,, I TABELL'S QOD STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 081540 DIYle'ON 0 …eMBI! NIW VOJIIK STOCK EXCHANGE,INC. M'''BI'' AMlfltlCAN ITOCK EKCHANQI!! October 16, 1981 We ,used this spsceJast week to try to make a number .of pointll . The first was that .. by a number of measurements, the process which began on April 27th of this year qualified as the eighth cycle bear market in Post-World-War-ll history. We went on to suggest that that bear market, which, through September 25th when It posted a low of 824.01 on the DJIA, had lasted 106 trading days, was, to date, rather short by historical standards. In fsct, we noted, all of the seven bear markets had gone on for considerably longer periods. We further pointed out that the rally which began on September 26th, reaching its high to date in a 6.57 . rise to 878.14 on October 8th, was not inconsistent with rallies which had taken place within the context of previous bear markets. That same point can be made in a number of other ways. By way of proving that technical analysis is not all that complex, bear markets can be defined, quite simply, as strings of consecutive trading days, on which either (a) a new low is made, or (b) a new low ia not made. One way Ten-Days or Longer Periods Bear Market No New Lows 1/5/53 – 9/14/53 5 7/12/57 – 10/22/57 1 12/31/61 – 6126162 2 2/9166 – 1017/66 3 12/3/68 – 5126/70 5 1/11/73 – 12/6/74 7 9121/76 – 2/28/78 8 4/27/81 – 3 Largest No. of Consecutive Days No New Lows 53 17 51 46 87 146 96 36 of viewing market history since September 26th ia as a string of 16 consecutive days which fall into the second category. It 1s the third period of 10 days or longer without a new low since the downswing began, the longest being the 36 t\'ading days from May 12 to July 1. The table at left shows the number of such periods in past bear markets. As can be seen, recent downswings, especially 1973-4 and 1976-8 have had considerably more 1D-day-or-greater inter- ruptions than this market has had to date. Furthermore, the interruptions have tended to be longer. The table also shows the largest number of consecutive days without a new low . in each of the past seven bear markets. With the exception of 1957, each one has featured at least one considerably longer interruption during which time no new low for the downswing was posted. The table at right views past bear markets in another aspect. -It lists, for each downswing, the number of periods of consecutive new lows Posted within that downswing. In the present case, there have been 12 such periods since last . Total Largest Periods of Days-New Swing . Consec. Lows Low-to- Bear Market New Lows Posted Low April. As can be seen; the three most recent bear markets each had more than 20 periods consisting of one or more consecutive days where a new low was posted. The total number of days during the downswing on which a new low was posted 1s also of interest. We have had 26 such days to date ,somewhat less than 1/5/53 – 9/14/53 7/12/57 -10122/57 12113161 – 6126162 2/9166 – 1017/66 12/3/68 – 5126/70 1/11/73 – 12/6/74 9121/76 – 2/28/78 4/27/81 – 12 12 12 14 23 27 29 12 23 -2.19' 28 -4.84 31 -9.94 37 -5.10 59 -7.83 64 -6.80 66 -3.12 26 -3.44 the figure achieved in past market ) drops. Finally, having defined bear I markets as a series of swings to new lows, we can measure the size of each of these swings as t market decline progresses. This size tends to build up as the downswing contines, with the larg est swing almost invariably being posted toward the end of the decline. Through 1974, most be markets produced at least one downswing of 5\-or-greater magnitude during the course of their existence. The biggest downswing, low-to-low, in this bear market has been the 3.44 drop from the. August 31 low of 881. 47 to the September 8th low of 851.12. It would be normal to expect the present decline to terminate with a drop somewhat larger than this It remsins possible, of course. that a major low was made on September 25. and that possi- bility w!ll remsin until such time as a new low is posted. It must, however, be stated, that market action since that date is totally consiatent with an interruption in an ongoing downswing process. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 854.83 S P Composite (1200 p.m.) 119.59 tumulstlve Index (10/15/81) 106.94 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL 'AWTrs No folement or exprelSion of opinion or (lny other maner herein contained I., or to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly. on offer or 1M! lollc,totlon of on offer '0 buy or ,II Clny security referred to or mentioned The motter is presented merely for the converlena of the subscriber. While oNe believe the touttes of our Informo tlon to be reliable, we In nO way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the Slatements mllde herein Any action to be lake by Ihe subscriber .hould be based on his awn Investigation ond i'ormation Janney Mo'gomery Seoll, 'c., 01 a corporoloon, ad Its office or employeu, may now have, or may lofer toke, posilions Of trades In respect to ay secUrities menhoned ' thiS or any future issue, and IVch POSITion may be different from any views now Or hereafter expreued In this or any olher ISlve Janney Montgomery cott, Inc. which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVISor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry Clnd otn anTomers Independently of any Itotement, mode In thll Of In any other Inve. FVMher Information on ony securiTy menhoned herein 15 ovclliable on reqvest

f TABELL'S i MARKET … -..,' I LETTER I 809 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. HEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBE' NEW YO STOCK EXCHANGE. INC. ME'BEA AMEfIlICN iIlTOeK f!ItCHAfrtOE October 23. 1981 We have been arguing in this space for the last few weeks that the downswing which has characterized most of 1981 so far probably constitutes the eighth cycle bear market of the post-World-War-II stock-market era. . f we .ar correct. it can then be recognz.ed as the downward phase of a typical four-year stock market cycle which began on March 6. 1978. We first tentatively Identified this date on April 14. 1978. sbout a month after its occurrence, and the chart below is an updated version of one that appeared on June 27. 