Viewing Category: Uncategorized

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 21, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 21, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - June 21, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

1..—— ——- I TABELL'S I ,\ MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – June 21, 1974 n Last,weekscmarket,p,erf()rmance,can. best.be cbi3J9cteriEda siJ1sipi.d . .—– ……. In five successive days of decline, through Thursday, the Dow managed to retrace the bulk of the ground it had gained on the advance in late May and early June, in response to signs at that time of easing of interest rates, Volume was just as unimpressive as the performance of the mar- ket itself, remaining for the most part in the 9-10 million share range, with late Thursday after- noon trading being the only period in which any sort of flurry of activity developed. Nor was the performance of any of the other indices a great deal better than that of the Dow. The Dow-Jones Utilities, for example, spent the week moving to a new bear market low,and it is interesting to note that that index is now at the lowest level it has seen since a few months around the time of the 1957 bottom. It is, in sum, difficult to find anything to get excited about in the market performance, al- though a number of reasonably favorable background factors remain. Mutual Fund cash posi- tion, for example, was up again in May, to almost 10.6, and mutual funds actually enjoyed an excess of sales over redemptions for only the third time since early 1972. This, of course, was due to the cash inflow into the new money-market funds but, even adjusted for this inflow, the net redemption fig'.lre was moderately impressive. It is possible to find some solace, also, in the developing patterns of individual stocks, and it is the area in which improving patterns are being seen which is to us, as technicians, of in- terest. Every once in a while the market will begin to show action which flies in the face of generally-accepted conventional wisdom. In early 1968, for example, the Vletnam war was at I-I.,,i.,t-s.h-,,,eight, .,cNith .absolute!yf!Q .p'ros pect .9!.wlJ1!9rawal in2.i.ght ..-.Let throu.ghout,1)1y first quartEl — of that year-, the technical act'ioTl of peac'e stocks thOSe companieswhlCh would bebene- -..-' ficiaries of the end of the war and increased consumer spending, was consistently superior to that of companies presumably benefiting from the level of war activity. At the end of March, it will be recalled, President Johnson made his momentous decision not to run for reelection that fall and to seek a cessation of the Vietnam hostilities. The result was the famous April Fool's Day rally, which touched off what was ultimately to be a 170-point advance in the Dow, with the so-called peace stocks leading the way. It is perhaps worth noting that only the prospect of Vietnam peace was enough to set the rally off. Peace itself did not occur until four years later. Again in 1974, the stock market patterns that seem to be developing fly in the face of current , conventional wisdom. We are assured on all sides that the outlook for consumer spending is bleak,and that it is likely to turn down sharply in the second half of the year. Yet a careful in- spection of stock patterns suggests that among the better ones are those belonging to a whole group of companies that would benefit from increased consumer spending. One obvious such area is the retailing industry, and the bulk of retail stocks, and there are a great many of them, appears to show, at the moment, distinctly improving price action. But the improvement is by no means confined to retail issues alone. Hotel and motel stocks, for example, most of which have been clobbered over the past year by the prospect of reduced travel due to the energy crisis,have begun to move sideways and to develop impressive base patterns. The same is true of airline issues whose mcremental profits, at)east, tend,to Qome,frgm,an.in… crea se 'in vacation travel. Autom'C;bUestOcks';- despite -saggi;g' sa-les, sho;' signs of baSing and – the same is true of selected building issues — at a time when we are reliably assured that high interest rates will strangle home building in the second half of 1974 and early 1975. Thus — while economic analysts are assuring us of the imminence of the apocalypse, a recession led by reduced consumer demand and lowered real income — the market seems to be trying to indicate precisely the opposite, that the second half of 1974 and the first half of 1975 will be characterized by business as usual , with a concomitant increase in at least some corporate profits. It will be interesting to see in the present instance who is correct. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m,) 816.57 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 87.60 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (6/20/74) 510,23 AWT/jb No statement or expression of opinion or cny other moiler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sol,cltot,on 01 on offer to buy or sell any seCt.Jrlly referred to or mentioned The mallnr IS presented merely for the convef'lencs of the subscriber While e believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be loken by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own Invetlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and liS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may loter toke, positrons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSitIon may be different frOM any views now or hercoher e1pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS regiSTered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may gIve adVice to Its mvestment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further ,formation on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 28, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 28, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - June 28, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 28, 1974 .. 'But he has got nothing on,' said a little child. o – '-r — .;– ..!- ;.-H9.n2JrlJi!!n l\ers, Thmgeror s. e Clot!' The classic cop-out of the techmcian, when he has nothing more to say about falling markets, is to talK . about fundamentals and to proclaim that stocks are cheap. We plead guilty to this in the present instance, although it is, In fact, true that stocks cheap, and we think due note ought to be taken of the fact. The following table is an update of a study we last published a year ago. As we all know, the absolute historical nadir for price-earnings ratios was 1949, during which year the Dow-Jones Industrial Average it- self sold at 7.2 times earnings (a ratio which, if duplicated for the entire average today, would place the Dow around 643). The table shows a recent price for each of the 30 components of the Dow, a consensus estimate of 1974 earnings and the price-earnings ratio based on those earnings. Next is shown the 1949 price-earnings ratio, the pnce at which the stock would sell were 1974 earmngs to be capitalized at this ratio,and the percentage dlfference of that price from the current one. Stock Recent Price Earmngs 1974-E 1974 1949 PiE 1974 Earnings x 1949 PIE Pet. Difference Allied Chemical Alcoa American5rands American Can Amencan Tel. & Tel. 37 4/10 9.0 11.2 46 41 5.50 7.5 10.7 59 35 S.25 6.7 8.7 46 27 3.80 7.1 9.6 36 46 5.35 8.6 14.8 79 24 44 31 33 71 Anaconda' Bethlehem Steel Chrysler duPont —- Eastmanoda-k 21 4.50 4.2 30 4.75 6.3 16 2.25 7.1 162 12.00 13.5 1-03 4,.