TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 10, 1980 – ,– We–f6un1 -oursel'veatdit'frYe1rremnef nlglit -engage'd-inon-eM tile – which tend to emerge in the company of perceptive colleagues. The basic question which the dinner-table conversation sought to explore was, To what extent does speculation exist in the current stock market The topic is not an infrequent subject of discussion among those who share a background in classical technical analysis. In its early days, stock-market analysis, like most other disciplines, developed a number of conventional wisdoms, and one of these, in simplest terms, was that specu- lation was bad, and, conversely, lack of speculation was good. A high degree of speculative activity allegedly suggested the presence of potential irrational sellers, while the lack of same was said to indicate a market dominated by hard-headed professional investors who were unemo- tionally taking advantage of the bargains created by previous waves of speculative selling. This perception is firmly grounded in the standard literature, going back to John MacKay's narrations of the Holland Tullip Bulb Mania and the South Sea Bubble, and continuing through the various histories of the 1929 stock market crash. It has its roots in a fundamental perception which acknowledges that among the baser human emotions are fear and greed, and that these emotions, in varying degrees, tend to reflect themselves in financial markets where the partici- pants are, after all, individual humans. The technician is, by one definition, indirectly a market psychologist. It is his task to develop quantitative indicators which measure the sort of emotional factors discussed above. A recent prob- lem is that many such quantitative indicators, especially those developed in the 1940's and 1950's, are turning out to be somewhat less than useful at the moment. For many years, the level of American Stock Exchange volume, for example, was an excellent proxy for speculative activity. Today, interpreted in conventional terms, that indicator would suggest that almost no speculation -existealort11ebetterpa-rrof-a-.lecHde–Durin-g-this-supposedly American Stock Exchange Market Value index has advanced 475 in an almost uninterrupted six- year cycle during a time when most other market indicators were doing very little. The exception- al market performance of secondary stocks in general, the sort of stocks that are supposedly the focus of purely speculative interest is, of course, a well-documented fact. With the confusing picture being painted by these indicators, the question of the existence of speculation or lack thereof becomes, as we suggested, particularly interesting. The proper answer must, we think, involve a return to psychology. Investment is, essentially, the intelligent balance of risk versus reward. The sort of speculative activity considered bad in the classical percep- tion is characterized by the presence of large numbers of investors who, for one reason or another, are deluded into focusing their attention solely OJ1 the reward while ignoring the risk. This delu- sion can take many forms. There is little qualitative difference between the individuals who thought it perfectly safe to purchase stocks on 10 margin in 1929 and the professionals who created high-minded rationalizations for buying growth stocks at 50-100 times earnings in 1972. Both were concentrating on reward and ignoring risk. On a purely intuitive basis, we are not entirely certain that this sort of thing exists to an excessive degree in today's stock market. That activity involving risk, in some cases high risk, abounds, cannot be denied, as secondary-stock performance, options volume, and other indicators clearly demonstrate. We have, in the past, expressed the belief, however, that, following a decade of obvious exodus by individuals from the stock market, the surviving stock-market investor is a hardy breed. We suspect that his very survival indicates that his risk-awareness remains a well- developed instinct. To find examples of lack of risk-awareness and excessive reward-obsession today, we think one must range far afield from the stock market into markets -for other financial assets. It is – possible to wonder, for example, about the degree of risk-awareness being demonstrated by inves- tors in such areas as precious metals, art, and other collectables. The most dangerous sort of market, of course, is the one where the conventional wisdom of just about every participant sug- gests that the direction of prices can only be upward in an unending curve extending into the indefinite future. For an example of a market that fits that definition in 1980, how about residen- tial real estate The existence of speculative activity in other areas, of course, may be precisely what has confused the stock market scene. What the eventual interrelationship will be is a question which remains unanswered. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 958.96 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 131. 17 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (10/9/80) 1022.34 AWTsla I No lfotemenl Qf ew.preulon of opinion or any other motler herein contolned or 1 to be deemed 10 be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the SOllcltotlon of on offer to b\Jy Of leU ony security referred to or menltcmed The maUer 15 presenled merely fo' the convertencc of the subscrtber Whtle e believe the sources of our information to be rei table, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any aellon to be taken by the subscrtber should be ba!.ed on hiS own investIgation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, os a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, positions or trodes In respect to any securohes mentioned In thiS or any future luue, ond such pas Ilion moy be different from any views now or hereafter e)!prcssed m thiS or any other I!.sue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regIstered With the SEC os on mvestment adVisor, may give odvlce to liS mvestment adVisory and other customers mdependently of any statements made ,n thIS or m any other Issue Further information on any sccury mentioned herein IS ovculable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIV'SION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 17, 1980 – —We have as 'we ….skeEl-ftt what –I the most likely course Jor the 'siock market assuming one Presiaimtial candidate or tlie-other is elected next month. Very often the asker of this question is an avid Republican or Democrat who is interested in proving the thesis that his party offers the better hope for the market and lor the economy. Presented below are some statistics which should please partisans of neither stripe. The table shows the percentage change in the stock market for one, two, three, and six-month periods and one, two, three, and four-year periods following the October close of each Presidential election year since 1900. Summarized at the bottom of the table are a number of averages. The first shows the average percentage change in the market for all years since 1897 over the periods in question. The second shows the