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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 27, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 27, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - March 27, 1975
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,.- .. ….-r- . , I ITABELL'S I I MARKET I ) LETTER I –oil 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHA.NGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 27, 1975 ……..—/Last w8ek we presented twoalter-nativ,-esAacing thestock..markeLas-ltapproached….the80-Osu-pply-,,-ar-ea ,,- in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Earlier th1S week, aided by the dramatic news events from the Middle East, the market resolved these alternatives. In flve trading days the lliw-Jones Industrial Average cor- rected 1tself from 776.12 to 743.43 or 5.48. The short-term tops formed on our two-point unit and five- point umt charts mdicated a downs1de potential of 728-720; and on an intraday basis these objectives were approached. Subsequently the market reestablished its uptrend. The short time span (68 trading days) of the init1al phase of the bull market ( 36.17) coupled with the volatility of the general market provides us w1th a rationale for the continued sustamability of this move. We complete this week our review of the technical pos1tlOn of the major industry groups. Comments on individual stocks are based solely on technical factors and further information 1S available on request. OILS. The domestlC oils as a group have moved sideways smce advancing from their 1974 lows with no apparent improvement In relatIve strength indicated. The internationals also continue to show poor relative strength action and we would avoid purchases for capital appreciation at current levels. PAPERS. Although group actlOn of the paper stocks has been neutral, lOdividual issues have made sub- stantial percentage gains. These stocks would mclude Crown Zellerbach (32), International Paper (41) and Union Camp (53). The moves appear to be part of a long-term consolldation phase and time w1ll be needed to work through heavy overhead supply. An interesting buy candidate is Weyerhauser (33). Ab1lity to reach 36 would indicate long-term ups1de objective of 62. Support is present under current levels. RAILROADS. In spite of disappointlOg relat1ve strength action of this group, we continue to feel Burlmgton Northern (36), Norfolk & Western (64), which have minor short-term tops, can be purchased on weakness as downside objectives are reached. Also, Seaboard Coasthne (29) continues to trade in strong support area lOdicating higher levels for the longer term . .- – RML-ROAB-EQUWMEN'l'. .One of4hemost-attracHvepatterns1OHtlS-group-is cAmtedIndustne-5e),- -.-.-1–11 whlch recently broke out of base formation mdicating an upside object1ve of 76. Strong support is present in m1d-40 area. Pullman (45) continues to trade in long-term neutral pattern. The ab1lity to reach 51 would break out of 1tS trading area with an upside potential 10 the mid-70's. RETAILING. The long-term relat1ve strength of the retailing department stores remams positive and we would cons1der purchases on weakness. Federated Department Stores (40), Kresge (25), May Department Stores (33) and J. C. Penney (56) are all in the process of broadening potentially constructive base forma- tions; however, time will be needed to develop these patterns in order to penetrate heavy overhead supply. Strongest area 10 retailing group continues to be the fooo stores and we recommend purchase of American Stores (35) which mdicates an upside objective of 46-64 and Safeway Stores (44) wh1ch has an upside objec- tive of 60. Strong support is present under current levels. RUBBERS. Although stocks in this group appear to have reached downSide object1ves, substant1al llme will be needed to improve technical patterns. The exception in this group is Bandag (33). The ability of this constructive pattern to reach 37 would mdicate long-term ups1de objective of 70. SAVINGS AND LOAN. Recent short-term relative strength of these stocks has been impress1ve, most stocks appreciating 100 from their 1974 lows. However, from these levels stocks appear to be encounter- ing heavy overhead supply and we feel time w1ll be needed for further advances. SOAPS. W1th strong support under current levels, Colgate-Palmolive's (29) ab111ty to reach 31 would break stock out of major long-term base indicatmg higher levels. Purchase is Justified. Proctor & Gamble's (94) techmcal pattern 1S neutral. Ab1lity to reach long-term ups1de breakout of 108 mdlCates mitial upside objective of 150. SOFT DRINKS. Coca-Cola (79) has broken out of a long-term base formatlOn wh1ch mdicates a poten- tia1120. Pepsico (60) also-has'broken'out'of'a'base formation which-indlcates ups1de objeCt1ve oe75.- We' would continue to hold both securities but look for short-term relat1ve strength deteriOratlOn. STEEL. Long-terrn pattern of major steel companIes continues to be most constructive. Bethlehem Steel (34), Republic Steel (32) and U.S. Steel (57) have broken out of maJor base formations lndlCatlOg higher levels and we feel purcha se j ustifled. Also ,Armco (30), Inland (40), Wheeling Pittsburgh (25) have strong technical patterns and we would consider purchase on weakness for the long term. UTILITIES. Electric utihtles continue to show below average relative strength and lMe would aVOid pur- chases at current levels. The natural gaS-OIl pipelInes, however, we feel present an interesting buymg opportunity and we would suggest Houston Natural (33) and Northern Natural (58) as buy cand1dates. Also, Kaneb SerV1ces (20) on the American Stock Exchange appears attracllve at current levels. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 771.59 ANTHONY W. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 83.96 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (3/26/75) 474.18 RJS/jb No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, ar IS to be deemed to be, directly or md,rectly, an offer or the SOliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlioned The matter IS presented mllrely for the converlence of the wbscflber While He believe the sources of our Information to be rellCble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Thereof nor of the Iatements mude he'em Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own mveshgahon and Information Janney Montgomery SColt, Inc, as a corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now have, or may later Toke, POSitions or trades In respect to any securltle mentioned In thiS or any future ISSue, and such pOSition rn.oy be ddferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In th.s or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode ,n thiS or In any other laue further information on any secl.mty mentioned herem IS available On request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 04, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 04, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - April 04, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE I April 4, 1975 J maybecalledthe.fir.st,The,m,Ir(eLhas beenuncjergning, .IJ).thepasttw.ow.eeks ,whaJ .significant respite in