-2-0 -24-.5 9.6 2.9 3.7 11. 7 12-.-0 43 104 14 -53 8 -50 140 -14 50-..,..,,,,,,,!F''-.,,-5L- — Esmark Exxon General Electric 26 5.00 5.2 70 12.00 5.8 49 3.35 14.6 7.3 36 7.4 89 8.8 29 38 27 -40 General Foods General MotorsGoodyear Tlre International Harvester InternatlOnal Nlckel International Paper Johns Manvllle Owens Ilhnois Procter & Gamble Sears Standard Oll of California Texaco Union Carbide Umted Alrcraft U,S. Steel Westinghouse Woolworth 24 2.60 SO 4.00 16 2.60 23 4.25 27 3.50 48 4.40 17 2.80 39 5.75 HTO 3.80 83 4.50 27 5.50 25 5.75 41 5.50 26 5.00 45 6.25 12 1.90 .-l!i..b.Bl 9.2 12.5 6.2 5.4 7.7 10.9 6.0 6.8 26.3 18.4 4.9 4.3 7.5 5.2 7.2 6.3 5.5 9.2 4.1 4.8 6.0 13.5 4.1 8.2 11.1 16.2 8.5 6.0 5.8 12.2 7.2 4.4 5,7 12.3 24 16 12 26 47 18 23 64 62 38 33 33 67 36 28 11 33 -68 -23 13 74 -62 35 64 -38 -54 22 32 63 38 -37 -8 120 AVERAGE 803 89.39 780 Amazingly enou-gh. 18 of the 30 Dow components -more-thanhalf, are now selhn(;iat price-earnings – – ratios lower than those of 1949. Were all of the 30 components to be capltalized at 1949 PIE ratios at the end of this year, assuming the earnings esllmates hold up, the Dow would sell for 780, only 20 some odd pOInts below current levels, and an equal dollar amount Invested In each component at leday's prices would produce an 8 gain by the end of 1974, were 1949 p/r ratios to be uniformly applied at that time. Now, Wall Street lS full of perfectly rational explanations as to Just why thls should be the case. The bond-stock YIeld relationship. It can be argued. is today precisely the reverse of what It was In 1949. and the host of economic problems now facing us have all been studiously documented. Nonetheless, there comes a time when It IS necessary to emulate the httle boy In Andersen's faIry tale who IS the only one unsophisticated enough to pOInt out a simple and obvious fact. That simple and obvious fact, insofar as most stock pnces are concerned, is that they are today, by any historical standard, amazing bargains. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 802.80 S & P Compo ( 200 p. m.) 85.99 J\NTHONYW. TABELL DELAfIELD, HARVEY TABELL Cumulative Index (6/27/74) 491. 99 J\wT/lb No statement or expreSlon of opinion or any other mattIJr herein contained I, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ondoreelly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any secvrlty referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convellence of the subSCriber Whole we believe the sources of our Informahan to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any aellon 10 be token by the subscrober should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any eCVrlheS menfloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafler elpressed In Th,s or any other Issue Janney Montgomery ScOTT, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an ,vestment adVisor, may give adVice to lIS ,vestment adVisory and othel customers ,ndependently of any statements mode ,n Ihls or In any other Issue Further information on ony serurlly mentioned herein 15 available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 05, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 05, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - July 05, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

——————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK S1OCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE -;-;.; — ..,- -.–,;.- ….. –'–.-,.,– . . Jy,,,r114..,.. ——- This is the way the world ends Not wIth a bang but a whimper. T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men Mr. Ellot's viSIon of the form of the apocalypse does not, in most times and most places, ex- tend to the stock market. Bear markets m the past have had a strong tendency to end WIth a very distinct and noticeable bang, the best example bemg the most recent one, WIth Its cllmax on May 26, 1970. It IS equally true that rather obvious selling climaxes were a feature of the endmgs of most other recent major bear markets, notably those of 1966, 1962 and 1957. It IS necessary to go all the way back to the early 1950's, and to certam occasions m the 1930's and 1940's, to find bear markets which have, m effect, qUIetly turned themselves around whlle no one was really paying attention. It is nonetheless worth explonng the possibilIty that the current downswing, whenever and wherever it comes to ItS ultimate end, wlll not be charactenzed by climactIC action visible in any other but the most esoteric technical terms. One argument m favor of such a contentlOn IS the general one that each market cycle has a tendency to be suffIciently different from the past one so as to fool the greatest pOSSIble number of people. Thus, the fact that the bear market of 1968-70 came to an end WIth one of the more classic, textbook instances of a selling climax to have occurred in recent years, suggests that its 1973-4 successor may well have a dIfferent sort of terminatlOn. An equally persuasIve argument IS the large number of observers who appear to .-be..;;.Locl0ng…LfQel1i!lgchmlL. If this.feeli!!9pecomes wIdespread, It becomes highly. likely that one of two thmgs ;;ill happen. either appa-rent-c1iffiactlcactlo'n';;;It take place 'i;here- upon the market will go lower (there IS, in technical history, plenty of precedent for this sort of thing), or, alternatively, the cllmax wlll never take place, and a turn WIll not be recogmzed un- tll the market has already moved substantIally off its low. It can also be persuasively argued that the market has already or shortly will have seen enough mdivldual bangs to have reached an effectlve sold-out bottom. ThlS week's collapse in Polaroid and Damon constituted really nothmg more than a long and dlstmgUlshed lme of in- dividual d,sasters runmng back through Combustion Engmeenng, Avon Products, the mortgage trusts, and Walt Disney all jffi W3y1oLevitz FurnIture. Eventually, the last of the Issues whIch supposedly-professlOnal portfolio managers have managed to mamtain at pnces mcredibly out of line with the rest of the market WIll have jomed the processlOn down the tube, and we can once again look for a market where It IS possible to practlce secunty analYSIS rather than readmg com- pound growth tables. It IS also just possible that that happy day may not be too far off. Now, none of the foregOing is meant to suggest, certamly, that a bottom has already occurred or that it may not occur at levels Significantly lower than the present. The December low on the Dow at the moment of thiS writmg has managed to hold, although the Dow gives the ImpresslOn of holdmg on by ItS fingernails in an attempt to keep from following the other major mdlces into the abyss. Our CumulatIVe Index, mCidentally, posted a milestone of sorts last week by break- ing through the 500 level a week ago to close on Wednesday at 475.16. ThIS figure represents a declme.of 51.from.the ..1973.hlgh and an astounding 68 from the high of 1465 posted m 1968. A market which has seen the average stock lose-twothld; of Its wlue over asix-yeaTjj'E;r,od'ls one that IS calculated to produce the sort of lethargiC bottom we have been discussing above. As we have pointed out