TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE Well, now, what have we here July 29, 1977 , – -.- '. ,As.. recently,aslast Fdda'ythestock.markeothad,be.en.beha.1ngin Jhe.same .. , '– familiar, if boring, fashion we have come to know, if not, particularly, to love. The Dow, after six straight advancing days, had risen once more to the top of its 1977 downtrend channel while the S & P 500 had reached its best level since last March. Our Cumulative Index, as it had been doing ever since spring, had moved to a new 1974-77 high, and most broad-market indicators were happily in gear on the upside. At this point, the proverbial roof fell in. The week opened with a nine-point decline, another six points was subtracted on Tuesday, and Wednesday produced a rouser of a 20- point drop that moved the Dow to a new 19-month low. Early trading on Friday was extending the drop still further. Two pOints, it seems to us, are worth noting. The first is that there is no deny- ing the severity of the decline and, thus, the potential technical damage that has resulted. It has been possible on many occasions so far this year to point — with justification — to the fact that the averages were understating the market's performance on downswings and that the bulk of the list was not, in fact, acting all that badly. Such was most certainly not the case early this week. Wednesday's trading saw 1327 declining issues, a number sufficient to suggest a relatively ex- treme degree of severity. The Transportation Index, until lately an above-average performer, broke to a new low underneath a line formation which had contained it since late May. 64 new lows for the year were scored in Wednesday's trading, and, in a weekly scan which we regularly perform, 197 issues,or almost 14 of the stocks under survey, declined 5 or more on the week. — – …I.t.w,as-,'-i'n–schort, a nasty piece of work. While all this must be admitted; it must also ! be not;;jttiat one week is . . '' still ' only one week. As we suggested above and as we discussed at length in this space three weeks ago, most indices of overall market behavior have been demonstrating perfectly satisfactory up- side action despite the weakness in the Dow. That upside action continued unabated through last Friday. While the sharp correction has certainly created the potential for a fair amount of techni- cal damage, it is hardly by itself enough to constitute a harbinger of extreme weakness. In most cases, and we do not think that the present one will be an exception, it is not short-term down- swings which provide clues as to the market's future direction; it is, rather, the nature and extent of the rallies which follow. A weak rally attempt and subsequent turndown after whatever bottom is reached on the current move would certainly have to be viewed with suspicion. Needless to say, this chain of events has not yet occurred and would, at a minimum, require a few more weeks to complete. Even the action of the Dow, furthermore, was well within the context of the downtrend which has been established since the first of the year. We have drawn attention to that downtrend channel in this space in the past. Its lower limit, even recomputed to include the re- cent lows, is at around the 878 level. Thus, the drop has done nothing mOre than bring the 30 Industrials back to the bottom of a channel which has contained them for all of 1977 thus far, the fourth time this year that a move toward the bottom of this channel has taken place. What, then, of the immediate future The short duration of the decline to date, while it places a limit on the long-term technical damage done, also raises the possibility that – the-doWnswingmay-'liol'iet'ha-verun'its cciUrS.' 'In-afeWdays, shortterm marKet oscilliitOrs'llave not yet had a chance to reach the sort of oversold territory from which a rebound might be expected to take place. However, further weakness would create such a condition and provide the back- ground for a short-range advance. It will be the character of this advance, as suggested above, that should be watched. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (7/28/77) AWT/jb 883.40 98.09 675.95 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opmlon or any olner matter herein contaIned IS, or .5 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer Of the oll(llol1on of on offer fa buy or sell cny securrty referred to or mentioned The moiler 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informa lion fa be reliable, we In no way represent or guaronlee the accuracy thereof nor of the s'alements mode herein Any action to be toen by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and InfOrmalion Jonney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may rater lake, posilions or tr.cdes .n respoct.lo .cny secu.utJeSmenllOned In thIS or. any bture'Sve. and;uch pOSIIJOn.IIl!JY be different from ony views now or hereafter expreSed In thu or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,ch ,s registered With the SEC as on ,nvestment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othe. customers .ndependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Funner Informallon on any securoty mentioned herein IS oVOIlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STA'rE ROAD, PRCNCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 5, 1977 Around 1973, which seems like eons ago, we undertook to prove the thesis that the — .,theninstitutionally-favored growth – marketasil whole. -Asacounterpo stocks were less tha innofhis theme-;-we nserleeacstoena-a'baltytnvaayltuiemd-ina-rgerloautpioonft ot 11 h'e;YCrr;—,-J' cal issues which were at that point beginning to show above-average technical action, although remaining in comparative disfavor with the investment community. We have re-examined the per- formance of these 11 issues at various times during the intervening years. The present is perhaps a good time for another look. As readers will' recall, cy- clical stocks were among the leaders in the early stages of the bull market which began in late 1974. From a technical paint of view, this was hardly surprising. Mcst of them had, during 1973, a year in which the averages declined, broken out on the upside of long trading ranges, and al- though they retreated rrodestly during the abysmal market year of 1974, they did no more, for the most part, than return to support levels. This was fallowed by their 1975 market leadership. That leadership, however, came to an end for most of these issues a year and a half ago — in early 1976. This was the point at which the Dow began its current long trading range, and one of the factors undoubtedly contributing to that continuance of that range has been the depressing effect of poor action on the part of these issues, heavlly represented in the Dow. The following table, shOWing the 1974-76 move for the 11 stocks, together with their recent low and the percentage of the a dva nce retraced, illustrates this. Alcan Aluminum 1974 Low 19 Advance 58 1976 High 30 Recent Low 27 Advance Retraced 27 All1ed Chemical 24 I.