, — TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES,DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 January 4. Iq91 Based on its record so far at least. 1991 has the potential to be a highly unusual stock-market year. It couldwi!ldup, beingonly thethird.year since .theDowJ onesIndustrial Average was' first compu'ted -in 1897 in which'the traaitional year-end rally fails to carry into January of the following year. The rally began early. which is. in itself. unusual since the market trend for 1990 had been decisively downward. This flies in the face of the historical tendency for the rally to begin late in years when the market had been down. The rally high. reached on December 26. Was 2637.13. Both of the first two days of 1991 were down days. and. at this writing the Dow finds itself some sixty points under that peak As we discussed at length last week. there have been only two instances ince 1897 when th year-end rally failed to carry into January. They were. strangely enough. in consecutive years. 1976-7 and 1977-8 Both these instances took place during the course of the September 1976 – February 1978 bear market. a rather mild affair (the decline was 26.9). in which a fair number of issues performed rather well. Interestingly, the market environment we foresee for. at least the early part. of 1991 is not dissimilar. The dilemma facing the market today can be exemplified by the chart at right, a 5-point- unit point-and-figure chart of the S & P 500. IC one looks only at the index's most recent action, in other words the base formed during the fall of 1990. the outlook is highly encour- aging. That base may be counted from either point E or point F as far as point G, yielding an upside target of 360-375—in other words. a test of the all-time high. There exists some real question, however, as to whether this jnterpre1llioll jlU!1alid9ne,.Fjrst.of alL. '''''' the market finds itself, at the moment, pressing into heavy overhead supply from the top formed during 1989-90 between 365 and 325, identified on the chart at C-D. Not only does this top present a formidable upside obstacle. but its downside potential is significantly below levels already reached. The identification of this area as a top is buttressed by the fact that. at its July high, the 500 had just about reRched the upside target of the 1987 base at A-B. It is necessary to ask, moreover, just where the upside leadership for an extended advance might come from. We recently took the opportunity to examine the percentage change of each of the S & P 500 components from their autumn-1990 lows to whatever highs were subsequently reached. The advance in the 500 itself, of course, was only 12.2. Individual issues managed to advance. in four cases more than 50. and some 242 stocks managed to post a greater-than-20 advance. Interestingly. a large number of these issues were in the financial area. and of the 58 S & P components that fall into this category, 49 rose by 20 or more. This is normal technical action. Finance stocks were among the leaders on the downside during the 1990 price collapse, and it is typical that such issues should find themself achieving the sharpest bounce on the first noticeable rally. We must hasten to add, however. that this action most assuredly does not mean that these stocks have the potential to be upside leaders. Before recovery can be foreseen, a protracted period of basebuilding must take place, and most finance stocks, having reached short-term objectives, are probably now trading around the upper limit of where those bases will be formed. ' In contrast to the banks and insurers. there exists another large group of issues whose market action has been diametrically opposite. These are the usual suspect. institutional favorites possessing impeccable growth records. Such stocks were generally resistant to the 1990 decline. Philip MorriS, as good an archetype as any, feU only 13 between July and October. and was recently trading above its early October high. one of only 50 stocks in the S & P 500 to have acheived that feat. The technical pattern indeed suggests that it could sell at still higher levels, along with a host of similar well-known names in the food. consumer, and health-care fields. We are, however, inclined to question whether these issues have the potential to lead a dynamic bull market from current levels. For the time being. therefore, we are inclined to maintain the pessimistic, short-to-intermediate-term outlook discussed in our final 1990 letters. As we noted at that time, the further weakness we anticipate could well provide a major buying opportunity. Dm. Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index 0/3/90 AWTjb 2564.10 320.27 4539.15 ANTHONY W. T4.BELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or e)(preSSlon of Opinion or any other matter herein contaIned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our informatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any actIOn to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own mvestlgallOn and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corporation and rts officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posilions or Irades In respect to any securrtles menboned In this or any future ISSue, and such posrtlOn may be dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other ISSue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to rts Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any S1atemenls made In thIS or In any other Issue Fur1her mformahon on any secUrity mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 – -, January II, 1991 These are, Indeed, parlous times. The United States Congress finds Itself debating whether or not we should engage In a war which will, without doubt, produce a saddening total of American casualties. At home, It Is, by now, almost universally agreed that we find ourselves In an economic recession which will Impact, In one way or another, large numbers of U.S. citizens. These are serious matters Indeed. They are sufficiently serious as to require the market technician once more to note that, Important as these events are to all of us, they have no direct effect whatsoever on the stock market. The stock market Is moved, we need to remind ourselves, by buyers and sellers acting in the market place. This is not to say that war or recession are irrelevant. Buy and sell decisions may well be made In response to events on the economic or the Middle Eastern