Viewing Author: mkasprak

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 14, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 14, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - May 14, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE. ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVl910N OF MEMBER NEW YOAI( STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 14, 1976 May has arrived, and it has brought with it a number of events, including a successful — First -. and'a Ann sPEl ual,M Ctilcu arket lardo Techni gw'ood c'isa'nas'ioAn sso in ciati Prin on cet Seminar on, 'New , – 0 J which eiey. w – e It disc l'ias ussed also'o in fo t u his gnt space witlnr last -tne sweaeseonk,al,-J appearance of FORTUNE magazine's compilation of statistics on America's 500 largest industrial cor- porations. I Those who have been exposed to this letter in past springs will know that we are some- thing of a FORTUNE 500 freak. There are, almost invariably, we feel, investment parables that can be adduced from a scanning of the figures, and we think this year to be no exception. Such a scanning is, of course, at least partially, an exercise in hindsight, and it should be stressed that no implica- tions are being made here about the investment merits at the moment of any of the companies men- tioned. Nonetheless, we think a look at the record is interesting. Perhaps the most fascinating statistic that FORTUNE has compiled is the total return, including capital appreciation and dividends, on each of the 500 companies. It has done this for both the year 1975 and the 10 years ended December, 1975. The first set of figures underlines the fact that 1975 was, indeed, a rather good stock market year. The median total return for all 500 companies in 1975 was 5f. 23 per cent and investment in American Bakeries, the best-performing stock on the list, produce a 251 per cent total return. Nonetheless, 44 of the 500 companies produced a negative total return in,1975 in the face of one of the most expansive bull markets in history. It is, however, the figures on total return for the decade which are most intriguing. Purely by accident, the base period 1965-75 is particularly faSCinating in that the Dow, on December 31, 1965, was exactly 969.26, within just a few pOints of where it is today. The difficulties accom- panying stock market investment over the past decade are underscored by the median total return for '' .. ,….the.,,5.00companiesP4lt..3.0JLper9.entandth.ef;'lctthi;l.t.J 76 of the 500 showl'.rta Ilg!ltive total.!tu,,rn….IJ…,.. over 10 years. ' . . .. . .' . It was, nonetheless, possible to earn above-average rates of return in the marketplace. The following table shows the ten highest stocks in terms of total return over the decade as computed by FORTUNE together with their price/earninqs ratio on December 31. 1965. Name Total Return 1965 PiE Ratio Name Total Return 1965 PiE Ratio Fleetwood 43.05 8 Baker International 24.87 13 Archer Daniels Midland 27.70 16 Westmoreland 24.49 12 Utah International 26.89 9 Philip Morris 24.40 12 MAPCO 25.45 14 Masco 23.02 16 Pittston 25.44 12 Burroughs 21.63 22 The list is interesting, we think, in that, with the single exception of Burroughs, it in- cludes none of the typical institutional glamour issues (Philip Morris may now be a member of the club but was not 10 years ago when it was purely a tobacco company). Advocates of growth via technology will find the list disappointing. In addition to three coal stocks, whose presence can be explained by the peculiar energy developments of the past decade, it includes a mobile-home maker, a soybean processor, a pipe line, an oil well driller and, of all things, a manufacturer of faucets. Likewise, the advocates of paying high price/earnings ratios for assured growth will be disappointed by the list. GOing back to the end of 1965, the S & P 500 stock index was selling for 17.8 times earnings and the Dow 18.3 times. Again, with the Single exception of Burroughs, every one of the best performers was, in 1965, selling for a multiple lower than that of the Dow. –Indeed i it can be'conversely argued' that investment in high-muHiple growth stocks ex-. . – poses one to a greater risk of being wrong if the growth potential fades. FORTUNE (1965 price/earnings ratios in parentheses) also provides us with a list of the five lowest total returns over the decade which comprises Lockheed (13), Addressograph Multigraph (24), Genesco (15), Avco (14) and Litton Industries (38). As can be seen, at least two of these issues were accorded growth multiples accord- ing to the conventional wisdom of ten years ago only to be shattered when the growth failed to materi- alize. The FORTUNE figures strongly suggest, we think, the validity of the age-old axiom that concentration on values is the best way of achieving investment results. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 994.02 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 101'.51 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/13/76) 603.97 AWT/jb No statement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contaIned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the conVel'lenCE of the subscriber WhIle e believe Ihe sources of our mforma- han fa be relIable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the stlbscnber should be based on hIS own Investigation and Informatron Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may lofer tae, POSItions or trades m respect 10 any securlfles menfloned In thiS or any tllure Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed rn thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may 91ve adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 21, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 21, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - May 21, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 21, 1976 By now everyone is almost agonizingly familiar with the lateral trading range that has con- tained the Dow-Jones Industrial Average since late February following its meteoric rise in the first two tnonthsol'the-y,-ar' Likewrs e anyone wnotl'aS'been read ing -any -farm'Of'techllifalffia rKetcOiiiiiient'isi' – aware of the fact that, throughout this period, the Dow has been outperforming most breadth indices, indicating below-average performance by the broad range of stocks. We conducted, this week, an in- vestigation to ascertain whether this underperformance extended to the American Stock Exchange and the Over-The-Counter market as well, and the general conclusion is that this is, indeed, the case. While American and Over-The-Counter issues underperformed the Dow in the early phase of the advance, they moved with it and even ahead of it on into mid-February. Since that time, both Amex and OTC indices have been performing less well than the Dow ,and as measured by breadth, the average ASE issue has been underperforming the average NYSE issue. Finally, interestingly enough, there is some suggestion that this trend, at least as far as the Amex is concerned, may now be reversing itself. The following table shows some relevant market statistics for selected dates since the Decem- ber 5 low. The first column shows the DJIA, the second, the American Stock Exchange Market Value Index and the third, the ratio of the latter to the former. Obviously, when this statistic is rising, it means the Amex index is outperforming the Dow and vice versa. The next two columns are breadth indices for the New York and American Stock Exchanges starting from an identical base. The last two columns give the NASDAQ OTC Composite Index a'nd its ratio to the Dow. ASE Ratio Ratio Mkt. Val. ASE/ NYSE ASE OTC OTC/ Date DlIA Index DnA Breadth Breadth Compo DII-A 12/5/75 818.80 82.40 .1006 780.62 781.20 74.72 .0913 12/26/75 859.81 82.58 .0960 785.46 780.58 77.13 .0897 ….'