1980, just before the major averages moved on to their recent highs. We think that the current version demonstrates how neatly (perhaps too neatly) the recent stock market fits into the four-year cycle pattern. NO 1968 SEP 1976 JRN 1973 J 1953 UL 1957 DEC 1961 FEB 1966 SEP 1 MAR 1 SEP 2 1961 OCT 196CT OCT 1 The chart is drawn to a uniform horizontal scale, and the lower Une shows the recent cycle with its major component swings in the S P 500 from March, 1978 to the low of September 25. The other dsta on the chart attempts to relate the present cycle to previous ones. The horizontal Unes in the middle of the chart, as an example, show the length, in trsding days, of each of the seven previous completed cycles. A comparison of the length of these Unes to the current cycle shows that this one (900 daya through September 25) has already lasted longer than the 1974-78 cycle (863 days) and the 1962-66 cycle (885 days). The others, however, were all considerably longer and the average length for seven previous cycles is 1,043 dsys which would call for the present downswing to bottom sometime in April, 1982. The dates across the top of the chart show the relative position of each high point in the pre- vious cycles. As can be seen, even measured to November 28 when the S P made its high. the preseT cycle has produced a longer advancing phase than either of the last three. The advancing phase turned out to be somewhat shorter than the comparable phase of the four earlier cycles, although less so if one uses the March-April high, when the Dow and a number of other indices in contrast to the S P 500 scored their bull-market pesks. What is germane at the moment of course, is trying to pinpoint the level of the next low. Th. dates at the right hand side of the chart show the relative levels of each of the previous seven lows based on percentage decline from their respective highs. As can be seen, the current decline (19.75) has already exceeded those of 1953 (13) and 1978 (19.4) and is about equal to the 1957 (21.6) and the 1966 (22.1) declines. It stU! falls considerably short of the 1961-62, 1968-70, and the 1973-74 drops. Were one of the three latter declines to be equaled it would be possible for the S P to drop a further 10 or 20 or 35 respectively, from its September 25 low to 101, 90. or 73 versus its recent level arour 11'. .Fo!' various reasons we regard the latter eventuality ss highly unlikely. Something on the order of the 196 or 1970 declines, however,would not, we think, be totally out of the question. Dow-Jones I,ndustrials (1200 p.m. 840.85 S 6 P Composite (1200 p.m.) 1l8.93 Cumulative Index (10/22/81) 1064.52 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No clement Of eJq)reulon of opinion or any other motter here.n contolned b, or Il to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndtrectl'l, on offer or the 1011(11011011 of on offer to hl.Jyor noll anr. leoJflty referred to or menlioned The molter If pre.enled merely for 1M- convleme of Ine Subscnber, Willie He believe the source, of OUf .nformation to be lellob e, we in no way ,epreSl,' or guorol\lee the C1'UrOty thereof nor of the Iloteroel'lh. mude here.n. Any action to be token by the lubCTlber should be bOled on hi' own invetlgaflon ond /nformollotl jann1Y MOlHgomery ScOtf, Inc. 0 (I corpora'ron, and III a/hee or mpJoyeeJ, may ow hov, or mol' loter tDkt!', poSItions or trodes In respett to emy leeulihes mentloed In thIS DI ony fUlure Issue, and Ivth pCSITlon IT'oOy be different from any views nC)W or hereafter expressed In thIS or any OfheI ,uue Janney Montgomery Scooff, (nc , which II registered w.th Ihe SEC OJ on Investment adVisor, may give odvlCe to IfS (fTvestment odw'Ory ond othCr !Vstomer, ITldendently of ony slOlementl mode In thn 01 In ony other .uue FUrlhet ,iormohon on ony setunty mentioned here, I, ovolloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVl810N OF MEM9EA NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE ,.,. ………. -, Ootober 30. 1981 One of the less attractive sOcial phenomena of our, time has come to be called psycho- babble. It can be defined as the common usage. by large numbers of people. of the jargon of psychology. despite the fact that these users possess almost no knowledge of the discipline in question and have certainly not taken the time to do ahytJUng so' radical as. say. read Freud. Undeterred by almost total ignorance. psycho-babble addicts go on routinely tossing words like adjustment. crisis. role model. and peer group into everyday conversat10n. Technical analysis of the stock market remains. thank heaven. somewhat less trendy than psychoanalysis. but something which may well be becomingtechm-babble is beginning to emerge. Recent pronouncements on the stock market have not been without reference to selling climaxes. usually without the betrayal of any awareness of precisely what constitutes such a climax. With the market having behaved as it has over the past month. we are also beginning to hear about tests of the lows. It is therefore possibly worth expanding on what we have been saying on this subject for the past few weeks. Much of the babble about such a test arises from the fact that the Dow Jones Indus- trial Average last posted a new low on September 25 at 824.01 and subsequently rose 6l over a nine-day period to 878.14 on October 8. It then began a decline for which the low. so far. is 830.96 on October 26. This decline was subsequently interrupted by a mild rally. In the Dow. at least. the market again found itself this week moving toward the September 25 low. although it must be noted the Standard Poor 500 at around 119 remains well above its compa- rable figure of 112. 77. Now out of this configuration two sorts of pattern can conceivably emerge. The first. and simplest. is that the Dow will, before too long. move decisively below the 824 level. We can then siinply identify the cycle bear market which began last Spring as an ongoing phe- nomenon. Unplessant as this may be for the investor. it will at least possess the virtue of presenting an orderly and recognized configuration to the market analyst. Paradoxically. from a longer-term point of view. it may also be the most bullish. We have operated for some time on the theory that the potentiality for lower market levels exists. Under such conditions it is often best to get the dreary business over with so that we can. with some confidence. get on to the next bull market. The alternative possibility. of course .is that the lows Df Selltember 25 will continue to hold. This might even be followed by a fairly significant rally attempt. Indeed. the potential currently exists for such a rally to carry as far as the low 900's on the Dow. Emergence of such a rally would undoubtedly be accompanied by an outpouring of techno-babble about a successful test. The trouble is it wouldn't mean very much. Unfortunstely. all that a rally at this stage would do is exhaust the potential of the minor base which currently exists and leave the market vulnerable to further decline. In short. we do not see. at the moment. the sort of pattern Which would support anything other than an intermediate-scale rally within an ongoing cycle downswing. . As we have been pointing out in recent issues. this sort of interruption has become a more and more common happening in recent years. On December 5. 1973. for example. the DJIA reached a low of 788.31. a decline of 25 from its January 1973 high. as compared to the current decline of 19.5 in the Dow to date. By January. 1974 it had rallied almost 100 points to 880. It then declined, exceeded that high in March. 