding 70 rise. If this single year is eliminated from consideration. the results for July and August are much closer to normal. Secondly. while it is true that July and August do show significant pluralities of advancing months over declining months. it must be remembered that advancing periods tend to outnumber declining ones over the 52 years by almost three to two. When standard tests of statistical significance are applied. the period with the clearest seasonal action is the month of December. which is why this letter has always emphasized the importance of the year-end rally. Likewise. the tendency toward a declining market in September is statistically more significant than that of a rise in July or August. Interestingly enough. none of the other months show any discernible seasonable pattern' whatsoever. Frospects for a summer rally in 1981 are. in many ways. more obscure than usual. The bulk of listed issues. particularly basiindustry and interest-sensitive stocks. continue to act constructively from a technical point of view. Set against this action. we have the energy-related issues. a major component of the market. which remain in downtrends with only tentative possibilities for forming a base at current levels. Therefore. while we think it continues to make sense to maintain a fully invested position in selected stocks. there appears to be some doubt as to whether the traditional explosive form of the summer rally will actually materialize. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 1005.42 DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 133.59 Cumulative Index (6/11/81) AWTsla 1180.36 No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any other matler herem contOlned 1, or is 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly. on offer or the sollcitotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The molter ,s presented merely for the converlencc of the subscrIber. While .ne believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on his own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporahon, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poslhons or Irodes In respect to any SeCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, ond such POSition moy be different from any views now or hereofter e1pressed In thiS or any other Inuc Janncy Montgomery Scott, tnc, which IS registered With the SEC os on mvestmenl odvlsor, may give adVice to Its mvestment adVisory ond olhel customers Independently of ony statements made m Ih.s or In any other ISsue Further information on al'ly seC\Jlty menhoned herein IS ovoiloble on request l

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMeeR New VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe June 19, 1981 Many analysts have a tendency to regard market forecasting as an art which follows immutable rules — rules laidaown- at 'too beginnIng -of tlniewniclf -remainf6rever iil-effectThere eXists, -certainlY;-an-'i!lement of permanence in stock-market behavior, but one of the things that makes study of the market particularly faSCinating is that, in subtle ways, the rilles of the game keep changing, and one must remain always on the alert for new phenomena. One such emerged in 1976-1978. For years, analysts had been studying market breadth, the number of stocks advancing and declining, as a clue to the market's future direction. At market tops, breadth indic'es would fail to confirm new highs in the market averages, and after some delay, the averages and breadth would usually turn down together. In the 1976-1978 period, we had a case, unique, to our knowledge, on the historical record. where the averages underwent a full-scale bear market but breadth did not move down at ail and actually improved during most of the period. Interestingly enough, what has been going on recently bears some resemblance to what took place at that time. DOW JONES INDUSTRIRL RVERRGE DOW JONES INDUSTRIRL RVERRG DRILl BRERDTH I-I U BRERDTH I.I ., (' t,/; ,. ,r,\\J' I . \l ' l – .. , \ '; i ,. , \ , ,I ' , , i\ ,, 11\I'I ,'11 'i \\ \ ,'\ , ,!I.'Vv/,I/\,. /\ \ ' i, I ' , ,t\ ,; ! .'.-. t' ,/, , ' ,/ \, 1,'1, ' . I , ,!I '. /oJ',) f' n nLT 16 76 C 76 FEB 77 I1AR 71 Y 77 .AJN 77 77 T BO 'IOV 80 DEC 80 81 FEB 81 H; 81 PR 81 r 81 .LIN 81 The charts above show the action of the Dow together with daily and weekly breadth indicators in the periods September, 1976- July, 1977 and September, 1980 to date. As can be seen, from January, 1977 onward, the Dow moved irregularly lower. Weekly breadth, however, moved in an irregular uptrend from January through May, and then, on only a small rally in the Dow, sailed ahead to new highs. Daily breadth, although the January-May downtrend was steeper, did approximately the same thing. Most recently, what appears to be a similar breadth pattern has been developing. Between September, 1980 and February of this year, both daily and weekly breadth moved in an irregular sort of downtrend despite new highs in the Dow in November and January. Since the February low, however, weekly breadth has totally cancelled this potential divergence and moved ahead to new highs, most recently posting a new peak despite the failure of the Dow and of the S & P to do so. Daily breadth figures have not yet confirmed this sort of action but have recovered almost all of the ground lost since last April and is not that far away from confirming an uptrend from its December, 1980 low. If the 1976-1978 patterns follow through, the implications may not be that bullish for the averages. In- deed. following July, 1977, the Dow dropped some 150 points to its March, 1978 low. Good breadth action prevailed throughout this period, however, and there existed a bear market in the averages but not in the average stock. That market was. in other words, one where an appropriate strategy was to remain fully invested as is, in our view, the appropriate strategy today. