Viewing Month: May 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 02, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 06540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – May 2, 1975 -…– We have noted in this space in the past that the stock market has, of . …… — – ………. ……. 0 — -.–'-la'te,be.ens.l..-emo-nst-r-at-ingvOLo.- la-, – …… tility-more sirtiilaYto that -of the-r9Td'stiian tne 1940-1970 period. It is, perhaps, worthwhile to document some of the tentative evidence in favor of this conclusion. One mea sure of volatility in a given year is the number of days showing large percentage changes, either up or down, during that year. The following table shows the number of trading days in each year since 1926 that the percentage change of the Dow fell …within various ranges between under 1 and over 5. YE AII -u 1-21 2-31 341 4-51 sr . -..YEU -1I 121 -!I 341 4-51 5h 121 133 55 e I I III 1'151 255 2e 0 0 I'J IU1 1&4 4 c I 0 0 1'152 210 II 01 III '12e 2\4 &8 A 4 III I U5 235 I'! I III III III 1'12'1 154 84 25 II 5 12 1'154 235 15 2 I!I 0 I'J 1'130 14 'II i!& 20 8 4 155 ill4 3(11 1 III III I 1f/31 102 'II 56 il5 13 \3 15 ill 32 III III I'J '1'II! 'I &0 4& 34 i!'! 35 1'157 ill2 32 1 III I 1'133 120 71! n 27 !1 15 235 1& I 01 134 1'12 H 21 2 2 2 1'15'1 il1 3! I III 0 III 1'135 233 5'1 'I 0 0 I'IU 212 3'1 I 0 III 0 1'131 244 44 12 I III 1'111 228 22 III 0 II 01 ' .1937 181 73 20 1 & 7 1'1&2 188 50 l! I 1 1'138 1&I A2 3'1 12 5 2 1'163 237 \I 20I \'13'1 21'1 55 1'1 II I 1'1&4 208 '3 0 0 0 III 1940 cO 37 1 1'101 257 9 3 –.,…,.,, '19irz-' i! 5 7'0 0—il 143 218 !0 c 3 2 0 I 4 i 1'1&5 3'1 00J.'I&2(11 0 0 1&7 232 II 0 I'IH 21118 13 44 19 1& 0 0 (lO – 20' (11' .. – 'II II 0 i! 0 0 1\ 1944 2'11 7 0 0 0 19&9 218 32 II 11 0 145 257 28 I 0 0 0 1'17(11 1'12 51 8 2 III I 1'146 213 48 13 4 i! I 1'171 2\7 34 1 I e '1947 235 42 5 I 0 1'I7 25 2& 0 0 0 ' ,1'148 241 29 5 2 01 0 1973 15'1 7'1 10 4 II ,I'ln 2&1 21 II II 0 0 IHO 134 75 4 8 2 1'1'''' 242 31 & I I III 191 os 2'1 8 I 0 'The statistics are interesting. For the years 1926 through 1928, a highly placid market climate pre- vailed in which well in excess of 200 trading days saw percentage changes of less than 1, and there were very few wide swings. This abruptly changed in the 1930's. In the bulk of these years, the number of days on which the percentage swing was under 1 was just a bit more than half of the total trading days, and the number of days in which the percentage change ran between one and two per cent generally reached 70 or better. Likewise, especially during the 1929-32 bear market, there were a number of days on which percentage swings were considerably wider. Then, starting in 1940, as can be seen, the pattern of the 1920's returned and remained pretty consis- tent through the period. The only years in which a noticeable increase in volatility took place were the bear market years of 1962 and 1970. In 1973, as near as we can tell, the pattern abruptly reversed itself. Both 1973 and 1974 saw fewer days with a percentage change of less than 1 than any year since 1933. Likewise, the number of days on which price change ran 1 or greater exceeded any-year since the-lafterpart6fTlfe-1930(S – A partial explanation of this lies in the fact that 1973-74 constituted a continuing bear market, and volatility, as the table clearly shows, tends to increase in such a climate. What is interesting, however, is that the pattern is continuing so far into 1975, one of the sharpest up-years in market history to date. If one were to annualize the 1975 figures, for example, there would only be 137 trading days with less than 1 change, 88 where the change was 1-2 and 27, where the change exceeded 2. Thus, the vola- tility pattern established in 1973 apparently continues. If this sort of thing is, indeed, the wave of the foreseeable future, it is quite obvious that some of the investment strategies a ppropriate to the last 30 years may be inappropriate in the 1970's. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 840.82 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 88.94 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (5/1/75) 483.34 AWT/jb –N-,-,-'o-',-m-,,-'-'–'–'–'''-0'-0-'-''-'0-0-0-'-oo-y-,-th-,-,-m-o'–,–h,-,,-,,-'-o–o,-,,-d–,–o-,-,,-,-,-b-,-d.