————————————————————————————————————. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ,, I ! I I I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE -I October 14, 1977 I – – t – – – – -… –Th eongoing process ,of stock -rna rket -d.ecline-Y'hich until. recently., .ha d cbeen .more -' I disquieting than painful, finally began to 'pinch a bitthi-week. One of the characteristics of the drop, as we documented statistically a few weeks ago, has been its relatively slow down- side momentum. Last week's trading, however, failed notably to fit into that mode. Such items as three consecutive 8-point daily declines in the Dow, 104 new yearly lows on Wednesday and 128 on Thursday, along with 1200-plus declining issues are hardly the hallmarks of a slow re- treat. Rather, they bring to mind the familiar and uncomfortable spectre of a bear market. Furthermore, if we examine the extent to which the Dow has been marked down over the past year, we now begin to get uncomfortably close to what we recognize historically as bear-market numbers. Since September 21, 1976, the Dow-Tones Industrials have declined by 19.4, and the drop measured from year-end 1976 is 18.6. Since we have beenacustomed in the past to using a 20 threshhold as the definition of a major bear market, it can be seen that the present downswing comes close to enjoying that dubious appelation. It is necessary, therefore, to address ourselves to the prospects of yet further decline. In such a discussion, the issue which must first be raised is the location of any possible sup- port level. Support, of course, is one of the more abused terms in the technical lexicon, and we have been hearing in the financial press for quite some time now about various support levels. These seemed to start around 880 and dropped slowly as the market pushed lower. Despite all this rather facile use of the term, there does, indeed, exist an area of support, support being properly defined in terms of a broad area rather than an absolute level. The existence of this support should be apparent to anyone with access to a chart of the Dow covering the last — -two-years' oftra ding!Afterreach1ng'itskpreviouslYear'marketlowill.late19'Z4i!tS80 ;-the' Dow.–,…..-I advanced in early 1975 in a four-month spurt that took it to over 830 by mid-April. Subsequent- ly, it peaked at just under 890 in mid-Tuly, 1975, declined to touch a low around 780 in October and, then, spurted again to over 1000 in early 1976. Nine months of trading in the latter part of 1975 took place in the 780-880 range. This should, in theory, constitute an area of demand, and it is, indeed, this area to which the Dow has now returned. The second factor which must be considered is the magnitude of the original top which preceded the current decline. That top is now clearly defined as the trading range between, roughly, 950 and just over 1000 which characterized all of 1976 trading between early February and mid-September. Analysis of this top suggests a downside target somewhat below the pro- jected support levels with objectives. centering around the 760-740 range. We have in the past been skeptical of these numbers,since individual stock patterns did not seem to support them. They now appear, however, remote, to be a possibility. It is, finally, necessary to consider whether, on a short-term baSiS, condltions(exlst for a market turn. This has not been, until recently, the case. The market has been declining, as we know, since mld-Tuly. However, the decline has been slow enough so that at no point, on a short-term basis, has its internal condition reached a stage which by standard definition could be called oversold. However unpleasant it may be, the action of the past few days is beginning to change this. Without in any way suggesting an immediate upside reversal, most short-term indicators are approaching levels at which the preconditions for such a turn, at anleast, are presenL – Tlie-marketTs, in surWrY'7in … ……….-. – ' area of general support, and the level of the most pessimistic readable downside targets is not terribly far below current prices. We have, mqre- over, for the first time since the middle of last summer, reached the sort of oversold condition from which a rebound attempt might be expected to take place. Under these conditions, it would appear Inappropriate to allow oneself to be panicked over the admittedly poor current action which erupted last week. Dow-Tones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (10/13/77) AWT/jb 820.17 93.58 642.99 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other maHer herem contained 15, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndirectly, an offer or the 50licltollon of on offer to buy or sell anr, security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convel'lenC!I of the subscriber While we beheve Ihe sources of our Informahan to be rehab e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any acllon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hIS own Inveshgal10n and Informallon Janney Monlgomery Sc01l, Inc, 0 0 corporotlon, and 11 officers or employees, may now have, or mcy loler toke, POSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, cnd such poslhon may be dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter exprCSed m thrs or any other ruue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS registered wllh the SEC os on rnve51ment adVIsor, may give adVice 10 Its rnvestment adVisory and othel Clltomers independently of ony stolements made in thiS or m cny other Issue Further mformol1on on ony securrty mentioned herein IS OVOllab!e on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE RO…. D, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – October 21, 1977 Thomas Wolfe wrote a novel called You Can't Go Home Again, and the proscription – -embodied in that—title-has-a,paralleLfor,investors ,towjt—ygucanLlradg,at.y.!l.te-,clays ,!lrices, or at last month's or last year's prices either. . .- ,- , The maxim is worth recalling at a time like the present. In all too many cases, in- vestors are prone to remember the recent price history of stocks which they own and to allow that price history to influence their decision as to what ought to be done with the security in question at the moment. In the current instance, when prices have lately been falling fairly sharply, many security-holders will recall the fact that, a few months ago or a year ago, they could have sold stocks at higher prices and will allow this factor to color their decision as to whether or not to sell today. Like W. S. Gilbert's Flowers that Bloom in the Spring, this has nothing to do with the case. If probabilities favor the market heading lower by a sufficient amount, then stocks should be sold at today's prices regardless of where they may have been over the past year. By contrast, if stocks are attractively priced at current levels, they should be bought, and fears en- gendered by the fact that the market has been trending downward for nine months should be ignored. The above bromide is easy to