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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 24, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 24, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - October 24, 1969
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Walston &- Co. lnc – – – – – Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchange. OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 7rfr – i..Eln October 24, 1969 The evidence is now glaring — and the investor ignores it at his peril. July 29, 1969 constituted, in all probability, a major bottom in the stock market. Now, we are well aware of the fact that nothing in the equity market is ever a 100 certainty, but last week's market strength unquestionably seemed to provide the final affir- mation of a long-held contention — that the past three months have constituted part of a base formation which will, ultimately, lead to higher market levels. Strength continued un- abated in this week's trading, with the Dow scoring a 3-point advance on Monday, a 7-point advance on Tuesday and, finally,a 13-point advance on Wednesday. Weakness which brought the Index down 10 points in early trading Thursday was erased that afternoon and the next day, with anew high of 868. By mid-week the market had reached what may be termed an extreme-overbought condition on a short-term basis. On that day, the average plurality of advances over decline for the previous ten days was 385 or 24 of the average number of issues traded. This is a rare occurrence and is typical only of rallies which take place following major market bot- toms. It has occurred only six times previously in the past 13 years; in January 1958, three times at successively higher levels following the 1962 bottom, in January 1967 and most re- cently in April 1968. In all cases, a worthwhile advance ultimately followed the occurrence. Now, admittedly, the very fact of the market's being overbought indicates the prob- ability that the upswing will run out of steam on a short-term basis in the near future. How- ever, the most probable aftermath could be a period of consolidation perhaps going on into early 1970 rather than a substantial correction. We feel offer an excellent chance to take a fully invested position. of consolidation wil st cks in which we would favor accumulation on weakness is the FABERGE … (37 1/4) Few industries have prpyE;4. the ves as well insulated again the effects of economic cycles as has the c02s . For the last decad'e, sales have been growing at an annual rate -sumer disposableincome-but-change – n- —-0, e ing not only the steady rise in con- (CJf- lie-of-the American-population;-Today;- the male population, here as a started to spend a greater part of his in- come on such 15ie of success has bee t e e v s, deodorants, bath soaps, etc. The sweet sme just granted. As a leader 1 benefited from the sh an cosmetic field, Faberge, formerly Rayette-Faberge, has is hair spray use in recent years. Rayette Aqua-Net, the com pany's leading brand in field, has been the nation's top selling brand for several years, accounting for about 0 of the total domestic market. In addition to the various lines of hai products, produced by the Rayette, Tip Top and Caryl Richards divisions, Faberge also manufactures such popular items as lip sticks and nail glaces (a more sophisticated name for nail polishes), Kiku Japanese-inspired bath items, Brut, Woodhue and Aphrodisia men's shaving and bath products. A new line of fragrances, cosmetics and bath items is slated for introduction this Fall under the name Xanadu, and should be of help to nubile men and wome Sales and earnings have been improving steadily in recent years with the current pro- jection for 1969 calling for revenues to rise to near 140 million, vs. 130.4 million last year, and earnings are expected to approximate 1. 70 a share, compared with 1. 52 in 1968 Considering that the final quarter of the year, encompassing the busy Christmas buying sea- son, normally is the best by far, the earnings may exceed the estimated level by a small a-mount. Either way the outlook remains highly favorable-for a continuation-of-this impressiv — trend well into the foreseeable future. One leading advisory service is on record as antici- pa-Ling earnings well above the 2.00 level during the 1972-1974 period. Judging from past action, it would not be surprising to us to see this earnings level reached in the 1970-1971 period. Technically, FBG has formed an area of congestion in the low 30' s tllat goes back over a year. Not only does this base area form considerable downside support, but it also enables the projection of a price objective around the 55-60 area. Already on the Price Appreciation section of our Recommended List, Faberge again is recommended for purchase by invest- ment-oriented accounts. Dow-Jones Ind. 862.26 Dow-Jones Rails 201.23 ANTHONY W. TABELL-HARRY W. LAUBSCHER WALSTON & CO. INC. This mnrket letter 18 published for Jour convemence and InformatIOn Hl1d IS not an offr to sell or n soliCitatIOn to bu any secuntles dlSCUSqed The m- fonnatlOn was obtamed flom sources we helleve to be rehahle, but we do not guarantee Its a'CUrRcy \Vnlston lL Co. Inc anll lb, officers. directors or cmplo)cc'l may have Rn mterest In or pUl'lhltSl' and set! the 'amb referred to herem WNsol

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 31, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 31, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - October 31, 1969