1974 and posted a series of irregular rallies and declines which did not culminate in another new low until July 8. six months after the initial low was posted. From that point, of course. it proceeded to shed another 200 points. Phenomena not unlike the first half of 1973 also took plsce during the 1976-78 and 1968-70 bear markets. In the light of this record. we Imd ourselves unable to wax ecstatic over a test of the lows that has so far remained successful for a bit over one month. nor would we be impres- sed by the sort of rally which might emerge from such a test. A bullish pattern can arise from the current configuration. it seems to us. only by the emergence of a climactic low more clear-cut than that of last September or by a continued prolonged base-building process. one involving a time-frame a great deal longer than a single month. Needless to say. such evidence has not yet evinced itself. '- ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTrs DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 833.52 Sill Composite 12 00 p.m.) 119.69 Cumulative Index (10/29/81) 1062.22 No Itatmel'H or .-preUfOn of opinion or ony other motter hereu'! cMomed IS, or ,s to be deemlld 10 be, dIrectly or Indorec1ly, on offer or the OhCIIllon of on offer to buy or ,ell ony secunty referred 10 or mentioned The motler ., presented merely for the Conver-Iena of Ihe lubs(rtber. While we belle.ve the 5Ourte5 of aUf Informo tlo to be relloble we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe ocwraey Ihereof nor of Ihe slClements mude hereIn Any Cc110rt to be loken by the subTlber should be bo'ed on hIS own',nlle\gohon and InformOllon Janney Montgomery Scott, Ine, 0 a (Orporailon, and ,ts officers or employees, may now halle, or may loter loke, pohonl or Hodes In respec1 to ony secudtles menhoned In thllo or any future litUe, and Iouch pOSItIon may be dIfferent 1rom ony IIlews now or MereD/ter e.-pressed in thl' o. any OlMf alue Janney Monlgo,..,II'y Sectt, Inc, wh,ch II regIstered w,h ,e SEC 01 0'1 .nvellment odv,sor, may give adVice 10 lis mveltmenl odllilory and other tuSlome!S Independently of any S10tetTlenh mode In In or on any olhcr ,Slue ufTner tnformlJllon on ony ecurtly mentioned herein II aVaIlable on reqvest

f, f L……… TABELL-S MARKET ,' LETTER' 909 STATE ROAD. 'PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMIIEFI NEW YOAI( STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEM8ER AMEFI'CAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 6, 1981 We have spent our .time, In the. last !ew.issues of this letter, .taking.a.somewhat jaundiced view of the stock market. That view is based on the proposition that the major problem facing the portfolio manager today can be reduced to a rather simple set of alternatives; (a) either the stock market recorded a major bear-market Iowan September 25, 1981, or (b) it didn't. Our own assumption, for the moment, remains that alternative (b) is more likely to be the correct one. The centrality of this set of alternatives is, we think, axiomatic. If a major bear market remains underway, the dangers to capital preservation are obvious. On the other hand, it can be amply demonstrated that a large portion of the excess return earned by common stocke over the years has come from their performance shortly after major turning points. Thus decisions made at this juncture could well impact portfolio performance for years to come. The reason we fmd ourselves discussing major turning points at this particular time stems from a background view of the market which can, we think, be adduced from known facts. We are, first of all, inclined to accept the proposition that the so-called four-year cycle in stock prices (It is either more or less than four years depending on how measured.) is a real phenomenon. We think the fact that such a cycle began in March 1978 is the only plausible current interpretation of the cyclic pattern. We think it equally unassailable that the decline of 19.53 in the Dow between April and September of this year constitutes part (or all) of the declining phase of that cycle. Once the cycle has run its course, the obvious aftermath will be the next major bull market. We thus arrive squarely at the issue suggested above. Was September 25 a cycle bottom Here, cycle theory itself is of precious little help to us. Cycles, be it remembered, are measured from low to low and the last low can now be assumed to be March 6, 1978. Nine hundred trading days intervened between that date and September 25 of this year. As we pointed out in this space two weeks ago, this 900-day length would be perfectly consistent with the two shortest of the seven cycles that have occurred in recent market history. The other five cycles would suggest that a September 25 low is premature, perhaps by as much as six months to a year. We venture now into uncertain waters, since we are thus forced to determine whether market behavior around the time of the September 25 low was consistent with that observed at past major market bottoms. We came to the conclusion at the time and are, reluctantly, forced to hold to it, that such is not the case. In terms of breadth there have been four major upside days since October, the best one being Monday of this week when 66 of all issues traded advanced. The early stages of all seven major prior advances have included at least one day on which 70 of all issues advanced, and, in most cases, 80 advanCing days have occurred. Nor has the volume normally associsted with selling climaxes taken place. Monday's trading, agsin, produced 1. 41 times average volume as measured over the previous 25 days. A figure between 1. 5 and 2 plus has been more typical of major reversal points. None of this is to argue that the market has not behaved well in the past month or to assert that it cannot rally from here. Indeed we have been trying to demonstrate in our last few issues the fact that behavior to date — or even behavior to date extended by a fairly meaningful rally — would not be inconsistent with recent bear cycles. The question of the short/ intermediate course of the market is one which we view as, so far, being unanswered. Crucial at the moment would be the ability to reach 880 in terms of the Dow. A base of some proportions exists between the September bottom and that figure, and the ability to break above 880 would suggest an advance to somewhere in the 920-930 range Unfortunately such an advance would not take the market to a level Significantly different from where it now finds itself, and it would move the major indicea into areas of heavy overhead supply while just about exhausting the upside potential which now seems to exist. We continue, therefore, to operate on the assumption that the market story has not been completely told by the low chalked up last September. We emphasized above that we feel only that this assumption is the best possible one at this time. Furtber broadeninp of a potential base pattern together with future successful testing of the September low or, alternatively, future downside action culminating in a more recognizable selling climax could drastically alter our view of the investment odds. For the time being those odds, it seems to us, remain unfavorable. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 855.31 S P Composite (1200 p.m.) 123.)1 Cumulative Index (11/5/81) 1099.68 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No clement or expren,on of opiniOn or orty other matler herein contOlned II, or Is to be deemed to be. d.rectly or .ndtrectlr,' on offer or the 10Ile.,ot.on of on offer to buy or sell ony leeuII reFerred to or ment,oned Tne motter Is presented merely for the conve,e,, of tne subcrober Wht e -Ne believe tne Ources of our Informa t,on to be relloble. we il'l no way represent or guarantee tne accuracy tnereof nor ot the stotements mude herein. Any action to be token by 'he subscriber shold be bosed on his own investlgotu;m and Information Janney Montgomery Seoll, Ine. as 0 eorporollon, ond Us officers or employees, moy now nove, or moy 10ler loke, pasftfon. or tlodes ,n respect to ony securillt\ menlloned ,n thIS Of tiny future luue, ond luch pOS!hon moy be different from ony views now 01 hereafter e7presed In ,ts or ony olner IS,ue Jonney MOfllgomery Seoll. Inc. which 15 re;llSlered wltn Ine SEC os on Investmenl odvnor, moy g,e adVice to Its ,ve,lmenl odvIOty ofld Olnel customers ,ndependently of ally stolemen1li mode, ,IllS Of ' ony o1ner Isue further information on cmy securiTy menhoned nerem 1 ovolloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET; LETTER . 90e STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08840 MEMIEiIII NEW YOfilK STOCK eXCHANGE. INC. MEMBER .'.U'CAN BTOCI( EXCHANGE – November 13, 1981 . . – – –', r-' – -.. – — – For '8 numoer' Of weeks now, this letter has been attemptiiig' to assert s' particular' view -of the general equity market outlook and, for the most psrt, as a proxy for that general market, we have been using the Dow Jones Industrial Average. As is often the case, this has created problems. since, if recent market action is traced uaing other indicators, the picture becomes somewhat different. It must be emphasized, however, that action of these other indicators does not alter the broad, longer-term market pattern. The table below traces the recent history of seven major averages including the Dow. The first four columns show the dramatic difference in recent action. All seven averages scored bear-market lows on September 25. The DJIA, in terms of its percentage advance from that low to its high. has dramatically underperformed all of the other indicators, even the normally-Iess- volatile Utilities. The Dow high, moreover. was scored over five weeks ago on October 8. whereas other averages are either now reaching highs or peaked as recently as early November. DJIA DJT DJU S P 500 S P 400 NYSE Camp. NYSE Fin. !I/25 Low 824.01 335.48 102.21 112.77 125.93 64.96 68.10 Recent High 878.14 394.06 110.78 124.80 139.48 72.38 77.59 Date 10/8 11/12 11/12 11/3 11/3 11/4 11/12 Advance From Low 6.57 17.60 8.38 10.67 10.76 11.42 13.93 11/12 Close 860.54 394.06 110.78 123.19 136.74 71.69 77.59 , Adv Possible From Objective 11/12 960 12 410 4 111 131 6 147 7 75 5 77 Adv From Low 16.5 22.4 8.8 15.9 16.6 15.3 13.2 The inferior action of the Dow has caused it to form a pattern different from that of other indices. Unlike the others. it has remained in a trading range. which mayor may not be a potential base formation. between 824 and 878 and has not. the 878 high being five weeks old, yet broken out of that range. By contrast. every one of the other six indicators has already broken out of the base formed subsequent to the September 25 low, and four poasess Objectives. shown in the table, moderat ely. although not a great deal. above current levels. The Dow Jones Utilities and the NYSE Financial Index have already reached their shorter term objectives. Were the other indices to reach these objectives, moves of 4-7 from Thursday's close would be involved. The Dow, by contrast, were it to break above 88O,might have a possible objective as high as 960. a further 12 move from present prices. The point is that, were such a rally to ensue. it would no more than cause the Dow to catch up with the other averages. The final column of the table is thus the most interesting. If one measures the difference between the Septem- ber low and the upside objective on all the averages a move on the order of 15-16 appears to be in order for all of them. The basic difference is that most indicators have already accomplished some two-thirds of this move. The Dow. so far, has managed to accomplish less than half of it. Unfortunately. allowing for the modest further strength shown in the table, attainment of the upside objectives shown would place all of the indicators in the same position. They would then have run out their base formations and would flnd themselves in areas of massive over- head supply. Further upside progress from that point. therefore. would be highly questionable. Possible exceptions to this are the Utility and Financial averages. which still possess favorable long-term patterns despite the fact their short-term objectives have been reaChed. It is doubtful, however. that these segments, although they might outperform the market, could demonstrate significant upside strength in an environment of heavy overhead supply for most stocks. We are therefore. regardless of the psrticular average being used for measurement, con- tinuing to view the current rally with a certain degree of skepticism. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 859.97 S P Composite (1200 p.m.) 122.68 Cumulative Index (11/12/81) 1110.16 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No cltlment or I!xprenion of Optnl(Irl or any oihtH moiler herein COr'llolned u, or to be deemed 10 be directly or Indirectly on offer or the soliCitation of on offel to buy 01 lell any, security referred 10 or mentioned lhe moiler 15 presented melely for the convel'lenc(. of the wbnber. Whl e e believe the sources of our Informo han 10 be rehab e, we m no way represent or gvoronlee the occurocy thereof nor of Ihe stotements mude herein Any action to be token by 1he subscriber should be based on hu own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os a corporollon, and IU officers or employee1, may now have, or may later toke, ''\11PDtloni OT ,rodes In respect 10 any securities menTioned In Inl or any fvlule Inue, ond l!,leh pOSihon may be dlfferen! from any views now Or hereafter expressed In or any other bsue Janney Montgonery Stott, Inc. which 15 u!gl5tered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy gIVe advice 10 lIS Investment adviSOry and athll! customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other ISsue Further information on any security mentioned herem Is available on request