expound in market letters but difficult to follow in practice. It is further complicated at the moment by the fact that individual investors' percep- tions of reality will vary depending on which sector of the marketplace their present portfolio most closely resembles. The Dow-Jones Industrials are now down 20 from their highs of September, 1976, the lowest level, as the newspapers are fond of pointing out, in over 24 months. Thus, if an investor's portfolio performance has recently resembled that of the Dow, he has watched his capital erode for the past 13 months and is poorer, theoretically, than' he has been at any time —durin'g the past two years. The DoW, however, — we reiterate theIact once again — -,Silot the onlysegment- – of'the market. We have referred to our Cumulative Index, which, we believe, is a fair measure of the action of all NYSE issues. In contrast to the Dow, it reached a new peak as recently as July 22, three short months ago. Since that time, it has declined along with all the other market indicators, but it is off by only 8.1 from its high and sold for its current price as recently as April and May. Quite obviously, perception of recent market history is going to be colored by which index more closely represents portfolio performance. A portfolio down 20 to a two-year low is likely to engender quite different feelings than one which has moved 8 off its high over 90 days and is stUl, roughly, within the confines of a six-month trading range. And, yet, as we noted above, It should all not make the slightest Iota of difference. The question — Indeed, the only question — concerns whether a strong probability exists that well-chosen equities will, in the future, trade Significantly below their prices at this precise point In time, October 21, 1977. Despite the dismal short-range behavior of the market, which has not improved any since we discussed It at some length last week, there are reasons to suggest that such is not the case. A glass can be either half-empty or half-full, and, while the fact that the Dow is already down 20 is not, as we noted, a circumstance calculated to generate wild enthusiasm, it does suggest that a fairly substantial degree of correction has already taken place. The fact that 20 has been a sufficient threshold to define major bear markets prior to 1970 should at least give one pause. It is arguable, of course, that in the current case the Dow has merely led the rest ' ….. – of themarket and, that 'eventually,the bulk of -stoeks .. represented' by the Cumulative -Index , wlll' ;- play follow-the-Ieader into the abyss. The above-average technical action which characterized the broad-based Indicators up until July Is, unfortunately, no longer a fact of market life. Yet, it must be noted that analysiS of individual patterns does not support this likelihood either. In all too many cas es, downs Ide obj ectlves of previously-formed tops are being reached and support levels are being attained. We are inclined to think, based on analysis of the present rather than on looking at the past, that precipitous sales of equities would, at this stage, be unwise. Dow-Jones Industrials (1130 a.m.) S & P Composite (1100 a. m.) Cumulative Index (10/20/77) AWT/jb 808.99 92.38 636.96 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of op'nion or any other matter herein contolned Is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the lollcllollon of on offer to buy or sell any ecvnty referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the conve,ence of the subSCriber Wh,le Ne belreve the sources of our Informo f,on fO be rei, able, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any aC1lon to be faken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and ,nfOrmaIIO., Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 115 officers or employees, may now have, or may lofer toke, poslhons or trades in respect to any secur,IIes menlloned In thIS or any future ISSUe, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(presed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wnlch IS reglslered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 115 Investment adVisory and oThe. customers Independently of any statements made ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any seo.Jrlly menlloned herem IS available on request

…——- – — – ……—- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – – – – ———-' 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 28, 1977 We have, in the past, characterized the stock market's behavior as being good but not good enough.- ThisAdescription, unfortunate1y,fitted theperformance oLlas t,w eek ' '…,' I…- Admittedly, if nothing else, last week's gyrations relieved the boredom of the past few months. Ever since last summer, we have become accustomed, it seems, to the Dow dropp1ng about two points a day on an almost daily basis. Recent action, at least, serves to wake us from the sort of lethargy that this behaVior tends to engender. The fireworks began on Tuesday when; having skidded to a new low and broken the 800 level, the Dow managed to put on a dramatic rally in the last half-hour which erased most of the day's loss and brought the indicator back up above 800 on a closing basis. This was followed by a series of fits and starts on Wednesday morning, during which process the Dow by midday was back under 800 once more. From that point, an advance began, carrying for an almost-12-point gain on the day, one of the Average's best performances of the year. The strength continued through noon on ThursdaY,with an intra day high of 825.71 being reached before mild profit-taking set in. All this was impressive, although, as we suggested above, not sufficiently impressive when viewed in an historical context. Undoubtedly, in describing last week's market, the phrase rebound from an oversold condition will be heard. The question is just how oversold a condition was, in fact, reached, and the answer, apparently .. is not the sort of condition that has character- ized major bear-market bottoms in the past. Probably the most commonly-used technique in measuring short-term oversold and over- bought conditions is to add the total of net differences of advances and declines on each of the previous 10 days, a procedure which, obviously, tends to produce large negative values when the -1'–''m'a'rKet nas oeen aOWiiSharply. By-itSeII1J1'isfigure Is wortflless for long-range historical coni'' parisons, since the number of stocks traded on the NYSE has risen historically for many years. It is, however, easy to put the basic figure into historical perspective by expressing it as a per- centage of the total number of issues traded. On Tuesday of this week, the total excess of declines over advances for ten days was 4,lBB. As a percentage of issues traded for the same ten days it was 22.4. It is possible to put this figure into focus by noting the fact that it is the B7th occasion since 1946 on which the ten-day excess of declines over advances reached 20 or more of the total of issues traded. Whatever relief