-,-m-,d–'-,-b-,-d-,,-,,-'-,-,,-od,-,,ct'y,-oo-';ff'-''-;'h'-'O',,o,,,;o'-;o-o;;ff'' to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convenlena. of the subscriber. While we bell!!ve Ihe SOUfces of our Informa- tion 10 be relmble we In no way represent or guorantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any octlon 10 be token by Ihe subscriber should be bosed on hiS own' ,nveshgollon and mformOhOl Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as () corporOhon, and lIs officers or employee may now hove, or may loler loke, POSitions or trodes In fCSP!!ct 10 any secUrities mentioned on Ihls or cny future Issue, and such POSlllon moy be dlfferen from ony views now or hereofter e'pressed in thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wiln Ihe SEC os on ,nvestment odvlsor, may g,ve adVice to Its investment adVisory ond olhel customers mdependently of any tatement mode m thiS or .n any other Issue Further Information on any secullty mentioned here.n IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 09, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , I 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMeE R NEW YORK STOCk eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 9, 1975 We first suggested in this space on January 10 that the most plausible upside objective for the Dow, – , assuming theOctober.-December-,-1975 double bottomto-be'abase format-ion,was850-.This'week;–less- I– than four months later after a move which astonished most observers, including ourselves, by its rapidity, the Dow reached a closing high of 855.60, thus attaining the objective of the base completed in the latter three months of last year. As we have been noting in recent issues of this letter, the momentum of the advance should from this point on be more severely tested, since the overhead supply of stock existing at current levels remains heavy. We have, since January, been using the Dow as a benchmark for talking about the general market and, indeed, if one looks at the performance of that index versus the other major indices since the lows of last October, there is reaJly not much overall difference. The Dow, as of Monday, was 46.3 above its October low, the S & P 500, 44.6 and our CumulatlVe Index was lagging slightly behind, having posted a 35.5 advance from its October bottom. However, if one breaks the performance of the three indices into shorter time intervals, an interesting phenomenon emerges. The following table shows the level of the three averages at various turning paints between October 4, 1974, and May 5, 1975. Cum Cum Cum DIIA Chg. Chg. S&P Chq. Chq. CUM. Chq. 10/4/74 584.56 62.28(10/3) 355.91 11/5/74 674.75 15.4 15.4 75.21(11/7) 20.8 20.8 410.31(11;11) 15.2 15.2 12/6/74 577.60 -14.4 – 1.2 65.01 -13.5 4.3 359.99 -12.3 1.1 1/10/75 658.79 14.1 12.6 72.61 11.6 16.6 399.50 11.0 12.2 1/21/75 641.90 3/17/75 786.53 – 2.6 22.5 9.8 34.6 70.70 86.01 – 2.6 21.6 13.5 403.56 38.1 491.52 1.0 13.3 21.8 38.1 3/24/75 743.43 – 5.5 27.1 81.42 I .4/17/7-5819.40..,..,.A–JO ..240 .1–87.-25 – 5.3 30.7 466.98 – 5.0 31.2 ,'7—2—4-o1-4-83–20- —5—3-;8—1-'. 4/29/75 803.04 5/5/75 855.60 – 2.0 6.5 37.3 46.3 85.64 90.08 . 1.8 37.5 478.64 5.2 44.6 489.55 – 1.0 34.4 2.3 37.5 What is quite clearly shown is that the Dow was underperforming the other averages during the base- building stage of the advance from October to December and about equaling their performance on the ini- tial phase of the raJly from January to March. Since that time, the Dow has been outperforming the other averages and in effect has caught up with them and passed the'll. As the table shows, the first obvious instance of underperformance by the Dow was its move to a new low in December which both of the other averages refused to confirm. Its October-November rally was considerably less than that of the S & P and its November-December decline was steeper. In mid-January, of course, all three averages broke out of their base formations and staged the most dynamic phase of the advance, terminating on St. Patrick's Day, 1975. For this period aJl three of the advances were Similar, but the Dow, having underperformed previously, was stiJllagging the other two. As can be seen, however, the recent history is just the reverse. The Dow has clearly outperformed both the S & P and Our Cumulative Index on both the March-April and April-May rallies, and the S & P 5'00 has, equally noticeably, outperformed the Cumulative Index. Quite obviously, the most recent month and a half of the upmove has been concentrated to a large degree in Dow- Jones components. What are we to make of aJl this It is, first of aJl, not that unusual a phenomenon, very possibly caused by the fact that buyers ,after a long bear market, tend to prefer the relative security of familiar, blue-chip names. The Dow's strength has, of course, produced the potential divergence between the Dow and breadth, to which we have referred in past issues of this letter. The Dow has scored two suc- f cessive raJlies!onew hi9hos (long wih the P 50.Q.t a lesser eox!ent) ,hilebreadt.!'