TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE AOAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVIBION OF' MEM6ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHA.NGE March 20, 1981 –!'- – …-…….s. –,,.. – k-. '- . — – – 0- .. – ;;-;;.;;-;;'t;'-11-1 The Dow-Jones Industrial Average's latest flirtation wIth the 1000 level set uS to doing- some this week. The venerable indicator first touched 1000 some 15 years ago in January. 1956. Since we have spent some 27 years In the securitIes business. this means that something more than half of our career has been spent witnessing periodic occurrences of this phenomenon. We were. thus. inspired to collect the figures below. 1966 is so far back in ancient history that computerized data bases do not cover it, but we have shown. in the table below, the closIng price of each of the DJIA TS components for selected dates starting with Dec- ember 3, 196B. the second occasion on which the Dow approached the 1000 mark. (It should be noted that IBM and Merck were not in the Dow for most of the period shown. All prices have been adjusted for stock splits.) Following the 1968 rise, the Dow then reached what is, to date, Its all-time high at 1051. 70 on January 11, 1973. 1t spent much of 1976 at or above the 1000 level with the high being reached at 1014.79 on September 21. The last three columns of the table show the Dow's most recent three attempts at four digits, November 20, 1980 at 1000.17, January 6, 1981 at 1004.69, and March 16, 1981 at 1002.79. Company Name 121 3168 1/11/73 9121/76 11/20/80 11 6/81 3/16/81 Alhed Chemical Corp. Aluminum Company America AmerlCan Brands, Inc. American Can Co. AmerIcan Tel & Tel Bethlehem Steel Corp. duPont Eastman Kodak Exxon Corp. General Electric Co. 37-1/4 24-7/8 35-3/4 58-3/8 55-1/4 28-7/8 58 78-3/4 41-1/2 49-318 30-1/8 19-7/8 45 32-3/8 54-5/8 29-112 61-1/2 147-3/4 45-5/8 73-5/8 40-1/4 29-1/2 42-5/8 36-1/8 62-1/8 42-1/8 44 93-518 56-7/8 55-3/4 60 3/4 33-5/8 76-1/2 30-3/8 47-1/2 28-1/4 43-1/4 74-1/4 87-1/2 61-1/2 55 31-1/8 80-1/4 32 50-3/8 26-7/8 44-3/8 75-1/2 80-1/2 64-1/2 56 112 36 73-314 29-7/8 52 29-3/4 51-7/8 82 70-3/4 68-1/2 General Foods Corp. eneralSJvlotors .-' – , – ,c–. 43-7/8 29-112 33-3/4 29-518 30-7/8 34 8 3 1 . 1 2 – 8 3 ' 73 -..;c –46-1-/1349–05i-'lHJ,o;o,-I,,,.-1 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Inco Ltd. InternatIonal Business Mach. International Harvester International Paper Co. Johns Manville Corp Merck & Co. Minnesota Mimng & Mfg. Owens Ill. Inc. Proctor & Gamble Co. Sears Roebuck & Co, Standard Oil of California Texaco Inc. Union Carbide Corp. United States Steel Corp. United Technologies Corp. Westinghouse Electric Woolworth Co. 30-3/8 37-1/4 66 36-7/8 39-114 40-1/8 44-3/8 56 39-112 48-1/8 33-3/8 17-3/8 44-1/2 48-7/8 29-1/8 36-1/8 37-1/2 34 30-3/4 36-1/8 83 37-1/8 41-7/8 29-518 98-3/8 88 21 114-3/4 60-3/4 21-1/8 39-5/8 50-3/8 22-1/2 22 46-1/4 30-1/4 24-1/4 17-7/8 35-112 22-1/8 72 72 31 28 71-318 42-1/4 30 25 80-3/8 80 66 60-1/2 29-1/8 27-1/2 95-7/8 73-1/8 35 16-1/8 19-318 51-7/8 29-518 49-1/4 65-1/8 52 51-1/4 24-3/4 34-5/8' 61-1/4 18-7/8 32-1/4 24-5/8 24 18-1/4 21-3/4 71-112 25-7/8 44-5/8 26 85-3/4 63-1/8 26-1/2 71 16-5/8 49-318 47-1/4 54-5/8 25-7/8 65 31-7/8 25- 3/8 18-3/4 22-1/8 64-5/8 19-5/8 51 24-1/8 85 62-3/8 29-3/4 74-1/8 17- 3/8 42-3/8 38-1/2 59-1/8 32-3/4 56-1/4 31 25-3/4 Taking the entire period December, 1968 through March, 1981 shows that the five best-acting stocks were Standard Oil of CalIfornia (143). American Brands (106), Merck (92), Exxon (70), and United Tech- nologies (56). An equal investment in these five companies would have produced a 90 gain over the 12year period. The worst-performing components were American Can (-49), Sears Roebuck (-48). International Harvester (-47), Inco (-41), and Johns Manville (-40). An investment in these five would have shown a 45 loss. Over the 12 years. those stocks advancing and declining are divided evenly with 15 stocks up from their1968 figure, as of last Monday, and 15 others down. A short-term comparison comparing MondayTs prices witli. those of January 6also has its interesting facets. ever the two-month period involved J 16 of the components have advanced and 14 have declined. The basic reason that the Dow remams below its January highs lies in the action of International Harvester plus the three oil components of the average. An equal investment in the Dow components. leaving out these four issues, would have produced a 4.1 gain over the last six weeks, The diversity of action, if nothing else, puts a fine point on some of the sermons we have recently been delivering in this space on the subject of securIty selection. As the table quite clearly shows, though the average itself may have made no progress over the past 12 years. the action of the individual components has been widely varied, and. in some cases. quite dynamic. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 991. 71 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 133.77 Cumulative Index (3/19/81) 1104.60 AWT sla No statement or expression of opmlOn or any other motler herein contOined IS, or IS to be deemed to be directly or indirectly, on offer or the solicitation of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menTioned The matter IS presented merely for the convellence of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Informo tlon to be rellClble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the staTements mude herein Any actIOn to be loken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, POSitiOnS or trodes In respect to oily securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or on)' other Issue Janney Montgomery Scort, Inc, which IS reg,stered wah the SEC as on investment adVISor, may give adVice to Its ,vestment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of ony sTotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menTioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER' 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081540 DiVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE ./ March 27, 1981 Come on now. Does anyone really, after the last three weeks, still believe that the stock market is a-,random walk The denotlement, 0f..course7'isthat',-on.Weanesday-,-March25;cthe Dow-Jones' ., Industrial Average closed at 1015.22, its highest level since 1973, and a point decisively above the trading range in which it had been locked since last August. It is, however, the ritual dance it engaged in in the course of reaching that point which is of interest to the mnrket observer. . The level of about 1000 on the Dow was of particular interest this time aro\md since, in addition to being an easily-remembered approximation of high points going back some 15 years, it was also the level of recent widely-repeated oracular predictions. The Dow, therefore, did not simply embrace and ravish the 1000 level. It flirted with it coyly over a period of no less than nine trading days, until such time as the final consummation took place on Wednesday. The story