TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC 1609) 987-2300 May 24, 1991 The market did nothing last week to resolve the dilemma wllicll has constituted tile major topic of discussion in recent issues of tllis letter. Most major averages Ilave remained in a trading range for almost three months, since mid-Marcil, tile boundaries for tllis range, in tile case of tile Dow Jones Industrials, being roughly 2850 and 3000. Last week's activity consisted entirely of backing and filling in the lower part of that range, all of this taking place on flat breadth and light volume. Indeed, Tuesday's turnover of 109 million sllares was tile lowest figure for 1991 to date. Tile market's indecision at current levels reflects, it seems to us, the equal plausibility of botll bullisll and bearish arguments. The bears can base their case on the current relatively Iligh level of prices in relation to earnings, dividends, and book value. Tecllnically, they can also point to tile size of tile potential distributional tops that Ilave been built up and to tile apparently now dissipated supply of institutional casll. They can suggest, also, tllat economic signals are at best, mixed. Bulls, however, can note that tile market has seldom, if ever, been wrong in predicting recovery from recession, something it is obviously doing at the moment. (It has often been wrong at predicting recessions, but tllat is another story.) In addition, it can be pointed out tilat the averages posted higlls as recently as five weeks ago, and that those peaks were confirmed by breadtll and momentum. The current impasse may well continue until the case for one or tile other of these arguments becomes more compelling. Some analysts Ilave noted the relative paucity of new highs, pointing out thar, ori April … 17, the day the DJIA penetrated 3000, that only 217 NYSE issues posted sucll peaks. 'It is true tllat this was a figure exceeded many times as the market reached new higlls during tile 1980's, the onset of the 1982 bull market Ilaving produced 653 daily new. highs on October 11 of that year. Recent levels for tllis indicator have been low in comparison to such figures as this. but this is not, it needs to be stressed, a new phenomenon. The peak figure for daily new highs following the 1987 crash was 306, back in August, 1989, and last month's figure is, interestingly, the best since then. In this light, current levels do not appear to be all that low. A more rigorous look at daily new-high statistics confirms that feeling. We have such data going back to the early 1950's, and, of course, over such a long time period, the figures must be adjusted so as to be comparable. The easiest way of doing this is to divide by the number of issues traded. Thus, the 217 new highs on April 17 constitute just over 10 percent of the 2109 issues that traded that day. It needs to be noted that new-high figures have been computed differently in recent years than they had been prior to the mid-1980's. The study can be formallzed a bit further by studying the levels of this new-high percentage at and around instances of the market's scoring new peaks. Such periods can be defined as those periods when the Dow was in the upper decile of its prior one-year range. A peak figure of not much more than 10 percent during such periods was common during the early stages of past bull markets, and the market often tended not to top out until such time as new highs in the averages were accompanied by much lower new-high figures. The market's high in April of 1981, for example, saw new-high numbers topping at 8.23 of issues traded. The — . same essentially 'Was ..-true ..-of Ufe . mll-rk-et . around the 1976 T top' and ..other past market' peaks- -;- during recent decades. It is difficult, in other words, to make a case for the current level of new highs being particularly bearish. We have in these figures, it would seem, yet another manifestation of the market's present uncertainty. Dow Jones Industrials 0200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (5/23/91) AWTjb 2914.80 377.34 6021.79 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statementor expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained 1, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly. an offer orlhe solicrtatlon of an offer to buy or sel! any securrty referred to or mentIOned The maner IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poslhons or trades In respect to any secUrities menllOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pt'. hon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 – – – – …..'.r– -. .- May 31, 1991 The technician's function is the study of markets, and that study is broad enough, in our view, to include not only price action but also the institutional arrangements of said markets. We could not, therefore, resist giving some thought to the recently announced scheme for extending trading hours on the New York Stock Exchange, now approved in a split decision by the SEC and due to commence on June 13th. To those of us old enough to recall Rube Goldberg the plan possesses a certain whimsical charm, Briefly, it calls for two after-hours sessions. The first of these, from 4 to 5 p.m. simply allows for the electronic placement of orders at the regular-way closing price, these orders to be matched automatically at the end of the session. The second, lasting until 515, will permit the off-floor trading of baskets of stocks comprising at least 15 issues and worth at least 1 million. There are a number of vantage points from which one may consider this particular plunge into the brave new world. It has, for one thing, been noted that the first late session Is totally computerized, bypassing the trading floor and, in the process, the specialist system. These two traditional elements are regarded by many as being synonymous, a contention we have never quite understood. The computer has been around for quite some time now, and, since Its arrival, we can see little justificstion for the traditional preference for trading securities by having grown men stand around in a confined space shouting at one another. Long ago, we were fond