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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 23, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 23, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - June 23, 1950
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—-r – Walston.Hoffman&. Goodwin SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HILLS EAST ORANGE, N. J. LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND PASADENA SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE'''- SANlA ANA EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN. MD. HARRISBURG, PA. PITTSBURGH, PA RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO – …. ……;lATIlE.wASH.- ..-; STOCKTON VAlEJO – – '''; TABEll'S MARKET lETTER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5, N. Y. DIgby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORFASTORIA PlO1B 9MlbO The industrial average continues to move in a wide range. Since the first of the month the market has advanced from a low of 218.66 to a high of 229.20 and then tested the low again this Tuesday at 218.99. At , , this week's lows the market reached an overhL,-apght condition on our short term indicator and gave two distinct buying signals one on Monday which 1 proved to be somewhat premature, and another on Tuesday at 219.92 in the I. averages. From this pOint a very sharp rally ensued and at Friday's high of 225.55 the market had rallied 6.56 points (from the week's low. While this average has not yet reached overbought territory on our short term indicator, it will ,do so on Monday unless a sharp technical correction should occur. This may result in a short term sell signal early next week. However, neither the intermediate term indicator or the long term indicator are in danger of registering a comparable overbought signal as they have i strengthened their position due to last week's decline. Therefore, even I .' if a short term sell signal is given early next week, it would appear that it would result in no more than a consolidating phase and a minor decline. It is entirely possible that we are entering a more dynamic – phase of the advance – a phase that will be the prelude to an eventual distribution area. It takes time for such a distributional area to form and during the formation of such a pattern the market in general, and specific issues in particular, could have sharp price advances. This would be accompanied by much larger volume than hitherto witnessed. From a time element such a period could last from three to six months. I continue of the belief that the highs in the industrial average will be somewhere in the 240-260 area. This opinion is purely conjectural because as yet there are no actual building up of distribution patterns. Before that occurs , it would appear that there must be increased public participation and ad- vances in the secondary and speculative issues. ,i Leadership' this week has shifted somewhat. The soft goods iSsues! i notably department stores and textiles, showed considerable strength. These' . . groups, which have been laggards for the past f.our years, were drawn to ; your attention in our letter of May 5th when we advised the purchase of eight retail store issues. Since then we re-recommended several of these issues and a number of textile stocks. While these issues have advanced , from recommended levels, I still believe that they will move higher and , ; advantage should be taken of all price dips to add to holdings. A group of representative issues is listed below, together with their accumulation areas, upside breakout points and possible price objectives. Approx. Price Allied Stores 38 ; Assoc .Dry Goods 19 ; Best & Company 29 , Burlington Mills 22 City Stores 20 Goodall Sanford .,17 Interstate Dept. 27 Lerner Stores 23 , Lowenstein M. 27 May Dept .Stores 50 r'jercantile Stores 17 Montgomery Ward 57 National Dept. Stores 18 Pac ific Mills 34 Reeves 14 Robbins Mills 24 Wyandotte Worsted 12 1949 1946 Approximate Div. igh Trading Range 3.00 3 3/8 25 37 1.60 36 1/4 12 – 19 2.00 52 1/2 24 30 1.50 29 7/8 14 24 1.20 38 1/4 13 – 21 1.37t 47 3/4 14 19 2.00 50 18 26 1.50 44 1/2 17 26 2.00 43 3/4 21 – 27 3.00 70 36 48 1..00 35 13 – 18 3.00 104 1/4 48 59 1.50 39 14 – 22 3.50 48 28 – 34 1.50 18 11 18 1.00 26 3/4 15 26 1.50 25 3/8 8 13 – New indicated rate. – 1948 high. Possible Indication 50 – 55 29 33 48 28 40 35 – 40 29 36 32 35 34 70 25 75 80 32 42 – 51 '26 34 17 24 ,, I ;' I ,1i .'' , June 23, 1950 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This memorandum Is not have an Interest in some to or be all construed as an offer or 50ltdtation of of the securities mentioned herein. The offen to bll)' or sell o/Iny securities, From time to time Waldo,n, Hoffman foregOing material lias been prepared by, us as.a matter of Information o&nlyG. oIotdwISi.nbameady upon Information believed reliable but not necessarily complete, Is not guaranteed s accurate or final, lind IS not Intended to foreclose Independent Inquiry,

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 30, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 30, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - June 30, 1950
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-Wolston.Hoffman (\ Goodwin SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. .-. '' . LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSfIELD BEVERLY HILLS EAST ORANGE, N. J. HARTfORD, CONN LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGESTOWN. MD HARRISBURG, PA PASADENA PlnSBURGH, PA. PORTlAND, ORE. SANTA ANA SEATTLE, WASH . STOCKTON' VALLEJO TABEll'S MARKET lETTER 3S WALL STREET. NEW YORK 5. N. Y. Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORF-ASTORIA Under a deluge of selling brought about by the suddeH unexpec-teG Korean crisis, the industrial average toppled to a low of' 206.33 on Tuesday and, after rallying back to 216.99 on Wednesday, again reacted to ,the same low on Thursday. The rail average dropped to 50.66, rallied to 53.84 and then declined to 51.10. The market rally on Friday carried the averages baclc to highs of 211. 