scene. However, the market's response to similar happenings In past history has often been at variance with what one might expect. It Is the technician's job to examine these historical relationships. The market's Initial response to the possibility of war in the Persian Gulf was Indeed a bearish one. On August 1, the day before Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait, the Dow was just under 2900, 100 points off its high. It lost 190 points In the next four days and another 300-plus points by mid-October before a rally, which apparently ended at noon on the first trading day of 1991, stemmed the tide. This action cannot be said to be unusual, since the Initial reaction to the prospect of war Is often negative. Following December 7, 1941, the market continued what was, by then, a three-year-old downward trend. Its response to the outbreak of the Korean War was a 13 decline In June 1950. Following the outburst of World War I In Europe, the Stock Exchange was closed for 3 1/'2hecmcinotln;t'hn-su.-a-n-c-e-of-w-a-r-,-'hro-w-e-v-e-r-,-has, for whatever reason, tended to produce rising prices; — April 1942 launched a four-year bull market which continued until after war's end. July 1950 saw the start of an almost-50 rise in stock prices. The starting date of the Vietnam conflict Is a matter of opinion, but it certainly included parts of at least two major bull markets. The underlying reasons for this are not, as some have opined, an Indication of some sort of institutional amorality in financial markets. The thesis that economic activity brought on by war often mitigates against an economic downturn Is undoubtedly closer to the mark, and may Indeed have some applicability In the present case. As far as recession Is concerned, we need once again remind ourselves that the market leads the economy. There have been eight recessions in the Post World War II period. It is interesting that, based on monthly average prices for the Dow, the market was higher in the month of the recession's end than at its beginning in no fewer than four of those eight cases, and that the average change for the DJIA during these recessions was 1.8. The table at right shows, for these eight recessions, their beginning and end dates, the associated stock market low, and, most importantly, the relationship of that low to the Recession stock Months Months Market After After Low peak Trough eventual peak and trough. This relationship is one of the reasons for this letter's current short term pessimism. It is likely that the recession began (Remember that it has not yet been officially proclaimed) sometime during the fourth quarter of 1990 The fact that stockmarket lows have tended to take place well after a recession's onset tends to mitigate. we think, Nov 4S-0ct 49 Jun 49 Jul 52-May 54 Sep 53 Aug 57-Apr 5S oct 57 Apr 60-Feb 61 Oct 60 Dec 69-Nov 70 May 70 Nov 73-Msr 75 Dec 74 Jan SO-Jul SO Apr 90 Jul 81-No,v 92 . Auq 82 7 2 2 6 5 13 6 13 3 B 6 4 6 3 2 3 against October, 1990 being such a low. Given an end to recession In, say, the fourth quarter of 1991, the three- to eight-month lead generally shown by stock market bottoms could produce an important low early this year. It is pointless at the moment to declare that we are in a recession. This Is obvious. The market analyst is faced with the more difficult job of predicting, well in advance of the fact, when that recession will end. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (11 00) 2496.53 S & P 500 (11 00) 314 .53 Cumulative Index (1/10/91) 4489.94 AWTjb No statement or expression oj Opinion or any other maner herem contamed IS, or Is to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an oHer or the soliCitation of an oHer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or menllOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herern Any action to be taken by the subscrrber should be based on hiS own InvestlgallOn and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , as a corporation and I1s oHlcers or employees, may now have or may tater take, POSitionS or trades In respeclto any securrbes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posrtlon may be dlHerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment advisor, may gIVe adVIce to Its Investment advISOry and other customers rndependently of any statements made In thiS or rn any other Issue Further Information on any secunty menboned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 —- …——- – 'Jariuary-187 1991 –.- -.- — …. –. Thursday's 114-point rally on the highest trading volume in over a year may be said, HI one sense, to have demonstrated the inherent perversity of financial markets. The DJIA, let it be recalled, had spent late summer and early fall of last year in a 20 decline, universally ascribed to apprehension over the possibility of war in the Middle East. The market bottomed out, for the time being at least. in mid-October, but since then, especially during the last couple of weeks, prices have duly rocketed upward with every news development suggesting that an Iraq war might be avoided, and, conversely, collapsed in response to events indicating the increased likelihood of such a war. After three months of such action, a real shooting war finally erupted on Wednesday night, and the market promptly went through the roof. It can be argued, of course, that the one thing the market was not anticipating was a short. successful war with relatively few casualties, an outcome suggested by what has transplred up to this writing, at least. In our view, however, a more general principle applies. That principle is embodied in the Widely-noted observation that the one thing the stock market absolutely cannot stand is uncertainty. From August through this week, it had been force-fed gargantuan doses of uncertainty. Thus, the emergence of war as fact, rather than as speculation was, at least in part, responsible for the rally, Readers turn to this letter not for political or military punditry, but for comment on the technical pOSition of the market. Let us, therefore, get to such comment. We noted a month ago that many investors seemed to fear that a bull market might somehow sneak up on us We noted that this fear runs counter to past experience, which suggests that bull markets do not arrive quiCkly, but announce themselves early in the game with rolls of drums and blares of trumpets Th u rsdI!Ys…!!lltio1L-c!1rtain!ysounded….clarioncall. Perhaps the simplest standard for measuring