.22.,//'22''45''/!7i766………S99-99734-…55,572–;;11;00-55-..-12.15.;.1;;;.1050-588- 826.98 804.09 82'67'4'5-803-9'2 91. 73 9'27'09 .0923 0920—– 2/26/76 978.83 104.17 .1064 823.57 802.66 91.45 .0934 3/5/76 972.92 103.65 .1065 820.99 800.54 89.47 .0920 3/11/76 1003.31 105.30 .1050. 823.75 801.23 91.21 .0909 3/24/76 1009.21 104.71 .1038 822.56 799.17 90.93 .0901 4/21/76 1011.02 103.47 .1023 820.02 795.14 90.77 .0898 5/12/76 1005.67 105.01 .1044 818.70 794.10 90.64 .0901 5/13/76 1001.10 105.48 .1054 817.95 793.85 90.22 .0901 5/19/76 988.90 104.67 .1058 815.91 792.44 89.25 .0903 Scanning down the dates reveals some interesting facts. Both the American and OTC markets underperformed the Dow on the initial phase of the rise as shown by the declining ratios between Decem- ber 5 and December 26. Indeed, in that period the Amex index hardly moved at all. When we come to the three days at the end of February, however, some interesting changes have taken place. First of all, both the ratios have improved dramatically, indicating relatively stronger moves on the part of secondary issues. NYSE breadth reached its high for the year on February 24 as did American Stock Exchange breadth. A glance down both columns shows the failure of breadth on either exchange to post new peaks after February. This suggests that the average stock on both exchanges has been underperforming senior issues, since the capital-weighted Market Value Index on the ASE, like the Dow, reflects largely the action of larger companies. The OTC index reached its high on February 25,and that high has not yet been dupli- cated. Likewise, the ratio of the OTC index to the Dow reached its peak on the next day. A few days later,on March 5,the ratio of the Amex index to the Dow reached a peak at .1065, a high that, likewise, has not been duplicated since then. As the table shows, we have seen a series of successive highs on the -Dow unaccompanied by ne'; peaks -on any of theotner ind'icators- This 'remained -true until MayI3'- – ;..- when, as the table shows, the ASE index moved into new high territory, if only marginally, while the Dow remained below its high. At .10S8,its ratio to the Dow on May 19 was just about the highest it had been since back on March 5. It is yet too early to tell whether this recent awakening on the Amex is the precursor of any wave of interest in secondary issues or just a flash in the pan. It is also worthy of note that it has not to date been confirmed with rising breadth action. Nonetheless, we think the figures suggest a total ab- sence of any sort of speculative activity,and,while speculative activity is not the only precursor of mar- ket tops, it is generally the precursor of the more dangerous sort of decline. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 994.21 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 101.73 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIEW, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (5/20/76) 601.66 AWT/jb No statement or e)(prCS!on of opinion or ony other matter kerCH) contolned 15, or IS 10 be deemed fa be, directly or Indirectly, on oHer or Ihe soliCItation of on offer 10 buy or sell ony secutlly referred fo or mentroned The matler rs presented merely for the conver,enc& of the subscrrber Whrle we belreve the sources of our mforma- tron to be relrable, we m no way represent or guorantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be bosed on hIS own investigation and InformatIon lonney Montgomery Sco't, tnc , os a corporation, end Its offIcers or employees, moy now hove, or may later toke, posItions or trades tn respect to any securitIes mentIoned en thIS or any future Issue, and such posItron may be dIfferent Irom any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue lonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as an enveslment adVIsor, may gIve odvlce 10 ,ts Investment adVISOry ond other customers Independently of any statements made In thIS or In any ather Issue hrrther Informalron on cny securIty mentIoned herein IS avcllable on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 28, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 28, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - May 28, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 28, 1976 We stated in our letter of AprIl 30 that time is slowly beginning to run out for the mar- ket ins ofar a sups idea cJion.is ,con.cerDed …,.,l'!r-9dE; ,.pt.!r,! dJ!1g..wJthin-,.rsJrif.t.ed rngl'l.s\IQ1,.a I the one that has eXIsted swce late February do not, historically, last all that long, and, If the current trading range is not to be ultimately VIewed as a penod of distribution, it will have to be penetrated with some decisiveness on the upside before too much more time has elapsed. Thursday may come to be known as the day when time finally ran out. The pentration of the 1010970 trading range took place — but on the downSide rather than the upside,with the 965 level bewg reached intra-day before a modest rally at the close. This downSide breakout, coupled with the desultory breadth action which has characterized the market Since late March, strongly suggests, at least in the conventional wIsdom, a correctionary phase. Downside objectives center around the 910-860 range in terms of the Dow-Tones Industrials and around 91 for the S & p 500 stock composite. Both these objectives coincide with strong support levels. As we said above, these conclusIOns are the obvious ones m terms of conventional wisdom. However, a few additional factors must be noted. The first of these is the pOSSIbility of false breakout. Breakouts from tradwg ranges more often than not foreshadow the direction of the next move. If they invariably did so, however, technical work would be a perfect forecaster, and we, certainly, have never asserted this claim. False breakouts most often occur when the eXIstence of a tradwg area is widely known and wide- ly observed and this is, we thInk, the case in the present instance. Thus, the possibility, at l';j.,e)(t't;;th.atth.rT1ket,haym(L n.cved down…9…pJt,.may sharply reverse Itself and returnt the trading range. — – – — – ThIS leads us to the other method in which the market might surprIse the conventional wisdom, i.e., by going down further than the technical pattern mdicates. We confess we consider this eventuality as hIghly unlikely. The sort of distribution that would foreshadow a major declIne sImply does not eXIst w ind,v,dual stock patterns at the moment, and the 860-850 level in the Dow-Jones IndustrIal Average provides massive support which should be sufficient to halt a ny declIne. This leads us to a dIScussion of context. If a decline were to ensue from this point, we think it would have to be viewed as an wtermedlate-term declIne WIthin an ongoing upward cycle. Indeed, a decline to the support levels mentioned above would put the market in a much healthier technical pOSItion than it IS in at the moment and could be the base for a new upward leg which would carry to new highs. This, m turn, might have considerable long-range significance,as it would break the Dow deciSIvely out of the thIrteen-year trading range WhICh we have referred to so often, presentwg important long-range cyclical connotations. The final powt to be made IS the generalIty that, by and large, Wdlvldual stock patterns do not look anywhere nearly as bad as do the patterns on the averages or general market ind,cators. 