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Walston &- Co. Inc Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Prine, pal Stock and Commodity Exchange. OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABEll'S MARKET lETTER October 31, 1969 After reaching a new high at 868 in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average last Friday, the market was subject to profit taking most of the week and moved back to an intra-day low of 839.82 on Thursday before strength on Thursday afternoon and Friday era sed half of the week's losses. Considering the overbought condition mentioned in last week's letter, the most probable outlook for the foreseeable future is a senes of extended swings back and forth — probably centering around the 860 area. Durmg this period, individual issues wlll pursue their own patterns, and periods of weakness should be used for accumulation. One 1.. stock suitable for such acC1t1JJlUlahuntillstreYi-ewed below. -THE NATIONALCASH-R-EGISTER…COMPANY Current Price Current Dividend Current Yield Long Term Debt Common Stock 145 1/8 1. 20 O. 8 319,600,268 10,330,675 shs. It would appear that few companies have as much going for them as Natbnal Cash Register has going for it. After IBM, NCR is the largest and most important factor in the offic equipment field. It has held the major share of the cash register market for a long time Sales-1969 Est. 1. 245 billion and now seems about to expand its already Sales-1968 1. 102 billion large overseas market in this area as switch- Earns. Per Sh. 1969-E Earns. Per Sh. 1968 4.20 4.35 3 74 . ing over to the decimal system takes place throughout the United Kingdom. In to benefit from its Mkt. Range 1969-1968 154 1/4 – 99 1/2 increasingl tr ry position in the h ne , an area expected to show unusually large production gains during the 197'o(sifASupp . nd services connected with the cash register and accounting at9I a nt for a considerable portion of revenues, which is fully expected to parall hin es growth in the years ahead. . –Only a few -years -i . at -into the computer-'ring.–It intro- – ' duced its latest line in March ing area have risen shar y wit lka. in the electronic data processrs computer-related products now accounting for between 15 and 2 0 e . Trade sources have suggested that NCR has the potential to double market within the next four years. The company has been highly selective 1 ap ch to the computer and EDP markets in general and has sought to concentrate on oping business in the financial and retailing industries, where it already had long-stan' favorable relations with customers. Earnings have been in an erratic trend in recent years, largely due to costs related to the computer business. Heavy initial depreciation charges on recent computer placements and the still high introductory costs are expected to keep results under some pressure. However, 1969 earnings results are expected to witness the first breakout from the 2. 50 to 4.00 earnings plateau that has been maintained for ten years. Current estimates call for earnings to rise to between 4.20 and 4.35 a share, from the 3.74 reported for last year. One leading advisory service has gone on record as projecting NCR's earnings for the 1972-1974 period to above the 7.00 a sh'tre level. Technically, there is substantiahon for the fundamental enthusiasm in this situation. When NCR moved above the 140 level in September, it broke.o.ut of a trading range that.kept the stock confined to an area between 140 and 110 for more than a year. This base area not only now creates a formidable support zone limiting downside potential, but it also enables the proJection of a price goal at 175 initially. Recently added to the Quality and Long-Term Growth section of our Recommended List when it temporarily dipped slightly below the 140 level in late September, the shares of National Cash Register Company again are recommended for purchase at preyaiUng mar-ket… Dow-Jones Ind. 855.99 Dow-Jones Rails 200.20 ANTHONY W. TABELL-HARRY W. LAUBSCHER WALSTON & CO. INC. AWTHWLamb ffThis market I,ttel 19 I'uhlu,hld 01 'Olll ('OIl\l'IlIUlI'C mil n'OImnt1fHl lind ,.. not ,In to 1'1(11 01 l ..IJ(ll.ltWIl in Iou\' lin L('uI,llllI The tn- fOlmatJon Wf\'I ol.otl\lllPd Clom we hrI'v. to he It'h,II,.., hut '\L ,I not b'1Il1,wtl't. Lh,lIl'(,'u1';H\ \\',lI;;tol1 l.. Co 1111'. ,md it .. officer'!, ,IUI-dort or emplove!', mllv have IIIl IIItt'rCBt III 01 IIUIf'h.I;'It' .Ind sell the .. 1 to herelJl, WN.301

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 07, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 07, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - November 07, 1969
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, Walston &- Co. —–Inc —– Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchange. OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS IL E TABEll'S MARKET lETTER November 7, 1969 The passage of hme and the progression of market cycles continually bring new sets of problems which are posed to the market technician. Until just recently, the major prob- lem was to determine whether July 29, 1969 constituted a market bottom, or merely an in- terruption of an ongoing decline, The evidence inclined us fairly firmly toward the former view all along, and it has continued with each week to be more conclusive. The market strength of the latter part of last week when the Dow again approached its October 24th high added further evidence. It was accompanied by positive readings in a number of lagging indicators — indicators designed to signal uptrends not close to bottoms, but after a revers has been well confirmedAt.the present time, most such devices are in positive territory –and the premise-of a new seemsto- furtherevi -, . dence contradicts it. This being the case, a- new set of problems is then posed, centering around the ques tions of how far can the advance carry and how long can it be expected to remain in effect. There is, f!ir a number of reasons, no easy answer to these questions at the moment. One reason is that all of the popular stock market indexes, along with a substantial number of individual stocks, are in what are known in technical parlance as broadening base patterns. A broadening base occurs when a decline takes place with a number of significant pauses on the way down. When the market finally bottoms and a recovery sets in, very often pauses will take place at approximately the same levels on the upside