the vigor of a rise is percentage change. and the Dow's upswing of 4.57 was indeed only the fifteenth instance of a rise greater than 4 since World War II. No fewer than six major bull markets since that time have been launched by greater than 4 rallies, the bull markets beginning in 1957, 1962, 1970, 1974, 1982 and 197. It must duly be noted that in a couple of cases, 1962 and 1974, the 4-plus rallies took place prior to an initial bottom which was later slightly penetrated. The record is impressive nonetheless. The 1519 advancing stocks also provided an impressive statistic, that total being almost six times as great as the sum of declining issues, 263. Advances likewise totalled 74 issues traded, similarly a level which has, in the past, been characteristic of takeoff rallies. To percent change and breadth must be added the huge volume of 319 million shares, well in excess of twice its normal levels. (The average for 25 days through Tuesday was 138 million shares.) Upside volume was more than seven times the downslde figure. This is nowhere near a record, but still encouraging. The only thing the rally failed to produce in terms of technical strength was an explosion of new highs, only 38 such highs having occurred in NYSE trading. It is not unusual, however, for this figure to begin its expansion well after a market bottom has occurred. For all this, though, the technical picture, in one sense at least, has not significantly been altered by the rally so far. The most recent phase of the market decline began from a closing high of 2637.13 on December 26, following a short-term top formation built up during December between, roughly, 2655 and 2565. It is therefore, possible to view Thursday's move as nothing more than a spike return to that top. Furthermore, as we noted here, illustrated by a chart, on January 4. this is not where the truly heavy supply exists. The crucial area of overhead supply is in, roughly, the 2600 – 2750 area, this supply comprising over a year of trading going back to August 1989. We find ourselves still unable to become fully convinced that the base formed since last October is sufficient to penetrate that overhead supply without further work being done ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (1/17/91) AWTjb 2629.95 327.72 4590.62 — No statement or expression oj opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable. we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc . as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positIOns or trades In respect to any securities menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posItIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registeredwlih the SEC as an Investment adVisor. may give adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further Information on any secuTity mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987,2300 January 25, 1991 lVe spent approximately tlalf of last weeks letter discussing market action for one single day-,-Januar7, lY9L We intend tospnd t!tis week's edltion.,going into.furttler detail on the same subject. This could-;oCcOUrse,be described'asoVei'kill. Whatrefevance;-the reader may' – well ask, can one day's trading tlave to ttle long-term stock market outlook The answer is quite a bit, if action on ttlat particular day is sufficiently unusual. For there are, technicians have long recognized, short-term patterns that can occasionally afford an insightful glimpse into ttle longer-term, supply-lemand picture. One such pattern, noted by some of the earliest writers, is the selling climsx, In which the market moves down sharply on dramatically increased volume and then turns and, on equal volume, moves sharply to the upside. This is caused. theoretically, by panic selling, which, finally exhausted, is replaced by informed buying once the wave of liquidation has run its course. There is evidence that this sort of pattern has subtly altered in recent years, with ttle first half, the panic-liquidation phase, often being absent. The institutional investors who dominate todays markets, it is reasoned, are less apt to become fear-crazed sellers, but can be stampeded into buying once an oversold market gives evidence of turning. An especially sharp market rise, therefore, is not without significance. The 114-polnt rise in the Dow last Thursday can certainly be appropriately described as sharp, amounting, as it did, to 4.57. If one gauges that day against the vast panoply of stock -market history, it is not all that- exciting, ttlere tlaving been no fewer than 87 larger daily rises since the first computation of the Dow in 1897, and, in the same period, 105 advances of 4 or greater. We need, however, to remind ourselves of the fact that, where market volatility is concerned, the 1920's and 1930's were an era entirely unlike the current one. Of ttle 105 greater-than-4 rises, no fewer ttlan 80 occurred between 1926 and 1940. There followed 17 years, until 1957, before such an upswing again occurred, and, as noted last week, there tlave been only 15 cases since then, within which category January 17, 1991 ranks eighth in terms of perc,,-ntag!lva,,-ce. The association of 4-plus rises with turning points is -unmistakable. There have been. since that time, eight completed bear markets, seven of which had one or more 4 rises associated with their low. In 1957, a sharp advance occurred one day after the market low on October 22. The actual low of the 1962 bear market was at 535 on the Dow in June, but an initial low of 576 was followed by an unusual single-lay rally on May 29. 