1 TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 9872300 December 2. 1988 One of the basic tenets of technical analysis is that trends persist—ln other words that, at any given time. markets . aremost .Hkely…..to-,-con ti!tu '!-to Ldojusl….w.bat..-1by …haye ….most……recently…..,been -\ doing. Inevitably, of course, there is a turning point for every trend, and technicians spend 8 great deal of energy In attempts to identify those turning points. The point IS that reversals are relatively rare events, and trend continuances constitute the norm. Such is the case at the moment where there exists little evidence to suggest that equity markets are likely to begin doing anything significantly different from what they have been doing throughout 1988, i.e. nothing. Date ——— Dec 4 87 Jan 7 88 Jan 20 88 Apr 12 88 May 23 88 Jul 5 88 Aug 23 88 Oct 21 88 Nov 16 88 Nov 30 88 DJ Average ——– 1766.74 2051.89 1879.14 2110.08 1941. 48 2158.61 1989.33 2183.50 2038.58 2114.51 P e r c e n t Ch a n g e This Swing ———- From Hi From Lo ——- ——- – — 16.14 — -8.42 – 12.29 2.84 – -7.99 – 3.32 11.18 2.30 – -7.84 – 2.46 9.76 1.15 – -6.64 – 2.48 3.72 — Number Of Days This Swing Cumulative ———- ———00 22 22 9 31 57 88 29 117 29 146 35 181 42 223 18 241 9 250 The table above teUs the dreary story. On January 7, the fourth trading day of the year, the Dow was at 2051.89, within a couple of percentage points of where it is today, and above its low of two weeks ago. That January high culminated a 16 advance from the early December test of the crash lows. The entire year has. therefore, consIsted of seven interme(hate-term b swings, three up 1 and. four dow.n ,a,er.agtngjusLover9Wn…ex.tent,and……bitover 30-tJ!adingdaysi'-;'J1;ju'ratio,n,….,.I There exists a hny ray of sunshine in the fact that this trading range appears to have a shght upward bias. Each of the three major highs so far, April, .July, and October, has exceeded the previous one by around 2, and each of the lows, May, July. and—assuming it holds—November 16, has likewise been slightly better than its predecessor. Projecting this environment through December, one might expect a high some 2 above October, say 2225, as a possible target for a year-end rally We would hesitate to make such a prediction on extrapolation alone, but there is nothing in the present evidence which seriously contradicts it. The downside objective for the Dow was reached at the October low, and, although there currently exists no ba.se to suggest an immediate upward move, one could form fairly quickly, particularly were a pull-back testing the mid-November bottom to occur. As we suggested above, the technioian is condemned these days, to scratching for reversal evidence, and finding none. Such evidence is certainly not to be found in looking at volume, which appears to be in a sort of a bear market of its own. In any case, a 50-day smooth of daily NYSE volume peaked at around 218 million shares in October and again in December, 1987. The figure dropped from there to 175 million in February and, Rfter a short rally, to 161 million in June. August saw a rise back to 176 million but, as of Tuesday, the average posted a new low at 147 million shares. Looked at another way, total Volume for the month of November was 2.8 billion shares. the first month under 3 billion in two years and the lowest monthly aggregate since August, 1986. Of course, as we have always noted in discussions of volume. the real way to look at it on a long-term basis is in terms of shares listed. The turnover ratio is the percentage of total listed shares which trade in any given period. Measured in terms of months. that number dropped under 4 in November for the first hme since September, 1985. The November ratio. estimated at 3.7 compares to 6-plus levels achieved repeatedly in 1987. A long-term view of the turnover raho is an interesting story. Its record value was 15.5 in 1928, and, over 14 years, It declined to under 112 of 1 in 1942. By 1946,-it had-soared to 2-1'12, I , and then in 1946-1949—a period, our readers know, to which we have compared the present one–it once more retreated to around 8/10 of 1. It did not move above 3 for almost 30 years, until 1978. Subsequent expansion was mOle rapid. The 5 level was attained in 1982. It remained mostly in the 3 – 4 range through 1985 and then expanded to 6 in 1986. There now exists a year's worth of evidence suggesting that the trend may have turned down again. Under these CIrcumstances, it IS not unlikely that trading could return to 1982 levels with a turnover ratio of around 2 1/2 4 Given today's listed shares, this could mean months in which daily volume averaged close to, or even under, 100 million shares, not, It must be admitted, a particularly pleasing prospect. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2090.15 S & P 500 (12 00) 271.18 Cumulative Index (12/01/88) 3842.40 AWTebh No statement or e)(preSSlon of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemedto be, directly or indirectly, an offer orthe solicrtatlon of an offerlo buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our InformallOn to be rehabte, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herein Any acllOn to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and miormallOn Oeiaileld, Harvey, TabeH Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any secufll!es mentioned In thiS or any future ISSue, and such poSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc whlch IS registered With Ihe SEC as an Investment adVISor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further tnformallOn on any secUrity mentioned herein IS available on request

.– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 December 9, 1988 Purportedly under the stimulus of Gorbachev peace overtures and an ever-so-slight glimmer of -ctight-at-tlreehilofJh'e-Mijmer-ast'tunnelfhe-marl,rrallied-ffirough01lt'!he nrW part of last week, pushing well into the overhead supply at 2140-2180 remaining from October's short-term top. All possible projections of the most recent base have been run Ollt, and we continue to feel that the major averages are somew'hat overextended on a short-term basis. We would, therefore, prefer to see a minor pullback from which a decent year-end rally might be mounted. There exists some tentative evidence of an improving technical background in a number of areas. An example of such an area is advisory sentiment. where it develops that. for the weeks ended November 25th and December 2nd, more than half of all market letters were adopting a bearish stance. Thls lnformation comes from Investors Intelligence Inc. of New Rochelle. New York which, for many years, has compiled a regular tabulation of published market letters. claSSIfying their current opinion as bullish, bearish or neutral. As many of our readers will be aware, these particular figures, hIstorically, have not been kInd to our profession. A large number of bearish advisors is considered by many analysts to be a bullish slgnal and vice versa. This impression is borne out by analysis of the past 25 years of sentiment data. Over 1300 one-year periods taken at weekly intervals, the Dow was up, on average, some 6 1/2. Over thls time span there occured 142 weeks in which the majority of market-letter writers were reglstered as bearish. The average one-year rise following these occasions was 1'3.13. twice as great as the overall average. The same is true, to a lesser degree. when six-month intervals are measured. Over shorter periods. one month and three months, the data is inconclusive. This bias undoubtedly arlses from the well documented tendency of letter writers to achieve maXImum majority bearishness precisely at major bottoms. In the period for which we have available data, major lows occurred in 1966. 1970, 1974, 1978 and 1982. In 1966 the low for the Dow occurred nOctober-'7th7''2-5of'aavisorswe'i'ebearlsh on precisely that date. The May-I970 bottom provided an even more dramatIc lnstR.nce. More than half of advlsors were bearish in 17 of the 19 weeks surrounding that low, beginning in March and ending in July. The bear-market low of October. 1974 was preceded by 19 weeks in which the majority of commentators expressed bearish VIews, and the 1978 low was at the midpOlnt of a string of 12 such weeks. We all remember August. 1982 to have been a major bottom. Seven of eight weeks ending in July of that year saw a plurality of pessimistic advisors. One fact that has not. to our knowledge, been widely noted lS the tendency of advisors to become bearish after the market has moved down. which may account for the heavy pessImism seen around lows. Again, separating out the 142 weeks which saw more than 50 of advisors bearish, we find that, on average, the Dow had been more than 14 higher a year before the forecasts were made. In other words, pundits tended to become pessimistic only after the market had declined approximately 12. Likewise, the market was down an average of 8 over six-month periods prior to the weeks of bearIsh majority opinion. One could, in other words, condemn letter writers as being little more than simple-minded extrapolators of trend. All of this brings us to the cu rrent instance. The last two weeks are examples of the extremely rare case of advisory sentIment's being more than 50 bearish after the market had risen over the prior year. Indeed, of the 142 weeks showing bearish majority sentiment. only 15 have occurred at a time when the market had been lower a year before. It must be admitted that the record for the 15 weeks in question seems to be just about the same as for the others. The market generally was higher—often considerably higher—- a year later. The exception was 1981, when a – . – -string of bear–i-s–h forecasts in … the early part of that year actually turned out to be correct. Advisory sentiment figures would become especially encouraging, in our view, if a protracted string of weeks with majority bearlsh opinion were to emerge. It will be lnteresting to see If such is the case. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (12/08/88) AWTcg 2149.36 277.20 3857.42 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL, INC. No statement or expression at opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offeror the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Intormatlon to be rehable, we In no way represen1 or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the slatements made herein Any ac\lon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabe!1lnc , as a corporation and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, positions Of trades In respeclto any securities mentIOned In thiS Of any future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informabon on any securtty menttoned herein IS available on request