96 and 52.52. The c.i.,ility to hold above Tuesday's 10KS and above the strong 205 support level is an encouraging technical indication. The present market is dominated by fears and emotions and flash news happenings rather than values, earnings and ' i vidends. This is liable to continue until the present crisis clarifies. In the long run, the present happenings should result in higher stock prices. Ask yourself the question of I'i'hether you would rather own cash than stocks in the event of a huge in– crease In our national debt and the consequent infl,,lonJ.r- pres cure . Of course, it may take some time for this reasoning to assert itself and under , the stress of fear and hysteria, stock prices might work temporarily lower first. Let us try to divorce emotion from reason and present the techni- cal pattern entirely apart from our fears of what mayor may not happen. When the industrial average penetrated the June double bottom lows of 218.66 and 218.99 and the rails penetrated the 53.62 low of June, the intermediate trend was indicated as down. It then becomes a question of wheter the 229.20 top of June 12th was a bull market high to be followed by a bear market or whether the 229.20 high was just an intermediate term top to be followed by correction, consolidation and new highs. r believe the latter to be the case. The June 12th high had none of the .; 0 -2cteristics of a major top. There was no heavy volume of trading in low-priced speculative issues with widespread public particjpation. The leadership was in higher grade investment issues and even at their tops, thece issues were yielding above 6 in comparison with 2 5/8 on high grade bonds and after paying out less than half their earnings and selling at 'prices well below eight or nine times earnings. There were no undigested 'new offerjngs or large purchases on slim margIn. There were no large distributional tops formed. Compare these conditions with those present at the 1929, 1937 and 1946 tops. If the June 12th high is just an intermediate top to be fOllowed by new highs after an intermediate correction, how low could the intermediate correction carry The industrial average has advanced approximately sixty-nine pOints from the June 1949 low and the rails have advanced eighteen points. A normal intermediate correction usually retraces one-third to -, one-half of the advance. That would mean approximately 206 to 194 in the -, industrials and 52 to 49 in the rails. The first objective has been 8ached 1.n both' averages. How do these objectives check with the technical pattern There is, strong support at 205 in the industrials and so far the average has held above this figure. There is also strong support all the way down from 205 to' 195. Below that is the heavy support at the top of the threeyear accumulation range. There is strong support in the rails at 50-49 and all the way down to 45. What are the downside objectives on the point and figure charts ',';e industrial average has built up no top pattern so no indicz.tion is available. However, top counts on individual issues indicate tbe possibility of moderately lower levelS 1.n some issues. It is harl to translate this into' terms of the industrial average but I would hazard the opinion it is within 205-195 area. The downside indication on the rails is 49-46. What is ' – – -' — , the short term and intermediate term in- dicators The short term indicator is in a sharply oversold condition, the lowest since the 1946 break. The intermediate term indicator has not yet reached an oversold c,onditlon as yet but it is very close to such a condi- tion and is in a position to do so in the next 22 trading days whether the averages do or do not reach new lows. In conclUSion, from a purely unemotion al technicl viewpoint,believe we are in an intermediate term correction of a major upswing. The low may have been reached at 206.33. Further unsettling 'news mieht carry the averages temporarily lower. Favor purchase of issues that would benefit from a semi-war or defence economy. Rails and steels are ou din rou s of this t e. If; h!l m,;'M1(!d;;.t.64rnedduilAdtbmQe to or be alt construed as an offer or solleltatlon of of the securities mentioned herel The offers to buy or sell any foregoing material has been .l m prepared by fl'fb us as a matter ston, Hoffman & Goodwin may of Information only It is bas(1d upon Information believed reliable but not naceullTily complete, Is not fi1uaranteed 5 aCCUfo!lte or final, and 11 not Intended to foreclose Independent inquiry

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 07, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 07, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - July 07, 1950
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. '- Wolston,Hoffmon &, Goodwin SAN fRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. – – —1 LOS ANGELES. CALIF. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HillS EAST ORANGE, N. J. HARTFORD, CONN LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD. HARRISBURG, PA. PASADENA PITISBURGH, PA PORTlAND, ORE. SANTA ANA SEAnLE, WASH STOCKTON VAllEJO TABELL'S MARItET LETTER ,.' 35 All STREp1. NEW YORK 5, N Y. Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORF-ASTORIA PLaz.!l 96860 The market reached a condition of relative stability in the past week as compared with the hectic fluctuations of the previous week. Since the sharp drop of June 27th,' the industrial average has held in a trading , range between 216.99 and 205.92. Friday's close was 203.59. The rails have held in a range between'53.84 and 50.66. Friday'S close was 52.29. , My technical work continues to indicate that the current decline is an intermediate correction in a major uptrend. At the lows of last week, the industrials had retraced about one-third of the approximately sixty- eight point advance from the June, 1949 lows. That is the minimum correct- tion. One-half to two-thirds is regarded as the maximum. Whether the lows of last week hold depend largely on news developments. If they do not,there are strong support levels all the way down to 185 which would be the maxi- mum two-thirds correction. The downside indications on individual issues point to the 205-195 range as the most likely area where this intermediate decline will bottom out. Would use suc'h a possible decline to purchase stocks. Listed below are three groupings of issues that appear to have attractive technical patterns for long term appreciation. Purchases should be made during periods of market weakness and not on strength. BETTER GRADE MEDIUM GRADE SPECULATIVE XAluminum Co.of Amer. Anderson Clayton )lAtchison,Top. & S.F. Caterpillar Tractor Columbian Carbon Fairbanks Morse Federated Dept.Stores General Electric X General Motors ,i Ingersoll Rand Kennecott Copper Allied Stores Associated Dry G. Avco, pfd. Bullard Burlington Mills California Pack. Carrier Corp. …,…..Celanese Chic. Pneu.Tool Chicago,Rock Island City Stores American Airlines American Airlines,pf American Export Lines Amer.& Fgn Pr.2nd pf Amer. Woolen Boeing Air Bohn Aluminum Braniff Airways Budd Co Capital Airlines , Kresge Libbey-OWens-Ford May Dept.Stores McCrory Stores Mercantile Stores Montgomery Ward National Dairy National LeaCl. Otis Elevator OWens Illinois Penney (J. C ) Pfizer (Chas.) \Pullman Sears, Roebuck ., Stand.Oil of Calif. Stand.Oil of Ind. Stand.Oil of N.J. Union Pacific United Carbon Western Auto Supply Westinghouse Elec. Youngstown Sheet & T. Combustion Eng. Chic. Great West. Crown Zellerbach Chic.lnd & L. . -Distillers Seagram Chic.Mil & St.P. pf Electric Boat Denver & Rio Grande Firestone Tire Eastern Airlines General Tire \lttf4Elastic Stop Nut Hewitt Robins,Inc. oodall Sanford Illinois Central Gray Mfg Inter. Minerals c Interstate Dept!St. Gulf,Mobile & Ohio Long Bell Lumber Lambert Co. ' M-K-T, pfd \'!