average change for the various periods following election years. Following this are averages for periods following election years which elected a) a Republican, and b) a Democrat; and periods following election years in which a) the incumbent party was returned to power, and b) a new party was installed in power. PER C E N T C HAN G E 0 V E R YEAR PRESIDENT PTY 1 MNTH 2 MNTH 3 MNTH 6 MNTH 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR I900 Mcklnley 12.79 19.77 13.16 28.39 9.16 11.89 -23.56 6.76 1904 Roosevelt R 14.26 10.44 13.17 20.70 32.91 47.41 -8.46 30.94 1908 Taft 1912 Wilson R 5.78 4.39 1.89 6.98 20.04 2.71 -8.17 9.91 D 1.36 -3.13 -7.71 -13.42 -13.68 -21.27 44.50 57.42 1916 Wilson D 1.30 -9.19 -8.78 -10.88 -28.78 -18.26 13.68 -18.79 1920 Harding 1924 Coolidge R -10.49 -15.30 -10.38 -7.19 -13.82 13.14 4.21 22.50 R 7.03 15.81 18.41 15.33 50.41 44.51 74.64 142.32 1928 Hoover R 16.35 18.97 25.92 26.62 8.47 -27.29 -58.19 -75.45 1932 Roosevelt 1936 Roosevelt D -8.97 -3.18 -1.62 25.46 42.42 50.82 125.75 186.25 D 3.40 1.53 4.83 -1.65 -22.02 -14.37 -14.28 -24.03 .59 -7 79 .-13 I 2.4–1.5 .262.22-B1l.6 1944 Roosevelt D 0.55 3.95 4.87 12.91 27.35 15.44 23.65 28.72 1948 Truman D -9.24 -6.00 -5.04 -7.67 0.49 19.29 39.09 42.74 1952 Eisenhower R 5.36 8.42 7.63 2.05 2.44 30.80 68.95 78.23 1956 Eisenhower R -1.47 4.09 -0.14 3.02 -8.09 13.21 34.75 20.95 1960 Kennedy D 2.91 6.12 11.69 16.95 21.29 1.62 30.13 50.44 1964 Johnson D 0.27 0.12 3.41 5.64 10.05 -7.56 0.76 9.08 1968 Nixon R 3.43 -0.91 -0.67 -0.23 -10.12 -20.66 -11.91 0.33 1972 Nixon 1976 Carter AVERAGES R 6.56 6.75 4.55 -3.57 0.11 -30.38 -12.50 0.98 D -1.84 4.12 -1.09 -3.94 -15.19 -17.87 -15.47 -3.37 All Years Election Years 0.52 1.96 2.94 4.27 6.46 12.98 17.68 23.92 2.33 3.21 3.32 5.07 5.05 3.90 15.52 28.74 Repub. Elected Dem. Elected 5.96 7.24 7.35 9.21 9.15 8.53 5.98 23.75 -1.29 -0.82 -0.72 0.92 0.94 -0.74 25.05 33.73 Incum. Re'lcted 4.22 5.23 5.27 6.28 6.74 3.18 4.93 14.08 New Party -1.18 -0.55 -0.31 2.81 1.91 5.23 35.17 55.97 The line showing average performance for all election years tends to suggest a positive outlook from now until early 1981. One, two, and three-month periods following October in election years are significantly better than the average of all years. On the other hand, the same line demonstrates that the first halves of Presidential terms tend to show below-average stock market results, as demonstrated by the sub-par one and two-year performances following past Octobers when a Presidential election was held. Republicans will be delighted to know that, for the first two years of a Presidential term, the stock mar- ket tends to perform considerably better if a Republican is elected than if a Democrat is elected. Democrats, on the other hand J will not be reluctant to point out that, over three and four-year periods following elections, the market has acted considerably better under Democratic administrations than under the GOP. Before either party draws much comfort from these statistics, however, it should also be pointed out that the market tenqs to perform well over the short term when the incumbent party is returned, but poorly over the longer them. By contrast, the instaUation of a new party tends to produce poor short-term stock-market results but very good stock markets over the first three years and the four years of the new President's term. The election of Mr. Reagan, in other words, should be bullish for the short term and bearish for the long term since he is a Republican, but just the opposite since he will, if elected, be replacing an incumbent Presi- dent. Mr. Carter's election, by contrast, may be viewed as bearish for the short term since he is a Democrat but also bullish for the shari term since he is the incumbent. His party makes the long-range outlook follow- ing his election optimistic, but his incumbency suggests the opposite view. None of this. we are afraid, seems to prove very much except that the stock market is a complex beast. As noted, we doubt that partisans of either side can draw much ammunition from the above statistics. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM Cumulative Index (10116180) AWT sla 957.42 131. 87 1025.46 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or ony other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the COnVcr'lenC(I of the subscnber While lie believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slalem('nlS mude herein Any action to be loken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Inve5gollon and information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os a corpOfOllC)n, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later loke. pos.hons or lrades In respect 10 any menl10ned In IhlS or any future ond such moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In or any other Inue Janney Monlgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odvlCe to lis ,vestment advltory and other customers ,dependently of any statements mode, thiS or In any other Issue Furlher information on any sectmty mentioned herein available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE October 24, 1980 It is now apparent that the stock market has entered into a new phase, which phase can be dated, – approximately ,-from .A when the Dow-Jones.lndustria!, Average reacllecl, a, high oLlI6li. 72.This high was followed, three weeks later,- by a closing low of 928.58 on September 8 and a-'sharp rally to a 1980 high of 974.57 on September 22. A week later the Dow had plummeted to 921.93 on September 29, and three weeks afterward had rallied to 972.44 on October 15. It has since retreated, most notably in a 15-point slide in Thursday's trading. The action of the S & P 500 over the same period has been similar, but with more of an upward bias, that index's 1980 high having been reached at 133.70 just about a week ago. We have, quite obviously, a trading range circumscribed by the 5.71 range, between 921 and 972, over which the market moved in late September, and market action for the past two months has essen- tially been contained within this range. Trading ranges may be defined as the range of a given index over some fixed number of days, 50 trading days having been proven to be an appropriate figure for analytical purposes. Ever since October 6 the high and low for the Dow over the preceeding 50 days has been confined by the 5.71 figure mentioned above. This statement has continued to be true for the last 15 days. This is, by no means, an unduly long period. The following table lists all periods of 30 days or longer since 1949 when the difference between the 50-day high and low for the Dow has been less than 6. Also tabulated are the one-month, two-month, and six-month changes in the DJIA following the periods in question. Daie JUN 3 1949 MAR 24 1950 IEC 30 1950 A 51 JUN 26 1952 NOV 18 1952 APR 2 1953 SU' 10 1953 MAR 2 1956 AUG 13 1957 MAY 5 1958 JUN 3 1960 AUG 3 1961 NOV 14 1961 JAN 25 1962 1962 AUG 29 1963 JUL 16 1964 JUN 8 1965 FEB 28 1966 HAY 1 1969 JUL 14 1972 OCT 8 1976 HAY 23 1977 JUL 26 1977 AUG 10 1979 In DJIA IlLEod 59 167.24 55 209.78 37 235.41 35' '1c;21-L3 71 271.24 65 278.04 44 280.03 38 262.88 33 488.84 38 492.14 39 461. 