Viewing Month: November 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 01, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 01, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 01, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —– – —,I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 1, 1974 A term familiar to those with even the most superficial knowledge of technical analysis is head-and-.-' -should ersfprmatlon-,,sed .to-lefer to..elther.a .bottom.ortop,reversa 1.,l'art oLthis..!a mlliarity .results, from the simple but graphic name which makes the formatlOn so easy to recognize on- a chat. A;other reason — , – for the familiarity is the fact that the formation has been discussed by some of the earliest writers on technical action, with references having appeared as early a s the 1920' s. As market analys is- ha s become more sophisticated, there has been some latter-day scepticism as to the predictive validity of the formation. One academic is reputed to have had his students reproduce it on a chart by flipping coins, an exercise whlch, if nothing else, should raise the question of just what those who are paying 6,000 a year for a college education are receiving for their money. In any event, the phenomenon of the head-and-shoulders formation is a well-known one in the financial field. As we said above, the formation has been discussed by many early writers, and it is described at some length in what, to many, is the bible of technical work, Technlcal Analysis of Stock Trends, by Robert D. Edwards and John Magee. Reproduced below, in the left-hand column, is Magee and Edwards' description of a head-and-shoulders bottom and, in the right-hand column, is a corresponding discussion of the action of the Dow-Jones Industria I Average in recent months. A. A decline, culminating a more or less extensive On July 24, the Dow reached a high of 805.77 down trend, on which trading volume increases not- and declined to a low of 627.19 on September 13. ably followed by a minor recovery on whICh volume Volume tended to run around 10-11 million shares runs less than it did during the days of final decline through mid-August building up in late August and and at the bottom. This is the 'left shoulder' early September to above 16 million shares on five separate occasions. Volume on the reversal day reached 18 million shares. The market then staged I–''''',—,.,.'.,,-''',…,,—……….-…..,.,……—''..,…-ee-3-dey7recovery-to67,7-.88withwolumeontheHFst two days running 13.7 and 11 million shares, respectively. B. Another decline which carries prices below the bottom of the left shoulder, on which activity shows some increase (as compared with the preceding recovery) but usually does not equal the rate attained on the left shoulder decline, followed by another recovery which carries above the bottom level of the left shoulder and on which activity may pick up, at any rate exceed that on the recovery from the left shoulder. This is the 'head ' From the 677.88 high of early September the Dow declined irregularly to a level of 584.56 on October 4. Volume on the final three days of the decline was 12.2, 13.1 and 15.9 million shares, respectively. This was followed by a sharp 6-day recovery to 673.50 (versus the September low of 627.19) culminated by three days of clos e to 20-million share volume, Including October 10, the highest volume day of the year when 26.4 million shares changed hands. C. A third decline on deCidedly less volume than accompanied the making of either left shoulder or head, which falls to reach the low level of the head before another rally starts. This is the 'right shoulder I From October 15 through October 28 another irregular decline ensued, with the Dow reaching a low of 633.84 just above the 627.19 low of September 13. Volume dropped off sharply on this decline, reaching a low of 10.5 million shares on the final day of the drop. D.- Finally ,-anadvanceOnwhich activity Increas- -,. Th-ere followed' a -2 1/2-day rally on'Tuesday;– —– es notably, which pushes up through the neckline Wednesday and Thursday morning of this week with and closes above it by an amount approximately e- the Dow reaching an hourly high of 678.82 on quivalent to 3 of the stock's market price, with a October 31. Volume picked up markedly on the rise conspicuous burst of activity attending this pene- with 20.1 million shares trading on Wednesday trati,on. This is the 'confirmation' or 'breakout'. and 18.8 million on rhursday. If there is any correlation above, it is, obviously, intended. Indeed, a large part of Magee and Edwards'description, with the exception of the last part of paragraph D, has already been fulfilled. This portion remains to be accomplished and, of course, the Dow pulled back sharply from its high on Thursday afternoon and Friday morning. In the case of the Dow, a level three percent above the neckline, obvious- ly around the 677 level would be 697. Were that level to be attained on continued rising volume, the con- clUSion, for anyone having any degree of faith in historical technical work, would be fairly obvious. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 667.40 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 74.12 ANTHONYW. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/31/74) 399.29 A,orT/jb No statement or e)'presslon of optnion or any other maHer here.n contotned is, or IS to be deemed to be, directly Of Indirectly, on offer or the s.ohcltoflon of on offer to buy or sell any secuflty referred fa or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the convel'lenee of the subertber While oNe believe the s.ources of our tnformahan fo be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the oceurocy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any oellon 10 be toen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCurities menTioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such POSition moy be ddferent from ony views now or hereoher e1pressed In thiS or any other bsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regIStered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry and olher customers Independently of ony statements mode tn thIS or In any other ISsue Further Informotlon on any seOJrlty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 08, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 08, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 08, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081;540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe -. ……….-'——;.—''- 4 It is occasionally our privilege to appear on portfolio Noyember-,,-8..,19 -……—-,-,.—,1,stratgy paels held- by thNe;' YorkSclety- of Security Analysts, and we enjoyed that privilege once more yesterday. The burden of our own re- marks was based on the following syllogism — the current level of stock prices is apparently dis- counting all economic possibilities with the exception of a worldwide depression. Therefore, if one does not expect such a depression, an aggressive attitude toward stock prices is warranted. One of our panel colleagues, an eminent Wall Street economist, was, properly in our view, less sanguine on the prospects for the economy than were we regarding the stock market. He looks for the probability of a continuing recession perhaps running through mid-1975 with corporate profits down on the order of ten percent for 1975 as a whole. He also conceded the possibility (approximately a 30- percent chance) that the actual 1975 economic scenario might be something worse than that. Now, in our opinion, as we have indicated repeatedly in the past, that something worse would have to be pretty bad in order to justify the current level of equity prices. However, if we postulate the more likely forecast suggested above, it is then necessary to try to project the possible effect of such a scenario 'On the stock market. To begin with, the fact that we are in a recession, and probably have been since the beginning of 1974, is not, perforce, an argument against purchases of common stock. The table below lists the last four identified recessions in the U. S. economy and gives the timing of the related stock price decline. As can be seen, stock prices began declining 5 to 15 months before the recessions started. Thus, if, in early 1974, when real Gross National Product began its decline, we entered into a reces- sion, the peak In stock prices in January, 1973, is a perfectly normal phenomenon. More interesting – . is Hie leat!of previousStock marketboftoms on recesslc;n-trou-ghAsca!lbes-eenthemarkBt;–inthe- four previous recessions, bottomed from 6 to 11 months prior to the economy. If we are then willing to accept the forecast that the current recession will bottom in mld-1975, the thesis of a stock market bottom In the fall of 1974 Is entirely in line with historical experience. Recession Recession Length Stock Months be- Stock Months be- Start End in Months Peak fore Start Bottom fore End July 1953 Aug. 1954 14 Dec. 1952 8 Sep. 1953 11 July 1957 Apr. 1958 10 Apr. 1956 '15 Oct. 1957 7 May 1960 Feb. 1961 9 Jan. 1960 5 Sep. 1960 6 Nov. 1969 Nov. 1970 13 Dec. 1968 12 May 1970 7 Jan. 1974 () June 1975 () 19 Jan. 1973 13 Nor Is the prospect of a decline in corporate profits of necessity an argument that stocks should move lower. For the twelve months ended June, 1974, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average earned 93.26, and an estimatedflgure for the 12 months ended September would be around 96. Hazarding a guess as to the fourth quarter is a bit iffy, but, in all probability, the figure will be relatively flat. If the fore- cast above is correct, earnings should turn down with the first quarter of 1975 and probably continue down on a 12-month basis throughout most of the year. However, there is absolutely no reason, on an historical basis, why this should necessarily pro- duce lower stock prices. In 179 quarters, from 1930 to date, earnings have advanced in 119 instances and declined in 60 cases. In 35 of the 60 quarters in which earnings declined, the market actually ad- vanced during the quarter. .c , ' … .-,- . . The reason for this is a phenomenon which we have documented in past issues of this letter — that multiples placed on earnings tend to move in the oppOSite dl rection from earnings themselves. Thus, in the 60 quarters when earnings declined, in 46 cases the multiple accorded those earnings rose from that of the previous quarter. The converse of this is most dramatically demonstrated by re- cent history, where earnings, since the 3rd quarter of 1971, have advanced some 80 percent, whereas the multiple given those earnings has declined from 16.6 to 6.3. Historically, in the 119 quarters which have shown rising earnings, multiples have declined in 81 instances. The cloudy corporate- profits picture is cited by many as a reason for not taking advantage of the current level of stock prices. This contention would hardly appear to be borne out by the historical record. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 667.40 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 74.77 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (11/7/74) 406.037 AWT/jb No siolemenl.o( exptesslon'of opinion or any olher maHer herein conlolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the ollcltollon of on offer to buy or e11 any securrfy referred to or mentioned, The moiler 1 presented merely for the COnvef'lence of the subSCriber While Ne beheve the 50urces of our 'nforma tlon 10 be relJ1lble, we In 1\0 way represent or guarantee Ihe accvracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein. Any action to be laken by the subcnber should be based 6n hiS own Investlgallon and information Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and In officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, P051lronl' or k-ades- (rt respett to any lecUfltles mention.ed In thl (If an.y future IHue, artd such POSition may be different from ony VleW now or hereaFter el(prened In tl'lIS or any.other 1ssl.JoC. 'Jann.eY Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch 15 reg!5terod With Ihe SEC as on I1westment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment adv,sory and other euslomCtl Ind.tpendcnl.ly 'f any, staternents mode In tn15 or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS aVOIlable an request – -'

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 15, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 15, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 15, 1974
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TABELLWS MARKET LETTER J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCtANOE, INC MEMSER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 15, 1974 A consensus is now being reached (having extended last week all the way to the Office of the – Pres ident of the U'S) that'theU ;'Seconomy is 'now'inarecession'9'o'manyrthatsuch a'con-'- OF census is necessary will be a surprise, since it is widely believed that economists have a clearly defined set of rules as to what a recession is. Such is not, in fact, the case. A recession is arbitrarily defined as such, usually well after the fact, by the prestigious National Bureau of Economic Research, and these gentlemen are generally uncommunicative about the criteria used. Veteran NBER-watchers, however, have come up with a rule of thumb. They have noted the fact that every time in the postwar period that real Gross National Product has declined for two consecutive quarters, the NBER has later defined that period as a recession. Since real GNP has now declined for three quarters, all of 1974 to date, it is thus agreed that the NBER will at some point in time get around to defining a 1974-7 recession. Yet in many ways it is a unique one. The following table shows the changes in current-dollar Gross Domestic Product, real Gross Domestic Product, and the price deflator for the 1929-33 de- pression, three of the four postwar recessions and the current period. (All figures are in billions ,and GNP is used for 1973-4). The differences are rather striking. In 1929-33, of course, physical output was declining sharply and prices were also declining, albeit not at a rate sufficient to keep pace with the decline in output. In 1953-54 and in 1957-58 current-dollar output was declining steadily,and rising prices Simply accelerated the stated decline in real output. In 1969-70, how- ever, and again today, we have a very different sort of an animal. In both cases current-dollar output was rising. It was the fact that prices were riSing at a faster rate, especially in 1973-74, that caused real-dollar output to decline. -What we are suggestin;f; of coUrse, is'that the major culprrtfiT'ine currenCinstan-c-e is not'fall.. ing output but riSing prices. In other words, inflation rather than recession. Whatever curative measures are considered, it seems to us, should take this factor into account. Current Dollar Change Real Gross Change Price Deflator Gross Domes- Annual Domestic Annual Change Year Quarter tic Product Rate Product .ocRca…te- Annual Rate 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Full Yr. 102.3 89.6 75.3 57.7 55.3 -12.4 -16.0 -23.4 – 4.1 202.2 181.9 167.9 142.9 140.3 – 7.7 -14.9 – 1. 8 – 2.6 – 9.0 -10.0 – 2.4 1953 1954 2 3 4 1 2 366.1 364.6 359.5 359.1 358.8 – 1. 7 – 5.4 – 0.4 – 0.3 415.0 412.4 407.5 401.4 400.6 – 2.4 – 4.7 – 5.8 – 0.8 0.7 – 0.7 5.7 0.4 1957 1958 – 1969 1970 3 444.0 4 439.5 1 432.8 3 – 937.6 4 944.8 1 954.0 2 966.5 3 982.5 4 986.8 – 4.0 – 6.0 3.1 3.9 5.4 6.8 1. 7 453.0 446. 435.7 ..725.3, 721. 3 717.1 718.5 723.2 715.1 – 5.9 – 9.1 – 2. – 2.3 0.8 2.6 – 4.4 1.9 3.5 – 5.4 6.4 4.5 4.1 6.4 1973 4 1344.0 1974 1 1358.8 2 1383.8 3 1411.6 Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 P.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 4.5 7.6 8.3 650.03 72.14 845.7 830.5 – 7.0 12.3 827.1 – 1.6 9.3 821. 1 – 2.9 11.5 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (11/14/74) 402.14 AWT/jb No statement or e)(prenlon of opinion or eny other motter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be. dlreClly or indirectly, on offer or 'he sollcltollon of on offel to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentlonod The motter IS presented merely for the COnVef'lenCE of Ihe subscriber While He bellevo the sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereol nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be loken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott. Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke. posllloM or trades In respect 10 any securities menhoned In Ihls or any future lSue. and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery colt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Iflveslmenl adVisor, moy give adVice to lIs Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or 1M any alher Issue Further IMformotlon on any security mentioned herein IS aVailable On request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 22, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 22, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 22, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGE. tNC MEM8ER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe November 22, 1974 ' I-I-….,Th'estock-!!la..!ket,has a nasty habit of shattering the hopes of those who wish to squeeze it in- – to neat little categorfes, and it dfdSo once aga'in in last week s t'ld-ing. We -had dlscui;-s-ed-In this space three weeks ago the possibility that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was forming an almost classic head-and-shoulders base formation with a potential right shoulder in, roughly, the 630-680 range. That particular possibility was disposed of last week, as what might have been a right shoulder was penetrated sharply on the downside. Viewed as a distributional top, the formation implied a test of the October 4 low, 573.22 on an intraday basis, which test was indeed taking place at week's end as the average flirted with the 600 level. 1 It is now, of course, necessary to ask what, in fact, has been altered by the week's market weakness. Certainly not the various indicators of market psychology which suggest a pervasive state of peSSimism — pessimism of the sort normally accompanying important lows. The weakness does not alter the fact, for example, that mutual fund cash position remained at record levels for the third month in a row in October, after reaching an almost astronomical 13.5 percent of total assets in September, this, incidentally, after adjusting for the presence of money-market funds. Nor does this week's downswing cancel out the unusually high levels of short selling recorded as the market rose during October. In three of the four weeks of that month, short sales were in excess of 10 percent of total volume, again, a level normally attained at important lows. Nor can the weakness alter what has already taken place, such as the astonishing reversal -' '- mf!1enumotthe Oc!obr,!9.pe.!iod ,1iVhich ,we have1Jcu.ssednthis spaGe n the past. ing that it is the sort of thing characteristic of past bottoms. '- t- The question which really needs to be asked at this juncture is whether last week's market downturn alters the basic conclusion that the market moved, in early October, out of a downtrend into what eventually will turn out to be an accumulation area of some sort. We do not, in sum, think that that conclusion is changed by last week's action. The only change, we think, is in the shape and timing of the potential base. Rather than rebounding from the 630-680 level as we might have hoped it would do, it now becomes obvious that further accumulation must take place at lower levels, levels around, or perhaps even slightly below, the low of October 4. There is ample historical precedent for this sort of thing. In May, 1970, the last major market bottom, it is true, the Dow, after rebounding from the 630 level to over 700, reba sed at the 680-720 level and then moved ahead on the upside, never seriously testing the May low. Similar action took place in the period October, 1957-April, 1958. In 1966, however, after reaching a climactic low in August at around the 760 level, the Dow, after rallying to approximately 820, plunged to a new low of 736 before completing its base formation. Likewise, in 1962, the May low around 550 was penetrated on two separate occasions, first in June and then again in October before a market advance finally ensued. What.we are.saying, of course, is.that, throughout market his!ory, base formations have taken many varied shapes, and there is no way of predicting what shape the current one will assume. We are suggesting, moreover, that a slight penetration of the early-October lows would not, of necessity, be a cause for alarm. The real question is whether or not we are now in a ba sing process. We think that the psychological factors referred to above, plus the obvious downtrend penetrations by a large number of individual issues, strongly suggest that sort of process is currently under way. Dow Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 615.77 S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 68.98 Cumulative Index (11/21/74 378.53 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or ony olner motler herem Con/Dined 1, or '10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sol1cllollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The matter 1 preented merely for Ihe convef'lenn. of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our InForma- tion ta be reliable, we m no way repres(!nt or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor ot the slOi(!ments mude herem Any actIOn to be token by the subscnber should be based on hiS own InveshgOllon and information Jonney Montgomery Scott, tnc , as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later talo-e, posItions Of trades In respect to any seCUrities mentIoned In thiS or any Future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh IS registered With Ihe SEC as on Investment odvisor, may give adVIce To Its mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of Clny slotement mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further Informotlon on any securrty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – November 29, 1974

