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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 05, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 05, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - April 05, 1974
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————–, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , ….l 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE – -c……;;;-.,-.- …4o;- — – '–!!'- '-…,…o-AprH . . 5r.–1-974 -…………- -..'i.–.-.;; I Maybe it is only the euphoria induced by a three-week vacation featuring large doses of sun, powder snow and the beauty of Idaho's Sawtooth Mountains. In any case, we think we see some slight improvement in the stock market picture. It is not so much that we are at the moment wildly bullish, but that we are more ready to become bullish — not so much that we think technical work totally p,ecludes a move through the December lows on some averages ,but that we can see some convincing reason for buying into such a decline. Let us try to document this in a bit more detail. The latter part of March featured a rather sharp short-term decline in which the Dow declined from a high of 899.16, on a cloSing basis, to a low on March 29 of 846.68. The downside objective of the top formed in early March had been approx- imately 840, and apparent demand was met in this area as our short-tem oscillator reached an over- sold condition and mild price improvement was seen in the latter stages of last week. It is generally an encouraging sign when minor declines halt at objectives or support levels, and this apparently has been the case with the present one. We now apparently have the opportunity to broaden further the base in the rough 800-900 area which was begun in the latter part of 1973. — As we said above, the question of whether Spring (and this would be a normal seasonal pattern) will see a new low remains moot. The answer, as has been the case with a number of stock market dilemmas over the past couple of years, will be provided by the action of the now-Iargelydiscredfte'drrj'stner g-rowtn'sl6cKs-TI1-ese Issues nave generollysofa-A3rl!a-sr,–been-able-to'– –,- – hold above their recent lows. Were these lows to be penetrated — and it should be noted that short-term patterns tend to suggest the likelihood of such a penetration — another downside move of considerable proportions in these issues could ensue. To what degree the rest of the market would be resistant to such a move is, of course, problematical but in any case, we would expect the bulk of the list to outperform the fading glamours In such an eventuality. The real reason for our feeling that some improvement in the technical picture has taken place lies in the way individual stock patterns seem to be developing. With a few notable exceptions few issues appear to have moved into major uptrends. What has happened, rather, is that in many stocks — perhaps in the bulk of them — downside movement has been replaced by lateral movement. In a significant number of cases downtrend channels going back two or more years have been penetrated,and it appears apparent that a great many issues sometime between last fall and today became thoroughly sold out and reached what are apparently demand levels. Such action does not in any way suggest immediate upmove, but it is nonetheless a precursor to it. It has been suggested in some quarters that the poor breadth action of recent weeks (through Tuesday, five of the last six days when the Dow advanced had more declining stocks than advan- cing ones) is a sign of underlying weakness. This view, in our opinion, uses a valid indicator for an invalid purpose. Poor breadth after a long market advance is interpreted quite correctly as a sign market odfecwlainneing upsIde,momentum andwe-are, at the and,a,clue to moment, not tahnati'mfapreonfdfintghm-arlketofpeaakY.earF-oilolnogwbienagrmaa-mrkaejot,r ,–,.-I- inferior breadth action is a relatively routine phenomenon. Shattered confidence after a market drop tends to be rebuilt slowly and normally flows first into the blue-chIp Issues in the Dow- Jones Industrial Average thus causing the Dow to outperform the general market, often well on into an advance. As we suggested, whether the market lows have yet been seen is problematical, but we would find ourselves uncomfortable in the camp of the ever-more-vocal superbears. Dow-Jones IndustrIals (1200 p. m.) 848.48 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 93.26 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index '4/4/74) 598.01 AWT/jb No statement or epresslon of opinion or any OTher matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, on offer or the solicitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell onr, security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the converlenCE of the subKTlber While we believe the sources of our information to be rellob e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ocllon to be token by the subs.crlber should be based on hiS own Investlgollon ond Informatron Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as 0 corporatron, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poslflofl5 or trades In respect to ony securities menlloned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such POSITion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thu or ony other ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any stoTements mode III thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 11, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 11, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - April 11, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , -..J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE , ..,,-. .. Aprll11, 1974 It has been, in a worn, a market-of-iilmcisl-tntrealbl-e tlllllness.TJ1eWeek-began-as'the'prevlous-one had – left off with a sharp decline in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, accompanied by more than a thousand declining issues One would have thought, perhaps, that the stage was being set for yet another precipitous downward move such as the declines of mid-January and early February.'-Yet, despite continuing news of higher short-term money-market rates, the market moved higher in Tuesday's trading and co'ntinued dull for the remainder of the week. The most notable feature of the week probably was the volume or, more properly, the lack thereof. For the past fortnight, daily New York Stock Exchange volume has been running in the 10-11 million share range, a level not seen since a short period in June of 1972 and, prior to that, during the normal period of dullness following the May, 1970, lows. Yet if the NYSE figures appear miniscule, consider American Stock Exchange figures. Volume West of Trinity Churchyard has been running consistently under the two-million share level, a rate about half of the still-depressed trading level of the end of 1973. Quite obviously, the torpor of last week has done little to resolve any of the questions which beset the current stock market. We would like, therefore, to devote our space this week to expanding a bit on some of the thoughts we expressed seven days ago. The general tenor of last week's letter was that (1) we thought there was