12 36 628,98 48 715.71 30 732.56 35 696,52 32 683.69 55 7'6.40 75 847.47 145 889.05 73 951. 89 36 949.22 49 9.22.26 115 958.38 48 917.06 38 908.18 34 867.06 I J I A ll!oot,b l Cbs 170.68 2.06 1.88 244.51 3.87 c.!l.9j .;lO 278.57 -3.05 2.70 286.52 3.05 278.22 -0.65 266.09 518.65 '–1 'i . 6.10 481.0' 468.55 1. 61 640.37 1 .81 718.72 0.42 729.40 -0.43 1.82 611.88 -10.50 738.33 1.64 840.21 -0.86 879.49 -1 .08 919.76 -3.38 930.78 -1.94 969.97 5. 17 924.04 -3.58 925.37 0.91 854.12 -5.95 870.90 0.44 Af t e r 3Ciooibs LCbs 179.07 7.07 219.70 4.73 252.18 7 t 12 250.43 -2.61 74.41 1.17 287.84 3.52 267.63 -4.43 275.93 4.96 516.44 5.65 447.90 -8,99 480.00 4.09 614.29 -2.34 708.49 -1.01 696.03 -4.99 711.28 .2 1! 536.98 -21.46 755.23 3.97 868.67 2.50 878.89 -\ .14 931. 95 -2.09 886.12 -6.65 947.32 '.72 974.24 1.65 888.4, -3.12 835.85 -7.96 838.89 -3.25 6!iooibs 193.23 218.33 24Q.65 275.74 'B'-;-O-' 78.04 264.79 298.88 500.90 543.31 594.56 702.54 655.36 574.67 568.60 802.75 887.18 939.53 792.37 848.34 1025.59 918.88 770.70 885.49 LCbg 15.54 4.08 6.05 7.24 '6 T9 0.00 -5.44 13.69 2.47 -10.12 17.82 -5.47 -1.84 -10.54 -17.49 -16.83 10.51 4.69 5.68 -16.76 -10.63 11 .20 -4.12 -8.87 -15.14 .2.13 Results are diverse. The major bear markets of 1957, 1961-62-, and 1966 were preceeded by such trading ranges, as was the decline of 1977-78. In many other cases, however, as the table quite clearly shows, the trading range proved only a stopping point on the way to what ultimately proved to be significantly higher prices. What is perhaps interesting is that with the single exception of April, 1962, there was no case where the market moved significantly lower after only a one-month period. The trading ranges, in other words, tended to occur early in the distributional stage, affording time to react if downside breakouts made it obvious that they constituted distribution. This, we think, will be the case in 1980 if, indeed, the present phase turns out to be a distributional top. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 938.57 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 129.28 Cumulative Index (10/23/80) 1006.88 AWTsla ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of OPinion or any other molter herein contained IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, dHedly or Indirectly, on offer or the SollCitotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the COnvePlcnce of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude heretn Any action to be token by the subcnber should be based on hiS own Investlgollon ond tnformottol Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 11 officers or employees, may now hove, or may loter take, POSltlOrtS or tlodes In resped to ony securttles merttloned in th.s or ony future lSue, ond such position moy be dlfferenl from any views now or hereofter e;rpreSed In or any othttr luue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh 15 reglllered WIth Ihe SEC as an II'1ve/ment advl50r, may give adVICe 1o liS Investment adVIsory and other customers Irtdependerttly of arty stotements mode Irt thiS or In any other ISSUe Further IOformatlon on any secullty mentIOned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 31, 1980 – atraditionstartedin this 'market letter 32 'years'ago, ..,. to forecast the winner of Tuesday's Presidential election As 'old-time readers know, our record in this exercise is considerably better than our stock-market record, since all such forecasts made in the past have been correct We find ourselves, therefore, under a certain amount of pressure, since the conventional wisdom assures us that this election is the closest in years, and most analy- sts are refusing to hazard a guess as to the outcome. In approaching the task, we reminded ourselves that this is, after all, a technical market let- ter and that technical analysis consists essentially of reasoning from past publically-available data. The results of the past two Presidential elections indeed constitute such data, and we have spent a couple of days manipulating them. In this work, we attempted to follow the rules of the election itself and worked with alternative electoral-vote scenarios, using the popular vote only indirectly. It is interesting to note that most polls focus exclusively on popular vote total. Tradition demands a forecast, and accordingly, using the, approach above, we forecast the election of Governor Reagan. It is perhaps worth recalling botJi 1972 and 1976 results. The first was a landslide for Mr. Nixon,in which his opponent carried only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia. The most recent, although a Carter victory, was close enough so that a swing of a few thousand votes in a couple of states would have changed the result If only a miniscule portion of 1972 Republican voters repeat their ballot of that year, Mr. Reagan would appear an easy winner. On the other hand, it would not take the loss of much of his 1976 support to erase President Carter's margin of four years ago. The President's task, in other words, seems marginally more difficult than that of his opponent. – – In our analysis, we found it convenient to divide the country into three regions. The first – shares mostly in excess of 60, and 125 of the 129 votes went for President Ford in 1976. With ,- the possible exception of Oregon, these votes should be safe for Reagan in 1980. The second region is the Northeast/Midwest which contains the historic swing states where elections are deter- mined. It went to President Carter in 1976 by 160 votes to 104, these 56 votes, interestingly enough, being precisely his margin of victory. In most cases, however, his winning percentage was small. The most interesting region of the three, by far, is the South. It possesses 145 electoral votes. Every one of these went to Mr. Nixon in 1972 by margins ranging from 63.6 to 79.9, generally the largest winning margins he was accorded. Yet every one of these states, save one, swung to Mr. Carter in 1976. But for the fact that President Carter was born in Plains, Georgia, this letter would probably today be discussing President Ford's reelection prospects. To win, President Carter must both retain his hold on the South and preserve or increase his 1976 margin of victory in the Northeast/Midwest. 1972 results, along with the polls, suggest that the former willnot be an easy task. The latter is more possible, but a few votes either way could indeed change the result. It is possible to envision two scenarios based on each of the past two elections. In both arios we assigned the electoral votes ranked by the polls as just about certain, to their respective candidates, 152 votes to Governor Reagan and 99 votes for President Carter. If, in other states, Governor Reagan is able to repeat the 1972 Nixon vote, less 19, he will win, 275 electoral votes to 263. This scenario awards him such Southern states as Texas, Florida, Maryland, Alabams, Kentucky, and South Carolina, and he is the victor despite losing Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. In the alternative scenario, based on the 1976 vote, a swing of only 2 from the 1976 Carter tsliy is envisioned in fsvor of Governor Reagan. This produces a 284-254 electoral vote win for Governor Reagan. In it, he gains no state in Carter's Southern stronghold except Missisippi. He does, however, pick up Ohio and Wisconsin in the Northeast/Midwest, and retains those North- east/Midwest states which President Ford won in 1976. Texas, Pennsylvania, or Florida could be conveniently substituted for Ohio with the same results. In summary, Governor Reagan appears to have a wider variety of gain opportunities than does the President. This is, at best, a weak rationale for a forecast, but since the polls resoloutely refuse to predict a winner at this point, we will abide by it. