Viewing Month: August 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 01, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 01, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 01, 1980
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 1, 1980 The stock market advance proceeded in satisfactory fashion this week, with the Dow attaining a new cJos- on .Wednesday.. Somewber.e ,the ad5ance m!!y.laye .lost '!!pass.eDge.!, namely oil industry group whose comPonents have lieerlfeaders during mosf-cifthe 197980-market 'strength 10/3/79 11/7/79 2113/80 3/26/80 7/23/80 7/30/80 DJIA Change S & P 500 Change International Oils Change Ratio to S & P Domestic Oils Change Ratio to S & P Crude Producers Change Ratio to S & P 885.15 109.59 195.02 1. 78 245.3 2.24 455.9 4.16 796.67 -10.0 99.87 – 8.9 183.52 – 5.9 1. 83 239.3 – 2.4 2.40 445.0 – 2.4 4.46 903.84 l3.5 118.44 18.6 233.99 27.5 1. 98 345.5 44.3 2.92 603.7 35.7 5.10 762.12 -15.7 98.68 -16.7 199.63 -14.7 2.02 277.4 -19.7 2.81 470.5 -22.0 4.77 928.58 21. 8 121. 93 23.6 252.85 36.6 2.07 299.4 7.9 2.46 654.7 39.1 5.37 936.18 0.8 122.23 0.2 242.57 – 4.1 1. 98 286.3 – 4.4 2.34 639.1 – 2.4 5.23 The above table shows the Dow, S & P 500, and three major oil industry indices at selected dates since last October. It clearly documents the relative strength of the oils last fall and early this year. All three oil indices declined less than the broader averages in October-November, and advanced by considerably greater amounts on the February rise. In March, however, some weakness set in. Domestic oils and pro- ducers declined by more than did the Dow or the S & P, and the drop in international oils was about the same. On the rise through July 23, domestic oils participated hardly at all, and the rise in the other two was not spectacular. Last week's action showed fairly sharp declines in all three oil indicat9rs as the major averages movea ahead. . — .0 – – -' The table below shows some relevant technical statistics for major international and domestic oil stocks. It documents the fact that 10 of the 15 stocks shown have, so far, been unable to move above their highs of early 1980, and also shows that, at this week's lows, most stocks had moved off fairly sharply from their re- cent highs. Moreover, in the past fortnight, most issues have formed tops or potential tops. Where these exist, the downside objectives of those tops are shown in the table together with the downside breakout point if such a breakout has not already occurred. Early 1980 Spring 1980 High Low Recent High Recent Low Breakout Downside Objective Exxon 67 55 72 69 Gulf Oil 54 35 45 39 38 Mobil Oil 89 57 80 73 70 60 Royal Dutch 92 67 92 87 Standard Oil, Calif. 85 62 81 73 66 Texaco 41 30 39 36 35 32 Atlantic Richfield 53 41 49 42 38 Cities Service 37 29 39 32 30 Conoco 58 41 59 52 48 46 Getty 97 66 90 81 78 68 Phillips 61 38 51 40 38 Shell 38 28 40 34 32 Standard Oil, Ind. 60 46 65 57 Cc 54 48 Sun Co. 45 31 40 37 Union Oil 62 45 61 55 52 45 The point that must be noted is that the tops, so far, are small, and in most cases, existing patterns do not suggest objectives below the lows of last spring. Thus, the worst that can be inferred about oil issues at the moment is that they may continue to show weaker relative action than they did in early 19791980. Were the tops to broaden, however, and large numbers of oil issues penetrate their spring 1980 lows, the technical implications could be a good bit more serious. It must be recalled, for example, that oil and oilrelated issues comprise almost a quarter of the S & P 500. Weakness in this area, therefore, could constitute a heavy drag on the performance of the general market. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (7/31/80) 932.59 121.11 932.18 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of op'nion or ony other maHer herein contolned 1, or IS 10 be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, an offer or the sol,cllol.on of on offer to bvy or sell any secunty referred to or mentrcned The metier IS presented merely fa/ the converlence of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarontee the accuracy thereof nor af the statements mode herein Any action to be tolren by the ubscrlber &hould be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corpo'atlon, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, POiltlonl or trades In respect to any seCurities mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereafter e,.pressed In thl' or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give odvlce to liS Investment adVisory and othet customers independently of any statements mode in Ihll or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 08, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 08, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 08, 1980