of taunting a friend of ours, an NYSE specialist, with the comment that he would, some day be replaced by a machine. His exasperated rejoinder was, How are you going to get a machine to risk money. He had a point. Machines, as every computer – –proCesslonal-.knows,arethe creation-oC-human–beings, and -breadthR!lddeptho.mrktsarethe results of human beings willing to commit capital to those markets. It seems to us, though, that the Issue of sufficient depth and means of trading are totally separate, and we see no reason why a change in one necessarily applies to a change in another. The ostensible reason for the after- hour sessions, of course, had nothing to do with computers. It was billed as a step toward 24-hour trading, such a practice being a part of the internationalization of financial markets, a phenomenon proclaimed, in almost all quarters, as being the wave of the future. Global investing, it seems, has become one of those Wall Street visions which attains the status of revealed religion. Now we are not about to question the basic desirability of the free movement of capital across national borders. We also have no doubt that the trading of U.S. securities in London and Tokyo will Increase as will the use of foreign securities by American money managers. We would, however, hate to see this Increase become an excuse for battles for turf between various trading centers, especially If those conflicts Involve the relaxation of traditional disclosure standards. We think, in other words, that changes in market structure should be considered in light of the basic attributes of truly efficient markets, not the least of which is disclosure, a cornerstone of U.S. securities trading since Edison invented the ticker. We have a special bias toward this attribute since reported trading figures are, it goes without saying, the lifeblood of the technician. For this reason, the reduced disclosure requirements for the basket trading session are, for us, a cause for some concern. After thinking about this, we began to wonder, however, whether basket trading figures should indeed be included in the price action traditionally analyzed by the technician. The technical analyst's goal is, after all. the detection of changes in investor preferene for..,a particular finpni!t..l instrument by studying the priceJlC'!tion of that instrument. The trading of securities in a basket is, in a sense, the admission of no knowledge of, or preference among, the individual components of that basket. To those of us who believe that knowledge, intelligence and hard work are useful components of the investment process, index trading may, in the long run, turn out to provide opportunities for the rational asset manager. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY,TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3006.93 S & P 500 (1200) 387.22 Cumulative Index (5/30/91) 6148.58 AWTjb No statement or expression 01 opinion or any other matter herein contained 1, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offeror the solicItatIon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the ,ubscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor oflhe Slatements made herein Any action 10 be taken by Ihe subsCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and Informallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corporallOn and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles menlloned In thiS 1Jf any future Issue, and such Pl' lion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In Ihls or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 .– ——-.-'–.- —. .; — -4June7,-1991 The second penetration of the 3000 level by the Dow Jones Industrial Average proved a bit more successful than the first. The prior peak had involved just a single day's close. at 3004.46 on April 17. A drop of a bit under 5. to 2865.38 on May 15. ensued. but. beginning last Thursday. no fewer than five consecutive closes above the benchmark level took place. For the record. the Dow's closing high to date for whatever upward process we currently find ourselves in was attained this Monday at 3035.33. It cannot. unfortunately. be said that the Dow's feat was fully refiected by the rest of the market. Probably the most important positive note was provided by our daily and weekly breadth indices. both of which moved to post-October 1990 peaks. The daily index managed to do so by just three one-hundredths of a point. but it did. indeed. confirm the high. The weekly index. which. in recent years. has generally performed better on the upside. moved to a decisive new peak. ……A….e.r.lg.e…….. 001-1…. hdlll.II 011-11111 'lII.porll 001-1,,,, 0111111.. SIP Ildlll.II SlPInI SIP flOIIiI lSI IIdu DTC IIdllt.II IIhl LIII i IlIIiii' 5001 Olll! lrudtb Indu I 1,,,,, 1981 II, 11 lit II III II I tllI,l 1,.11 II 81,b 81,b 11,1 1981-1110 HI,I 1122.11 !1!l.tl !!I1.1\ \.9\ 3001.11 1181.11 1111.41 1211.11 -!\'\I '.11m.1l 1lI.1l II 111.09 -11.38 313.H 410.41 IIUI 331,11 m.80 311.9\ !.II 1111.11 120.11 413.11 390.11 lUI lUI !U. '!I.I' 365.11 m,Ol 31\,\8 1.\0 ml.l1.Oll 181.50 411.10 511.10 1.41 ill. 11 m.O! 111,98 150.11 -L1.31 111,81 lmlll\ll15ln2–i1llll.11 l00l.22 .. 981.141 -1.32 982.31 II llllll!, 1110 I 1111, 1990 Iml' I C!II,I I 0 ..,1 I.Cbln,l 81,1 1111-0111..1.9.1.1.1.9.0.-.D.l.Io. I,.-Oltl 303\.33 1m111..u11 111.11 m.83 ll.I' l11.21 111.1. !I1.10 3119.l0 112.10 11.49 13.1. -3.0\ 11.21 1\.91 -2,11 l.lO 11.11 1!.58 13.01 1.11 -11.