some degree of likelihood that the market might move lower, and (2) that we thought any such weakness should be used as a buying opportunity. We were, with this pronouncement, doing two separate things, two acts that are often confused in in- vestment thinking. We were — in ltem I above — making a forecast and — in item 2 — suggesting an investment strategy. As we suggested above, it is, we think, lmportant to keep the two processes separate. Quite obVIously, in an uncertain world, forecasts are necessary, and some expectation as to the probability of future price action Is quite certainly a necessary component of any investment plan. Fore- –……o..ca-sting.,howevJI',a;;thoseoLus–'-.Voho have been in the business of sticking our necks out for some period of time are well aware, continues tobe a hazardous -a-;;-d-uncertain art, and; with'an enlbarra-ssirrgdegree 6FI- regularity, forecasts made with all due diligence based on the best avallable data often tum out to be just plain wrong. Strategy, therefore, involves a great deal more than forecasting. It involves the formulation of an investment plan which must allow for what will happen if the forecast on which the plan is based turns out to be totally incorrect. The forecast in last week's letter suggested a market which might move through the previous lows but not to a great degree. This, therefore implied a strategy which involves the maintenance of reserves for the time being but the commitment of those reserves on any relahvely minor down move in the market — to, let us say, the 750 level in terms of the Dow. If the strategy is followed and the forecast turns out to be correct, there is obviously very little problem; the investor who became fully Invested at the 750-800 range will wlnd up with some very attractive purchases. Strategy, however, must focus on the way in which the forecast could go wrong and there are, obViously, two ways in which this could take place. The first, of course, is a market decline greater than the one we now envision, the sort of thing being suggested by the vocal super-hears we mentioned in last week's letter. Were this eventuality to ensue, the investor would find himself 100 committed at the 750 level while the market continued to plummet. Yet, even in this case, it seems to us, the risk would be temporary in nature. The levels at which we are suggesting commitment of reserves would be ones offering incredibly sound fundamental value. It would appear to be totally unwarranted pessimism to suggest that stocks might sell for any great length of time below these levels a 5 anything other than a temporary market aberration. It is the other direction in which the forecast could turn out to be incorrect that. quite frankly. worries us a blt more, for a great many more lnvestment problems would be posed, we would think, were the mar- ket to refuse to move toward or through the December lows and then begin to exhibit some strength. The strategy wehave suggested would then leave the investor maintaining fairly large res'Les Vfhip!t he hC!d refused to commit at lower prices, with the possibility of a major advance staring him In the face. Nor would he be alone in th.s particular dilemma. The current high levels of institutional cash position suggests that the number of poor Grenvilles could be embarrassingly large. In strategic terms, we are willing to put up with the first risk mentioned above and we know of no real answer for the second, except the continuing scrutiny of individual technical patterns and the pattern of the general market. We must reiterate that we see no reason at this point to alter our forecast of some- what lower prices as a working hypothesis for putting together an investment plan. We would certainly, however, be willing to alter it were any evidence of improvement in upside momentum to develop. Dow-Jones Industrials 844.81 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo 92.12 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (4/10/74) 584.74 AWT/Jb No statement or expressllm of opinion or any olher matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlredly or Indlredly, an offer or the ollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony 5ecuflly referred to or menhoned The matter IS presented merely for the conVerlencc of the subSCriber While oNe believe the !.Curces of our Informalion 10 be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ochon 10 be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own investigation ond informatIon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporat,on, and lIS officers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, pOSitIOns or trades In resF)ect to any seCUrttles mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, ond such position moy be different fro'T1 ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jenney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which 's registered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, mQy give advl(e to Its 'nvestment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In th.s or In any other Issue Further onformotlon on ony security mentioned hereon 15 ovailoble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 19, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 19, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - April 19, 1974
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER L – – , 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE .. April 19, 1974 We have examined, in our past two letters, the merits of an attitude toward stock prices more , -posinvehall 'we-have-b'een 'able'to'assurrre-for sometime';-specificaHy;–suggesting,thepossibil-, – ity that the lows of last December may ultimately prove to be an important cyclical turning point. We are, as we have suggested for the past two weeks, still not totally convinced of the conclusiveness of this contention and are not yet willing to base investment policy thereon. Yet a number of arguments in its favor do begin to emerge. Interestingly, a number of these arguments center around the calendar, which, for the first time in many months, is beginning to work in the market's favor. It has never been our thought that seasonal patterns in the stock market should be relied on m toto. Indeed, ironically enough, if reliance on these patterns proves to be correct in the current instance, such reliance will be proved to have been wrong last December. At that time, It was possible to argue that the month's low was not a major bottom, simply because no major low m many years of market history had occurred between December and April. Now, however, seasonal patterns are suggesting that 1973 may be the first instance of just that phenomenon occurring. To begin with, let us consider the historical length of past bear markets. The longest downswing in the postwar experience, that of 1968-70, lasted 18 months. Most of the others have been considerably shorter. If we are still in the bear market which began m January, 1973, it is now 16 months old. The record tends to suggest that time is running out. , – Tn'e' pnenomenon oftfieyei,fterl(rrally,mdth'eDecemberlow-is 'one-;wh,ich'we haveoof-ten ,(lis-,cussed in this space. In 17 of the 48 market years since 1926, the low of the