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – .. — — — Paradoxically, stock market action of the sort displayed last week makes us feel old, reminding us that our stock market career extends back to the dear, dead days of the 1950's and 1960's. As always appears to be the case in reminiscence, it was a better and a simpler time. Many of the trappings of today's financial markets were as yet uninvented, or at least, undiscovered. Options, exchange-traded ones at least, were nonexistent. Modern portfolio theory was unheard of, and beta was still a college fraternity. This, at least, had the advantage of not requiring a graduate degree in mathematics for successful portfolio management. The most complex mathematical skill required in those days was the calculation of compound growth rates, which could then be projected indefinitely into the future. Another attraction of that bygone era, at least to one whose professional expertise centers around common-stock analysis, is the absence — or so it seems — of alternative investment media. Gold remained the exclusive province of croaking prophets of gloom and doom to whom no one paid much attention. Commodity trading went on unnoticed in dusty tombs, located in lowrent areas on the fringes of the financial district. The noun collectible had not yet been invented, and most people thought of their homes in terms of shelter rather than annual price appreciation. Investmentwise, (Come to think of it, we don't think the suffix -wise had been invented then, either.) the stock market was the place to be. Ttiere eXlstedthen, tliosEi' with-long memories will recall, a breed Of money managers tionately known as gunslingers, whose function consisted of charging inordinate fees for making investors richer than they deserved to be. This even worked for a few years, until sanity, painfully in the case of a good many clients, returned, and it was discovered that the Midas touch was a good deal less prevalent on Wall Street than many had thought. At any rate, one of our friends among this crew had the habit, when the tape was clattering away merrily, to exclaim to all who would listen, Nobody should have any cash except for subway tokens. A faint — a very faint — whiff of this sort of flavor could be detected in the stock market of last week. We know now, of course, that the era referred to above, like all speculative bubbles, came to its inevitable denouement over the past decade. Our thinking about the stock market inevitably tends to be colored by recent events rather than earlier ones, and, as the Dow-Jones Industrial Average moves toward the 1000 level for the umpteenth time, it is difficult not to view the advance with a certain degree of skepticism. This skeptiCism is particularly engendered by the atmosphere of the past two years, during which, three advances, not unlike the one from this spring, were quickly and surprisingly aborted by almost complete retracement. In the light of this sort of recent history, it is perhaps useful, as we have tried to do above, to remind ourselves that nothing is permanent, and there was, in fact, another time when the market behaved differently. Certainly, at some stage, there will take place a stock – market rise which will not find itself quickly turned back after what, by historical standards, is a rather paltry advance. We have spent the last decade, in this letter, speculating on just when such an event might happen. We intend to continue to address the question. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 959.47 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 124.31 Cumulative Index (8/7/80) 952.06 AWT sla ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or C)(prenlOn of opinion or ony olner motter herein contOlned IS, or Il 10 be deemed 10 he, directly or indirectly, on offer or the 501lCIIotion of on offer to buy or sell ony secunty referred to or mentioned The molter 1 presented merely for the converlena of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our mforma hon 10 be reliable, we III no way represent or guarantee thC! accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any OChon to be token by the subscriber shOuld be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Information Janney Montqomery Scott, Inc, as a oorporC/lorT, and liS offICers or employees, may now have, cr may latcr toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future usue, ond such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or ony other Issue. Jonney Montgomery Scott, In(, whICh IS registered With Ihe SEC as an Irwestmenl adVisor, moy give adVice to lIS 1Ilves!menl adVISOry and other cvlfomers Independently of any Slotements mode In thiS or rn any other Issue Further Information on onv securrty mentioned herem IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 15, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 15, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 15, 1980
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE August 15, 1980 '-The atwariance-with 'rest 'of the financial-com- munity on a -number of basic propositions. 'There eXists, for example';- conventional wisdom which states that a market which has moved up sharply is, precisely because of this fact, vulnerable and in need of a correction. The technician, by and large, would argue that market strength is a healthy condition which is more likely than not to continue. The strength of the past four months has some claim to uniqueness. The Dow has moved up 27 over 78 trading days, through August 11, with the largest correction during that period being 2.21 . The only instance of a steeper rally in almost 40 years is the 36 move which took place over just 68 trading days between December, 1974 and March, 1975. In an effort to establish a benchmark for pre- vious rallies to compare with the present one, we have identified in the table below all rallies since 1942 which have continued for 78 days or more without a 5 correction or which have advanced more than 27. There are 22 such instances. Starting Date DJIA High After 78 Dals Subsequent Advance High No. of Days Later Advance From First High – Apr 28, 1942 Nov 30, 1943 Sep 14, 1944 Mar 26, 1945 Jun 13, 1949 Jul 13, 1950 Dec 4, 1950 1Mar 14, 1955 Feb 12, 1957 Dec 17, 1957 Oct 25, 1960 Oct 23, 1962 Nov 22, 1963 Jun 28, 1965 Oct 7, 1966 Jun 5, 1967 Jul 7, 1970 Nov 23, 1971 Dec 6, 1974 Oct I, 1975 Jun I, 1979 Apr 21, 1980 92.92 129.57 142.96 152.27 161. 