the almost unprecedentedly sharp advnce which began on De;;emb; 6' f last yer t 57'7.60– on the Dow and which carried 36.2 to 786.53 on March 17, a penod of 68 trading days. Over a five- day period ending on March 24, the Dow lost some 43 pOints for a 5 1/2 correctIOn before rallying sharply on Tuesday and Wednesday a week ago to reach a closing high of 778.26. Since that time, the averages have again declined, with some wide intraday fluctuations, and ,as of this writing, are testing last week's lows. This strikes us as perfectly normal action since, at the lows of two weeks ago, most market indices, the Transportation and Utility averages as well as the Industrials, had reached the down- side objectives of the small tops that had been formed. Thus, a period of fluctuatIOn will be necessary in order to build a ba se for a new leg of the advance. As was predictable, with the unpleasant memories of 1973-74 so fresh in our minds, the first SIgn of any downside activIty brought forth the usual rash of predictions that the bull market was over or that, indeed, it had not been a bull market at all, but only an interruption in the plunge into the abyss which purveyors of the apocalypse had assured us was commg. ,This latter sort of reasoning seems to us to be particularly specious. Even if St. Patnck's Day, 1975, proves to have been the high point of the advance 'which, in our view, IS highly unlikely), it requires an act of supreme semantic contortion not to call a 36 advance a bull market. Those forecasters who have been conSistently calling for lower levels and those mvestors who spent the first quarter of 1975 sitting on large piles of cash have, quite frankly, missed the boat and can best start off by admitting the fact. The real question, of course, is just what is the technical SIgnificance of the downswing. As we have pOinted out in this space in the past, the tendency of bull markets in the postwar period has been – t o goa—-grea t- deaI-lon;Jer–than-68trad.ing da-ysilief0rethef.irs t;5-correGtion-ensuedW ethmLthefa ct…..- . – that one has taken place this early IS just another demonstration of the fact that markets of late have taken on a great deal more volatility, a volatllity in many ways more characteristic of the 1930's than of the pos twar period. The downswing from January 11, 1973, through October, 1974, for exa mple, had no fewer than 23 swings of 5 or more. It is highly possible that its upside aftermath will demonstrate a like volatility. It should be noted, ,oreover, that in no bull market since the 1920's has the first 5 correction denoted the end of the upswing. It has most often denoted a loss of momentum and meant that the rate of advance compared With that of the initial rally was becoming relatively more slow. This IS, we thmk, the case m the present instance. We have been usmg for some time a projected upside target of 850 for the Dow and have been unwilling, by and large, to look beyond this. The 850 figure is arrived at in two ways. It is, first of all, the most plausible upside obJectlVe for the base formed in the October-December period, and it is confirmed by the bases formed on other averages be- side the Dow, almost all of which suggest a move of like magnitude. Secondly, 850 constitutes an area of Significant overhead supply. For a period starting with the last two weeks of November in 1973 and continumg through the end of June, 1974, the Dow spent most of ItS time trading in a range between, roughly, 825 and 875, With only occasional downthrusts below this area, to around the 790 level. It did this, moreover, on fairly heavy volume, especially in the early part of the period. It has long been our contention that the market's behavior when this supply was reached would be the major determmant of its future action. We are now reaching the pomt where such a test is taking place, t he Dow havmg backed off two weeks ago from the very lowest part of this supply. Moreover, a great many mdivldual stocks, which have outperformed the averages, are now reaching the price levels at which they traded in the early part of 1974 before the final phase of the bear market-break'. In a great many cases; these mdivldual- issues, predictably enough, have begun to back and fill as they reach their individual supply areas. Our own feeling, then, IS that the most likely market scenario is more or less as follows. We would expect the advance m the averages to continue, in fits and starts, and with wider swings back and forth, to around the 850 level. We would expect that that level will prOVide suffiCient resistance to restrain the market on the upside for probably the remainder of 1975. If individual stocks in significant numbers beglr to move through their 1974 supply levels, It would be bullish, mdeed, and possible to project a highly constructive market climate for 1976 and beyond. If the overhead supply turns out to produce Significant distribution, however, a reassessment of the outlook at that point would then be warranted. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 749.92 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 81.26 Cum'cllative Index 4/3/75 466.06 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of Op'nlQn or any other motter herein contolned IS, Or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCltotlon of an offer to bvy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the (onverlence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our nformo tlon to be relloble, we In no way represent or guorontee the accuracy thereof nOf of the Uotements mude herein. Any aCllon 10 be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporotlon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or moy loter toke, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other IUue Jonney Montgomery 5colt, Inc, which IS regtered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other lSue Further information on ony security mentioned herein IS avoiloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 11, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 11, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - April 11, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, 'NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMeEA NEW YORI( STOCI( eXCHANGE, INC MEMBeR AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 11, 1975 . We JO , had the -.. pleasurelast week — .,.F – – oL,ttending.. — — a . m – ee – ti n g of.the – Mar …….. k- et–T-e-c.hn i c i a n' s- A-s sociatio..n… '- a professional organization composed of our fellow practitioners of market analysis and one dedicated …. to raising the standards of that profession. The theme of the meeting was the growing use of techni- cal analysis by professional investment managers and the conclusion was, indeed, that such use had been mcreasing. A secondary theme emerged, suggesting that the reason for this increasing use was that, over the past two or three years, at least, technical analysis had been right or more useful in determining portfolio policy, while fundamental analysis had been wrong or less useful. Now, obviously, as practicing technicians, we are willing to defend the use of technical analysis. but in this case we would