-,…- —-AslceotahlehemSteel- —'-;2246 83 44 46 135 61 51 96 47 -23 i2b48;–o -,-' – International Paper 32 147 79 46 70 Kennecott Copper 26 58 41 26 lOa Monsanto 40 ISO lOa 69 52 Phelps Dodge 26 73 45 28 89 U. S. Steel 24 145 59 34 71 Westvaco 13 138 31 26 28 Weyerhaeuser 24 104 49 32 68 As the table shows, ten of the 11 are now well below their 1976 highs, and two have retraced their entire bull-market move. The bulk of the list has given up from one-third to two-thirds of its 1974-76 advance. It is, therefore, probably worth examining the status of the 11 issues at the moment. As could be expected with a list selected four years ago, the technical patterns are less consistent today than they were at the time the stocks were first chosen. There is, nonetheless, some degree of similarity. The stocks have, by and large, returned, at current prices, to the strong support levels whence they originally began their move some two and a half years ago. There is, at the moment, no evidence of improving technical action in these stocks, and, indeed, on a short-term baSiS, it remains dismal. The recent sharp declines, however, have placed the stocks in what can only be termed a sharply oversold condition. Our own analysis is that the moves of 1974-76 in these issues wer not tranSitory pJenomenona and that 'they willohave-imPlicatiOlis far oeyond the current 'cycle.-We would, in other words, look— – – ing ahead, expect these issues to rebase and resume the very-long-term uptrends which began in the early part of this decade. That process will, needless to say, take time, but it is one which, we think, will be worth waiting for. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 890.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 98.96 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (8/4/77) 672.42 AWT/Jb Note AI! comments above are based solely on technical factors and further information on individual issues is available on request. No ,totemen! or eltpreSSlon of opInion or any other matter herein contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the SOllCIIoilon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convellence of the ubscflber While 'Ne believe the SOurces of our Informa Tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the atcuracy thereof nor of the statements mude hertlin. Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Inveshgallan and Informahon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or may loter lae, posillons or trodes In respect 10 any seCurities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and uch position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on InveSmenT adVisor, may give odvlce to Its invesTment adVISOry and oThel customers Independently of any statements mode tn thiS or tn any other Inue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROA.D, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 tlIVI810N OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AM! RICAN STOCK EXCHANGe August 12, 1977 e ..,…–. h'As deadly.seriousa41.lsiness.asthe,soc&mar.ket'may, be-,-there .have-always-been –. – those who have tried to see its humorous side. Often the attempts at humor have taken the form of so-called theories or laws to explain whatever aberration happened to be taking place in the market at the moment. Many years ago, for example, there was the famous football theory of stock-market prediction. The details of this one are mercifully lost in antiquity, but it went something on the order of, Buy the market if Army beats Navy by more than seven pOints. If not, sell unless California ties Stanford. The thing, of course, worked — at least at the time of its formulation. It successfully called the 1929 crash, the 1932 bottom and a couple of other sub- sequent moves. Later results, we recall, were somewhat less successful. More recently, in the middle 1960's, came the X theory. The basic tenet of this formulation was that to outperform the market, one Simply bought stocks whose names ended in X. That one worked for awhile, too, at least until Xerox and Syntex became slightly less stellar performers than they previously had been. We have been trying to formulate similar laws to explain the behavior of the current market, and we think we have one which we are perfectly willing to share with our readers. Here- with, then, the Tabell Obscurity Principle If you've never heard of it, you can buy it. Like the other principles mentioned above, the Obscurity Principle has some only- moderately-tenuous relation to fact. It has been impossible of late to pore through 2000 stock market charts, an exercise we perform weekly, and not be struck by the number of relatively small companies, on both the New York and American Exchanges, which are demonstrating extra ..,. ordinary-technical action .-T-his w0uld.obeunsuf'!)ris ing.were-wes omewhere'in'the-blowoff-pha-s e – – of a bull market with all the juices of a typical speculative upsurge running freely. Such, how- ever, is hardly the case at present, as the better known companies on the American industrial scene lead the DJIA and the S & P 500 in a general southeasterly direction. It is difficult to say just why this should be so. Our own gues s, however, is that the phenomenon is not unrelated to the emerging acceptance of certain tenets of modem portfolio theory. One of the cornerstones of this theory is the concept of the effiCient market, a market in which all relevant information is held to be instantaneously known to all participants, thus making it impossible for any investor, however well informed, to take advantage of information not already reflected in the current price. Our own opinion is that, while the efficient-market theory may possess a bit more academic respectability, it has about as much intrinsic merit as the football theory discussed above. Let us, for a moment, however, posit its partial truth. If there is an element of reality here, it would be most applicable certainly to large companies being followed by many investors and to gargantuan money managers with limited flexibility to move in or out of stocks. It is, indeed, just possible that the m'arket, insofar as these investors and these stocks are concerned, might just be efficient in the sense in which the word is currently used. It is less likely, however, that the same premise is as applicable to the stocks of smaller companies which are effectively unavailable as portfolio choices to those who must move mammoth amounts of money. Thus, the discrepancy between the action of these companies and – .