\eIlIClJ'Q Lerner Stores Lowenstein Radio-Keith-Orpheum Reynolds Metals McGraw ,Hill St.Louis-San Fran ()' National Dept.St. Seaboard Airline Northern Pacific Spiegel pef U Pacific Mills' fjvlHM XRepublic Steel Sunshine Mining T.W.A. Schenley United Airlines Smith (A.O.) United Stores,2nd pf Southern Pacific Western Airlines Southern Railway Western Union Texas & Pac. Rwy. Wyandotte Worsted ,; !- I Twentieth-Cent.Fox Western Pacif-ic July 7, 1950 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This memorandum Is not to be con,trued , n offer or sollclt.!ltlon of offers to buy or '011 any securities. From time to time Walston, Hoffman & GoodwIn mlly hllve an Interest In some or all of the socurities mentioned hereln The foregoing material has been prepared by us as a matter of Information only. It Is based upon information believed reliable but not necessarily comlete. Is not guarnteed liS accurate or final, oIInd I, not in,tended to foreclose independent Inquiry. I — –

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 14, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 14, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - July 14, 1950
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Walston-Hoffman & Goodwin' '..,. , ;; SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HILLS EAST ORANGE, N. J. HARTfORD, CONN. LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD. HARRISBURG, PA. PASADENA PITTSBURGH, PA. PORTLAND, ORE. SANTA ANA. SEATTLE, WASH STOCKTON VAllEJO TABELL'S MARKET LEnER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 6, N. Y. Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORFASTORIA PL… 9-6860 The Ldustrial average reached ,1eW low territory 0, Thursday at an , 'itra-day low of 195.40. This is apprOXil;13.tely a 48 retraceme,-,t of the adL va.1ce from the June, 1949 lows. The rail average held stubbor'11y above the , . '50.66 low reached C' June 27th, l'lhich was a 44 retracement of the oe year' 11 . adva'1ce, The low of last week was 51,75. The fact that the i1dustrial aver, ',age met support at the expected 195 level, plus the divergent action of the two averages gives credence to the probability that the market has reached ,its low for the interrr,ediate phase. The short term indicator registered a buy signal at Thursday's close ;of 197.44. Trading purchases appear justified on minor dips. The iter mediate term indicator is deeply oversold but has not as yet registered a buy signal. Some further time may be required for this longer term indicator to confirm the change in trend. Expect further wide swings on news developments but, at last week's lows, it would appear that the market had piscounted the worst that could be expected at the moment. A probable pattern would be an attempt to rally to the 210-212 area followed by consolid tion in the 210-205 area. The outer limits could be stretched to 215 and OQ. , This week's market was featured by the diverse action of various groups with trader's selling those issues that would appear vulnerable in a ' , defense or semi-war economy and buying issues that Iwuld not be particularly; hurt by a partial imposition of excess profits taxes,controls, allecations ' , .and the various anti-inflationary devices of the 1942-1945 period. Actually ' the market is trying to discount something that hasn't yet happened and may or may not happen. This becomes an even more hazardous operation when it s not certain that the patterns of World War II will be followed in the evellt ' ..that we approach a defense or partial war economy. ', 'l'he market of the past week has favored rails, steels, su;ars, tex, ;–',;tile's ;-metals. aircrafts, airlines,- oils, retails and-ot-her ,groups with i'strong tax bases and earnings prospects. A great many of these issues held , above the late June lows last week, even though the industrial average propped ten pOints lower. For near term-trading purchases, these issues appear attractive. I have listed below a number of these issues, together , with the lows of late June. A downside penetration of these lows would jni dicate a change in the now favorable trend. Allis Chalmers (28 3/4). Aluminum Co. (54 3/8), American Airlines (9 5/8), American Car & Fdry (22), Arner. Export Lines (17), Amer. Sugar (46), Amer' Woolen (23 1/8) Anderson Clayton (55),-Armco Steel (34), Acchison, Top, ' , & S.F.(108 Atlantic Coast Line (42), Bethlehem Steel (33), Black & Decker (262 ), BOhn Aluminum (24)/Bullard f17) Burlington Mills (19) California Pack (37) Chicago Great West (134) Chicago,Mil.St.Paul,pfd. (28 3/8) Chicago & Northwest.(ll) Chicago Pneumatic (26 lj8),ChiCago, ;, Rock Island (36 3/4) Colorado Fuel (15i) Columbian Carbon (302 ) Conti- 1 '; nental Motors (5 7/8) Del. Lack & West (7)' Denver & Rio Grande West (242 ), Eastern Air (13 5/8) Eastern Stainless Steel (12) Elastic Stop Nut (8) ; Electric Boat (l6i) Fansteel Ietal (11 7/8) Francisco Sugar (lli) Georgia, Pacific Plywood (11 3/4) Gulf,Mobile & Ohio (12 7/8) Illinois Central , (35 3/8) Ingersoll Rand (63) Interlake Iron (13 1/8) International Har- . i vester (25 1/8) Jones &; Laughlin (30 1/8) Kansas City Southern (44.) '' Kennecott COI;lper (52 3/4) Lockheed Air (28 1/8) Lowenstein (25) Mesta !' Machine (38t) Missouri-Kansas-Texas pfd (22) National Lead' (40i) Newport! Ind (10 3/4) New York Shipbuilding P6) Northern Pacific Rvry (17) ,' Northwest Air (8) Pacific Mills ..(302) Pan American Air (8) Phelps Dodge (47) Pitts. Consol Coal (24) Pressed Steel Car (7 3/8) Pullman (31 3/4) Revere Copper (20) Reynolds Metals (21) Rheem Mf (22) Richfield Oil i, ' (40 1/8) St.Louis-San Fran ( 9 7/8) Schenley (31) Seaboard Air (26 1/8) Shamrock Oil (24) Shell Oil (39i) Sinclair (24) Southern Pacific (49) Southern Rwy (32 3/4) SI;lerry (27 3/8) Std.Oil of Ind. (46 1/8) Tenn.Corp. (Hi) Texas Co. (62 5/8) Texas & Pac. Rwy (48) Thompson Prod. (52) UEion Oil of Calif.(25 5/8) Union Pacific (81) United Airlines (13 3/8) United Aircraft (27 1/8) U.S.Foil (15) U.S.Freight (14 3/4) U.S.Steel (31) Vanadium (25) West Va. Coal & Coke (12 5/8) Western Air (7i) Western Md Rwy.(13) vlest.Md. pfd (28) West Union Tel A (253/4) Weston Elec.(23) Wheeling Steel (26 1/8) White Motor (17) Woodward Iron (35). ,. Jllly 14. 1950 EDMUND W.TABELL This memorandum Is not to be construed as an offer or solldtatlon of off.n to buy or lell any securities From time to time Walston, Hoffman & Goodwin may have an Intered In lome or all of te securities mentioned herein. The foregoing material has been prepared by us as a matt.r of Information only. It Is based upon Information b.nned r.nable blrt not nocessarily compl.te, Is not glUlranteed as accurate or final, lind II not Intended to foredose Independent Inquiry. u …. ,… . . . . . . . . . , ,….,,'…… , ………., ; , .. .. ………………..