.5nd ;,urCuula;. -,- t!ve Index)-have failed to conhrm'these highs. However, the action of breadth has been good enough so that a future confirmation could come at any time,so that we are not as yet deeply disturbed by the phenomenon. A large part of the discrepancy, we think, can be explained away simply enough by the fact that many Dow components were deeply undervalued in relation to the market at last faJl's depressed levels and have simply been correcting that undervaluation over the past few months. Indeed, a great many of those same components indicate even higher levels from a technical point of view. Thus, while the above-average Dow performance may constitute evidence of some narrowing of the advance, we do not think that narrow- ing is yet pronounced enough to become unduly disturbed about the general market outlook. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 845.67 S & P Camp. (1200 p.m.) 90.12 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (5/8/75) 492.99 AWT/jb No statement or e.presslon of opmlon or any other matter herein contamed IS. or 1510 be deemed to be. directly or Indirectly. On offer or the sollcltallon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for the convef'iencc of the subscriber Whde -Ne believe the sources of our mforma tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any acon to be token by the subscrrber should be based on hi' own Investlgatron and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc. as a corporation, ond lIS officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke. positrons or trodes In respect to ony securrtles mentioned m th,s or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e.prened In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scalf, Inc, wfucn IS registered With the SEC os on mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Irwestment adVISOry ono olhel CIIstomers mdependently of atry Slotements mode In thiS or 111 ony other Issue Further Information on any seO-lnty mentioned h(!feln IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 16, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl. STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE — – …. …;0;;;;; …… –.' -.. ——-;c … ….—;;!i-e'.; -'–'–…. ……. May 16, 1975 . One of the jobs of the market technician is to act as a forecaster. He must, in other words, on occasion peer into the murky future and offer an opinion as to the most probable market environment in the weeks, months and years ahead. Forecasting is, by nature, a hazardous pro- fession and, by its very nature, involves the risk of being wrong. In our own 21 years of assay- ing forecasts, we have produced our share of monstrously inaccurate ones. Forecasters are fond of reminding their readers that Babe Ruth also struck out a lot. The fact that the market technician must occasionally assume the forecaster's role leads many to believe that he must, at all times and in all places, have at his fingertips a firm predic- tion as to the precise outlook for the market in the intermediate future and that this opinion must be held with the same degree of convlction as all previous opinions. This is, in our view, erroneous. To return to the baseball analogy one more time, the forecaster has the option of plcking just exactly when he will step up to bat. The view that forecasts are an ever-present necessity confuses, in our opinion, forecast- ing with investment policy. It is necessary at all times to have a recommended investment policy for portfolios of varying degrees of risk aversion. If a portfolio manager's investment policy at a given point in time, for example, is to be aggressively committed to equities, and he is presented with a portfolio in a highly defensive posture, he will, of course, have to take immediate steps to change that posture. This will be equally true whether the investment policy is one of long standing or one that has been just recently changed. .. . – Thepresentmarkettsaprlmeex-amp-e-of-the''-ort-ofenVironnlennNh'ere-investment'polrcy 'l- remains clear-cut, but forecasting becomes difficult. The Dow has now reached the upside tar- get of 850 we suggested last January. As we have been pointing out repeatedly in these letters, there exists at current levels a