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (6/18/81) 997.34 132.16 1178.97 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsIa No stclemenl or expreSSion of op'nion or any ather matter rereln contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,nd,rectly, on offer or the solICitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The mat'er IS presented merely for the converlena of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our m(ormo- tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any aellon to be loken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery ScOIl, 'nc, 05 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poslhons or trades 1M respect to any secuntles menhoned In thiS or any fulure Issue, ond such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thu or any other issue Jonney Montgomery Seo't, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investment odvlSor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory anrl o'her customer Independently of any statements made In r;ls r In any other Issue Further information on any securlly mentioned herein .s avoilable on request

,..-, …. '-lo TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE June 26, 1981 '–Veteran-observers are well aware-that the-stocKmarket, at variOUS poiritslntime,–tenas tobecome obsessed with one particular area of the financial scene. It is obvious, at the moment, that the market's current obsession is with interest rates and the money supply, and almost every move, up or down, tends to be explained, not entirely without justification, by developments on this front. It is interesting that the market has chosen almost totally to ignore the basic fiscal policy changes being proposed by the Reagan Administration and now in various stages of progress through Congress. It is, in our view, at least an arguable premise that the final form taken by these changes will have a considerably more far-reaching effect on corporate earning power and thus on corporate market value than will the day-to-day fluctuations of interest rates which are the market's current major concern. There is .. for example, the entire approach which has become embodied in the catch-all phrase, supplyside economics. The basic supply-side claims, it seems to us, have profound implications for the stock market. The controversial assertion that supply-side tax cuts will ultimately result in increased tax revenues and thus reduced fiscal pressure is justified on the premise that the proper application of tax reduction will stimulate capital investment and thus productivity. This can only work, it would appear, through increasing corporate cash flows in many areas, thus producing a fairly profound effect on capital values. This is an area that should, at least, be of direct interest to the stock market. These supply-side claims are opposedby two equally vocal but totally different groups, one on the political left, the other on the right. The first group is comprised of the aging neo-Keynesians who dominated fiscal policy thinking for so many years and whose economic models are totally at variance with the concept of supply-side stimulus. The second group consists of balance-the-budget-beforeanything-else conservatives who are unwilling to assume the inflationary risks implicit in supply-side tax cuts, which might not perform as advertised. What is lacking in all three participants in the debate, the two above plus the supply-side proponents, is any noticeable sense of humility. One would -suppose-t-ht-economisthose-past-forecastin-record,–hkehat-of-market-analysts-,-falls-comliderllblr— short of perfection, would be aware that they practice an inexact science. and it is an unfortunate fact that no one knows, with any degree of certainty, what the effects of supply-side tax reduction will be, including those, pro and con, who are most vocal in expressing their opinions. It is this element of uncertainty, in our view, which may constitute an important barrier to the stock market's upside progress. Meanwhile, various sub-elements of the proposed tax changes seem to be of basic importance as far as the stock market is concerned. One, OfcoUllse, isapossible reduced level of capital-gains taxes, a possibility raising all manner of theoretical questions which space prevents discussing in a single issue of this letter. Another change of significant importance entails revised depreciation allowances, centering around what was originally 3-5-10 and what has now, apparently, become 3-5-15. We cannot avoid interjecting our own view that it is in this area that the administration's tax proposals find themselves on the shakiest ground. Depreciation, it should be remembered, is a provision involving recovery of the cost of an asset over the