m the past, the thmgs the stock market IS supposed to be worrying about have been awfully well publlClzed by th,s tIme and it is at least worthy of note that on Wed- nesday, after the stage had been set by the Fnday ,IS-point decline, the market shrugged off a 12 pnme rate WIth a ratherde;ultory ho-hum. The current bear market may, mdeed, wmd up With the usual climactic bang and make pinpomting a bottom easy for us, but ,at this stage ,we doubt if we would make climax-seehng an Important part of our mvestment game plan. Dow-Jones Industnals '1200 p.m.) 790.36 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (200 p.m.) 83.72 DJLIIFIELD, HARVJY, TABELL Cumulative Index (7/3/74) 475.16 AWT/jb No stCltement or expression of opinion or Clny other moiler herein tonlalned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe SOIIC'loIIOn of on offer to buy or sell any 5ecunty referred to or mentioned The moiler ,s presented merely for Ihe conveflente of the ubscrlber While 'lie beheve the sources of our mformalion 10 be relioble, we In no way represenl or guorontee the accuracy thereof nor of the 5tolemenls mude herem Any act,on to be loken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgotion Clnd informatIon Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, os 0 tarporat,on, ond ,/5 offIcers or employees, moy now have, or moy loler toke, positions or trades 1/1 respect 10 any secufltles mentioned ,n th,s or any future Issue, and such posillon mClY be dlfferen, from any views now or hereafler expressed In ,hiS or ony other ISSlJe JClnney Montgomery Stolt, Inc, whIch '5 registered WIth the SEC as on Investment odv,sor, may gIve adVice to ,Is Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of ony ,tatements mode ,n th,s or 111 any other ISsue Further mformO'lon on ony leamty menl,oned herem 1 ovo/lable on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 12, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 12, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - July 12, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

–,– – \ TABELL'S MARKET LETTER '-,, 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 12, 1974 Monday's 21-point drop m the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, which saw that venerable index follow most –other'ma j or market'oarorrfetets-to-'a-Iow BelOW'fljii('orlilSTDecernoer; Ra''-;-,thoutdouJ5Ccalteredthe techi – cal picture, although not in as fundamental a degree as many might suspect. The penetration of the December low on July 8 marked only the second time since 1926 that that low has been penetrated so late in the subse- quent market year. The only other case was penetration of the December, 1928 low in October, 1929, a iact, we hasten to add, that has, in our opinlOn, absolutely no statistical significance. The llkelihood now, of course, is that the market .s headed lower, at lea st over the short term. Th.s re- mains true despIte Friday momingls sharp rally In response to a slowed nse in business loans. It is necess- ary to have some working hypothesis as to Just how low that might be. Here there .s very little change. For the Dow and most other mdices, the applicable distributlOnal tops were formed m 1972 and 1973, and these tops were violated on the downside la st December. The trading range In which most indices held throughout the first six months of 1974, the limits of which, m the Dow's case, were the December low of 783.56, and the March high of 904.02, did not widen the previously formed tops, although that range apparently faIled to turn out, as we must confess we hoped it mIght, into a saucer-type base formation. It, therefore, appears that the original downside targets which were .dentifiable fairly early last year are now likely to be fulfilled. For the Dow ,most of these targets center on the 740-680 range which, quite obviously, is not all that far be- low current levels. Downside objectives of similar percentage magnitude exist for the other IndIces. For the Dow-Jones Transportation Average, for example, the downSIde objectlve IS an apparent 135-115 versus the current level of 153. In the case of the broad-based mdlces, the Standard & Poors 425-Stock Industrial Index has a down- side objective of 83 versus its current level of 92, and the Standard & Poors 500 suggests a possible 74. For the New York Stock Exchange mdex, now 43, a downside target of 40 .s readable. It .s, of course, qu.te possible that these forecasts might,have to be altered,should the recent advance demonstr.te9Jll-'ayJn9 power. More evfdence, -however, will certaInly-be requIred. – – .- All of the above numbers have a certain conSIstency 10 that they suggest, In all cases, a test of the lows of May, 1970. Such a test, incidentally, would be perfectly consistent w.th the longer-term hypothesis we have been proposing in th.s space for the past three years, the theory that the basic secular trend of the stock market has changed from the rising channel which charactenzed the 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's, to a flat channel, centered around the 850 level m terms of the Dow, with llm.ts roughly a couple of hundred points on either s.de of that level. We do not, In other words, place ourselves in the camp of the super-bears. We think analYSIS of the technical patterrsof mdiv.dual .ssues strongly suggests that the bulk of them are suff.ciently thoroughly sold out so as to prevent them from mOVIng a great deal below current prices, although quite obviously they could be vulnerahle to short-term weakness. We also think that the apparently-huge amounts of money now on the sidelines mitigate against the suggestion that we are headed for some sort of apocalypse. We do, how- ever, think that a good deal of vulnerabIlity remains for a faIrly extensive minority of mdividual stocks, most of them those glamour issues whIch have not yet had corrections comparable to those which have affllcted the bulk of the ilst. LIke the averages, most of these Issues spent 1972 and r973 forming substantial top formatIons and, lIke the averages, penetrated these top formations on the downside last December. Some of them, and 111e nantes are sufficiently obVIOUS so that they do not need to be recounted here, did, indeed, move lower In the first six months of 1974 and are at or approaching theIr downSIde obJectIves. A number, however, Including many in the drug and off.ce eqmpment helds, staged a m.ld rally In the first half of this year and moved up mto the overhead supply from the 1972-73 tops. There are very few cases that we can recall where the princ.ple of overhead supply has been better demonstrated than by the action of the past few weeks. Almostuniformly, on the recent decline, the growth Issues that had moved up Into the overhead supply backed off sharply from that supply on the recent drop, and now hnd themselves posseSSIng short-term patterns which suggest a move to new lows and dn ultimate extension of thdt move to the downside objectives of the angInal tops. These objectives, it must be noted, are in many cases substantially below current levels. I\s our readers are well aware, we have always been philosophically opposed to the pnnciple that a hand- ful of select Issues, rightly or wrongly tagged as growth stocks, should sell at an immense premium over the bulk of the list. The past year or so has done a great deal to destroy that nahan, and technIcal patterns now suggest that the next few months could see the final demise of the myth. We do not, In sum, see any reason, In practIcal terms, to worry unduly about further short-term weakness in the market prOVIded that portfolios are protected by rigid exclusion therefrom of as-yet-uncorrected growth lssues. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 778.16 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 82.04 DLLArILLD. HARVIY, TABrLL Cumulative Index (7/11/74) 449.79 AWT/jb No slotement or expreSSion of opinion or any other matter herein contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlfectly or indirectly, on offer or the wlicltatlon of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the COnVerienCE of the subscriber WhIle we believe the sources of our Information 10 be rellCble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements ,ode herem Any achon to be loen by the subscllber should be bocd on hl5 own InvestlgollOM and IIlformoflon Jonny Montgomery Scott, nc, 0 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, positions or Irodes In respecl to any secuntles mentioned In Ihls or any fulure ISwe, and such position may be dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed HI Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered wllh Ihe SEC as an Inveslmenl adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel CUSTomers Independently of any stalements mode In Ii-liS or tn any olher uSUe Further Information on any securtty mentioned herein 1 available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 19, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 19, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - July 19, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , ( \ \- – – – ………–…- 909 STATE ROA.D, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE July 19, 1974 After breaking sharply to new lows a week ago, the stock market displayed some firmness last week, staging a normal,.,,o!lectiol! ,of the,Fridayadv.nc.e.Q.n MonpilY caJ1d1uesdgY;!J;lcU,hen.dvancjTlg,ag!1J.o new rally high on Wednesday and Thursday. Presently the Dow is just underneath the heavy overhead . supoly from the early 1973 trading range, and its reaction to this supply will be mteresting. The opinion has been expressed that the recent advance may be the start of a so-called summer rally. We have studied that phenomenon in this space for the past two years, pointing out that the theory of a summer rally had some basis in fact, but that It would be unwise to lean upon It too hard as a market fore- casting tooL The following table is an updated version of that study including the changes for 1973. ONE-MONTH PERIODS TWO-MONTH PERIODS Ending Month Advances Declines Avg. Chge. Advances Declines Avg. Chge. January 31 17 0.71 31 17 2.10 February 26 22 -0.06 26 22 0.64 March 26 22 -0.20 23 25 -0.37 April 27 21 0.87 29 19 0.75 May 25 23 -0.76 29 19 0.34 June 22 26 0.82 23 25 0.01 July 33 15 2.29 31 17 3.06 August 32 16 1.80 35 13 4.24 September 21 27 -I. 17 29 19 0.57 October 26 22 -0.49 24 24 -1.59 November 28 20 0.52 29 19 0.09 December 37 II 1.37 32 16 1.93 Total . 334. 242 9.47 341 n' . 23.5 . 0..98 .. The table shows the action of the Dow- Jones Industrial Average m everyone-month and two-month period from 1926 to 1973. For each period the number of instances when the market advanced and declined is shown, together with the average percentage change for the period. A prehmmary look at the table, in- deed, supports the notion of a probable summer ra lly. The average monthly advance for the Dow over the period has been .47 whereas the average performance m July is an advance of 2.29, more than four times as great. LIkewise, the average advance of 4.24 for the two months ended August is four times larger than the average two-month advance. It would, mdeed, appear that the expectatIOn of an advancing mar- ket during July and August has some solid grounding in fact. laving made th,S statement, however, a few doubts must be raIsed. The first factor which needs to be pomted out IS that a large part of 'he high average advance for the summer period rests on the aCCIdent of the 1932 bottom's having occurred at the end of June. Thus, July and August of that year produced the largest two-month advance in stock-market history, an astounding 70 rise. If this smgle year IS elim- mated from consideration, the results for July and August are much closer to normaL Secondly, while it IS true that July and August do show sigmficant pluralities of advancmg months over declining months, 1t must be remembered that advancing periods tend to outnumber declining ones over the 48 years by almost three to two. When standard tests of statist1cal sigmfIcance are applied, the penod with the clearest seasonal action is the month of December, which 1S why th,S letter has always empha- sized the importance of the year-end rally. Likewise, the tendency toward a declming market in September is statistically more significant than that of a rise in July or August. Interestingly enough, none of the other months show any discernible seasonal pattern whatsoever. Lastly, in lookingJor seasonal patterns, it IS wise to examine the most recent data to see If It seems to be deviating from the pst and, indeed, this is apparently the case The eight years between 1966 and 1973 have produced three rallies and five declines in July and five rallies and three decline m August, but the two month penod ended August has produced three ralhes and fIve declines with an average advance of less than 1. Even the familiar December rally appears to have lost ItS recent reliability, and, mter- estingly enough, a new seasonal tendency, not heretofore apparent, seems to be emergmg — that of a decline in May-June. Every May, from 1965 through 1974, with the smgle exception of 1972, has produced a declining market, and all two-month periods ending in June have shown declmes for the past ten years. The moral of the whole exercise, we suppose, is that the stock market IS a difficult and changing beast, and, while certain seasonal tendencies are apparent, they constitute only one factor in what IS mvanably a highly complex equation. Dow-Jones Industrials '1200 p.m.) 787.39 S & P Camp. (J200 p. m.) 83.62 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (7/18/73) 472.03 AWT/jb No stctement or expressIon of opinion or any other matter herein tonlClined IS, or ,s to be deemed to be, directly or Ind,rectly, on offer or Ihe sol,c,tot,on of on offer to bvy or sell any setullly referred to or menhoned The molter 1 presented merely for the COl'wef'lence of the subscrober While -He beheve Ihe sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the sotements mode herein Any ac;tlan to be talen by the subSCTlber should be based on tliS own mveslllallan and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as 0 corporat,on, and lis officers or employees, moy now have, or may iater lake, posillons or Irades In respec;t to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In th or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered WITh Ihe SEC as on investment adVISor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel customers mdependently of any stotements made m thiS or In any other Issue Further ,nformatlon on any security mentioned herem 1 available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 26, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 26, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - July 26, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