TABELL'S .MARKET . , , R, '/t,) .; .t, .'S.b.J-.a;.tlr'. il''; 809 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYI.IO' OF MEMeE HEW YO STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MUISE AMEIIlICAN 8TOCK EXCHANQE – .- ….November 20, 1981 – ' '- – – ..- —- A couple' of months ago, President Reagan was being rather widely taken to task in the press for the failure of his economic program. The President, not unfairly we think, pointed out that, at the time (late September), his allegedly failed economic program had not yet begun the centerpiece of that program being the tax cut Which went into effect October 1. The current hot item in the financial press, of course, is recession. Whether this recession is or is not linked to Reaganomics is a question whose answer seems to depend largely on the poHti- cal affiliation of the commentator involved. Nonetheless it is worth pointing out that the reces- sion in question hasn't yet happened. Now that statement, we admit, is probably not quite true. If as and when the National Bureau of Economic Research, the official arbiter of such events, gets around to telling us that we were, in November 1981, in a recession, it wU1 probably identify that particular economic contraction as having begun sometime last Summer. Nor are we questioning those savants who are forecasting a less-than-rosy economic outlook. Indeed, the President himself has used the phrase hard times, one nostalgically redolent of his 1930's upbringing, to describe what may lie ahesd on the economic scene. Long-term readers of this letter are familiar with its biases, and they wU1 probably be able to detect, from the introduction above, the subject of this particular discourse. They are right. It is yet another sermon on the interrelation of economic events with the stock market. In this connection, we think it is worth drawing attention to two other themes that have appeared before in this space, first, the distinction between forecasting and journalism and ' second, the fact that the stock market leads the economy. Journalism is, of course, the reporting of events, and, as far as economics is concerned, events tend to be confined to the official release of various statistics, such as Gross National Product and Industrial Production. The former has been declining since early this year, and the latter since August. Both are Hkely to continue to do so. What we are saying, of COUl'88, is that as far as journalism is concerned, our biggest dose of recession news still undoubtedly lies ahead of us. Forecasting, on the other hand, is a different animal. It is no trick to look ahead and suggest that forthCOming economic figures wU1 be bad. As we look further ahead and try to figure out just how bad they will be and for how long, the process becomea more subject to error. There has, moreover. been plenty of error in the past forecasting of some of the ec0nometricians about whose predictions we are hearing so much today. The most pessimistic among them may be right. Their record does not necessarily inspire confidence that such is the cue. It now becomes necessary to 'tie all of this to stock prices. We ourselves. as readers are aware. are not optimistic on this subject. Since we like to think of ourselves as rational, how- ever. one simple eventuality would make us a great deal more optimistic — i.e lower prices. If these lower prices occur. it is possible to foresee at this early stage that they be accompanied by widespread heralding of economic disaster. .. – The following. in other worda. appears to be the future outlook for those factors which will be the input for forthcoming investment decisions. That near-term economic news will be abyssmal can be regarded as a virtual certainty. The course of stock prices is less certain. Either they will refuse to decHne in the face of that poor economic news. which wU1 be a sign of great technical strength. or they wU1 move lower as the news manifests itself. which would simply be the normal expectation. What can be suggested, on the historical record. is the fact that equity prices wU1 be close to their absolute low at just about that time that nomic reporting is most pessimistic. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 849.22 s , P CompoSite (1200 p.m.) 121.38 Cumulative Index (11/19/81) 1099.81 .- ',', No stotement or tlJ(preUton of OJ;lInlon or any other moffer herein con1lIned '. or is fa be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the IDI/tltallon ol.(m olfer kI buy or leU ony ucunty referred to or menhoned The moiler presented merely for the tonVlllen of Ihe subscriber While 'lie believe the IOUftfl5 of or Informo- , lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the ,Iclements mude herein Any octu;m to be token by Ihe b,cdber Ihould be nil 'o.Tetbosed on own Invesllgatlon and mformallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. til CI corporation, ond lis offlcer or employees, may now hove, or may lak, poslhOflS or Irode, In respect to ony leCurlTles mentioned ' Thll or ony future InUe, and luch pOsItIon may be dIfferenT from any …Ie…..' now or hereafter exprened In th' or any oTher Inue Janney MonTgomery Seo'T, Inc, wh,ch II reglltered WIth The SEC 05 on ,nvestment adVISor, may gIve od…lce to III investment advisory nd oher CUSTomers Independnfly of any SlolemenTS mode In Ihl5 or In ony other ulue Further rnformallOn on anI' seCurity mentlQl'/ed hereIn IS ovoJloble On request

.i rf . , TABELL1S MARKET LETTER .9 …. .'.i!' -r- ' …… – ..t……,..J. ……… ,..t; 4;….,. ' t .,. I ; ;5.-.! ….'. '; ' . 908 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBEfIt HEWYOIlIK STOCK !;ltCMANOE, tNC MEMBER AMEAICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 27. 1981 -. -. Our readers are aware that, while allowing for the possibility of -a fairly dynamic short- term rally. this letter has not been particularly optimistic about the intermediate-term prospects for atock prices. As a contrast. therefore. we feel we should draw attention to one particular portent which has manifested itself as a result of the last few days' strength. The Dow-Jones Industrial Average closed October at 852. S5. and. barring unforeseen disaster. it will close higher than that next Monday. This means that November. 