- – – -..—……… -…..—..';. -….–;;.—–…— – – that-of the'largecompany-dominated market'averages-;– Much has been made of the institutionalization of the stock market and the flight therefrom of individual investors. It is ironic that,at the height of this phenomenon, the number of attractive investment opportunities apparently available to the individual investor and effective- ly unavailable to financial behemoths appears to be increasing at an unprecedented rate. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (8/11/77) AWT/jb 875.52 98.02 672.06 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No totemenl or e)(preulon of op'nton or any other moiler herein contOlned IS, or , 10 be deemed to be, dHeqly OT indirectly, On offer or the SOIIC1tot,on of on offer 10 buy or sell any securlly referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presenled merely for the cOl'wel'iencc of the ubscnber While 'Ie believe the sources of our Informolion to be reiJoble, we In no way repreent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herc!ln Any action to be to\…cn by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Inve;llgoloon and InfOrmalion Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may nON have, or may later lake, poslhons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such pOSition may be dlffe'ent from any views now or heteafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scoll , Inc, which s registered with the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and other C'Ustomers Independently of any statements mode to Ihls or to ony olhe' Issue Further mformotlon on ony security menlloned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 19, 1977 One of the many functions of the technician on the investment scene is that of market histo',' – riail fhus;-eIther subconscfously'or15efteryet;-c01isciouslyCan(nonnBlIY7he examiilespast'iiiarKet history and divides it into periods of bull and bear markets. Within each of these bull and bear mar- kets, he also attempts to identify intermediate and minor moves opposite in direction to that of the major trend. As one approaches this level, the definitions often become somewhat fuzzy and less precise. Nonetheless, they are, it has always seemed to us, an important part of the intellectual baggage a responsible market analyst brings to his work. When one looks at market history far enough in the past, the definitions of bull and bear markets become fairly clear and, in effect, a permanent part of the record. Very often, however, recent history is less clearly defined, and it is not until long after the fact that we can definitely identify a given market period as a bull market, bear market or something in between. Such is the case in the present instance, which, as we have been regularly noting, offers one of the more complex equity markets in recent memory. In attempting to classify it, however, we do have a few firm and and permanently fixed facts to work with. To begin with, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is now down just a shade under 14 over a period of 160 trading days from December 31, 1976. If one cares to measure from the high of last September 21, the decline is 14.8 and is now 230 trading days long. This much, at least is unalter- able. Now, a decline on the order of magnitude of 14 can wind up as only one of two things when it is finally classified and catalogued by the market historian. It can be either an intermediate- term drop within the context of an ongoing bull market or it can be a part — either a major or minor , –' part — of an sta'geTritoWhi ongOing major bear cycle. ch of these two slots future Here, then, is the dilemma. It hfstortaiiSViiIti'iiimately place remains uncertain at t the first eightrronths h0i1s……….- 1 1977 . Let us examine the first possibility. A 14 bull-market correction, while not all that com- mon a phenomenon on an historical basis, still possesses ample precedent. As we hit the 14 level, however, we are approaching the maximum size for this particular species of market beast. If an intermediate-term correction, therefore, is all we are looking at, an end thereto should be approach- ing, regardless of whatever short-term horrors may be in store over the next few weeks. The only source of worry for the investor and portfolio manager, therefore, should be the possibility that, eight months to a year ago, we embarked on a new major bear cycle. It is thus worthwhile examining just how much paniC this particular prospect should engender at this particular stage of the game. The answer, if one looks at most recent history, is that the panic button should be pushed rather firmly. The two most recent bear markets were 1968-70 and 1973-74. Those little beauties took us down 36 and 45 on the Dow, respectively. A repetition at this point would take us to somewhere between 640 and 550, not a prospect to be regarded with tranquility. It is, there- fore, appropriate to ask whether most recent history is currently our most reliable guide. We are not so sure that it is. If one believes that a major cycle low occurred at the end of 1974, then bear market definitions for that cycle are no longer valid. During the previous cycle, that of the 1950's and early 1960's, we were accustomed to use a 20 screen as a filter for bullbea cycles. There were, indeed, identifiable bear markets during this period with corrections as small as 13. Thus, if we are to use this period as our guide, the worst could be just about over. —As we said above, we do not believe the 1968-74 experience is necessarily applicable in . …. —– – -. —-..- .. – – — — – —-,.– —— –…- …. ,.- the present instance. Without in any way minimizing the extent of the technical distribUtion Wh ich has taken place over the past summer, it is quite clear that there exists no distribution on the order of magnitude that was beginning to take place a decade ago. The phenomenon of massive distribu- tional tops, following a protracted rise fueled largely by speculative expectations, is one that is notably absent today. It would seem, therefore, that investment action based on the presumption of massive vulnerability from current levels would be premature at best. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p. m.) Cumulative Index (8/18/77) AWT/jb 861. 57 97.40 666.57 ANTHONY W . TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or elpreS510n of opinion or any otner moffer herein contolned 15, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the solrcllollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred to or mentIOned The moiler IS presented merely for the converlence 01 the subSCriber Whde we believe the sources of our informa- tIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be token by thc subSCriber should be based on hl own IOvestlgahon and Informahon Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later loke, pOllIons or trades In reSpect to cny securities mentioned In thiS or cny future Inue, ond such posilion may be different from ony Views now or hereJiter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS regnlered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment odvlsory ond olher customers independently of any statements mode In thiS or In ony other rssue Further Information on cny sccuroly mentioned herern IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ,, 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE August 26, 1977 We have repeatedly discussed the difficulties involved in trying to discuss the current stock market in terms of the averages, which, as we have noted, have failed to reflect the price action -…. 9 l'l..rg,equ'!ll;,-ersofLin,divigu!l; sjQc!ss.Yw,Q J!his,,el-l ,tlierefpre,,,Jota ke,another-ta c k ,a n d '- become more specific — to see if we can learn anything about the equity-market cl1mat from the re- cent price action of two individual issues. We have deliberately chosen two issues which possess practically no similarity other than that their names begin with the same letter of the alphabet, Bethlehem Steel and Burroughs Corporation. The recent price action of the two issues is typically disparate. Bethlehem sold over 40 at the beginning of this year and as recently as last June was in the low 30's. It closed Thursday at 20 1/2. Burroughs, on the other hand, touched 54 1/2 as recently as April and sold this week over 70, all this at a time when the market averages were trending generally lower. Both these moves, the strength in Burroughs and the.weakness in Bethlehem, constitute reversals of recent form. Burroughs, which reached a peak of over 120 at the height of the growth- stock craze in 1973, declined to the low 60's in the 1973-74 bear market and then, after recovering to 110, moved below its 197iJ-low on its recent slide to the middle 50's. Bethlehem, by contrast, was essentially unaffected in the 1972-74 slide and, between the end of 1974 and early 1976 moved from below 24 to 48. In terms or price performance, then, we have one former market leader recently fallen on hard times and what was recently a subpar performer now acting considerably better. As everyone is aware, the fundamentals for the two companies are as different as their comparative price action has been. Burroughs has enjoyed more than a decade of uninterrupted earn- ings growth of the sort that, a few years ago, made it the darling of those who believed in the one- decision school of investing. There has, in the recent past, been no deterioration of this fundamental picture. Earnings have continued to expand at a rapid rate, and both of the first two quarters of this 0;;I – year -new asialw-timcoemmhelgnhda'abtl4g.a8i9nspevresrhsaursetheBceotmhRleahreambl,ealga1in.Rbeyr'clOodll,i,;w'asitt,h 12-mol1lbearningsmoYlngtoa has fallen recent and we'll' – . advertised hard times — a deficit in the first quarter, a desultory second quarter and a recent slash in the dividend from 2 to 1 having been just a few of the recent unfavorable news items concern- ing the company. What moral are we to draw from all this The pOint, it seems to us, is that, if we are to postulate considerably lower prices for the market as a whole, we must be able to foresee further substantial weakness in both Burroughs and Bethlehem. Both these issues are reasonably representa- tive of whole classes of securities which are fundamentally important to the marketplace. We must ask ourselves, therefore, what is th plausibility of this concurrent weakness occurring. As far as Burroughs is concerned, the whole of the last five years has been, essentially, a markdown process from the ridiculous overvaluation of 1972-73, when at the craze of the growth- stock mania, supposedly rational investors were willing to pay over fifty times earnings for the stock. This markdown continued until just recently, when the stock, with no change in the fundamentals, was available as low as 13 times trailing-12-month earnings. It would seem a fair conclusion that at that level the reevaluation proces s might have been at leas t largely complete. 1 What about Bethlehem If the near-term outlook is as questionable as it appears to be, is not further weakness a possibility Here, we must recall, we have a stock whose price has already returned to around the level of its 1970 low. We have, furthermore, a company which, as recently as two years ago, managed to earn 8.70 in a single 12-month period and now sells for 20. It seems to us equally valid to question the downside possibilities in this Instance. ,–, ,If downside possibilities are.limited., one mustloQk at the c!f.J!u!r2-ugh-.h.as, -ccimpleteathe correctional' its-'19-72'73 overvaluatiOilai1d Bethlehem has been driven to a level where it is oversold on an intermediate-term basis, both stocks could enjoy a fairly decent recovery from these prices. Were the growth and cyclical universes, which these two issues tYify, begin to move concurrently to the upside, the market results could be positive indeed. Dow- Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 849.45 S & P Composite (1200 p. m.) 95.58 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (8/25/77) AWT/jb 660.11 C' Note All comments above are based solely on technical factors and further information un individual issues is available' . on request. No statement or e)(preSlon of opinIOn or ony other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on oHer or the SOllcltotlOn of on offer to bvy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlenc of the subSCriber While He believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be tc\l-el' by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Jonney Montgomery