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 21, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 21, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - July 21, 1950
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…../…… ……… ' .. '. Walston.Hoffman (\ Goodwin SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK. N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HILLS EAST ORANGE. N. J HARTFORD, CONN LONG BEACH MODfSTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN 01 EGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN. MD. HARRISBURG, PA. PASADENA PITISBURGH, PA. PORTlAND. ORE. SANTA ANA SEATIlE, WASH STOCKTON VALLEJO TABEll'S MARKET LEnER 35 WALL STREET. NEW YORK 5. N. Y Digby 44141 HOTEL WALDORF.ASTORIA In last week's letter we noted 'that the ability of thPeLoin96dB6u0 strial average to hold above the 195 support at 195.40 and the divergent action of the rails in failing to react below the June 27th low of 50.66 probably indicated that the market had reached its low for the intermediate phase and that the pattern suggested an attempt to reach the 205-212 area. Also we noted that a change in leadership was expected and listed a large number of issues that appeared favored in a defense or semi-war economy. This week the market staged a strong rally led by the type of issues mentioned. The rail average reached new high territory for the year on Friday at 59. 83. The industrials rallied into the 205-212 range to reach a high of 208.89. Rails, steels, oils, metals and textiles were the strong.groups. The advance has been rapid and some consolidation may be needed to strenghthen the technical pattern. Recommended issues should be bought 'during periods of market weakness. Four weeks have elapsed since the invasion of South Korea on June 25th. The confusion and emotionalism of the early days has passed. The situation and pattern is still far from clear but there are a number of things that appear to be at least probabilities if not certainties (1) The Korean happening is probably not an isolated incident. It will probably be followed, over a period of months and years, by similar incidents in various parts of the world. (2) This implies continued ,spending over a long period of time to build up not only our own defenses but those of other non-Communist nations. (3) It probably does not mean all-out war. The production of Soviet Russia and her satellites is not sufficient to cope with this country at this time. As of 1948, America produced more than half of the steel in the entire world and four times as much as Russia. We produced almost two-thirds of the petroleum and almost ten times as much as Russia. With Canada, we produced more than half the world's copper and six times as much as Russia. Even with all of Europe and Asia in the Soviet'p hands, it would take time to build up a production of these vital materials equal to ours. (4) The happenings of the past four weeks mean inflation. There never has been a deflationary war. The value of money will be downward. (5) Business will be good and remain good for a long period of time. All fears of a nearby depression can be eliminated. (6) The amount and form of taxation, controls and allocations will depend on war developments, but it does not appear that there will immediately be more than a moderate amount of curtailment of civilian production. It will be a sort of twilight period between war and peace. (7) Under such conditions, some companies will be less vulnerable than others due to past average earnings and invested capital. Furthermore, in a semi-war or defense economy, the major companies will ,have less of a competitive advantage over the secondary or marginal companies. (8) This implies a change in the leadership of the market with red chip issues in the van rather than the blue chips. (9) 1\s the initial emotional phase is replaced by more sober thinking, it appears probable that the investor will deCide that, in an inflation- ary economy, the ownership of common stocks is preferable to holding cash or high grade bonds. July 21, 1950 EDMUND W. TABEL WALSTON, HOFFMAll & GOODWIN ….. This memorandum is not h/llve lin Intorest in some to or be all construed as an offer or solicitation of of the securitiu mentioned herein. The offers to buy or leU any securities From time foregoing material has been prepared by us to as atimmaettWer aho ftonIf(H)romfaftmioann & Goodwin may only. It IS based upon rnforrn/llflon believed tenable but nof necess/llrrly complete, 11 not 9ueranteed as accurate or final, lind is not intendlld to foroclose independent Inquiry

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 29, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 29, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - July 29, 1950
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Wolston.Hoffmon &, Goodwin SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. ,;- ', LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSfiELD BEVERLY HillS EAST ORANGE, N J HARTFORD, CONN LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD HARRISBURG, PA PASADENA PInSBURGH, PA PORTLAND, ORE. SANTA ANA SEATTLE, WASH STOCKTON VALLEJO TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5, N Y. Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORFASTORIA Pllllr.a 9006860 For the common stock buyer whose chief interest is in long ,'cen! capital gains rather than current income, I believe that the stocks o air- line companies present an outstanding opportunity at preset price levels. Of all of my twelve-hundred or more graphs o,r ir;ividual stocks, the air- ILles have the clearest technical pattern for subs.tant.i.al long term appre- ciation. Obviously, these issues, most of which pay no diVidends, are speculative. Also, from another an31e. they may not be suiCable vehicles for short term trading. But I believe i;l,ey .ffer the possibility of vf.ry large percentage gains cr,at'; the patlan!J'c,;'lOldei', ,L.f.cause ,1 . (1) The airlines are definitely growth issues;,…Fron; lQ40 to 19)9, passenger revenue and revenue passenger miles fi6Wnhave;icreased each year. Pas senger revenue was 53.3 million in 1940 arid, 389 .3 millioli. in 1949. Fvenue passenger miles flown were 1,052 million in 1940 and 6,816 .;- 1'1111ion in 1949. Another example of growth io; the fact that the ra'cio 'of , air passenger miles to Pullman travel was 3.90 in '1935. In 1940 it had in- Gl'oased to 12.81. In 1949 it was '(0.30. In addition, the number of air- craft in service has increased sharply. There wer.e 369 in lc,40 and 8b'5 in 1949 .. – . (2) espite this tremendous ,rcwth, the average price of airline stocks today is not much higher than in 1940. ,.' (3) In addition, at present price levels, te' average airlin, stock'is selling considerably below the 1945-1946 highs. Barron!s airline average is now o.rouncl. 