massive amount of overhead supply which will be extremely dif- ficult for the market to penetrate. A fairly large number of issues are beginning to form moderate- ly suspicious-looking lateral formations which may eventually turn out to be areas of at least minor distribution. On the other hand, there are few, if any, signs of major loss of market mo- mentum. The potential breadth divergence which we have been noting for the past couple of months evaporated last week when breadth actually led the Dow into new high territory. Many issues, moreover, retain upside potentials well above current levels. The existence of all these countervailing factors makes it, in our view, hazardous in the extreme to issue a firm forecast at this stage of just how the market environment might develop. Investment policy, on the other hand, which was originally dictated by a forecast of a move to 850 in January, remains, we think, clear-cut. It calls for maintaining an aggressive attitude toward equities, keeping portfolios in a relatively fully-invested position. This remains true even for those portfolios which have remained in a relatively defensive position throughout the astounding market rise of the past five months. It goes without saying that there is a great deal more risk in assuming an aggressive posture after the market is already up almost 50 than would have been the case had such a position been assumed earlier. Quite obviously, purchases executed at today's prices bear a greater risk of having to be liquidated at ultimate loss.than would earlier purchases.made at.lower.prices. Yet.,.as many writers.have—, pOinted out, it is not success on individual trades that determines portfolio success. Purchases and sales are nothing more than the means by which a portfolio is changed from one posture to another. We think, therefore, that those portfolios not now committed to equities up to the limits of the portfolio's acceptable risk, should take steps to make that commitment, and those already so committed should remain so. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 839.17 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 90.72 Cumulative Index (5/15/75) 504.10 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expressIon of opinIon or any other motter hereIn contained '5, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or ,ndirectly, on offer or the sollcllotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIoned The matler IS presented merely for the converlenee of the subscriber While oNe belIeve the sources of our informatIOn to be relIable, we In no woy represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemenb mude herein Any act.an to be token by the subscr.ber should be based on hIS own Invest'gollon and Info,mollOn Janney MonTgomery SCali, Inc. as a corporatIon, and ,IS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, posItIons or trades In respect to any seCurles mentla'\ed In Ih,s or any fuTure Issue, and such pOSItIon may be dIfferent from ony vIews now Or hereafter expressed In thiS or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery Stott, tnc, whIch IS regIstered wllh the SEC os on Inveslment adVIsor, rnoy gIve odvlce to lIs Investment odvlsory and other customers Independently of any latemCllls mode In thiS or ' any other Issue .Further Informal Ion on any security mentioned hereIn , ovalloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 23, 1975
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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE In view of the wide range of conflicting market forecasts which have recently been assault- ing the investing public, the following (obviously fictitious) dialogues may be illuminating. They represent a discussion between two eminent market forecasters, Lemuel Upson Bullwinkle and Albert Downing Bearfeather. Bullwinkle was fairly close to the edge last fall, having remained invested in growth stocks to the bitter end. He has been enjoying a modest comeback of late, however, Bearfeather obtained a huge following in 1973-74 when he advised a policy of investing solely in treasury bills and gold stocks. That this policy has been less successful recently is attested to by a certain shrillness which has been creeping into his tone of late. Bearfeather This is the largest rally in a bull market since 1929-30. 