also like,at least partially,to defend our fundamentalist brethren. To the extent that fundamental analysis has been wrong since the early part of 1973, it is not, in our view, that the principles of security analysis have been incorrect but that inept security analysis has been in- correct. Let us illustrate what we suggest by this statement. From the first quarter of 1973 through the third quarter of 1974, corporate prof,its rose steadily, earnings on the Dow, for example, increasing from just over 70 to just under 100. During precisely the same period, the stock market went through the most severe bear market it had seen since the 1930's. In the fourth quarter of 1974, earn- ings flattened out and will undoubtedly decrease rather sharply in the first quarter of 1975. That same period has seen one of the sharpest rises in the stock market during the postwar period. To the extent, therefore, that the fundamental analyst has concentrated on forecasting quarter- to-quarter earnings changes and making buy and sell recommendations based thereon, he has, in fact, been wrong. Yet precisely that error has been committed over and over again. It is quite easy to ,teJTlontrlte tha!lacYBf,thlg .ort.of appoi'chillJerJTlcs .. o,!he vrg,-..a.',ehaveone.q9I1e , .. ut , the mistake tends to be committed more often in terms of individual stocks. All too often buy and sell recommendations are made on nothing more than a projection of increasing or decreasing earnings. The now-thoroughly-discredited one-decision theory was nothing more than an extension of this fallacy, suggesting, two years ago, that the favorite growth stocks were appropriate conservative in- vestment vehicles because their earnings were continuing to increase, without regard to the price being paid for those earnings. None of this, however, is a criticism of security analysis itself. It is simply a criticism of security analysis misapplied. The suggestion that technical work, to the extent that it was able to forecast the market decline of 1973-74 and the subsequent rise in 1975,was correct and that funda- mental analysis, to the extent that it failed to anticipate these phenomena,was incorrect, raises some interesting paints about the relative roles of the people who are, or should be, involved in portfolio strategy deciSions — the security analyst, the technician and the portfolio manager. We have often suggested, not entirely facetiously, to our fundamentalist colleagues, a golden rule that the security analyst should be prohibited from ever using the words buy or sell. We are, incidentally, perfectly willing to extend the same prohibition to the technician. It is the third party, the portfolio manager, who should ultimately make the buy or sell decision. Quite obviously, inputs from the security analyst and the technician should be important to him in that decision, but they will not be the sole inputs, since he must also concern himself with the nature and objectives of the funds under management. What we are saying, in other words, is that it is the role of the security analyst to present facts about individual companies and industries. These facts include shorterand-longer-range .earnings – -projections, assessment of the factors that-ight cuse chan'ges in these projec-tiOM, anaiysis of financial condition and, not least, an assessment of the relative value offered by a given security at a given price both on an historical basis and compared with alternative investment opportunities. All of this can be done without once uttering the two no-no words above. The techniCian, equally, can concern himself with identifying the major and minor trends for an individual security and for the general market and with an assessment of the prospects for a reversal of those trends. This also can be accomplished without specific suggestions of purchase or sale. The portfolio manager, adequately supplied with the inputs mentioned above, coupling them with his own professional expertise and knowledge of the requirements of and risk aversion of the funds under management, is well-equipped to make the ultimate purchase or sale decis'ion. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 783.09 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 83.79 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL Cumulative Index (4/10/75) 468.23 AWT/jb No statement or e)tpre10n of opU'lIon or any other matter here'n contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the OII(;.lollon of an offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or menhoned The matter IS presented merely for the convellence of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by Ihe subscfI\ler should be based on hiS own Invesllgahon and Information Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its oHlcers or employees, may now hove, or may loter toe, positions or trade In respect to any securities menloned In thiS or any future ISSUe, and such position may be different from any vlev..s now or hereafter epressed In t!'us or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, tnc , which IS rllglslered With the SEC os on mveSTment adVisor, may give adVice to its Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Funher mformatton on cny security menttoned heretn IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 18, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 18, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - April 18, 1975
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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE fiOAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe – April 18, 1975 –. -T- h..-e stock market – ' . -.- . reminded us -. – – once more last .– – , – w-.-ee.-k t h-.a-t bul l m' -a r k-e ts be.. ….– ha ve li – k-e- bull – mar-k.-ets..;;. .. …….oc ,- During the latter part of March, the sharp advance from the December lows had suffered its first mod'' erately protracted interruption, declining some 5 1/2 over a sui-day period. There ensued a three- day rally, a six-day ,test of the previous lows, and that was it. The past eight trading days have seen a 76-point advance on the Dow, from a close of 742.88 on April 7th to Thursday's close of 819.46. Many observers, even before last week's rally, have expressed surprise at the velocity of the advance. We have, ourselves, noted that recent events suggest the emergence of a market volatility more reminiscent of the 1930's than the 1950's and 1960's. Yet in a way, it is unsurprising that the advance from the 68Q to the 780 level on the Dow took place over a short period of time — unsurpris- ing in the sense that there was almost total lack of overhead supply between those two points. The following table breaks the range of the Dow for the 1973-74 bear market into 10-point brack- ets and shows, for each 10-polnt range of Dow-Jones closes, the number of days between January 11, 1973, and December 6, 1974, on which the market closed in that range. It also shows the total vol- ume for thos e days. DOW-JONES NO. OF TOTAL DOW-JONES NO. OF TOTAL … RANGE —— – DAYS .. VO-L-U-M-E—- RANGE DAYS VOLUME ——— ———– 570 580 1 15,500,QOO 820 830 18 263,970,00 580 590 3 41,950,0('0 830 840 16 237,260,000 590 600 2 26,200,000 840 850 25 317,870,0;;0 600 610 8 111,96Q,00r 850 860 33 478,920,QOG 610 620 – – -.620–6'30 6 75,850,000 -3-4'3'0'(''O 860 870 8'10–8'30 18 26t,260,000 26-.