1\ few stocks have mInor tops, to be sure, but they are defmitely minor In scope,and a vast horde of ISSUe-S show -little s;;ggestlOn 6rany great downsicte-';ulneraSllItY. – 1\11 of whIch leads uS to the basic question as to whether Investment polIcy should be altered in the light of existing techmcal cIrcumstances, 1. e., should equitIes be sold here In the hope of repurchase at lower prIces later on. ror the ogIle trader who IS WIllIng qUIckly to reverse h,S policy should' conditions change, such actIOn mIght be appropnate. ror the longerrange In- vestor, however, we thInk that the better policy would be to ride out the storm. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 967.99 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 99.66 Cumulat,ve lnde)' (5/27/76) 5fl3.fl5 I\WT/jb I\NTHONY W. TI\!lLLI. DJLllrIrl.D, HI\RVI;Y, TI\!lJLL No ,Iolemenl or expreston of optnlon or any olher moiler herein conlalned IS. or ! to be deemed to be, dtrectly or Indtrectly, an offer or Ihe soltltotton of on offer to buy or sell any eunty referred 10 or menttoned The matter tS presented merely for Ihe converdenct of the subscrtber WhIle oNe bel(cve the soures of our (nforma lIon to be feltable. we In no way represent or glJarantee Ihe acclJ(ocy thereof nor of the stotements mude herem Any octlcn to Iw token by the lJb5cnber sholJld be based on hiS own tnVesligotton and tnformotlon Janney Montgomery SCali. Inc. as 0 corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now have. or may later toke. paslhaM or trades In respect to any securities mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posillon may be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In this or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott Inc, whlh IS regISTered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVIce to .t Ivestment adVisory and olhel customers Independently of ony statements modc In thu or In any olher Issue Further information on any setuflly menlloned herein IS available on req\..est

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 04, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 04, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - June 04, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER — 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE June 4, 1976 It should come as news to no one that 1976 is a Presidential election year, and we have .,…men,tlOl'leJjprgvJouqJy,inthiss p1ce thaLthisfa cthnuJdbe,ta ken. into ,account-in ,acmacket f-or-eca st-. -W-e ….- have, in the past, tabulated the election-year pattern, and the table below is an update of that study complete through May of 1976. It shows, for each year, the President elected and his party, followed by the average price for each month, expressed as a percentage of the previous December's close (I.e., 110 means the market was up 10, and 90 means it was down 10). Year President Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 1900 McKinley R 101 103 104 lOS 100 98 98 99 97 100 108 114 1904 Roosevelt R 102 99 99 101 99 99 103 107 112 118 125 126 1908 Taft R lOS 100 lOS 111 117 117 123 126 125 126 134 138 1912 Wilson D 100 99 102 106 lOS lOS 106 109 109 109 108 103 1916 Wilson D 99 98 97 96 98 99 98 99 102 lOS 107 103 1920 Harding R 99 91 97 96 91 89 89 86 89 89 85 77 1924 Coolidge R 103 104 102 100 99 101 101 113 112 110 115 119 1928 Hoover R 99 98 103 110 113 108 108 112 120 123 131 132 1932 Roosevelt D 103 101 102 76 66 59 63 89 102 88 87 82 1936 Roosevelt D 102 108 112 112 104 108 116 118 120 126 130 128 1940 Roosevelt D 99 98 97 98 85 76 80 82 86 87 88 85 1944 Roosevelt D 102 101 105 101 105 109 112 110 108 111 110 115 1948 Truman D 97 92 94 101 106 110 108 104 103 106 100 99 1952 Eisenhower R 102 100 100 100 100 102 105 106 104 104 105 109 1956 Eisenhower 1-960-Kennedy R 97 ,98 104 lOS 103 102 107 106 103 102 100 102 8—99….,…,98-92-939296-93-94-9-29,1.,—93-97– 1964 Johnson D 102 103 105 107 109 108 III 110 III 113 115 112 1968 Nixon R 98 94 92 99 101 104 104 101 lOS 108 109 110 1972 Nixon 1976 R 102 103 106 108 107 106 104 108 107 106 112 115 109 114 116 116 116 Incumbent party did not control Congress. Incumbent party not re-elected. The nineteen completed years show an approximate normal distribution. Eleven are bull markets, three (I920, 1932 and 1940) are distinct bear-market years, and in five years the trend was flat. There a ppears to be a tendency toward a flat trend or moderate wea knes s in the first ha If. Eleven of the nineteen years showed little market change through June. Indeed, only in the three years which evolved into bear markets was the first half action predominantly on the downside. It is worthy of note that a downward bias tends to occur on two sorts of occasions, first, when the incumbent President loses the election,and, second, when the incumbent party does not control Congress. How- ever, 1972 was an exception to this latter rule and 1976, based on action to date, may well be, also. Indeed, it is interesting to note that 1976, through May, has produced the strongest uptrend. The first statistic suggests that the market may be a good forecaster of election returns. In none of the six years when the incumbent lost the election was the market up more than 5 in the first half. President Ford may thus be able to rcad some comfort into the market strength shown to date. The most consistent fact about election year markets, though, is a deftmte tendency toward a strong second half. Indeed, as the table shows, in 16 of the 19 completed years, the average – – 'price'feir December was'nigher- than the-averagepricE'- for June .Evenintwoofth-e-threebear 'matkets – 1932 and 1940, the market rallied in the second half from the June lows. In 1912 the June-December difference was miniscule, and the market spent most of the second half in hlgher territory. Only in 1920 and 1948 was there a distinct decline from June to December. Fitting all this into the 1976 pattern, we have argued in the past the case for anticipating short-term market weakness, but we have asserted that we expect it to be relatlvely minor in scope. The election-year pattern that has existed in the past would be entirely consistent wlth a minor decline from now into the early summer, followed by a basing-out process and higher prices later on in the year. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 969.47 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composlte (I200 p.m.) 99.63 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/3/76) 486.87 AWT/jb No statement Of expression of apullon or ony other matter herein contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sol,cltotlon of ,on offer to buy or sell any secvnty referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the corwerlence of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our Informo- tlon to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herem Any action to be faken by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own mllestlgahon and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and ITS officers or employees, may now hove, or may lOfer toke, poltlons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thIS or ony future Issue, and such pOSition moy be different from any VieNS now or hereafter eo.press(!d In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mcnhoned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 11, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 11, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - June 11, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

,————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08'1540 DIVISION OF MEAfo!lER NEW YORI STOCI( EXCNANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – ., June 11, 1976 Stock market commentators, ourselves included, have a well-known propensity for coming I.,… …..,I-..'–upwith..tlJ.e…Y'rong an.w,erserl1a.Pljan.eve!lless.,forgb'C.e.abJe..in,hg..vgr ,is-thatptllskintl)fL!ITtong questions. We suspect our own guilt in this rega'rd insofar as the last few -issues of this letter are co- cerned and would like herewith to make some attempt at expatiation. Much of our recent comment in this space has concerned itself with the March-May trading range in the major averages, the subsequent downside breakout from that range and the suggestion that this breakout may be a harbinger of lower prices over the intermediate term. This sort of discussion is not, of rourse, totally useless, since it is both necessary and desirable in portfolio management to operate wlthln the framework of a near-term hypothesis. Yet lt totally fails to address itself to what should be the most basic and cruclal question facing the stock market analyst in the mid-1970's — the question of whether the flat secular trend which has imprisoned the stock market for more than a decade ha s come Or is about to come to a n end. We drew attention to thls phenomenon 5 1/2 years ago when, on January IS, 1971, we said in this space, the equity market from 1942 until 1966 was buoyed by a secular uptrend advancing at the rate of about 9 a year on the Dow. Sure, there were bull markets and bear markets within the frame- work of that uptrend, but the bull markets were long and dynamic and the bear markets, although painful, short and quickly recovered. There is real evidence, at the moment, however, that the secular uptrend is no longer with us. Indeed, computed from 1966, the slope of the DJIA has been virtually zero. The most statistically accurate description of the market on average for the past five years is that It is a wide, flat trading channel. As everyone is by now aware, the intervening 5 1/2 years have conformed precisely to this pattern. The question of continuance or noncontinuance of the flat trend is to our mind absolutely crucial, for, as long as it continues, market timing and the shifting of portfolios between stocks and –ecashw.ilLbe.a!l.absoluteneces.sityiLab9y.e-ay.eageiml.esJmenCr.llsJ,ltsAr.e,obe''ttil.ined……li,o'1lnwt''1hec,.. ,I…… other hand, the flat secular trend shifts to the sort of uptrend which characterized the 1940's; 1950's and 1960's, timing will become far less crucial,and stock selection, as was the case ten to thirty years ago, will become the more Important component in the Investment equation. There is, qUlte obviously, no clear evidence at the moment of an.end to the flat secular trend. Indeed, the market's Inability to penetrate the 1000 level a few months ago fits squarely into the pattern. Ironically, however, the prospect of near-term weakness places the market in a stronger position to break out of the trading channel than would otherwise have been the case. A move significantly above 1000 early this year would have taken place in the obviously mature stages of a bull market leg, and would thus have had to be regarded with some scepticism.On the other hand, if the market now, after an intermediate-term decline or consolidation, turns around and rebases, embarking on another upleg Significantly above the 1000 level, we would have a fairly strong harbinger that a new investment era had, indeed, arrived. Such a move if, as and when it takes place, would be the third upward leg in a bull market which began in December, 1974, and,according to the tenets of a number of cyclical theories, the presence of three rather than two upward legs denotes a move in conformity with a primary upward trend. It is also possible to advance some fairly solid fundamental arguments that a new era may be in the offing. The period between 1949 and 1974 can be viewed in one sense as a complete cycle in terms of multiples which investors were willing to place on corporate earning power. That cycle began with the Dow selling at seven times earnings in the summer of 1949 and advanced to a point where it sold for 24.2 times earnings at the end of 1961. The multiple, in tum, steadily deteriorated to the third quarter of 1974, to the point \\here Sl.OO of DJIA earning power could be purchased for S6.20. Some scholars have adduced evidence that this sort of long-term cycle is a continUing one,and,lf this is the case, the prospect Is for a decade-Iong.risein baSIC multiples which. could not fail to carry.the.Dow far, farbove the,IOOO mark. An ultimate return to the 24-times earnings level of 1961, coupled with a 100 rise in current earning power, ..- would bring the Dow close to 5000. This Is not being offered as a forecast,but we do not, on the other hand, see why it should be viewed as fantasy. It would merely require the repetition of two phenomena, both of which have occurred during the investment lifetime of most readers of thiS letter. It is, thus, basically the question of the end of the lO-year, secular stagnation With which market forecasting should now be primarily concerned. It is a question on which we shall continue to comment in the future. Dow-Jones Industnals (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (6/10/76) AWT/jb 969.06 99.99 581.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No Ilalement or expressIon of oplnson or ony other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdHcc1ly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to bvy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentioned The moiler 15 presented merely for the conver.cncr of the subSCriber While -He betleve the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee Ihe accurocy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herem Any action 10 be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now hove, or moy lotcr toke, polIons Ot trode! In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expessed In thl' or any other luue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give ad …. lce to Its Investment adVISOry (md othel (ustomers Independently of any latements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any securoty mentioned herein IS o….qiloble on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 18, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 18, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - June 18, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