60 197.44 222.33 2.5,5.-12 391. 36 454.82 425.65 566.05 558.06 711.49 840.59 744.32 847.77 669.36 797.97 577.60 784.16 821. 21 759.13 108.91 139.65 152.53 169.08 183.29 231. 81 255.71 284.19 459.42 506.04 458.65 653.62 684.86 820.25 945.84 849.89 943.08 783.68 959.18 786.53 949.86 893.94 964.08 17.2 7.0 6.7 11. 0 13.4 17.4 15.0 11. 2 17.4 11. 3 17.8 15.5 22.7 15.3 12.5 14.2 11. 2 17.1 19.1 36.1 21.1 8.9 27.0 145.82 150.50 161. 52 206.97 228.38 235.47 263.13 408.89 487.45 520.77 678.10 734.91 726.96 938.23 995.10 909.63 943.08 950.82 971. 25 786.53 I, OIl. 02 897.61 287 33.9 106 7.8 63 5.9 166 22.4 204 24.6 20 1.6 45 2.9 248 43.9 57 6.1 26 2.9 332 47.9 206 12.4 73 6.1 292 14.6 79 5.3 67 7.0 127 21.3 51 2.2 62 6.4 10 0.4 The first three columns in the table above show the Dow at the start of each of the 22 rallies, the high it had reached after 78 trading days, and the percentage advance to that high. The next column, which is the crux of the table, shows the subsequent high reached before a correction of 5 took place. The last two columns show the number of days the Dow continued to advance, uncorrected by 5, and the percentage advance at the subsequent high from the high which had been reached after 78 days. As the table shows, there are numerous instances where rallies comparable to the present one have taken place, and where the index continued to advance for periods of as much as a year with percentage increases in excess of 20. It must also be emphasized that the figure in the column ('ntitled Subsequent High refers only to the high reached before a 5 correction took place. In most instances, that correction was mild, and the following advance took the market to new highs, often by substantial amounts. It is also worth noting that every period in the past 38 years that we have come to identify as a major bull market began with a rally meeting the criteria suggested above. This included the markets of 1942-1953, 1953-1956, 1957-1961, 1962-1966, 1968-1972, and 1974-1976. The record would suggest, in other words, that the sharp market strength since last April, rather than indbating that the averages are vulnerable to a serious correction, leads, based on the historical record, to precisely the opposite conclusion. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (8/14/80) 963.99 125.50 968.48 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No stalement or expression of opinion or any olner molter herein contolned 'S, or IS to be deemed to be, d'redly or Indorectly, on offer or the 50lu;llollon of of offer hto buy or sell any secvrlty referred 10 or mentIOned The mottcr IS presented merely for Ihe converlence of the subscriber While oNe believe the wurces ofbour n hon to be relloble we III no woy represent or guarontee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any octlon to be taken by the svbscfl er s au e based on hiS own'mvcstlga!ion and Information JonnC!y Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may naw hove, or may later tdke. positions Of trades In respect to any seeuntles mentioned Ir' thiS or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hefeaJter expredse hln thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Seolt, In.c, which IS registered with the SEC as on mvestmerlt adVISor, may give adVice to !IS Invedment a vlSoryan at el customers Independently of any stalemel'llS mode 1M thiS or In any olher Issue Further information on ony security mentioned herem IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 22, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 22, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 22, 1980
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCk eXCHANGE – August 22, 1980 Technical colleagues whose view of Jess than sanlWine have drawn cattention to the action of market breadth indicators; pOintingouf the'existence of a breadth divergence-and adduc- ing from the existence of this phenomenon a significant degree of vulnerability for the stock market. This view is not without merit. Breadth action does, in fact, raise questions, and those questions must be dealt with if one is to do a cnmprehensive job of formulating a forecast. Breadth statistics (advances and declines) have been studied for many years, and the conventional analysis is well documented. It involves the construction of a breadth index, based on advancing and de- clining stocks, which, in a healthy market rise, is supposed to confirm new highs in the averages by itself achieving new highs. Failure to do so is considered a sign of potential market weakness. Such a classical divergence is documented on lines 2 and 4 of the table below, which shows highs and lows at selected points since 1974 in the Dow, the S & P 500, and our own daily breadth index. As the table shows, both the Dow and S & P achieved new highs in April, 1976 with breadth having peaked out two months before in February. After a decline into June, the subsequent rally took both averages to new highs by significant amounts, but breadth failed to achieve a new high. This constituted the classical sort of bear market signal'BREADTH DATE DJIA DATE S & P 500 DATE INDEX 1. Low 12/06/74 577.60 2. High 04/21/76 1,011.02 3. Low 06/09/76 958.09 4. High 09/21/76 1,014.79 5. Low 11/10176 974.04 6. High 12/31/76 1,004.65 7. Low 02/28/78 742.12 8. High 09/11/78 907.74 – –9—.