useful life of that asset. We fail to understand how an administration basically committed to an inherent skepticism regarding the beneficient powers of government can believe that the useful life of an asset can be determined by government fiat. It certainly cannot be gainsaid that present depreciation provisions fail to provide for recovery of a long-term asset's cost in an inflationary environment. The problem with monkeying around with governmentdecreed useful lives, it seems to us, is nothing more than an attempt to introduce a countervailing unreality as an antidote to another unreality. More fundamental cures for the disease exist. One such has been proposed by a pair of Harvard academics who propose replacing depreciation taken over a period of years with a one-shot allowance for an asset's cost appropriately discounted over its useful life. Arcane as this proposal may sound, a moment's thought will convince one that it has the undoubted merit of adjusting for future inflation ,regardless of amount, since the entire depreciation allowance is made available in the same dollars used to purchase the original asset. Another proposal which would work equally as well would be provision for allowing the mark-up of existing assets at various intervals to replacement value less accumulated depreciation and re-adjustment of depreciation schedules to recover that amount over the asset's remaining useful life. Despite these quibbles, however, there exists in this quarter basically very little quarrel with the administration's tax packages. It is our view, based, we freely admit, as much on hope and optimism as on analysis, that the ultimate results of supply-side tax reduction could be pleasantly surprising, not only to the recipients of the tax cuts, but to the economy as a whole. This pleasant surprise, in turn, could result in a surprisingly good equity market. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 994.67 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 132.80 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TAB ELL AWTsla No statement or cxpreSllon of opinion or any alher moffer herein conta,ned is, or 15 to be deemed to be. directly or indireCTly, on offer or the 10l\clloloon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converlence of Ihe suhscrlber While oNe believe the sources of our mformatlon to be rehoble, we In no way represent or guaran'ee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action 10 be taen by the subscriber should be based on his own Investigation and Information Janney!t0ntgomery Scotl, Inc, as a corporation, and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake POSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thls–or any future Issue, and such POSition may be d,fferenl from any views now or hereaher expressed In thl or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS r;;glstercd With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investmen' odvlso'Y al'lrl olhel customers Il'Idependently of ol'ly statements mode In thiS or In any other luue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS availablE' on request

TABELLS MARKET LETTER , -C;;C—;.c—–.–.——- 909 STATE hOAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe — – – – — —.-0'-'-. July .2, 1981 – …' We have been focusing in recent issues of this letter on what seems to us to be one of the great ironies of the stock market forecasting profession over the past half dozen years–its preoccupation with bull and bear markets. The ironic aspect of this particular obsession stems from the fact that, ever since market timing and portfoliO strategy have become buzz words among money managers, there have occurred no bear markets in the traditional sense. The sum total of our downside experience since the 1974 lows were reached has been a two-year period in 1976-1978, when the averages declined a bit more than 20 percent but the secondary stocks rose in abundance, and three sharp declines, which were essentially intermediate in scope, in the fall of 1978, the fall of 1979 and the spring of 1980. Technical analysis provided some, occasionally ambiguous, warnings of these swings prior to their occurrence and they were, indeed, of sufficient magnitude so that the aggressive trader -might profitably have benefited from an attempt to anticipate them. For the longer term investor, however, seven years have now gone by, during which essentially the proper policy was to remain aggressively committed to equities, always providing, of course, that those equities were well chosen. We have tried, in our own forecasting efforts, to suggest that we see nothing in the technical evidence that indicates a change in this basic market environment. However, we have thing of never, we hope, deluded ourselves the past arid that intermediate term into peri thin ods king that of below- amvearrakgeetpvIu'llcneeraacbtiiolni-tcyO\iwldas-.a,…….,,,…i- not, in fact, occur. We raise this point at the moment since the market appears to be approaching a fairly critical stage, with a pattern developing out of which such intermediate term weakness might well arise. To recapitulate recent history. the Dow last achieved a high on April 27th of 1024.05 and, thereafter, reacted to a May 11th low of 963.44. The recent advance to 1011. 