really begins back on January 6 when the Dow continued the year-end rally to achieve a new closing high of 1004.69. The twenty-point break on record volume the next day was followed by two weeks of lateral action around the mid-960's. An eventual low was reached at 932.25 on Feb- ruary 2, and tested on February 13. From that low, a bit over a month ago, a recovery set in which, by the beginning of March, had brought the Dow back to the mid-960 level. The question, of course, was whether or not all this was preparation for yet another assault on 1000. To gsin the full flavor of what happened subsequently, one is forced to resort to hourly readings. On Thursday, March 12, having spent two weeks at the 960- 970 level, the Dow posted a 22-point gsin, closing at its highest level of the day at 989.92. The following day saw strength at the opening bell which took the average,at its initial figure, to within an ace of 1000 at 997.93. This first assault was, predictably, turned back, and the market was six points below its opening figure at noon. An other attempt took place between noon and one o'clock, with a level above 995 being reached. This assault also was repulsed, and the final close (possibly suggesting that Friday the thirteenth was an -'- – inauspiciousAay-for- an-assault-on.a-new-highwasfourpointslowerAhanThur.sday!s .—— Monday, March 16 saw another attack with renewed vigor. After moving sideways until one o'clock, the market rallied sharply and closed at 1002.79, breaching the four-digit barrier but re- msining below the January 6 high. Tuesday's trading saw only slight progress (1004.86 at two o'clock was the high), followed by late afternoon weakness which led to a 10-point decline. That decline extended to a close of 986.58 on Thursday, March 19. Last Friday witnessed yet another attempt. The average was ahead 10 points to 996.13 at three o'clock, but lost a goodly portion of that gsin in the final hour. Then on Monday, the attempt was revewed and 1002.16 was reached at two o'clock, followed by weakness between two and three. Final- hour strength led to a close of 1004.23, 46/100 of a point below the January 6 high. By 11 AM on Tuesday, we were at 1009.37, but whatever was out there at the 1000 level had not yet given up. The two O'clock figure was below 1000, and the final close was 996.13. Finally on Wednesday, after reaching a low at noon of 998.56, the Dow demonstrated persistent strength throughout the entire day, and finally reached the 1015.22 figure mentioned above. We ask our readers' indulgence for this flight into recent history and are symphathetic to the com- plaint that it does nothing to answer the question, What now. Actually, with the recent strength, the framework for a plausible short-term scenario exists. We think that the market's ability to move decisively above the 1000 level suggests that the more optimistic interpretation of the February-March base we have been alluding to in the last few issues of this letter is the correct one. This would suggest a short-term target in the vicinity of 1050. Interestingly enough, the more broadly-based indices have, in recent days, formed a pattern which somewhat parallels that of the Dow. The S.& P 50 for instance, now possesses a possible upside target of 144-146. Both these figures, if achieved, would make the trading range of August, 1980-March, 1981 a matter of historical artifact. The clear question would then center around'how far the move begun in March of last year was likely to carry. As we have suggested in the past, readings of as high as 1200 on the Dow are possible. Agsinst this optimistic interpretation must be set the present maturity of the cycle which began some three years ago now in March, 1978. We are not yet ready to consign the 1000 level entirely to past history. Indeed, as we write this, it is agsin being approached, this time from above, in what must be considered a normal correction following the Wednesday rally. We would suggest, however, that the prospect for a move substantially above that figure is now better than it has been in some time. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 1003.96 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 136.18 Cumulative Index (3/26/81) 1127.92 AWTsla ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stctement or expression of opinion or any olher motter herein contotned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndirectly, en offer or Ihe 501,;110110,\ of on offer 10 bvy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 15 presenlC!d merely for the conYef'lenCE of the subscriber While VIe beheve the sources of our Informo han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor -of the statements mude herein Any action to be laken by Ihe subSCriber should be based on 1'115 own Invesllgohon and Information Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, poslhons or trades In respect to any secufltles mentioned In thiS or any future Iue, and such posItion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which 1 registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lts Investment advlso!), and olhel customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on ony security mentioned herein IS aVOIloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEy 08540 DIVISION OF MEMSER NEW YORI( STOCI( EXCHANOe. INC MEMBER A.MERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe April 3, 1981 —- — …. – — – , – – – – – . . …. — — — — — —'!' -….. -….. e. – -0… – – FO' most 'imdrtat questions, there exist both simple and 'compi,'' a'ns';ers' in-many cases; the com- plicated answers do not contribute any additional useful knowledge by virtue of their complexity. Such is often the case with questions regarding the equity market, and it is particularly true, we think, today. It is possible, at the moment, to take an extremely simple-minded attitude toward the stock market. That attitude can be constructed approximately as follows The market has just made a new high; we are, therefore, in a bull market; one should, therefore, be fully invested in common stocks. This, it is true, is an excessively simple construct. It is also probably correct. It is when one begins to look at the market esoterica that we technicians are paid to observe that com- plexities begin to arise. The first one, which we have mentioned before in this space, centers around the proper interpretation of the base formed in January and February of this year. As we have pointed out, the optimistic interpretation of that base leads to a short-term target of 1050 in terms of the Dow, and, as the patterns have formed recently, similar targets in the broader-based indices. In light of market action over the past couple of weeks, such targets appear plausible. The past fortnight's inspec- tion of individual chart patterns has detected a broad host of upside breakouts in individual issues, a large number of those breakouts being of significant proportions. Certainly, a continuation of the move to no more than 4-5 above current levels appears