40 as compared with 84.06 on January 1st', 1946. , (4) The airlines in World War II benefited greatly, .from the stii,lUlus of wartime traffic. In our present defense or semi-war ec anomy , a' similar stimulus to airline traffic should cccur. In the event of a lessening of the war tension and a return to a peace econo;ny, airiine traffic vlOuld also .tend to imc.rease..;. T.r,'ffiC for June .is e;pected,)to,,show a large gain over a year a g o . , ' ;;.'.. , (5) Costa should not rise in proportion to additibi'iail business and most of the gain, \Quld be carried, down to net earnings,' ,';;, .' ,' (6) ,The airlines, in the war period from September 1939 to Pearl Harbor advanced 60 as compared with a 10 decline in the market. In the entire war period from 1939 to 1945, the airlines showed the gre2t;est p,ercentage appreciation of any group and advanced over 400. , . (7) In the event of an excess profits tax, the airl'inea could be a ; speciai case. In World War II, they had a favored status. Their tax exemp- tion was related to mail contracts rather th&, average earnings or invested capital. While it is only a conjecture, it appeavs probable that, due to the importance of alr.l.ine transportation in a war'emergency, similar favor- able treatment would occur. (8) The safety record of airlines is showing constant improvement. According to some sources, traveling by scheduled airliner is safer than , riding in an automobile. As improved instrument landing and radar equip- ment are installed in more cities, delays and cancellations will be lower- p.d and the passellger jvo'c,ntial will be greatly increased. . (9) Express and freight shipments, which are 'now only a small and rela', tively unprofitable ;'lal't of airline revenue could increaGe sharply. . i(10) Large institutional investors, such as mut'clal funds, trtlts ,pension. funds, insurance companies and the like have a very small percentage of fj 'cheir assets invest;ed in bonds, preferred s cocks and cotmr.on stocks of the irlines due to their speculative character and uncertain income. A change or the better could release a tremendous potential demand for airline aecurities due to tl,eir growth possibilities. (11) The technical pattern.s ')1' the airline iS31;\e are. v.cr-j',,' favorable. Very s.rQng accumUlation baStS Dave been formed Wiin.;'P,,3,sibilities of wide r,ercentage appreciation from present levels. . ,, ' . (12 );'The l)obmtially unfavorable fae tors snch as ',deendence on our mail 2ubsidies and the commandering of fleets in the e',rent' of a war emergency ,la' be 'overstles;ed. A discussion of these possibiiities and a list of the most favorable 3tocks in the group, from a' tec.hiifcal viewpoint, will ;Je discussed in my next letter, ., EDl'IDllD W. TABEtL ' C t memoradumJu h s not to be construed as an offer or solicitation of offers to buy or sell any secuHtes From Ilfn to time Walston, Hoffman & Goodwin may heye an interest in some or all of the securities mentioned hersln. The foregOing material hal been prepared by UI as a matter of informofion only. It is based upon informotion believed reliable but not necessarily complete, is not gUaronteed as accurate or final, and is not intended to foredose Independent inquiry ..'.' …..- – ;.–It., – – I – I,. – ' (-..,…'.,. …. ;, .''.f, …- – – —-

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 04, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 04, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - August 04, 1950
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P-,',—————————– — ——- Walston-Hoffman &, Goodwin, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF, NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. .,9'- 8AKERSFJElD BEVERLY HillS EAST ORANGE, N J. HARTFORD, CONN LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSID!! SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD. HARRISStJltG, PA PASADENA PIITSBURGH, PA. PORtlAND, ORE. SANTA ANA' SEATTLE, WASH STOCKTON VALLEJO TABELL'S MARKET LEnER 35 WALL STREET. NEW YORK 5. N. Y. Digby 4-4141 In last leek's letter I expressed the opinion thThtWRf iaj ,line conpanle. of;er outstrmding profit pDss'Lbili tL s fur I!!-m9'on , 'st')ck buyer vlhose chie, interest is in long term capitBl gains ruther than in vurrent income. I stated twelve reaL,ons some technical and some unda i', nental, for thIs conclusion. Lee us novi consider some 01 the 'Leemingly un- ,favorable factors in the airline situation. At the em, c' World War II both the .'3.irlines aI1d the investing pu;lic ,.-ere ver' optimistic on t;,e future of the industry. The companies e;;panded rapid 1\' . Tey borrolved money, boug.ht ne'; equipment, hired big sto.f,s and extenled their routes. Passenger revenue increased sharply in 'he period bet1'ecn 1)46 an6 1948, but not uS l'apidl- as the te0 rapIdly ex- ,panl ec. coses. Ac a result, most companies lost money in the three-e.lr per, ,,'. Air rle,ll S;)',)sidies, '.hih ;,ad been reducec. 2, in 1945, were L ,s,a),'ply inreasc( i1 1948 In an eff rt to assist se;;e Clf the more mar,;inal ',;. ' ,p'lies. In 1049, 1;ile picture slc,'l;; started to c'lanGe. Costs l'ere cut '. tlL',rply ariC, as trafic cClnJinue1 to increase, '1 large '.i'1ount was c'.rried , 'n Lnto net In ),0. This improvement 1li',S coneinued lnto 19S0 vlhic- brings \'.p t e possi!.ility cf rl cu'c in /,ir .nil pY,1ents , I shall n0t atte1Pt to enter into the argument of novi f.lUch of' air ,',8il Pl,- is '-,r serviceD render0( an h01 much i8 sultic',y. Tile iolportlnce -. tle question varies itl indi,vidu;-;l companies. Air rfall revenues are less th,m ''7 ,r t0tal reVC;1Ue 'r E23tern All'line, a; ag,,inst 2'J Lor SOFle ,, t ,e sFi.ller c.arr.Lers. ',';le rne v,l'ies ,'idelr , Some of t1,e smller 'cr'rrLer; receive tel, tir,lee as ;.111 p2r ton i1'.-1 '5 so(,le or t'1e .'