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 919.62 S & P Composite (12 00 PM 126.75 Cumulative Index (10/30/80) 986.45 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or C!xpresslon of opinion or (lny olher mottcr herein contolned 1, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dIrectly or ,nd,rectly, an offer or thl! sol,c,tot,on of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convellence of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarontee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements ml,lde hereIn Any actIon 10 be token by the subscriber should be based on hIS own fnvestlgatlon and InformatIon Janney Montgome'y Scali, Inc, as a corporatIon, and lIs OffICI!rS Or employees, may now have, Or may later lake, pos1tlons or trades In respect to any securttles mentIoned 111 Ih,s or any future Issue, and such poslllon may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed 111 th15 or any other lSue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh ,s regIstered WITh the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVICe to Its 1I1vestmen! adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or 111 any other Issue Further InformatIon on any security mentioned hereIn IS aVaIlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – November 7, 1980 ,- c – If hascometo ourattent;on -tnarthere may nave , developments'last, week which are reputed to have had some effect on the stock market. Such an effect, however, was not particularly apparent in the week's market action. Now we are perfectly aware, from long experience, that we will be absoloutely unable to con- vince the majority of our readership that the above statement is not really intended to be facetious, despite the fact that the statement is almost entirely true. The market's response to the Reagan victory on Wednesday was essentially Pavlovian. There exists a conventional wisdom, probably dating back to the McKinley administration, that the stock market is supposed to go up in the face of a Republican victory, and the market duly did so after the election, before posting fairly sub- stantial declines from some of the bizarre prices which featured Wednesday's opening. This is not intended to argue that there do not exist profound implications for the nation, the economy, and hence, for the stock market, in this week's Republican sweep. Defense companies will undoubt- edly benefit from more ag-gressive military procurement, and oil companies from the possible realization that there exists less political capital than previously supposed in blaming every conceivable social ill on oil-company profits. There is little reason, however, for these developments to have any particular near-term effect on the prices of the oil and defense issues which led this week's upside parade. We would be disloyal to our profession if we did not believe in the essential wisdom of the stock market. We doubt, however, that it is sufficiently wise to assess, at this stage, all the implications of four years of Ronald Reagan's occupancy of the White House. In order to understand the lack of change in the stock market picture, it is only necessary to examine where the market was last Monday, vis-a-vis where it stands today. The market forecasters essential problem can be stated quite simply. Since early last spring, the market moved 1- noticably to wane starting in mid-August, and that waning of momentum created a trading range, expressed, in terms of the DJIA, between, roughly, 920 and 970. It had long been apparent that this trading range was of some technical significance and that the ultimate breakout frdm that range would be meaningful. As of Monday, despite a weak downside attempt late last week, no such breakout had taken place. The post-election frenzy took the Dow up to the top of the familiar trading range from which point it promptly retreated, and, by Thursday afternoon, just about the entire gain had been given up. Except for the record volume, and the fact that it all took place within the space of a couple of days, there was nothing, really, to distinguish this action from the same sort of thing that had occurred on at least three occasions since mid-August. There is, furthermore, little useful knowledge that can be gained from the volatility of Wednesday's and Thursday's trading. The central problem now facing the market forecaster is the exis- tence of a top formation. The identification of tops in an exercise substantively different from that 0 calling bottoms. In the latter case, one-day action, of the selling-climax variety, is often highly meaningful. Tops, however, consist of a cumulative chain of evidence, and in such cases, one-day moves provide only an additional link in such a chain. Our readers will be well aware that we have scrupulously refrained, in our comments of the past few months, from stating that recent market action does definitely constitute a top. For the time being, we continue to avoid such an identification. For most of 1980, and in some senses for long before that, technical action, in our view, has argued overwhelmingly for a fully-committed position with respect to equities. Long positions in falling stocks constitute j t one of the risks involved in equity investments; the other one is failure to participate in a rising ock market. Thislatter risk is one we have not been willing-to undertake, and still think-it rna e a real one. Given a chance to reflect upon the Reagan victory, we think the market will collectively decide how that victory should be reflected in near-to-intermediate-term price levels. When such a decision is made, technical evidence will, we presume, be provided. Even following the momentous events of the past week, such evidence is not yet complete. – — Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 933.53 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 128.99 Cumulative Index (11680) 995.97 AWTsla ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL NQ statement or expreslon of opinIOn or any other molter herein conlOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dlreCl1y or Indirectly. on offer or the solicllolton of an oHer to buy or sell ony secIJrlly referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convePlence of the subSCriber While -JoJe believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reliable, we In no wo-y represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude nereln Any action to- be token by the subscriber