1981 will be an up month. This has some significance since. for ressons we are totally unable to explain, the month of November seems to possess some predictive value for market action for as long as a year ahead. Action for the month itself has been almost precisely normal. In the 85 years since 1897. the Dow has been up 51 times in November and down 34. showing a rise 60 of the time. This is close to the 57 rising average ahown by all one-month periods since the Dow was first constructed. What is interesting. however. is what has happened following the 50 past instances of an upward November. The following table summarizes some pertinent figures. ALL PERIODS FOLLOWING UP NOVEMBER Average Year Average Year Period Length Periods Periods Periods Periods Change Change Following In Months Up Down!!2. Up Down.!!E. All Periods Up November 1 577 440 56.7 35 15 70 0.49 0.92 2 576 440 56.7 31 19 62 1.00 2.32 3 587 428 57.8 32 18 64 1.53 2.07 4 596 418 58.8 34 16 68 2.05 3.73 5 615 398 60.7 36 14 72 2.60 4.89 6 605 407 59.8 33 17 66 3.16 4.39 7 612 399 60.5 32 18 64 3.71 4.70 8 612 398 60.6 37 13 74 4.25 6.95 9 602 407 59.7 35 15 70 4.83 8.55 10 608 400 60.3 35 15 70 5.42 7.62 11 606 401 60.2 32 18 64 6.03 7.27 12 614 392 61.0 32 18 64 6.62 8.61 The table shows the history of aU market periods of one to twelve months in length since 1897 and compares it with the 50 periods of like length following an upward November. Taking the first line as an example, of the 1017 one-month periods since 1897, the Dow waa up in 577 cases and down in 440. thus showing a rise 56.7 of the time. In the 50 Decembers following an upward November. however. the average found itself up 35 times and down only 15, thus rising 70 of the time. The average percentage change for all 1017 one-month periods was just under one half of 1. For the 50 period! following an up November. the average advance approached 1. The table may be read in the same way for all periods of lengths from two up to twelve months. A glance through the table will show that the predictive value of November appears to be quite uncanny. For all twelve period-lengths. the market produced a greater percentage of rising periods following an upward November than was'the case overall. For example. it rose 70 or more of the timp over periods of one. five. eight. nine or ten months compared with an expectation of around 60. Likewise. the average percentage change following an up November comfortably exceeded the average percentage change for all periods of similar length no matter what the length of the period in question. The average December-January change following an upward November. for example. was 2.32 versus an expected average of 1. Now none of the above says the market cannot go down after an upward November, and it has. indeed. done ao on numerous occasions. Certainly. there are large numbers of other factors detailed at length in recent lettera which go into the formation of our present market opinion. Nonetheless, the recent rise. causing November of this year to be an '.lP month. has. marginally at least. improved market proapects. AWT It Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 882.71 S P Composite (1200 p.m.) 124.46 Cumulstive Index (11/25/81) 1124.06 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No s'alement or expren,on of opinion or any other motter nereln conjomed 15, or .s 10 be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or ,directly. on offer or the lollcltotlon of on oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motter ., prelenled merely for the converoltmCf; of lhe subSCriber While -Ne believe the sources of our Informohon 10 be rehoble, we In no way repre!ent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subs.crlber should be based on hIS own Investlgotlon ond mforrrn;lllor'l J/lr'Iney Montgomery StOll, Ir'lc , os a corporation, ar'ld lIS off,cers or employees, may now have, or may later tOKe, poslhons or Iraclu In respect 10 or'ly ecurilies mentioned In thiS or ony future Inue, ond such position may be dIfferent frOM any views now or hereafter eKprelSed In Ihl5 or any other issue Janney Montgomery Scan, Inc, whIch ,s reg,ered With the SEC as on ,nllestment adVisor, may give odYlce to ,tl Investment odyhory ond othel customers Independently of any ,talements mode 'r'I thiS or In any other Issue Funher ,nformatlon on ony SCCUflly mentioned herein ovolloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER . ……….. ' …. i. -…. ,, ,,.. …. … 808 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MM8 NEW VOAI( STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBEA AMEAICAN STOCK EXCHANQE December 4, 1981 Rent finm.cial new has concentrated. to a great degree, ,on the. .rather. extraordinary l'ally in the bond marKet and the concomitant strength in stocks. It is possible for a skeptic to point out. first of all. that the bond-market rally was hardly all that extraordinary consid- ering the oversold position in which senior securities found themselves at the beginning of last month. It can also be suggested that the accompanying rally in equities which has moved the DJIA. BOme eight percent above its September 25th low has hardly been that dynamic in Hght of the fact that conventional wisdom has been assuring us for most of 1981 that an im- proving bond market was all that was necessary to unleash stock prices on the upside. While all this has been going on. this letter. the priBOner of its own technical bias. has been saying Httle or nothing about interest rates and has been concentrating upon a number of entirely different aspects of the stock market scene. It is possibly worth recapitulating some of those aspects. -and we The Four-Year think the only Cpfa.culsei.bleAscuorurer readers know. we are believers nt interpretation of that cycle is in the four-year cycle, that the last major stock-market bottom was seen in March.1978. Once this hypothesis is accepted. a peak and the onset of a bear phase some two and a half years after the low becomes highly likely. The Standard. Poors 50o-Stock Index did indeed peak in November, 1980 and the Dow-Jones In- dustrial Average followed six months later. achieving its high in April, 1981. Both averages have since posted proximate-20 declines, thus achieving the threshold normally used to identify bear markets. All the major averages posted their lows on September 25th and have not exceeded those lows since. The question. therefore. that we will be living with for BOme months is whether the cycle which began in March. 1978 ended in September. 1981. Such an interpretation would not be totally implausible based on the historical record. but a later term- ination date. ssy sometime in the Spring of 1982. would possess a higher degree of likelihood. The Dog That Did Nothing in the Nightime — or the Missing Selling Climax. As noted above. s four-year cycle low occuring in September, 1981 would not have been totally out of line with the historical record. However. such lows tend to be accompanied by identifiable climactic action. The means of identifying selling climaxes verge on the esoteric. and they have been reviewed at BOme length here. Suffice it to say that. in our view. such a climax did not manifest itself in late September or early October. The Subsequent Base. Given the lack of climactic action. it would have been totally unsurprising had the market. after a short pause in September-October, shortly turned around and moved to new lows. This.of course. is precisely what it has not done. Instead, most averages spent the Fall forming short-to-intermediate-term base formations. In the case of the broader-based indices. such as the S P 500 and the NYSE Composite, these bases were completed by early November. The pattern for the more widely-followed Dow-Jones Industrials lagged behind. and the bsse apparently did not complete itself until a breakout took place last week. Despite the time disparity. the current base patterns