1970 also saw a large rally ttle day after the bear-market low was posted. In 1974, there were two more-than-4 rallies in October, from the 601 and 633 levels on the Dow, before the average finally bottomed at 577 in December. The 1976-78 bear market was peculiar in that the actual selling climax did not occur on the February low, but ten months later on a test of that low. This was the famous Halloween Massacre, and it was duly followed, on November I, by a 4.4 rally. An additional climax occurred on yet another test, in April, 1980. Finally, the August 12, 1982 bottom was followed five days later by an almost-5 advance on August 17, and two more similar rallies on October 6 and November 3. The two days following October 19, 1987 each produced huge advances, the 10 rally on October 21 being the largest since 1933. To reiterate, of eight bear markets over 33 years, the bottoms of seven have been associated with 4-plus rallies, the only major bear market failing to produce such a phenomenon being 1966. Likewise, the only greater-than-4 advance not associated with a bear market low in these 33 years occurred on November 26, 1963, following the important intermediate-term break set off by the Kennedy assassination. The January advance can also be considered unusual in terms of volume, the 318 million stlares which traded being 2.185 times the 25 -lay average. This manifestation is rare and has taken place only 18 times since 1957. As is the case with 4 rises, these instances have tended to be assooiated with importnt bottoms. Althouh no,such dey cccurred,ln 1966, 1970, or 1974, five of the large rallies discussed above were also heavy-volume days. Finally, there were, on January 17, 1,519 advancing issues, which constituted almost 75 of all issues traded. This number has been bettered only 38 times since 1957, and, once more, the bulk of these instances were associated with major-cycle lows. There are a number of reasons, most of them familiar to our readers, why we are unwilling quite yet to pronounce the end of the 1990–9 bear market. It must be admitted though, that last Thursday's trading constitutes an impressive phenomenon, suggesting that the lows of earlier this month could very possibly constitute an effective bottom. Certainly any further evidence of internal strength in the market would suggest, at the very least, a relatively beneficent intermediate -term outlook. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (1124/90 AWTjb 2652.72 336.35 4727.37 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expression of oplmon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an oHer or the solICitation of an cHer to buy or sell any security referred to or men\!Oned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience althe subsCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor afthe statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investlgabon and rnformattan Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporallon and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler lake, poSitions or trades In respect to any securrbes mentIoned tn thiS or any future ISSue, and such poSItion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , whICh IS registered WIth the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS Of In any other Issue Further Information on any seCUrity menlloned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 February I, 1991 — – Wediscussedf in..-our… prevJous …two-issues, theignificance .. oL. theJ.OO-point-ILralJ-Y-….which – occurred a fortnight ago, pointing out that seven of the eight last bear-market bottoms had been characterized by similar rames. Wednesday and Thursday's followthrough, with the Dow up another 74 points, reinforces the original message and suggests, that, though the market is obviously overbought for the short-term, the path of least resistance is upward. Problems exist, however, when one tries to gauge the extent of any potential upmove. This can be documented by inspection of individual technical patterns for any representative set of investment -grade stocks. In the table below, we present some technical statistics on one such representative set, the 30 components of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. — — stock ———————– Allied-Signal Corp Alumlnu Co of Arner ,American Express American Tel Tel Bethlehem Steel Corp Boeing Co Chevron Corp Coca Cola Co Du Pont De Nemours Eastman Kodak Co Exxon corp ,General Electric Co General Motors Corp Goodyear Tlre Rubber – —- -InteITBnati-ona-i-'–Paper ,Mcdonalds Corp Merck Co Inc Minnesota Mlnlng Mfg Navistar lnt'l Phllip Mords Cos Pnmerica Corp Procter & Gamble Sears Roebuck Co Texaco Inc u S X Corp Union Carblde Corp United Technolo9ies Westinghouse Elect Woolworth Corporatlon Price -B–r-e-a-k-o-ut Supply 29 34-36 65 64-70 22 24 30-37 32 40-44 14 17-18 48 50 55-60 70 76-78 48 37 39 38-41 42 44 46-50 52 63 66-70 35 36-40 20 127 135 150-165 60 28 31 30-l4 91 84 3 4-4 1/2 56 26 27-29 77 82-86 29 34-37 58 62 60-65 29 ll-34 19 20 21-23 48 50 54-60 28 30 33-38 31 30-34 Objective ——–33-40 66 33 34 15 53-72 82 60-66 50 70 66 80 39 25 260 61 46 100 98-150 3 1/2 60 25 100 38 73 21 68 34 potj!ntial Gain ————-13.8\-37.9\ 0.0- 7.7\ 4.5\-68.2\ 6.3\-37.5\ 7.1\-28.6\ 2.1\-50.0\ 8.6-17.1\ 25.0-37.5 2.7\-35.1 2.4\-66.7\ 26.9 4.8-27.0\ 2.9\-11.4\ 25.0\ 5.5\-104.7\ 1-7\ 7.1-64.3 9.9\ 16.7-78.6 16 7\-50.0 7.1 0.0\- l.8 6.5\-29.9\ 17.2-31.0\ 3.4-25.9\ 6.9-17.2 0.0-52.6 2.1-41.'1\ 3.6-17.9\ 0.0- 9.7\ .- – The first problem is that while almost all the Dow components have formed some sort of base since last fall, 10 of the 30 have not yet broken out of these bases. The point at which these ten would post upside breakouts is shown in the second column above. Those stocks with no figure shown have already broken out on the upside. There exist two technical factors Which, given current market conditions, are relevant to the assessment of a stock's intermediate-term potential. The first of these is overhead supply. Such supply, from 1989 -90 tops, exists in all but six of the issues, and its level is shown in the third column. In some cases the supply is massive. In others, it is relatively small. The second factor is the extent to which a base has formed. In a few cases. there now exists a sufficiently wide base to'suggest that .he supply may be penetrated. in many, the upside targets and the supply coincide. The final column attempts to assess the potential percentage gain for each stock, using first conserV'ative, and then optimistic, interpretations. Under the conservative interpretation, it is assumed that breakouts will not occur and the lowest figure for the supply or the upside objective will be attained. The bullish projection assumes breakouts by all issues and uses the widest possible objective. It is possible, using the figures shown, to project upside targets for the Dow. Using the less optimistic scenario yields a possible target of 2,955. The more optimistic one yields an upside potential a good deal higher—as much as 3,700. Experience, however, shows such longer-term projections should be discounted by about 10, Which would produce a target in the 3,300' s. Analysis of upside momentum as the advance continues should give some idea of the ultimate projection. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2728.46 S & P 500 (12 00) 341.36 Cumulative Index (1/31/91) 4968.26 No stalementar expression of opinion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offeror the soliCitation of an offerlo buy or sell any security referred to or menlJOned The matler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subsCriber While we beheve the sources of our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subsCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and informatIOn Delafield, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees. may now have, or may later lake, posrl1ons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSItion may be different from any views nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentloned herein IS available on request