previous December has never been broken. In 22 of the 31 years that the low was, in fact, penetrated, penetration took place in January or February. With only four exceptions such a penetration, if it was going to occur, took place prior to April 26 and two of those exceptions turned out to be temporary aberrations in what was basically an upward market year. The fact that the December lows have, in fact, held as late as the date of the current writing in 1974, must be viewed in a positive sense. The final mteresting bit of calendar evidence is provided by the decennial pattern. We have, ourselves, always been a bit suspicious of this pattern since we can find no particular rationale for it. It IS, nonetheless, on the face of it, persuasive. The 70 market years from 190'0 through 1969, have included 43 advancing and 27 declining ones, with the average advance being 6.5. Yet for some reason, years ending in the digits 4 and 5 have tended to depart dramatically from this norm. Six of the seven years ending in 4, from 1904 through 1964, were advancing ones and five of them produced advances greater than the overall average. The average performance for such years is a 16.71 gain. The pattern for years ending in 5 IS even stronger. All seven of these years produced advances of an amount greater than the 70-year average and the mean performance for the seven years is a 34.42 advance. Based on this theory, at least, we are entering mto what must be conSidered an auspicious portion of the decade. Now,' as we said above, we think total reliance on patterns of this sort IS probably super ficial, and we would want to see the bullish argument confirmed by more persuasive technical evidence as the market pattern develops. We think, however, the factors cited above will provide an interesting background to such evidence should It emerge. i Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 860.92 S&P Compo (l200p.m.) 93.82 Cumulative Index (4/18/74) 593.76 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL No statement or eprCS510n of opInion or any other mOiler herein contolned IS, or 1510 be deemed 10 be, directly or tndlrectly, on offer or the sollc,totlon of on oHm to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the conllel'lence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mforma tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy ihereof nor of ihe siatements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Information Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, 0 a corporatIOn, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may loter toke, pOSlhons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In Ih,s or any future ,ssue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e…pressed In thl or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, whl;h IS registered with the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and oth(!1 customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS 01 In any other ISsue Further Informollon on any seo;urlty mentioned herem IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 26, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 26, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - April 26, 1974
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1- TABELL-S MARKET LETTER — 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE .-.' – ,,–,',- 'd '' . Apr,il'26,1974,.–w- – All right. We know that we have used the last three issues of this market letter examining the reasons for being bullish about stock price prospects, and we are likewise painfully aware that, starting on the day when we published the last of these effusions, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average proceeded to drop some 42 points before a rally this morning. After 20 years we have be- come thick-skinned enough to be inured to this sort of thing. Besides we can say, in all honesty, that we were not, in the series in question, suggesting the deployment of buying reserves. We were merely examining the conditions under which such reserves might be deployed. So much for excuses. Where do we stand at the moment In terms of the Dow, we have now moved out on the downside of a rather classic short-term head-and-shoulders top formation which suggests various objectives in the range of 800-780. The suggestion is, of course, a test of the December 5 low of 788.31. We have repeatedly stressed, as our readers are aware, the histor- ical significance of this low. We noted last week that on only four occasions since 1926 has it been violated to later than April 26 of the following year. Whether 1974 will prove to be the fifth exception is a rather interesting question. The problem is that, in restricting our discussions to the Dow, we are talking about only a rather small segment of the market. Most indices of first-tier growth stocks continued to plunge to new bottoms well after the DJIA low was made in December, and technical patterns clearly suggest that most of these issues have a fair amount of further room on the downside. Indeed, at least in part due to the weight given growth issues in its construction, the S & P SOO-Stock Gompositewa,a oi..Yg.tElrkY, already at a new 1973-74 low. For this index, ,the bearmart continues. Our own Cumulative Index was, as 'of yesterday 'a mere tWo'points ab6vetfi'e -low….it' – … chalked up on December 24. Part of the reason for the poor performance of the S & P 500 and also of the Cumulative Index can also be ascribed to the fact that a new villain has entered upon the stage, that villain being the utilities. Prior to last week's passed dividend by Consolidated Edison, we thought the market was responding somewhat better to unexpected bad news than it previously had been. The first omitted dividend since 1885 by a large and respected company was evidently, however, a bit more than it was prepared to take. The Dow-Jones Utility Average gapped on the downSide (something we don't ever remember happening, although it may have occurred sometime in the dim, dark past) and plunged from a level of 86.69 last Friday to a close of 78.80 yesterday, a decline of 9 in five days in an index of supposedly non-volatile investment grade issues. It is an interesting, albeit somewhat disturbing fact, that the Dow Utility Average is,at today's prices, at a lower level than at any time since early 1958. As we said above, this has had something to do with the per- formance of the S & P 500 and of the Cumulative Index. The 500 contains 60 utility issues, weighted by capitalization. There are well over 100 utility issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange which are included, on an unweighted basis, in the Cumulative Index. Thus, the fact that these indices are at or flirting with new lows should be hardly surprising. Thus, while admittmg that the short-term prospect for lower prices is a real one, we confess we are inclined to view such a decline with equanimity. While the question of whether the Dow will penetrate the December bottom is an interesting one from an academic point of view, we do not'tlililklt 15 o(overriding-importa-nce–The answer tothe question will,in our view,be determined by whether a severe enough decline takes place in the qrowth issues (and perhaps now in the utilities) to drag the rest of the market down along with it. The whole pOint of our discussions in the last three letters was that we were becoming worried about an investment strategy which con- tinued to stress the maintenance of buying reserves in a market which might not give us the opportunity to commit those reserves at lower prices. On any weakness around or to new lows by the Dow, we think that the commitment of those reserves would be indicated and would ultimately prove to be profitable. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 825.95 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 89.55 DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL Cumulative Index (4/25/74) 554.83 AWT/jb No stotement Qf expreSSion of OpinIon or ony other motter herein contaIned '5, or 1 to be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or 'ndlrectly. on offer or the OIICIIOl1on of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The mOiler IS presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber 'WhIle we believe the sources of our InfOrmolion TO be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee The accuracy thereof nor of the lIatements mude herem Any ocllon To be token by The SubSCriber should be based on hiS own InveSTigaTion and information Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporaTion, and ITs officers or employees, may now have, or may laTer toke, posITIOns or trades In respect to any secUrities mentIOned 10 thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from ony Views now or hereafTer erpressed In thIS or any other Inue Janney Montgomery SCaN, Inc, which IS regisTered WITh the SEC as on investmenT adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and olher customers Independently of any statements mode In thIS or In any other luue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 03, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 03, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - May 03, 1974
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.———- – ——- I TABELL'S I MARKET LETTER I I 1 —-'1 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 3, 1974 After collapsIng a week ago for a very good reason, the Consolidated Edison dividend cut, the market proceeded, on Wednesday and early Thursday, to turn around and retrace a good deal of the ground lost for no apparent reason whatsoever. Indeed, it did so in response to more of the same sort of news that pundlls have been assuring us for the past few months is responsible for the market's malaise. As of this writing, the 10 3/4 prime rate has become more widespread, and an 11 rate already exists in certain quarters. All this, we are assured, is bearish for stock prices although it is seldom made clear why this should be so. Theoretically, one might suppose a high prime rate would produce a high call-loan rate, which would discourage borrowing to finance stock purchases. Yet in fact, stock exchange margin debt has recently reversed its sharp slide of 1973 and begun to edge up somewhat. Most of the recent comment on short-term interest rates has, in our view, been centered around the wrong area, i.e. the level of those rates, and it is indeed true that that level is at its highest point in over fifty years, a fact which, no doubt, lends the rate some news value. A more useful figure for analytical purposes, however, is not the level of short term rates—which, although at a record, is not all that different from where it was in the Spring of 1970 or the Fall of 1973—but its relationship to longer-term money rates, in other words, the shape of the yield curve. The recent situation has been ,- fundame ntatl y d ifferent-from'tha t'of ;-sayc;-luly19-70'-'\ t-thatpoi nt,short- te rmorates7were-r4 si ngdra – –,-1 matically, but only for a short period and by a modest amount did they ever rise above the rate offered by high-grade corporate bonds. By contrast, in the Fall of 1973 when prime commerCial-paper yields, a widely used gauge of short rates,averaged 10.23, seasoned AAA long bonds afforded only a 7.88 return. Roughly the same sort of relationship prevails today. Now there has been some recent disagreement as to Just where the prime rate, and the multitudinous other short-term rates which are tied to it, will ultimately wind up. The president of a large Philadelphia ba nk recently opined that a 12 prime was in the offing, while a major New York City bank suggested that 6 by sometime this summer was a possibility. At the moment, Philadelphia, although tied with New York in ice hockey. appears to be leading it in interest rate prediction. Regardless, however, of the differing opinions of human forecasters, the collective forecast of the marketplace is quite clear. The phenomenon we have at the moment is known as an inverted yield curve, and it has never, in the past, persisted for very long. Normally, the resolution is a return of short-term rates to their normal position below the yield of high grade bonds. In its willingness to lend money over the longer term at rates decidedly inferior to those readily available from short instruments, the market is quite clearly saying that it does not expect short rates in the double-digit range to be a permanent feature of the finanCIal scene. –IInto We the think, lA any case, that, whatever happens present pricestrucfureforcommoostocks– to As the we prime rate, 'suggested this factor has now lA'last week's'letter, beuennlllbui-lt–' Consolidated EdIson came along, the market had been responding well to bad news. Having absorbed Consolidated Edison, it has evidently reverted, for the time being at least, to that pattern of response. Ignoring bad news has long been one of the signals that a market decline is at or past a terminal phase. It will be interesting to see if such turns out to be the case in the present Instance. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 91.62 Cumulative Index (5/2/74) 564.00 AWTed 847.23 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or e)(preSSlon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe sollCltoTlon of an offer to buy or sell any seCUrity referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for Ihe convel'ence of the subSCriber. While -lie believe the sources of our mformo han to be rellable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation ond mformallon Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc. 0 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In Ihls or any future ISUe, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter el'pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investment advlwry and othel customers Independently of any statements made rn thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 10, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 10, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - May 10, 1974