-f;ow——-11-1 10. High 10/05/79 897.61 11. Low 11/07/79 796.67 12. High 02/13/80 903.S4 13. Low 04/21/80 759.13 14. High OS/15/80 966.72 10/03/74 62.28 04/05/76 103.51 06/07/76 98.63 09/21/76 107.83 11/10/76 98.87 07/19/77 101. 79 03.06/78 86.90 09/12/78 106.99 1-11-1-4-17-8- -92749 10/05/79 111.27 11/07/79 99.S7 02/13/S0 11S.44 03/27/80 9S.22 08/15/80 125.72 12/06/74 02/24/76 06/02/76 09/22/76 11/10/76 07/22/77 03/06/78 09/11/78 08/31/79 11/07/79 01/28/S0 03/27/S0 08/15/80 997.68 1,092.36 1,074.23 1,091. 39 1,079.62 1,106.76 1,083.86 1,121.14 l,098.9S 1,044.12 1,067.09 1,009.74 1,065.41 A bear market did, indeed, ensue. The Dow declined from Over 1000 to 742 and the S & P from 101 to under 87 as shown at line 7. However, breadth behavior was strange and unprecedented. Breadth reached new highs in July, 1977 (line 6) despite total failure on the part of either average to approach its old high on that rally. Although the averages collapsed in the fall of 1977 and the spring of 1975, the decline in the breadth index was minor and the first leg of the subsequent rise, shown on lines 7 and S in the table, brought breadth to a level which constitutes its high to date, despite the fact that the related highs for the averages were considerably lower than peaks reached subsequently. Lines 9 and 10 of the table show the Halloween Massacre which reached its low in mid-November, 1975, and the subsequent rally in 1979. The Dow recovered almost all the ground lost, the S & P made a new high, but breadth conspicuously failed to do so. The decline and rally on lines 11 and 12 show the new peaks achieved in the indices early this year with breadth remaining below its peaks of late 1978 and late 1979. Yet again, on the last two lines, the phenomenon has repeated itself. The best rally of the series has taken place on the averages, carrying both to post-1978 highs and the S & P to an all-time high. The breadth index, however, has remained below no fewer than three prior peaks stretching back over a two- year period. The question is what are we to make of this. It can, of course, be construed as a divergence in the classic sense. The problem is that, as far as breadth is concerned, a sort of mini-bear market has, in fact, alredy taken place. Breadth had retreated, as of last April, almost back to its low of late 1974, correcting just about all the subsequent advance. It is, at least, conceivable that the breadth correction that never took place in 1976-78, when the averages fell sharply and breadth hela firm, finally arrived in 1978-80, when the averages performed relatively well and breadth indices collapsed. Such an interpretation is admittedly less than an obvious one, and it is certainly one open to argument. It must be supported, in our view, by reference to cycle theory, an exercise we intend to attempt in future issues. It, nonetheless, does succeed in explaining the behavior of breadth without the sort of bearish prognosis which conventional analysis would call for. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (8/21/80) 963.23 126.56 971. 46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of opinion or any other molter herein contOlned IS, or 1 10 be deemed to be, dHecl!y or mdHec1ly, on offer or the sol'cltatlon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony scc;urlly referred 10 or mentioned The mailer Is presented merely for the conVCllencc of the subscriber Whilo we believe the sources of our informatIOn to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be tolen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporahon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke. positions or trades In respect to ony seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Inue, and such p051lion may be different from anv views now or hereafter e)(pressed 1n thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, hlCh IS f(!glstered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVIS(;Hy and othel custam(!U Independently of any statements mode In thl or In any other Issue Further ,nformation on ony security menl!oned nereln IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 29, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 29, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 29, 1980
View Text Version (OCR)

.;, 0-' 'TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE August 29, 1980 . almost linear- upward trend that iias 'characterized it since last spring. We have had, in the-p'ast'f6rt– night, three separate rally attempts, all of which were turned back around the intraday level of 970 on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. The last of these culminated into the decline which began at midday on Tuesday and continued through Thursday's trading, the average back to a new low at 930. Action has by no means been uniform. Each of the three rallies in question carried to new highs on the Transportation Index, and the Utility Average, which remains well below its high of a month ago, really failed to participate at all. All the drops took place. furthermore, on reduced volume, with Mon- day's trading dropping to new