– — — — — ———————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION 01 MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – June 18, 1976 It,hasbeen.remarked-by.someA!lonym)llsdyosgep.tig,in9iJd.';lat.,th9Jthe.-t09k.Jll.a p ket invariably does that which inconveniences the greatest number of investors. Last week's market action may well provide a perfect example of that tendency. In a word, the market went up. Why, the reader may well ask, should this normally happy state of events be re- garded as discomforting The answer lies in the fact that the stalling of the Dow at or around the 1000 level ever since March indicates that a large supply of stock was brought forth at that level. Presumably, at this moment, those who sold that stock are discommoded somewhat by last week's strength. The strength also poses some difficulty for the market analyst insofar as placing the stock market picture in long-range perspective is concerned. In our letter of three weeks ago, we outlined what we then thought were three salient pOints regarding future market action. These points were I) that a conventional reading of technical indicators suggested that lower prices might be in the offing, 2) that the high degree of visability of the so-called line formation just under 1000 suggested a fair degree of probability that the downside breakout from that formation might be false, and 3) that even if a decline did ensue, its magnitude was unlikely to be serious enough to force an alteration of strategy on the part of the long-range investor. The first comment that needs to be made is that this basic thinking is not yet al- tered by last week's market strength. In conventional terms, the rally from the closing low of 1—-Ql.'., ''L-09-0Il–June..canw-ed…as-not-hiRg—more-tha n.a—mov-6—i-nto4heavy–,s upply-a t-a r-eu ndl….,…,….–I the 1000-1010 level that has stalled the market on the upside so many times since last spring. If this conventional wisdom is to hold, the market rally should shortly peter out, and prices should resume the downward course on which they were apparently embarked two weeks ago. The strength, however, has, obviously, increased the probability of the second scenario in the above paragraph, the possibility that the recent downSide breakout was a false one and that the market wi 11 shortly resume its upward course. The conventional reading was the more pleasant one as far as the market analyst is concerned. A relatively moderate mtermediate-term decline would provide him with an oppor- tunity to advise a highly aggressive attitude toward equities and provide a healthy buying opportunity for any cash reserves that might exist. The possibility of resumption of the uptrend, however, creates problems for a number of reasons. First of all, upside objectives, as far as any further upmove is concerned, are somewhat limited. The base formed in the fall of 1975 has always suggested a target somewhere around the 1065 area and that target remains in effect, buttressed by a reading of the potential base formation which has been pieced together since March. That figure is not all that far above current levels so as to cause undue elation at the prospect. Were the market to move ahead to around the 1065 level, of course, an upside penetration of the 12-year trading range would have been achieved, but not to such a degree that it could be called decisive. Presumably, at that point a new pattern would have to form, thus postponing the forecaster's ability to make a long-range assessment of the market picture. '- – '- – – – o- – — — —— – – –.–.-..- – – – ——- . –.– As we pOinted out three weeks ago, however, all this poses a great many mOre — problems for the forecaster than it does for the investment manager. We suggested then that the overall outlook basically called for no change in strategy on the part of the long-range in- vestor and that, even though the possibility of lower prices existed, a continued positive attitude toward equities appeared warranted. That basic view is unchanged and, indeed, even reinforced by the week's strength. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (6/17/76) AWT/jb 1002.37 103.71 600.80 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or expreulon of opmlon or any other motter herem Contained IS, or I! 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndlrectly, on offer or the SOllCltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to Or menhoned The moiler IS presented merely for the converolenCt of the subSCriber WhIle we believe the sources of our mformotlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurac.y thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any acllOn to be token by Ihe subSCriber should be based on h,s own investIgation and mformotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. as a corporatton, and lIs offICers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades tn respect to any securtttes menttoned In thts Of any future tssue, and such posttton may be dtfferent from any Vtews now or hereafter expressed tn thtS or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, tnc , which tS rt'.9lstered wtth the SEC as an mvestment odvuor, may gtve advtce to Its Investment adVisory and olhel customers independently of any statements mode In thts or tn any other tssue Further Informotton on any securtty mentIOned herein IS avotloble on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 25, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 25, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - June 25, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 25, 1976 A few years back, Broadway enjoyed a rather charming musical comedy entitled How Now, Dow Jones. Like most such efforts, the plot was eminently forgettable, and we have, indeed, -forgotten,most. ofit .