\1 -'.49 l.ll \.83 -11.11 -\.95 11.1\ -11.50 \.10 -2.09 1.03 1.11 -3.90 1.11 -0.16 -8.91 -0.30 -1.31 0.08 -8.3l 0.01 The table above appeared in this space two months ago. on April 5. and We have updated it here. adding. in the process. a few columns. and recording the actual April highs Which. for all the indices shown. were posted after that letter was written. The final column. showing each average's percentage change from its April high to Its high of this week. 1S the first item of interest. The Dow's achievement of a new peak by 1 was hardly earth-shaking. and the similar accomplishment by the S & P Industrials eVen less so. Of all the indicators listed. only the Dow Jones Transports were to achieve a truly decisive new peak. All the other indicators failed to join the Dow in new high ground. This is of some interest. since it constitutes a 180-degree reversal of what had been going on since last January. During that time. the broader based Standard & Poor's indices were decisively outperforming the DJIA. and the S & P averages were. in turn. being outperformed by measures of secondary issues. such as the ASE Index and the OTC Industrials. By contrast. in this weeks action. the Dow posted new highs unaccompanied by the other averages. It would not take a great deal to cause these others to confirm on the upside. but the failure to do so would be distinctly less than bullish. Another indicator of market diversity is the extent to which many averages find themselves below their highs of 1989 or 1990. The current upswing has failed to produce newall-time peaks for the Transports. Utilities. Financials. and the Amex. Indeed the Value Line and the interest-sensitive Financials and Utilities are still below their highs of 1987. All this raises some interestine questions regaroine thp. .nAtl1r'P .of thp…(lnr-rpnt cytJlj0) process. Is the current upswing a new bull market following a three-month bear ma-rket in August-October of last year, or is it the extension of a bull market which began in October-December 1987 and began to peak. in certain areas at least. as early as October 1989 The answer to th1S question is of overriding importance for the longer term picture which is why we have refrained from being dogmatic about long-range term prospects. We have preferred to note, as we have been doing since January, the continued indications of short-to-intermediate- term strength. Those indications were reinforced by the action of the Dow and of breadth last 1 week. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2969.81 S & P 500 (1200) 379.36 Cumulative Index (6/6/9il 6210.77 AWTjb No stalemenlor expression 01 oplmon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offeror the soliCitation of an offerle buy Of sen any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience althe subsCriber While we believe the sourCes of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell tnc as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any secuntles menliOned m thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, labellinc , which IS registered wlth the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformallon on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – June 14. 1991 If for no,reason.ther.than.Jheheat, we.are.re!DindeCthat.. summJ'. .jsupon u8,and!he so-called summer rally is. once more, a topic for discussion. We are, therefore, 'reproducing below the customary table. covering 94 years of market history since the Dow was first computed in 1897. One Month Periods (18971991) —————————— End Month ——— A–d-v-a-n-c-e-s D–e-c-l-i-n-e-s Average t Chg. ————– January 60 34 1.11 February 46 48 -0.21 March 57 38 0.73 April 51 44 0.87 May 48 47 -019 June 49 45 0.66 July 58 36 1.48 August 62 31 1.65 September 36 57 -1.34 October 50 43 -0.12 November 56 37 0.74 December 68 26 1.40 Two Month Periods (1897-1991) —————————— A–d-v-a-n-c-e-s Declines ——– A–v-e-r-a-g-e t—C-h-g-. 61 33 2.53 54 40 0.91 46 49 0.44 56 39 1. 65 51 44 0.78 48 46 0.39 58 36 2.14 62 31 3.39 54 39 0.27 40 53 -1. 41 55 38 65 29 0.68 2 02 TOTAL 641 486 0.57 650 477 1.15 As the table indicates. of the 1127 months since 1897. 641—or 57—have been advancing months. and 480—or 43—have showed declines. Thus. the normal expectation for any given —month -would -be-52-5aadVQnces- and, 39-40' decline -Slmilarfigurescanbeadducedfor-two-month' . periods. From the data above, We have been able to extract four patterns of a seasonal nature which seem to be statistically significant. The most significant one is the least known. the tendency toward a market decline in the month of September. Since 57 of all months since 1897 have been rising ones. the expectation would be a plurallty of advances OVer declines. However. precisely the opposite is the case for September. which. in 93 years. has produced 57 declines and only 36 advances. with an average drop of 1.34 percent. The probability of such a pattern being due to chance. a chi-square test tells us. is less than 1 in 1000. The next most significant pattern has been the year-end rally. illustrated by 68 rising Decembers in 94 years. Our readers know that we have published an annual comment on this phenomenon around December or January of each year. Another seasonal manifestation, which we have demonstrated based on data since 1926. although we have no idea of the reason therefore. has been the fact that the direction in which the market moVes in November has appeared to be a moderately successful predictor of the market's direction for the following year. Of the four seasonal phenomena. the least significant has been the summer rally. which is due to be analyzed at this juncture. As the table shows. the 58 advances and 36 declines for July are marginally better than one would expect. August shows an even greater aberration. The percentage advances for July and August. along with that for the two-month period ending in August. are the largest figures in the table. although December-January performance is close. Despite these figures. standard tests of statistical significance suggest that the summer rally is a less reliable phenomenon than the others noted above. It has been eVen less reliable recently. especially In July. with five of the nine Julys since 1982 having been down months. The most recent performance of the four seasonal indicators is mixed. July 1990 was up (barely). but August. along with the two-month period. saw a 10 decline. which continued through September. – validating that' particular seasonal tendency. The -average is rlow some 400 points above where it closed an up November. However, the year-end rally aborted. with a decline below the December low just before Persian Gulf success sent the market shooting upward. There seems t incidentally. to have emerged in recent years a brand new tendency—the occurrence of important market turning points during the summer months. Major market bottoms took place on August 12. 