'Bullwinkle I love the way you gloom-and-doom guys always drag out 1929-30 which, of course, is a one-of-a-kind case. The present rally, of course, has lasted longer and scored a bigger percentage advance than 1929-30. The central fact, though, is that the November, 1929-April, 1930 rally, the classic example of a bear market rally, occurred early in the downswing, shortly after the high had been made in October of 1929. There's absolutely no historical precedent for a bear market rally of the magnitude of the recent one following an almost two-year decline in prices. Bearfeather Look, in order to call the present advance a bull market, you'd have to attain new bull market highs. That would mean a rally above the 1973 high of 1051.70. We aren't anywhere near that level and aren't likely to get there. – Bullwinkle The idea tat bull marketshave !2.go to ne.V!..higb,,torbear!I1a!etstne;v.lo!Nsis , stupia. Bullmarkets and 'bear- markets take place'-fn- an' overall secular framework which may be upward as it was from 1942-66, or sideways as was the case in the early part of the century when you had a whole slew of bull markets that didn't go to new highs. You measure bull and bear mar- kets by percentage advances, and it's strictly an intellectual cop-out not to call a 48 advance a bull market. Bearfeather All right, let's not argue about that. You've made my point. As you say, the mar- ket climate has changed drastically from that of the 1940-66 period. Quite obviously, we are in a new downward cycle,and the next decline is going to take us to new lows, all the way down to the ultimate point where the entire market rise of the last thirty years is fully corrected. Bullwinkle I don't see where you get the assumption that because the last major cycle was up, the next one necessarily has to be down at the same rate. Elementary statistical analysis shows that we moved into a new market environment somewhere around 1966, but all the evidence we have to date suggests that the basic underlying trend is more or less flat rather than sharply down- ward. That guy down in New Jersey who writes the blue market letter pointed this out as early as 1971. Bearfeather Boy, are you an incurable optimist. I'll give you a chance to really lay it on the line. Where do you think this market is headed Bullwinkle Oh, probably to about 1100 on the Dow. Bearfeather Oh, wow. How the heck can you possibly come up with a number like that Bullwinkle All you have to do is look at past bull markets. Every one of the post-World-War- . II perid.has h,ad.!l grejlterduration.and,amplitude thanthe ,current.rally. Therefore,. it's a logical. – expectation' that the present advance just getting underway is gOing to go a good deal further. A love back up over 1000 would be no more of a percentage advance than we had m 1949-53, for example. Bearfeather Look, you have just gotten through saying that we are in a new market climate. Now you're relying on the experience of the old climate, and saying that the market's going to behave the way it did in the fifties and sixties. Any attempt to draw on that experience to arrive at a forecast for the 1970' s has to be totally suspect. (To Be Continued) Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 827.13 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 90.08 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (5/22/75) 497.80 AWT/jb ,.. No stalement or expressIon of op'nion or any olher motler herein contamed IS, or . to be deemed to be, drrectly or Ind,rectly, on offer or the sollcltohon of on oHer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subscrIber Whde oNe believe the sources of our Informaho/\ 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor ot the statements mude herein Any achon to be tclen by ihe subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own inVestigation and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or any other lSue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wlln the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give cavlce to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any stotements made In thiS or jI\ any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - May 30, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 30, 1975 The Bullwinkle – Bearfeather Dialogues (con't.) (For those readers who missed last week's letter, the following represents a continuation of a totally fictitious dialogue between two equally fictitious market forecasters, one a perennial optimist and the other a similarly perennial pessimist). Bullwinkle Okay, I'll admit it's dangerous to draw on the 1950-60 experience in looking for parallels to today's new stock market, but I still