last week's performance may have provided, it was hardly a jewel of great rarity. The 22 figure, furthermore, is not one which has been associated in the past with important bottoms. Almost invariably, the oversold nadir at such bottoms has exceeded 25 of issues traded and, in most cases, it has managed to move above the 30 figure. Such was the case, for example, in October, 1974, May, 1970, October, 1966 and June, 1962, and the condi- tions were little different at major lows going back into the mid-1940's and 1950's. Another point which must be raised is that the present occasion represents only the second time in the past 12 months of decline that a comparable oversold condition has been reached, the last one being more than a year ago in October, 1976. Previous major drops have been characterized by multiple and separate occasions on which the 10-day advance-decline total dropped below the 20 figure. The bear market of 1973-74 had no fewer than 11 such occurrences, and that of 196B-70-had.seven–Most-important;downswIngs inthe past haveincludedat least– five. It is not our intention, with the above, to assume an overly pessimistic stance and our readers are familiar with the fact that such a stance is not characteristic of our current feelings about the stock market. Indeed, the market's ability to pull itself out of its lethargy and to begin to demonstrate difference of opinion among its participants by putting on Wide swings in both directions is to us a constructive sign. The historical record would seem to suggest, however, that what we saw last week was the beginning of such a process rather than the end of it. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 819.30 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 92.43 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/27/77) . 633.13 AWT/jb No statement or expreion of opinion or any other matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the ollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security tion to be relloble, we In referred no way 10 or mentioned The mOiler I presented merely represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor for of the the (onverlence of the subSCriber statements mode herein Any aCWhohniletooNbeebteolieevne btyhetheousrucbeSs Corfiboeru rhinoufoldrmbae- based on hiS own Investlgallon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, and lis officers or employees, may now hove, or may later tae, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thl or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on iflvestment adVisor, may give odv.,e 10 ItS Investment advlSOry ond othel cvstomers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue further mforma/lon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

,/ v —, TABELL'S MARKET JLETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 4, 1977 This letter has reiterated at various times In the past the rather simple axiom that moving objects. This Is an assertion that should surprise'-noone,tocksare .A- —- – ….,………..- —-,.,.- -''-.-,,- especially following –the market of the past few weeks, when the'movement h'as'beEfn all1oo a-pparentand -Ifs'-dlrectlon quite clearly down. It Is necessary, however, periodically to remind oneself of this truism since the techniques Involved In analyzing stationary and moving objects are, In fact, quite different. A stationary object can be viewed Simply In terms of Its location at a given point In time, 1. e., Its level. A moving obj ect has to be thought of not only In terms of its level but also In terms of direction. We have often used the analogy of two airplanes at Identical altitudes, one In a tail- spin and the other In a controlled, powered climb. Despite their Identical levels, one's attitudes toward being a passenger on the respective planes should be quite different. If one considers nothing more than the level of the current stock market, It Is very difficult to become concerned. It Is, Indeed, even arguable that current equity prices are, on an historical baSiS, highly attractive. This Is certainly the view espoused by large numbers of corporate managements who have, in the recent past, been willing to make bids to take over en- tire companies at prices Significantly above the levels at which the stock market was valuing them. The same sort of judgment is reinforced by looking at stock prices In relation to current earning power and dividends. When this sort of measure is employed, It becomes apparent that the mar- ket is now priced not too far from those levels which characterized the bottom in 1974, a period we know in retros pect to have been a unique historical opportunity. It Is when we start looking at direction that we begin to have difficulty with the Cur- rent climate for equity prices. It certainly does not require sophisticated technical analysis to recognize the fact that the current direction of prices is downward and has been so since the first 0t-the ,yar. It.has, mOleover, been downward with a persistence and la.k,arial1lity w,hiC;'hi..S. 1 relatively rare in stock market downswings. In addition, there Is' reasonably al5undant evidence – – that the weakness, which was confined to a relatively narrOW segment of the list at the beginning of the year, has, in recent weeks, been spreading to broad numbers of stocks. The number of new lows being attained on a daily basis attests to this quite vividly. In the face of this sort of evidence, It Is obviously rather hard to react with wild ecstasy to the current level of stock prices, however attractive that level may be on the basis of historical comparison. Nonetheless, that attractive level remains a fact of stock-market life and will probably remain so for some time. Its existence as a fact should, if we are rational, make us all the more enthusiastic over any visible evidence that downSide momentum is waning or re- versing. To this end, we presented last week a rather detailed analysis attempting to assess whether recent action had, in fact, been symptomatic of a market turn. We were forced to come to the regrtful conclusion that such was not the case. It must, however, be admitted that this sort of conclUSion Is one that can legitimately be reversed at any moment. It would, in other words, be fairly easy for the market, in a very short time, to produce the kind of performance which would suggest the advisability of a highly aggressive stance toward equities. There remains Insufficient space here to document in detail the sort of evidence which the stock market would have to provide, although we may have the opportunity to comment on this sort of thing In future Issues. Basically what Is needed, however, Is more volume and more fluctuation. Until last week, at least, volume had been holding around levels which had characterlzed it all the waythrough the decline. An historical symptom of market bottoms, by con..