low levels around 35 million shares. It is difficult to observe a great deal of distribution, eitner in the averages or in individual stock patterns. It is, for example, extremely difficult to read any serious downside implications in the recent trading pattern with its 970 ceiling on the Dow. In order for any further serious vulnerability to be adduced, a broadening of the potential top would have to take place. This broadening could take one of two forms. The first possible form would be for one or more rallies to develop andto be turned back at around the 960- 970 level, action which would create a possible distributional top of some importance. The second possible source of vulnerability would be for the -tradIng rarige of the past fortnight to turn out to be the head portion of a head-and-shoulders top formation. This would require a continued decline to around the levels of mid-July, 920 roughly on the DJIA, further backing and falling in the area of 920-940, and an ultimate downside penetration of that range. Such a formation would provide a downside objective of moderately serious import. If must, of course, be pointed out that we are discussing above not the content Of the technical pattern to date, but a chart pattern that or might not form in the future. All of the above could, of course be cancelled which achieved new one that was ac- camp, with proof for the view yet to be forthcoming. One aspect of the past two weeks' trading has done a great deal to weaken the arguments available to the pessimists. If there existed, throughout the recent rise, one area of potential vulnerability, that vulnerability existed in the oils and oil-related securities. We discussed this at some length in our letter of August 1, pointing out these issues, which had generally outperformed the market for as much as six years, had suddenly begun to demonstrate somewhat inferior relative strength. Interest- ingly enough, the rally through August 22 took a few oil issues to newall-time highs, thus effectively destroying whatever potential tops they may have had. This sort of action has not yet occurred in any- thing approaching the majority of the group, but, were it to follow through with a fair number of the other petroleum issues, one major source of potential vulnerability would have eliminated. This would not suggest, necessarily, that oils were about to outperform the market on a short-term basis. It would simply foreclose the possibility of the sort of intermediate-term decline for oil stocks which would invariably have a depressing effect on the general market. We attempted, in our discussion of two weeks ago in this space, to point out some of the implications of the extraordinary rise of 27 on the Dow from the April 21 low. We indicated that the rise was, by most measurements, the most dynamic rally that has occurred since the lift-off rally which ended the bear market of 1972-1974, and that it had many characteristics of the initial rallies of major bull markets in the past. It is true that the very steepness of the advance makes the possibility of a slightly steeper than normal correction all the more likely. The rally in question in 1974-1975, for example, was finally interrupted, after a three-month period, by a correction of some 6 percent. The point is, however, that once this correction was past, new highs. were shortly achieved and continued to be achieved on a fairly regular basis for the better part of two years. Such, of course, may not be the case this time. We find ourselves once more in that area on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which has turned back every important rally attempt since 1966. The market attained this level last fall and immediately re- traced the entire advance just as it has repeatedly done over the past decade. We have talked about this secular trading range since 1971, and we have been suggesting ever since that we did not expect it to continue indefinitely. In the absence of the sort of developments referred to above, developments which are, at this point, conjectural, the possibilities for an upside penetration of that secular trading range appear to be as good at the moment as they have been at any time during recent market history. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (8/28/80) 931. 06 122.20 966.56 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expressiOn of opinion or ony other motter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or mdHectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to bvy or Sell! ony security referred to or men honed The malter 15 presented merely for the of the Whde we belteve the of our tnforma- han to be rei table, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stale'T1ents mode herem Any aC'ltOn to be taken by the subscrtber should be based on hIS own investIgatIon and Informollon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and Its offICers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, posltlon or trades In respeC'l to any SecUflhe mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, and such POSItiOn may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Seoll, tnc , whteh .s regIstered w.th the SEC as on Investment odv.sar, may give adVIce 10 lIs .nvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statemenh mode In Ihls or In any other Issue Furlher mformolton on any securtty mentioned hereIn IS ovollable on request

Download PDF