SCOIl, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, POSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony VieNS now or hereafter expressed In lhls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers IndpendentJy of any statements mode In thiS or If! any other Issue Further information on any secuflly mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER , 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK eXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE September 2, 1977 Nervous markets — it Is hard to describe the current market as anything other than -,I —-nervous ,,– have a-tendency to beobsessed-wlth nu-riibers -regardlessof whether or-not theparticular- numbers Involved have any real significance. Thus, a stock market rally found itself aborted earlier this week as the Commerce Department announced that Its Index of leading indicators fell In July for the third consecutive month. The market chose to Ignore the reassuring statements enanatlng from various Administration spokesmen who assured us that the three-month dip Indicated nothing more than a slowdown in the rate of economic expansion and not a possible (gulp!) recession. The re- assuring spokesmen were not, as we shall see below, on totally unsolid ground and, yet, it remains a fact that the leading-Indicator composite was put together In the first place because its components tend to lead — and what they tend to lead Is ,In fact, economic contractions. The job of the technician, of course, Is to look at numbers as dispassionately as possible and not at whatever rationale happens to be currently offered for the behavior of those numbers. The leading-Indicator series, therefore, Is, at this time, worth a look. To begin with, there have been no fewer than 39 separate occasions, since 1948, when the series has declined. Of these, it would seem fair to eliminate 21 occasions when the decline lasted for only one or two months. This leaves us with 18 occurrences similar to the present one where the leading indicators have dropped for a three-month or longer period. Six of these 1B declines were just three months In length and the other 12 were longer, with the two longest periods of con- secutive decline being 11 months. The first fact that Is perhaps worthy of note Is that in the 30-some-odd years under study, despite 18 three-month-or-longer drops in the leading-indicator series, there have been only six -'montre)cjess-sdibo-ness. Thus, on the face of it, il5t-;infaCt7indlcatea there appears recessiO!l.lnd teoe db;eCal otsweor s- t6oi-.oi tn1en yc hsaungcgelSt hUiaattaprdercojpSioHfyt h,.r;e.e………- – t this is the case. There was, for example, a three-month drop In late 1950 and a seven-month decline in the early part of 1951, all this despite the fact that no recession was in the offing for two years. The period 1955-56 saw three separate declining periods of five, four and six months, respectively. No recession occurred until the summer of 1957. A nine-month decline during 1966 foreshadowed no recession whatever and, indeed, by the time it was three months undelWay, the stock market had just about reached a major bottom. This leads In tum to yet another difficulty. Even assuming that the leading indicator series correctly forecasts recessions (and despite the false signals, it has tended to forecast correctly the six recessions in the past 30 years), this does not necessarily suggest its validity as a forecaster of the stock market. Indeed, the stock mar- ket is one of the 12 leading indicators In the composite suggesting its well-known tendency to lead the economy. Thus, one of the six-month declines that correctly forecast a recession was August, 1957-January, 1958. The problem, of course, was that by the time we were three months Into that particular decline, it was October of 1957, Just about the time the stock market had bottomed. In the most recent case, by the time we were three months into an ll-month leading-indicator decline In 1974-75, the ultimate bottom in the market was only a few months away. None of this means that we should totally disregard the behavior of the leading-indicator series, and, indeed, continued weakness would, on the record, be a cause for alarm. At the moment, however, in terms of actual Significance, It can be said, at best, to do nothing more than lend an element of uncertainty to the stock-market scene. While on the subject of numbers, Incidentally, we cannot resist drawing attention to one whfch'received a' gieatdeal-'l-e-s-s'attenticin'tha-w-dlCnh-e 'indicator- composite -OlfWed-nesaay; tne;;o, r- Financial Times Index of the London Market broke 500 on the upside for the first time since the e,,!rly 1970's. This has some Interest in view of the imperfect but reasonably well-documented tendency of this market to lead our own, albeit that this leadership tends to be more noticeable at tops than at bottoms. In the past, at least, declines in the United States market have not tended to be overly serious if the London market was expanding, and that It has certainly been doing, having risen from 265 last fall to Its current level. It will be Interesting to see whether the bull market currently being enjoyed by our friends across the ocean is ultimately transportable to our shores. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (9/1/77) AWT/jb 867.Bl 97.04 662.74 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or expression of opinion or any other matter herem contamed n, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the SOllCll0110n of on offer to buy or sell ony seoHily referred 10 or mentioned The mattelr IS presented merely for the converllence of the subscriber While e believe the sources of our Informo tlon 10 be relloble, we In no woy represent or guarontee the accurocy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any ocTlon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporation, and 115 officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or trades In respf!ct to any seCUrities menlloned 1M thiS or ony future ISsue, and such posillon may be different from any views now or hereater evpressed In thiS or any other Inue Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered With thc SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adVISOry ond olhel customers mdo!Jpendenlly of ony statements made 111 thiS or m ony other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