well within the range of possibility. Such a move, as we pointed out last week, would lend strong credence to the theory that the sideways trading range of September-December was nothing more than an interruption in an ongoing upswing from the lows of silver Thursday back last March. Such an upswing would have plausible targets in the area of 1200. When one begins to look elsewhere for evidence confirming such targets, the picture becomes mixed. Let us consider, for , breadth statistics. Most breadth indicators, including those of the most hA;h hiA hAVP nnwthp.Dowinmoving ab9ye thejrevelsoLJJIJLUary 6. Breadthcan, there-,.,,-jI''1 fore, be said to be in gear with the market in an upside move dating back to the year-end rally low early December. That move, incidentally, having now extend,ed into early April, and having advanced well over 10 percent, suggests, on the basis of historical evidence, that the December low of 908.45 is unlikely to be broken during 1981. What is still lacking in breadth statistics, is a confirmation of the highs of last September. Such a confirmation by one indicator, unadjusted weekly breadth, will probably take place when the figures for this week are finally in. As far as other breadth indicators are concerned, however, it will require considerable time and further strength before the highs of last September are penetrated. When and if a confirmation of last September's high does take place, those unshakably determined to seek bearish arguments in breadth statistics will be able to point out a lack of confirmation going back to September, 1978. We are inclined to dismiss this argument for a number of reasons, but it is probable that it will be heard from those who remain inclined to continue to fight the tape as the market moves to and through the highs made last fall. The importance of the September, 1978 breadth peak is one facet of a fairly important unresolved cyclical question. Our own interpretation of the market's position, in terms of the major four-year-cycle, has been — since approximately one month after the cycle started — that such a cycle began March, 1978. There exists growing evidence that this cycle may have been attenuated and that a new major cycle began just over a year ago, in March, 1980. It would be useful, although it is unfortunately- im- possible, to be certain whether we are dealing with a three-year-old mature bull market or one that, at the age of 13 months, remains relatively youthful. . It is possible to raise yet other esoteric questions. New NYSE highs for the week ended March 27 were 354 versus a figure of 516 last Septem,ber. The best figure so far attained for new daily highs is 175 on March 23, versus levels consistently above 200 in the September-November period. This consti- tutes evidence of some degree of maturity for the current upswing. – ;' 1I of this, however, should do nothing more than remind us that we see only through a glass darkly, and that portfolio management consits of making decisions in the face of uncertainty. Uncertainty has always existed, and it exists currently. However, the most practical attitude toward equities at the moment undoubtedly remains the simple-minded one suggested above. That attitude calls for a fully invested position in common stocks. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (4/2/81) 1011.17 136.16 1139.97 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL' AWT sla No statement or expreSSion of opinIOn or any other motter here'n contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCItation of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlen of the subscriber While 'Ne believe the sources of our InformaTion TO be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and II'Iformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatlon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, poslilons or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSitron rooy be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thl or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVIce to Its Investment odvl(Y and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other ISsue Further Informal Ion on any secunty mentioned heretn IS available 01 request

,(, ;;;'-' , TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION Of' MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – ……..— – – April 10. 1981 . – -….- – – — — –'- — — . – – – —-' –; – -.'—- Some three weeks ago, in this space, we made our own contribution to celebratmg the DowIs reachmg the 1000 level by reprinting the closmg prices of each of the 30 components on six different dates which had in common the fact that the Dow had, on those dates, closed at a hIgh above 1000. The dates were in the years 1968. 1973. and 1976. along with three more recent occaSIons. The purpose of the exercise was to show the diversity in prlce actIon among the individual Dow components over a long period of time. The study, however, did nothing to illuminate the relative value of the Dow today versus the previous dates on which it had attained 1000. We have tried to suggest some conclusions In thIS direction by putting together the table below which shows the earnings and dividends for each of the 30 components for 1968 and for 1980, both being years In which the Dow closed at or close to the 1000 level. We have also shown, in the table, the percentage changes in the earnings. dividends. and the stock price. the last taken from the orIgInal study three weeks ago. Company Name Allied Chemical Corp. Aluminum Company Amenca AmerIcan Brands. Inc. Amencan Can Co. American Tel & Tel Bethlehem Steel duPont Eastman Kodak Exxon Corp. General Electric GeneaLEQodsCor.p General Motors Goodyear Tire & Rubber Inco Ltd. International Business Mach. International Harvester International Paper Johns Manville Merck & Co. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Owens Ill. Inc. Proctor 8; Gamble Co. Sears Roebuck 8; Co. Standard Oil of California Texaco Inc. Union CarbIde Corp. United States Steel Corp. United Technologies Corp. Westinghouse Electric Woolworth Co. AVERAGE EARNINGS 1968 1980 1. 46 1. 59 8.59 6.54 3.42 13.13 4.23 4.26 3.74 3.65 2.66 2.33 2.97 8.19 2.77 4.83 7.15 13.01 1. 96 6.65 2.08 5.15 6.01 2.06 1. 93 (2.65) 2.85 2.56 1. 54 2.69 5.72 (9.82) 2.28 5.97 2.39 2.47 1. 30 1. 49 1.55 2.15 1. 36 1. 33 3.07 2.60 5.54 5.78 5.09 7.78 1. 75 7.02 8.31 10.48 3.13 5.25 2.55 7.28 1. 74 4.71 1. 29 3.60 DIVIDENDS 1968 1. 73 .60 1. 88 2.20 2.40 1. 60 1.83 1.09 1.83 1. 30 I 20 4.30 .71 1. 23 .52 1. 80 1. 39 1.10 .90 .73 .68 1.20 .65 .63 1. 45 2.00 1. 60 .85 .90 1. 00 1980 2.15 1.60 5.90 2.90 5.00 1.00 2.75 3.05 5.40 2.90 2-1-5 2.95 1. 30 .69 3.44 2.50 2.40 1. 92 2.30 2.80 1. 40 3.60 1. 34 1. 80 2.45 3.10 1. 60 2.20 1.40 1.45 CHANGE Earmngs 488 311 284 1 119 – 24 81 207 338 239 147 38 33 271 162 3 326 287 228 262 29 428 171 303 68 186 170 57 Dividends 24 167 213 32 108 50 180 195 123 -1.9 – 31 83 – 44 561 39 73 75 155 283 106 200 106 186 69 55 158 56 45 173 111 Stock Price 52 44 106 – 49 6 3 – 11 4 70 39 – – 38 – 38 – 41 -2 – 47 30 – 40 92 11 – 25 54 – 48 144 – 13 21 13 55 – 17 – 24 10 Considering the fact that the Dow average itself is unchanged over the 12 years (The average price change, equally weighted. is 10.) the increases in earning power and dividend payout are quite as- tounding. 