-r—————————————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 February 8. 1991 Achetez sux canons, vendez aux clairons – -frerlchProvei'b- We suggested in this space on December 7 that there was little pOInt in worrying about a bull market sneaking up on us. Such markets, we noted, generally announce themselves. early in the game. with rolls of drums and blares of trumpets. This the current stock market did on January 17. with a 114-point rally. 1,500 advancing stocks and 300.000.000 shares of volume. It has been repeating that announcement loud and clear ever since. It has. really. been quite an amazing three weeks. The Dow was. on Wednesday. up 14.6 from its low of early January and an astonishing 19.7 from the October bottom. Since the January 9 low. the market has been up on 15 of 21 days and. perhaps even more unusual, there have now been some 13 consecutive days. and 16 days out of the last 17. on which daily advances exceeded declines. While all this was going on. trading activity boomed. with volume well over 200.000.000 shares on the past 7 trading days. To find anything in the way of a correction during the upside explosion. one needs to look at half-hourly figures. There have been. from January through just this Wednesday. three downswings lasting longer than an hour and a half, the worst case being January 28 -29. when the Dow was off 26 points between 330 on Monday and 1030 on Tuesday. It seems obvious to us that there can be only one factor cited to account for all this—the Persian Gulf War. Consider the market's position the day prior to the war's breakout. A 20 decline had bottomed just three months previous and had been followed by an unimpressive 11.5 rally. More than half the ground gained by that rally had been lost by January 9. and the December low had been broken, historically a bearish indication. Then came the war. and. almost immediately. the achievements of high-tech weaponry began to suggest a successful conclusion. The market has never looked back since. – – – – – . Why we must.a.ash-ourselvest should-this'be so!On6 reasonA-is,-essentiaHy-non-quar..tifiable- , , – . – but. we are convinced after 37 years of observing the stock market. none the less real. This IS the tendency of the American people to rally behind its leaders whenever a catastrophe or crisis takes place. One thinks of what this letter called the uJohnson confidence boom, following the assassination of President Kennedy. The polls suggest. so far at least. that the majority of Americans support the action taken by their government. The nOW-Ubiquitous flags and yellow ribbons are not, we think, unrelated to the stock market euphoria. The war, however, is likely to have a more tanglble effect. It was just six weeks ago that the majority of economists reached the consensus that we were, by then, in a recession. Now. before that recession has even been officially recognized, we are beginning to ,hear from seers that, given the stimulus of war production on economic activity. the recession may be short. possibly over by mid-summer, and relatively painless. Since the prognosis of a recession was the major fuel for bearish scenarios in the second half of 1990. the prospect of that recession's end has improved the market outlook dramatically. The quotation at the top of this page. translated. means Buy on the cannons; sell on the bugles. The axiom. not a bad piece of folk wisdom. suggests purchase of stocks on the outbreak of war and their sale when the sound of bugles heralds Victory. The first part of the advice has certainly proved true. Technical factors. however. would suggest that a fair amount of both time and upside action remains before we can test the validity of the second part. The chart pattern for the Dow indicates. minimally. a test of the previous highs with the most plausible upside targets centering around the 3.100 level. The reading. as we noted last week. can be confirmed by inspection of the individual pattern for the Dow components. Indications are, in other words, that the old high for the Dow. achieved just under 3.000 last summer. could well be exceeded. although not by very much. This suggestion )8 J interestingly, confirmed by .the study of previous long runs of days showing positive breadth. The present instance constitutes the 16th case since 1926 when there have occurred more than 12 such successive days. Such periods seem to have a tendency to occur not at the outset of a bull market. but following more or less severe declines taking place in the advanced stages of bull markets prior to those market's ultimate highs. August. 1960 and August-September. 1965 are cases in point. In summary. the evidence points toward a continuation of the markets upward course, but there is some likelihood that the advance, while worthwhile, may turn out to be relatively limited. There is also the suggestion that we may have to rethink the meaning of the August-october downswing of last year. That. however. is the subject for another letter and we feel that the market will afford us plenty of time to undertake such a reassessment. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2820.54 S & P 500 (1200) 375.03 Cumulative Index (2/7/91) 5259.78 AWTjb No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Inditectly, an offer or the solicltatlon of an offer to buy or sell any security re1erred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvesllgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or emptoyees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respect to any secunlles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be drlferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Detafletd, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVIce 10 Its investment adviSOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISsue Further mformabon on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

— , TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 February IS, 1991 This week saw the confirmation of a new bun market, or, at least. the extension of an old one, if, that is, one is willing to believe the S P 500 That particular indicator closed on ' Wedne.say 369.01,, whi,ch flgtl!!,c()ntit!eLa,!ew all-;tllI!e,high. pennie.,-above the ,pevious, closing high of 368.95 achieved on July 16, 1990, The Dow Jones Industrials, which, we all remember, were, in mid-July, just a quarter of a point under the 3,000 level, remain considerably below their historic peak. This outperformance of the Dow by the S & P is a relatively new phenomenon. From shortly after the 1987 crash to the high of July last year, the DJIA had been the better performer. In early 1988, the Dow was sell!ng for around 7.6 times the S P, and by last July that figure had increased to 8.2 times. The ratio is now 7.86, suggesting distinct deterioration in the DJIA's relative strength. What has excited the most furor, however, is not the Dow or the S & P. These indices, over long periods of time, tend to be highly correlated in any case. The interesting development is the newly improved action on the part of secondary stocks which, as every investor must now be aware, have dismally underperformed their large-capitalization brethren for years. The Value Line Composite, an equally weighted index constituting a good proxy for smaller issues, is now up almost 22 percent from its January low versus 17 and 18 percent respectively for the Dow and the S & P. It is necessary. however, to put this performance in perspective, which we attempt to do with the chart below. The two lower lines trace the action of the S P and the Value Line since 1962, and the upper line is a ratio of the two. RATIO (v….. uE LINE I S&f' 500) 5&P '500 VALUE LDE CCWOl1l1 The long term underperformance of the Value Line is striking. At this week's high of 227.75, it remained well below its summer-1990 peak of 250.56, which was, in turn, lower than the ,1989 J—- high at 278.98 and even-the pre-crash-1987 peak'of'289.02. Astoundingly enough, the Value Line was, just three months ago, under its 1968 high of around 189. The ratio, or relative-strength line, shown at the top of the chart tells the true story. The S P clearly outperformed the Value Line from 1968 through the end of 1974. Essentially, be- tween 1973 and 1976, the performance of the two indicators was about the same, indicated by the fact that the ratio line was relatively nat over this period. There then occurred an interval lasting some 12 years, through mid-1983, during which smaller stocks achieved much superior gains. This superiority is even more noticeable if one looks at a typical over-the-counter index. The point is that the last period of secondary stock outperformance was preceded by a three-year period where small and large stocks performed alike. The final turn in the trend lasted for more than a decade. A comparison of what the Value Line-S & P ratio has done so far versus the mid-1970's strongly suggests that a lot more work needs to be done before we can be certain that the ratio has turned upward. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow Jones Industrials )12 00) 2893.07 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. S & P 500 (1200) 365.98 Cumulative Index (2/14/91) 5429.23 No slalemenlor expression 01 opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indlreclly, an oHer orthe soliCitatIOn of an oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentlooed The maner IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any aclton to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Oelafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporatlOO and ItS oHlcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respect to any securrtles mentIOned m thIS or any future Issue, and such posrtlon may be different from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabe!! Inc, which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment advisor may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further mformal!oo on any secunty mentlooed herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 February 22, 1991 The stock market fireworks, almost as spectacular as those provided by a Patriot missile, – -have.-for-the time'being-at -least.subsided-,-after-havingacheiving'Cnew high- for the -move (an all-time high in the case of the S P 500). After three lackluster days, the Dow, at yesterday's close, had pulled back forty-odd points. This affords us our first chance in a number of weeks to sit back and take stock of what has been going on. Those goings-on, it must be admitted, were fairly impressive. After reaching a low at 2365.10 on October 11, the Dow formed a small base and then posted a modest recovery to 2637.13 on the day after Christmas. It had given up close to half the gain in early January and appeared to be headed lower when the Iraqi War began. It then spurted 18.9 in just 27 trading days. Effectively the market has, as measured by the averages, recovered all the ground lost last summer and fall. It is at this point, in our view, that taxonomy becomes fairly crucial. There can be no disputing the fact that we have had, since October and especially since January, an unusually dynamic stock market rally. Since such rallies generally take some time to lose momentum, we have no hesitation in suggesting that it is likely to continue for a while. The question that needs to be answered, is whether this rally—what has already taken place and whatever remains of it—constitutes a new bull market or simply the continuation of a bull market that began in October, 1987 and was briefly Interrupted in July – October 1990. A -rast gulf in expectations exists between the two alternatives. The average bull market in the twentieth century has involved a rise of 81. Applying this to the 1990 low suggests an ultimate target close to 4,300. A simple extension of an existing bull market could involve, as we will develop below, an ultimate high not too different from today's prices. In order to classify the recent upswing, we need to categorize the downswing which preceded it. It began on July 16, 1990, and, after 62 trading days, had produced a drop of 19.9 in the S P 500 and 21.1 percent in the DJIA. It would be useful to know, it seems to us, whether to 1 