-As .we,r,ecall, .how.ever,the.story'couldnohcome to .its ,happyconsummation ,wlth …,.. the heroine finally marrymg the hero, until such time as the Dow crossed 1000. We bring thls'up at this point Simply because the Dow's current flirtation with 1000, which has been going on now since February, certainly has elements of comedy, although, mdeed, not a very good one. The by-now- familiar game continued again last week wIth the Dow-Jones Industrial Average on lv'bnday once more posting a closing high above 1000 at 1007.45 and once more being thrown back as the index moved down to a 996.56 close on Wednesday. As of this writing, the market has recovered, and yet another attempt at a new high is being made. The following table documents the swings that have taken place on the successive penetrations of the,1000 level since the end of February of thIS year. We are counting February 25, wIth its closing hIgh of 994.57, as part of the scenario, smce the average did, indeed, post an mtraday peak above 1000 for three days centering around that period. The table shows the rally peak and the low reached on the subsequent decline for the eight tImes the Dow has moved above 1000 this year and, for comparison, a Iso shows the action of the S & P 500 on the same days. The final column, a nd the one we think perhaps most interesting I shows the comparative action of our Cumulative Index, which effectively documents the action of all stocks llsted on the New York Stock Exchange. DATE DJIA S & P 500 CUM. INDEX 2/25/76 3/4/76 3/11/76 994.57 970.64 1003.31 102.03 98.92 101.89 623.77 616.05 620.75 3/15/76 974.50 99.80 608.27 3/24/76 1———4/2/T6 1009.71 99T7'58 103.42 fOrZ5 618.03 6U9'(PI——- 4/5/76 1004.09 103.51 615.37 4/9/76 4/Z1/76 968.28 1011.02 100.35 103.32 593.90 605.93 5/5/76 986.46 100.88 594.96 5/10/76 1007.48 103.10 605.79 6/7/76 958.09 98.63 577.52 6/21/76 1007.45 104.28 604.95 Those of bullish persuasion may find some comfort m the actIOn of the S & p 500, noting the fact that, at Monday's high, it had moved ahead Into new high territory, something the Dow had been unable to accomplish. There are fairly solid grounds for thIS, since markets m the past where the S & P outperformed the Dow have generally been good ones. However, as we stated above, we think the most interesting statistic in the table IS the CumulatJve Index. As the table very clearly shows, that index made its high back in February and has not equaled It smce. Even more mterestlng is the fact that each of the seven successive peaks m the Dow has seen a lower peak m the CumulatIve Index. LIkeWise, four of the six declines saw new lows posted by the Cumulative Index. Quite clearly, the average stock has been underperformmg the market smce February . What, it may well be asked, does this all mean It IS, first of all, nothmg more than a description of a state of affairs, the fact that it has been a great deal harder to make money in the stock market smce February than the averages woufd indicate. It does not say that It was not possible, or that February-June .was apenod where judicious stock selection would not have earned abovaverage returns. The portent for the future 15, at thIS moment, less certa in. There have been fa irly pro- tracted periods In the past where the Cumulative Index and similar Indices have underperformed the market and then, ultImately, caught up and moved ahead to new peaks. There have certainly been m- stances simIlar to the current one where the Dow and the other averages have merrIly sailed ahead to new hIghs whIle the Cumulative Index failed to follow. Ultlmately, however, continued weakness In the vast bulk of stocks, when It has gone on long enough, has tended to draw the averages down along with It. What we are saying, in effect, is that mspectlOn of the action of the Cumulatlve Index and other measurements of general market tone will be a great deal more valuable In formulating a forecast than recounting the Dow's dalliance with a four-flgure level. Dow-Tones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 1003.77 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 103.96 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/24/76) 603.97 AWT/jb No statement or expreSIon of OPiniOn or any other matter herein contained IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presenled merely for the converlence of the subSCriber Whole we believe the sources of our mforma- 'Ion to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any odlon to be token by the subscflber shovld be based on hIS own mvestlgotlon ond Informallon Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and .ts officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POltlOns or trades m resped to any secUrities mentIOned In thiS or any future .ssue, ond such pOSllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS ar any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on mvestment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVISory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 02, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 02, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - July 02, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER — 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCKANGE July 2, 1976 We have, over the past few weeks, spent more issues of this letter than we would naVecarea to playing-variations'onth-e'themeof the-Dowrepeatedly-stallingaroundthe-OO(hleveh –, Since, at this writing, the phenomenon appears still to be in effect, we decided to examine the narrow trading range of the past few months in the light of the historical record. In order to accomplish this, it is first necessary to quantify the nature of the doldrums in which the current stock market finds itself becalmed. The lowest price at which the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has recently sold is 958.09, a level achieved twice, first on the seventh of June and, secondly, on June 9. The highest recent price, and the peak for the entire bUll market, has been 1011.02, a figure achieved on April 21. This represents a range from low to high of 5.34. Having establlshed these parameters, we can scan backward into market history and find the last date this year on which the Dow sold above 958.09 and never subsequently sold below it. That date happens to be February 18, 95 trading days ago as of today. The Dow has, In other words, spent 95 consecutive days locked in a 52.93 point range. It then becomes an easy matter (easy, at least, if one has access to a computerized data bank) to go back and look for similar periods in the past. The criteria we decided to use in searching for such periods were that the Dow should have spent a period of 90 trading days or longer locked within a trading range of 6 or less from low to high. As it turned out, going back to 1926, there have been 18 such periods prior to the present one. The current period, 95 days within as. 34 range, is hardly record-setting either as to narrowness or longevity. There was a 90-day period in 1965, for example, when the Dow held within a range of under 4, and the long1I–,est,o-e.r.iod-1e.OovLJ1enJ.corlfined within a 6 range comprisei!..t161 trading days ending On May 11, 1940. Were that experience to be duplicated, incidentally, th-e Dow could spend from now until October 6 without making either a substantive new high or new low. A common thread which seems to run between narrow trading ranges such as the present one is the fact that the market which leads into them appears to be much more often an upward market, such as is the case in the present instance, than a downward market. 