99 in mid-June and the subsequent decline, which has reached a low under 970 at this writing, must be regarded as a conventional upside failure. and it is now quite obvious that the May 11th low is being tested. That low may. indeed, hold and ,if it does so, it will have to be construed, in our view, as a bullish portent. Penetration, however, would strongly suggest that further intermediate-term weakness was in store. The key to our own technical interpretation at this point is that we do not think that the distributional top formed between January and April has been broadened by the recent advance-and-retreat cycle. The downside risk at the moment, therefore, seems limited to the original objective of that top, i.e., in the 925-900 area. Individual stock patterns, which have admittedly deteriorated in certain areas; for example, defense and drug issues, do not appear to suggest downside objectives consistent with much lower levels for the averages. In many ways, weakness which might occur from this point could be viewed as an example of rotating leadership. Energy issues, the major drag on the market since last fall, appear to be attempting to form bases. Since many such issues declined as much as 50 percent, further vulnerability from these levels appears limited. It is quite conceivable, however, that energy stocks, in the process of building longer-term base formations, could test their lows of a few weeks ago. This sort of test, coupled with intermediate-term declines in other areas, however, is likely to produce fairly disappointing action on the part of the broad market averages. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12 00 pm) 965.47 S & P Composite (12 00 pm) 129.48 Cumulative Index (7/1/81) 1160.51 AWTjt ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of OPinion or any o'her malter herein (ontolned os, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. on offer or the SOIICI'otlon of an offer 10 buy hOn to or be leI(!!IioCinbr,e security , we In referred no wCly 10 or mentioned The motler IS presented merely represent Of guarantee the accuracy thereof nor for the convel'lenct; of Ihe vbsctlb(!r Whde we believe the sources of our Informa. of the statements mode herem Any actlan to be loken by the subscriber should be based an hi' own inVestigation and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc as 0 corporation, and .ts officers or employees may now hove or moy loler take positions or trodes 11\ respect to ony seCUntles mentioned in Ihls or any future Issue, end such pesI).on may be different from any 'views now 01 h/eafter expressed J th,s or any other ,ssue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its ,Vestment advISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In Ih1 or In any other Issue Further Information on any seCl.mty mentioned herein IS available on request

..- , 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE The last fortnight of stock-market action has been, to say the least, less than encouraging. The Dow most recently reached a closing high of 1011.99 on June 15, this high, as we suggested last week, a probable unsuccessful test of the rally high of 1024.05, posted back in April. Following the mid-June peak, what might be considered a mini-failure took place, as the average rallied to 1006.66 on June 23. This was fOllowed by no fewer than eight consecutive declining days, the closing low so far being Monday's figure of 949.30, completing a 6.2 percent drop from the high of three weeks ago. We mentioned last week that the most plausible downside targets for the Dow appeared to center around the 925-900 area, a target zone which remains 25-50 points below the lowest levels achieved so far. In the absence of evidence that a base attempt was taking place, we would be inclined to continue to use this target zone in our current scenario. It is true that some minor evidence of an oversold condition managed to manifest itself in last week's trading. The period June 29 to July 6, for example, saw five consecutive' days on which more than 1,000 issues showed up in the decline column. This is a fairly rare occurrence which, in fact, has occurred on only five previous occasions in all stock market history. Interestingly enough, the last time it occurred was on the five days ending December 11, 1980. This significantly, turned out to be the precise starting point from which the current intermediate-term rally began and also the starting point for the year-end rally. The previous occurrence was a string of six days with more than 1000 declining issues which ended on March 10, 1980. This was just 2! weeks before the Silver Thursday low on March 27. It was also at a point some 60 point higher than that ultimate low. Likewise, – —–the intermediate-tellil decline-;,rrthe-fatl–of–19'f8-saeparatesimilar–occasionsasthe – – – – — . market moved down. Both of these were on the way to the bottom rather than at the ultimate nadir. Last week's technical action can therefore, it seems to us, logically be viewed as typical of a market which is on its way to a short-term bottom but is unlikely to have actually achieved that bottom. In order for one to assume that a meaningful low took place on July 6, a number of other pieces of evidence would have to fall into place. In classic terms, the most convincing sort of evidence would be a rally attempt accompanied by meaningful