-364 ,10-.0(lO 630 640 6 84,350,00. 8.0 890 25 355,160,000 640 650 8 133,030,00(; 890 900 20 305,340,000 650 660 14 20r,140,OOO 900 910 15 217,940,0.1(; 660 670 10 158,270,000 910 920 16 242,820,000 670 680 11 178,020,0('0 920 930 17 267,310,0'0 680 690 2 28,2'0,000 930 940 15 240,140,000 690 70n 0 0 940 950 14 234,030,00( 70r. 710 1 15,690,OOfl 950 960 19 303,550,000 710 720 1 1,650,OO 960 970 20 3 .. 4,370,000 720 730 2 25,490.01)\ 970 980 21 349,790,000 73n 740 2 21.640,Qon 980 990 5 87,920,00 740 750 1 11,750.000 990 -10O', 5 86,270,000 750 760 5 57,320,000 10nl, -1010 2 42,000,000 760 770 4 43,860,00; 1010 -1020 2 34,630,00 7,0 780 (, 78,50C.OOr 1020 -1030 5 93,20,OGG 780 790 8 11 3,370.0 0 1030 -.1040 1 22,230,00 790 80n 80n 810 8 95,480,OnO 16 218,730,00 1040 -1050 1050 -1060 0 1 25,05C,I)O 810 820 15 222.230.000 As the table clearly suggests, the break from 780 to 680 was so sharp that there were very few days with very little volume while the market was trading in that range. There were only 24 days dur- ing the bear market on which the Dow traded between 780 and 680'land less than 300 million shares of volume,occurred-in that,price range. By contrast, as the table.shows, the volume of trading-in the range 800-860 was intense. There were 123 trading days on which the Dow closed within that range, and the total volume for those trading days was a staggering 1.7 billion shares. As can be seen from the table, the price range with the heaviest trading was between 850 and 860 where almost a half bil- lion shares changed hands on 33 trading days. The paucity of overhead supply between 680 and 780 goes a long way toward explaining the ease with which the stock market has been able to accomplish its rise from January to mid-March. The heavy supply in the low 800's, however, suggests some possible difficulty in extending this rate of rise much longer. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 816.88 86.85 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (4/17/75) 483.20 AWT/jb No statement or epreS5lon 01 opinion or any other motter herln on'otned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dHectty or Irldlfectly, on offer or the soliCitatIOn of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe conver,ence of the subscriber While we belllilVe the sources of our Informa- tion to be rellcble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof ncr of the stolementt mude herem Any action to be token by Ihe subSCriber should be bosed on hl own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, pOltlans or trades In respect to any secufltles mentioned In thiS or any future ISsue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed rn thIS or any other Issue Janney Montg.omery Scolf, Jnc, which IS registered With the SEC as on ,vestment advls-or, may give adVice to Its rnvestment adVisory and othel ClJstamers Independently af any statements made In Ih,s or rn any other Issue Further onformahon on any security mentioned herein 15 available n reql,lesl

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 25, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 25, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - April 25, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBEA AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 25, 1975 -Marketacticinovr tl1epastweek has follc;ceci(namil1ar pittern—–After attainintab-ull mar– –,, ket closing high of 819.46 on April 17 — with an intraday high of an astonishing 835.18 — the Dow dropped off sharply, rallied a bit, and then began a 2 1/2-day slide to an hourly low of 797.48 on Thursday before again moving ahead. As of midday Thursday, the average had actually reached the most plausible downside objective of the miniscule distributional top that had been formed, the decline being of even less magnitude than the six-day drop which occurred during the third week of March. All of this simply underscores the fact that corrections in bull markets tend to be rather short, tepid affairs. Normal action at this point would call for a short period of consolidation followed by another upward move, in all probability to new high territory. Markets like the present one are actually the easiest environment in which to operate, at least as far as the market technician is concerned. As a technician, he is aware, as Harold Schreder was probably the first to pOint out, that stocks and the stock market are moving objects and display the dynamics associated with moving objects. A market that has established a great deal of momentum, upward in the present instance, does not, historically, turn on a dime. It, instead, goes through a long process of slowly lOSing upside momentum before the balance ultimately shifts in favor of the downside. The technician is also aware that this process tends to be more protracted at tops than at bottoms. Bottom reversal patterns can often form quickly, the last one, a scant three months long in October – December, 1974, being a perfect example of the genre. Tops tend, on the other hand, to be more protracted affairs with upside momentum being dissipated very slowly and with noticeable sideways movement before the balance finally – -Snlftstothe'downsTile—Sucha process-,- needless to say;-ifirideea ifha-g'b'egun -at all–;-fs no''w,–.of-;,i, in its earliest stages. The other thing that makes the present sort of environment easy for the technician is that he has a fairly clear-cut idea of what he should be looking for. There are a number of characteris- tic indicators that have had a tendency to behave in certain ways at past reversal pOints. It is, quite obviously, with these indicators that the technician should be spending a great deal of his time. At the moment the great bulk of these devices show absolutely no negative connotations whatsoever. Three possible exceptions to the above should be noted. The first is the existence of heavy overhead supply at around the 850 level which was discussed at some length in last week's letter. The second possible negative is market breadth. No major bear market in recent experi- ence (with the exception of 1968-70 in which breadth deterioration took a different but notice- able form) has begun without a so-called breadth divergence, l.e., an instance of the Dow Jones Industrial Average attaining new high ground without an accompanying high in daily and weekly breadth indices. The potential for such a divergence now exists. Our own daily breadth index, as an example, reached its high on March 17 and did not move into new high ground on last week's rally. However, there is no reason why this factor, at the moment, should be interpreted negatively. In many cases in the past, confirmation of new highs by breadth has taken place only after a three or four month delay and, furthermore, divergence has tended to lead actual tops by periods of as long as a year. 