16 of the 19 occurrences on record have, in fact, occurred following up markets. Of the three exceptions, two constituted reversal phenomena. The trading range ended May, 1940, followed a downswing and led into an essentially upward market, and the major bull cycle of 1949-68 was preceded by a lOS-day trading range of just under 6. The only instance of a long trading range interrupting a continuing down market took place in 1947-48. We are, thus, left with 15 instances, prior to the present one, where a narrow trad- ing range followed an upward trend. The most striking fact about these 15 instances is that 112L them constituted interruptions in continuing upward move and only four constituted reversals. There seems, in other words, a pronounced tendency for narrow channels such as the present one to turn out to be consolidations, rather than distributional tops forecastmg a reversal of the major trend. There have, of course, been the four exceptions. The 1966 bear market was pre- ceded by a 94-day, 5.96 trading range. Likewise, the 10 correction of May- June, 1965, the 13 correction of the first nine months of 1953, and the terminal phase of the 1938-42 bear market were all foreshadowed bY'protracted narrow trading-ranges. However; the-1942-46-bull-market contained no fewer than three interruptions as narrow as and longer than the current one, the bull market of 1949-53 contained two, and the upswing of 1962-66 no fewer than four. Although we certainly intend to continue to look for evidence that the present case is an exception, the historical odds, at least, favor the present trading range being a precursor to higher pnces rather than lower. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (7/1/76) 609.10 AWT/jb 995.33 103.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or epress!on of oplMon or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 1o be, dIrectly or Ind,rectlr.' on offer or the soliCitation of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentIOned The mOIler IS presented merely for the converlenCtl of ihe subsnber who e e bel!eve the 5Our5 of our Informot!on 10 be rehable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the acurocy thereof nor of the sto'emenis mude hereon Any actIon 10 be laen by the subsr!ber should be based on h,s own InVestlgotlon ond Informot!on Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corparat!of1. ond !IS offIcers or employees, moy now hove, or mClY later lake. posItIons or trades tn respet 10 any securtHes mef1ttoned In Itus or ony future ISSUe, cmd such POSttlOf1 moy be dtfferent from any views now or hereafter el'pressed In Thts or any other tssue )of1ney Montgomery Sott, Inc, whIch IS reglste'ed wl1h the SEC os 0 Investment odv!sor, moy gtve odvlee to tIS mvesfmef1f advtsory and othet CI.Islomers tndependently of any statements made In thts or tn ony o'her Issue Further mformohon on any securtty menhonC1d heretn IS aVQllable on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 09, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 09, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - July 09, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER l 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMEFtICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE – July 9, 1976 As the Bicentennial celebrations subside, comments are beginning to emerge on the –''ettrhaids iptinoennablmseu'nmotmCeartr'a'llyth.-eL6nosentg6-ft'itmhe-e readers of this le pasftwosummers tter and wexilpl rbeessaewcfaarefntfhlaatdwegerheeavoesKexeapmti;;iinedii'sin…,..,..-.-,,–J-,-1 about it. The following table, updated through 1975, shows the number of advances and declines for the one and two month periods ended each month of each year from 1926 through 1975 together with the average percentage change for the period. Ending Month january February March April May june july August September October November December Total ONE-MONTH PERIODS Advances Declines Avg. Chg. 33 17 0.97 28 22 0.05 27 23 -0.13 28 22 0.95 26 24 -0,78 24 26 0,89 33 17 1.98 33 17 1.52 21 29 -1.42 28 22 -0.19 29 21 0.44 –.E. -.-ll. 347 253 1.28 0.46 TWO-MONTH PERIODS Advances Declines Avg. Chg. 33 17 2.36 28 22 1. 02 24 26 -0,19 30 20 0.90 30 20 0.40 24 26 0.07 31 19 2.82 35 15 3.66 29 21 0,06 25 25 -1. 57 31 19 0.30 —-.ll 353 –.lZ. 247 1. 76 0,96 The table shows the action of the Dow- Jones Industrial Average in every one-month and twomonth period from 1926 to 1975. For each penod the number of instances when the market ad 1……,…vanan9 declined is showlL..1Qgether withtl;leavera,gep,ercentagechange.foLthepenod …,.A…pre-'–I-I –liminary look ';'i the table, mdeed, suppo'rts the notion of a probable summer rally. The average monthly advance for the Dow over the period has been .46, whereas the average performance in July is an advance of 1. 98, more than four times as great. Likewise, the average advance of 3.66 for the two months ended August is approximately four times larger than the average two- month advance. It would, indeed, appear that the expectation of an advancing market during July and August has some solid grounding in fact. Having made this statement, however, a few doubts must be raised. The first factor which needs to be painted out 1S that a large part of the high average advance for the summer period rests on the accident of the 1932 bottom's having occurred at the end of June. Thus, July and August of that year produced the largest two-month advance in stock-market history, an astounding 70 rise. If this single year is eliminated from consideration, the results for July and August are much closer to norma\. Secondly, while it is true that July and August do show significant pluralities of advancing months over declining months, it must be remembered that advancing periods tend to outnumber declining ones over the 50 years by almost three to two. When standard tests of statistical Slg- nificance are applied, the period with the clearest seasonal action is the month of December, which is why this letter has always emphasized the importance of the year-end rally. Likewise, the tendency toward a declining market in September IS statistically more significant than that of a rise m July or August. Interestingly enough, none of the other months show any discernible seasonal pattern whatsoever. Lastly, in looking for seasonal patterns, it is wise to examine the most recent data to see if it , .seems'tobe deviatingfrom thepastand;-indeed;–this'is apparently thecaseTheten years be- …tween 1966 and 1975 have produced three railles and seven declines in July and five rallies and five declines in August, but the two-month period ended August has produced four rallies and six declines with an average percentage change of -1.5. Interestingly, enough, a new seasonal tendency, not heretofore apparent, seems to be emerging — that of a decline in May-june, although, it must be admitted, the bull market of 1975 was strong enough to override this tendency. Every May, from 1965 through 1976, with the exceptions of 1972 and 1975, have produced a declining market, and all two-month periods ending in June showed decline in the 1965-1974 period. The moral of the whole exercise, we suppose, is