breadth and volume — volume returning to, say, above the 60-million share level with advancing stocks consistently running into the four figures -just as declining issues did last week. Such evidence, needless to say, has failed to manifest itself, and it certainly cannot be found in Thursday's rather tepid rally attempt. Meanwhile, outside the main arena, there are a number of interesting sideshows going on. One such subsidiary event has been' the action of the gold market, with the yellow metal, as readers are well aware, having recently moved below 400 in both the European and U.S. markets, a level less than half its high of a year and a half ago. There are, of course, various explanations or, more properly perhaps, rationalizations of this phenomenon. One,of course ,is that record high short-term interest rates makes gold's cost-of-carry prohibitive. We find this explanation unconvincing since money rates were not all that different when the metal was at twice its current level. We think the explanation more probably lies in lessened inflationary expectations on the part of gold market participants. As our long-term readers are aware, this letter has never been accused of excess piety in worshipping at the altar of gold. We have never, however, claimed that, in proper context, it did not provide a longterm store of value and thus a protection against extended periods of inflation. It has of course done this, doubled and in spades, in the 1970s and 1980s. We have, ourselves, never held to the belief that either the inflation or stock-market environments of that decade were permanent phenomena and, as readers know, we count ourselves among the more optimistic observers as far as reduced inflationary prospects are concerned. We find ourselves happy, therefore, that the gold fanatics, a group with whom we have been known to be at odds in the past, seem, in their market action, to show that they share our optimism. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12.00 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (7/9/81) AWT rs 954.62 129.21 1135.51 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or eXpreS5jon of Opinion or any other mafler herein contomed is, or 1 10 be deemed to be, dlrcC'lly or 'nd,reC'!ly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell ony ccunly referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subsmber While we believe the Ources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guoronlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any acTion to be tak.en by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later tok.e, pontlons or trades If! respect to any secur/Ws mentioned 1M thiS or any future Issue, and such POSitIon may be different from ony views now or hereafter e;.pressed In thIS or any other issue Janney Montgomery Scalf, Inc, which .s registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVISor, moy give adVice to Its Investment advlOry and olhel customers .ndependently of any stotemenls mode .n thiS or In any other Issue Furlher information on any security mentioned herein Is available on request

————————————————————————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANoe,lNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 17, 1981 JheN ew YorkoStock)lxctHl-'lgeJeleaedLetlytheiI' m()nthly figur.sn-.!bel'XE Jirms carrymg customers' stock margin accounts .. Since.figures. have been avSilable, debit baJances of margin accounts in aggregate terms have generally moved in the same direction as stock prices, but at a more exaggerated rate. The chart on the opposite page shows this to be true, until the Dow Jones Industrial Average from its 1976 high declined to its February, 1978 low. Uncharacteristically, since that time, margin debt has increased with minor interruptions to new highs through June of this year. Margin customers of the NYSE member firms added 170 million to their indebtedness bringiIlg the total margin debt to a record of 14,870 million at the end of June. This is the third month in a row customers' margin debt posted an all time high in the series that dates to January, 1965. The NYSE reported that margin accounts totaled 1,320,000 in June, also a record in the series. Because of the speculative nature of the market and the level of the DJIA coupled with the extraordinarily high cost of broker loans used to finance the stock purchases, the number of accounts and the amount of margiIl debt are indeed remarkable. In the following exhibit we will try to put these figures in perspective by comparing the behavior of margin accounts to margin debt. Also, we have taken the highs and lows of the margin accounts /debt and compared them to corresponding major highs and lows of DJIA. EXHIBIT I Margin Debt(mil) Accounts(thou) Ratio Date Dow-Jones June, 1968 High 6690 940 14.05 11729768 985.08 July, 1970 Low 3780 770 20.37 5/26/70 631.16 Dec. 1972 High 7900 Dec —' .