1982 and July 24. 1984. In the opposite direction. the top leading to the 1983 – 1984 decline began to form during the summer of 1983 and. of course. the major high for the Dow. preceding the 1987 crash. occurred on August 25. 1987. The October-December. 1987 low was a return to the normal pattern of fall reversals. but of course the short. sharp 1990 decline started from a July peak. AWTjb Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (6/13/91) 2993.74 380.94 6141.94 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL INC. NO S1alemenl or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indlfectly, an offer or the sohcltatlon 01 an offerlobuy Of sell any security referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aellonto be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and mformation Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, posrllons Of trades In respect to any securlttes mentIOned m thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be dlHerenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, labellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may gIVe adVice to I\S mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made m thiS or In any other Issue Further mformallOn on any secuTity men\loned herem IS available on request

\ TABELLS MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 –.-.- It Ain't Necessarily So Ira Gershwin. f2!gy and Bess We headed this letter with the above quotation 16 years ago. in February. 1975. We were reminded. this week. by the market reactions to unfavorable earnings news from Columbia Gas and IBM. of the difficulty in forecasting quarterly results. Our study of 16 years ago advanced the thesis that — even if such results could be perfectly predicted — the usefulness of such predictions for a price forecast was. at best. limited. Wall Street's conventional wisdom. in other words, ain't necessarily so. n Earnings for the Dow Jones Industrial Average were first measured on a quarterly basis starting in 1929. Thus we are able to measure percentage changes in 12-month earnings starting with the first quarter of 193'0. running through the first quarter of 1941. a total of 245 quarters. For five of these quarters. in 1932-33. earnings Were negative and comparisons are thus distorted. This leaves us with 240 quarters which can be studied. Of those 240 quarters. 12-month earnings for the Dow declined in 90 of them. Was this bearish for stock prices Hardly. and indeed. the scale is tilted slightly in the opposite direction. In more than half of those quarters. 49 of 90. prices rose rather than fell. Thus. paradoxically. a forecast of declining earnings is. however marginaliy. bullish for stock prices. (A bit of the same tendency is manifested on the upside. Of the 150 quarters in which earnings rose. 56. or more than a third. saw declining prices). The reason for all this. of course. is that the market anticipates rather than follows. It — is. sensibly. willing to pay higher prices for recessionary. below-normal earnings and is less –Willing tciplace a-premlum-onriBing. above-noriiiQIearnings-'Thus. Dow 'Jones earningsPeake(Ctwo- – – I years ago and have declined in 7 of the past 8 quarters. fslling some 33. Yet in 6 of the 8 quarters. the price paid for those earnings has risen. producing. in the process. a 600-point rise for the Dow. This is a falrly graphic example of the fact that multiples tend to move in a direction opposite to earnings. . This is amply borne out by the record. In the 240 quarters since 1930. the quarter-to-quarter change in the P IE ratio has been in a direction opposite to the change in earnings in 171 of those quarters. In the 90 quarters in which earnings were down. the multiple increased 67 times and decreased in 23. The most recent two quarters. the last quarter of 1990 and the first of 1991. are typical. In both. earnings were down sharply. yet the average posted a sharp advance in both periods. The same may well turn out to be true for the current quarter. It can be shown. moreover. that the multiple is a great deal more important in determining the course of prices than are earnings. As noted above. falling earnings produced fslling prices less than half the time and rising earnings. rising prices only about two-thirds of the time. Yet. in 174 out of 240 quarters. multiples and prices have moved in the same direction. To forecast multiples. as we have nuted in the past. it is necessary to turn to technicsl work. and that work does not. at this point at least. suggest serious weakness. The market's recent willingness to place a higher valuation on the below-normal earning power during a recession is a phenomenon totally consistent with the historical record. ' Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2957.74 S & P 500 (1200) —-376.78- Cumulative Index (6/20/9t 6111.76 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. …- -,-. .—- ,,.- —– AWTjb No statement Or expression of opInion or any other matler herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly. an offer or the sollcltallon of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matler IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our InformatIOn to be reliable. we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own investigation and mformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and tts officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades tn respect to any securles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dlReren! from any views now or hereafter epressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelilnc , which IS registered wl!h the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advlso!), and oUler customers Independently 01 any slalements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 28. 1991 We write this piece on the final trading day of June 1991. and. thus. half of another stock-market yeaheI!o.-coJt!p!let …………,Th..-general.impression,among- investors seems tobe that …. 