Viewing Year: 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 08, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 08, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - January 08, 1988
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,——————————————————————————————————————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 January 8, 1988 Point-8nd-figur c..b.!lring .J)8\!.ingb.een, in our-..case. a .1amUyaffair. we .incurred-,,-our first exposure to the interpretation- of such charts when we were still in high school. If we had looked at a chart of today's market at that time, we have no doubt that we would have identified last week's action as 8 breakout from a fairly important base formation with an upside objective somewhere around 2600. It is often wise in technical analysis, to adhere to the acronym, KISS (Keep It Simple. Stupid). We are, therefore, probably better off by not vexing ourselves with complicated reservations regarding the above opinion. Such reservations would be stimulated by the strange pattern currently to be seen in market breadth indices They would include the fact that a significant number of individual stocks have, at the moment, no base pattern at all. They would also involve questions regarding the long-term pattern which would be formed by a rally falling short, as the projected one might, of attaining new highs. Let us, for the moment at least, content ourselves with the simple scenario that we find ourselves in a market whose short-to-intermediate-term direction is up. This having been said, it is worthwhile, we think. to focus on one particular aspect of recent market behavior That aspect is the sharp rise in market volatility. This phenomenon, it should be emphaSized, is not restricted to the period centered on October 19. High volatility has been a feature of all of 1987, and it has continued to manifest itself right up through this week. Our readers know that we have used as a volatility measure the standard deviation about their mean of daily log changes in the DJ1A within market months. We will not bore our non-mathematical readers by explaining this figure once again and ask that it be taken on trust that the statistic is an accurate measure of volatility. We have previously noted that October, 1987, produced an alltim e record J orthis particular-numbe,comfortably exceed in g-N ov ember.-1-929W-hn t-is——I significant, we think. is that above -average volatility continued in both November and December. This is the first time we have put together a string of three such months since 1938. Thus, in terms of the extent of daily swings, recent market behavior appears to be much like that of the 1930's, and may even resemble the early part of that decade when above-average swings characterized every month between May, 1931 and November, 1933. It can be demonstrated in many ways that current market vacillations are of an entirely different breed than those many of us are used to. If we use June 1949, the start of the last super-cycle bull market, as a starting point and look at the ensuing 38 112 years through the end of 1987, we arrive at some rather interesting numbers for daily market swings. Let us take, for example, the 100 largest daily declines, in percentage terms of course, occurring during that 38 1/2 year period. The last three months of 1987 constitute only 0.65 of the period under study, but 16 of the 100 largest declines took place in those three months. Indeed, of the 11 largest daily drops, seven occurred during 1987's final quarter. It can be argued, moreover. that this is really acceleration of an ongoing phenomenon. Nineteen of the 100 largest declines took place in the year 1987, and 37 took place in the 1980's. Nineteen Seventy-four, it will be recalled also had a number of large declines, and if we include that year along with the 1980's, we have, in 9 years, 56 of the 100 largest drops Since, we are stUdying volatility, not trend, however, we should be equally concerned with advances. Over the same 38 1/2 year period, ten of the 100 largest rises took place in October-December, 1987, and eighteen occurred during the year as a whole. Following the practice above, we find that 68 of the largest 100 advances since 1949 occurred either in the 1980s or in 1974. It seems axiomatic, then, that volatility has increased sharply over that observed in the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's. However, as we have noted above, if one goes back to the 1930's, there is no dearth of similarities to the tumultuous market behavior being observed today. It is our feeling, that, until evidence to the contrary appears, investors should expect a continuance of the wide market swings of the past three months. How this prognosis is to be translated to portfolio strategy must be determined by the individual investor. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (1/7/88) 201376 257.02 3312.86 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or eKpreSSlon or opinIOn or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indlreclly, an oHer orthe soIlcltalron of an offer to buy or sell any security referred \ to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respect 10 any secuTitles menlroned In thiS or any future ISsue, and such posllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to tts Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS Of In any other Issue Further Informallon on any secUTIty mentioned heretn IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 15, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 15, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - January 15, 1988
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– – — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – ——————-7———————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 January 15. 1988 A funny thing happened on the way to 2600. We noted in last week's letter that a naive readmg of the point-and-figure chart for tne Dow, without considering other factors. suggested a possible move to the 2600 area. -T-Dur,,letter goesJo….pess.Jltnoon each Friday. Whereupon, the market spent last Friday afternoon falling out of bed and wound up down some 140 points. Subsequent action through this week. whIle featUring wide, mtra-day sWings. has been inconclusIVe. We do not. honestly. feel all that embarrassed about last week's pIece. Indeed. under the stImulus of the improved trade defIcit, it may still prove vahd. However, we thmk toe important part of tne letter was its second half, which focused on what we believe to be the market's major current attribute msofar as Investment management is concerned. That attribute, of course, IS volatility. Our concern regardlOg the recent emergence of this factor is apparently widely shared, notably by tne New York Stock Exchange, which announced today an experimental six-day program involving reductIon of automated trades. A few years ago. tristit'uti'onal lnvestor magazine emblazoned on it'3 cover the phrase. This isn't a bear market. This 18 the way things are go1Og to be from now on. 1I If this is true in respect to . .volatihty. mvestors had best be aware of it. , 10 5'ING5 IN OJlo 1929-1938 ..li – 'Ie .