-197.41——.r.ow——-391.01-.., 750 9.49 1/11/73 1051.70 625 —…….15 ..98..;1..2.. /6JJ4 -557..7…s011 June, 1981 High 14870 1320 8.88 4/27/81 1024.05' . From 1965 to date the range of this ratio is 20.37 high on July, 1970 and 7.94 low on October, i978. The ratio tends to be high at major market bottoms (July, 1970 and December, 1974) and low at market tops (December, 1972). The relatively high ratio in June, 1968, a market high, can obviously be attributed to the large amount of speculation in the market. Also, the ratio tends to peak before market highs and after a market low. If these observations are valid, the recent or a subsequent high in customer margin debt would iIldicate the DJIA could be higher at a later date. EXHIBIT II June, 1968 July, 1970 Dec. 1972 Dec. 1974 June, 1981 Margin Debt High 6690 Low 3780 High 7900 Low 3910 High 14870 Total Market Value 641037 531077 872000 511054 1225000 Percentage 1.043 .712 .906 .765 1. 214 Date 11/29/68 5/26/70 1/11/73 12/ 6/74 4/27/81 Dow-Jones 985.08 631.16 1051. 70 577.60 1024.05 Another way we are able to analyze the customers' stock market debt is to compare it to the total market value of equities listed on the NYSE. From 1965 to date the range of the percentage of margin debt to total NYSE market value has been 1. 53 percent high on October, 1978 and .597 percent low on January, 1971. The observations seem' to be the same – the higher the percentage of margin debt to market value, the higher the averages, and, conversely, the lower the percentage, the lower the averages. Although the above exhibits would allow for stock prices to go higher, one set of figures released by the NYSE would argue this point. The number of customers carrying margin accounts under 40 percent equities totals 13 percent. This figure represents an alarmiIlg 25 percent of total margin debt, a figure in excess of 3.7 billion. In simplest terms, this means the quality of credit has deteriorated during the month of June, with 25 percent of the debt in accounts in the lowest equity class. It should be remembered that in August-September of 1974, this ratio reached a high of 23 percent, a series record, representing 58 percent of total margin debt and was thought to be a major contribution to the decline in late 1974. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.) 956.62 S & P Composi1e1200 p.m.) 130.66 Cumulative Index (7/16/81) 1141. 51 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL RJS rs No statement or expreSSion of oplOIon or (lny other molter herCln contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the OII(llollon of on off!)! to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the tonvenlence of the subscriber While e believe the sourtes of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the acturacy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any Ottlon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now hOVII, or may loter take, positions Of trodes IfI respect 10 any securlhes mentioned In thiS ar any future luue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIS mvestment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of ony statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformotlon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request .. II . I,, -''J '- , i III II \ I pnn 11l1ll- ,I I I I 1200 1 1100 Innn I v-a -, gOD- Cl 1/ Vvv8nn 7nn ' I V .6nn Ie; 14 11 j) z(f) 11 0 In – -m 9 , mwI- B Cl z 7 -Q a L 6 Ir 5 4 !/rt r V trVI I V- 1000 900 IV BOO I- 700 OJ R . I , 600 j Ii 15 ;A U/J'i 14 I ,I I– 13 12 V'I\! 11 10 1/ I, , 1– 9 B 7 , I )Ir NY E 6 I' 5 4 l MRRGIN DEBT 3 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1\ 197'-1 ,I 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 II'II 3 II I –

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEy 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANoe. INC MEMBE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANoe – July 24, 1981 , .As, .0L a to resist the temptation with. alI!.q!, -than- 3O-Yi'.r…wstorYl…0ften find .itdiffic)llt quote from past issues. We apolog;.ze to our, readers' in. advance -for the fact that this week's issue consists almost entirely of such quotes. The reasons will, however, be apparent. From the issue of November 3, 1978 Monday featured an almost-classic selling climax which totally faIled to follow through in Tuesday's trading as a 17-point decline to 792.45 took place in what may come to be known as the Halloween Horror Story. Then on Wednesday, ostensibly due to President Carter's plan to strengthen the dollar, came a 35-point rally … It is, in sum, an undeniable fact that the sort of condition that the market had reached late last week and early this week was a rare bird indeed for the post-World-War II period. It is possible to go even further and state that that condition, when achleved in the past 30 years, has been almost universally associated with major market bottoms. Climax lows are not always the actual lows in the averages, and, indeed, they may be followed by new lows often quite some time later. Such climactic troughs, however, have usually tended to pinpoint what may be thought of as the effective bottom. Having said all this, we are compelled to raise a more-than-moderately disquieting point. It all took place at the wrong time. The textbook climax action of last week occurred, not after a major downswing, but very close to a market top scored just last September. This, and the fact cannot be ignored, is totally without precedent for the last 30 years … From the issue of October 19, 1979 We noted last week that on n!onday, October 9, 91.1 of issues traded moved lower in price and pointed out that this was the seventh highest figure since breadth statistics have been maintained. The near record was