followed by a resumption of th uptrend. This produces the familiar head and shoulders type of base formation which, when it is complete, allows for a much broader the case. Let us take as an example the current chart 9f&tur h\'iiow- nes Industrial Average. Between May and July of this year, the fr ust under 970 to its low of under 800. There were, however, a couple of f\tlj.y si cant pauses on the way down, one in early July in the 868-888 area, remember, once having touched its w – – -\ 'd id-July at 840-856. As we all he subsequently remained in a -at-the-t-ime; -the upside'potenti-als -of-this base centered around the penetrated on the upside in October, however, a trading rang is willing to accept h t i an 81n characterized the market ever since. If one he' e late July pause in the downswing, a broadened upside projection 0 – 5 c s possible. The pattern could broaden still further with additional work in th 8 ar A similar possib' for broademng exists in the Standard & Poor's 500. A conser vat i v e projection on e upside is 103 versus a present level of 98. This would be below both the May high of 106.74 and the 1968 all-time high of 108.37. It is, however, not at all a stretch of the imagination to conceive that the pattern could broaden so as to indicate an objective in the 110-115 range or a newall-time high for the Index. The problem of projecting an upside target is further compounded by the fact that, since the middle 1960' s, bull markets, in the averages at least, have been considerably less dynamic. The Dow advanced better than 700/0 between 1958 and 1961, and better than 850/0 between 1962 and 1966. The subsequent advance to December 1968, however, was only 320/0. The familiar argument tht the Dow was not representative of the market during the peri od is, at best, only partiril1y true, since the broader-based incJices also chalked up historically small adva.nces in 19613-(;8. One that seems to be ;hanging, however, is the length of time which an advancing phase occupies, On this basis, it would be normal to suggest that the coming upswing will last somewhere between a year and two years, pretty much the standard for the post-war period.- – ..'1 In summary, then; -there–are- some real difficulties involved in forecasting just how far the market rise may carry,and we would not expect these difficulties to be resolved for some time. It is not necessary, however, to be able to see the end of the road at the begin- ning of the journey. The odds now favor a fully invested position until such time as market evidence persuades us otherwise. Dow-Jones Ind. 860,48 Dow-Jones Rails 199.16 ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. AWT'amb This mRrl.ct kttl1 IS pul,ilshed for YOUJ con'cnlcnee It,d 1nfOlmRtmn nnd 1, nut In O.fI'CI to 01 H formntJon \\,IUI obtRlllooJrom wurce. we bellevl' to be rehal,lc. hut do not gunr,\l\tc(' Its lICCUH1C\ employees rna) have an mterellt In or pUTrhase an'\ sell the S('CUlltW' referred to hetelll — lu ,U) ;,eCUllth!!\ d,,,tus,,ed The 1fiv \V,llslon &. Co. Inc ,tnd officers, Ullcctors or

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 14, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 14, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - November 14, 1969
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Walston &- Co. —–lnc —-Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchanges OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS lABELL'S MARKET LETTER November 14, 1969 Any reader of the financial page is certainly familiar with the great debate that, at the moment, is raging in economic circles. On one side are those who contend that the monetary restraints imposed on the economy throughout 1969 are indeed working, even though the results may not yet be apparent, and that the major danger at the moment is one of overkill — the precipitation of too deep an economic recession in 1970. The other side would argue that inflation has not yet been cooled — that the economy is still buoyant and continued restraint is..Btill-I'.equired. so obviously turn and start to move up last August There is an answer, we think, and it is perfectly consistent in light of the market's past behavior in similar circumstances. . '.1 Let us state, first of all, that we find ourselves on the first side of the argument mentioned above. We think that the effects of monetary restraints will become manifest at the end of 1969 and early 1970, that a recession is a distinct possibility, and that there should, under any rational policy, be shortly forthcoming some measure of monetary ease. How, then, do we square this view with our admittedly optimistic assessment of the outlook for common stock prices The National Bureau of Economic Research defines four periods in post-war econo- mic history as recessions November 1948-0ctober 1949, July 1953-August 1954, July 1957 April 1958 and May 1960-February 1961. In the case of four, there was an accompanying decline in stock prices. In the 1948-49 rec Sl in stocks came five months before the economic recession as defin9,yt e . 1953-54, it came six months before and in 1957-58 a month before (a h s c lces had been flat for a year), and in 1960-61 the peak in stock ain the nomy by five months. Again, in all four cases, the market had bottomed rted rior to the recession trough. The marketbottom-led the b ou onths-in-1949,eleven-months-in 1954;- six months in 1958 and five Now, admittedly, 'f we rm period, it is difficult to know where the peak will e e 1 P n ted. The FRB Index has moved ahead, albeit sluggishly, throu . Corporate profits, however,peaked in the first quarter and earning n e Clard & Poor's 500 reached their high in the last quarter of 1968. All this, it seem us, is perfectly consistent with a market which reached its high in Decerhber 19 , and it s bottom at the end of .Tuly 1969. The stock market's quite obvious lead on the economy is an outgrowth of its willing- ness to capitalize earnings which are being