-.. – trast, is shrplY e';panded VOlume, -bOth on the-downside and subsequently 0;; the upside. – Llke— wise, fairly Violent fluctuations in both directions tend to be characteristic of bottoms. The warning flag provided by a few days of truly severe market decline followed by a distinct and broad rebound would, similarly, constitute bullish evidence. These signs may manifest them- selves at any moment and, were they to do so, would call for a sharp reversal of attitude as re- gards Immediate stock-price prospects. Until such action takes place, however, consideration of the direction of the stock market must take precedence over recognition of Its admittedly attractive level. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 806.31 91.16 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/3/77) 627.93 AWT/jb No stalement or eKpresslon of opinion or any other matter herem conto!ned IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCItation of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The mailer I preented merely for the Convef'lcnce of the subcrlber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of Ihe stotements mude herein Any achon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery SCalf, Inc, a5 a corporation, and Its officers or t'mployees, may now have, or may loler toke, poslhons or trades In respect to any securilies mentioned In Ih,s or any future Issue, ond such position moy be d,fferent from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to 11 Investment advisory ond othel customers Independently of any statements mode In this or In any other lSue Further Information on ony seC\wty mentioned herein IS ovorlable on request

—- -. — – ——–, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 11, 1977 Broad and dynamic strength on Thursday and Friday of this week decisively violated the – s hort-term—downtrend Channel'wh-Ich.-has, conta1ned-the maJor-averages .slnce ,last .July-.A, l-I-polnt…- rally In Thursday's trading, on sharply Increased volume of 32,000,000 shares, was followed by ad- ditional wide strength early Friday. The current problem centers around analyzing the broader mean- Ing of all this admittedly Impressive strength. In the eyes of most Investors, the job of the technician is to forecast, that is, to sug- gest, with as much accuracy as possible, what the market is likely to do in the future. It is assumed that, along with everybody else, he is aware of what it has done in the past and that, therefore, comments on past history will be of little save academic interest. This view, unfortunately, is somewhat of an oversimplification. The future is always uncertain, but even the past, on occasion, Is somewhat murky. The present Instance constitutes a rather neat case in point. Have we been, for the past year, in a bull market or a bear market The answer to this question is less than obvious, and it must, It seems to us, be answered in order to gauge how one should peer into the future. . If one looks solely at the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, there is little doubt but that we have been in a bear market for the past fourteen months. The venerable thirty made their high that long ago and, early this month, were down 21 from that high, enough to qualify as a major downswing by any historical standard. The problem is that the Dow Is not, as investors are coming to realize, the only game in town. The S & P SOO-stock Index, for example, is down less than 16 from its 14- month-ago high. This amplitude, while somewhat on the extreme side, has in the past been squeezed into the context of intermediate-term declines within an ongoing bull upswing. One problem with the intermediate-term decline argument, however, Is that, In the case of both major Indices, the process has been going on for fourteen months, a rather excessive period of – time..iorac.onectionwlthln.aIlOngolngtr.eod.ILill, noneth,eleSJl,Ros.sJbJ.!! Jt;Lgi.around this dlflig,l…….. ty by looking at the action of market breadth or at an unweighted index such as our Cumulative Index. Using these Indicators, we find that the market's most recent high was made last July, a scant 3 1/2 months ago, and It is certainly possible, on the record, for a market to interrupt an ongoing upswing for this short a period. Moreover, since making its peak last July, the Cumulative Index has dropped only from 694 to a recent close around 628, a 9 1/2 decline and one, obviously, fitting the descrip- tion of an Intermediate-term correction. What we are trying to suggest, of course, Is that the Simple question of where the market has been Is, at the moment, almost as difficult to answer as the question of where it may go In the future . So what Noone, It may well be pOinted out, Is going to get rich on what the market did last year. The problem Is that deciding what It did last year is crucial, In our view, to a forecast of what lies ahead. If the period since September, 1976 Is to be considered a bear market by conven- tional standards, as the action of the Dow would suggest, It then becomes comparable to a limited and clearly definable set of past bear markets, and we would expect the same sort of action that term- Inated these downswings to be present at the termination of this one. Major declines In the past have tended, rather uniformly, to attain certain levels of downside momentum and a certain degree of over- sold condition before terminating. We devoted this space two weeks ago to an extensive discussion of the fact that the present downswing has not yet met those standards, and this week's rally does little to change the situation. If, by contrast, we are looking at the moment for nothing more than an end to a 3 1/2- month minor correction, then the standards we are able to apply are a good deal less stringent and comprehensive. If we are seeking nothing more than the end of a IS-week downturn that began last –July-; tKen the-o acUon- of th-e'last tWo we-eks qu-ite-adequatelyfits -th-e necessary -crlteda. — — – Having gone through the above exercise, we are forced further to confess that we have no immediate answer to the dilemma, at least in the theoretical context in which we have discussed It so far. In a practical context, the answer, strangely enough, is somewhat easier to find. Probabili- ties, at the moment, favor a rally, and, axiomatically, during rallies it is appropriate to own stocks. Just how far such a rally might extend in time or amplitude and where it is likely to fit into the larger cyclical puzzle are questions we shall have to allow the passage of time and the accumulation of ad- ditional evidence to answer. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 842.52 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 95.76 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/10/77) 655.17 AWT/Jb No statement or exprl!SSIOn of opinion or any other mgtler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly. on offer or the solicliatlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 1 presented merely for the conver'lence of the subscriber While oNe believe Ihe sources of our Informo tlon to be retloble, we In no woy represent or guorontee Ihe occurocy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein. Any oelion 10 be loken by Ihe subscflber should be based on hiS own lnvesllgallon ond Information Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, ond lIS officers or employees, moy now hove, or moy later lake, positrons or frodes In respect to ony securities mentroned In thiS or any future lSve, and such pOSItIon may be different from any views now or hereQfter epressed In thl or ony other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give odvlce to .ts Investment odvlsory and othe, customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In any ather Inue Furlher Information on ony securrly mentioned here.n '5 avorloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 PIVISION OF MEMBER New VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – November 18, 1977 . –..–…She ,market.technician,has. beOiln.defined, ,most often by…..disbel1evers.in technicalowork,. as . an analyst who is prone to comments on th-e order of, If the 'market goes up, it will go up, and, if It goes down, it will go down. The cavil, of course, is not totally fair, and it can be answered on a number of levels. Perhaps the simplest one, however, is the innocent rejoinder, So what, what's wrong with that What is wrong with it, of course, is that it goes against the grain. We are all imbued ,with the myth of the rational economic decision-maker. It is accepted as given that the only sensible attitude toward trading any good is to attempt to buy cheap and sell dear. How, then, to rationalize buying that which has just lately been cheaper or selling what has only recently been higher-priced How, also, to rationalize the converse, refraining from the purchase of assets now at substantial discounts from recent levels In defense of his own approach, the technician begins with a certain skepticism regarding the ability of others to determine just how cheap Is cheap and how dear is dear. (It is worthwhile to recall, say, the fundamental justifications advanced for buying growth stocks in 1972-73). He can go on to suggest that the idea in purchasing a capital asset, such as a common stock, is not necessarily to buy it cheaper than it has sold In the past, but cheaper than it will sell in the future. If this necessitates buying after an advance, he will aver, the premium Is simply the price one pays for a somewhat higher degree of certainty. The technician further asserts that markets and stocks tend to move In broad price trends which are most often unrecognizable at the instant of their turning. This was the rationale behind the earliest technical precepts, such as the Dow theory, which advocated gauging major movements In the I–…-tock-mak-et-by-measur-ing-.m!nor-'-Gnes .-Itisposs-lble–toquaiTelwith 's-imple-minded,acceptance 'of-the- original Dow theory tenets almost a century after their inception. It Is hard to prove, however, that the baSic premise of the theory is unsound. All of the above is not unrelated to the present case. The DOW-Jones Industrial Average in the seven market trading days between November 2 and November 11 moved up 5.62. Prior to that, it had moved down 20.3 over the ten months which had, to then, comprised 1977. What does this ability to advance suggest regarding future prospects for stock prices To begin with, the 20 decline places us In a rather unique historical category. Only six previous declines of this magnitude have occurred In the past thirty-six years of market history. It seems, therefore, at least worth examining what the ability to rally approximately 5 over a week and a half meant during the course of those previous six declines. If one looks only at the first four drops In question, those of 1946, 1957, 1961-62 and 1966, it is easy to become convinced that recent action Is encouraging Indeed. In the course of these declines, there was noadvance of as much as 5 until such'time as they had largely run their course. (In the latter two cases, a 5 advance occurred before, but fairly close to, the ultimate bottom). The most recent two bear markets, however, tell a different story Indeed. During the course of the 196870 downswing, during which the Dow dropped 45, there were four advances of 5 or more, and three of these were quite protracted, lasting for 54,73 and 47 trading days, respectively. The record of the most recent bear market, that of 1973-74, Is even more discouraging. That one,whlch reached Its high of 1051. 70 In January, 1973 and Its low of 577.60 on December 6, 1974,included no fewer than 13 flve-percent-or-greater advances. Most of these were of rather short duration, but at least one, – that of August-October; 1973; lasted 46 trading' days .'Ori tliis most recent record, It\votild -seem 'ad– vlsable to do less than wax ecstatic over a 5 1/2, shorter-than-two-week rally. We are, therefore, loath to do so, yet on the record, as we have suggested, the doctrine that the market will go up If It goes up is not all that bad. It Is worth remembering that each of the 20 declines referred to above were followed by advances ranging In amplitude from 32 to 354. If the present short-term rally can prove Itself by advancing to significant further new highs or by extendIng itself in time appreciably, the upside prospects will be worthwhile Indeed. We are perfectly w!llIng In this Instance to accept the premise that strength begets strength. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p. m.) Cumulative Index (11/17/77) AWT/jb 836.54 95.30 665.75 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of Opinion or any other metier herem contClined IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred fa or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convePlenceJ of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be rehable. we 1(1 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements ml,lde herein Any action fa be talen by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and ,nformation Janney Montgomery Seott. Inc. as a corporohon, and Its officers or employees, may now have. or may later toke, posItions Of trades In respect to ony secuflhes menllaned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSltlOr'l may be different from any views now or hereofter eo;pressed m thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Seoll. Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on ,vestment adVisor, may give adce to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any seCtHIty mentioned herein 15 available on request