followed on Tuesday, October 10 by a day on which 86 of all issues traded declined. The relative rarity of such occasions is underscored by the fact that since 1946, there have been only 147 days on which more man 15 of all 19u ….. nanos . The essimtial p'o!'t which we tried to make last week was that these occurrences generally have been of two sorts of occasions 1) the terminal phase of declines, and 2) declines which take place in reaction to sudden and un- expected events, a category which, we think, suitably characterizes Mr. Volcker's bombshell of two weeks ago. The point is that recent action hardly falls into the first category mentioned above, since it took place within a week of the major indices' achievement of new bull-market highs. It seems therefore, highly likely that it must be placed in the second category. It is, therefore, worth noting that most declines of this type were shortly reversed by moves to new highs before too long a time period had elapsed. From the issue of March 28, 1980 If the intervention of precious metal prices into equity trading was a new phenomenon, the effect it produced was an old one … From a technical point of view, Thursday's trading was straight out of the textbooks, constituting the familiar phenomenon known as a selling climax. The occurrence of this particular classic example, We must quickly point out, does not necessarily suggest that the stock market saw its absolute low of 729.95 intraday for the Dow on Thursday afternoon … We have in the past in this letter used the technique of suggesting that an effective bot- tom has been reached … This reminder is, we think applicable in the present instance … Our feeling, however, based on Thursday's action plus the historically oversold condition which preceded it, is that the preliminary stages of a technical rebuilding process have probably begun. And here we go again. Just three months after reaching a rally high of 1024.05 the Dow has declined almost 100 points to a closing low of 924.66 on Wednesday. What has conspicuously failed to occur so far is the sort of selling-climax action which took place on each of the three occasions described above. As the quoted text makes clear, that sort of action,capping short, sharp declines which took place shortly after new highs had been made, at the time, was unexpected. Now, after three repetitlons in tWD and a half years, it would be logical to expect the current declining phase to end with action not dissimilar to the sort of thing described above. Markets, of course, have a tendency to produce surprises, and the present one could sur- prise in one of two ways. First, it could develop into something more than an intermediate-scale decline, on the order of the three discussed above, and ultimately turn out to be of major proportions. As we have noted in the past, we doubt the likelihood of this eventuality based on present technical patterns. A second surprise would be a decline which petered out and which failed to end with the climactic conditions which have now become commonplace. While this is possible, we do not think that climactic action is yet widely enough expected to make its absence a likelihood. Dow-Jones Industrial Average (12 00 p. m.) 932.36 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 128.14 CumUlative Index (7/23/81 1126.83 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL ATWrs No slaleml!!nt or c)(prCUlon of Opinion or any other motter herein tonlolned Is, or to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of on oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscrober While we belteve the sourtes of our .nformotlon 10 be reliable, WI! In no way represent or guorontee the occuroty thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any aellon to be IOen by the subscriber shOUld be based on hiS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, lnt , as a corporation, and Its officers or employe!'s, may now have, or may later lake, positions or trades In respect ta any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSllion may be different frOm any vlew now or hereafter exprested In thIS or any other Issue Janney MOl'llgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give adVice to 'IS Investment odvnory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or Hl any other Issue Further information on any serurlly mentioned here'n IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBeR New YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMSER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGe … – .– ….. .,. . ….uly2!!