27 of the 30 stocks Increased their earnings over the 12 years involved, and all but 2 increased their dividends. The average percentage increase in earnings was 173, and the average rise in dividends 111. These figures stand up well even when adjusted for inflation. The GNP deflator rose by 119j; over the 12 years involved. Earnings bettered this increase by a conSIderable amount, and dividends about equalled it, even at 1980 rates, considerably lower than those estimated for 1981. 19 of the 30 stocks were able to show earnings mcreases better than the rate of inflation, and 12 posted dividend increases of more than that amount. The investor who followed the smple-minded course of buying the 30 current Dow stocks and holding them 12 years ago is now receiving approXlmately equal income after adjusting for mflation to that which he received at the time of purchase. We think there are two conclusions to be drawn from this study. The first is that investors in equities over the past dozen years may, at current prices at least. have seen capital values eroded by mflation. but the income provided by dividend growth has been able to keep pace with rising prices. We think It reason- able to conclude. furthermore, that the Dow remains demonstrably a much cheaper investment vehicle today than it was at the same price a bit over a decade ago. For this reason. the Dow's recent stutter at the 1000 level. while it may, for reasons we have suggested, be easily justified technically. would appear to have relatively little justification in terms of fundamental value. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P CompOSIte (12 00 PM) 1001. 89 135.00 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL Cumulative Index (4/9/81) 1142.44 AWT sla No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convel'lence of the subSCriber While -Ne b(!lleve the sourcC of our information to be reliable, we m no woy represent or guorantee the occurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and mformatlon Jonney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os 0 corporotlon, ond 115 officers or employees, moy now have. or may loter toke, pOSitiOns or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities menlloned In thIS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, tnc , which IS registered With Ihe SEC os on Investment adVISor, may give adVice to liS mvestment adVISOry and other customers Indept!ndently of any statements made m thIS or In ony other Issue Further informatIon on ony security mentioned h(!fcln IS avoiloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCH!NOE April 16. 1981 It has been the ofFrepeated opimOhof.thisletter1hat . when engaging-irttM nazardbu ari-'of stock market forecastIng, It is as important to ask the right questions as to get the right answers. It is. perhaps, worthwhile, then, at a time when ready answers to the stock market dIlemma are receIving wide publicity. to back off a bit and try to see just what sort of questions we should be asking ourselves at this stage. In such a process. it IS always best to begin WIth known facts. The first such fact is that we are (or. at worst. were three weeks ago) in a bull market. This statement is derived from the simple arithmetic of the Dow's having been at 759.13 on April 21. 1980 and at 1015.22. some 34 higher. on the 25th of last month. Thirty-four percent. while rather paltry for a bull market. even by modern-day standards. unquestionably meets historical criteria. Like most bull markets. this one started out WIth a dynamic phase. Between April 21 and September 22 of last year. it moved ahead 28 to 974.57 in just 5 months. This sort of thing is reasonably familiar to market observers. It is comparable to the 26 advance between December. 1966 and September. 1967. the 42 illcrease between July. 1970 and April. 1971. or the 52 rise from December. 1974 to July. 1975. Beginning in September. as we all know. the advance became more irregular. New hIghs above 1000 were subsequently reached, first in November. then in January, and once again three weeks ago. Yet, compared to the prior upside phase. the advance has definitely been more modest. The Standard & Poors 500. for example. posted ItS high last November and remains. at current levels. some 4 below that peak. The same is true of other broad-based indicators. There are only two possible interpretations of this sort of action. Either we find ourselves in a distributional phase preceding an important market decline. or we are in (or have just terminated) a consolidation phase preparatory to a new upswing. Having defined the question, we can now proceed to offer an answer. Based on the weight of currently available evidence. we are inclined toward the latter interpretation. There exists ample historical precedent for the argument favoring a consolidation phase. especially if one examines the history of more ,recent upswings as compared to those that took place in the 1950's and early 1960's. Following the initial advance from 669 in July-, 1970 to .950 in April. 1971. for example. -,.,– tl1eDow posted a 12 decline to August. recovered- some two-thirds of tne ground-lost. and then posted – — – another 13 drop to 798 in November. 1971. This was followed by an upward move to 1051 in January. 1973. Likewise. 1974 saw summer doldrums in which the Dow. having attained a high of 882 in July. declined to a low of 784 in October. It subsequently rose to 1014 in September. 1976. Neither of these instances is terribly unlike the present Gase. ill which the Dow declined 9 from its high of last November. posted a 10 rally into early January. dropped 7 by mid-February. and then moved tl the most recent new high. As we suggested in our letter of last week. one of the most telling arguments in favor of a consolidation phase lies in the patterns of individual stocks. By and large. these patterns fail to reveal the sort of widespread distribution whiCh one would expect to find during the buildup of a major general-market top formation. We see instead stocks just breaking out of important base formations or, more commonly, in various phases of upmoves where, in most cases, higher objectives are readable. What may well make the current market unique is the single exception to this rule. The only area in which important distributional patterns appear widely is in the energy stocks. The rather sorry short-term behavior of these Issues is, of course, a matter of historical record. It can be exemplified simply by noting the fact that the Standard & Poors Oil Composite Index reached a high of 392 back in November. It was. as of this Wednesday. around 278. a drop of almost 30. We have. in this single statistic. an almost complete explanation for the lack of progress in the