—————-, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ., 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 , DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 25, 1977 Overbought and oversold are terms often used by technicians to describe the recent short-term behavior of the stock market. There are various techniques commonly utilized to measure the existence of these conditions, but In simplest terms, extreme overbought and oversold states signify noth, – -Ing-inore'thafithe fact'that the-markeCh-as- b;eninoving up or downwlthahOvenDrmal momentum and Yireadth. Tracking short-term overbought and oversold conditions Is a useful exercise In two respects. First of all, It helps us to gauge the short-term direction of the market and, secondly, perhaps even more Importantly, such measurements have Implications for the market's longer-range direction. Paradoxically, In this respect, both extreme overbought and extreme oversold conditions possess bullish longer-range Implications. this can be Illustrated by the chart below which shows the Dow since January, 1970. together with one commonly-used short-term Indicator, a ten-day total of dally advarces minus dally declines expressed as a percentage of Issues traded. — ——!'.;;'r;o;O;r;;N;E-T;O-P;'F;E;R;EN;CEOF-RO-V. ;OE-C-. -Q;SP;ER-C;EN;T;RGE OF-;TO;T;.-IS-SU;ES;;T-;P-OE;O-;- -. o III 1/ III Id '\ h I … ' . 1'9) 11511 1'973 1191 1916 11911 As the chart quite clearly shows, extreme oversolds, below minus 30, tend to be char- acteristic of the final decline In major or Intermediate-term corrections. The lower solid line on the chart, drawn at this level, was penetrated around the major lows In 1970 and 1974 and, also, at the Important Intermediate-term bottoms of 1973 and 1975. As we discussed a few weeks ago, we were somewhat dis- appOinted at the failure of this Indicator to move lower than minus 22.3 at the October low, thus failing to register the oversold condition characteristic of a bear market climax. ,. Just as the terminal drops of bear markets tend to reach extremes, so do the Initial ,up- . . swings of ,long-term bull markets ;-'Thus;' as,the chart again 'shdWthe extreme' oversold con'dTt!OnSmen— tloned above tended to be followed by equal extremes In the opposite direction when the market first began to move ahead. Most recently, following the moderate oversold of late October, the Indicator reached a high of 23.4. This Is Interesting, since It Is the best level reached since early 1976 and suggests that the current rally has displayed more vigor than any which has occurred during the past two years. It did not, unfortunately, approach historic peaks, and, to date, It remains well below the 30 level attained In late 1970, early 1975 or early 1976. Further strength from these levels, however, or another sharp rise following a modest correction, could produce an extreme-overbought condition and, were this to occur, It would have to be construed In a bullish sense. DOW-Jones Industrials (1200 P. m.) 841.48 -s & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) 96.38 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/23/77) 677.46 AWT/jb No stalement or expPl!Slon of opinion or any other moiler herein contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe sol'C.lal,on of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or menl,oned The molter , presented merely for Ihe converlencc of the subsctlber While -Ne believe the sources of ovr informa- lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or gvarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mode herein Any act,on 10 be loken by the subscllber should be based on hiS own investigation and ,formation Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os 0 corporation, ond ,Is offICers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, posll,on5 or trades In respect to any seuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, ond such pOSit' on may be different from any views now or hereafter el'pressed In this or any olner Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, wnlch IS registered wltn the SEC as on Investment adVISor, may give adVIce to Its ,nvestment advisory and otnel customers Independently of any stalemenis mode In th.s or In any otner Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein Is available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVtSION OF MEM8EA NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC MEMaER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 2, 1977 Is–!' -. -. .. Part of,.tpe lIlillket. pO!!Irnntato utockJll-trad.ejs tl)e fQrecast. Indeed,it. couldalmost be said that indulgence- in this exercise 'somethfng 'e';pect'ed byh!S llders, who 'come to expct,' . on a regular basis, some comment on what the stock market is likely to do. The word likely is worth stress, since what is usually expected is a forecast rather than a prediction, and there exists here a subtle distinction. The latter word is Latin in its origin, stemming from prae, before, and dicere, to say. The former is a pure Anglo-Saxon product, related to the German Y! and the Old Norse kasta, meaning to throw or project. In modern usage, Webster tells us, both imply inference from facts or accepted laws of nature, but ' forecast' adds the implica- tion of anticipated eventuality and differs from 'predict' in being usefully concerned with probabilities rather than certainties. Undue emphasis on probabilities versus certainties has often cynically been called hedging, but that is another matter. We have often thought the demand for forecasts — or even predictions — to be an ex- cessive and, indeed, unnecessary one. Forecasts do not earn an investment return and past rightness about the course of the stock 'market is generally not accepted as currency at the local supermarket. In asset management, a forecast is useful only insofar as it suggests a course of investment action and that course of investment action later turns out to have been a profitable one. The baSic function of the investment advisor is to suggest appropriate investment policy. That policy may, indeed, be unrelated to a forecast, or the forecast which prompts it may, in fact, be a purposely limited one. We have in the past attempted to illustrate the investment decision-maker's dilemma by the admittedly over-simplified diagram below. It postulates two possible investment decisions, to be long stocks and not to belongstocks, andtwopossiblestatesoftheworld, the stock market is going either up or.down.. There are thus four possible results, two of which are right and two wrong. II The two wrong decision boxes represent risk, and part of the problem confronting the investment manager at the moment centers on which of the two risks MARKET DIRECTION tlP DnWN he prefers to assume, that of being long stocks if the true course of the market is, indeed, downward, or that of not being long stocks if the market's real direction is up. We have been documenting in this space for about a month the sorry fact that recent markets have provided us with little on which to base a concrete forecast. We know that the past course of the market, from July to the end of October, was down, and we know that, last month at least, that downward course was temporarily stemmed. As we have been suggesting, however, the November rally failed to provide us with the zg'z- rig h t wrong o -III -U'- III iCI oZ– wro n g rig h t !