–!98 . …,L There -eXists traditionally, in the minds -of most Americans ;-some soreoCtemiolls–relation- ship between the fortunes of Wall Street and those of the Republican Party. This image 'probably goes back to the days of Thomas Nast cartoons depicting bloated capitalists with dollar signs on their vests. There is at least some logical justification for the association in that Republicans have been called the party of business, and it is indeed undeniable that, over the long term, the overall level of business profits constitutes the basic determinant of securities prices. Nonethe- less, attempts to link Republican political fortunes to the level of the Dow Jones Industrial Average have, over most of the past century, foundered on the hard rock of statistical fac!. Somehow, the financial community conspicuously fsils to treat Republican successes with the elation that, subconsciously at least, many observers have come to expect. The truth of this particular axiom has been demonstrated once agsin over the past year. Mr. Reagan was nominated last July and elected last November. With the passage of his tax bill in both the House and Senate this week by larger-than-expected margins, coupled with Congress' prior acceptance-in-toto of his budget proposals, he has recorded a political success perhaps un- equaled since the fabled first hundred days of the Roosevelt administration in 1933. The stock market's total response to this phenomenon has been a yawn. On all three of the occasions mentioned above, the Dow Jones Industrial Average remained steadfastly in the low 900's. To those who believe that the market possesses some sort of collective wisdom, the inevitable corollary is that it is sending us some sort of message by its apparent total boredom with the present administration and all its works. Those of a bearish frame of mind, including the pur- veyors of disaster chic, are forced to the conclusion that the message being conveyed is that the administration's economic program, 3t simply, is not going to work. The gloom-and-doom theorists have never been able to any alternative an e\'(jr in 0Jtu.a. 'lIlU SO rnat It Jeaas -me',aau,.r to '. Tney . . a.r ,,,y of the middle ground that the Reagan program purports to offer. Smce most of these oaoao – presumably- emerged from their bomb shelters long enough to vote for Mr. Reagan last November, they must be at least mildly embarrassed at finding themselves in bed with such apostles of the old order as Walter Heller, who are equally vocal in assuring us that no middle ground exists. It has never been the view in this quarter that the market was a sort of Delphic Oracle with the ability to know things that the rest of us don't. Indeed when the market demonstrates such knowledge it is generally and reliably wrong. The last such demonstration of prescience that we can recall was the certainty in 1972 that earnings and prices for the nifty fifty were going to go on increasing forever and ever. Prior examples of the market's wisdom include the inevitability of a post-war depression in the late 1940's and the certainty of continuing prosperity in 1928- 29. With this background, we find ourselves singularly undisturbed by the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the Reagan program. Indeed, we should have found it a great deal more disturb- ing had the market greeted the President's arrival by going on one of its periodic tears and equating his accession with some sort of new version of the Second Coming. One can find ample historical precedent for the present torpor in the year following the election of both prior new Republican presidents. Both in 1952, following the election of General Eisenhower, and in 1968, following that of Mr. Nixon the market did nothing over most of the subsequent twelve months. In the case of Eisenhower, at least, it found itself just about having doubled by the end of his term. In contrast to any oracular quality, we think the market tends, at any given time to reflect the state of conventional wisdom, conventional wisdom that has only slowly and psinfully developed over long years of experience. Since the year-Old Reagan fiscal policy essentially represents a reversal of almost a half century of prevailing wisdom, it is far too early to expect the market to have developed any collective thinking on the subject whatsoever. The current conventional wisdom reflected by the equity market quite obviously centers not around politics but interest rates and the theory that these must in fact come down before stocks can be expected to go up. As is the case with most such widely-held views, we suspect this one may find itself rudely shattered in one way or another over the next few years. By that time, the market may have developed the view of the Reagan economic program which it now resolutely refuses to express. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL – t Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.) 949.58 S & P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 130.61 Cumulative Index (7/30/81) 1142.77 No statement or eprenlon of OpiniOn or any other matter herein contomed IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dHectly or md,redly, on offer or the Ol,c,tollon of on offer to buy Or sell any secunty referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convenlenc of the subsCriber While we believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihc statements mode herein Any octlon to be loen by The subscriber should be bosed On hiS own Inves1tgatlon ond mformotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 1\ offICers or employees, may now hove, ar may later loe. positions or trades In respett to any securities mentIoned m thiS or any future Issue, ond such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter eypressed JIl Ihl5 or any other 'Sue Janney Montgomery Scott. Inc, wh,ch rs reg.stered …. rln the SEC as on InVeStment advisor, may glllt! adVIce /a lis tn ..estment advI50ry ond othel L-ruom.,od.P.Od.OYOIOOy'-o'-.m-.omod.,oth,,o,, ooyoth.,,,,.F'th'Ofo'mot,oooOOOy,,ru,,,ymoOO'dh',OOObO ,,q.,, –,