affected by a recession more generously than it capitalizes earnings at the height of a business boom — which is, when one thinks of it, a perfectly rational tendency. In the four recessions mentioned above, corporate profits after taxes, as measured by the Department of Commerce, declined around 25 in the first three and 11 in the last. In the first two recessions, the decline in earnings on the Standard & Poor's 500 was less than the total corporate profits decline, and in the latter two it was slightly greater. What is interesting, however, is the fact that in every recession the price earnings ratio has increased sharply, 20 in 1948-49, 15 in 1963-64, 33 in 1957-58, and 44 in 1.960-61. — – This is especially interesting in view of the current relatively low multiple on the Dow. Present prices mark the Dow at 14 times latest earnings. In a recession a 20 decline in earnings, about the worst being forecast, would bring earnings of 48. A 30 increase in the multiple, not at all out of line historically, would result in those earnings being capitalized 18.2 times for a price of 873. Were the increase in multiple to be compara,ble to the 1961 receSSlOn, the multiple could rise to over 20, which would result in a price target of close to 1000 at the recession's bottom. Dow-Jones Ind. 849.26 Dow-Jones Rails 196.22 ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. AWTamb ThIS market letter IS publtshed (or your COn\CnlCnec nnd mformatlOn lind 1 not tn offf'r to sell or .1. soiL'Jtntton to bu\ !lny seeuntles The In- ormatIon WAS obtnmed from sources we heILevl.' to he rehable. hut …. e do not guarantee Its accunl.l'\' emplo),s may have an mter('f!t In or purchase and sell the S(eurltll's rercrrl(1 to herein & Co Inc Ami Its officers. director'! or WNSOI

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 19, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 19, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - November 19, 1969
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Walston &- Co. Inc Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchanges OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS Fu.-c.. lABEll'S RECOMMENDED LlSl November 19, 1969 This edition of our Recommended List gives long-term technical upside objectives, plus indicated support levels or shorter-term downside objectives. In all cases, we believe the stock would be attractive for purchase at the levels given in the support column. QUALITY & LONG-TERM GROWTH Close Qual- Upside 11/18/69 . ity Obj. Address.Multi. 66 1/4 A 94-112 Alum.Co.Amer. 73 3/4 B 82-84 Amer.Tel & T 53 1/8 A 60-67 Boston Edison 32 3/4 A 62-80 Caterpillar Tr 42 3/4 A 51-64 Del Monte 29 3/4 A 35-50 Fed.Dept. St 38 1/2 A 49-53 Int.Bus.Mach. 363 1/4 A 450 Intern'l Paper 41 A- 46-60 Jewel Cos. 50 1/2 A 64-80 Johns Manville 33 A 46-57 Sup- 60 67-65 50-48 32 37 23 30 325 35 47-44 26 Close Merck 1071/4 Natl Cash 143 Nevada Pr 43 5/8 Parke Dav. 35 Phillips P 26 Radio Corp 40 Rey.Tob. 485/8 Royal Dutch441/2 Sears Roe. 69 1/2 Sup. Oil 158 Union Carbo 40 5/8 Qual- Upside Sup- Rort A 116-136 96-90 A 175 138-128 B 68 39-36 B 50-60 32-28 A 37-43 23 A- 47-62 36 A 76 45 A 62-68 40 A 102 62-56 A- 195 140 A 50-63 40 PRICE APPRECIA TION Close Qual- 11/18/69 ity Amer.Dist. 215/8 B – Amer-Mach.F.-ill/2 B Arvin Ind. 26 1/4 B Atlas Chern. 23 1/8 B Cenco Instrum. 453/8 B Chic. Mus. Ind 30 B Clark Equip. 35 A- Copperweld St 18 7/8 B Dan River Mills 141/4 B Dart Ind. 53 1/2 A- Faberge 375/8 B First Chart. Fin. 411/4 Grolier,Inc 323/4 B Ingersoll Rand 41 5/8 A- Koppers Co. 41 1/8 B Upside Obj. 42-47 27-37 34-50 38-50 52-56 38-45 46 46 22-36 68-78 55-60 60-80 43 53-78 60-68 Sup- Close port 11/18/69 19 McNeil Corp. 17 3/4 19'—'M-edusaP.C-30 22-18 Mesabi Tr. 9 17 Pittston 67 3/4 40-38 Rep. Steel 37 1/4 28-24 Reynolds M.353/8 29 Robt. Cont. 40 1/8 14 Seab. Coast 1. 38 1/2 10 Stokely V.C.31 3/4 46-42 Sub. Prop.G. 33 1/2 33-27 Texas Inst. 119 1/2 43-37 Union Camp. 33 30-26 Vornado 22 1/4 39 West. Union 481/2 38-35 Quality B A- B B B- B B B A- B B B Upside SupObj. port 23-32 15 4058 24–16-22 8 75-90 64-60 45-62 34-28 42-71 30 52 33-30 48-55 39-34 44-56 26-22 40-54 29-26 165-180 90 46-74 28 29-40 18 70-79 44 SPECULATIVE PRICE APPRECIATION Close Qual11/18/69 ity Allied Supermkts.14 5/8 Amer .Motors 10 7/8 Camp. Chiboug. 11 5/8 Comp.Sciences 30 1/4 Dixilyn Corp. 24 7/8 Gibraltar Fin. 32 1/2 Gt. West Fin. 25 1/4 B B B Upside SupObj. port 22-33 24 20-26 40-43 30-4846-58 40-60 10 8 10 24 19 28-26 20-18 Close Qual11/18/69 ity Kysor Ind. 27 7/8 Macke Co. 18 3/4 Mesa Pete. 44 1/4 Pacific Pete. 27 5/8 Penn Central 323/4 Technicolor 23 7/8 Tishman R. 25 5/8 B B B B B Upside Obj. 36-52 26-47 60-73 43-51 62-104 40 45-58 Support 24 15 41-38 25 27 18 21 Anthony W. Tabell Walston & Co. Inc. This Bulletm lS llUbhshl.!d fot your ('onvefilt'OU' .)fi' Info mlilion …. nd IS not .n OtT('1 to or a SOlICit ItLnn to buy an) b('CUfltlCS ,hsCI\s,c,! The )nformatwn wns oht!\lncd (lorn we ldlLVt to I leh,\ble, hut Wt rio not gU.l.r.lnltL' Its ,\ClUIII'Y, \V….lbton &, Co, Inr an,l officel. tillc'torR 01 may hElve an Interesllfi or llUlrhllb' an.l bell the IdellL'i1 to helt'ln WN-916

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 21, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 21, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - November 21, 1969