'.' TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 December 16, 1988 We must confess that we face the challenge of preparing this particular piece…!!w'.!i!;tha.–c —- -certaih7de'ffree…o. f ohtrepldatiCustom re-q uires us. alon-g -wifh 'maS-tather market commentators. –.- to produce a year-end forecast. ano, traditionally, we have divided this forecR.st into two parts, the first part, due in this issue, being a review of the year 1988. The difficulty lies in making such a review more interesting than watching paint dry. It seems, indeed, that the theme of just about each letter we have produced over the past six months has been how excrutiatingly dull the action of the stock market has been. It really has not been all that bad a year. The Dow, with two weeks of 1988 to go, finds itself a bit over 12 above its 1987 close. and there have, heaven knows. been worse year-ta-year results. It is that markets which are exciting and Interesting are those that are going somewhere or doing something. This. the 1988 market never seemed to want to do. Quite obviously. since the averages are up on the year. there were a number of occasions, notably In January. March – April, July. and October, which featured the attainment of new post-crash highs. However, the typical pattern was two or three such highs scattered over a period of a couple of weeks followed by a retracement of almost the entire move. We reviewed the details of all of this two weeks ago 1988 began with the culmination of a fairly dynamic year-end rally, which topped out three days into the year. Since then, the year's pattern has comprised seven swings of between, roughly. 6 and 12 percent, lasting on average for some 30 trading days. The highs and lows for each successive swing tended to be slightly above the level of its predecessor, thus giving the whole pattern a minuscule upward bias and producing the modest overall rise noted above. All these moves back and forth. however. produced one of the narrowest trading ranges in market history. The range between the year's high and low, 16.2, ranks 80th on the list of 92 years since the Dow was first computed. If one omits a dozen or so trading days in January and February when the Dow traded below its May bottom, an even narrower range of 12 1/2 has been I .'ifararlge narrower th'1-t of 91 of the 92.years sinc!, 1897.,-,,….., – 1 As if all of the above were not bad enough, the last three quarters of the year have, as we have repeatedly pointed out, been characterized by subnormal breadth, a divergence between breadth and the averages having been in effect since March. In addition, as we pointed out last week. volume, as the year went on. tended to dry up, and there exist some indications that it might fall to levels even lower than today's already-depressed ones. A number of other factors need, it seems to us, to be mentioned in a review of 1988. One obvious one is that it followed on the heels of October, 1987. We will not cite all of the gory statistics (they have been set forth repeatedly here) that show this was the worst market crash since 1929. We will simply note that, in our view, the occurrence of the crash and the torpor of 1988 are not unrelated. We find ourselves in agreement with conventional wisdom that the 1987 break produced general discouragement in regard to the equity market, and that this contributed to the dullness which pervaded last year. Ironically, the general public, unfamiliar with Wall Street, may well have the impression that the year was an exciting one. For it was, as we all know, the year of the takeover. This phenomenon, which did. indeed, produce tiny islands of excitement among the dullness, spilled over from the financial section to the front pages of the nation's press, especially as it began to take on, as in the case of the RJR-Nabisco affair, some of the elements of soap opera. The takeover boom, however, raised more serious issues. Many of these issues involved, in one form or another, the process of debt creation, especially the proliferation of so-called Junk debt. Prolonged and intense debate among serious students of the stock market on this subject continued throughout the year. The issue remains, we think, largely unresolved. Discussion was not confined to the area of private debt creation. 1988. of course, was an election year. and we heard a great deal about two economic issues in particular—the budget and trade deficits. Few analysts seemed terribly optimistic about an immediate resolution of either of these problems . . To borrow a phrase from ex-President Carter, 1988 can be characterized as a year of malaise. Just about everything in market history, or course, has taken place before, and malaise is no exception. As is typically the case with majority opinion, it often proves to be unfounded. We have pointed out from time to time during the year the similarities of 1988 market action to that of past rebasing periods. focusing to a great extent on 1946-1949. This particular aspect of market behavior will be relevant, we think. to next week's 1989 forecast. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2139.46 S & P 500 (1200) 274.82 Cumulative Index (12/15/88) 383470 AWT ebh A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL' No slatemenl or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sel! any security referred to or mentIOned The maner IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any actIOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securrlles menllOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered wrth the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and O1her customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any secunty mentioned herein IS aval!able on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC, MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 December 23, 1988 As is customary at this time of the year. last week's letter contained a review of 1988 – – -'-. stock-market-' aetion..,,–In-'-summary-;-we '-pointed–out -that -the- aftermath of-the -October1-1981coliapse consisted of aratherlackluster'lradiri'g range with a moderate upward bias, but featurIng substandard breadth and declining volume. We are required. thIS week. to assess the implications of this past history for future major behavior—in other words. to produce a forecast for 1989. For the first part of last year, there was one plausible, and rather ominous. interpretation of the market action which was taking place. One could overlay a chart of the October, 1987 market crash on the one which had taken place 58 years before and discover that the fall and subsequent recovery in 1929-30 and in 1987-88 were almost exact duplicates. WIdely heard at the time was one of this letter's most unfs vrite terms. bear-market rally II We have pointed out repeatedly, that the bear-market rally is, like the unicorn, essentially a mythical beast. Those who persist in believing in this particular mythology love to cite 1929 -30 as an example, despite the fact that it is the only case of a bear-market rally of that sort of magnitude in aU of stock-market history. By mid-year, however, the 1929-30 analogy had fallen apart. That advance lasted six months. and the market then plunged to new lows. Today, fourteen months after the 1987 crash, we fInd ourselves, despite all that is wrong with current market action, within a few points of post-crash highs. As we reached the second half of last year, and the 1929-30 similarity began to disappear, another historical comparison came to attain plausibility. After a sharp break In the fall of 1946, the market. as was the case last year. remained in a narrow trading range, this one with a lesser upward bias than the present case and with even worse market breadth. The 1946-49 analogy becomes even more apt when one considers investment psychology. There was, in those post-World War II days, an extant conventional wisdom which insisted on the absolute inevitability of a post-war depression. It is certainly arguable that a like conventional wisdom exists todav, a universally-held pessimism which can be explained by the single word. debt. The belief that the budget deficit and the resultant buildup of government debt possesses the potential for unmitigated disaster, has attained the status of revealed truth, along with the belief – – that -th e 'tlal1e-dllfictrnl1rs't-be -rlfd uce-d-tnorlllfr 't1Jpreventna tiona1anKruptcyi-iticsof-nj;-;;e..-. ——o-1 private debt structure fume over the proliferation of leveraged buy-outs and the utter asininity of some forms of financing for those buy-outs. And. as far as the quality of existing loans is concerned, we all know about thIrd-world debt and the savings-and-Ioan industry. There exist only a few voices crying in the wilderness with countervailIng views. Milton Friedman produced a Wall Street Journal article a couple of weeks ago entitleci Why the Twin Deficits are a BleSSIng. Yes, Blessing is the word the man used. The appellation, it should be noted, was created, not by some sort of kook, but by a Nobel-Prize winner. There have appeared, from time to time, like comments. pointing out such items as the fact that the U.S. Government debt is not historically excessive when looked at in terms of national Income and that the deficit is not all that different from those shown in recent years in other countries. It has also been pointed out that, even with the recent growth in corporate leverage, the average U.S. corporation today displays a more conservative balance sheet than its counterpart in Japan or West Germany. Comments of this sort tend to be buried deep in the financial pages, while the headlines feature politicians assuring us of our imminent destruction by the deficit. Now it is true, of course, that the conventional wisdom in this case could turn out to be right, and. if it is, the economy—and, presumably, the stock market—are in deep trouble. This remains a risk, and we are not willing at this point, to predict whether that risk will turn to reality. What we do think, however, is that the perception of that risk is so widely held that it is likely to color market action for most of 1989. This leads for a forecast for the upcoming year, which calls, unfortunately. for more of the same. We expect. in other words, the 1988 trading range to continue, possibly with the same sort of upward bias it possessed over the past year, so that modest new highs above the 2183.50 close of last October will likely be attained, although we do not expect, at this stage, an approach to the August, 1987 high of 2722.42. On the low side, 1989 could see a test of the tradIng range's