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,I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE . May 10, 1974 – .-Thre -a-re a–number o-fr sons1or-looti;g–f;rd to–Maychye a'mong'tliem '-thefwering of the — dogwoods in Princeton, New Jersey. To us numbers freaks, however, May's arrival takes on an additional significance. For It brings the issue of Fortune magazine containing ItS statistICal tabulation on the 500 largest U. S. industrial corporations. There is almost no limit to the permutations and combinations of lIgures one can derive from a perusal of this data. One of our own favorite mampulations, with the phenom- enon of earnings growth havmg attamed an almost rellgIOus SIgnifIcance m the financial community, is to cull out the ten companies with the largest 10-year growth In earnings per share. The list almost invari- ably is composed mostly of surprises rather than the familiar billion-dollar growth companies, and this year is no exception. Herewith, then, the ten companies WIth the largest 1963-73 per share earnings growth as computed by Fortune. Return to Rank Return to Rank Investors 1973 in 500 Investors 1963-73 In 500 ITE Imperial -48.42 403 14.86 61 Fleetwood Enterpris es -83.65 483 White Consolidated -51. 00 415 19.14 33 Loews Corp. -53.60 423 24.90 14 Champion Home Builders -76.64 480 New York TImes -26.44 248 Wheelabrator-Frye Clark Oil Tesoro Petroleum Sk-y-l-i-ne-H-omes -39.18 335 -27.01 314 24.36 49 -6-.5.-28-.—461- 5.38 223 27.20 9 22.22 20 20-52–. -..-26 – – As we suggested above, however, the names are not exactly those that the average investor mIght guess were he to attempt to pick the compames with the greatest earmngs growth for the past decade. It must be noted, also, in all fairness, that Fortune's method of computing earmngs growth may be over-simplistic, in that a straIght 1963-73 comparison can be distorted if the 1963 base year happened to be a particularly poor one for the company involved. which IS I in fact, true in some cases above. The most fascinating statistic, however, IS the way the market treated these ten companies m 1973. The second column of the table above shows the return to mvestors for 1973 as computed by Fortune, m- eluding capItal gain or loss, plus dividend mcome, together with its rank in the 500 on this baSIS. Nme of the ten common stocks show a loss, and In each case that loss IS substantial. A 100,000 portfolio equally mvested in the ten compames at the end of 1972 would, at the end of 1973, have shrunk to 55,314 . Over the longer term, however, the lIgures would tend to suggest that the market does recognize true growth. For the seven companies where data was available, six, In fact, showed above average percentage returns over the 10-year period. The average annual percentage return and its rank m the 500 for this perIod is shown in the rIght hand two columns. 10,000 mvested m each of the companies at the end of 1963 would have grown by 1973 to 457,000. We thmk the table demonstrates rather vividly what, to us, are some of the least appealing tendencies in Wall Street's valuation of stocks, the tendency to pay a great deal of attentIOn to short-term, even quarter-to-quarter, earnings changes and the tendency to place premIum multiples on at least some com- panies with above-average past earnings growth. Thus I the presence of three mobile-home companies on the list and the fact that these three represent the three worst performers IS not surprIsing. The mobIle home industy In gen-eralhas shown one of the more astounding grow-th rates in the U. S. economy-over —– the past decade. The market duly noted its appreciation of this fact in 1972 when it valued Skylme at 47 times earnings, Fleetwood at 41 times and Champion at 55 lImes. In 1973, earnmgs growth for all three companies flattened out, and it was VIvidly demonstrated that what the market gives It can take away, the taking away being documented In the stocks' performance. A more rational approach to valuation rmght have prevented the stocks from attainmg the euphOrIC levels they reached In the lIrst place, and lessened the shock when the problems within the mdustry, (which,for all we know,may be temporary) became apparent. Dow-Jones Industrials (200 p.m.) 862.33 S&PComp. (200p.m.) 92.73 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL Cumulative Index (5/9/74) 557.65 AWT/jb Note Comments on indIVIdual stocks are based solely on techmcal factors, and further informatIon on all issues IS available on request. No statement 10 buy or sell or expression of opInion or any other any security referred to or mentioned motler herein lhe motter IS contained presented '5, or IS to be metely for the cdoenevmee'JdI1n0CEboef, directly or mdlleclly, the subsCtlber While on we offer or the soliCitation of believe the sources of our on offer Informa- 110n to be reliable, we In no way represent or guatantee the occl,Irocy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any Oellon to be tolen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own pos,tlons or trades Inveshgollon and Informallon Janney Montgomery In respect to ony seCUrities mentioned 10 thiS or any Scott, future Inc, as a Issue, and csourcphorpaOtilotnl,onanmdoyItsbeoffdicifefersreonrt employees, moy from any views now now have, or may later lake, or hereafter elCpressed In thIS or any other Iue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor, may g,ve adVice to lIs IIwestmenl adVisory ond olhel customers mdependently of ony slo/ements made 10 Ih,s or 10 any olher ,Sl,Ie Further Informollon on any secutlty menlloned herein 1 aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 24, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 24, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - May 24, 1974
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TABELL'S I, MARKET I LETTER I JI 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGe May 24, 1974 – Readers of this letter over the past couple of months will be aware that we had been trying to worLourselves into ,a .more optimisticframe .ofmindabout- the, stock .mal'ket.thanAthad ,beeF1 pos s -….. Ible to assume for some time. The basic reasoning behind this was that, having for some time ad- vocated the maintenance of some amount of cash reserves, we were becoming worried about whether the weakness which would allow those reserves to be committed would ultimately occur. Many of the factors we cited as prospects for possible optimism were so-called background factors, stemming from the fact that all available evidence suggested that there were large amounts of potential equity money sitting on the sidelines and that any favorable development, the most obvious one being a drop in short-term interest rates, could return this money to the stock market with explosive force. The prices which existed when the market held relatively firm throughout April and early May, however, were evidently not attractive enough to entice this sideline money. Starting two weeks ago, a sharp plunge to a new lower price level took place,with the Dow, which dropped for seven straight trading days through Wednesday of this week, having gotten within an ace of Its December low of 788.31. A sharp rally on Friday morning improved the picture somewhat and, once more, for the time being at least, the previous low has held. The Dow, however, is the only average still remaining tenuously above its prior bottom, almost every other major index hav- lng, on the recent decline, moved into new low territory. Along with this drop, a number of disappointing technical developments can be cited. For a while, at least, the