— — —, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —— – – —- —- —- – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVI910N OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE July 26, 1974 The market continues to be beset by crosscurrents whlCh are, to say the least, confusing. A major downside penetration of the early-1974 trading range took place in the early part of the – month, 'wi th 'the DoW'rea cnTnga'low' of '7 53 13oiijulY-'rf th-Thi'i;- penetrat16fi-W'a s -fflowed b2y—1 a sharp, two-day rally, followed by another two days of retracement. Following that, until Thursday's weakness, the market edged irregularly higher, posting an intraday rally high of 809.76 on Wednesday. Despite the fact that the advance was a great deal more orderly than the one last June, which saw the market move up almost 70 points in the short space of eight trading days, Internal indices of market vitality behaved a great deal more positively on the recent rise than they did a month ago. Indeed, the improvement was sufficient to cause major buy signals to be glven on a number of the most highly sensitive technical ind1cators. It should be recalled, however, that the very sensitivity of these same indicators has caused them to give numerous false buy signals during the cour'se of the 1973-1974 decline. It 1S often helpful in times of market confusion to outlIne the various possible scenarios which could anse out of what we already know has taken place, These poss1ble scenarios, as we see it, are four In number, and we will try to discuss each one briefly. 1. The low of the 1973-4 bear market occurred on July 11th. There is very little, on the face of it, to support th1s argument. None of the normal technical indicators, such thIngs as h1gh odd-lot short sales, increaSIng short Interest, expanding volume, extremely sharp recovery, etc., etc., all of which have tended to charactenze major bottoms in the past, were present at the low of a couple of weeks ago. Its only plaus1bility lies in the contrary opinion which has been suggested in recent issues of this letter, the theory that the bottom of the present bear market, whenever 1t occurs. will not be accompanied by the usual. easily-recognizable techni- ,.,.. ea l's 19na-lsWe- thin-kthat-;fortlrefirs tti meSince' th'e '-ea rlyl9-S-0 s7th-e-precnnd1tiCYrisf6rthYs–,'-I kInd.of a bottom are present. and we must, therefore. at least recognize the possibihty that the lows were, in fact, seen two weeks ago. Further fuel for this argument is provided by the fact that a fair-sized mInority of 1ssues. steels being a particular case in pOint, have begun to show highly dynamic upside action In the face of an apparent continued bear market. 2. A typical selhng climax, carrying the Dow to the downs1de objectives in the low 700s mentioned previously in this letter. The arguments In favor of this poss1bility are the obviOUS ones. contending that this sort of bear-market termInation has been the typical experience of the recent past. The counter-arguments are those stressed above. We cannot get away from the feeling that somehow the market 1S not going to make it all that easy for the by-now large numbers of practicing technicians to pinpoint the preC1se turnIng point. 3. A continued slow drift to new lows. With lower downside objectives In fact existing. there 1S much to be said In favor of this scenario. Whether or not it occurs. 1t seems to us. will depend on whether the new emergIng strength in heavy Industrial stocks will be great enough to offset any weakness which might take place in the as-yet-uncorrected glamour 1ssues. That the former will outperform the latter has been our 10ng-heJd contention. The exact mix of performance will go a long way toward determining whether or not the averages do, in fact, post new lows. 4. A vInd1cation of the Super-Bears. We are. at the moment at least. willing to reject this scenano out of hand. Our own view of the economic outlook does not support the forecast of continued double-digit-Inflation. followed bY,a-necessary corrective depression. which 1S the forecast used to buttress the arguments of the gloom-and-doom proponents. We thInk, on the other hand, that the present level of stock prices, In the majonty of cases. already d1S- counts the possibihty of a sharply reduced level of bUSiness activity. and we feel that. were such reduced levels not to materiahze. the enSUIng ups1de action could be dynamic Indeed. In summary, there appears to be little for the Investor to worry about in the case of any of the scenarios mentioned above. other than the last. and we have already stated our willingness to reject that last. If this 1S the case, carefully selected common stock portfohos at today's prices could tum out, over the long term. to be well bought Indeed. Dow-Jones Industnals (1200 p.m.) 787.70 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 82.92 DBLArrELD, HARVLY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (7/25/74) 471.69 AWTJc No sfatement or e)(prenlon of opinion or any other motter herem contained IS, or I to be deemed to be, dlrectly or indirectly, on offer or the sol1Cllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to Or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the converlenCE of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Info rma han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statf!ments mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber shOUld be based an hiS awn investigation ond information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may lofer toke, poslhons or trodes In respect to any securilies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position lI'OCIy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on onvestment adVisor, may gIVe odvlce to liS mvestment adVISOry and athel customers Independently of ony stotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on ony secullty mentioned herein IS ovollable on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 02, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 02, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - August 02, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