- L – …..L. sort of concrete reversal evidence normally seen at market bottoms. Thus, the difficulty in forecasting. In the absence of a forecast, then, we are forced to choose between which risk it is more appropriate to take and here, we think, it is possible to come down firmly on the side of the proposition that the risk involved in owning stocks is preferable to the risk involved in not owning them. There are a number of reasons, both fundamental and technical, for this preference but, 'suffice it to say, we-are willing to-defendthem.- – – . – – – …..,…….- Once we have come this far, an investment policy clearly follows, and that investment policy involves a reasonably aggressive attitude toward equities. The process of arriving at this policy has involved little in the way of a forecast about the viability of the current rally, that task, as we have suggested, being more than usually fraught with difficulty. It is policy, however, that will ultimately prove useful or otherwise, not a forecast. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (12/2/77) AWT/jb 822.94 94.47 678.64 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stclement or e(preslon of opinion or any other matter herem contolned IS, or IS;O be deemed to be, dlfectly or indirectly, on offer or the sol,cllchen of on offer to bvy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converllnce of the subSCriber While we believe the sourcbs ofbour hnflnI' lion to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuroy thereof nor of the statemenTS mude herein Any actIOn 10 be to\.en by the su TI er S au t e based on hiS own mvestlgahon and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, In , as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now hahe, or may later \.e, positions or trades In respect 10 any SeCIJrltics mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and suh position may be different from any views now or ercodfter expredse hm Ihls or any other Inuc Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment a Yisoryon at er customers Independently of ony statements mode in thiS or in any other Issue Further Information on any security men honed herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET I LETTER 1 I J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVIBION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCt-lANGE December 9, 1977 One of the reasons that technical analysis of the stock market has managed to hold '– –our -unflagginginterest for the'past -24 -yeacs-is thatit'isa subjectat 0nce-simpleand'inflnitely .- complex. In practice, technical work may involve numerous difficult and highly esoteric tech- niques including the application of some of the more abstruse branches of higher mathematics. And, yet, at the heart of it all are a few eminently simple principles. Among these principles are the dictum that a trend, once established, tends to remain in force and that longer-term trends, even as bricks and mortar make up a building, are made up of shorter and intermediate-term trends. The two principles above apply not only to trends, it seems to us, but to general markel environments, a subjective definition that goes beyond simple up or down trends. The longer a given market environment remains in effect, the more obvious its individual elements be- come and the more clearly-etched its profile. As time goes on, of course, there will be short periods of market behavior which are inconsistent with this long-range environment. Often the central question faCing the technician is whether or not the short periods cumulate to form a chain of evidence strong enough to suggest that the basic climate may be undergoing fundamental change. To illustrate this sort of dilemma, it is only necessary to look at the experience of the past two years. 1976, at least subsequent to mid-February, constituted an identifiable mar- ket environment. The Dow, although It reached Its high in September, moved sideways for a period of six months. It is a fair statement that, during this period, the Dow was typical of the action of most indiVidual stocks. Breadth, during the middle two quarters of 1976, had no notice- able trend nor did our Cumulative Index of all New York Stock Exchange issues. Indeed, unlike the Dow, it fa iled to move to a new high In the latter part of the year. After a short correction In October-November, 1976, the market began moving a- '-had 'sharply ;this 'ra1iy-occupying'mollt01'h-mrjth-Uf-Decem1Jenlyear ag-o-'Hbwever, starfing—I with this period, a noticeable divergence took place between the Dow and the more broadly-based market Indicators. The Dow topped out on December 31, having failed to move to a new high. In terms of individual issues, however, the rally was a good deal more dynamic. Breadth,the Cum- ulative Index and, incidentally, the American Stock Exchange index shot ahead to new cycle peaks. We, thus, embarked, In that short month, on a period in which the popular averages were drasti- cally understating the market's performance. That one month was indicative of a change in the ba sic climate. Thus, although the trend of the averages altered radically as 1977 began, the dis- parity between those averages and the broad market continued. If one looked at the Dow, the first half of 1977 could be characterized as an irregular, not very steep, downtrend. As far as the other three indicators were concerned, the trend was also irregular but the bias was distinctly up- ward. It was quite clearly a market environment In which, despite the fact that the averages were trending lower, It was a senSible proposition to own stocks. The scene shifted again in July. At that point, the downtrend in the averages be- came steeper, but this time It was joined by the other indicators. Breadth and the Cumulative In- dex both sunk to new lows although by a much lesser amount than the Dow. The question posed centered on whether this short-term action indicated an end to the superior performance of the broad-based indicators, just as the action of December, 1976 suggested the start of that per- formance. The evidence to date does not so suggest. As we all know, the Dow rallied sharp- – , l)i'last month -ana has; in the past week-;b-e'en correcting agood part of that rally. A character- istic of the rally once more was superior action on the part of broad-based indicators. Breadth moved above its October high and close to Its 1977 peak. So did the Cumulative Index, and the American Stock Exchange index, as recently as this week, posted a new high for 1977. Mean- while, the recent downswing,which brought that rally to an end, Is far too new a phenomenon to evaluate. The indication seems to be that the basic market environment which characterized most of 1977 remains essenhally unchanged. The picture on the Dow, In a downtrend all year, remains clouded. However, there appears to be little to suggest that that wavering action is not continu- ing to understate the performance of the market. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 812.37 S & P Composite (1200 p,m.) 93.43 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/8/77) 668.00 AWT/jb No 510lement or exprenlon of opinion or ony olher motter here'n contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlredly or tndlredly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The mOiler IS presented merely for the converlence- of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our mforma tlon to be reliable we m no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nar af ,he statements mude herem Any achon 10 be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own'lnvestlgalion ond Information Janney MOnlgarflery Scott, Inc, 05 0 corporation, and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or May lofer toke, paslhans or trades In respect to any secuTltl!!S mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll. Inc. which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and other customers rndependently of any statements mode In thl or In any other Issue Further mformallon on any securFly mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMISEA NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC, MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE December 16, 1977 Mid-December has once again arrived, and anno Domini 1977 Is about to pass Into hls- tory . It I our u su al cust om t- ocelebrate the7' end-0..- ing of. eaGh….-01..— …….- stock-mar-ket year with a two-part series of letters The first consists of a -review cit what we'65nsider to bethe sallent features of the-year – just passed. The second, usually using the first as a takeoff pOint, generally attempts to peer into the future and to offer some thoughts as to the kind of market environment which will characterize the year ahead. Historically, the first of the two letters tends to be the easier task. Our personal crystal ball is,generally,a bit clouded, while the history of the prior 52 weeks has already been writ and is abundantly documented. Producing a history, therefore, should consist of nothing more than selecting those features of the prior year which may be germaine to a forecast for the coming one. Without implying that it will be easy to produce a forecast for 1978, it must be noted that, this year, Interestingly enough, producing a review of 1977 is just about as difficult. How, in- deed, are we to describe the fascinating and, in many ways, rather unique stock market wlth which we have been dealing for the past twelve months. An attempt at such a description immediately brings to light some of the difficulties. Let us look, for example, at the most commonly used stock-market measure, the Dow- Jones Industrial Average. Its most recent cycle high was reached the day before the new year began on December 31, 1976 at 1004.65. (It had been higher by a miniscule amount three months earlier in September, 1976). On November 2nd, it reached a closing low of 800.85. The decline's extent is ap- propriate for those obsessed with round numbers. The Dow dropped just over 200 pOints, and, since it started at just about 1000, those 200 pOints represent almost exactly 20. Succumbing,ourselves,to the conventional weakness for round numbers, we have, In the past, used precisely that 20 as our C rlteriafor. et1n9mi'lj opear lTlark!'ts. )9 77.,by.tis stanc!;trd, Jil!aJUJe, ancl theSceJttrtUi'l k 9four 1978 forecast should be to determine whether the signs of conventional bear market bottoms are, or have been, present. Yet, when we begin to measure the behavior of the average stock, all manner of diffi- culties intrude, for, indeed, most stocks, by most measurements, have not been declining throughout 1977. Throughout the first six months of the year, the general trend of the Dow was flat to slightly downward. The history of broad-based market Indicators through July of last year also showed a flat trend, but that flat trend had a distinct upward bias. The period July-October produced a decline of fairly serious proportions In the Dow. In terms of broad-based indicators, it produced only a minor correction. That correction was, Indeed, so minor that the miniscule recovery which the Dow enjoyed during the first two weeks of November brought most inclusive performance measurements back close to their 1977 highs and, indeed, brought a few to new highs. All this took place while the Dow (and the S & P 500) were languishing around their year's lows, where they remain today. It is not unusual for analysts with bullish or bearish biases to disagree on where the mar- ket Is going. At the present, they find themselves embroiled In a controversy as to where it has been. The optimist can look at the Dow and suggest that, having undergone a decline of major bear-market proportions, It should be fairly close to its bottom. Or he can take the oPPosite tack and point out that broader-based indicators remain In a continuing uptrend with only tentative signs of loss of momentum. Conversely, the pessimist may point to the unrelieved downtrend in the Dow and use the argument that, since broad-based indices have declined relatively little, the market as a whole retains a good deal of potential on the downs ide. The most perplexing part of all this i the fact thatit is largely -unprecedented.- It Isnot- unknown fo; broad-based indicators to outperform the Dow -by a Significant extent and, indeed, this usually occurs around the middle stages of bull markets. It is hard to fit 1977 into this particular category. Furthermore, such a divergence usually consists of superior upside performance by the bulk of stocks, while the Dow moves ahead to a lesser degree. The phenomenon of moves in opposite direc- tions is rare, to say the least. We have managed to write a whole page without really saying what happened to the mar- ket In 1977, and, as we have suggested, this is possible only because dlfferent,but equally valid, market measurements relate strongly divergent versions of the facts. It will be our job In next week's forecast to try to guess what implications this divergence may hold for 1978. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 817.74 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 93.49 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (12/15/77) 668.46 AWT/jb NQ slolemenl or e)(preslon of opinion or any olner molter herein contolned IS, or 15 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliclfatlon of on offer to buy or sell ony serufiTy referred to or mentioned The mOlter IS preented merely for the converlence of the subc(lber While oNe believe the !.Ources of our InformotlOn to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statement mode herein Any Clchon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hl own Investigation and mformaloon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os 0 corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades m respect to any securities menhoned In thiS or ony future Inue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed tn thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, which 15 registered With the SEC as on Investmenl adVIsor, may give adVice 10 lIs Investment adVISOry ond other C\JSlomer Independently of any stotements mode In IhlS or In any other Issue Further informatIon on any security menlloned herein IS aVOllable on request