classifythatdropasamajorcyclebear-makp.t,or'etertoLcall-itan-intermediate-term– – – – – decline occurring within the context of a bull market that was 33 months old at its outset. The latter sort of occurrence is relatively rare, but not unheard of. By January 1960, the Dow had advanced to 679 versus 420 in October 1957. Between January and October, a decline to 566 ensued before an ultimate top at 735, 8 above the January 1960 high, was attained in December 1961. A shorter but steeper drop, around 10 percent in 31 trading days, interrupted the 1962-1966 advance in May – June 1965. The Dow's ultimate peak in February 1966 was just 6 over the May 1965 peak. The arguments against the intermediate-term decline theory involve, in addition to the phenomenon's rarity, the extent of the July-october decline. At roughly 20 percent it would. be deeper than any bull-market correction since the 1930's, and would exceed a great many declines which we have come to call major bear markets. There exists, however, a compelling case to be made in its favor. First of all, the 62 trading days of the July – October decline would make it the shortest bear market in history, excepting only 1929 and 1987, which could, certainly, be argued to be exceptional cases. Additionally, as we noted here two weeks ago, essentially uninterrupted rallies tend to be more characteristic of a bull markes later stages than its early ones, often taking place after intermediate-term drops. Most persuasively though, it is difficult to interpret existing chart patterns as suggesting the imminence of a major upswing. Higher prices are indeed indicated. The short base formed last fall affords an upside objective of 3100 and if we are to go back to the 1987 -88 base, proper if we are dealing with a single bull market, there remains a target of 3400 which has, of course, not yet been reached. Neither figure is really of major bull-market proportions. We are perfectly willing to admit that we are, at this stage, unwilling to come down firmly on the side of either interpretation of the cycle picture, nor do we see ,sny immediate need to do so, since, over the short term, the market is, in all probability, headed higher. We also freely admit that, While the 1990 decline was going on, we were persuaded by the bear-market theory, expecting that downswing to continue longer and fall lower than it actually did. Since its failure to do so, we are less certain. In any case. we think keeping in mind the two opposing arguments regarding the cyclical background will be useful as we attempt to interpret market developments in the months ahead. ANTHONY W. TAlIELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL JNC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (2122/91) 2921.04 367.43 5478.43 AWTjb No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlrectlyor Indlrectty, an offeror the solicltallOn of an offerio buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Informatron to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor 01 the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investlgahon and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its olltcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now Of hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informalton on any SecUfity mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 March I, \ 991 The central theme of this letter in recent weeks has been the expectation of higher prices coupled with the.caveat\hatthose .pl'ices.mayweU. not. wind .up. being. all. that. much . higher. .One. ., r. reason for the latter reservation centers around valuation. It has been pointed out by many analysts that equity valuations are, overall. not excessive. For the market averages. these valuations are now in the vicinity of their historic mid -point rather than at the high levels which have tended to characterize market tops. This statement is, however, less true for a group of issues that we have come to term the usual suspects, stocks that have led the market for most of the past decade. Consider the following table whiCh gives some relevant stati.tics for typical examples of this genre. As can be seen, current price-earnings ratios are, in some cases at least, approaching their 1987 peak levels. Sep 1987 1990 1982 Low 19B7 High Earnings PIE Recent HIgh Earnings PIE Coca Cola 5 26 1.35 19.2 54 Merck 11 15 2.10 35.1 104 Philip Morris 51/2 31 1.80 17.2 69 Procter & Gamble 20 52 2.50 20.8 91 Wal-l1art stores 1 1/4 21 SO 42.0 38 2.04 26.4 4.56 22.B 3.83 18.0 4.85 18.8 1.143 3 The five issues in the table all have certain other similarities. They are up sharply from their 1982 lows, 1255 as a group versus 286 for the Dow. Earnings have continued to expand from 1987's third quarter, used to calculate their P/F1s at that years high. Indeed those earnings have approximately doubled. For these issue., the 1987 bear market was only part of a temporary interruption. They were, indeed down sharply in that market. However, all five quickly recovered their losses and, at recent peaks, were, as a group, 85 above 1987 highs. Companies such as .these can be said to be examples of Wall Streefs preoccupation with excellence. Indeed, one of the companies above (Merck) has, for five years, been cited by .—!'ortu ne .,,-s America's most Jldmireg .comp!lny .Fo.rth.emos Lpar.t,thisis .n..periec tlylogical – – – – I phenomenon Looking at the long-term earnings history of any of the five, one sees virtually uninterrupted growth stretching back to the 1950's, often with only one or two down quarters. There can be little doubt that they deserve SUbstantial market premiums. Market premiums, however,\are not without risk. Those of us who have been around for a while remember the premium multiples commanded by a group of companies known, in the early 1970's, as the nifty fifty. Set out below' are figures for five stocks in this group. 