– f I ! I ! —- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 1 I \ — —-' 909 STA.TE ROA.D, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANoe. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 9, 1977 We published In this space last June 24th a discussion of computed trend channels for ..-;the,lJRwI'n'!.,!!-!ia!I!!rgal9.111,e!ltE!.gTwith. .Eh,a !!;lowing..,.thtw!r.endthenll\!\slry– In effect. These two channels, representee by the solid and dotted lines on the chart below, ran — from the September 21, 1976 high of 1014.79 and the December 31, 1976 level of 1004.65. The June 24th date is marked on the chart below and, as can be seen, the two trends had largely con- tained the Dow up to that time. What has happened since Is perhaps worthy of further discussion. MAJOR. INTERMEDIATE &MINOR COMPUTED DONTRENDS – DJIA SfTkBER 1. 1977 – fES 1971 I'f'R 1!fl1 P.f'R 1977 I'fI.T 197 …. 1977 …u. 1m JUG Isn 1977 As the chart shows, the Dow backed off from the upper llmlt of the Intermediate-term channel shortly after the June letter was written. It then moved up again In late July and tested the upper llmlt of the channel once more. From that point, on July 22, It began Its current sllde. That sllde can be dellneated by still a third, minor trend channel shown on the right-hand side of the chart. That channel, In tum, has been decisively penetrated on the upside by the recent rally. At Its recent low, the average was precisely at the bottom of the Intermediate channel – – a t around the -850 level. What'lspartlcularlylnferesting 7' more-over;-IS' tharthe '!lottom -levelsof-the — major and Intermediate downtrend channels have converged, thus suggesting that If the Intermedi- ate ehannel Is to be broken, such a break could occur fairly shortly. We have, therefore, three separate events of Importance having occurred In the last two weeks — the convergence of the major and Intermediate channels, the rebound from the bot- tom of both channels and the concomitant penetration of the minor downtrend channel. Whether this reversal will be confirmed by an ultimate upside break above the top of the Intermediate channel, now around the 905 level, remains to be seen. We would certainly regard such a break as having more-than-passlng significance. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 858.89 S & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 96.59 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/8/77) 666.98 AWT/lb No 51alemenl or expreSlon of opinion or any other motter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or mdnl!clly, on offer or the 501l(llollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony secunty referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for fhe convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sour!;eS of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the STatements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber shauld be based an hiS awn InVestlgalion and Infarmatlo'l Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later take, poslhons or frades In respect to any secUrities menlloned III tflls or any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter expn!ssed III thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othe, customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or III any other Issue Further IIlfOrmalion on any security mentioned herein IS ovollable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 16, 1977 The stock market experienced last week what we have come, privately, to call the Thursdaynoon reversal. This particular technical phenomenon Is a maddeningly recurrent event known only to the ,,-,w;r.,J.WJt!er, !;I,,c ,Ple!l.fgen.!o, ,IIJkell!.lnlrylsmtme. ,n,!h!,dy…after- noon preparatory to final editing on Friday morning and submission to the printer at noon. With devilish regularity, it seems that, whenever the market has been doing something all week with enough consistency to warrant a letter on the subject, It will immediately tum around and do something else, even as the letter is in the process of being dictated. Such was the case last Thursday when we chose to discuss and display a chart on the reversal of the Dow from the bottom of Its computed downtrend channel. Having, moved ahead for seven consecutive days ending on Wednesday and down only modestly at midday Thursday, the Dow chose that juncture to begin another slide which took it, by midweek, close to last month's low, the point from which the rally had started. However sharp the decline, however, it did not negate the basic thinking presented in last week's letter. Indeed, by Tuesday, the Dow had returned once more to almost precisely the bottom of the computed channel we discussed last week and, from that pOint, rallied once more In Wednesday's and Thursday's trading. Admittedly, the less said about the vigor of the rally, the better. Breadth was abysmal,and volume continued in the irregular downtrend that has characterized it since the end of July. Nonetheless, the rally took place, and the rebound from the bottom of the major and intermediate trend channels remains intact. Another thing that remains intact is the rather extraordinarily good behavior of the broad market as compared to the action of the Dow, a phenomenon which has been going on all year .. We were at recent lows, down 15 from year-end figures in terms of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, a percentage drop unquestionably of intermediate-term proportions and one of sufficient magnitude to have characterized in the past what later came to be regarded as major bear markets. It would be folly to claim that, in this sort of environment, the broad stock exchange list as a whole is not lower than it was –1-. . . f.-when-19 76came'toa 'c10s-.-What -ls..,at-emlyntrlil51e7nowever;-ls-tlfefacttnat'ltrs'7ea11ydo'w'-C'n'-' relatively little from its year-end level and, indeed, by a number of measurements, is really not much lower than It was last February when the Dow was a good 75 pOints higher. The following table shows the Dow and a dally breadth index at various market low pOints since last December 31. As we have stated before, the breadth Index, which is computed from the number of stocks advancing and declining, is, we think, a fair measure of what the broad range of securities is doing. The figures, we think, speak for themselves. DATE Dec 31, 1976 Feb 11, 1977 Feb 25, 1977 Apr 5, 1977 Apr 26, 1977 DIIA 997.34 926.03 926.20 909.74 910.36 BREADTH 101.86 97.03 94.52 92.75 93.07 DATE May 31, 1977 Aug 3, 1977 Aug 26, 1977 Sep 13, 1'977 D)1A 892.55 877.25 844.42 848.49 BREADTH 92.96 97.79 93.73 93.99 Breadth, at Its September 13 low of 93.99, Is obviously lower than It had been at the beginning of the year when the Dow was around 1000. Yet the fact that It Is acting better than