–'—- . … . .. . . . . ….,. . . . . – . H' ' 200 'IUHgt OF ORfS '50 The chart above IS a scatter diagram covering each 10-or-greater swing in toe Dow since October, 1929, a total of 138 market moves. Each mark represents one move, eitner up or down, of 10 or morp. witn toe percentage change of that move bemg read from the vertical aXIS, and the number of days for the swing along the horIzontal axis. Let us first conSIder the moves identified by a plus SIgn. These 55 SWings took place between February. 1947 and August, 1987. It is easy to observe what appears to be a distinct relationship between the extent of a given move and tne number of days reqUIred to complete It. ThIS relationship can be summaT'ized by the regression lme drawn on the chart and, although there is wide variation, the fIt is reasonably close. Of the 55 moves during that period. 36 lasted more than 100 trading days. By contrast, the moves marked with a asterisk are those whicn took place between 1929 and 1946. A more chaotIc distributIon would be hard to imagine. These 1929-46 moves. moreover.- are concentrated on the left hand 'ide of the chart showing that tne duratIon tended to be quite short. Indeed. 19 of the 55 swings were less than 10 days 10 length. Finally. moves marked by a zero show the six 10-or-greater swings SInce last summer's hIgh. It appears obvious tnat they are rignt at nome with the swings of the 1930's. Market reform may return us to the era when important market moves were measured in months and years rather than days and hours. Until thIS occurs, though. continued volatIlity should probably be expected and will have to be dealt WIth. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWT'ebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S P 500 (12'00) CumulatIve Index 0/14/88) 1966.01 252.23 31Rq 73 No statement or expression 01 Opinion or any other maner herem contaIned IS, or IS to be deemedto be, directly or Indirectly, an offer orthe solicltallon of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe Ihe sources of our mlormatlon to be rehable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on his own Investlgallon and mformallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabe!! Inc, as a corporation and I\S officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any luture Issue and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc , whlch!s registered wl1h Ihe SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVice 10 liS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further in/ormation on any secUfity mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 22, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 22, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - January 22, 1988
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 January 22, 1988 A.1thougil this letter, over the course of 42 years. has devoted itself largely to technical -'!- analysis, we -have never marle–th-e claim.. that-.technicRl-work-po.c;sesses ….aUtne .,answers. Wehay e. ather, leaned toward a more modest affirmation, WhICh. simply, states that sHch 8nalysb shouJd constitute an integral part of the investment-decIsion-making process. At the moment, it must be confessed, technical indications remain somewhat inconclusive. It now becomes apparent that tile upside breakouts by many averages some two weeks ago. were ralse. and Rlmost all market indices have pulled back into trading ranges and currently find themselves somewhCIe between their October 19 lows and recent highs. We think there ic;; d reason for this, and it involves making the diHtinction between market-related and external phenomena. Future prospects in a number of areas external to the market seem, at tnis point, to be uncp.rtain, and it may well be that this is causing the volatile backing and filling which has been the centra) feature of trading for the last three months. The necessity for distinguishing between the two sorts of phenomena emerged, in our oplnJon, with comparison of the current market scene to that of the 1920's, a comparison, which hac;;, naturally, occupied a fair amount of space in recent editions of this piece. We have made the point that we considered the drop from 3RL17 in September, 1929 to 198.69 m November to be 8 product of factors internal to the market itself. We now know. all too well. that the villain was a wave of rampant speculation fueled by the presence of ridiculously low margin requirements. The illusion that the stock market was a royal road to the riches, had, we tnink. been dlssipateil by November, 1929, once the Dow had been trimmed by some 4B percent. Following that November low, the market staged a reasonably impressive rally whicn lasted some six months and regained approximately half the ground lost. ' –Arpr';iIlt;-wr9a3s0 at this point that factors totally outside the stock market began -It is now apparent, economic contraction on an unprecedented to take over. By scale was undEfrway. time went on. It became equally obvious that the tools then available to cope with a major depression were inadequate for tile task. As Indeed. we now realize in the light of history that, in many areas, the proper action would have been the direct opposite of the course actually taken. Attempts to balance the budget were made at a time when, it is agreed. fiscal policy should have provided a stimulus. Congress responded to a growing trade deficit by raising tariff barriers sharply, and finally, by 1931, tne Fed had allowed the money supply to drop some 30 percent. Given these wrong-headed policies, depression became inevitable. and falling stock market prices between 1930 and 1932 did nothing more than reflect that depression. Like the one in 1929, tne market break between August and October of last year was, in our opinion, a market-related phenomenon. Speculative fever was as high as it had been 58 years before. except that this speculatIon was being carried on by supposed professionals rather than individuals. Due to the introduction of rl.erivative products. large amounts of stock could be controlled by small amounts of money and, as the market broke, trade deficits were featured on the front pages of the financial press. By October 19, however, the market's internal problems, as in 1q29 – 1930. had, in our OpiJlion, been largely resolved, however painful the process. What remains to be seen is whether or not external depressants on the scale of toe 1930's will emerge. A number of outside factors remain. we think, uncertain. Opinions differ, for example, as to whether the ovember trade figures signify a deciSIve reversal, or only a random blip in a continuing downtrend. The problem of third-world debt, obviously. remains. although tne recent proposal witil respect to the Mexican component thereof may be a blueprint for the best possible solution. The levels for other sorts of debt, are, moreover, just as disturbing. Leverage created by acquisitions and buyouts, for example, has not yet become a terribly onerous burden for creditors. but it could, ultimately, do so. Tne worries enumerated above, legitimate ones, in our View, are what now overhang tne market and cause the current confusing patterns of technical behavior. Ultimately. present economic fears will eitiler dissipate or prove to be Justified. The market's technical action should, at some point. foresnudow one of these two outcomes. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELf, AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials 0200) 1886.77 S & P 500 0200) 244.57 Cumulative Index (1/20/88) 3208.66 No statement or epresslon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer orthe soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we believe Ihe sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the aCCuracy thereof nOf of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and InformallOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered WIth the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informa\lon on any securtty menlloned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 29, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 29, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - January 29, 1988
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TABELLS MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 16091987-2300 January 29. 1988 We indicated n this space last week that much of the uncertainty in the current market outlook could be traced back to uncertain fundamentals. That uncertainty. in turn, may be due to tne fact that ihterprelatioof-fundamental data Loften- seems to be -moreJof an …arL.lhan ascience. Consider for example. the fonowing recent news items. , . . .. – – – ''''! Item It was announced on Wednesday that Gross National Product grew at 8'4.2 annual rate in the fourth quarter. one of the best increases in a number of years. Item On tne preVIOUS day. it was reported that durable goods orders i1ad risen 6.7 in December. the largest rise In more than a year. Item A week ago. four major computer companies reported Sharply increased earnings for the latest quat'ter. Hem, On tne previous day. the leader in that same industry. IBM, weighed in with a 50 rise in net income. — Let us now conSIder tne market's response to the aforementioned information. The sharp rise in GNP produced a stock market which, under the influence of program trading, dropped almost 10 points. Higher durable-goods orders were followed by a 26-point drop in the Dow. Of the major computer companies, , whose earnings almost doubled, dropped three points. Microsoft reported earnings up 79 and fell 3 1/4 points, Onisys. showing a profit versus a loss last year. dropped 1 5/8 points, as did Motorola, whose earnings had posted a 62 gain. With these issues posting downSide leadership. the DJIA dropped 57 points. Finally. the sharply-improved IBM earnings caused the stock itself to fall 6 points. While leading the Dow to a 27-point decline. — Now, we are perfectly willing to agree tilat tile proposition that rising earnings or improved economic statistics should always be followed by stock-price rises is a fairly simple-minded one. Indeed, aU sorts of sophisticated rationales were cited for the stock-market results that seemed so perverse. Thus we learned that the GNP rise was based largely on inventory build-up and that the unexpected durable goods demand was largely due to aircraft bookings. Which tend to be erratic. Analysts were quoted as saying that the 62 earnings rise in Motorola was less than expected. and therefore. prompted disapPOinted selling. According to the Wall Street Journal. however. Apple's eariiings iitcrease excee-drdth-emostoptimisticexpectations,- yet-failed—toe-ep …thestockprice–from-''I plummeting. In the same vein, the Journal quoted analysts as saying Microsoft results were – -. fabulous and absolutely awesome. The stock's reaction could hardly be so described. Finally, it was explained that lBM's earnings rise was largely due to lower taxes and should. therefore, be discounted. Along with upside-down reactIons to what seems to be good news, the market also appears to be becolning confused as to just what sort of external statistics it should be responding. We remember being instructed last year that a better bond market was the sine qua non for a rising stock market. Equities peaked on August 25 last year following a bond market high in July. at which a representative O.S. Treasury issue. the 8 3/4's of 2003-08. sold over par. The low for these bonds on October 16 was under 86. thus, apparently confirming the correlation between the bond market and the stock market. What remains unexplained. however. is the fact that the bond is again above 100. with the stock market, for three months, having done nothjng whatsoever. There have been numerous days during the last quarter when bond and stock prices moved in opposite directions, something that would have seemed inconceivable in the first six months of 1987. It may well be that the bond market's usefulness as a stock-market barometer is coming to an end, as was the case with the money-supply barometer, which had everyone bemused a couple of years ago. Remember the money supply We waited with bated breath for the figures to be released each Thursday afternoon. Increases regularly brought the stock market to its knees, on the theory that Mr. Volcker. then the resident ogre at the Fed would attempt to counteract the rise by tightening monetary strings, thus, in some magic way, causing the stock market to fall. Declines in the money supply regularly produced stock market rises. Such, however, does not appear to be the recent case. Most monetary aggregates have. lately, been plummeting without any noticable upward effect on stock prices. It was Lord Keynes who likened the stock market to a peculiar form of beauty contest in which the object of the exercise was not to pick the most attractive girl, but to guess which lady the other judges would choose as most attractive. Such seems to be the case at the moment. with stock investors apparently unsure as to what numbers they should now be paying attention. There is, really. nothing unusual about this sort of confusion. The central tenet of the technician has always been that investor confidence is an important criterion for determining stock prices. It is hardly surprising that confidence should be in a state of shock following the action of last October. Technical work will, we hope. give us some clue as to when that confidence is returning and making stock buyers likely to respond more favorably to improved fundamentals. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (1/28/88) 1934.84 254.28 3300.60 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL INC. No statement or ressIOfl of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, directly Or IOdlrectly, an offer orthe solJcatJon of an offerlo buy orseiJ any security referred (0 or mentroned accuracy thereof e matter nor of the IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS our mformal1On to own Investigation baendrerlinafbolreawtleoInn no way represent Delafield Harvey oTrbeurarraInncteeatshea poraton and Its oHlcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any future ISSU8 nd such' pOsIOn may be , erenl 10m any VIews now or hereafter BXPfBSSed In thrs Or anyotner Issue Dela111!\d, Harvey, Tabelf Inc, which IS registered wh the SEC as an Investmentalsor may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentioned herein I available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 05, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 05, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - February 05, 1988
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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209- MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987,2300 February 5. 1988 liThe vtovmg Finger writes; and. having writ. Moves on nor aU your Piety nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel n,llf a Line, Nor aU you!' Tears w8!lh!'0l1t aWord of it.– .– – — 0 —- Edward FItzgerald, The Rubaiy';-t of Omar Kh Tnere is 1 strange flavor to much market comment being heard today It seems to nave virtually forgotten October 19. 1987. Now, we are perfectly aware that hardly a day has gone by without some piece of news regarding that fateful day and its aftermatn. The bulk of this comment, however. has concerned the actions of investigative bodles such 85 the Brady Commission, the SEC, etc. The intent of these groups is. indeed, admirable. They are probing for reforms in market structure, wnich migot mitigate against the recurrence of shocks of the magnitude of October 19 in the future. However prfliseworthy these efforts may be, they are, for the market technician, largely irrelevant. For the technician is a market historian. What he seeks are clues derilTed from past market behavior which may yield some insight into future behavior. For him, the essential fact is thAt October 19 happened. Toe difficulty lies In knowing how to interpret it. One of the first relevant statements WhICh can be made about Meltdown Monday is that it establishes the current market direction as being down. We do not necessarily mean this statement to be bearish. Indeed, just a few weeks ago, we issued a year-end forecast suggesting that 1988 might be an Inside yeaI'll. one in which the year's low would not be significantly below the October 19 bottom of 1738.74 on the Dow. or significantly better the August 25 peak of 2722.42. Such a forecast implies the likelihood of a basing period which might ultimately end with enough accumulation having taken place to suggest a new bull market—with the further implication that such rebasing might take place without important new lows being attained. However, until such a base is clearly established. the burden of proof must be on the bulls. The monstrouc;; technical damage done by a 36.13 decline over a 3S-day period—which is what took place between August 25and October 19—is not going to be easily – recfified. Thisis wnat–we mean when we sayfne tecnnician must recognize -tne -simpre-facflhat – — October 19 did actually happen, and that ite; shadow still hangs over today's market. 1- The problem with interpretation is that there are precious few prior events similar to October 19 with which we can compare it. We, along with everybody else who comments on the stock market, have mentioned the obvious one, the 56-day drop from September 3 to November 13, 1929. which took the Dow down 47.87. There occurred between September. 1932 and February. 1933 a 37.25 decline in a 40-day perIod, but neither the market nor economic background of that time can be said to resemble what exists today. The year-long bear market which began in March, 1937. might be said to possess some relevance. The Dow ultimately declined almost 50. but there was no interruption at all similar to tne one which has taken place from October 21 to date a time span of some three-and-a-half months. The length of tne 1938 – 1942 drop, three-and-a-half years, makes it, also, totally unlike the present downswing .1ust two bear markets of the current era are comparable to the present one in extent. The 36 drop in 1968-1970 is one. and anotber is the decline from January 11. 1973 to December 6. 1974. This latter instance may teach some useful lessons. It began with a year-long downswing of 25 in the Dow, with the low attaIned on December 5. 1973. There followed some seven months, to early July, 1974. during which the Dow failed to penetrate that December low. However. the low ultimately was broken, and a second phase of the bear market began, taking the average from 859.67 on June 10 to 577.60 on December 6, a fall of 32. There is. therefore, some precedent for an ongoing bear market's beIng interrupted by a trading range. such as the one in which we now find ourselves. What we hope the above makes clear is that the technician as market historian has very little to guide him at this stage. The experiences of the 1930's do not appear comparable to the present day, and the single recent case, where a secondary decline followed a protracted trading range, was just that. a single case in 1974. Even though the bear market of last fall looms over the present market like a dark shadow, it is hard to tell just what the effect of that penumbra will be. It is for this reason that we continue to advocate a policy of caution—one of patient waiting for the market to tell its own story. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (2/4/88) 1926.55 253.38 3333.63 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or Ihe sollcrtatlon of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menllOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of Ihe subscnber While we believe the sources of our Informallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor althe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informabon Delafteld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be different Irom any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, TabeU Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 12, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 12, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - February 12, 1988