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Walston &Co. ———Inc ——–Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchanges OVER l000F.FICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TADELL'S MARKET LETTER November 21, 1969 Stock market action has deteriorated quite sharply over the past two weeks. From a high of 871. 77 in mid-November, the Dow has reacted to an intra-day low of 820. 35 as of Friday. Although volume has not been heavy, breadth has been poor and most short-term indicators are now in deeply oversold territory. The depth of the decline at this stage is somewhat disquieting, but inspection of individual chart stock patterns shows absolutely no reason to abandon our contention that most stocks are somewhere in the process of forming a base. We would accordingly utilize the weakness to add to holdtngs of issues in good technical patterns such as Reynolds Tobacco C — – REYNOLDS TOBACCO. COMPANY — – – –,-,11 Current Price Current Dividend Current Yield 46 3/4 2.40 5.1 The renewed earnings upsurge previously an hCipated for Reynolds Tobacco seems to be on schedule. Despite rising industry costs, conti- Long-Term Debt 2.25 Conv. Pfd. Stk. Common Stock Sales-1969-E st. Sales-1968 297 million 8, 103, 837 shs. 40,235,552 shs. 2. 25 billion 1. 96 billion nued harassment by anti-smoking groups and an anti-trust action settlement, earnings for 1969 are expected to rise better than 10 above 1968 levels. Even more appealing to longer-term investors, the outlook for this rate of improvement being augmented is highly optimistic than Earn. Per. Sh. 1969-E. 4. 15 to several developments having taken place sinc Earn. Per Sh. 1968 3.71 RJR was the letter back in April Mkt. Range 1969-68 50 5/8 35 1/4 of this year w n h a sharerfb The most recent development was the 0a cR was selling at 38 3/8 ago of a new method of puffing cigarette tobacco, doubling its bulk and possible to produce a cigarette with a great deal less tobacco. 111 have two major effects. Firs the.-E-.ffi()1,lnt of tobacco in a tine the smoker irlhaleS. Second, si — u , so will the amount of tar and nicos represent 60 of ffiaiiUfacturing costs, substantial production ,s Meanwhile, 4 i Ust b s i fro e coming halt of TV and radio advertising are imminent. Sales vo u ' e damaged httle by the cessation, and cost reduct- ions of close to ne 1ble. In addition, se a i tant acquisitions have been completed over the past year, or are now in various stag discussion. The most important addition was McLean Industrie one of the largest oce freight transporters. Now called Sea-Land Service, this subsidiary has 38 vessels, 33 of which are container ships. Eight additional ships are under conversio to container carriers and eight more ships are being built abroad. Sea-Land also is nego- tiatingthe charter of sixteen containerships with the U. S. Lines subsidiary of Walter Kidde & Co. This unusually rapid growth is a reflection of the highly promising outlook for ocean trade and containerization in general. The merger with Professional Golf Company, a leading producer of golf balls and equi ment, has been temporarily suspended until agreement on the ratio of exchange of common shares has been reached. The eventual additio'lof this company to Reynolds' expanding inte- rests, should it definitely come about, would provide still another step away from the earlie almost complete dependence on tobacco products. This diversification into non-tobacco lines has resulted in a substantial position in the food industry. Although a recent agreement with the Dept. of Justice will result in the divest iture of its Penick & Ford Ltd. subsidiary, the company will be able to retain its profitable consumer food business. This operation includes such well known brand names as My-T-Fin Vermont Maid, College Inn, Chun Kmg Chinese foods, Patio Foods, Filler Products and Pacific Hawaiian. The company also is active in the production of aluminum, packaging and vinyl films. Technically, RJR continues to suggest favorable market action. There 1S good support in the mid to'low 40's and a long-term price objective in the mid-70's. Already on the Quality section of our Recommended List, Reynolds Tobacco again is recommended for purchas – Dow-Jones Ind. 823. 13 Dow-Jones Rails 192. 91 ANTHONY W. TABELL-HARRY W. LAUBSCHER WALSTON & CO. INC. AWT,m3J '8 m b This market letter lS )lulJllsheri for find Infolmdtlll1 IInri not 1\11 off..t tn or ,I ..,olultatlon to bu\ .lny dlscusst'tl The In- formatIOn …. n'l ohtnmcd from .,OUICt' v.e h'li('v,. to ,,. rdmhl,. hut …. e do not guarantel Its lIccur,lcy 8.. Co. Inc. ,lnd ts ffi d t employees mny hnve nn Illterest In or JJUuh.lSe liml !cll the !elUrLtles referred to herem L 0 leers, Irec or! or WN.301

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 28, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 28, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - November 28, 1969
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Walston &Co. —–Inc —– Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchanges OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABELL'S MARKET …;;n.. November 28, 1969 It would be impossible for anyone, save for the most insufferable Pollyanna, to de- scribe last week's market action as good. Nonetheless, even with the market having declined in 9 of the past 13 trading sessions, and the Dow again flirting with the 800 level, one cannot resist the temptation to wonder how bad the market's action really was. The answer would seem to depend, by and large, on where one looks. As mentioned above, the Dow-Jones Industrials, the most widely followed of market indicators, have re- turned to within an ace of the abysmal depths in which they sold at the end of last July. In the process, almost all of the October rally from an mtra-day low of 793.95 to the November high of 871. 88, has been retraced;Those bearishly further.-fodder for.thet-I' pessimism in the action of the Dow-Jones Rails which plummeted last week to a 3-year low of 184.39, and were coming close to violating their 1966 low of 181. 