should be based on hl own Investigation and mformotlon Janney Montgomery Inc, as 0- corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later tole, posltlons or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In th,s or ony future 1Ue, and such posilion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to lis Investment odvisory and olhel customers Independently of any statements made ,n Ih,s or In ony other ISsue Further information on any secuflty mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 14, 1980 The Reagan rally may have lasted for only a couple of hours before second thoughts set in, out tJ1e-stoek marketthis fo'liave' secoii'ifThoughts' regardingThe-' second thoughts. By last Friday, almost all of the gain posted on the morning following the election had been retraced, but Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday of this week saw three sharply advancing days which took both the Dow-Jones Industrial Average and the Standard & Poors 500 to new 1980 highs, and, in the process, took the market out of the trading range concerning which we have been prattling in this space since late last summer. As short a time as a week ago, in this space, we counseled in favor of waiting before making any definite predictions of a sizeable decline. In light of this stance, we can afford to be encouraged by this week's action without becoming totally euphoric. There was, as recently as October 30, a marginal downside breakout in the Dow which, we now know by hindsight, was false. Certainly the present upside breakout will have to be confirmed by future price firmness. Continued strength from this point would have important implications. This letter has regularly discussed the pattern of long, four-year cycles in the stock market, and the timing of the present'strength is fairly crucial in the context of cycle theory. The following table shows some relevant statistics for the seven completed major stock-market cycles since 1949,plus data on the present cycle for so far as it has continued. SiP Start Date 500 Date of High No. of S & P Days 500 To High Adv. Total Days S & P in Days End Date 500 Dec. Cycle Adv'cing Jun 13, 1949 13.55 Jan 5, 1953 26.66 987 96.7 Sep 14, 1953 22.71 14.8 1163 85 …,.., Sep 14, 1953 22.71 Jul 15, 1957 49.13 963 116.3 Oct 22, 1957 38.98 20.6 1033 'Jun26-;–i962 -52.32- 27. -U77 93 89 Jun 26, 1962 52.32 Feb 9, 1966 94.06 913 79.7 Oct 7, 1966 73.20 22.1 1080 85 Oct 7, 1966 73.20 Nov 29, 1968 108.37 516 48.0 May 26, 1970 69.29 36.1 885 58 May 26, 1970 69.29 Jan 11, 1973 120.24 665 73.5 Oct 3, 1974 62.28 48.2 1101 60 Oct 3, 1974 62.28 Sep 21, 1976 107.83 497 73.1 Mar 6, 1978 86.90 19.4 863 58 Mar 6, 1978 86.90 Nov 13, 1980 136.49' 682 57.1 To Date We have repeatedly noted that the last three cycles listed in the table above have characteristics very different from that of their four predecessors. The percentage advance in the rising phase of the 1966, 1970, and 1974 cycles was uniformly smaller, and the declining phase, at least for the first two, was considerably greater. Major bear-market declines in the 1950's and 1960's were of an approximately-20 magnitude. The declines which ended in 1970 and 1974 were 36 and 48 respectively. Even more importantly, however, the time spent in the advancing phase of the last three cycles was considerably shorter than has been the case since the middle 1960's. The first four cycles spent 900-1000 days in their advancing phase. The last three spent only 50(-600 days in their rising portion. Thus, through 1966, as the last column in the table shows, 85 or more of each cycle's total life was spent advancing. Subsequently, it has been 60 or less. The key fact is that the present cycle, now 682 trading days old, is beginning to take on some of the aspects of the earlier four cycles rather than those of the last three. With this week's new highs, it has now lasted longer, in terms of trading days, than any of the three previous market phases. although admittedly not yet by an amount that could be considered significant. Its centage advance has already exceeded that of 1966-68, although it would have a good ways to go before it were to equal the sort of increases considered normal a couple of decades ago. This change may even have started to take place with the declining phase of the last cycle which, terminating with a rather mild 19 decline, looked, in one respect at least, a great deal more like a cycle from the earlier part of the past-war period than the latter. The point is that continued strength from these levels, both in terms of time and percentage advance, will continue to make the present cycle more and more similar to those of the 1950's and 1960's and less similar to those of the 70's. Even allowing for the fact that the present advance might be in a relatively mature phase, such an interpretation is profoundly encouraging for the very long term. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (11/13/80) AWT sla 981. 23 136.36 1036.46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stolement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dtrectly or indirectly, on offer or the Sollcltotton of on offer 10 bvy tlon to based or be on sell ony securtty referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely reliable we III no way represent or guarantee the acclJrocy thereof nor hiS oWn'tnllesllgohon and Information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, for the COnvef'lence 01 the slJbscrlber WhIle oNe beheve of the statements mude herein Any octlon to be token y as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now htohvee,5Uorscmonfobyoeur lro5tearu t ke or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned III thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be different from any views now or hereoJter th n thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, tnc , which IS registered With Inc SEC as on Investment adVisor, may glye adVice to Its a VISOry on 0 III customers Independently of any statements mode In tnlS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on any security mentioned herein IS OValO e on request