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 ,. February 12, 1988 mi9 onti!le speculation that the Federal Reserve is easing credit and predictions by the Reagan administration tnat the D.8-. traoe-deficit wIll aecIine -this'year;-both- the stock ….market-antl-the bond market advanced this week .. Smce October 19 of last year. large advances. such as the 47-point gain on Wednesday. and similar declines in magnitude in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, have continued to broaden the trading range which has contained the DJIA between 2060 and 1730. Withm this framework. continued rotation of leadership has been apparent. For example, the consumer non-durable and interest-sensitive sectors, WhICh led the previous advance, has shown SIgns of relative loss of momentum. To put this in proper perspectiv, we have taken a monthly average of S &. P groups that either constitute an inflation hedge or would be a disinflatIon beneficiary and have created two separate indices. Inflation hedge groups would include. among others, metals. gold. steel, and the entire energy sector. Disinflation beneficiary groups would include airlines, drugs, foods, and the interest-sensitive sector—banks. insurance, and utilities. E eSTRNORD POORS 5QO lNFLRflOtI HEDGE VS OISINFLPTlDN BEtIEFIC1PRY RPTIO The chart above shows the monthly close of the S P 500 and the ratio of the inflation hedge index to the disinflation index from January. 1972 through January, 1987. If the inflation hedge index is advancing more than the disinflation beneficiary index. the ratio line is going up (1972-1980). Clearly. it can be shown from the chart above that the inflation hedge sector has underperformed those groups which are disinf1ationary beneficiaries since the start of the bull market, August. 1982. But it is possible to go back even further than this date. to identify the beginning of this significant change in the market environment. The ratio reached its high at the end of 1980 coincident with the high in the S P 500. This day, by hindsight, signaled the peak of the ratio of inflation hedge stocks relative to those stocks that are beneficiaries of disinflation. It was during the subsequent correction in the market to the August. 1982 low that the inflationary-hedge index turned down. This occurred while the disinflationary beneficiary index continued to move ahead in the face of a 15 decline in the S & P 500. The final confirmation of this Significant internal change came when the market rallied dramatically in August, 1982, but failed to include the inflation hedge sector. Currently. from the ratio peak of November 1980. the inflation hedge sector has declined with minor interruptions approximately 55 through July, 1986. The disinflation beneficiary index. on the other hand. has increased 174 to date. This is not to suggest that an immediate switch into the disinflation beneficiary sector was warranted shortly after the peak in the ratio in November. 1980. Rather. we -suggest an examination of the ratio over time wouldreflect the gradual internal.change.within … the –' market. By the August, 1982 low. this change should have been clearly identified with appropriate shifts in weighting made in order to participate in the advance which was to come. Where are we now in terms of this ratio We know from monitoring this type of series. the ratio peak was not coincident with a major market turn, in fact. occurring in November. 1980 well before the August, 1982 low. Therefore. conversely. the recent improvement from the ratio low established in July. 1986. well before the October, 1987 market decline. is now, perhaps, beginning to reflect a major shift in market sentiment.. Next week, we will examine individual S &. P groups in order to identify those changes occurring within the broad trading range that has contained the DJIA. ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. RJSebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (2/10/88) 1977.45 257.54 3390.50 No statement or expressIOn of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer 10 buy or s!! any secUrity referred to or men1lOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corpora\!on and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitIOns or trades In respect to any secuntles mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views !\Ow or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delaheld, Harvey, Tabellinc. which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securrty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 19, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 19, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - February 19, 1988 page 1
Tabell's Market Letter - February 19, 1988 page 2
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'U'LinBHELL S Iil1i1 Lin IRl &;; IE'U' LIE'U''U'E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 9S7-2300 – February 19, 1988 – The-performance of-thestockmark etfor -the-week must-be -describedas unimpressive. , The current position of the Dow Jones I ndustrial Average continues to be contained in the often referred-to trading range, which has confined the DJIA from the October low of last year, between a high of 2051.79 and a low of 1738.74. In a relatively short period of time, due to increased volatility, it can be shown that within this trading range there have been a DATE DJIA CHANGE DAYS/SWING number of completed short term swings as Shown in the table to the right, together with the percentage change and the length of each move. As we discussed last week, a closer examination of these market swings during this period, using the Standard & Poor's group indices as a proxy, shows an interesting process developing. On the back page these Standard & Poor's groups are ranked by percentage change, best to worst, for two periods, December 31, 1986 to October 21, 10 16 87 10 19 87 10 21 87 10 26 87 11 02 87 12 04 87 01 07 88 01 20 88 02 16 88 2246.73 1738.74 2027.85 1793.93 2014.09 1766.74 2051.89 1879.14 2005.97 0.00 -22.61 16.63 -11.54 12.27 -12.28 16.14 -8.42 6.75 o 1 2 3 5 23 22 9 18 1987 and October 21, 1987 to February 17, 1988. Examining these two separate periods clearly demonstrates the diverse behavior of these Standard & Poor's groups from one period, the final phase of a mature bull market, to another, the recent trading range from October, 1987 to date. Reviewing the first time period, we have been aware, as discussed last week, of a shift Which started prior to October 19, 1987 from the disinflation sector into the inflation beneficiary ectQ.hLs ifref1eted in.1he performance of,theindividual Standard.