y – – -L — – – — – – – -. . — TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – — – – !!eIaf. .Y'&y, .7akll 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF 71'1U;! 4,l1lrmry !//ott fi.C. MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE AUgust 2, 1974 -,,,,….I – -Tust seve-n sliortwe-eks'ago; -on TuIie-14 I we wrotT-a -ilter which mcludf'th-e'tole' lov.- -Tt-tab-ulated the performance of two groups of stocks, the so-called Vestal Virgins or growth favontes, and the Sex- less Spinsters, largely basic-industry, historically-cyclical companies. The table, which has been up- dated to show today's prices, shows the approximate price of the stocks in each group at five points in recent market history, the January 1973 high, October 1973 high, December 1973 low, April-May low, and Thursday' 5 close. The percentage change between points is also shown together with the average for each group and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Jan Oct Dec Apr-May …li.!Jlh High Change Low Change Low Change 8/1/74 Change DJlA 1067.20 997.59 – 6.5 783.56 -21.4 788.80 0.6 751.10 – 4.7 Avon Products 132 98 -25.7 58 -40.8 40 -31.0 29 -27.5 Purroughs 115 121 5.2 92 -23.9 96 4.3 90 – 6.3 Coca-Cola 145 145 – 115 -20.6 98 -14.7 84 -14.2 Disney 115 82 -28.6 41 -50.0 41 – 37 – 9.7 Eastman Kodak 145 135 – 6.9 108 -22.9 100 – 3'.8 86 -14,0 IBM 360 280 -22.2 235 -16.0 210 -10.6 202 – 3.8 Int'l Flavors/Fragrances 48 47 – 2.0 34 -27.6 32 – 5.8 30 – 6.3 Johnson & Johnson 132 125 – 5.3 100 -20.0 105 5.0 94 -10.4 McDonald's Corp 78 74 – 5.1 44 -40.5 50 13.6 38 -24.0 Polaroid 130 125 – 3.8 65 -52.0 53 -18.4 27 -49.0 Procter & Gamble 120 106 -11.6 89 -16.0 85 – 4.5 93 9,4 Sears, Roebuck & Co. 124 100 -19.3 78 -22.0 80 2.5 64 -20.0 Xerox 156 150 – 3.8 115 -23.3 106 – 7.8 94 -11.3 – . -Average — – – –9-9 – 21l–S– — – 5.5- '-14.4 Alcan Alumimum Ltd 26 40 53.8 36 -10.0 27 -25.0 29 7.4 Allied Chemical 28 48 71.4 43 -10.4 39 – 9.3 36 – 7.6 Alcoa 40 54 35.0 44 -18.5 43 – 2.2 46 6.9 Bethlehem Steel 30 36 20.0 27 -25.0 29 7.4 30 3.4 Int'l Paper 42 57 35.7 43 -24.5 42 – 2.4 46 9.5 Kennecott Copper 26 38 46 . I 31 -18 .4 31 – 35 12 . 9 Monsanto 55 74 34.5 43 -41.8 60 39.5 60 – Phelps Dodge 44 50 13.6 39 -22.0 35 -10.2 37 5.7 U. S. Steel 34 37 8.8 30 -18.9 40 33.3 45 12.5 Westvaco 28 40 42.8 27 -32.5 27 – 27- Weyerhaeuser 28 41 46.4 34 -17.0 40 17.6 34 -15.0 Average 37.1 -21.7 4.4 3.2 We pointed out In Tune that we thought the figures were Intereshng. In the first nine months of 1973, the Dow posted a 6.5 decline, while the cyclical Issues advanced 37, vs. a 9.9 average dechne for the growth stocks. The cyclica1s matched the performance of the Dow on the downside In the decline from the October hIgh to the December low, whereas the growth issues declined cons1derably more sharply. Likewise, on the move to the Apnl-May lows, the growth issues dropped another 51/2 while the cyclical issues advanced. It is in the last column that the major difference eX1sts between the table above and the earlier version of it published last June. When we published that letter, the Dow was at 844.81, some 90 points higher than it is today. At that point the growth stocks had, for the first time, been able to show superior per- formance over a short period. They were up almost twice as much from April-May lows as were the – – cyclical issues and.had'conslderably-bettered the-ris-e of the Dow-We'concluded the June 14-1ette'r-by saying, We think 1t is premature to conclude that the superior growth stock performance Wh1h charac- terized 1971 and 1972 and then disappeared abruptly in 1973, is about to burst out again in ltS old refulgence. Such has certainly not been the case, as the last column above shows. Of the 13 growth stocks, 12 are below their April-May lows and the average 14.4 decline IS considerably worse than the Dow declIne of 4.7. By contrast, only two of the cyclicals are down, and this group, on average, remains 3.2 above its prior low. We think, In sum, that the conclusions drawn in our June 14 letter are still valid. Dow-Jones Industrials (12'00 p.m.) 750.39 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (I200 p.m.) 78.57 DELAFIELD, HARVEY TABELL Cumulative Index (8/1/74) 447.43 AWT/jb No statement or expressIon of OP!nIOn or ony other moiler herem contCl!ned IS, or u to be deemed to be, directly or mdHectly, on offer or the sol!c!tatlon 01 on offer to buy or sell ony setunty referred to or menltoned The motler !s presenlcd merely for the convef'!enCE of the subscrIber Wh!le oNe bel!eve the sources of our mformot!on to be rel!Oble, we In no way represent or guorantee the occurocy thereof nor of the stotemenl mode herc!n Any oct!on to be token by the subKnber should be bosed on h!s own Investlgotlon and mformohon Janney Montgomery Scotl, Inc, os 0 corporot,on, ond !ts offIcers or employees. moy now hove, or may loler toke, pOSItIons or trodes In respcct to ony seturot!es mentIoned In th!s or any future Issue, ond such posItIon may be different from ony vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIs or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC os on Investment adVIsor, moy glVc odvlce to !ts Investment odvlsory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode In thiS or !n any other Issue Further mformotlon on any securIty mentIoned herem !S ovalloble on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 09, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 09, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - August 09, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 9, 1974 It seems to us impOSSible, from any rational pOint of view, to view the events which culminated la st.nightand. today. with anyfeeling other tha n-sadnesS We' find-ourselves Tn addition -;- in 'agree– ment with those commentators who have expressed admiration for the viability of the Constitutional structure. Beyond that, we do not think it is the province of this letter to comment on those events except insofar as they relate to securities markets. The response to the first rumors of resignation, it will be recalled, was a shrap three-day, 45-point rally ending on Wednesday with some correc- tion on Thursday and Friday morning. Although PreSidential resignation is an experience unique in 200 years of American history, the stock market's action was, m initial appearance at least, simply another repetition of a phenome- non that has ample historical precedent. That phenomenon centers on the fact that, shortly after any sudden and unexpected change in administration (or change in direction of administration) the rrKlrket tends to respond initially with an extremely sharp, short-term rally. That short-term rally, moreover, often constitutes the takeoff point for a sustained advance later on. Let us consider the precedents. On Sunday night, March 31, 1968, President Johnson announced he would not seek reelection and would actively pursue peace in Vietnam. The Dow moved ahead 20 points on the following Monday, setting an all-time volume record in the process and continued the advance throughout the early part of the month of April ,advancing over 50 points in two weeks. On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. The ini- tial response was a panic decline of 20 points, with trading halted early. However, after a three- day closing, the market opened the following week wIth a 32-point advance, closing 11 pOints higher than it had been the day prior to the assassination. The rally continued into early Decem- – -ber-for-a-tota 1-auvanCErofmore'thln''l'SOpo1nts. On Aprirr2-,-19457'Prn-siuent-Rb'oS'even-dfed at—'- Warm Springs, Georgia, wIth the presidency passing to V,ce President Harry S. Truman. On the following Monday, the market advanced sharply on expanded volume, and continued the advance without any substantial interruption for the next two weeks. Going back even farther, the after- math of the death of President Harding, on August 4. 