TABELLWS MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORk STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 21, 1980 TIle demonstrated a week ago had a satisfactory follow-through in last week's trading. A 70-million-sl1are advance on Tuesday-fOOK.lheuow lowing a mid-week correction, market strength was renewed late Thursday, and the average reached a closing figure of 1000.17. The S & P 500 concomitantly reached an all-time peak of 140.40. There had been a fair amount of rhapsodizing in the financial press about the market of a fortnight ago, centering around the rather spurious claim that the week ending November 14 saw the second largest stock market advance on record, coupled with the fact that the Dow was approaching the magic 1000 mark which, this week, it finally attained. To the serious student of stock-market history, the week's action, while both commendable and encouraging, was not in the least unusual. To begin with, it was the second largest advance on record only in terms of points gained on the Dow, the 54-point rise having been exceeded only by a 74-point rise in the week ending October 11, 1974. However, as we were all taught in grade school, the proper method of measuring such items is in terms of percent- ages. There have been, for the record, 51 weeks in the past half century in which the Dow advanced by a greater percentage amount than the 5.78 gain scored a week ago. The all-time record was 22.7 for the week ending August 6, 1932, and the modern record of 12.6 was set in October, 1974. Had the latter advance been duplicated, the Dow would have begun this week at 1050, and the former would have taken it to 1140. Sixty-eight percent of all issues traded advanced last week, hardly a startling figure since it has been exceeded 218 times since weekly breadth figures were compiled, including 4 times this year and 49 times in the past decade. Even the 276.7 million shares of volume failed to set a record. Volume was greater as recently as the week ending last September 19, and has been over 250 million shares on the week a dozen times in the past 13 months. What we had, in fact, was a typical, satis- factory component rally in an ongoing bull market. as we have said manrJ!imes before, are we proponents of the belief that numbers ending in three zero-s- h-ave any partICUlar maglC quality-. T fieD-ow;Itls! rue , after ing the 1000 level on a number of past occasions. However, the exact level at which this sort of resis- tance has occurred has never been precise, and we strongly suspect that it has been manifesting itself the trading area with a top at, roughly, 970 which contained the Dow from mid-August to early Novem- ber. None of the above is intended to suggest that the action of the past fortnight is totally without significance. The inability of the averages to make upside headway and the possible implications thereof have been just about the favorite subject of this letter since last summer. It has certainly been impossible, in commenting on the market over the past couple of months, to ignore the fact that many issues, which had lately posted almost vertical rises, had begun to move laterally, forming what might have been considered potential tops. The significance of the past two weeks is the fact that most, although, it must be duly noted, not all, of those potential tops were destroyed in the recent market strength, as the issues involved broke out of their individual trading ranges and moved ahead to new highs. Such action was notable in the area of Energy stocks and a fair number of High Tech- nology issues, many of which demonstrated that they may be ready to embark on new upside legs. As noted, however, potential tops still exist, and it would, moreover, be optimistic to expect Energy, High-Technology, and other leading groups totally to carry the burden of market leadership in the same fashion that they have been carrying it for the past two years. In other words, if the bull market is to be adjudged an ongoing phenomenon, more stocks must be able to post upside break- outs from their recent trading ranges, and new leadership must emerge. Signs of such possible leadership were beginning to become evident this week in such areas as Chemicals and Forest Products. What last week's action does is reinforce the presumption that the bull market that began in March, 1978 is a continuing and present phenomenon. We devoted last week's letter to trying to fit that bull market into the context of normal cyclical patterns and concluded- that it would not be historically un- …….. usual for it to have another year of life remaining. We also noted that a fairly substantial advance from current levels would not be totally out of historical context. Such a normal cyclical advance would take the Dow to somewhere in the area of 1200 which, coincidentally, happens to be one of the more plausible intermediate upside objectives based on the existing pattern. We are proceeding on the assumption, in other words, that another 6-12 months of a strong stock market is the most likely of all possible environments. Subsequent action may invalidate this particular thesis, but, until such action occurs, a continued aggressive attitude toward equities appears warranted. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 994.97 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 139.55 Cumulative Index (11/20/80) 1051. 65 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT sla No stolement or e;o;presslon of opinion or Clny other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or thll solicitation of on offer to buy or any security referred to or mentIoned The mottm IS presented merely for the of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any achon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and InformatIon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, ond Its offIcers or employees, may now have, or may loter take, positions or trades In respect to any SeCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any VIews now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Stoll, Inc, whICh IS regIstered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, moy gIVe adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and othel C\lstomers ,ndependently of any statements made In Hus or In any other lSue Further information on any secuflty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 28, 1980 -' fact that we -pronounced ,.,.skepticism 1000 level on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, it is inevitable; we suppose, that-we offer some comment on the fact that this most widely followed of all market indicators closed at the figure of 1000.17 on November 20. For the record, this constitutes the last of five distinctly separate oc- casions which have found the Dow in a flirtation with four digits, these occasions having been spaced over a period of no less than the last 15 years. The average's first attempt at the 1000 level was in January-February, 1966 when, in two in- stances. it managed to post intraday highs above the magic figure, for the first time on January 18 and the second time on February 9. It was never able to post a closing above 1000 before the 1966 bear market took the index much lower. The second attempt on 1000, almost three years later in December, 1968, never saw anything but an approach. with an intraday high of 990.99 having been attained on December 3. The first actual close above 1000 was on November 14, 1972, initiating a three-month period during which the average reached its all-time high of 1051. 