the Dow and continues to do so remains evident. On August 26, for example, the breadth Index was at 93.73. This is a level actually above the two lows of April when the Dow was at 910, some 60 pOints higher than current levels. It is not too far off the level of February 25 when the Dow was higher still. Indeed, T throughout the entire period there has been a tendency for, breadth to demonstrate a seIs ll!gher low' asthe'D6Wcdecllned fromriin-orti'eid'bOttbm'ti5'nfinorfrel'-ilbottorri';' Betwee-n the end of May arid'August;-' as the table shows, the breadth Index was actually up almost five points despite a IS-point decline In the Dow. And even on the recent decline, breadth, last week, was able to hold above its end-of-August levi. \ This superior breadth behavior Is a phenomenon of some rarity since breadth Is known to have somewhat of a downward bias. Whatever its long-range significance, it seems to be suggesting, at the moment, that the market, while far from healthy, is a great deal less sick than the action of the averages presently seems to suggest. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p. m.) Cumulative Index (9/15/77) AWT/jb 860.88 96.78 663.37 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stolemen! or eKprcsslon of opInion or any olht!( moHer herein c.ontOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, direClly or indirectly, an offer or the sol,cltohon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber Wh,le we believe the sovrces of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any odlon to be token by the subscflbcr should be based on hiS own Invesllgotlon ond Informolton Jenney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its offICers or employees, moy now have, or may loler loe, posllions or trades In resped to any seCUrities mentloned In i!-IIS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed III thiS or ony other IUue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS regiSTered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment odvlS.ory end othel customers .ndependently of any statements mode In th,s or In any olher Issue Further ,nformatlon on any security menhoned herem IS available an request

– -… – — TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – . 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE September 23, 1977 Following an attempt to bottom at around the 850 level, the Dow slid on Wednesday and —Thursday-to yet-another- newlow-;-reachlng- whbelw–the'840 level-.-,…Slnce .Its,hlgh,of last-September ' (a year ago this week), the average Is now down more than 17 and, on the record, if the phrase bear market does not soon become widely heard, It probably should be. And yet, what we have here appears to be a somewhat unique beast. This can be documented, we think, by asking our readers to bear with us through the following table of numbers. The table shows every one of the 24 declines of 10 or more that have taken place since 1946 and, In the last three columns, the percentage decline, the number of days the decline required and, finally, the average decline per day expressed In hundredths of percentage points. This latter figure Is not nearly as esoteric as It sounds, since It Is an accurate measure of the speed with which the market Is going lower — In other words, the steepness of the drop. Start Date May 29 1946 Feb 8 1947 Jul 24 1947 Jun 15 1948 Jun 12 1950 Jan 5 1953 Scp 23 1955 Apr 6 1956 .\ug 2 1956 Jul 12 1957 Aug 3 1959 Jan-5-16-o Dec 13 1961 May 14 1965 Feb 9 1966 Scp 25 1967 Dec 3 1968 Apr 28 1971 Jan 11 1973 Oct 26 1973 Mar 13 1974 Nov 5 1974 Jul 15 1975 Sep 21 1976 DJIA End Date 212.50 Oct 9 1946 1fl4.49 May 17 1947 186.85 Mar 16 1948 193.16 Jun 13 1949 228.38 Jul 13 1950 293.79 Sep 14 1953 487.45 Oct 11 1955 521. 05 t1ay 28 1956 520.95 Feb 12 1957 520.77 Oct 22 1957 678.10 Nov 9 1959 b-8-5 o-4/-Oc t-251'96-0 – 734.91 Jun 26 1962 939.62 Jun 28 1965 995.15 943.08 Oct 7 1966 Mar 21 1968 985.21 May 26 1970 950.82 Nov 23 1971 1051.70 Aug 22 1973 987.06 Dec 5 1973 891.66 Oct 4 1974 674.75 Dec 6 1974 881. 81 Oct 1 1975 1014. 79 Scp 21 1977 – DJIA 163.12 163.21 165.39 161. 60 197.44 255.49 438.59 468.81 454.82 419.79 550.92 566-05 535.76 840.59 744.32 825.13 631.16 797.97 851. 90 788.31 584. 56 577. 60 784.16 840.78 decline No.of Days Per Day -23.24 93 25.0 -11. 53 81 14.2 -11. 49 182 6.3 -16.34 281 5.8 -13.55 22 61. 6 -13.04 176 7.4 -10.02 12 83.5 -10.03 36 27.9 -12.69 132 9.6 -19.39 71 27.3 -18.76 68 -17-'42–2-05 27.6 . -B;-5- -27.10 134 20.2 -10. 54 30 35.1 -25.21 167 15.1 -12.51 122 10.3 -35.94 367 9.8 -16.08 146 11. 0 -19.00 154 12.3 -20.14 27 74.6 -34.44 143 24.1 -14.40 22 65.5 -11. 07 55 20.1 -17.15 252 6.8 – Let us look first at the column which shows the percentage decline for each of the 24 drops. The present dip of 17.15 has been exceeded by only nine previous downswings over a 31- year period, most of those now recognized as having been major bear markets. It seems quite clear that,ln terms of the Dow at least, what has happened over the past year Is approaching reasonably serious proportions. What Is strange about the current Instance, however, Is the number of days which It has taken the present stock market to arrive at Its present level. The decline has been exceeded In number of trading days by only two markets In the past, those of 1968-70 and 1948-49, and, If the market continues lower, that last record will be exceeded In another month. Even If one chooses to – -vlenlfecentlre perloa'January;1973-Decembe-;-t974'a's'one'ofcontinuousdeClIne-; It totals OiiJy-43'j days. We are rapidly, In the present case, g'ettlng Into that league. In terms of steepness, however, we have quite clearly at the moment one of the flattest drops In three decades of market hlsOry. Only two declines have moved downward at a slower rate those within the basing period of the late 1940' s. Almost every decline that has come to be known as a major bear market has Involved a considerably steeper drop than the current case,and,even for the first 252 days of the 1970 decline, the rate was a good deal steeper than the current one. A glance at the table quite clearly demonstrates, as far as we are able to see, that this sort of flatness appears characteristic of Intermediate-term drops rather than major downswings. Dow-Jones Industrials (1100 p.m.) 841.48 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composite (1l00 p.m.) 95.23 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (9/22/77) 654.45 AWT/jb No statement or epreSlon of opinion or any other matlcr herem contaIned Is, or , to be deemed to be, dorectly