1923, was an initial decline followed by a sharp' rally throughout the remainder of August,which produced a 7 1/2 advance. Now, the rea son for this sort of behavior IS not the fact that the market exhibits a macabre ex- citement at the unexpected removal of a President, by whatever means. There exists, rather, m our view. a strong psychological tendency to rally round a new President. We thus, at the time, called the 1963 action the Johnson Confidence Eoom. If a rally from current levels ensues, the appelation, Ford Confidence Boom will probably not be a misnomer, just as it is, likewise, arguable that, in the earlier ca ses, the market wa s expressing mitial confidence in new Presidents Coolidge and Truman. The conditions preceding the changes in administration above and their longer-term aftermaths are also interesting. At the time both of Roosevelt's death and the Johnson announcement, the market had been advancing for a number of years. Both of the ensuing rallies, the one in 1968 lasting for nine months, and the one in 1945-46 for 14 months, proved to be the final advances of their respective bull markets. In neither case, did the market correct substantially following the initIal rally. In 1923, by contrast, the market had been drifting lower for most of the year. The initial rally in August was retraced entirely m September and October, but prices went on . . – – – –… – – – – – -.– – – –;;-. — – . — – —- from the October low to advance almost uninterruptedly into 1929. The 1963 experience, in many ways, constitutes a unique case. At that point the market had been advancing for over a year but was beginning to show distinct signs of weakness, mcluding sharply deteriorating breadth conditions. The boom of confidence m President Johnson was of sufficient strength to turn that technical condition around entirely in the first few months of 1964 and to lead to an advance which went on for over two years. If any sustained rally does develop from the current levels. then, it will undoubtedly be viewed by many as being ephemeral. Historical precedent, however, hardly suggests that this is likely to be the case. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 777.77 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 80.90 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (8/8/74) 462.05 AWT/jb No stalemenl or expression of opinion or any other moIler herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or Ihe sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any securrty referred 10 or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for Ihe conVCl'lenCE of the subscriber While -HC believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any cc1lon to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own InvestlgohOn ond Information Janney Montgomery Scot Inc, os 0 corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may Icter toke, positions or trades In respect 10 any seculltlcs mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hercofter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reglslc-cd With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS Of In any other Issue Further information on any secu-Ily mentIOned herein IS ovolloble on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 16, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 16, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - August 16, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ,. 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE August 16, 1974 Welk-ed)st.. e-.'-..k.,.i-b-ou-!-th-e-possibi-li-ty'o,L8aFor-d'.'C–;Q- n–i-de.n.,c..E…'l.,.-B.o-o m-. ILoneIs.t-..o…- be,forth – … commg, it was by no means apparent in last week's market, which celebrated President Ford's first week m the White House by plunging to new lows, at least as measured by the Dow-Jones Industnal Average. Actually, the Ford rally, if there was one, took place while Mr. Nixon was still in office and ended apparently, just as PreSIdent Ford was being sworn in. It was on August,S, 6 and 7, prior to the reSignation speech that the Dow advanced a total of 45 points. Starting on Thursday, August 8, the evening President NIxon resigned, and continumg through the Ford accession on Friday, to his speech to Congress on Monday, the market gave up all the ground gained and lost sixty points in six trading sessions through yesterday. Reasons for encouragement in the market's achon are, admittedly, sparse. There was, mdeed, a great deal of technical vigor to the rally, and, interestingly enough, that vigor continued past the rally pea k a week ago. The Thursday decline, for example, saw more advancing stocks than declining stocks despite a 1 1/2 drop in the Dow, only the seventh time this has occurred In the past 47 years. Market breadth continued fairly good on Friday and Monday despite the sharp drops on those two days. On Tuesday and Wednesday, however, the dechne began to develop steam as breadth deteriorated sharply, and other signs of internal technical weakness made themselves manifest. There were, indeed, a few signs that the stories being told by the Dow and by the S & P 500 –were a bit more pessimistic than the true action of the market. Our own Cumulative Index….f.-ool.l.-o-w–e-d .. – the popular aver'ages into newlow -territory'on Wedne'sday but it can be said', at least that ICis– now moving concurrently with the Dow rather than leadmg It as it had been dOIng ever since last spring; Some confidence may also be gleaned from the fact that, as of this writing at least, both the Trans portation and Utility averages have failed to follow the Industna Is mto new low terrItory, with the contracyclical action of the utilities being better technical strength than this index has been able to exhibit for some time. Likewise, the number of daily new lows, which peaked at 197 on Wednesday of this week ,constitutes a low figure, considering the posihon of the market averages. It IS not our purpose here to emulate Pollyanna. The market IS, mdeed, sinking to new lows and there is no strong technical evidence that It w!ll not, m fact, proceed lower yet. Indeed, the lower downside objectives that exist for most averages were outlined in this letter m the early part of July. We cannot avoid the feeling, however, that the really vicIOUS area of decline is being restricted at the moment to the over-exploIted growth issues. We have been regaling our readers ad nauseam for the past two years with the fact that we considered these Issues to be over-priced in relation to the obvious values available in the rest of the market, so we can hardly say that this action is surprising. Even m the growth area, however, a number of stocks are beginmng to approach major long-term downside objectives. Once this takes place, considering the already depressed nature of the bulk of the list, it IS difficult to envision where the market will find further downSide leadershIp. – – – – – – — We have commented in the past on the phrase,turned by another technician which states that the market IS always lowest at the low. A moment's reflection WIll reveal the fact that there IS, indeed, a grain of wisdom m this apparently inane statement, in that hIstory will undoubtedly some day show that one of the Sickening plunges to new lows that have been part of the stock market expenence since 1973 was, mdeed, the last one. It WIll also have represented one of the better buying opportunities of the pa st few years, but, If history is any gUIde, this w!ll not be recognized in many quarters until a great deal after the fact. Dow-Jones Tndustrials '1200 p.m.) 735.22 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 76.17 Cumulative Index (8/15/74) 439.76 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opInion or Clny other motter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer 10 buy or sell ony seCIJrlty hon to be reliable, we In referred no way to or mentioned The matter 1 presented merely represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor for of the the sclao!nevmelelnentsCfmuodf ethheerseuinbSCArinbyer acWtIOhnileto ebebtealieevne the sources of our Informaby the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and informatIOn Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pasltlons or trade, In respect to any SeCUrltles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any ather Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy gIVe adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other lS5ue fUMher Informollon on any security menhoned herein IS available on request