averages since last fall. As of the November peak. the Oil Composite represented 24 of the S & P 500 and. related groups comprised another 2 or 3. Under these circumstances. the fact that the 500 is. at the moment. only 4 below its November high. can be construed as nothing short of remarkable. It is. indeed. a testimony to the continued technical strength of issues other than the energy laggards. We are unable to interpret this sort of action — continuing general market strength. coupled with fairly severe weakness in one area — as being a symptom of market vulnerability. This IS especially true since energy issues had, until November at least, been unquestioned market leaders. Measured on a longterm basis. these stocks have been demonstrating consistent. above-average relative strength since early 1976. The emergence of a corrective phase after five years of superior performance would appear to be nothing more than a legitimate expectation. Moreover, while some degree of further vulnerability in oil issues does exist, downside objectives in these stocks are being approached in a number of cases. If nothing else. the magnitude of the decline already posted would suggest further downside action might be limited at best. Were oil issues simply to begin moving sideways in a base formation, while the rest of the market continued its established strength. the action of the averages could be dynamic indeed. It is unarguable that the current bull market is a great deal more mature than it was at its takeoff point back last April. We think however, that, in most areas, at least, it remains in fairly robust health. and it is probably far too early to begin making pronouncements about its imminent demise. Dow-Jones Industrials S & P ComposIte CumulatIve Index (4/15/81) AWT sla 1005.58 134.58 1144.87 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any otner matter nere.n contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the O(lcltotlon of on orler 10 buy or sell anr. secvflly referred to or mentioned Tne moiler 15 presented merely for Ine convc'lenc of the subscriber While we believe the source of our Informa tlon 10 be fel,ab c, we ,n no way represent or guarontee Ine accuracy Ihereof nor of Ihc slalement mude nereln Any ocllon to be loken by Ihe subSCriber snould be bosed on nlS own Inves!lgahan and infOrmation Janney Monlgomery 50011, Inc, os 0 corporohon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may loler toke, poslhons or trades In respect 10 ony securitIes mentioned In Ih'5 or any future Issue, ond such pasltlon may be d,fferenl from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In tnls or any other lSue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, wnlch 15 regluered wlln Ihe SEC as on Inveslmenl adVisor, may give adVice to .ts Investment advl50ry and olner customers rndependently of ony stotemenls mode In thiS or In any olner ISsue Further onformotlon on any security mentioned hereon IS available on request -'.

I TABELL'S MARKET 1 LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 24, 1981 Markets which are weaker than they appear on the surface are, historically, a major concern of technicians ,anda1arge body -of- standard -analytical' work is-devoted –to detecting- such4nternal- weakness. — Mar- – kets which are, in fact, stronger than they at first appear, are rarer phenomena. It is, however, arguable that we are watching just such an occurrence at the moment. Since the first of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, in its continuing flirtation with the 1000 level, has attained a series of marginal new highs, the latest of which occurred this Monday on a closing basis, with an intraday peak occurring on Thursday. More broadly-based, capital-weighted indicators, however, as bearish forecasters in the financial community are fond of reminding us have been able to make little progress since last fall. The Standard & Poors 500 reached its all-time peak on November 28 at 140.52 and has been unable to better that high since, having chalked up a whole series of successively lower highs, 138.12 on January 6, 137.11 on March 25, and 135.45 early this week. Yet is it easy to demonstrate, despite this lackluster performance on the part of the averages, that a conventional and fairly dynamic bull market continues in force, albeit, with one major group failing to participate — the energy stocks. This can be demonstrated graphically in the chart below which shows, for the past three years, the action of the S & P 500 together with the action of that same S & P 500, reconstructed by us with the energy stocks removed. S&F 500 S&P 500 WITHOUT ENERGY STOCKS J The divergences are obvious. From the spring of 1979, the 500 itself began decisively to outperform the 500, ex the oils, by a considerable margin. The divergence became most apparent in March-April, 1980, when the 500 failed to post a new low and, indeed, remained in an irregular uptrend formation. With the oils removed, as the chart shows, the 500 would have plunged to a new bottom, which would have had all the characteristics of a major bear market low. The two indices moved up in parallel through the fall of last year, but, during that period, the oils carried the 500 to its new peak, while the rest of the index moved laterally. Sine that time, oil weakness has held back the index itself, and removal of those issues clearly reveals the rest of the market to be moving sharply ahead to new highs. There is no particular theoretical reason why this should not be so. Numerous studies have shown that energy stocks, in terms of price behavior, tend to constitute their own universe, moving independently of the general market. They are simply once more demonstrating that tendency. Indeed, from a technical point of view, we would not wish to argue that energy issues are not vulnerable to still further weakness. We would not, however, think that that weakness should be allowed to color one's thinking regarding the strength of the general market. The market, as a whole, we think J remains in a rather obvious uptrend with energy issues simply not participating. Appropriate investment policy, therefore, calls for a continued fully-invested position in equities, albeit with energy issues somewhat underweighted. Dow-Jones Industrials (1100 AM) 1009.55 S & P Composite (1100 AM) 134.06 Cumulative Index (4/23/81) 1153.33 AWTsla ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other motler herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrec1ly. on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The moiler I presC!nled merely for the converlcnce of Ihe subscriber Whde we believe the 5Qurces of our Informa han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS aNn inVestigation and Informatton Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Ils officers or employees, may now have, or may later loe, pOSItions or trodes In respec1 10 ony seCufltles menlloned ItI thiS or any future Issue, and such pOltlon may be different from any views now ar hereafter expressed In thl or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh I rcglstt!rcd With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment odvlsory and othel customers independenTly of any statements mode ItI Ihls or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