1—–the ..Augu.sl-likeheat which characterized June failed to produce a fever in equity markets. It IS interesting to try to account for this feeling, since 1991. so far. has not been all that bad. From its 1990 close of 263366. the Dow. last night. was up 11.44. It is possible that investors have been spoiled by post-1982 stock markets. In the eight years since 1983. the market has been up in the first half of seven of them. the only exception bemg 1984. In three of those seven. it rose by more than the 11 of 1991 By earlier standards. though. this year looks pretty good. There were better first halves in 1975 and 1976. but. prior to that. it is necessary to go all the way back to 1954 to find a better initial six months. From 1926 to 1974. 49 years. there were only four first-half advances better than that of 1991. One reason that the current rise may seem less than earth-shaking may be the fact that so much of it was crammed into the early part of the year. Although the first eight trading days of January saw an almost-200-point collapse before the Gulf War turned the market around. the apectacular rally oVer the next 27 trading days brought the average to 2934.65 on February 15. a level almost identical to today's. The market therefore. in one sense. has been stagnant for the past 4 1/2 months. True. there have been a series of probes to new highs for the Dow Jones Industrial Average—to 2973 in March. 3004 in April. and 3035 early this month. The overall trend. however, has been flat. That flat trend. though. has featured some frurly obvious shifts in leadership. It was less than three months ago that financial pundits were hailing the renaissance of the small stock. Between January and April. the NASDAQ Industrial Average rose an astounding 48. Since then. however, it has declined 9 through Wednesday. approximately twice as much as the Dow. Since April. the Value Line Index. The Wilshire 5000. and most importantly. the Standard & Poor Industrials and Composite indicators have been showing worse action than that of the DJIA. Th!, carnage in certin—,,-areas-,- of… the… hightech …sector'has been–truly h6f-rif ying '-!-'–It is-not only thiS recent leadership, but also much older leadership Which has shown signs of fatigue. For the first time in 1991. many of the consumer-goods sectors. such as health care. foods. and beverages. have exhibited signs of deteriorating relative strength. Indeed. in many of the component stocks. definable top formations are evident. It is true that these tops do not. so far, indicate more than minor downtrends, but they have formed at levels where such issues seem more fully priced than they have been in a number of years. To all of the above. there can be added the assorted nosedives produced by lower second-quarter expectations. Under the circumstances. it is certainly pardonable for the investor to regard the first half of 1991 with a certain sense of malaise. There eXIsts. also, a sense of ongoing deterioration. largely in terms of market breadth. Along with many technicians. we use a ten-day total of advancing minus declining issues as a short-term oscillator. Such an oscillator often reveals not only short-term oversold and overbought conditions. but also gives an occasional clue as to intermediate-term momentum. Thus, at Its March low. this total was at -1675. At the April low. it bottomed at -1967 and the recent bottom was -2904. It must stlll be noted. though. that the latter level is still typical of an ongoing bull market. For comparison's sake. as the 1990 downswing got underway last fall. readings of well below -5000 were achieved. Also, as we have noted in this space. cumulative breadth indicators. on both a daily and weekly basis. confirmed new highs for the Dow early thIS month. Despite this loss of momentum, the essential market picture remains, it seems to us, unchanged. The major averages have been confined in relatively flat trading ranges since April, and. until downside breakouts from these ranges take place. we would not consider technical deterioration strong enough to take action. These breakout levels, as we have noted. would be 2840 for the Dow and 365 for the S & P 500. Such breakouts. were they to occur. would be disturbing. but ..they.not-soCar-fromcurrentilevels-that there appears any need to anticipate them. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (603909) AWTjb 2905.64 370.55 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. No statement or expression of oplillon or any other matter herelncanlalned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer arthe sollcrtallon oj an offerlO buy or sell any secunty ralerred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience 01 the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemenls made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on his own Investlgal!on and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporation and liS aHleers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, POSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be different from any views now or hereafter epressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may gIVe adVICe to lis Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informallon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

—–…– ,\ TABELLS MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 – ——————.- — — – .– July 5. 