& Poor's.g!,oup's., . Rank Group Oct 21, 1987 to Feb 17, 1988 Percentage Change Rank Group Oct 21, 1987 tn Feh 17. J9R8 Percentage Change TIRES RUBBER RETAIL STORES DEPARTMENT TEXTILE PRODUCTS GAMING COMPANIES AUTO PARTS-AFTER MARKET METALS MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL LOANS MACHINE TOOLS HOME BUILDING MACHINERY DIVERSIFIED STEEL 27.2785 26.7649 25.6863 20.8140 19.4948 16.3779 16.2273 16.1993 15.6984 15.6657 15.0114 MULTI-LINE INSURANCE -7.7961 ELECTRONICS SEMICONDUCTORS -8.6771 RAILROADS -8.9376 GOLD -9.2765 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT -9.3352 BROKERAGE FIRMS -10.0765 MONEY-CENTER BANKS -13.4763 PUBLISHING (NEWSPAPERS) -16.4271 INVESTMENT COMPANIES -16.6322 AIR FREIGHT -19.1489 TOYS -22.2222 What is interesting, however, is the performance of these same groups from October, 1987 to date. The list above shows the percentage change of the best and worst groups for this period. The natural resource sector (metals-miscellaneous and steel), capital equipment (machine tools and machine-diversified), and consumer durables (tire and rubber, auto parts-after market, and home building) are well represented. Also another major sector, showing improved relative performance, is energy and is technically positioned to assume market leadership. Just as interesting for this sallle p-eriod'\s- the-representation of the financial' sector in the -worstacting'groups. Something is going on within the limits of this defined trading range. As this letter has pointed out repeatedly in past weeks, it is possible for this process of rotational leadership from sector to sector and group to group to evolve within the current trading range. New leadership in sectors, such as natural resources, energy, capital equipment, and consumer durables seems to be emerging. If, in fact, this trading range breaks out on the upside, this rotational process that we are monitoring should give us a clue as to the leadership of the next advance. ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 1987.07 S 110 P 500 (1200) 257.94 Cumulative Index (2/18/88) 3424.49 No statement or expression of Opinion or any other matter herein contamed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of Ihe subscnber While we believe Ihe sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereot nor oflhe statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporahon and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSitions or trades In respecllo any secUfibes menl!oned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such poslbon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delalleld, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may 91ve adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or m any other Issue Further Inlormatlon on any secunty mentioned herem IS available on request DC l lS6 TJ JCT 1 19;7 PRETA DT 21 1937 T '00 7 l'l83 JKCNT CiAG CrlA uLJ ; ) T'.L 4 EETGNrsMl(CNVTCs 5 MrlS NlSCELLAt1US o CuAT o 70.293 5L.711l 39.)573 ,7.7741 3T.412 31.S92 -1.8457 -.27 15.0114 -8.0771 lb.317 8.Z 1 '-LUfH.'W,,,\ J XCLUlG 2N .40TOR CLJING I.S.M 10 POLUTION C!)Nf ROL 11 CrllEY-D1VRSlflc0 1 oVlu E) 31.2736 30.5637 3J.l97 1.;.46'9 Zi.TZ24 20.51)8 9.0713 '1. S 35) -6.57'3 -4.2tu5 5.667 -O.133 .1.3 T('c4.C\C l cNTRTAINNT 15 OIL Well E'JrMNT N 5c 10 M.JF.\CTUNG(QIV. IN.) 17 ELf';T;CA (.;LlIPMENT — 2.33;4 19.4406 13.91S1 11.4725 l.H93- -.31S7 6.9.6 -1.758c 6.3356 –9335 -. d PU2J..l!iIN'; IS TEXTILE PODUTS ,LO all INTEGR.lTcD INTERNATIO 21 iHU; 22 OIL C8MPC5IT .u SJFT DRINKS 24 ELrCTxONICSOEFEN5E Z5 GcNE.l MERCHANDISE CMAINS (0 AuTOMOBILE 21 ELECTRONICSISTRdMENTATIQ za HARDWARE TOJLS 2. HJUSfnOD PROGUCTS .0 COMPUTeR SYSTEMS 31 TIRES RUB3EQ 32 OIL INTEGRATED DOMESTIC 33 RAILROADS 34 FOCi) CHAI,V 33 COMMUNICATION EQUIP/MFRS 3 Q CM EMI CAL 5 J7 HOTCl/MOTl 3d CONTAINER PAPER 3j Si.P 500 40 AUTJ PARTS-JRG. EQUIFMENT 41 PUolISHIN; (NEWSPAPERS) 42 CQNTAINE METAL & GLASS ,.3 – C.JN';lQMERA.TES – H. l07 -1 131 14.3704 25.68.3 14.2404 0.9517 13.9363 2.5511 13.3533 .. 4 OC 12.316 -3.6604 12.0291 1.aS9; 12.6935 -3.113' 12.0063 10.3024 11.S097 12.2249 11.1781 11.4971 10.7BoO 2.3799 10.73,2 -6.26Bl 10.5620 Z7.Z7b; 9.9427 6.204, 9.3067 -8.9375 9.00,5 9.2343 8.5,04 9.6340 8.6904 2.4502 7.3503 -0.1107 6.75.1 11.3265 6.937 0.3212 6.5079 3.5699 5.3119 -16.4271 5.3455 -6.9076 ……7746.. -0 .7S42 ' – – – – . . 44 CDS,oTrCS 45 TEliPrlONE (NEW) 46 FDOJS 47 CMEMlCA lS -0 IV. 4a Sti02S 4. McOrCAl PRODUCTS & SUPPLI SO HEALTH CARE-OIVERSIFlcO 51 ReTAIL STOES(ORU.) 52 RETAIL STORES COMOSIrE ,3 NATURl G4S '4 PAPER ;;3 OFFICi QUIPI!NT -. SUI'LlE 5. HEALTn CARE-COMPOSITE ;7 AUTO TRUCS PARTS 53 PRDPRTY-CASUALITY IN SUR AN 59 MdlTI-lINE INSURANCE 60 CDMPUTER SOFTwARE t SERVIC 61 GAMING COMPNIES 6. HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT CDMPAN 4.33.0 3.6992 3.3260 2.9114 2.4371 1.0111 1.4619 1.1112 0.3911 0.6633 0.643S 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2&39 -).3680 -0.9735 -1.3252 -2.2160 -3.2037 14.930b -0.5111 5.2005 B.4563 7.0000 12.4714 6.3305 5.5H, 4.2513 -0.4d60 6.4385 0. 0000 4.2017 0.653 -4.0193 -7.19bl 6.15.1 20.8140 -0.8614 6J RESTAURNrS -3.lOl 64 INVc;TMNT COPAN1ES -3.7160 65 AUT PARTS-AFTER AKT -3.B306 .6 TEXTIL APAREL MFRS. -4.122 67 FOREST PRJDUCTS -4.9&03 68 AiR TRANSORT -5.1758 I – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – ; u – – ; ,0'c1 cMAoCH,INrEn T,RaGnL.ISS'–..–n''''-'5C;.5't.7,9'9O 2.678 -16.6322 19.494, -b.4 'n 1 11.1035 -1.0S), 16 .. 14. 411953;.;;.,———–1 71 LE1UR TIM 7 AIR FRtiGHT 13 L!TlC OMPlNIES 7.. LIFt IN.iUANCE. 75 HucSEHCLO F A 70 AERJSPACE-EFNSf 77 MAJOR REGIONAL 3AK5 70 c.'101.1… 77 TRURS du RcTLL STRS JETMNT l RETJIL SP(CIALT 82 MONEY CENTER 'A.Ki TT.) e TqSP.-!SC. G 5aViNG.i t laA COPArs d7 MANJFCTCE OUIG hAlT C-SC o RSJNhl OANS 9J R ETATE !VcSTNT TRU 9L 6CKEA FIRS , HJM 3UILIN -.311 -3.997 -10.U454 -11 .. J565 -12.0656 -12.Z96 -1.551 -13s.7244 -13.197 -14.4027 -15.0155 -15.a473 -15.43S0 -1.lZ09 -17.7014 -lo.Oo4 -ld. 1 433 -1'.c301 -l;tl.1S,l -21. 39S -30. 6,1 -;. 015 .92J -19.167 1.2191 .2.634' 6.2706 O.161 -.505 2 .. )277 -3.1;7 26.749 O.J1 -13.4763 o.a90 -22.22i 4.0170 -6.S113 -.4J0 -Z.S434 15.2213 3.11 -10.07 E.,,4

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 26, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 26, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - February 26, 1988