Tabell’s Market Letter – November 29, 1974

Tabell's Market Letter - November 29, 1974
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMlte NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE November 29, 1974 -'Often anencoufaging signinth'EistocK ma-rKeifis'theaoility to'llOldih'tJ1e-dbwiiSldeonJectTve – of a previous distributional top rather than exceeding that objective by a considerable margin. For the time being, at least, the stock market did just that last week, reaching the 610-580 level which had been the downside objective of the distribution formation at 680-630 and rebounding sharply on Tuesday and Wednesday to close reaching a Wednesday intraday high of 633.45. While mildly encouraging, the week's action does not alter the uncertainties outlined in last week's letter. Although we can reaffirm the probability that the market, as of early October. entered a basing phase, it is still too early to predict what the shape of that base will be or where its lower limit will ultimately wind up. Equally difficult to predict is the eventual timing of the ul- timate ups ide breakout. One possible set of grounds for optimism, however, lies in the season into which we are en- tering, i. e., December. The table below gives the closing Dow-Jones Industrial Average for December 10, December 20 and December 31 of each year from 1926 to 1973, expressed as a per- centage of the November close. (Where the market was closed on the date, the previous close is used.) There is, as can be seen, a pronounced tendency toward an upside market in the month of December, particularly in the first third and the latter third of the month. In 37 cases out of the 48, the market closed higher in December than it had in November, and in 38 cases out of 48 it was higher at the close than it had been on December 20. In 31 instances the market was up between the November close and the tenth of December. However, there is sgme,ten.cie!H;yt9't1ar(t.YI'ea!c!ls.. q1 Itlid-month .'fItth .tlle .mSlIkethaying,.been dO'l1 from the tentlL!Q…. the twentieth in almost half of the cas'es .'- ' Year 12/10 12/20 12/31 Year 12/10 12/20 12/31 1926 101.96 102.68 100.42 1950 99.87 101.58 103.43 1927 99.08 101.37 102.11 1951 102.34 102.37 103.05 1928 89.97 96.12 102.26 1952 100.31 101.01 102.91 1929 109.73 96.63 103.99 1953 99.12 100.77 99.83 1930 94.87 92.38 89.74 1954 100.86 102.73 104.56 1931 87.84 86.02 82.99 1955 100.91 99.71 101.06 1932 108.70 104.31 106.35 1956 104.32 103.74 105.65 1933 104.87 97.09 101.79 1.957 97.64 94.96 96.85 1934 99.83 96.75 101.07 1958 101.36 102.96 104.89 1935 99.97 98.00 101.25 1959 102.06 102.65 103.06 1936 99.43 96.94 98.19 1960 102.29 102.95 103.13 1937 102.62 104.54 97.87 1961 100.92 100.13 101.32 1938 98.99 100.43 103.30 1962 99.35 99.88 100.43 1939 101.54 102.36 103.12 1963 102.50 101.54 101.66 1940 1941 1942 100.28 95.43 101.31 98.37 94.38 103.71 100.10 97.14 104.28 1964 1965 1966 98.60 100.64 102.71 99.23 100.58 100.38 99.85 102.38 99.25 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 104.22c 102.70 102.18 103.55 98.99 103.04 101.63 105.04104.88 102.21 103.39 98.90 100.76 104.69 104.30 100.93 100.98 103.29 103.56 102.96 104.48 –1967,' -,-101.3L 1968 99.25 1969 96.51 1970 103.40 1971 103.06 1972 101.47 1973 103.51 Average 100.77 ,101.27 98.16 97.24 103.61 106.46 98.69 100.71 100.28 103.35 95.80 98.53 105.65 107.08 100.18 103.48 101.37 Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 616.16 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 69.70 Cumulative Index (11/27/74) 382.12 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opInion or cny other motler herem contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the SOllellolion of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 Or mentioned The moiler 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While oNe believe the sources of our informatIOn 10 be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Ihereof nor of the stotemenls mude herein Any action 10 be laken by Ihe subscriber should be bosed on hiS own inVestigation and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 05 (I corpoml1on, and 11s officers or I!mploye-es, moy now have, or may later lake, pos.hons or Ifodes In respect to any seUrlt.cs menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positIOn may be d,ffl!rent from any views now or hereoftl!r eypreued In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which .s registered With the SEC as on Investment OdVIS(H, may give adVice 10 Its Investment advlory and other customers Independen11y of clOy stalements mode ,n this or In any olher Inue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS aVOIlable on request

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