.trol1Ger ,', ;.irlL1e, In m.' event;, as totnl reVUlUe increase3, the per(,2nt,fe )l de- po-t'ence 'n ir ..ail vlill r.ecli1e. Mail ',;'.S 11 , total re\'enUe3 ',n 1949 ', s ,,;ainst 3'; ,.n l(;iO, ,'tal o,ir iLil r.eveme ,1 1949 12.S 58 .illion. ,'- I '!e c-nBjder r1.',t h2.1 ,' it ',',as c;uC)sic.J (lhi l ' is ver; q'-estion)le) it ;;'J.s still a s!la11 (-3t Lor !laincainin, approxi,ately 1000 tr–.nspcrt plC'.nes ' '1' potentlal 1een3e purposes. It in ver; s'lall s cor'.psrec. '''-;'1 s'1e 3 , ''illi,n (ove).' one hun(cre(, times as ;mch) I.e h;,lve t,ed up in.'ar.1 p'ice ftlp)rts oi pe;il1uts, potr coes 1.d ct-er 1'c.rm cor(Jc(l icier, . Un 2er t iC pr2cent ',;v'tential ';a1' e;1erc.ency, it is ('oubtul that dn, c'lange '1111 be ,ue ''n lr ''i.l rates. An(tieCi' possi'ilit7 is the co,,;ml',deel'if, o' the airIleet in , ' r e;;wrcenc)', Thls ,ppers doubtful. In Worl,l W-i II appro;'i–mtely 40 cf '/e' 0 airline pl,mefl Here t.ken ewer J,'Jt i;1Cre'1sinc; load fae or of tile re,;',.t.r,,' planes 1(' T'C th,n ut'I'set the (Lference. During 1943 tc 1945, plQ,nes ,,;-'pec'ateci. ;.;; p.ppr( xi, ,E',telJ- 90 capacit' ; '3 co;–.par8d with appro;i Cltel;' (0 , ii'l 1;41 ad 10il . ,'he '1V'-, ',Ie factors end t1e very attrC'.!'cive technical p;tterns ,appe.ilr to greatly' ,''ce,;,,; t;e potentiall- unLevc', l.)le o.ctors. Fron a tech,,';Jc.l lOilt (,f 'Ie'. ,the –)l'\'inc ss'.1er have at,-';cactive .raph p;ttrns . (1) In t.!e Cl VL en(,-p(l.).n( pref erreL stocle c;roup, Afilerican Alrllne3 , j'3,'0 pref'errec' sellinL at ;-5' and convertitle lnto 4.6 shares 0' cO.r.;on, ir-.l( Unite; Alr Li.!,.50 preferred, \,, convertible into 4,2 shrres 01 1 C 'rJ ,)11 appe2r nttrac ti ve i'or incont plus appre' iation. (') In tlle ')etter c;raoe CO!!1;lOr, steel; class,f; cation Alerican Airlines , ( 1) ) C(.1( Eastern Airl''nes (1(; ) are ,1utstandc',g, 7he 19115-2!6 ;',Ihs ,'ere ;,1 1/2. and 33 -!-. Be,t lssues are in strong L,ancIcl position ,',nel ilave .11 ,jependeflce ,'n E',.Lr . il subsidie,. The ch,;rt potterns indicrte at ,,'.(,' t an appr( ',1 .,'ti(',1 (' tl e 1911'46 highs. . c) III tl v)re 0peul,tive ;,r('up, 'illuse ejJenaEnce on .ir , a'l cub- ;31 les is l'J)t ,',(Jr.' Llp0rtmt, I 1I0Uld inclUde li',ed Air LinelJ (13 ) and I ' Wil (,O ). TlE. 14116 lliC'lS I'ere 62 1/2 Qnd-' , S. Neitle2 0' tlJese S3ues ''Gr;;' in as scunC 'innncLl positio') aIS A'eric'..L a,ld Ecst;el'n b;t cC,clld ShOll '; re,-.ter pe','ce.l'ca 'e ppr.;latIr,n 11 a ;.)OU 8.irl..e (,mrf(' and t;reat(,, 105ses 'J C. Q. ,.- ec 111in I !o.r'cct.. . , (it) In t' ,e Rztre ,el' specllat,Lve ,-,roup I l1c,,',ld choose We. te.rn Air Line; . ,( 1' ) an' 31 ;Li,,'l Alr;'2-S ( 10) cmd ,,;,'r,thnst AirlL'lcs (12). 'rhe 1945-6 , ; ,,-,b ',!el'er.upe t,',vel-' he; 1/2 ,'r WRstern, 3'( 1/2 i'or ErcenL'f' 'l' 63 1/2 . 'r \'rtl es (,. ,.p;'eGe ..LBS'.leS are pel'1.1,,tive b ' t Llat.. ( ',.1 Lc1e Q,ppreci2. cJ lon if' PrJElS . i I i L.l . C) All t,le abrve issues f.re listec on t 11e N.Y.S.E. I', the unlis'ced tel' Delta Airlir.o,,, '/'. is cLlts-candln,. TL 194,-46 high .. as 69 1/2, ';',e Ji;;pany i.s ,,ne 01 ,e tetter resional 0ar iers, S..nce 19 1!1,coLp'.ny has ('urneL .me in ever' ear \'lith 8F!eptlon 01 1,)7 a,1d has p,',ld dividends AIn' lIT\tttt.lse jind\O; lnitf,s' i som;cJr '0…. l..fipon in'ormafon eJle\l'fld e .r CI til ane; ar Of ,ollcitatlon ell of the securities mentioned herein. tel/able but not necessarily compl.fe, of The Is onlofoffre.ngqolltllolnlt9bnumtyeaetdoerr l.laelJ..IchLcWulr,bft,l&eoerr/h.f.i.MFlp,rAonmbdyi1is'f.Iin.&lorl-ttl1Iti'n.;4lletnM'td teDWdralosftofoInnr,efodHrOmoJfaeftmiolannndeo&pnelyGn.doMoItdIwIsi)nnbqaumslea.yd ….. … …….. . – – .. -.. '. ;, . .- – — –

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 11, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 11, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - August 11, 1950
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N! — '.' ., 'Volston.Hoffmon &. Goodwin. ;' SAN FRANCISCO. CALIF. NEW YORK. N. Y. PHILADELPHIA. PA. LOS ANGELES. CALIF. 8AKERSfiELD BEVERLY HILLS EAST ORANGE. N. J. HARTfORD, CONN. LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA fRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD HARRISBURG, PA PASADENA P1TISBURGH, PA PORTLAND, ORE SANTA ANA SEATTlE, WASH . STOCKTON VALLEJO TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5. N. Y. Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORFASTORIA PL… 96860 6- ..3 The industrials and rails last week, at 217.53 and ,reached ,'new high territory since the Korean decline. The advance has been rapid and ''Would expect at least a consolidating phase. The industrial average has re- traced two-thirds of the decline from the June highs and appears overbought for the short term. For the past six weeks, the most popular pastime in Wall Street has been the compilation of lists showing how the earnings of various companies might be affected by the imposition of an excess profits tax. Con-' Sidering the fact that the provisions of such a tax are not known, and most ,likely will not be known for several months, any conclusions to be drawn 'from such compilations could be subject to considerable amount of error. … Most observers have used the E.P.T. provisions of World War II as , the basis for their conclusions. This results in rather unfavorable potential, earnings for the growth issues such as chemicals, television, utilities,etc., 'and some rather favorable earnin6s potentials for quite a few companies whose management and outlook could best be described as mediocre under normal con-, tiitions. Basing a possible 1951 E.P.T. entirely on the 1942-1945 E.P.T. ' might result in some rather bad mistakes such as occurred in 1942 when the .1917 -1919 experience was used as a criterion. For example, the soft goods ..' issues were heavily sold after Pearl Harbor on the theory that their tax and economic picture was unfavorable. Montgomery Ward dropped from a 57 ;..high in 1940 to 23t in 1942. A year later it was selling at 50 . .; The purpose of an excess profits tax is one on which everyone .agrees – namely, to take the profits out of war. However, in applying this principal, it is impossible to be entirely fair. It is very difficult to ',differentiate between increased earnings that are due to war and increased ,' earnings that are the result of normal growth and efficient management. , It is doubtful that E.P.T. of World War II will be used in its , ntirety. I believe that the government realizes that there were several L inequities in the Act. Some allowance was made for growth, but this prin',ciple may be further enlarged in a new law. Also, the profit on direct war work may be sharply reduced by new forms of contract that will apply to sub- contractors as well as original contractors. It is even possible that we might have higher direct taxes rather than an excess profits tax. . It is too soon