that the stock market is a difficult and changing beast, and, while certain seasonal tendencies are apparent, they constitute only one factor in what lS mvariably a hlghly complex equation, Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p,m.) 998,28 S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 104.58 Cumulative Index (7/8/76) 615.88 ROBERT j. SIMPKINS, jR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL RjS/jb No talement or eypresslon of opinion or any other matte' herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCItation of on oHer to bvy lion to or sell any secvnty be reliable we ,n rtferred no way 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely represent or guarantee the occvrocy thereof nor for of the the COnverlencc of the statements mude he svbscrlber em Any While 'ile believe action to be token bthyethSOe VfCu bSCfolfboevrr,sht nOUf\d, mkbe' based on hiS own'lnvestlgatoon positions or tfades In respect to and information Janney MonTgomery any secvrlllCS mentioned In thiS or any S,olt, fvture Inc, as a Inue, and corporallon, ond lIs officers or such pOSition moy be different employees, may from any views now now ohravhee,reoorJtmer aeyyapreert0hem, Ih,s or any other ISSUC Janney Montgomery Scott, tn whICh IS registered w,th the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give odvlce to ItS Invfsent visoryon e, customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further I(.formatlon on any secuflty mentioned herein IS ovalo C on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 16, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 16, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - July 16, 1976
View Text Version (OCR)

,—————————- —- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – –lust th,e-., w;ek'S-ago, on JU2-5devotedthi1;-lette'6n9atiStiCalPaS sion,-.,..-t play built around the action of our Cumulative Index which, readers will recall, is an index which measures the average change for every New York Stock Exchange-listed stock. The burden of the exercise was to show that, since the Dow first rose above 1000 on February 25, 1976, the Cumulative Index had been underperforming both the Dow and the S & P 500, In particular having posted successive new lows at each consecutive minor market dip. We said at that time, Quite clearly, the average stock has been underperforming the market since February. We went on to say, The portent for the future is, at this moment, less certain. There have been fairly protracted periods in the past where the Cumulative Index and similar Indices have underperformed the market and then, ultimately, 'caught up' and moved ahead to new peaks … What we are saying, in effect, is that inspection of the action of the Cumulative Index and other measurements of general market tone will be a great deal more valuable in formulating a forecast than recounting the Dow's dalliance with a four-figure level. Having made that pronouncement at the time, we feel a responsibility to bring our readers up to date,and it is, indeed, interesting that, since that letter was written, the relative strength of the Cumulative Index has performed an almost 1800 pirouette. After reacting to a new low in early June, the index has turned around sharply, and, on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week, moved to a new high along with the Dow, this despite the fact that it started from a relatively much lower base. Thus, we apparently moved, early last month, from a period where the Dow was outperforming the average stock into a period where it is underperforming it. The action of the Cumulative Index would suggest that such averages as the S & P 500 Stock Composite and the 400 (formerly-425TIndustriaTlnaex,l5Ofhofwnich-m6ve(nnfea-d-wl1evrh19hslasrweekT8-'–,.,,..,…–t., telling a more accurate story of market action than is the Dow and that the market, over the past month, has been a good deal stronger than the Dow would lead us to suppose. This hidden strength has also been reflected in the action of breadth indices which, as we have been pointing out, had been consistently underperforming the market since last February. It is highly probable that our weekly breadth index will post a new high this week, thus affirming a continued uptrend. Daily breadth, although it has not yet equalled the high posted last February, decisively penetrated the downtrend line from that peak late last month. It has, moreover, moved above every one of its recent successive minor peaks other than the February one. Only a few more days of reasonably good market action would be required for this index to move into gear with the Dow on the upside and, thus, signalize a continuation of the bull market. The superior action of breadth versus the averages can be demonstrated in other ways. The present advance may be dated from June 8, 1976, the day after the Dow posted its low at 958.09. From that date to Wednesday of this week, there were 26 trading days, and there were more advancing stocks than declining stocks on 21 of them. This occurrence took place despite the fact the Dow advanced on only 14 days and declined on 12. There have, thus, been seven days during the past 26 which showed more advances than declines despite the fact that the Dow moved lower. This sort of action is by no means historically unprecedented. As a matter of fact, the period ended July 14 is the 48th instance since 1926 of a 26-day penod which saw 21 or more advancing days. What is interesting about these instances in the past, however, is that they have a strong tendency to take place during ongoing bull markets rather than near tops. In sum, the story being tOld by th-e bulk-of NewYorKStock Exchangelssues ;which;-untll amonthago;- had beena fairly pessimistic one, has now transformed itself into an optimistic tale, indeed. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 991.81 S & P Compo (llOO p.m.) 104.49 Cumulative Index (7/15/76) 625.65 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression Crf opinion or any olher matter herein 'onlolrled IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, d,redly or ind,rectly, on offer or the OIIClIOllon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The molter IS presenfed merely for the converlence of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our mformo lion to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the STatements mude herem Any action ta be laken by the subscriber hauld be based on hiS own investigation and ,nformaT,on Janney Montgomery ScOT!, Inc, as a corporClllon, and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respeCT 10 any SeCUrities mentioned In ThiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dlfferenl from oy views now or hereafter epressed In Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery coll, tnc , whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investmenl adVisor, may give odJlCe to Its InJestment adVisory olld othel cUSfomers mdependently of ony statements mode III thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlan on allY security mentioned herein IS available on request

Download PDF