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 23, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 23, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - August 23, 1974
View Text Version (OCR)

..— – TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 23, 1974 Ayear and a half ago, we published a series of four letters exammmg some of the impilcations of the ThenpopUTai theorY-ofgrowttl stock InvestmeOn ApiIU19-73 we P7IBfislles-umriiaryra-na1;onclu' sian based on those four letters. That summary is reprinted herewith,verbatim and in its entirety. There lS, of course, nothing new under the sun. The following quotation is an appropnate summary of what we have, in our series, lndicated was taklng place over the past few years. Selectivity took on a new character by reason of the overshadowing emphasis placed on expected future growth as the pnme criterion of an attractive investment. There was nothing wrong with these .. 1deas, except that it was almost impossible not to carry them too far. With encouragement from the past and a rosy prospect in the future, the buyers of 'growth stocks I were certain to lose their sense of proporllon and to pay excessive prices. The above is not Anthony Tabell writing in 1973 about 1971-72. It is Benjamin Graham writmg in 1951 about 1928-29. As readers may have gathered from our previous letters, we find ourselves, on this issue at least, comfortably in Dr. Graham's camp. Eut, If mindless projection of growth rates is not the simple key to investment success, what is an alternative philosophy We offer herewith three principles 1) Two and two make four. 2 There are no one-decision stocks. 3) Investor confidence varies more than earn- ings. Let us examine some of the implications of these three suggestions. It was Eernard Baruch who first suggested that in periods of market optimism it was necessary to repeat to oneself that two and two were four. We are, ln other words, willing to accept the intuitive conclusion that, when large numbers of buyers are agreed that a given method of investment lS a sure road to success, that method cannot prove viable over the long term. The enforcement of this principle 1S the function of the marketplace, and it is our belief that the market will be no less effic1ent in this task m the future than -it-hasbeenin'1hepast; — – – -',..,, – – – It should be made clear that what is being sa1d here implies no critiC1sm whatever of the fundamental merits of recognized growth issues, suggests that they should not sell at some premlUm over other 1ssues or affirms that they cannot under any circumstances be attractive purchase candidates. What we are suggesting, along with Graham, 1S that the concept that such 1ssues represent appropriate mvestment vehicles for conservative accounts, regardless of the pnce being paid, lS, to put it mildly, ludicrous. Secondly, we think the suggestion that there exists a class of one-decision stocks, where all that is necessary is to buy and hold, constitutes an abdication of the investment manager's responsibility. Were the mvestment manager perfect, his initial selections for purchase would, of course, be only those stocks which were going to provide the maximum long-term rate of return, and these could be held effec- tively indefinitely. Investment managers, however, are far from perfect. Each initial purchase memorial- izes the manager continually to decide whether to hold or not to hold, depending upon whether the original expectations are being fulfilled and to what extent the market price discounts these expectations. Finally, as we have pOinted out, the b1ggest factor in price change, over relat1vely long periods of time, tends to be caus ed not by earnings but by investor confidence in thos e earnings — this confidence being most readily expressed by the statlstic of the price/earnings ratio for individual stocks. Th,S fact has two implications. The first provides the reason for our convichon, which will surpnse no one, that technical analysis is an indispensible factor in the mvestment decision-making process. It 1S equally important m evaluating common stocks to have some idea of what the market is likely to pay for future earning power as it is to forecast what that eamlng power is going to be. Technical work, we think, is a most useful guide in making such a projection. The second implication of investor confidence variability is that price level, In relation to earnings and in turn to comparable vEduation of other stocks;-must beapri1ne criteria inlnveslment selectionIt'ls-' axiomatic that a stock having a low multlple, thus suggesting low investor confidence, has more potential on the upside should investor confidence increase and less risK on the downside should it continue to deteriorate. Willingness to ignore the price being paid, even in companies of the most prishne qualIty I involves, in our view, another abdication of the investment manager's responsibility by reason of the assumption of unnecessary risK. It may be suggested, of course, that recent markets have hardly tended to prove the soundness of these tenets vis-a-vis the simple-minded growth approach and, indeed, may even have suggested the opposite concluslon. We continue to believe, however, that the principles above represent viable guide- posts to a successful investment philosophy. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 706.82 S & P Compo '1200 p.m.) 73.24 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (8/22/74) 419.19 AWT/jb ..- No statement or expressIon af aplnion or any other matter herem contained IS, or , to be deemed to be, dtredly or Indirectly, on offer or the solIcitatIon of an offer to bvy or sell any securtty referred to or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the converolenc6' of the subscrtber Whde -Ne belIeve the sources of our mfarma- tlon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action 10 be token by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hIS own Inves\lgatlan and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, 0 a corporation, ond Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poslttons or trades m respect to any seclJrltles mentIoned In thIS or any flJtlJre ISSlJe, and SlJch POSitIon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issve Janney Montgomery Sc01l, Inc, which IS registered WIth the SEC 0 on mvestment adVIsor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of any statements mode m thIS or In any other ISSlJe FlJrther tnformatlan on any 5eClJrtty menhoned herem IS avadable on reqlJesl

Download PDF