for most averages seem to call for advances in the area of 15 from their respective lows. This would involve upside targets of 960 for the Dow. 131 for the S P and 75 -for ihe NYSE Composite. The Overhead Supply. Were the targets mentioned above to be achieved, almost all the averages would have moved up to the areas of massive overhead supply. supply formed by a year's worth of trading between Summer 1980 and Summer 1981. It is, of course, possible that a move through this supply could be staged with a minimum of difficulty. It does not, how- ever. seem approp.riafe to suggest that this is the most likely eventuality. It is the above combination of factors that has caused us to view the current market with BOme skepticsm. If the market is indeed able to demonstrate broad rallying power as the supply is reached. we would. of course. be forced to admit that that skepticism was ill-founded and resume our basically positive long-term attitude toward equities. If this is the case – if. in other words. September 25 turns out to have been a cycle bottom — we shall have missed a portion of the ensuing move. It is a risk. given the currently available guidance that we are willing to assume. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL – Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 891. 55 S P Composite (1200 p.m.) 126.11 Cumulative Index (12/3/81) 1131. 89 No 1101em&nt or expreSSion of opmion or any other motter I-tere.n contolned IS, or 10 be deemed 10 be, dIreCTly or IndlreC1ly, on offer or te 50llelloll,;n of If I to buy or sell any secuflly referred 10 or mentIoned The motler II, presented merely for the converlena of Ihe subsCriber While we belkeve eturb\o ursho d tlon to be rehable we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Thereof nor of Ihe statemenh. mude hereIn Any based on hl own'lnvestlgatlon and InformatIon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, ond Its oHlcen or dposillons or trades In respect to any secunhes mentioned In thIS or any fulure nIue, and such pOSItIon moy be dIfferent aC1lon 10 be to efmropmloyeneys,v;meway en now nOheee''urofteroIr(lpotreeuetodkei ns;ent advisory and othe, th or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery 5011, Inc, whuh Is regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVISor, may gld hln, saalloble on request customers ,ndependently of ony ,Iolements mode 111 Ihls or In any olher Issue fvrther 1r'lIOrmallon on ony secuflty mer'lllO

.. ( ! t !t….. .,' TABELL'S MARKET LE.. TTER . . '…' .J t., , …) …. ,.. t. …….. ….t .1'; …. l''A.. .. '809 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVla'ON 01' MEMIlE NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANQE, INC MEMII!;A AMEIII'CAN STOCK EXCHANGE – December 11, 1981 The name of the game for the market analyst is, of course, to forecast the future, i.e. what is going Jo.happen. This task is often made difficult by the fact that,.in many casea, that which has already happened is not precisely clear. The record is there to be sure, but the meaning behind that record can be obscure, to be clarified only much later. Such is the case at the present time. We know, for example, that the major market averages posted a low on September 25, 1981 and have not exceeded that low since. The problem is where to fit this known fact into an historical pattern. The question, in other words, is whether or not September 25th constituted a major cycle low, and, as OU!' readers are aware, we hsve been wrestling with this question for some weeks. One way of attacking the problem is known as the reference-cycle approach. This con- sists of comparing current stock-market action with trading which took place following past known low points. Low dates for the previous eight major stock market cycles are known quantities, and the table below attempts to compare current action with action following the eight prior dates in terms of four variables, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, the S P 500, the Advance-Decline line and NYSE volume, smoothed vis a 25-day moving average. Through Wednesday, 53 trading days had passed since the September 25th low. and the table shows the highest level reached for each of the four market variables in the first 53 days following each previous reference date. In each case the figure is expressed as a percentage of its value on the market low date thus making market action for all nine cycles comparable. High in First 53 Days Date of As Percentage of Market Low Market Low DJ I A S & P 500 Adv-Dec Line Volume Jun 13 1949 112.64 114.47 125.09 126.43 Sep 14 1953 110.13 109.12 115.91 121.30 Oct 22 1957 107.17 107.03 116.70 109.36 Jun 26 1962 114.98 114.26 136.01 100.18 Oct 7 1966 110.29 113.39 120.00 128.58 May 26 1970 116.54 113.32 124.27 111.76 Dec 6 1974 129.81 127.09 151.03 162.52 Feb 28 1978 113.77 112.67 120.40 198.50 Sep 25 1981 108.34 112.04 113.29 112.28 As can be seen, the current market has failed to distinguish itself in any of the four categories. The Dow-Jones Industrials, now up 8.3 from their high, posted a larger advance for the first 53 days in every past market, with the exception of 1957. In terms of the S P 500, the present market fares a little bit better. Following three past market lows, 1966, 1970, and 1978. the S P posted an advance on the same order of magnitude as the current one, and in two cases its advance in early stages of the bull market was considerably less than on the present rise. Performance of the Advance-Decline Line since September has been significantly worse than at comparable stages of any of the eight prior bull markets, and this, in our view, must be considered a weakness in the present picture. Volume since September has likewise been ; disappointing. The most significant clue that a major bottom had been made following March, 1978 — a market which might, otherwise, look much like the current one —was the significant volume expansion that took place on the ensuing rise. There has been no comparable expansion of volume to date. About the only past bottom after which most indicators behaved as they are currently behaving was the one in October, 1957. There are fair numbers of similarities between that market and this one, too detailed to go into at great length here. Basically, the bottoming pro- cess in that year was the product of increasing 11lIIlness which carried on well into the Spring of 1958. It was not until Summer, 1958, more than six months after the actual bottom. that the market took off in earnest. It will be interesting to see whether or not such a pattern develops in the current instance. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (1100 a.m.) 891.36 S P Composite (1100 a.m.) 125.50 Cumulative Index (12110181) 1129.10 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL' DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No 't'ment or tlxpreulon of OPIflI/;, Of eny other metltlr herem tonto!fled is, 01 1 to bt- deemed to be, dm!etJy or !fldlfedlr,' an offer or the soltcltatlon of an offer to buy or lell any leCUTI'Y referred 10 or mentioned The motter '5 preiiented merely for the convenlenc of the subSCriber Wh, e .we believe Ihe Ourtes of our Information 10 be rel'oble. we In no way represent or guerontee the accuracy thereof nor of thll stotllmenh mudll herein, Any octlon to be token by the bscnber ihould be 'ed on hIS own Invest,gotlon and Informallon Janney Montgomery Seott, Inc, as a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, poslhons or trades In respect loony seUII!.el mentioned In th or any future luue, ond lvrn POSition may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ih or any other usue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. whuh h reglstcred With the SEC a! on investment adVisor, moy give od'e 10 III Investment adVisory and olher CUslomers Independefllly of al'ly statements mode ,n IhIS or In any olher ,UVfI Furlher information on any security menhoned here.n IS OVOilabie on request