'jhe condition, however, remains present and should be watched – — — – …, –….., — —– – – – – – – . —- A third possible negative is the action of the Dow-Jones Utility Average which made its high back in early February and failed to attain new highs either in the March or April ralhes. Like breadth, however, this negative indication could easily be cancelled by ability of the util- ities to rebase and move toward their former highs. We have, quite clearly, now reached the stage where we should be looking at indicators cf loss of upside momentum, and we have tried to suggest above some of the things that ought to be scrutinized. This scrutiny will, of course, continue, but, at the moment, it results in no dis- covery of evidence suggesting substantially lower prices. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 807.96 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 86.49 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index 4/24/75 AWT/jb 481. 02 No statement or expression of opmlon or ony other motter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,nd,rectly, on offer or the 50ilcltohon of on offer to buy or sell ony SeC\Hlty referred to or mentioned The moIler IS presented merely for the conVe1lenCE of the subSCriber, While we believe the sources of our Informotlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be tocn by the subscllber should be based on hiS ONn Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scol!, Inc, as 0 corpora/Ion, and 115 officers or employees, may now have, or may loler take, poslitons or Irades 1M respect 10 any surltles mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such pOSItion may be dllferent from ony views now or hereaher expressed 1M thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Seot, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on IMvestment adVisor, moy give odvlCe to Its IMvestmenl adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or 1M any other Issue Further mformallon on ony security mentioned herem IS ovolloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 02, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 06540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – May 2, 1975 -…– We have noted in this space in the past that the stock market has, of . …… — – ………. ……. 0 — -.–'-la'te,be.ens.l..-emo-nst-r-at-ingvOLo.- la-, – …… tility-more sirtiilaYto that -of the-r9Td'stiian tne 1940-1970 period. It is, perhaps, worthwhile to document some of the tentative evidence in favor of this conclusion. One mea sure of volatility in a given year is the number of days showing large percentage changes, either up or down, during that year. The following table shows the number of trading days in each year since 1926 that the percentage change of the Dow fell …within various ranges between under 1 and over 5. YE AII -u 1-21 2-31 341 4-51 sr . -..YEU -1I 121 -!I 341 4-51 5h 121 133 55 e I I III 1'151 255 2e 0 0 I'J IU1 1&4 4 c I 0 0 1'152 210 II 01 III '12e 2\4 &8 A 4 III I U5 235 I'! I III III III 1'12'1 154 84 25 II 5 12 1'154 235 15 2 I!I 0 I'J 1'130 14 'II i!& 20 8 4 155 ill4 3(11 1 III III I 1f/31 102 'II 56 il5 13 \3 15 ill 32 III III I'J '1'II! 'I &0 4& 34 i!'! 35 1'157 ill2 32 1 III I 1'133 120 71! n 27 !1 15 235 1& I 01 134 1'12 H 21 2 2 2 1'15'1 il1 3! I III 0 III 1'135 233 5'1 'I 0 0 I'IU 212 3'1 I 0 III 0 1'131 244 44 12 I III 1'111 228 22 III 0 II 01 ' .1937 181 73 20 1 & 7 1'1&2 188 50 l! I 1 1'138 1&I A2 3'1 12 5 2 1'163 237 \I 20I \'13'1 21'1 55 1'1 II I 1'1&4 208 '3 0 0 0 III 1940 cO 37 1 1'101 257 9 3 –.,…,.,, '19irz-' i! 5 7'0 0—il 143 218 !0 c 3 2 0 I 4 i 1'1&5 3'1 00J.'I&2(11 0 0 1&7 232 II 0 I'IH 21118 13 44 19 1& 0 0 (lO – 20' (11' .. – 'II II 0 i! 0 0 1\ 1944 2'11 7 0 0 0 19&9 218 32 II 11 0 145 257 28 I 0 0 0 1'17(11 1'12 51 8 2 III I 1'146 213 48 13 4 i! I 1'171 2\7 34 1 I e '1947 235 42 5 I 0 1'I7 25 2& 0 0 0 ' ,1'148 241 29 5 2 01 0 1973 15'1 7'1 10 4 II ,I'ln 2&1 21 II II 0 0 IHO 134 75 4 8 2 1'1'''' 242 31 & I I III 191 os 2'1 8 I 0 'The statistics are interesting. For the years 1926 through 1928, a highly placid market climate pre- vailed in which well in excess of 200 trading days saw percentage changes of less than 1, and there were very few wide swings. This abruptly changed in the 1930's. In the bulk of these years, the number of days on which the percentage swing was under 1 was just a bit more than half of the total trading days, and the number of days in which the percentage change ran between one and two per cent generally reached 70 or better. Likewise, especially during the 1929-32 bear market, there were a number of days on which percentage swings were considerably wider. Then, starting in 1940, as can be seen, the pattern of the 1920's returned and remained pretty consis- tent through the period. The only years in which a noticeable increase in volatility took place were the bear market years of 1962 and 1970. In 1973, as near as we can tell, the pattern abruptly reversed itself. Both 1973 and 1974 saw fewer days with a percentage change of less than 1 than any year since 1933. Likewise, the number of days on which price change ran 1 or greater exceeded any-year since the-lafterpart6fTlfe-1930(S – A partial explanation of this lies in the fact that 1973-74 constituted a continuing bear market, and volatility, as the table clearly shows, tends to increase in such a climate. What is interesting, however, is that the pattern is continuing so far into 1975, one of the sharpest up-years in market history to date. If one were to annualize the 1975 figures, for example, there would only be 137 trading days with less than 1 change, 88 where the change was 1-2 and 27, where the change exceeded 2. Thus, the vola- tility pattern established in 1973 apparently continues. If this sort of thing is, indeed, the wave of the foreseeable future, it is quite obvious that some of the investment strategies a ppropriate to the last 30 years may be inappropriate in the 1970's. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 840.82 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 88.94 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (5/1/75) 483.34 AWT/jb –N-,-,-'o-',-m-,,-'-'–'–'–'''-0'-0-'-''-'0-0-0-'-oo-y-,-th-,-,-m-o'–,–h,-,,-,,-'-o–o,-,,-d–,–o-,-,,-,-,-b-,-d.-,-m-,d–'-,-b-,-d-,,-,,-'-,-,,-od,-,,ct'y,-oo-';ff'-''-;'h'-'O',,o,,,;o'-;o-o;;ff'' to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convenlena. of the subscriber. While we bell!!ve Ihe SOUfces of our Informa- tion 10 be relmble we In no way represent or guorantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any octlon 10 be token by Ihe subscriber should be bosed on hiS own' ,nveshgollon and mformOhOl Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as () corporOhon, and lIs officers or employee may now hove, or may loler loke, POSitions or trodes In fCSP!!ct 10 any secUrities mentioned on Ihls or cny future Issue, and such POSlllon moy be dlfferen from ony views now or hereofter e'pressed in thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wiln Ihe SEC os on ,nvestment odvlsor, may g,ve adVice to Its investment adVisory ond olhel customers mdependently of any tatement mode m thiS or .n any other Issue Further Information on any secullty mentioned here.n IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 09, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMeE R NEW YORK STOCk eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 9, 1975 We first suggested in this space on January 10 that the most plausible upside objective for the Dow, – , assuming theOctober.