97. Yet, it is also possible to cite indiCators proving that the last fortnight has not been all that unmitigated a disaster. The Standard & Poor's Stock Index, for example had, at its week's low of 92,24 retraced only 62 of its advance from a low of 88.04 in July to a high of 99.23 early last month. Similar action was evidenced by the Standard & Poor's-425 and the New York Stock Exchange indices. ' The above exercise is, of course, a perfectly valid illustration of the limitations of market averages and stimulates the unoriginal thought that investors own not averages, but stocks. It is always easy to define what averages are doing simply by citing their levels. With more than 2000 stocks listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges, it be- comes a bit more difficult to quantify what different what relative numbers. at a given time, and in 0 Nonetheless, it is fairly easy to cite a few e e Dow Industrials ar at the moment, misleading us as to the level of the m .I w k only at the Dow, the market is, as noted above, back to 1tS levelsMstfJ T umber of ind1vidual stocks eshowing a comparable pattern, however, is a i ly . scule. This can be illustrated by . the following table which divides the – –Jw.Yiilto nine pliases— fivedeclines and four rallies. Each of the at or above the 800 level. The f AartJund 840-860 on the Dow and bottomed out olblJful shows a series of 10-point ranges for the Do close, and the highs and new low i 0 ing nine columns show the average number of new g the market phase that the Dow closed within that range. A glance at tli a e ev' ces the changing character of the market since last Summe Decline Decline Rally Decline Rally Decline Rally Decline 7-16 – 1- 8/8 – 8/14- 9/3 – 9/10- 9/25 – 10/10 – 11/11- DJ Close 7/30 8/7 8/13 9/2 9/9 9/24 10/8 11/10 11/26 830-840 3-291 21-44 4-58 38-78 69-24 7-71 820-830 3-368 6-55 7-64 14-56 3-83 20-80 11-99 51-26 1-92 810-820 2-416 2-131 2-81 13-56 5-129 4-158 58-50 3-154 800-810 0-685 3-117 12-99 28-77 4-130 The first time the Dow reached the 800-810 area in July, the average number of stocks making new lows was 685. On the next move to this range, only 117 stocks on the average made new lows, followed by an average of 99 in September and 130 at the moment. Similar figures can be seen for other market levels and, m addition, the increasing number of stocks making new highs on rallies-is–readily apparent. Quite patently, to say that the market has- returned to its levels of last Summer does not constitute telling the full story. There is nothing, in other words, in the action of the past few weeks to negate the the- sis that we are somewhere in the process of forming a base, this process being defined as a period in which more and more stocks entered defined uptrends and fewer and fewer remain in confirmed downtrends. It is certainly impossible to ignore the v1rulence of the recent de- cline or — now — to deny the distmct possibility that the Dow, and perhaps some other indi- ces as well, may reach new lows before the base formation process is complete. However, we think the present weakness will prove, historically, to have been part and parcel of a re- versal process and not part of an ongoing bear market. Dow-Jones Ind. 812.30 Dov'-Jones Rails 186.64 ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. AWTamb Thill market letter is published for yOUr convenience and Inrormatlon and IS not an offer to sell or a soliCitation to buy Rny seeurltLes J cussed Th I formation Was obtalOed.from Bources we believe to rehnble. lout we do not guarantee Its Itcurncy Walston & Co Inc. and t ffi 115 d to' n employees may have an mtere!lt In or l-'urchase and sell the securltiE's referred to helem 115 0 cers. Irec rtI or —

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 05, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 05, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - December 05, 1969
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Walston &Co. Inc Members New York Siock Exchange and Olher Pr;nc;pal Siock and Commod;ly Exchange. OVER 100 OffiCES COAST TO COAST AND QVERSE.a.s TABELL'S MARKET LETTER December 5, 1969 Twixt the optimist and pessimist the difference is droll' The optimist sees the doughnut but the pessimist sees the hole. ………. . McLandburgh Wilson In recent weeks, pessimism has run rampant not only through the Wall Street canyons, but seems to have made itself particularly conspicuous throughout many parts of the coun- try. This gloom and doom attitude is not new to the stock market. It has been present in almost every major market decline of the last fifty years. The outstanding characteristic of this .attitude is not its.depth but its.t-iming.- -Almost,without exception;-this ,feeling-of.-,,—H-1rJ mountifng woe has reached its zenith near major market bottoms. It reflects the inherent . right 0 every man, often exercised, to worry more over what has happened rather than to be concerned with what is to be. Shakespeare put it aptly when in Hamlet he said There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. Lately, the market,as reflected in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, has been acting very poorly. This is without dispute. An unwarranted amount of importance was attached to the 800 DJI level. Its strength largely was psychological,and to an extent psychology is a factor with which to be concerned in the market. But statistically, the 800 level cannot be considered of above-average importance. While the Dow-Jones Industrial average was breaking to new lows, both intra-day and on a closing basis, the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite average, as well as the S& P Indus- trial Average,continued to hold above their previous low lstJuly.TheJuly lows were 88.04 and 96. 16, respectively. At prese9h-, the a and at 91. 73 and 101.14, respectlVely. The New York Stock i lS past Summer, July 29th to be specific, was 49.31. At the close on Frid(;y;hhis at 51. 