, r TABELL'S MARKET …….. , LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEM.!fIII HEW VOflilK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMtlE,. AMUIICAN STOCK EXCHANOE December 18. 1981 It is the accustomed usage of this letter to divide a year-end forecast into .two partS. starting with a revtew of the year just past and cOncluding with a forecast for the year to come. Today's task at hand. therefore. is to present a review of the stock-market year. 1981. Probably just about everything that is relevant about 1981 as far as forecasting the future is concerned can be summarized in one sentence. It was a bear market year. This is neither an attempt to be facile or overly simplistic. The recognition of what took place during 1981 as a bear market is. to our mind. crucial in formulating a position as to what lies ahead. We have seen many analyses of recent market action that are unwilling to make this assumption. We. on the other hand. regard it as central in analyzing the long-term cyclical position of the stock market. It is therefore perhaps appropriate to review the evidence. On November 18. 1980 the Standard and Poors 500 reached a high of 140.52. Five months later. on April 27; 1981 the Dow attained a peak of 1024.05. On September 25. they had declined to 112.77 and 82401 respectively. a drop of 19.75 for the 500 and 19.53 for the Dow. The historic criteria for the recognition of bear markets which. with the single exception of 1953. has isolated every major cycle drop since World War II has been a decline of just under 20. This figure was attained during 1981 in both major averages. As soon as we become willing to accept the 1981-bear-market concept. it remains only to set it into a cyclical context. Once more. as we have stated repestedly. to our mind the only tenable hypotfteslsis that this particular downswing represents the declining phase of a major stock market cycle which began in early March, 1978. The first part of that cycle consisted of a 38 advance in the Dow and a 62 advance in the S P, to the high point mentioned above. These percentage advances. especially the former, are on the low side of historiCal experience. but appear minimally acceptable. The cycle in question. then. having'- started in early 1978 and run to. at least. September 25 of this year, covered 904 trading days at a minimum. Under this interpretation the Dow spent 88 of its total cycle length advancing and the S P apent some 77 of its total cycle length in an advancing phase. These figures would be altered somewhat if one regards the cycle as still in effect, thus adding to its length the 59 trading days aince September 25. They are. however. firmly in the range of cycle patterns going back for as long as we can construct stock market averages. 1981 emerges, then as including a rather conventional major-cycle bear market which lasted at least until September 25. It is those remaining 59 days which, of course, present the problem. During that period the Dow raIUed 7.4 to 892.69 on December 4 and the S P some 12 to 126.26 on the same date. The stock market problem at the moment. as we have pointed out ad nauseam, lies in deciding whether those 59 days constituted only an interruption in an ongoing 1978-198 cycle or whether they are part of the start of a new one. We have presented in many recent issues of this letter the case for regarding the latter assumption with some skepticism, RaIUes much greater than 59 days in length have interrupted recent bear markets as have raIUes of considerably greater than 12. That the downward phase of a major stock-market cycle covered the first three quarters of 1981 seems a virtual certainty. Whether that cycle remains in effect is a still unanswered question. The range of cycle lengths for the post-World War II period is 863 to 1177 trading days. with an average 1043 days. The 904day length, so far, suggests that a bottom on September 25 is not historically inconceivable. However, were the present cycle to equal the average of the past 33 years it would continue until April. 1982, and were it to approach maximum length it could continue for most of 1982. The latter interpretation. however, appears unlikAlv. The one inevitable fact of bear markets is that they are followed by bull markets. and what we have tried to suggest in the above review of the past year is that it can be interpreted only as a bear market which either termbated three months ago at levels not too far different from those of today or one which will terminate fairly shortly. Such a framework. when one thinks aboutit ;is not too shaky a structure on which to build a 1982 forecast. Dow-Jones Industrials (1100 p.m.) 873.86 S P Composite (1100 p.m. ) 123.40 Cumulative Index (12117181) UI0.IS ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL AWTrs A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL No Qlement or e;llpreUlon of OPinion or ony other matter hereIn c.onlolned U, or is 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the OlIe,lotlon of on offer to buy or lell any security referred to or mentIoned Tne motter I, presented merely for the convefllen. of the subscriber wtllie we believe Ihe lOurces of our Informo tlon to be rellobl, we In no way represent or 'JIIClranfee the occurocy theren! flO! ot the Iforemenr. mude herein Any OC'f,on 10 be taken by the subscrtber lhoi.Jld be based on hiS own Inveulgot,on and informatIon Jonney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, 010 (orporOllOn, and Its offlters or employees, mey now have, or moy loter toke, posItIons or trodes In respect to ony securitIes mentIoned In thIS or any future luue, and such POS',on rn.ay be dIfferent from ony vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or ony other 'nue Janney Montgomery Sea!!, Inc, whIch IS regIsTered WIth rhe SEC 0 on ,VestmenT adVISor, may gIve adVICe to lili Investment adVISOry ond othel C'Ustarners Independen11y of any OTemen mode In th or In any other sue Funner InformatIon on any ecunly ment.oned hereIn IS ovolloble on request