-December-,-1975 double bottomto-be'abase format-ion,was850-.This'week;–less- I– than four months later after a move which astonished most observers, including ourselves, by its rapidity, the Dow reached a closing high of 855.60, thus attaining the objective of the base completed in the latter three months of last year. As we have been noting in recent issues of this letter, the momentum of the advance should from this point on be more severely tested, since the overhead supply of stock existing at current levels remains heavy. We have, since January, been using the Dow as a benchmark for talking about the general market and, indeed, if one looks at the performance of that index versus the other major indices since the lows of last October, there is reaJly not much overall difference. The Dow, as of Monday, was 46.3 above its October low, the S & P 500, 44.6 and our CumulatlVe Index was lagging slightly behind, having posted a 35.5 advance from its October bottom. However, if one breaks the performance of the three indices into shorter time intervals, an interesting phenomenon emerges. The following table shows the level of the three averages at various turning paints between October 4, 1974, and May 5, 1975. Cum Cum Cum DIIA Chg. Chg. S&P Chq. Chq. CUM. Chq. 10/4/74 584.56 62.28(10/3) 355.91 11/5/74 674.75 15.4 15.4 75.21(11/7) 20.8 20.8 410.31(11;11) 15.2 15.2 12/6/74 577.60 -14.4 – 1.2 65.01 -13.5 4.3 359.99 -12.3 1.1 1/10/75 658.79 14.1 12.6 72.61 11.6 16.6 399.50 11.0 12.2 1/21/75 641.90 3/17/75 786.53 – 2.6 22.5 9.8 34.6 70.70 86.01 – 2.6 21.6 13.5 403.56 38.1 491.52 1.0 13.3 21.8 38.1 3/24/75 743.43 – 5.5 27.1 81.42 I .4/17/7-5819.40..,..,.A–JO ..240 .1–87.-25 – 5.3 30.7 466.98 – 5.0 31.2 ,'7—2—4-o1-4-83–20- —5—3-;8—1-'. 4/29/75 803.04 5/5/75 855.60 – 2.0 6.5 37.3 46.3 85.64 90.08 . 1.8 37.5 478.64 5.2 44.6 489.55 – 1.0 34.4 2.3 37.5 What is quite clearly shown is that the Dow was underperforming the other averages during the base- building stage of the advance from October to December and about equaling their performance on the ini- tial phase of the raJly from January to March. Since that time, the Dow has been outperforming the other averages and in effect has caught up with them and passed the'll. As the table shows, the first obvious instance of underperformance by the Dow was its move to a new low in December which both of the other averages refused to confirm. Its October-November rally was considerably less than that of the S & P and its November-December decline was steeper. In mid-January, of course, all three averages broke out of their base formations and staged the most dynamic phase of the advance, terminating on St. Patrick's Day, 1975. For this period aJl three of the advances were Similar, but the Dow, having underperformed previously, was stiJllagging the other two. As can be seen, however, the recent history is just the reverse. The Dow has clearly outperformed both the S & P and Our Cumulative Index on both the March-April and April-May rallies, and the S & P 5'00 has, equally noticeably, outperformed the Cumulative Index. Quite obviously, the most recent month and a half of the upmove has been concentrated to a large degree in Dow- Jones components. What are we to make of aJl this It is, first of aJl, not that unusual a phenomenon, very possibly caused by the fact that buyers ,after a long bear market, tend to prefer the relative security of familiar, blue-chip names. The Dow's strength has, of course, produced the potential divergence between the Dow and breadth, to which we have referred in past issues of this letter. The Dow has scored two suc- f cessive raJlies!onew hi9hos (long wih the P 50.Q.t a lesser eox!ent) ,hilebreadt.!'.5nd ;,urCuula;. -,- t!ve Index)-have failed to conhrm'these highs. However, the action of breadth has been good enough so that a future confirmation could come at any time,so that we are not as yet deeply disturbed by the phenomenon. A large part of the discrepancy, we think, can be explained away simply enough by the fact that many Dow components were deeply undervalued in relation to the market at last faJl's depressed levels and have simply been correcting that undervaluation over the past few months. Indeed, a great many of those same components indicate even higher levels from a technical point of view. Thus, while the above-average Dow performance may constitute evidence of some narrowing of the advance, we do not think that narrow- ing is yet pronounced enough to become unduly disturbed about the general market outlook. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 845.67 S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 90.12 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (5/8/75) 492.99 AWT/jb No statement or e.presslon of opmlon or any other matter herein contamed IS. or 1510 be deemed to be. directly or Indirectly. On offer or the sollcltallon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for the convef'iencc of the subscriber Whde -Ne believe the sources of our mforma tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any acon to be token by the subscrrber should be based on hi' own Investlgatron and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc. as a corporation, ond lIS officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke. positrons or trodes In respect to ony securrtles mentioned m th,s or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e.prened In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scalf, Inc, wfucn IS registered With the SEC os on mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Irwestment adVISOry ono olhel CIIstomers mdependently of atry Slotements mode In thiS or 111 ony other Issue Further Information on any seO-lnty mentioned h(!feln IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 16, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl. STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE — – …. …;0;;;;; …… –.' -.. ——-;c … ….—;;!i-e'.; -'–'–…. ……. May 16, 1975 . One of the jobs of the market technician is to act as a forecaster. He must, in other words, on occasion peer into the murky future and offer an opinion as to the most probable market environment in the weeks, months and years ahead. Forecasting is, by nature, a hazardous pro- fession and, by its very nature, involves the risk of being wrong. In our own 21 years of assay- ing forecasts, we have produced our share of monstrously inaccurate ones. Forecasters are fond of reminding their readers that Babe Ruth also struck out a lot. The fact that the market technician must occasionally assume the forecaster's role leads many to believe that he must, at all times and in all places, have at his fingertips a firm predic- tion as to the precise outlook for the market in the intermediate future and that this opinion must be held with the same degree of convlction as all previous opinions. This is, in our view, erroneous. To return to the baseball analogy one more time, the forecaster has the option of plcking just exactly when he will step up to bat. The view that forecasts are an ever-present