market was showing a fairly healthy ability to resist bad news. The prime rate, ostensibly the market's major worry, was actually above where it had been last December when the Dow last bottomed, and yet stocks had been holding considerably above that low. This I –re5lstante to'l5ad news -eviderrtlyfetmIMtedwffntheConEaTIOn debacle; fo'rlnce 't!ITin-;-t/je' — market has resumed its familiar bear-market tendency to seize upon even modestly bad news Items as an excuse for havoc. The well-advertised problems of Franklin National Bank have created a run, not on banks, but on the stocks of practically every major financial institution, not only banks, but insurance and loan companies. The phenomenon of rotational collapse, where, one after the other, new stocks get clobbered by unfavorable comments or earnings news, has returned with a vehemence equal to that of the spring of 1973, as holders of such issues as Combustion Engineer- Ing and Research-Cottrell must now be painfully aware. Perhaps more disturbing is the advent of potential price vulnerability in issues which had, throughout 1973, been leaders on the upside. Notable examples of this sort of thing are the oil and electrical equipment industries. Weakness has also manifested itself in such industries as copper and aluminum, although here we suspect It is going to turn out to be relatively minor in nature without destroying the favorable long-term patterns which most of these issues still possess. It will, nonetheless, as is almost the case with short-term downtrends, be disquieting while it is taking place. Likewise disappointing has been the failure of many technical indicators which had reached moderately bullish positions in March and April to move into maximum bullish territory. Typical of this class of indicators is the short-interest ratio, which had reached a moderately bullish 1.82 in April (1.95 or better las m the pastbeen a signal for major bottoms), but declined in May to 1.41, a positive but not wildly optimistic reading. Obviously ,then, there are disturbing factors inthe present day.picture. Certainly.ifthe ban- ing system is about to collapse, for example, the equity market is not the place to be while the collapse is taking place. As we have pointed out in the past, however, profitable buying oppor- tunities have historically occurred when the market 'was discounting developments which ultimate- ly failed to take place. In most times and in most places, it has been profitable to bet against the apocalypse. On this theory, we would be willing to commit reserves if the decline were to move through the December lows on the Dow and continue on Into the 700's. Were this to happen, it would, of course, create a typical confusing and disquieting market atmosphere. We believe, however, that purchases made in such an atmosphere would ultimately turn out to be well-bought indeed. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 811.40 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 87.91 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/23/74) AWT/jb No statement or expre!on of op,nion or any other motter herein contOlned Is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly Of ind,rectly, on offer or the sol,cltot,on of on offer 10 buy han to or sell cny security be reliable, we In referred no way 1re0porersmenetntoior ngeudaraTnhteemothileerac1cuprraecsyenttheedremoferneolyr for the convel'lenc of the subscrIber While oNe believe the sources of our tnformaof the statements mode heretn Any action to be ta!.;en by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informollon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, pOSitions or trodes In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thl5 or any future Issue, and such POSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter epressedhi thiS or any other Issve Janney Montgomery SCOll, Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advISory and aT el customers Independently of any statemenTS mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS avoiloble 01'1 request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 31, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 31, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - May 31, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMeRICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE May 31, 1974 The market this week on disappointing volume continued to move lower sparked by Wednesday's 18.93 declineclosing near its-December low-cW7883f Pe'netratioh of tnfs–r51ffappears tobe-a fore' gone conclusion. However, the significance of such a penetration can be somewhat discounted as without exception all major stock market averages have already, in fact, broken their respective December lows. Utilizing pOint and figure analysis, a downside count, toward the area of the 1970 lows, of 730 is indicated. The time has come, we suppose, to ask ourselves just what it is that is worrying the stock market. Quite obviously, there must be some ostensible reasons for the absolutely abysmal technical perform- ance which the market turned in throughout most of 1973 and now in late May has begun to repeat. Let us try to tick off some of the supposed reasons. High Interest Rates. Certainly it is plausible that the record levels of short-term interest rates should have a deleteriOUS effect on stock prices. The effect, it can be argued, comes from a number of directions. First of all, the availability of unbelievably generous returns from practically riskless investments makes these investments attractive alternatives to stock, especially when stocks of late have done little else than go down. High borrowing costs obviously deter those few potential margin buyers left on the scene from utilizing their reserve buying power and lastly, it can be argued that, therefore, high borrowing costs pia ce a squeeze on profit margins and thus caus e lower earnings and lower stock prices in a great many industries, this argument being most persuasive in explaining the recent sharp drop in utility stocks. Illiguidity. This is also a real threat on a number of levels. The liquidity of the banking system is in general at new record lows, and loan demand, while having moved irregularly lower, remain at —. extremely. high .Iev.els . Obylpllsly.,..JIlost..ma.j orbankswouldbeunable Jo..meeLtneir.commitments,with–. ' out the huge amounts of money attracted by cetificates f d.;'poSit 'which they h';e bee; selling at – record interest rates. Corporations, meanwhile, with the equity market effectively shut off to them by the present depressed level of prices have had to turn more and more to high interest rate short-term financing. The potential for collapse in such a structure is obvious. The Middle East. The presence of armed conflict has a general tendency to make the stock market nervous, and it is certainly doubtful that the various Arab-Israeli outbreaks exercised a positive effect on the market,. It is notable, however, that the market failed to rally in Wednesday's trading even after President Nixon's announcement of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement. Watergate. There are a number of analysts who argue that the uncertainties over the President's impeachment or