1991 In terms of the conventional wisdom last week. New York become a suburb of Tokyo Monday's 52-point rally in the Dow was widely explained by a Japanese upside explosion in response to a lower bank rate there. Wednesday's and Thursday's loss of a major portion of the ground gained was likewise attributed to a plunge in the Nikkei. The market technician. perhaps naively. could hardly have been surprised by the rally off a close just above 2900 last week or by the decline from the 2972 level at mid-week. It. indeed. would have been expected behavior well before Commodore Perry's arrival in the Orient. It was essentially a compressed repetition of what has been going on since this Spring. As we noted last week. the Dow closed on March 6 at 2973.27. It then dropped to 2855. rallied to 3004 in mid-April. declined to 2876 at the end of April. reached 2971 at the beginning of May. and fell to 2865 in mid-May. It moved briefly above 3000 in early June. only to retreat to the 2906 level at last week's end. We apologize for belaboring this point. but it is. in our view 7 crucial. The fluctuations mentioned above have produced the pattern shown on the 20-point-unit point-and-figure chart of the Dow below. -. Our readers are by now aware of the basic tenet of point-and-figure charting that the width of a market congestion area is roughly proportional to the ultimate move following a breakout from that area. If the area at 3020-2860 trading range is to be considered a top. possible counts can be taken at either A-B or C-D and various objectives between 2520 and 2320 are readable. These targets correspond to the strong support in the 2600-2400 area in l 1 l iwhich the Dow traded between September and January. LI The 50-point unit chart at the left reveals a pattern which confirms the aforesaid count. It also gives some idea of the reasons for concern 1.'17'JIIIIII were the support from last fall to be penetrated. . . The .putative top formation would indeed be maSSive. .. 2000 We do not, at this time. foresee such an eventuality. Indeed we think it an even-money proposition that the current trading range will hold with an ultimate breakout on the upside. If the 2600-2400 support level appears likely. It needs to be stressed. though. that the threemonth range is fast becoming the major factor in determining what the market IS likely to do for the rest of 1991. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials 2942.98 S & P 500 374.95 Cumulative Index 6045.58 AWTJb No statement or expression of OpInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, an offer or the sollclla1lOn of an offer to buy or sen any secunty referred 10 or men1lOned The matler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor ollhe slatemenls made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgalton and Information Detafleld, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POSitIOns or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posItion may be different/rom any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS regIstered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce to Its IIwestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informallon on any secuflty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE. CN 5209, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 July 12, Iq91 Change IS an inevitable rule in financial markets. We were reminded of this fact recently when it was announced that the New York Stock Exchange would open for business a half hour earlierat 9 00 -A''f',1-;' . Suchxtensions'-a-re-notcommon-occurrences –The-Lopenl-ng .. wa8 moved bRCk to 930 A.M. from 1000 A.M. in 1985, and the close extended from 330 P.M. to 400 P.M. in 1974. The 1000-330 trading day had been first instituted in 1952. This replaced the pattern of a 1000 A.M. – 300 P.M. session on weekdays plus a two-hour Saturday session, trading hours which dated all the way back to 1873. As good a way as any to remind oneself of the evolution in financial markets is to page through the Wall Street Journal and visualize just how many of the tables printed there would have been totally absent — or at least radically different — not so many years ago. The first major set of statistics that one comes to in this exercise is the three-page listing of NYSE transactions. The table contains such niceties as bold-face type for issues with a large change in price and underlines for those with notable increases in volume. It is well to recall that these are of quite recent introduction along with such handy features as the ticker symbol, dividend, yield. and price-earnings ratio for each stock. Adding these items meant detection of the opening price. a the tradeoff many technicians are less than ecstatic abouL Something over 2.000 issues are shown to have traded in recent sessions as compared to. for example, the 800 that might have been shown in. say, 1950. This relatively small increase, though. masks the huge rise in total shares listed since that time. The total market value of all NYSE-listed issues now exceeds some 3,000 trillion. a figure almost 100 times as great as at the end of World War II. The next WSJ table also occupies close to three pages and lists similar information ,for the NASDAQ National Market System. This similarity is a fairly recent innovation. Prior to its advent only bid and asked prices for OTC securities had been shown. The fact that the OTC market has become the most important home for secondary securities is emphasized by the fact that the price table for the American Stock Exchange is the least changed for all the major listings. 1occocl'yingjust. one pge. and. showing under800 . issues. traded, a l.evel, lower than. that oc;f'-'the- 1 1960's. . '- . It is, of course, the emergence of derivative products which has brought about the greatest proliferation of new market statistics. The page full of options quotations is the oldest entry in this category, and it is surprising to recall that these instruments have now been around for some 18 years. It was not that long ago that commodity exchanges were rather dusty, out-of-the way enclaves, trading in such items as wheat, corn. and cotton. These classic commodities remAin. but have been augmented by such exotica as precious metals and assorted petroleum products. It is. however, stock-index futures, unheard of a decade ago, which have had the most profound recent impact on securities trading. It is common for the total market value represented by the S & P 500 futures contract, on a given day. to ex.ceed by a substantial amount the market value of actual stocks traded on the exchanges. An even greater volume is regularly turned in by interest rate futures, notably those in Treasury Bonds. Indeed the subject of bonds suggests a whole new area of recent changes. The listing in the WSJ of a bond-market data bank. together with assorted tables on interest rate statistics, represents a relatively new development. reflecting the more recent view of bonds as