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— — — – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 February 26. 1988 ..–1–.– ,-For….a –rmativ ely b r-1-ef-Jft'01nen-'–rhis week.;–on…. Thul'sday ;-it…..app-eared theDow–J-on-eS.'Indu-strial'''-Au'… was going to break out on the 'upsidefrom tile previous ninety trading days -that -has contained the since October 19 of last year between a closing high of 2051.89 and a closing low of 1738.74. Such was . not the case, 8S the DJIA again returned, ad naseau, to the often-mentioned trading range, discussed at length by us in the recent past. The chart below is an updated version of a chart that appeared in this letter almost three months ago. It is a twenty-point unit, point-and-figure chart tracing the last two year's market action in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It shows, in other words, each 20-point change in the DJIA from early 1986 to date. Also included are some key reference points on the chart. It is Interesting to again review the past performance of the DJIA. The 1800 level was first reached in March, 1986, and the DJIA spent the remainder of the year between 1780 and 1900. As 1987 began. the stock market dramatically advanced to a high of 2400 in April. Four months later, on August 25, the bull-market high, at 2722.42, was achieved. We are sll painfully aware of the subsequent correction culminating on October 19 at a closing low of 1738.74. Following that low, a two-day, 289-point rally to 2027.85 took place. There have been to date a series of eight swings in excess of 8 percent contained within the limits outlined above. Because of this increased volatility, a great deal of work has been done in a relatively short period of time. Currently, trading in the upper levels of this trading range, were the upside breakout to occur, an objective in the 2600 area for the DJIA is indicated, a meaningful rally but still below the old high. It could be argued that the breakout should ultimately occur on the upside as many of the other broad-based averages have, in fact, broken out of similar trading areas on the upside. However, we only have to go back to January of this year to remember the DJIA broke out on the upside only to return Shortly to its previous trading range. A large number of individual stock patterns have done exactly what the DJIA has done over these past few months. That is. individual stock patterns have broken out on the upside only to return totheir original support areas. We have observed increased volatility and the rotational leadership in the market and what we may be currently experiencing is nothing but more of the same. However, assuming the length ,of time the market has been contained within its trading range, as an ally, the recent short-term improvement in the market could be the precursor to a significant upside move in terms of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. RJSebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (2/25/88) 2019.56 261.83 3506.33 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. No statement or expression of oplnton or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdnecUy, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe conventence of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be rehable, we mno way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof norol Ihe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees. may now have, or may later take, poSItIOns or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any lulure Issue, and such posilion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabetl Inc, which IS registered Wlththe SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other cuS10mers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISSue Further information on any securrty mentioned herein IS avallabte on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 04, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 04, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - March 04, 1988
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– !.. . TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543.5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – — – March 4, 19B8 – -Last week's -market'action 'was;-in -ay,-typlcDfb98.Bbce.h1iVir' ()'fa,!,!,.–p.r'ofilo1m(,-e(I——–r improvement took place, but that improvement was hardly of the sort calculated to induce euphoria. The feature, of course, Was Monday's trading, in the course of which the Dow posted a 48point advance to a new, post-October-19B7 high. However, little or no follow-through was observable over the rest of the week. Despite this, Monday's strength was impressive enough. In attaining new peaks, the Dow followed the S & P Composite and Industrials, both of which had earlier moved into new high territory. Transportation averages have been outperforming the market for an even longer period It is only the interest-sensitive utility and financial indices which have failed, so far, to push to new peaks. Those averages which have moved recently to new highs were bettering levels which, for the most part, were achieved in early January. The two months that have passed since that time have not, in our view, constituted a broadening of the base pattern, but, rather, a test of support confirming the early January breakout. Thus, the upside targets mentioned back in January still appear to be valid ones. These targets—2600 for the Dow, 320 for the S & P Composite, and around 1000 for the Dow Transports—are uniformly just under 1987 highs. Individual stock patterns, in our view, confirm targets of this magnitude, with a large number of stocks now finding themselves in intermediate or minor uptrends, but with the overhead supply from 1987 tops still to be breached. It is possible, moreover, that attainment of those upside targets could require both time and rotation of leadership. As noted above, confirmation of the January breakout required almost two full months of market action. If this sort of thing continues, the time required to mount a ,-,- 1- full-scalett…Qf the..h!ghs could,.bbe.!!'Q!!!yleii!!ilegt!!h1V'y. More and more, the market pattern, as it develops, seems to confirm the suggestion of our year-end forecast, that 1988 might be an inside year, one in which the year's high was below the August 25, 1987 peak of 2722.42 and the low remained above 1738.74, the close of October's Meltdown Monday If this were to prove to be the osse, 1988 would be the seventh inside year in the last sixty, the previous ones having occurred in 1939, 1947, 1967, 1975, 1979, and 1984. Those familiar with market history will note that almost all of these were years following major bear markets, a description which will certainly be applicable to 1988. There remain problems in fitting projected 1988 action into a broader context. The first and most obvious problem which arises is that. if no new low is going to be made, the completion of a cycle bear market required only the 38 trading days between August 25 and October 19. There is, as we have noted, some precedent for this, although it is someWhat sparse. If we can swallow this pill, we osn then assume that a full-scale market cycle was completed last October. Its beginning would have been July, 1984, and the resulting 39-month length is comfortably within historical bounds. We have reiterated our belief that a new, secular stock-market trend began in the 1980's, but the sort of flat-ta-firm market projected for the remainder of this year does not help us in deciding just what the parameters of that secular trend might be. We may be well into the 1990's before we can define the super-cycle pattern with any assurance. We have, since October, been leaning heavily on historical analogy in this space, and we suspect it may be advisable to depend less and less on this sort of analysis as time goes on. It was all too easy—both for ourselves and or others—to compare the October-1987 break to 1929 and we, along with our colleagues . uniformly did so. History, however, never repeats itself exactly. and the 1929 analogy may-prove to be leBs and less useful. Two years ago, in discussing 1929, we suggested that any repetition thereof would assume a different shape. We are all aware of what the 1930 – 1932 liquidation of margin debt looked like. Any comparable liquidation in the 1980's or the 1990's, is likely to take place in debt incurred to finance takeovers and leveraged buyouts. It is less than encouraging to note that this sort of activity seems already to have returned unabated to its pre-October levels. The ultimate liquidation of the resultant debt, if it is to occur, may well produce a market scenario qUite at variance with historical analogies. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (3/3/88) 2042.27 267.09 3593.25 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL IN C. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herem contamed IS, or IS 10 be deemedlo be, directly or mdlrectly, an offeror the solicrtallGn 01 an offerlo buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of Ihe subscnber While we believe Ihe sources 01 our Informallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aClIOn to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and m1orrnatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, Or may later take, POSitionS or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue De!aheld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, whiCh IS registered wlththa SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentIOned herein !S available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 11, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 11, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - March 11, 1988
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I , TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC ,, 1609) 987-2300 – March 11, 1988 —–'1988as-SUpe .. Tuesay has certainlymade us a ware-is–a—presidentialelection –year—We Ilht1A,,' p—-II- tracked tne behaVlor of tne stock market n such years back to the beginning of the century. and the results are shown below. The table shows each election year since 1900, the president elected and his party, followed by the average price of the S & P 500 for each month during the year expressed 8S a percenta.ge of the previous December's close (i.e., 110 means the market was up 10, 90 means it was down 10). Year 1900 President McKinley Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Oct Nov Dec R 101 103 104 105 100 98 98 99 97 100 108 114 1904 Roosevelt R 102 99 99 101 99 99 103 107 112 118 125 126 1908 Taft R 105 100 105 111 117 117 123 126 125 126 134 138 1912 Wilson D 100 99 102 106 105 105 106 109 109 109 108 103 1916 Wilson D 99 98 97 96 98 99 98 99 102 105 107 103 1920 1924 Harding Coolidge R 99 91 97 96 R 103 104 102 100 91 89 89 86 89 89 85 77 99 101 101 113 112 110 ll5 119 1928 Hoover R 99 98 103 109 113 107 108 III ll9 122 130 130 1932 Roosevelt D 102 101 102 77 68 59 62 93 102 88 87 84 1936 1940 Roosevelt Roosevelt D 102 108 III 111 105 109 ll6 118 120 126 129 127 D 98 98 97 98 85 77 80 82 85 86 88 84 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 Roosevelt Truman Eisenhower Eisenhower Kennedy D 102 101 104 102 104 109 111 llO 108 111 110 112 D 97 92 93 101 106 110 107 104 103 106 100 99 R 102 100 100 100 100 103 106 106 104 102 105 110 R. 97 98 104 106 102 102 107 107 103 102 101 102 D 97 93 92 93 92 96 93 94 92 90 93 95 1964 Johnson D 102 103 105 107 108 107 III 109 111 113 114 112 1'. – – – – – –1','!Q!6.8-NN;i.on IU..,9'!nl!nJ4929!1-11'0nl104lOA41I(n).9i -'n..-4'on.Q8 H)'n, 1972 Nixon R 101 103 105 107 105 106 105 109 107 107 113 115 1976 Carter D 107 112 112 113 ll2 113 116 115 117 113 112 116 1980 Reagan R 103 107 97 95 100 106 III 114 117 121 126 124 1984 Reagan R 101 95 95 96 95 93 92 100 101 100 101 100 Incumbent party did not control Congress. Incumbent party not re-elected Presidential election years show a mildly bullish bias. Only three of them (1920, 1932, and 1940) are distinct bear markets. Thirteen of the 22 years are bull markets, and six showed a fiat trend. Another noticeable tendency appears to be flatness or moderate weakness in the first half. Half of the 22 years showed little market change through June. It is worthy of note that a downward bias tends to occur on two sorts of occasions. The first is when the incumbent party does not control Congress, which we know currently to be the case. The second is when the party of the incumbent president loses the election. Only in 1976, when that occurred. was the market up more than -6 in the first half. Thus, the direction of the market over the next few months may be a good indicator of Republican (for whiCh, read Vice-President Bush's) chances in November. An interesting figure to watch will be the average price in April. There have been nine election years in this century where that price was lower or the same as the previous year end. In six of those nine years,. the incumbent president's party was replaced in the White House. Also interesting is the distinct tendency toward a strong second half. In 18 of the 22 years, the average price for December was higher than the average price for June. This appears to be true regardless of the election results and even in bear-market years where, in the past, the market has rallied in the second half from the June lows. In only two years, 1920 and 1948, were there significant declines between June and December. The election year pattern. therefore, calls for little change in the market during the first half. Strength has been exhibited to date, yesterday's S & P being 107 of the 1987 year-end close of 247.08. This suggests that 1988 may be an exception and also augurs well for Republican chances. The second half of 1988, history strongly suggests, should see a rising market. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials 02 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (3/10/88) 2022.71 263.70 3618.52 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No slatement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein conlalned IS, or IS 10 be deemet! 10 be, directly or Indlrectty, an offer orlhe solicltallon of an offerlo buy or sell any security referred 10 or menhOned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the SubSCriber White we beheve the sources of our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any actIOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posItiOn may be dlfferefll from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, whIch IS registered With the SEC as an mvestmenl adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further InformatIon on any seCUrity mentioned hereIn IS available On request

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