necessity confuses, in our opinion, forecast- ing with investment policy. It is necessary at all times to have a recommended investment policy for portfolios of varying degrees of risk aversion. If a portfolio manager's investment policy at a given point in time, for example, is to be aggressively committed to equities, and he is presented with a portfolio in a highly defensive posture, he will, of course, have to take immediate steps to change that posture. This will be equally true whether the investment policy is one of long standing or one that has been just recently changed. .. . – Thepresentmarkettsaprlmeex-amp-e-of-the''-ort-ofenVironnlennNh'ere-investment'polrcy 'l- remains clear-cut, but forecasting becomes difficult. The Dow has now reached the upside tar- get of 850 we suggested last January. As we have been pointing out repeatedly in these letters, there exists at current levels a massive amount of overhead supply which will be extremely dif- ficult for the market to penetrate. A fairly large number of issues are beginning to form moderate- ly suspicious-looking lateral formations which may eventually turn out to be areas of at least minor distribution. On the other hand, there are few, if any, signs of major loss of market mo- mentum. The potential breadth divergence which we have been noting for the past couple of months evaporated last week when breadth actually led the Dow into new high territory. Many issues, moreover, retain upside potentials well above current levels. The existence of all these countervailing factors makes it, in our view, hazardous in the extreme to issue a firm forecast at this stage of just how the market environment might develop. Investment policy, on the other hand, which was originally dictated by a forecast of a move to 850 in January, remains, we think, clear-cut. It calls for maintaining an aggressive attitude toward equities, keeping portfolios in a relatively fully-invested position. This remains true even for those portfolios which have remained in a relatively defensive position throughout the astounding market rise of the past five months. It goes without saying that there is a great deal more risk in assuming an aggressive posture after the market is already up almost 50 than would have been the case had such a position been assumed earlier. Quite obviously, purchases executed at today's prices bear a greater risk of having to be liquidated at ultimate loss.than would earlier purchases.made at.lower.prices. Yet.,.as many writers.have—, pOinted out, it is not success on individual trades that determines portfolio success. Purchases and sales are nothing more than the means by which a portfolio is changed from one posture to another. We think, therefore, that those portfolios not now committed to equities up to the limits of the portfolio's acceptable risk, should take steps to make that commitment, and those already so committed should remain so. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 839.17 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 90.72 Cumulative Index (5/15/75) 504.10 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any other motter hereIn contained '5, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or ,ndirectly, on offer or the sollcllotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIoned The matler IS presented merely for the converlenee of the subscriber While oNe belIeve the sources of our informatIOn to be relIable, we In no woy represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemenb mude herein Any act.an to be token by the subscr.ber should be based on hIS own Invest'gollon and Info,mollOn Janney MonTgomery SCali, Inc. as a corporatIon, and ,IS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, posItIons or trades In respect to any seCurles mentla'\ed In Ih,s or any fuTure Issue, and such pOSItIon may be dIfferent from ony vIews now Or hereafter expressed In thiS or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery Stott, tnc, whIch IS regIstered wllh the SEC os on Inveslment adVIsor, rnoy gIve odvlce to lIs Investment odvlsory and other customers Independently of any latemCllls mode In thiS or ' any other Issue .Further Informal Ion on any security mentioned hereIn , ovalloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 23, 1975
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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE In view of the wide range of conflicting market forecasts which have recently been assault- ing the investing public, the following (obviously fictitious) dialogues may be illuminating. They represent a discussion between two eminent market forecasters, Lemuel Upson Bullwinkle and Albert Downing Bearfeather. Bullwinkle was fairly close to the edge last fall, having remained invested in growth stocks to the bitter end. He has been enjoying a modest comeback of late, however, Bearfeather obtained a huge following in 1973-74 when he advised a policy of investing solely in treasury bills and gold stocks. That this policy has been less successful recently is attested to by a certain shrillness which has been creeping into his tone of late. Bearfeather This is the largest rally in a bull market since 1929-30. 'Bullwinkle I love the way you gloom-and-doom guys always drag out 1929-30 which, of course, is a one-of-a-kind case. The present rally, of course, has lasted longer and scored a bigger percentage advance than 1929-30. The central fact, though, is that the November, 1929-April, 1930 rally, the classic example of a bear market rally, occurred early in the downswing, shortly after the high had been made in October of 1929. There's absolutely no historical precedent for a bear market rally of the magnitude of the recent one following an almost two-year decline in prices. Bearfeather Look, in order to call the present advance a bull market, you'd have to attain new bull market highs. That would mean a rally above the 1973 high of 1051.70. We aren't anywhere near that level and aren't likely to get there. – Bullwinkle The idea tat bull marketshave !2.go to ne.V!..higb,,torbear!I1a!etstne;v.lo!Nsis , stupia. Bullmarkets and 'bear- markets take place'-fn- an' overall secular framework which may be upward as it was from 1942-66, or sideways as was the case in the early part of the century when you had a whole slew of bull markets that didn't go to new highs. You measure bull and bear mar- kets by percentage advances, and it's strictly an intellectual cop-out not to call a 48 advance a bull market. Bearfeather All right, let's not argue about that. You've made my point. As you say, the mar- ket climate has changed drastically from that of the 1940-66 period. Quite obviously, we are in a new downward cycle,and the next decline is going to take us to new lows, all the way down to the ultimate point where the entire market rise of the last thirty years is fully corrected. Bullwinkle I don't see where you get the assumption that because the last major cycle was up, the next one necessarily has to be down at the same rate. Elementary statistical analysis shows that we moved into a new market environment somewhere around 1966, but all the evidence we have to date suggests that the basic