don't see how you can be bearish after a bull market that's less than six months old. There is absolutely no precedent for a bull market that short except 1938. Bearfeather All right, so there lE..a precedent, and the aftermath of that one was a 3 1/2 year bear market that went to new lows. I don't see how you can be bullish facing a bunch of second quarter reports that are gOing to be unmitigated disasters. Bullwinkle Come on now. First of all, I don't think a 25-30 earnings decline, which is what we're probably looking for on the year, is an unmitigated disaster, especially since that decline comes after Dow-Jones earnings have just set a newall-time record. Furthermore, we all know the market bottoms out well before earnings do, and a bottom last December is perfectly consistent with a bottoming of corporate profits in the second quarter of 1975. Bearfeather Ah ha. You're saying corporate profits are going to bottom in the second quarter. in aClI, factttiey'don't – – – . . – – u .- . . – u Bullwinkle The leading indicator composite turned up sharply just this week. Bearfeather There are plenty of forecasters who are unimpressed by this, and who suggest that the present credit structure is overstrained and untenable. Bullwinkle I might believe them if they hadn't been saying the same thing for the past 25 years. Bearfeather Let's leave the fundamentals out of it for a moment. What about the technical picture Can you actually see the Dow getting through the ton of overhead supply that exists between 850 and 900 It seems perfectly clear to me that this is the logical area for the market to top out and turn downward. Bullwinkle Look,I have enough trouble analyzing what's already on the chart without trying to guess what may be on the chart six months from now. What technical indicators are telling us right now seems clear-cut to me. There have been absolutely no signs of loss of momentum. New highs still hold a comfortable margin over new lows, longer term totals of advances still comfort- ably exceed declines, long-term moving averages are still rising, and, probably most important of all, the potential breadth divergence that existed a few month's ago has now disappeared and breadth is in gear with the Dow on the upside. Surely you have to be aware that we have never had a market turn down without these factors turning negative. Bearfeather I certainly wouldn't say never, but in any case, I think they will turn negative very shortly. The overhead supply I'm talking about exists not only on the averages but on indiv- idual stocks. All too many stocks, including some of the institutional growth favorites, are ,-,.- ,- – …—- — — – -,.,…- — ; – – – – — – -,-,.-. — -… ,– reaching areas of heavy overhead supply. Bullwinkle I am not arguing that the overhead supply won't slow the market down. It undoubted- ly will, but supply has been penetrated in the past and will be again. I think this market has enough momentum to do it. Bearfeather You are a ….. Note The remainder of the dialogue is unsuitable for a family publication. We shall try to summarize the results of this debate on a more serious note next week.) Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 824.55 S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 90.65 Cumulative Index (5/29/75) 501.77 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement 10 buy or sell or expreSSion of opinion or any other ooy security referred 10 or mentioned mol'er herein The mOiler IS contOlned presented IS, or IS 10 be merely for the cdoenevmereudn1C06boef dthleresdulbyscorrlbIenrdirWehcltlly on we offer or believe the OI.Cllollon of the sources of our on offer Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the otcurot' thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any o(1lon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS OWn investigation and Inftlrmallon Janney Montgomery Scofl, Inc, as a tarporotlon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later Toke, posl1!0lU or ',odes In respect to any seCUrities menlloned In thiS tu ony future Issue, and such pa5111an may be different from any views now or hereafter e;tpreued In Ih.s or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh.ch ' registered With Ihe SEC (lS on InvestmenT adVisor, may g.ve adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Indendenlly of any statements mode 111 Ihls or 111 ony olner Issue Fvrlner information on ony secuTity mentioned herein IS available on request

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