20, still holding above the previous 'J week, this average stood -This does — r' – tile marKet continuing .t…o….ac(poorly in the period just ahead. On the it not preclude the market's acting better than it has. The downslde NYSE indices can be placed close to their previous lows. wo into the 760-750 re '0. T at rhaps the Dow-Jones Industrials could dip down ount to a decline of less than 5 from prevailing levels, not an altog a – s situation. – Furthermore, it 0 e extremely dIfficult for someone to buy 100 shares of the Dow-Jones Industrial rage, or an equivalent amount of the NYSE index – or even that of the S&P. Individual stocks are bought and sold and the chart patterns for the majority of these individual issues suggest that there is rather small downside risk potential from cur- rently prevailing levels. The stock market always has been its own best crystal ball and probably will remain so for a long time to come. But in the market place the past has been a good key to future action and … study of this past history points out one undisputed fact selling when things look blackest, more often than not, reaps many regrets later on. It does little good to point out that Mr. Lowry, one of the most highly respected of all stock market technical analysts, said The market is always lowest at the bottom! Perhaps he said this with tongue in cheek for there is humor to it, but it cannot be Picking an absolute bottom to the market is an el,ercise without merit which we will leave to Saturday's heroes. The primary need is to understand that the future is bright and that stocks are cheap when considered from the investment viewpoint, and that buyers of stock on further weakness are apt to fare better in coming months than will the sellers. Particular situations to consider for purchase can be found either in the Tabell Recommended List or in the many sltuations recommended by our Research Department, listings of which are available from any Wailston Account Executive. ANTHONY W. TABELL-HARRY W. LAUBSCHER Dow-Jones Ind. 793.03 WALSTON & CO. INC. Dow-Jones Rails 179.76 WTHWLam1 Thl'l mJLrket letter IS publu,hed for l1nd information and ''I not lin olT… r to 61'11 or .-\ 501lc1I.-1.tlOn to lIu an) 't!r'untL, cll;culed (ormnlwII ohtailled from SOUle!!'! w(, lwlll'V t() h., It'lt.lbl , hut WL do not KUar.lnt;x Its .lrCUrar '\\'nh,trm & Co lIlt' 'Ind li; olfkelb, employees may have an Intel eat In 01 IJurt'h,l-c IIUti sell the r..f,'lrCli In The In or

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 12, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 12, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - December 12, 1969
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Walston &Co. Inc Members New York Stock Exchange and Other PrlOcipal Stock and Commodity Exchange. OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS FIL E. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER December 12, 1969 It has been the custom of this letter in Decembers past to devote one or two issues to a long range attempt at market forecasting for the subsequent year. This forecast has generally divided itself into two parts, the first looking backward at the year just past, and the second, an attempt to assess the year to come. Accordingly, in this letter we will attempt to lay the groundwork for a forecast by reviewing the year 1969. The squeamish are thus forewarned so that they may cease reading at this point. 1969, as nobody needs to be told, was a bear market year. Like all bear markets, .it.has.been.accompanied, e specially in.its .lateI'.,-more the .usual-jererniadB , and warnings of disaster. These have, if nothing else, provided us with an occasional good laugh during a period w.h.en.litle-BllSienance was available from prices crossing the tape. There are, for some reason, those who believe that every market downswing is a unique visitation unprecedented in historical experience. Actually, the market drop of 1969 was a phenomenon totally within the context of the post-war experience, and has been, withil! the standards of such experience, on the relatively mild side. Indeed, it was exceeded in severity by the declines of 1946, 1947, 1949, 1957, 1962 and 1966. None of this, admittedly, is calculated to make the investor feel any better about his 1969 losses. It is simply a re- minder that difficult years such as the past one have appeared before in stock market history and will undoubtedly recur again. President Harry S. Truman reminded us that those who could not stand the heat should get out of the kitchen. The applicable to the stock market. 0 It having been admItted that 1969 was a bearakt a, a uiry into the reasons therefor — aided by the usual 20-20 hindsight — ma aps pful. Was drop due to a decline in corporate earnings Hardly. ,e lng on what series one cared to use, have been flat to slightly up during m t he . The erosion is totally ex- 'plained-by the'fact that the . -'; ge earnings at the end of 1968, to a close. What we have clea V ,40;13 times current earnings as 1969 draws ell;.'0iS' an erosion of expectations. As we t e it becacle quite evident that (A) inflation was a serious problem an ,(milie ers that be were going to apply the necessary pressure at least according to i ow ghts, to bring this inflation to a halt. The consensus fore- cast for lower corporate its, certainly, and an economic recession, probably, which thus developed began ave its effect on stock prices, and the adjustment of expectations continued on its painful way, culminating at the ehd of last July. The recent decline in which the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (but not the br;oad-based indices or most stocks) carried on to still lower lows, is also explicable in the l,ight of renewed uncertainty as to the prospects for 1970. As we approach the new year, in fact, uncertainty'l is the keyword. No less an authority than Dr. Rinfret assures us that There ain't gonna be no recession, thus proving that bad grammar is equally as quotable as good economics. Dr. Friedman, on the other hand, warns us of the possibility of a serious r'ecession unless a 90-degree reversal of present monetary policy takes'place almost immediately. Stock prices, obviously, are not going to move up very much until it becomes possibl to see into 1970 more clearly. The salient fact, however, is that a good deal of potential economic difficulty has been allowed for by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average being some 200 points under its level of a year ago. The saw about the market's not discounting the same thing twice will be relevant in making a. 1970 forecast. i ,. Dow-Jones Ind. 786.69 Dow-Jones R-ils 173.06 ANTHONY W. T ABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. AW-T'amb This mnrJ…('t I('lie! is l,uhh.,hL( fnr your ,'OIWo.'IlICnf'e .-Inll InrOlmabnn ,'nd not ,In offer to ,wll 01 .1 formation \HI' oiJtrl.lll('d flom \\.(' 1,.'111'\(' to It'itnlri,, hut do not l'l'ulIr,inte;;, Its ,lrCUrolC emploYL'l'S may have an mterest m or pun'hnse ,md ;,ell the ;,'I Ulltll';, lcfl red to hC1L1n to huv ,lin WIlI;ton & Co. Ine fln,l It.., The 111ullL'Clors or WN30t '''-'