70 on January 11, 1973. No approach to this level was again made for another two and a half years. At that point, the Dow spent a full nine months moving back and forth through the magic number between March and December of 1976, but it was never able to close higher than 1014.79, a level reached on September 21. Finally, four years later. we have the 1000 figure again being attained. this for the fifth time. PERIOD – Dec 1968 Nov 1972-Jan 1973 Mar-Dec 1976 Nov 1980 CLOSING HI G H S DJIA S & P 500 iJ95..15 — 985.21 1051.70 1014.79 1000.17 94.06 108.37 120.24 107.83 140.40 Cumulative Index 1095.03 1455.59 979.97 660.89 1045.62 The table above shows the closing highs for the Dow, the Standard & Poors 500, and our own Cumulative Index for the five periods involved and shows in succinct form, we think, how little real meaning attaches to the present figure. The S 8. P 500, as the table shows, has been in a slightly upward trend over the five highs involved and is now at an all-time high some 50 above its level at the time the Dow first touched four figures. Our Cumulative Index, a truer measure of what all stocks have done over the period in question, is like the Dow, just about where it was 15 years ago. However, in the interim, it has traveled as high as 1455,and its low in the 1974 bear market was 355. It is in an indicator such as this that the true volatility of the stock market over the past decade and a half reveals itself. In a highly inflationary economy, the fact that the DJIA has topped out around the same level for 15 years is,. of course, an indication of the realtively poor performance of common stocks, in real-dollar terms, over the period. If we take the four highs subsequent to 1966 and adjust them to their level in 1966 dollars, the 1968 high was the equivalent of 900. the 1973 high. 735. and the 1976 high, 555. The recent high in 1966 dollars is just over 400. This sort of reasoning has been used in a number of forums as an argument against the owner- ship of common stocks. It is. however, in our view. nothing more than a hindsight affirmation of the fact that many stocks were drastically overpriced in 1968 and that others. notably the glamour issues, were equally overpriced in It has' long been the argument in this space that much of what we saw in the 1970's constituted a correction of that overpriced condition. Indeed, when measured from their 1974 lows. all three indicators tabulated above have moved upward at a rate in excess of general price inflation. the Dow, at an annual rate of 9H. the S 8. P 500 at 14H, and our Cumulative Index at an almost-20 annual rate. The real argument for or against common stocks in an inflationary environment must, it seems to us, finally rest on their relative value vis-a-vis other financial assets. We think that, in these terms. a strong case can be made for equities. That case is, we feel. indeed strong enough to make it only a matter of time before 1000 on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average becomes an historical arti- fact rather than a barrier to be breached. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 986.35 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 139.95 Cumulative Index (11/26/80) 1046.55 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No stalement or expreSSion of opinion or any other moHer herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler 15 presented merely for Ihe conver'lence of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hIS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, p051tlons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such pOSlhon may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any stalemen's made In Ihls or In ony olher Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS avaUahle on requesl

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMSER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 5, 1980 – – .–….-.—. – – –. We l-ia- v-e -com-m-en-ted I.n–thlS spac- e-ui'!-th…e-p-a-s-t -o-n-th- e ex- te-n-t towhlCh energy and energy-related-stocks have constituted the major factor in the bull-market rise from the spring of 1978 to date. This is graphically illustrated when one examines the extent to which these issues have contributed to the increase in the Standard &. Poors 500. That index, it will be remembered, is weighted by capitalization and is computed by first taking the price change of the individual components and multiplying that price change by the number of shares outstanding to arrive at a total market value for each issue. It is these market values which are totaled and divided by an appropriate base to arrive at the final index . Under these conditions, obviously, not only the price change of individual stocks and groups, but their size, is important, since it is that size, together with price change, which will determine the actual increase in total market value. From the end of June, 1978 through this Wednesday, the S & P 500 had moved from 95.40 to 136.71, an approximate 43 rise. The increase in total market value which produced this change was approximately 279 billion. The table below shows the 20 largest rises in total market value of the S & P's .component groups, together with the percentage that rise constitutes of the total 279 billion increase. Group Market Value Rise of Million S&p Group Market Value Rise Million of S&P Oil, Integrated Domestic Oil, Integrated International Oil Well Equipment & Service Railroads Metals Miscellaneous Oil Crude Producers Aerospace Chemicals-Misc. Conglomerates Drugs 69,808 58,780 29,798 12,201 10,282 9,331 9.174 9,094 6,631 25.0 21. 0 Office & Bus. Equip. Electronics (Semiconductors) 10.6 Natural Gas PIpelines 4.3 Electronics-Instrumentation 3.6 Tobacco 3.3 Machinery Industrial 3.2 Natural Gas Distributors 3.2 Electronic Major Cos. 2….7 Chemicals ..– 2.3 Offshore Drilling 5,614 4,982 4,847 4,800 3,776 3,658 3,386 3,342 3,303 2.0 1. 7 1. 7 1. 7 1.3 1. 3 1. 2 1.2 1.1 It is only necessary to glance at the main heaiins on the list to see that oils ha'Ce provided the major fuel for the increase. The major integrated oil companies have accounted for 128 billion of the total market value change, or just over 46. Another 30 billion, or 10, has been contributed by the Oil Well Equipment and Service stocks. Moreover, the action of the fourth-highest ranked group, Railroads, is largely a product of the action of those stocks possessing oil interests in the Overthrust belt. Miscellaneous Metals is the best acting of the non-oil groups. We then find a 9.3 billion rise in Domestic Oil Producers. If one broadens the oil category to include Energy, the preponderance is even more pronounced. Moving further down the list, we find Natural Gas Pipeline, Natural Gas Distributors, and Offshore Drilling having contributed major increases to the overall rise in the S & P. It is interesting, moreover, that no fewer than 18 of the S &. P component groups have actually suffered a shrinkage in market value in the 2-1/2 years in question, a period in which the overall index was up more than 40. These declining groups include Mobile Homes, Vending, Household Appliances, Truckers, Auto Parts. Personal Loans, Food Chains, Department Stores, Tires, Airlines, Telephone, Cosmetics, Soft Drinks, Soaps, Foods, General Merchandise, Electric Utilities, and Autos. The last six have posted a total decline in market value of 16 billion, with auto stocks having accounted for 8.2 billion of that figure. We think that the statistics have important implications for the present market outlook. It is important to note. first of all, that, if one is to generalize about the technical pattern for oil and energy stocks, it can be stated that there is. at this point. absoloutely no evidence of any major top formation. It is true, however, that a ,reat many of these issues are beginning to reach long-range upside objectives, suggesting that longer-range price appreciation from these levels may be limited. However, with a preponderance of the market rise so far being a product of action in the energy area, it therefore becomes implicit that the life of the bull market could be extended were other, less exploited groups to emerge and assume at least part of the task of upslde leadership. Many of the non-energy groups, which-have been an unimportant part of the rise thus far, or have even constituted a drag on the average, possess a fairly heavy weight in the construction of the 500. Many such issues, as we have previously noted, have impressive potential bases. A shift in leadership away from energy could, therefore, basically, be a bullish development. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (12/4/80) AWTsla 965.53 135.31 1035.41 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opln1On or any other mailer herein contal!'led Is, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presenled merely for the canve!lence of the subscriber While e believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ocllon to be by the subSCriber should bl! based on hl5 own investigation and Informal Ion Jonney Montgomery call, Inc, 0 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later tole, or trades in respect 10 any securolles melliioned In thiS or any future ISSUe, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressedhIn Ihlt ar d'rly other Inue Janney Mo('lt9omery Soott, , which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice la Its Investment adVisory ond 01 el independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS ovacloble on request

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCI( EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOel( EXCHANGe –'-2. …… –.,. ..-'December 12, 1980 .., . We had been for the past two weeks' oi-t Indu-;trial Aver- age at the end of last month to the 1000 level. Now, after just a fortnight, it will be the task of this letter to comment on the return of that average to 900, a figure which it penetrated on an intraday basis in yesterday's trading, before posting a late afternoon rally to close at 908.45. Based on the close, this constitutes a drop of 91. 72 points over a period of 14 trading days, a figure which, interestingly enough, is close to record-setting proportions. The largest decline in points over a 14-day period has been 126 points, culminating on August 27, 1974, when the market was in the throes of bottoming out after the 1973-74 bear market. More recently, the fourteen days ended March 25 of this year, two days before the S fiver Thursday reversal, saw the Dow off some 91 points. What is unusual about the present instance is its following on the heels of the attainment of a fairly significant new high. Fourteen trading days before the DJIA reached 1000.17 on November 20, it had been at 917.74 on October 30, and thus had posted a rise of 82.84 points in exactly the same length of time as the recent decline. That rise is the ninth largest on record for a period of that length. We may thus have just completed one of the more interesting round trips in recent stock-market history. It is this pattern, a complete retracement following a move to new highs, which creates a dilemma for the market technician at this stage. There was, in our view, to be quite honest, nothing about the recent probe of the 1000 level to make it particularly suspect, and our readers will be aware that we were certainly not, as the market approached that level, suggesting an immediate correction. Indeed, our view was precisely the opposite. The market, as of mid-November, had broken – suggest that the breakout might have been false. This, however, it proved to be, since the entire move was retraced, and the Dow has now penetrated its August-November congestion area on the downside. If the entire formation is to be read as a top, the implications are serious indeed, implying, at the very least, a test of the level at or slightly below 800 from which the whole rallying process began last March. The question that needs to be examined is whether the recent downside penetration may not prove to be just as misleading as was its predecessor on the upside. We think that this may be the case, at least to some degree. Distributional top formations formed with an amazing degree of rapidity over the past couple of weeks. Most of them, however, do not seem to be of sufficient magnitude to justify the more pessimistic readings possible on the averages. Furthermore, looking at the Dow presents a worst-case scenario as far as the present market is concerned. The patterns on the other averages, in particular, the S & P 500, are quite dissimilar. Even after the sharp decline, that index remains within the confines of an uptrend chan- nel going back to last summer, and no significant downside penetration has taken place. It may be that the indicator is in the early stages of a distributional top formation, but that formation would take a fair amount of time to complete. This is a picture in complete contrast to that shown by the more familiar index. What we seem to be seeing, in many ways, is a replication of what has now become a disturbingly common phenomenon, the sudden interruption of an advance by a decline of intermediate-term proportions, one which arrives suddenly and is over with quickly. This sort of occurrence, it will be recalled, has taken place on no fewer than three recent occasions, the fall of 1978, the faJl of 1979, and the spring of 1980. Percentage declines in Dow terms for the three prior instances wert 13, 11, and 16. This decline has involved a fall of 9.2 so far. It is also rapidly attaining the sort of oversold condition which resulted in the culmination of the three prior drops. We think it is wise to operate, for the time being, on the theory that nothing more serious than a repetition of something similar to past declines is in the offing. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (12/11/80) 913.40 128.27 964.64 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTsla No Ictement or expression of opinion or ony other matter here'n contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,nd,rectly. on offer or the soliCitation of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlenCE of the subSCflber While e belIeve the sources of our informa- tion to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subSCriber should be based on h,s own investIgatIon and informatIon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, ond Its off,cers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, POSItIOns or trades In respect to any seCUritIes mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posItIon may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS regIstered WIth the SEC os on Investment adVIsor moy gIve odvlce to ,ts Investment adVIsory and other OJstomers rndependently of ony statements mode III thiS or III any other Issue Further IIlformotlon on any seo.IfIly mentIoned herein IS available on request