resignation have caused a market climate which will make it impossible for stocks to move ahead until the issue is finally, one way or the other, resolved. The phenomenon of the Johnson confidence boom following President Kennedy's assassination in 1963 is cited by these analysts with the suggestion that the installation of President Ford by some means or another this summer might pro- duce similar results. The Securities Industry. The recent wave of brokerage house mergers and the reports of declining profitability have again raised doubts about the long-term future of the securities industry, The impli- cations here are important also. While the existence of particular firms may not be important, a viable industry is a necessity if the American economy is going to be able to maintain its ability to raise capital. Serious doubts are being raised at the moment as to whether such viability, in fact, exists. Now, as technicians, we think the significant fact about all of the above is that none of it will be – any news whatsoever to-anyone who has been'even vaguelY following the finanCial' press. All of the – . – above factors, it seems to us, consist not so much of explanations of why the market ought to head lower, but why it is where it is at the moment. Furthermore, again with out particular technical bias, we doubt that the amelioration of anyone of the above tactors is suddenly going to turn the market. We suspect, in other words, that, over the short-term, purely on technical factors, the market is headed into lower ground. At some point, a bottom will be produced, and it will not be because of any of the factors cited above. It will be simply because the last investor who can be panicked into dump- ing stock at lower prices has finally done so, and it will be precisely at that pOint, as has been the case throughout recorded history, that a turn in the tide will take place. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 802.33 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL S & P. Camp. (1200 p.m.) 87.32 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/30/74) 512.20 AWT/jb No statement or eKpreS510n of opinion or any olher maHer herein contolned IS, or 15 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell ony secunty referred to or mentioned The matter .s presented merely for the convellen of the subscrober Whole we beheve the sources of our ,nformatlon to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be token by the SlIbscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation ond ,nformallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, POSItIOn or trades In reSpect to any seCUrities mentioned m thlt or ony future Issue, and such POSIT,On may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh ,s registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advl(e to ,ts mvestment adVisory and othe, (Vtomers ,ndependently of ony stotements made In thiS or In any other Inue Furlher onformatlon on any security mentioned here'n IS avollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 07, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 07, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - June 07, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEM8ER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE — -I – – – – .- –June7,19…4. — ——…….—o-. ,..- To a greater degree, perhaps, than at any time in at least the recent past, Wall Street finds itself divided between proponents of the bullish and bearish case for the equity market outlook. Both sides, of course, have ammunition. The optimist will suggest that the December low in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has now been twice decisively tested. After an intraday bottom of 783.56 was reached last December, the Dow declined in February to an intraday low of 795.68 and then promptly rallied in March to a new 1974 high. The subsequent decline reached an intraday bottom last week at 788.90, whereupon a four-day, 42-point advance bounced the mdex off that low yet a third time. What more evidence, the optimist can ask, is needed to prove that a strong level of effective demand exists around the 800 level Dow-Schmow, replies the bear. Any true index of security prices, he will suggest, has moved on to decisive new lows, well below its levels of last December. Consider the S & P 500 Stock Index. It broke its December low in February, penetrated that low again in April and moved to another new low last week. And lest it be argued that this is true because of the importance in that index of utilities which, as we all know, are faced with problems of their own, it can be pointed out that the S & P 425 Industrial Index, which includes no utilities, has done almost precisely the same thing. The pessimist can also suggest that the Dow-Jones Transportation Index and the S & P Rail Index have also moved below their December lows, although here the argument is not quite as strong, since both these indices, to date, made their bear market lows back in August, 1973, not in December, and those lows have not as yet been penetrated. Bulls and bears, likewise, can find arguments to buttress their position in a whole host of more – -esoteric teclinical indicators. A few of tlie more wU!eJ.YIOJ.lowealnaicators turnea-qUitebUlllsh-lasC-' –, December, but only a very few. Others have turned bullish quite recently, and still others remain in an ambiguous state, generally favoring the optimistiC view, but not yet having reached levels which have characterized past major bottoms. The question is whether, at this precise point in time, it is necessary to take a position at all. We can clarify this assertion, perhaps, by examining the nature of technical indicators in general. When one sets oneself to the task of creating a technical indicator which is gOing to suggest a source of action, that indicator will be subject to two risks — akin to what statisticians call alpha and beta risk. The first risk is that the indicator will suggest a course of action which later proves to be erroneous. The second risk is that it will fail to suggest a course of action which later proves to have been the correct one. Generally, there tends to be a trade-off between the two sorts of risks. It is not difficult to construct a whole series of indicators, for example, which have, in the past, successfully identified every major stock market bottom within a very short time after the fact. The trouble is that such indicators generally have a low degree of reliability and will often tum positive at points other than market bottoms. It is equally easy to construct indicators with a very low percent'' age of false signals. The trouble is that such indicators generally do not tum positive until a large percentage of the advance, both in terms of time and amplitude, has already taken place. Our approach has always been to follow both types of indicators and adjust investment posture slowly, first as the more sensitive indicators begin to tum positive, and then more aggressively as the high-reliability indicators turn. In this light, it is well to review where we are at the moment. — Even the highly sensitive'sort of technical indicator hasnot,- as of this moment, turned positive- — although it would take just a bit more market strength for this sort of device to suggest that stocks were a buy, at least on a trading basis. Were this to start to happen and, as noted above, it could do so at any time, we would be willing to advocate at least a partial commitment of reserves, and we would follow it up with more aggressive commitment if, as, and when the more reliable sort of indi- cator began to turn positive. To date, as we suggested above, no real change in the pessimistic technical picture has yet taken place. Yet the sorts of changes that could tip the scales decisively in favor of the bullish or bearish arguments is probably fairly imminent, and we Will continue to comment on these changes a s they occur. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 853.10 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 92.62 Cumulative Index (6/6/74) 535.08 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD HARVEY. TABELL No statement or epreSlon 01 opinion or any other matler herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solICitation of an oHer to bll' or sell any security referred 10 o mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convefllenCE of the subSCriber While oNe believe Ihe sources of our Informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stolements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 0 a corporollon, and Its offICers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toe, pOSitIOns or trodes 11'1 respect to ony secuhes mentioned In thiS or any future lSue, ond such position may be dlfferenl from ony views now or hereofter epressed In thiS or ony other Issue Jonney Montgomery SCali, Inc, whICh IS registered wllh the SEC o on Investment odvlsor, moy gIVe adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers ,dependently of any stOlemenlS made In thiS or In ony other Issue Further informatIon on any security mentIOned herein IS oVOllable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 14, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 14, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - June 14, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER A.MERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE June 14, 1974 -.- A-whlle-ago7'wh'en 's-mrre'-wag'1lubbed- growth' stocks ;which-w-ere stlllat'their'peakof-institution 'popu —- larity, I1Vestal Virgins. II we formulated a group of stocks of our own, which we named Sexless Spinsters. These were, by and large, basic-industry, commodity-oriented companies, which had historically been viewed by the market as cyclical in nature and which generally were selling at PIE ratios of one-third to one-half those of the growth favorites. The following table shows the approximate prices of each group, 13 virgins and 11 spinsters at five pOints in recent market history, the January 1973 high, October 1973 high, December 1973 low, April-May low, and a recent price. The percentage change between pOints is also shown together with the average for each group and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Jan Oct Dec Apr-Mar High High Change Low Change Low Change Recent Change DnA Hli7.2l 99759 – 6.5 783.56 -21.4 788.80 0.6 853.25 8.2 Avon Products 132 98 -25.7 58 -40.8 40 -31.0 52 30.0 Burroughs 115 121 5.2 92 -23.9 96 4.3 110 16.6 Coca-Cola 145 145 115 -20.6 98 -14.7 118 20.4 Disney 115 82 -28.6 41 -50.0 41 49 19.5 Eastman Kodak 145 135 – 6.9 108 -22.9 100 – 3.8 116 16.0 IBM 360 280 -22.2 235 -16.0 210 -10.6 226 7.6 Int'l Flavors/Fragrances 48 47 – 2.0 34 -27.6 32 – 5.8 37 15.6 Johnson & Johnson 132 125 – 5.3 100 -20.0 105 5.0 118 12.4 McDonald's Corp 78 74 – 5.1 44 -40.5 50 13.6 62 24.0 Polaroid 130 125 – 3.8 65 -52.0 53 -18.4 42 -20.7 .P-fecter&Gamble 1.20-..1-.06dL69…….,..l6 ..0.-…85 .5105'''''''',.t23.5 Sears, Roebuck & Co. 124 100 -19.3 78 -22.0 80 2.5 89 11.2 Xerox 156 150 – 3.8 115 -23.3 106 – 7.8 124 16.9 Average 9.9 -28.8 – 5.5 14.8 Alcan Aluminium Ltd 26 40 53.8 36 -10,0 27 -25.0 29 7.4 Allied Chemica1 28 48 71.4 43 -10.4 39 – 9. 3 41 5, 1 Alcoa Bethlehem Steel Int'l Paper Kennecott Copper Monsanto Phelps Dodge U. S. Steel 40 54 30 36 42 57 26 38 55 74 44 50 34 37 35.0 20.0 35.7 46.1 34.5 13.6 8.8 44 27 43 31 43 39 30 -18.5 -25.0 -24,5 -18. 4 -41.8 -22.0 -18.9 43 29 42 31 60 35 40 – 2.2 43 7.4 31 6.8 – 2.4 48 14.2 36 16.1 39.5 68 13.3 -10.2 37 5.7 33.3 45 12.5 Westvaco 28 40 42.8 27 -32.5 27 27 Weyerhaeuser 28 41 46.4 34 -17.0 40 17.6 40 Average 37.1 -21.7 4.4 7.4 The figures, we think, are interesting. While the Dow was posting a 6.5 decline In the first nine months of 1973, the cyclical issues advanced an average of 37, versus a 9.9 decline for the growth issues. Although not invulnerable to the October-December decline, the cyclicals performed about the same as the Dow on the downside and considerably bettered the average 28.8 decline shown by the growth issues. This performance continued for the first four months of 1974 with the cyclicals showing a slight advance to the April-Mayolow., whereas the growth issues as a group continued to move lower. It is only on the recent rally that a chi.nge has become apparent 0 thts advance. the growthlssueshave posted an average 14.8 advance, exactly twice the advance shown by the cyclicals, which, for the first time, have failed to outperform the Dow. We think there are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the table, the most important of which is that the better performance of the growth stocks is a relatively new phenomenon, only six weeks old now, whereas, to date, at least, the spinsters have proved their staying power. Nine of the eleven cyclical issues, for example, are above where they were at their January, 1973 high despIte the fact that the Dow is some 200 pOints lower. Every one of the growth issues remains today below that high and in some cases the difference approaches being staggering. In short, we think it is premature to conclude that the super- ior growth stock performance which characterized 1971 and 1972 and then disappeared abruptly in 1973, is about to burst out again in its old refulgence. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 844.81 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 91. 56 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (6/13/74) 535.06 AWT/jb No statement or el(preSSlon of Opinion or ony other metter herein tontomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the solicotlon of on offer to buy or stili any seC1.Hlty referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the conve(l,en of the subSCriber While e believe Ihe sources of our Informo tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herelO Any action to be taen by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hl5 own investIgation and IOformohon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os 0 corpOlOhon, and Its officers or employees, moy now hove, or may later toke, poslllOns or trades In respect to any securities me'llioned 10 Ihls or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or herelfter expressed In thiS or any other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any olher Issue Further ,nformat,on on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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