underlying trend is more or less flat rather than sharply down- ward. That guy down in New Jersey who writes the blue market letter pointed this out as early as 1971. Bearfeather Boy, are you an incurable optimist. I'll give you a chance to really lay it on the line. Where do you think this market is headed Bullwinkle Oh, probably to about 1100 on the Dow. Bearfeather Oh, wow. How the heck can you possibly come up with a number like that Bullwinkle All you have to do is look at past bull markets. Every one of the post-World-War- . II perid.has h,ad.!l grejlterduration.and,amplitude thanthe ,current.rally. Therefore,. it's a logical. – expectation' that the present advance just getting underway is gOing to go a good deal further. A love back up over 1000 would be no more of a percentage advance than we had m 1949-53, for example. Bearfeather Look, you have just gotten through saying that we are in a new market climate. Now you're relying on the experience of the old climate, and saying that the market's going to behave the way it did in the fifties and sixties. Any attempt to draw on that experience to arrive at a forecast for the 1970' s has to be totally suspect. (To Be Continued) Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 827.13 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 90.08 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/22/75) 497.80 AWT/jb ,.. No stalement or expressIon of op'nion or any olher motler herein contamed IS, or . to be deemed to be, drrectly or Ind,rectly, on offer or the sollcltohon of on oHer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subscrIber Whde oNe believe the sources of our Informaho/\ 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor ot the statements mude herein Any achon to be tclen by ihe subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own inVestigation and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or any other lSue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wlln the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give cavlce to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any stotements made In thiS or jI\ any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 30, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 30, 1975 The Bullwinkle – Bearfeather Dialogues (con't.) (For those readers who missed last week's letter, the following represents a continuation of a totally fictitious dialogue between two equally fictitious market forecasters, one a perennial optimist and the other a similarly perennial pessimist). Bullwinkle Okay, I'll admit it's dangerous to draw on the 1950-60 experience in looking for parallels to today's new stock market, but I still don't see how you can be bearish after a bull market that's less than six months old. There is absolutely no precedent for a bull market that short except 1938. Bearfeather All right, so there lE..a precedent, and the aftermath of that one was a 3 1/2 year bear market that went to new lows. I don't see how you can be bullish facing a bunch of second quarter reports that are gOing to be unmitigated disasters. Bullwinkle Come on now. First of all, I don't think a 25-30 earnings decline, which is what we're probably looking for on the year, is an unmitigated disaster, especially since that decline comes after Dow-Jones earnings have just set a newall-time record. Furthermore, we all know the market bottoms out well before earnings do, and a bottom last December is perfectly consistent with a bottoming of corporate profits in the second quarter of 1975. Bearfeather Ah ha. You're saying corporate profits are going to bottom in the second quarter. in aClI, factttiey'don't – – – . . – – u .- . . – u Bullwinkle The leading indicator composite turned up sharply just this week. Bearfeather There are plenty of forecasters who are unimpressed by this, and who suggest that the present credit structure is overstrained and untenable. Bullwinkle I might believe them if they hadn't been saying the same thing for the past 25 years. Bearfeather Let's leave the fundamentals out of it for a moment. What about the technical picture Can you actually see the Dow getting through the ton of overhead supply that exists between 850 and 900 It seems perfectly clear to me that this is the logical area for the market to top out and turn downward. Bullwinkle Look,I have enough trouble analyzing what's already on the chart without trying to guess what may be on the chart six months from now. What technical indicators are telling us right now seems clear-cut to me. There have been absolutely no signs of loss of momentum. New highs still hold a comfortable margin over new lows, longer term totals of advances still comfort- ably exceed declines, long-term moving averages are still rising, and, probably most important of all, the potential breadth divergence that existed a few month's ago has now disappeared and breadth is in gear with the Dow on the upside. Surely you have to be aware that we have never had a market turn down without these factors turning negative. Bearfeather I certainly wouldn't say never, but in any case, I think they will turn negative very shortly. The overhead supply I'm talking about exists not only on the averages but on indiv- idual stocks. All too many stocks, including some of the institutional growth favorites, are ,-,.- ,- – …—- — — – -,.,…- — ; – – – – — – -,-,.-. — -… ,– reaching areas of heavy overhead supply. Bullwinkle I am not arguing that the overhead supply won't slow the market down. It undoubted- ly will, but supply has been penetrated in the past and will be again. I think this market has enough momentum to do it. Bearfeather You are a ….. Note The remainder of the dialogue is unsuitable for a family publication. We shall try to summarize the results of this debate on a more serious note next week.) Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 824.55 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 90.65 Cumulative Index (5/29/75) 501.77 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement 10 buy or sell or expreSSion of opinion or any other ooy security referred 10 or mentioned mol'er herein The mOiler IS contOlned presented IS, or IS 10 be merely for the cdoenevmereudn1C06boef dthleresdulbyscorrlbIenrdirWehcltlly on we offer or believe the OI.Cllollon of the sources of our on offer Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the otcurot' thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any o(1lon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS OWn investigation and Inftlrmallon Janney Montgomery Scofl, Inc, as a tarporotlon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later Toke, posl1!0lU or ',odes In respect to any seCUrities menlloned In thiS tu ony future Issue, and such pa5111an may be different from any views now or hereafter e;tpreued In Ih.s or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh.ch ' registered With Ihe SEC (lS on InvestmenT adVisor, may g.ve adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Indendenlly of any statements mode 111 Ihls or 111 ony olner Issue Fvrlner information on ony secuTity mentioned herein IS available on request

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