to come to definite conclusions, but the technical , supply and demand formations of individual issues and groups are beginning to form longer term patterns as the hectic emotional period following the .. invasion of Korea is slowly being replaced by more calm and reason. . Some of the groups that were hardest hit,such as chemicals and . utilities and televisions, are beginning to show signs of reaccumulation. , hese groups appear to have reached their lows during the heavy ; liquidation of late June and mid-July. Some further time may be needed to ., ' ..broaden out the potential base patterns, but they should be bought during ','periods of technical correction. . The utilities, for issues of their quality, have reacted sharply ',from the May high of 44.39 to the July low of 37.15. The 37 level is one of very strong long term support. While these issues are not volatile market performers, they are now available on a very attractive yield basis for the longer term investor. 'August 11, 1950 EDMUND W.,TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This heve muemIonrtaenredutmInhlon.mote to or be '.III con,trued ,n an offar or IOlldtatlon of of the securities mentioned here1n. The offers to buy or sell u forogolng matarlal hilS y securities From time been prepllred by us to as II timmaettWeralosftonIfoHromlflffmlonn & Goodwin may only. It Is bllsed IIpon Informahon behoved telleble bllt not necessarily complete, Is not guaranteed s accurate or fll'JllI, and is not Intended to foreclose Independent inqu1ry. ,..

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 18, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 18, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - August 18, 1950
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r–;;'- —— – – Wolston.Hoffmon &, Goodwin' , SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSFIELD BEVERLY HILLS EAST ORANGE, N. J. HARTFORD, CONN LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD. HARRISBURG, fA. PASADENA PlnSaURGH, fA PORTLAND, ORE SANTA ANA SEAnLE, WASH. STOCKTON' VALLEJO TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET, NEW YORK 5, N. Y Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORFASTORIA PLa.. 96160 Both averages reached new highs on Friday with the industrials at 219.88 and the rails at 63.81. Both averages are now at upside resistance levels. Would favor taking trading profits and assuming a 50 liquid posi- tion on short term and intermediate term accounts. The panicky buying and hoarding of sugar, tires, nylons, and other goods that were shortage items in World War II, has fortunately subSided. It was an excellent example ofhow temporary hysteria can run directly , counter to facts and reason. The jittery portion of the public that expected a repetition of the , 1940-1945 pattern lost sight of a very important factor. Today, our economy , ' and productive capacity is much different from that of 1940. Even in the !,.i event of all-out mobilization, the impact on our economy would be relatively ' small as compared with 1940-1945. , , In 1940 we were just emerging from a ten-year depression. Our pro- i'ductivity was low. In 1939 our gross national product, the measure of the rate at which goods and services are being produced, was about 91 billion . annually. In 1940, almost 8 million people were unemployed as against 48 ' i . million working. Our plants and equipment were old and inadequate to meet ..' , the' tremendous demands of the coming war. We had no synthetic rubber plants ,i i Ino huge aircraft plants or ships. By 1942, more than 50 of our output was ., for war. Half of our food output was for military or lend-lease purposes. ' We all know what happened in the period between Pearl Harbor and 'the surrender of Germany and Japan. It was a great tribute to American in- jdustry and production. The plants and factories were built, the planes and , ships and war supplies were produced in unbelievable amounts. We not only ; i fed and equipped our own military and civilian economy, but also supplied '1 and fed our Allies, including Soviet Russia . .. ! Today, the situation is quite different from 1940. We have just .passed through ten years of prosperity and increasing production. As of , . June 30th, our gross national production was running at the fabulous rate I' of almost 270 billions. This is above the all time high reached in the ..; I j final quarter of 1948. We are turning out goods and service at a rate three I '. times greater than 1939 and twice greater than 1941. Our plants and equip- ',ment are modern and greatly enlarged. The synthetic rubber plants and the airplane factories are built. There are huge quantities of ships and equip- ment in mothballs. The steel for these items will not be needed in the vast quantities of 1940-1945. It is estimated that one-half of 1 of our present steel production is being used for defense and, in the event of all-, . out mobilization, the percentage for war would be only 10 of present outputi.'j Of course, there will be some shortages but they will be mainly in ; impol1t commodities and possibly in some of the metals. On,.the whole, the ,tremendous shortages of 1940-1945 will not exist. Production of goods i' using materials needed for defense will be cut but not as drastically as ! '.. most people imagine. For example, according to a recent estimate, automo- i' .bile production may be 5 million cars as against 8 million at present, i i' television cet production may be 4 million as against 6 million at pre, sent and refrigerators may be cut to 4 million from 6 million. There will be shortages only in relation to the amount of money I that people have to spend. As compared with 1940-1945, consumers goods and food will be in heavy supply. This leads to the conclusion that some of the stocks in the auto- mobile, refrigeration, television, air conditioning and housing fields may have been oversold in the light of the above possibility. August 18, 1950 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON, HOFFMAN & GOODWIN This memorandum Is not to be construed as an offef or solldhltlon of offen to buy or 5811 tiny securltles, From time to time Walston, Hoffm!ln & Goodwin m!lY h!lv& an Interest In some or all of the securities mentioned herein The foregoing m!lterial hu been prep!lred by us as a matter of Information only It is bued upon Information believed renable but not necess!lrlly complete, Is not CJuerenteed !IS at';Uf!lte or fln!ll, and Is not Intended to foreclose Independent inquiry.