or tndtrecily, on offer or the 101l(llollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The molter ., presented merely for the conve,cn of the subcrlber WhIle we believe the sources of our Information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent Of guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Ihe stolcmenls mude herein Any odlcn to be toen by Ihc subKrlber should be bosed on hiS own Invcsllgolron and Information Janney Montgomery ScalI, Inc. 0 0 corporation, and .IS offIcers or employees, may now hove, or may loler toke. POSitions or Irades In respect 10 any securities mentioned In Ihls or ony future IUe, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e,.prcsscd In thiS or any other issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVISor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVisory and othel C\Jslomers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISsue Further Information on ony seo,mty mentioned herein IS ovallable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – – – – – -; 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – October 7, 1977 ;''1c-CT;;he;…s.tock market gave no evidence, in the past week, of wanting to reverse the dreary …;., pattern which has been itShalliiiaJ'overtnepasCyear; Inaeed;-itsrecentaCtion-hasconformeu almost exactly to that pattern. On a minor basis, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has been moving down ever since July 22, when it closed at 923.42. To the subsequent low on September 28 at 834.72, the decline has been a shade under 10, and that decline can be characterized by a channel some 30 pOints wide, moving down at a rate of approximately 1 1/4 points per day. The upper limit of the aforesaid channel at the moment is just about at- the 850 level. It was, therefore, unsurprising, if disappointing, that the Dow managed to close at precisely 851.96 on Monday of this week before doing an about-face and heading due south in an almost-IS-point drop. ,The ostensible reason was fear of higher interest rates which has become, of late, the handy all-purpose explanation for outbreaks of the market's year-old malaise. In reviewing market action for the third quarter of 1977, it is obvious that a downward . bias was present although there did exist, in fact, a few bright spots. The S & P 500, in the period June 29-September 28, declined from99.30 to 95.31, a drop of 4.02. (The Dow for the same period, it is interesting to note, was down more than twice as much, 8.6. Analysis of the price action of individual components of the 500, however, suggests that many issues turned in reasonably good performances. 139 of the 500 issues in the S & P were actually up or unchanged for the quarter. 211 of the 500 issues did better than the Index itself, declining by less than the 4.02 decline shown by the average. No fewer than 304 of the 500 issues bettered the performance of the Dow, falling less than 8.6. The median decline was 5.9 — in other words, 250 issues declined less than 5.9 or rose, and 250 dropped by more than that amount. I- ….. The,leading &enQ(mef-iIl the I!ldextQt..tbl'qlrter was General Portland, Inc. ,w,.!'it,h'.'a- I 26.8 advance, this magnitude partially attributable,.of course,'to its low price. Second best, under the influence of a tender offer, was Babcock and Wilcox with a 26,5 rise. NCR Corporation rose 26.1. Other leading performers, with 19 or better advances, were Royal Crown Cola, Dr. Pepper, Dome Mines, Columbia Pictures, Franklin Life Insurance, Great Western United and ABA Limited. Examination of the top and the bottom issues in the 500 leads to a few observations. One phenomenon that seems to stand out is the resurgence, over the last quarter at least, of the old-line glamour issues. Prominent among the first 100-or-so stocks in the S & P performers are such names as Burroughs Corporation ( 11. 6). Philip Morris ( 11.4), Xerox ( 10.4), PepSico ( 9.4), McDonalds Corporation ( 8,4), Coca Cola (7.4) and K-Mart (6.3). fair number of other glamour stocks also managed to turn up on the plus side. On the other hand, cyclical stocks, especially steels, were among the weakest performers, Lykes Corp., Bethlehem Steel and Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel, all posting declines in the 30-40 range and U.S, Steel approaching this figure. Copper companies and aluminum companies were also prominent at the bottom of the list, posting, for the most part, drops of 20 or more. A few industry classifications seem to stand out. As noted above, two soft-drink makers were among the top ten performers. Restaurant companies, including Denny's, Pizza Hut and McDonalds all turned up as leaders. Finance and insurance stocks were also prominent at the top of the list, in most cases advancing by modest amounts in the face of a general market 1- –decline–Food stocks-seetned'for the most'part-to hold-their own or advance;-Oscar'Mayer,-H; – o J. Heinz, Standard Brands, Iowa Beef Processors and Beatrice Foods were among those issues managing to show advances for the quarter. On the other hand, coal, paper and tire-and-rubber stocks were generally among thos e is sues showing above-average declines . Note All comments above are based solely on technical factors and further . information is available on request. Dow- Jones Industrials (II 30 p. m.) 841. 30 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Composite (1100 p.m.) 96.12 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/6/77) 658.02 AWT/jb No statement Of e,..preslon of opinion or any other motler herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or Indrrectly, on offer or the sailellarlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The matter .s presented merely for the conver'lence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our .nforma' tlon to be rellab!e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herem. Any oct.on to be token by the subscriber shov!d be bosed on h. own mvestlgatlon and Infarmatlon Janney Montgomery Scoll Inc, as a corporat.on, and .ts officers or employees, may now have, or moy !ater toke, POSitions or trades m respect to tiny seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, 'and such POSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter e.pressed Ifl thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, !nc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may 91ve adVICe to ItS Investment adVisory and other customers mdependently of any slolemenl mode III thiS or III any other Issue further Information on any security mentioned herem IS avoilab!e on request