1962 Low 1973 Hi Earnings PIE 1981 Hi Earnings PIE Recent High Avon Products 11 Eastman Kodak 10 I B fit 15 Merck 15/8 Xerox 51/2 140 67 90 16 110 2.40 1.50 2.30 ,33 3.10 58.3 44.7 39.1 48.5 54.8 72 44 73 17 73 7.00 3.40 6.25 1.00 7.50 10.3 12.9 11.7 17.0 9.7 42 47 140 104 S9 The history of these companies through the early 1970's is the same as that of the five above through the early 1990's. Their price appreciation, fueled by spectacular earnings growth from 1962 to 1973, was outstanding. At their 1973 highs, they commanded premium mUltiple., multiples which make today's look fairly conservative. Between 1962 and 1973, they managed to go through a couple of bear markets which produced only insignificant downward blips on their charts. However, as we all now know, the post-1973 performance for many of these stocks turned out to be rather dismal. The interesting thing is that earnings progress continued for another nine years after 1973, as a comparison of their 1973 and 1981 earnings in the table will show. Over those nine years the five companies increased their earnings by 167, yet four of the five were, at their 1981 high, considerably lower than they had been in 1973, and three remain lower today. Thus, one of the justifications for technical analysis. What happened between 1973 and 1981 was not fundamental weakness, but simple erosion of investor confidence—the unWillingness to continue to pay extreme premium multiples. After 1981, fundamental problems of one sort of another did set in for four of the five, the exception being Merck, which is why it finds itself in both groups cited above. It is doubtful, though, that the market anticipated this only a decade in advance. None of the above is meant, in any way, to be a prediction. Indeed, one characteristic of both groups is that they endured a number of bear markets with no erosion of their premiums. As 1973 shows, however, premiums are not without risk. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, 'CABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (2/28/91) AWTjb 2894.06 364.03 5604.43 No statement or expression of opln!on or any other mailer herem contamed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly. an offer orthe solicrtatlon 01 an offerlo buy or sell any security referred 10 or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe Ihe sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own InvestlgaliOn and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Oelafleld, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may gIVe adVice 10 rts Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any S1atements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty men\loned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – – – – , 8 ———-March .-1991–'—- Everyone knows the market does not move in a straight line so each strong trend focuses attention on the coming reversal. The bigger the move, the more attention is paid to the correction. At times this concern may obscure the investor's view of what is really going on. We are currently experiencing what is clearly the strongest market ad vance since January 1987 and perhaps since August 1982. This type of advance tends to last six months or more. The two indicators analyzed below highlight the strength of the current move and suggest that a correction will more likely occur later than sooner. The breadth and extent of the current rally mark it as unusual. It is rare for the breadth to be as strong as it has been. Rarer still is an advance of over 20 percent in only 39 trading days. The ten day advance-decline oscillator rose above 4200 on January 30. This super strong breadth matches that of other strong rallies since 1949 (for historical comparisons. the data has been corrected for the doubling of issues traded since 1949). While there are four instances of super strong breadth occurring in our near bear markets (December 1952. October 1969, September 1973. November 1977). these represent less than 25 percent of all super high breadth readings. The only rallies to exhibit similar strength over the past eleven years are summarized in the table below. Date of First High Breadth Reading DJIA Beginning of First 5 Correction DJIA Percentage Advance January 13. 1987 2012.94 April 16. 1987 2405.54 19.5 –January-lg.1995—11227.. 36-April-21,–l986-,,-,,-c-..—185;'90 -5-1-.-2. — – August 7. 1984 1204.62 August 21. 1984 1239.73 2.9 April 11. 1980 791.55 September 22. 1980 921.93 16.4 As the table suggests, strong breadth readings tend to occur early on in major market advances. As infrequent as these readings are. they must be recognized as a normal part of a strong upswing. More intriguing is the extent of the current rally m such a short time period. The DJIA rose 20.36 percent over the 39 trading days between January 9 and March 6. 1991. None of the bull markets of the 1940's. 50's, or 60's had as sharp a rally. Even in the volatile 20's and 30' s there were only seven similar rallies. Focusing on the past 50 years. only the rallies of October 1982 and February 1975 are as steep. None of the other post war rallies come close. During the 1940's. 50's and 60's. only the rally of December 1962 reached over 15 percent. After achieving the 20 percent level on February 3. 1975. (711.44) the Dow climbed another 10.5 percent reaching 786.53 on March 17 before undergoing a five percent correction. ,In 1982, the 20 percent level was reached on October 6. (944.26) and climbed an additional 12.8 percent to 1065.49 on November 3. before experiencing a five percent decline. While we may not be able to expect another 10 percent advance from the March 6 close of 2973.27 (approximately 3270) before some sort of correction sets in, it is worth noting that very rapid advances such as the current one have occurred near the middle of an intermediate rise, not at the end. From a longer term perspective. October 1982 and February 1975 were near the beginning of major bull markets, Whether this rally is an extension of the December 1987 bull market or the first leg of a new bull market is a question we continue to wrestle with. While not concluslVe. the strength of the current rally. both breadth and magnitude. suggest a more bullish interpretation. KENNETH G. TOWER DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (03/07/91) 2971. 78 375.30 5838.21 KGTjb -' No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlrectty or Indirectly, an ofler or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secunty relerred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCrIber should be based on hiS own tnvesllgabon and tnformatton Detafteld, Harvey, Tabe!l Inc, as a corpora\!on and ItS officers Of emptoyees, may now have, or may later take, posllIons or trades In respect to any secunbes menllOned In thiS Of any future Issue, and such poSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered WIth the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, maygrve adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISSue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request