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 25, 1950

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 25, 1950

Tabell's Market Letter - August 25, 1950
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—————– — — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – ….Walston-Hoffman &, Goodwin SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. NEW YORK, N. Y. PHILADELPHIA, PA. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. BAKERSFielD BEVERLY HillS EAST ORANGE, N. J. HARTfORD, CONN. LONG BEACH MODESTO OAKLAND RIVERSIDE SACRAMENTO SAN DIEGO SAN JOSE EUREKA FRESNO HAGERSTOWN, MD. HARRISBURG, PA. PASADENA PITTSBURGH, PA. PORTlAND, ORE. SANTA ANA SEATTLE, WASH STOCKTON VAllEJO TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 35 WALL STREET. NEW YORK 5, N. Y. Digby 4-4141 HOTEL WALDORF.ASTORIA pu… 96860 In my letter of July 7, 1950, when the industrial average was at 208.59, I stated that The downside indications on individual issues point to the 205-195 range as the most likely area where this intermediate de- cline will bottom out. Included in this letter was a list of issues with . attractive technical patterns for long term appreciation to be purchased ; during periods of market weakness. In our next letter of July 14th, the , day after the industrial average reached its low at 195.40, I made the following comment The fact that the industrial average met support at the expected 195 level, plus the divergent action of the two averages,gives credence to the probability that the market has reached its low of the in- termediate phase. In this letter we listed a number of issues for near term trading purchases. Some of the issues in these two lists have advanced . sharply from their July 14th prices. For example, Reynolds Metals has ad- i ! vanced from 23t to a high of 32 3/8. Schenley from 34 1/8 to 41, LibbeyOwens-Ford from 59 to 76, Chicago-Milwaukee & St. Paul pfd. from 32t to 1 40 7/8, Illinois Central from 39 1/8 to 48 3/8, Missouri-Kansas-Texas,pfd. from 24 to 34, etc. I continued to maintain a constructive attitude toward the market until last week and in my last letter of August 18th said – Would favor taking trading profits and assuming a 50 liqUid position on short term and intermediate term accounts. I would continue the cautious attitude. The short term indicator gave a sell signal on Tuesday and the in- termediate term indicator is heavily overbought. I expect a retracement of one-third to two-thirds of the twenty-seven point advance from the July 13th lows. This would bring the market back into the 213-204 area. To 1. narrow it down a bit,. 212 to 208 looks like a logical buying spot. I would defer purchases until that level is reached or until the pattern indicates '1 a change. For the longer term I repeat my opinion that the averages will 'j !remain in an area bounded roughly by 230 high and 195 low — possibly a 5 leeway on either side should be given. It is entirely possIble that this ., range will hold for another year to two years. Such a market, of course, will be selective and there will be ample opportunity for capital appre- ciation if one holds the right stocks. If the averages should enter the 212-208 range, I would add to hold- ings. I am listing below a group of stocks that would appear suitable for purchase if averages reach that level BETTER GRADE .. Aluminum Company of America, Atchison,Topeka & S.F., Bethlehem Steel, Caterpillar Tractor, Columbian Carbon, Fairbanks Morse, General Elec., Ingersoll Rand, Kennecott Copper, McCrory Stores, Montgomery Ward, National Lead, Owens-Illinois-Glass, Chas. Pfizer, Stand.Oil of Calif., Stand.Oil of Indiana, Std.Oil of N.J., Union PaCifiC, Wewtern Auto Supply, Westinghouse Electric, Youngstown Sheet & Tube. MEDIUM GRADE Allied Stores, Associated Dry Goods, Bullard,Burlington Mills,Carrier, ! , .'.,; Celanese, Chain Belt, Chic.Pneumatic Tool, Chicago-Rock Island, Com- .,. .1. bustion Eng., Electric Boat, General Tire & Rubber, Hewitt Rotbins, Illinois Central, Lowenstein, Northern Pacific,Pacific Mills, Republic Steel, Schenley,A.O.Smith, So.Pacific,Sperry,Texas & Pac.,Western Pac. SPECULATIVE Amer.Airlines, Amer. & Fgn.2nd pfd.,Armco,Bohn Alum., Braniff Air., Budd, Capital Air, Chic.Great West.,Chic Ind. & Louis.A.,Chic.Mil & St.Paul pfd.,Denver & R.G., Eastern Air, Elastic Stop Nut,GoodallSaruford,Gulf,Mobile & O.,Minn & St.Louis,Minn.St.Paul& S.S.Marie, M-K-T pfd, Northwest Air,Pitts.Consol.Coal,Reynolds Metals,St.Louis- San Fran., Seaboard Airline, TWA, United Air, Western Air, Western Maryland, Western Union, Wyandotte Worsted. August 25, 1950 EDMUND W. TABELL WALSTON,HOFFMAN & GOODWIN ,'I Thb memorandum Is not to be construod as an offer or solIeltatlon of offors to buy or sell any seuritilll From time to time Walston, Hoffman & Goodwin mey heye ,an Interest In lome or !!III of the &ecurlfies mentioned herein. The foregoing material h!!ll been prepared by Ul as a matter of information only. It Is based upon Information belleyed reliable but not necessarily complete, is not guaranteed a, accutate or final, and is not Intended to foredose Independent Inquiry. .. -,,.- – ..-…… .

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