'f / TA'BELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08!S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER New VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 1, 1981 r -! . -……. – Under the impetus of a declining Federal Funds rate, the market turned generally weaker after reaching a new high of 1024.05 on the Dow Jones Industrial Average on Monday. The three days of weakness, however, have not yet destroyed the positive price pattern still implicit in recent trading. The chart below, which will be familiar to our regular readers,shows the action of the Dow since March 27, 1980, together with three trend channels, major, intermediate and minor. These channels are computed mathematically based on trading through Monday's 1024.05 high. The major channel begins on March 27, 1980 at the Silver Thursday low of 759.98, the intermediate on December 11, 1980 at 908.45, and the minor channel at the low of last February, 931. 57. . The analysis of these channels is in no sense predictive, since they describe only past history. However, the market's ability to remain in the various trend channels suggests that current action is at least consistent with the past trend, while a penetration of the channels suggests that new market foreces, of indeterminate nature, may be in effect. COMPUTED MRJOR, INTERMEDIRTE & MINO TRENDS DOW-JONES INDUSTRIRL RVERRGE As the chart shows, the minor–and steepest–channel which marks trading since February 13 was violated slightly, though not decisively, at Thursday's low. However, both the intermediate and major channels remain inviolate. The lower limit of the intermediate channel is now at approximately 970, and the corresponding figure for the major trend is roughly 955. The major trend is rising at approximately .70 points per day, and the intermediate trend at .77 points per day. At the moment, there is no suggestion of market weakness which would cause the lower limits of either of these two channels to be violated. For long as they continue to hold, it is a fair assumption that the market uptrend which began a year ago on a major basis, with an intermediate leg having begun last December, remains in effect. Dow-Jones Industrials (11 00 AM) S & P Composite (11 00 AM) Cumulative Index (4/30/81) AWT It 998.92 133.21 1143.92 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No tolement or expressIon of opinion or any olher mOIler herein contolned is, or 1 10 be deemed to be, dHeC1ly or lndlfettly, on offer or Ihe sollc.tot.on of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convef'lence of the subscriber. While Ne believe Ihe sources of our information 10 be relloble, we In no woy represent or gvarafltee the accvracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgotlon ond Informallon JOnfley Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, position, or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In Ih,s or any future lSue, and luch POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter elpressed III thl or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery coII, Inc, whICh 15 registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry ond othlll customers Independently of any statements mode ,n tnn or III any other ISsue Further information on any secvroty mentioned herein IS availoble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY OBS40 DIYISION Of' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – May 8, 1981 -;0'- -,,,- '!'— .,j; Following a by-and-large satisfactory performance whih carried throught;) just' a fortnight ago, stock market action suddenly turned a bit disappointing. As of April 27, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average had moved ahead to a new 1981 high of 1024.05. In the seven trading days which followed, it managed to shed some 50 points, once more penetrating the 1000 level and reaching a Tuesday closing low of 972.44. A couple of rally attempts, neither of them very im- pressive, on Wednesday and Thursday, left the average around that low as of this writing. The ostensible reason for the past two weeks' weakness has been the behavior of short-term interest rates, and commentators who find it necessary to discover reasons for every market jiggle have once again dragged out this behavior as a rationale for the market's abrupt reversal. There is, of course, an element of justification for this, but it must also be recalled that the relationship between stock-market action and the direction of short rates is a recent one in any case and remains tenuous at best. Bond prices had actually been declining irregularly since midJanuary when the Dow-Jones 2o-Bond Average, now 58.44, was at 65.78, and prior to that, since June, 1980 when it was 76.61. During both of these declining periods, the stock market turned in a relatively respectable performance. This remained the case until two weeks ago, when the dispute between monetarist economists and the Federal Reserve once again surfaced and led to renewed warnings of financial chaos, warnings which have been fairly familiar fare for over a year. – From a technical point of view, the stock-market weakness has altered the picture, albeit not oy all that much. It is very seldom; as we continuous1y remind our readers, that snort term -p…-1 action, in and of itself, changes market perspective. It tends to be rather, a series of short- term rallies and'declines, together with the market's behavior on those swings, which produces changes in the technical outlook. Coincidentally, we discussed the market last week in terms of the major and intermediate trend channels which have been in effect since March, 1980 and Dec- ember, 1980, respectively. At current lows, the Dow has returned to the bottom of the inter- mediate-trend channel. It is also close to the bottom part of the major-trend channel. Quite obviously, the ability to hold approximately around current levels would leave both channels intact and would have to be construed bullishly. Technical patterns for the averages suggest that such might be the case, although further very-short-term weakness remains at least a possibility. With the 990 low which has contained the market since March now decisively broken, it is possible to read downside objectives in the Dow in the 950-935 area. A comparable objective for the S & P 500 would be 128. Attainment of either of these downside objectives, especially if followed by a worthwhile rebound, would not significantly violate the uptrend channels mentioned above. The only sort of development which would call market action seriously into question would be violation of the lows of last fall, moves below 900 on the Dow or 122 on the S & P Composite. There appear to be very few individual stock patterns at the moment which suggest that sort of weakness. As we have noted in the past, the only market area where serious technical vulnerability exists is in the energy stocks, and even these issues ,have moved down sufficiently,so that,a short-term rally would not be surprising. Some small clouds have, indeed, appeared on the stock market sky, but, it seems to us, they would have to darken considerably before a serious market storm could be predicted. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 977.49 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 131. 89 Cumulative Index (5/7/81) 1121. 53 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTsla No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any other motler hereIn contolned 1, or I to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer Of the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter ' presented merely for the corwerlen!;f'! of the subscrrber While we belIeve the lIOurces of our information to be reliable, we m no way represent or guaronlee the ourocy rhereof nor of the statemenTS mode herem Any action fa be token by the subsrlber should be bosed on his own investigation and !nformation Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as ( corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSlhons or trades m respect to any SeCurities mentiOned m thiS or any future InUI!, and suh pOSition moy be different from any views now or hereafter elCpressed In thIS or any oTher Issue Janney Montgomery ScQrt, Inc, whICh IS registered with the SEC 0 an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othe! C\ntomers independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any seuflty mentIOned herem IS aVailable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 15, 1981 – – – – .- — — –.-As .h-a.s' b.ec-om.e;-a 'May tradition; this letter is being p- -re–p-a-r—e-d-' on -T—uesday, May 12, three days–.-,, — ;.- in advance of its Friday publication date. Each year in mid-May, the writer and the members of his staff who would normally prepare this letter in his absence, find themselves at the annual convention of the Market Technicians Association, which is taking place this year in Sarasota, Florida, This annual gathering of the MTA, an organization with which we are proud to have been associated since its inception, is always interesting and useful. Among its features are, generally, a number of papers on various technical indicators. Such papers, as is proper with material presented before a professional organization, are usually documented in voluminous and, to the uninitiated, boring detail, presenting scrupulous historical evidence for the fact that a given indicator behaves in a certain way. The question of historical evidence, coincidentally, is an interesting one in the present instance. As we write this piece, the market has been trending irregularly downward for some three weeks. During those same three weeks, as we noted in our last issue, short-term interest rates have risen sharply, the last manifestation thereof being the prime-rate increase by Chase Manhattan Bank to 19H. Inevitably, the twin occurrence of rising interest rates together with a declining stock market has been a feature of stories appearing in the financial press. There are a number of very good theoretical reasons as to why the two phenomena might be coincident, and we have no quarrel with those journalists who associate them. At some point, however, it becomes necessary to draw a distinction between journalism and forecasting. The point at which that dis- – –tinctiontendstogetd1Swn-is-in-theprocess-of.accumulating-hsrd ,nllmericaLeY.idenceas.iuQ,1 whether or not rising short interest rates can or should be directly associated with a declining stock market. In the accumulation of this sort of evidence, it is necessary to be rigorously specific, If rising interest rates forecast a stock-market decline. for example, what interest rates are we talking about. what defines a rise or fall. and over how long a stock-market period do they forecast a change It is when we attempt to perform this sort of exercise that the relationship between interest rates and the stock market becomes a bit more fuzzy than journalism would perhaps have us believe. Just as an example. let us try to develop some hard evidence. Let us use 90-day Treasury Bills as a proxy for short-term interest rates. Between April 24 and May 1, 1981, bill rates increased from 14.02 to 15.78, a rise of 12.55. This turned out to be coincident with the recent stock market decline. If we then hypothesize that a rise of more than 12 in 90-day T-Bill rates is a harbinger of decline, we can then inspect the evidence. We find, for example, that the last time such a rise took place was on June 27, 1980, the result being that the stock market was 4 higher 4 weeks later, almost 9 higher 8 weeks later, and 6H higher 13 weeks later. The previous instance was a 13 rise in March, 1980, which resulted in a modestly lower stock market 8 weeks later, and a market that was 5 higher after 3 months. A 12 rate-jump in November, 1978 saw a market that remained essentially flat for the next three months, and the previous instance, in June, 1975, produced short-term strength fOllowed by a mild tailing off. To find cases where a short-term interest rise of greater than 12 led to a severe stock market decline. one has to go back to a couple of instances arising in the advanced stages of the 1974 bear market. None of this is meant to suggest, for a minute, that no relationship between short rates and the stock market exists. Indeed, the historical evidence, especially over recent years, tends to suggest the possibility of such a relationship, but one which is complex, and, at best, somewhat tenuous. The relationship generally involves long periods of rising interest rates (on a 13-week basis, bill rates currently have been rising for only 2 weeks) and is complex in the extreme. In other words, before accepting facile judgments that the current rise in money rates is the precuJ- sor of a market decline, we would demand of the forecaster making such a judgment hard evidence of the sort mentioned above. ' ANTHONY W. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 982.89 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 131. 96 Cumulative Index (5/14/81) 1128.55 AWT sla No stclement or expreulon of opinion or any olher matter herein CaT1lomed IS, or II to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe sOllCltOtion of on offer to bvy Of sell (lny security referred 10 or mentioned The malter IS presented mNely for the converlenn of Ihe subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the occurocy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be oo1ed on hiS own Investlgotlon ond Informohon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corporation, and liS officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, poslhons Of trades In respect to ony U!CUrllie1 menlloned In thiS or on.,. fulure Issue, (lod such POSition may be different from ony views now or hereofter expressed In IhlS or ony olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment odvisar, may give odvlce to It Investment adVISOry ond othel (USlomC!rs Independently of any statements mode In Ihls or In (lny other Issue further Informolion on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