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 19, 1969

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 19, 1969

Tabell's Market Letter - December 19, 1969
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Walston &Co. ———lnc——— Members New York Stock Exchange and Other PrincIpal Stock and Commodity Exchango. OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABELL'S MARKET LETTER December 19, 1969 The forecaster has an opportunity, as 1969 draws to a close, to make his usual an- nual prediction even more ponderous than is normally the case, for we are now entering, not only a new y'3ar, but a new decade, and such htles as The Shape of the Seventies have been common headings on publications emanating from Wall Street. The question of a long range forecast for the seventies is, indeed, an interesting one, and we will touch it briefly. Let us first, however, dispose, if we can, of the new decade's first year. We devoted last week's letter to a discussion of the 1969 decline and to characterizin that decline as a bear market experience.-Ifone is-w-illing to admit that 1969 was, in fact, a typical post-war bear market, the next logical question is What has been the aftermath of previous such markets The answer is simple and quite fascinating. The Standard & Poor's 500 had, at last week's low, declined some 19 from its 1968 high. It had done this just five times previously since World War II — in 1946,1948, 1957, 1962 and 1966. It is interesting to note where the market was one year after each of these declines reached the 19 figure. In one case (1946-7) it was about unchanged. In the – other four cases it was substantially higher by amounts ranging from 40 in 1949-1950 to 24 in 1966-67. Couched in terms of the Dow, a duplication of this experience would mean an upside target for this time next year of between 945 and 1075. Now, the above is obviously a simple exercise, and a forecast for the next year should obviously be based on a number of much more sophisticated tools. We must confess, however, that we cannot understand why most the sort of histori- cal experience cited above in looking into the next year. W)0nstrongly suggests that 1970 should be a fairly good t ty e above reasoning and that it is incum- bent upon anyone who forecasts otherwise to docume1j\t the ic economic situation is anyway different today than it has been for to be sure. There always are. But e 'historicaf record is difficult to ignor. Wh' –Iql\aPte ntury. There are differences g 'on of higher prices impl,icit in the otner words, th'a'n-970 coillc)'wello-e a good year for the stock Having said this, we w re is'S ill not pointing out what seems to us one striki recent change in mar t a en three years and ten months since the Dow-Jones Industrial Averag igh. The record length of time without a new high in the past 25 years wa 0 y in 1946-1950, and since a new high in the next three month is hardly likely, 1966- 9 set a new standard. The Standard & Poor's 500, admittedly made a new high just ear ago, but even in this average, the upswings have noticeably moderated of late. What we are saying, of course, is that there is evidence that the long-ter secular uptrend which characterized the 1950' s and early 1960' s may well have flattened out. It could not, of course, have continued indefinitely. The whole 1949-1961 bull market was, in essence, a period in which the multiple placed on the earnings of the Dow rose from under 9 to over 24. The past decade has, in a sense, been a correction of this rise in price I earnings multiples to the extent that at last week's low, the Dow was selling for less than 13 times its latest reported earnings, or lower than it had been since the early 1950' s. The fascinating dilemma for the 70' s, to us, centers around how much longer the in- vestment community will continue to re-evaluate the appropriate price to be paid for earn- ings. If the wheel were to come full cycle, and we to return to 1949-1950 levels, quite obviously the outlook for the first part of the decade would be somewhat less than glowing. It is arguable, however, that the multiple correction,atleast in the Dow, may well be com- plete, and that pIE ratios generally may firm at around this level or even improve. For the broader Standard & Poor's index, which is more heaVily weighted with the growth favorites of recent years, the question is more difficult to answer. For here PIE ratios are somewhat higher on an historical basis and thus more vulnerable. The question for the 70's then, is not earnings. We continue to be bullish about the long range future of the American economy, and thus about profits. The real question is whether a decade-long re-evaluation of profits is complete. If it is, the outlook for the comi decade could be pleasant indeed. ,,' Dow-Jones Ind. 780.76 Dow-Jones Rails 170.20 AW.Tamb ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL, Thl; mnrket kttcr IS pubhshcd for )our l.on\emence and mformatlOn and 1'1 not iln ofT'l to jell 01 ,\ soliCitation to l,uv .my 'CI'UllttC& dl'CU'lsl'd The in- formatIOn W.I'! obt,I1nt'rI from sru1r('l v.e I'hcve to I.e rt'h,lblt, hut we do nut. gu.lrnnt!.(' Its \\',11..1011. & Co.. InL ,mrl Ill'. officels, dhl'Ctors OJ employec'! rna. have an mterest m or PUI chase and sl'll thc SCI UIIlw I efer! i'tl lo hell'1Il WNsot

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