trading instruments rather than assets to be held until maturity. There exists today. moreover. a bevy of financial instruments representing monstrous sums of money which trade without the benefit of any listing in the Wall Street Journal. One thinks. for example, of interest-rate swaps. a delightfully arcane instrument that few understand. Swaps. in turn, have managed to sire — we kid thee not — swaptlons. We think the sort of evolution discussed above is a subject worth examining. It can be examined from a number of aspects. Parochially. the information explosion represents a challenge to the technIcian. We have come a long way from the years where it was possible to post a few – hundred-charts by handand run aLfew-numbers througha-desk calculator in order to follow most of the U.S. financial market. Luckily. the same device that is largely responsible for the Information explOSIon is available for its analYSIS. That device is. of course, the computer. The Investor also finds himself faced with a growing multiplicity of choices. Not only have available domestic investment instruments multiplied, but the growing internationalization of markets has provided a whole new range of opportunities. It is, of course. in response to such internationalization that trading hours are being increased and wtll. it is widely agreed, continue to increase. moving toward eventual 24-hour trading. Ultimately, of course. it becomes necessary to make value judgments about all this. Many of the new developments are, inarguably, desirable. Others are inevitable. The utility of some. we firmly believe however, can be questioned. All of this. as noted above, is worth ponderIng. and we hope to do so from time to time in this space. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELJ), HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2952.59 S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (7/11/91) 376.32 6087.40 No statement or expression of Opinion or any other maner herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or Ihe soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security relerred to or mentioned The maner IS presented merely for the convemence 01 the subSCriber While we beheve the sources 01 our Information to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee the accuracythereol nor of the statements made herein Any acllonto be taken by the subSCriber should be based On hiS own investigatIOn and Ini0rmatlOn Delafield, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posItions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS Of any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may give adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Fur1her mformatlon on any security menlloned herem IS available On request

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 ,'nf' t' i'f';;;t . – , ' '.' J uly 19. 1991 -, – L. – ,; , f'''1 ,'. . ., , We return this week to the subject of the trading range which has contained the market-sinde ,the…… early part of this year, That range is currently delimited by the closing high for the Dow of 3035.33 on'rJune 3-;and the -closing-low'of'2855. 45-on- March-2-1.—This constitutes-a percentage -range, c. from low to high, of 6.3 percent. or. more properly. a log difference of .0611. The DJIA has remained within SImilar confines since February 5. a period five months or 112 trading days long. We set 'our, cpinpu.ter this week to search for similar trading ranges in which the average remained in this narrow a ,Scope ,. for an equal or longer time. Since 1948, the present is the thirteenth such occurrence, and- these. ff … – suc'h ,thirteen instances are shown in the darker bars on the chart below. (In 1964, two successive ranges. the second at higher levels. followed each other.) , .. 'J/ DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE , 6Sk kb6 kb-6 bb- E-r-r-r-r-r'-'-r-r-r-r E e eeeeee eeeeee ee e eee A glance at the chart will show that trading ranges per se have limited usefulness as predictive tools. Indeed of the twelve prior instances of such ranges. six were ultimately broken on the upside and six on the downside. Nor can we glean any particularly useful information as to how long the present impasse might continue. Six previous ranges remained in effect for periods approximately.,. equal to the present one. and six others lasted notably longer. ranging from 150 trading days in of', 1964-1965 up to 237 trading days. or almost a year, between February 1961 and January 1962. It is possible to classify each of the twelve prior patterns as either reversals or continuations. A market that enters a trading range from below and breaks out on the upside is a continuation pa'ttern as is. naturally. its downside counterpart. A market that enters and leaves in different directions is, of course, a reversal and there are five such reversals t all of them qualifying as intermediate -major tops or bottoms. Of these reversals, four were major tops, oocurring in February 1961'- 'January 1962. September 1964 – April 1965. January 1976 – October 1976. and April 1983 – February 1984. ' The only major bottom is the base formation between December 1957 and May 1958. . .. By contrast, of the Seven continuation patterns, five were upside continuations and in only two cases did a market both exit and enter its trading range in a downward direction. The present . instance. since the Dow entered its trading range following a sharp rally, will be another instance of a continuation pattern if'the eventual breakout''''takes- place on the upside. – 4' There are three particularly interesting instances of patterns that are, technically. /' continuations. In both 1948-49 and 1953. the Dow broke out of long sideways trading areas on the downside. but within a month reversed itself and started upward again. in both cases from what turned out to be major bottoms. Something of the converse occurred when an upside penetration from a lateral trading range occurred In September, 1962. The market continued to move ahead for 3 months. ,but in December reversed itself as the 1968 – 1970 bear market was launched. . This. it seems to us, is a phenomenon of which we should be careful in 1991. The recent containment of the market in the rough 2855-3035 range is well advertised. and It may well be that such a breakout will caUSe a sharp follow-through. either up or down, which could. shortly thereafter, run out of steam. It will, therefore, be of critical importance to assess the internal strength of the market when the Ultimate penetration finally occurs. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABECL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 3015.88 S & P 500 (1200) 384.59 Cumulative Index (7/18/91) 6204.54 No statement or expression of oplmon or any other maner herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed to be, drrectly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicltalion of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence 01 the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Informalion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aclron to be taken by the subscrrber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and lis offICers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSItrons or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any Mure Issue, and such posilion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabetllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securlly mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 — — -.-….- July 26, 1991 Monday, July 15 turned out to be one of the more interesting days in recent stock-market history. The morning's newspapers confirmed stories that had emerged the previous Friday afternoon indicating that the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. was about to be seized by New Jersey state insurance regulators. That piece of intelligence was totally overshadowed, however, by the announcement that Chemical Banking Corp. and Manufacturers Hanover Corp. had agreed to merge. This produced a mini-bull-market in bank stocks. Manufacturers Hanover closed the day up 6 1/8 points for a 26.3 gain, and Chemical posted a 2 7/8-point, 12.1 rise. A passel of other bank stocks shot up by 10 or more on the theory that, the ball having begun rolling, they might be part of future mergers. As far as the general market was concerned. it was nothing more than a ho-hum day, typical of the sort of soporific action which has characterized the market since February. The Dow was up ten points. and 996 stocks advanced while 595 declined. Volume was some 20 million shares lower than it had been the previous Friday. We are citing this particular day as one which appears to be perfect example of the mood of the present equity market. The market paid no attention whatsoever to the Mutual Benefit fiasco and ignored the fact that the CHL-MHC merger was at least in part due to serious difficulties with problem loans on the books of both partners. It focused instead on the presumed operating savings to result from the consolidation which. it can be argued. are insignificant compared to the larger issues. Another. not unrelated example of the same sort of thing was cited by Wall Street's resident cynic. Alan Abelson, in the following week's Barron's. He poked a bit of fun at the recent trend in corporate fashion toward announcing large non-recurring writeoffs along with the reQorting ' or Iiivoratile operating resuits;-1te cited the example of-the -AT & T restrucfuringiblY – – amounting to 4 billion. the announcement of which sent the stock up a couple of points. What we are suggesting. of course, is that. despite the occasional pounding taken by companies with disappointing earnings, the market seems inClined, at the moment, to ignore bad news and, at the very least. put a favorable spin on events, the implications of which are, at the very least, mixed. The seizure of the nation's 18th largest health and life insurer might, it seems to us, have been at least the cause of some sober reflection, suggesting, as it does, that the ills of savings & loans and banks may have spread to a whole new area of the financial community, one without an FDIC or FSLlC in place. The market, however, has proved itself again and again to be totally unconcerned with weaknesses in the U.S's financial infrastructure. It believes that, having muddled through third-world loans, junk bonds, and collapsing real estate prices, we will continue to muddle through whatever the future holds in store for us. We are not necessarily being critical of this view. It may J indeed, be the correct one, for the market is seldom wrong. Few market commentators active today actually remember the 1930's, but many of us were taught by those who remembered them, and a total horror at the prospect of credit contraction was instilled in us in those long-ago classrooms. A pessimistic view of credit conditions, therefore, is hardly rare in the financial punditry emanating from oldsters like ourselves. The market, though, seems to be suggesting that we have indeed learned the lesson of the 1930's and that the upside of the current crisis is that insured deposits, for all their cost, have at least forestalled the kind of public panic which characterized the collapse of sixty years ago. Whether the market will prove to be right in this instance we do not pretend to know, and, as market technicians,.wearenot required to worry about it. We remain secure in the bellef that the market itself will give the first clue of any possible change in the high level of investor confidence which seems to permeate it today. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (7/25/91) 2975.85 381.28 6161.78 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, an oHer or the solicltal Ion of an oHer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informalion to be re!lable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgabon and mformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabel1lnc, as a corporation and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSlllons or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafletd, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further 1n1ormatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on request