1——- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 22, 1981 We seized-,the oPP!'rtunitY'in'this'space-last'week to'commnt on the recent .linkage which exists, at- – andleast in the mind of many analysts, between the stock market 'shortterm interest -rates in- those' remarks, we tried to suggest that this relationship was, first of all, a rather recent one, and secondly, a good deal less simple than the conventional wisdom would have us believe. When one stands back and looks at the long-term relationship between interest-rate levels and the stock market, the whole ques- tion becomes fraught with paradox. The current conventional wisdom is, for example, that rising interest rates are bearish for the stock market and falling interest rates are bullish. This has been an accepted bit of folk wisdom over the entire 27 years of our own career as a stock market observer. What is interesting is that the accepted rationale as to why this should be so has varied widely over the past three decades. Basically what has happened is that analysts over the years seem to have accepted the gospel of rising interest rates bearish — falling interest rates bullish as a matter of faith, and then drawn whatever documentation from the most recently available economic history that seemed necessary to justify that belief. For the benefit of youn-ger readers and those without an historical bent, let us recapitulate the situation of about 30 years ago. At that point, the approximate interest rate for long-term, high-grade corporate bonds was about 3 percent, and yields on such instruments as T-bills were often as low as H percent. By contrast, quality stocks provided yields in the 7-9 percent range. The accepted doctrine of the time viewed this relationship as entirely appropriate, citing the variability of common-stock dividends and the certainty of return provided by high-grade senior securities. The late Dr. Benjamin Graham, the accepted savant of the period, developed something called the central value theory, a theory which suggested that average earnings on the Dow over the prior ten years should be capitalized at twice the available rate On high-grade bonds, thus arriving at a normal or central value for stocks. Indeed, when one stood at the vantage point of the mid-50's and lOOked back as far as the mid-20's, ' tYiis particUl,, theory nandily -expl8ineoagaoCl-deaI'of-Ule-variationof–StocpriceS7'The-only-prob- , ,.- lem, of course, is that it hasn't explained them since. Following the middle fifties, as the stock market consistently rose and stocks became more and more over-valued under the theory, Dr. Graham, in successive editions of his book, revised the formula a couple of times. Unfortunately, however, there arrived the point when even revision made it totally useless, and it quietly died a natural death. Were the theory to be applied today, the normal value of the Dow would be calculated at approximately 600, and, while there remain those in the fever swamps who believe such an outcome will eventually transpire, their opinion is not widely heeded. Today we hear very little about the variability of common stock dividends. It is presumed, indeed, that they will follow a gradually rising course, most probably because, over recent years, that is precisely what they have been doing. We are instead informed that rising bond prices are necessary for a rising stock market because current high interest rates provide a sufficiently high totru return to compete with common stocks for investment funds. In order for such competition to cease, we are told, interest rates must come down. Now one would have thought that bonds, having yielded more than stocks for over a decade, had been doing a pretty good job of competing with equities as far as return is concerned. However, we are assured, in an inflationary era such as the present, the real rate of return on bonds is quite different from the nominal one. This is an argument that we ourselves have repeatedly put forth for at least a half-dozen years, and it remains irrefutably true. Its truth, however, has led to the currently vogueish construct of a real interest rate. Money rates, we are told, consist of two components', a real rate and an inflation premium, the real rate being around 3 percent, and the rest compriSing a built-in recompense for expected inflation. This theory explains the past 25 years just about as well as the central value theory explained the 25 years prior to 1955. As Steven Leuthold, in his excellent book, The Myths of Inflation and Investing, has pointed out, it explains almost no other period in economic history . What all this tends to suggest, of course, is that the basic credo of the market technician remains a sound one. That credo states, quite simply, that the prices of financial instruments, both bonds and stocks, are determined by supply and demand. Supply and demand are, in turn, created by the actions of individuals in the market place. Individuals, in turn, have, throughout history, accepted the conventional wisdom of their day, including the real interest rate, the central value theory or –if one goes back far enough — the efficacy of leeches in the cure of disease. This is' not meant to argue that interest rates Or that the valuation of stocks relative to those interest rates should not be considered in their proper context by the investor. It is simply to suggest that investors' ,attitude,S (and technical analysis remains the only tool we possess for diagnosing those attitudes) remain an equally valid consideration. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/21/81) AWTsla 974.24 131. 40 1141. 79 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL NQ slQlemel'll or expreulon of opinion or any other matter hereIn contaIned 1, or 1 to be deemed to be, dIrectly or rndnectly, on offer or the 501lcltot.on of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented mel ely for the convellenCt of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of olir Informa lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guoranlee the aCC\.lrocy Ihereof nor of the statements mode herem. Any cellon 10 be token by Ihe subscrrber should be based on hiS own InvestigatIon and Information Janney Montgomery Seoll, tnc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, posions 01 Irode' In re'pect loony seeun',es menlJoned In thIS or ony future luue, ond svm poslI,on may be d,fferent from ony VIews now or hereoher expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc whIch IS registered With the SEC as on rnvestment adVisor, may give adVIce to lIs Investment adVIsory and other C\.Il10mers Independently of any ctements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securlly mentioned herein IS available on request