lows, but we doubt this would 'involve anything as low as the October-December, 1987 bottom in the 1700's. More likely would be a test of the January-May lows in the mid-1900's. We are. in short, looking for a continued rebasing period. and we are willing to work on the assumption that it is likely to occupy all of the upcomIng year. Should evidence to the contrary emerge during the year. we hope to be able to recognize it and suggest appropriate revisions in investment policy. ANTHONY W. TAflELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2169.46 S & P 500 (1200) 277.77 Cumulative Index (12/22/88) 3860.75 AWTebh WE WISH YOU ALL A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR' No statement or expression 01 oplmon or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation 01 an offerlobuy or sell any securrty relerred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convemence of the subscriber While we believe the sources 01 our Inlormabon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herem Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, poslbons or trades In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,WhiCh IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independenlly of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ,,- 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 December 30, 1988 For some years now. we have studied the familiar seasonal tendency of the stock market to stage —.-year-end rally, and-it-I!as-been the'custom ofthiSlerferTo poiiitiufSomeofthe col'iCfiisioM — – – – – that can be derived from a study of this phenomenon, Since 1897, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average was first computed, a rally. however small, has begun in December and continued into the new year in 89 of 91 cases, the two exceptions occurring in the mid 1970's. The following facts about the year-end rally may be noted. 1. The year-end rally often has been of great magnitude, occasionally continuing through the entire subsequent year without a 5 correction being recorded. It has frequently continued. with only minor interruptions, for as long as six months into the new year. In many cases, with 1987 being the most recent, the rally continued into February, March or beyond. However, on other occasions. it has been of only a few day's duration, reaching a top extremely early. This was the case in 1988, when an extremely dynamic year-end rally peaked on January 7, the fourth trading day of the year, and an 8 112 correction followed. In the bear-market years of 1960. 1970, 1973, 1974, 1981, and 1982, the rally reached a peak by the first week in January, and, as noted above, the 1976 and 1977 year-end rallies did not carry into January at all, the only two in market history so to fail. 2. There has been a persistent tendency for the rally to begin early in years when the market has been up, and late in years when the market has been down. In recent upward years, 1967, 1975, 1979, 1980, and 1985 are examples, the rally commeneed from early December. In recent downward years, 1962, 1966, 1969, 1977, and 1981, the rally began late in the year. 1986 was an exception, an upward year where the year-end rally started on December 31. The 1987-88 year-end rally started on December 4, (1987 was an up year), and the 1988-89 rally almost certainly began in November, with the December low occurrIng on the second day of the month at 2092.28. -of3. The impo;t;nfthing to wath in ;connectio;-With the market action -in the early months th new year is that December low. This low has been broken in 52 years out of the past 88. However. in 30 of these 52 cases, it was broken in January and February. For example, in 1970, 1973. 1977, 1978, 1981, and 1982, the December low was broken in early January. Since 1937, it has never been broken later than mid-March with four exceptions 196 1974, 1981, and, of course, 1987. Thus, if the market is able to hold above its December low for the first 2 112 months of the year, chances become good that this low will not be penetrated. 4. In years when the December low has been broken, the subsequent trend has been downward two-thirds of the time. 1962, 1966, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1977, and to some degree, 1984, are typical cases. 1965, 1978, 1980, and, most recently, 1982 are exceptions. 5. The magnitude of the rally is an important clue as to the year's market trend. For example. an advance of 10 or more from the December low has been followed by an upward or neutral market in 40 of the 46 years that such an advance has occurred. An advance of less than 10 from the December low before an identifiable correction takes place has been followed by a downward market 10 30 of the 42 years. Last year's year-end rally was over 16. In each year from 1985 to date, the year-end rally has been well in excess of 10. In 1962, 1970, 1973, and 1977, as examples, it was less than this figure. 6. The length of time for which the rally continues -into the new year is important. For example, in 27 years, the rally continued into March or later. In 23 of these 27 years, the eventual trend was upward. In 1964, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1985, and 1986, the year-end rally continued into March and in 1961, 1967, 1971, and 1980, into February. Although 1988 was technically an up year, the rally, as noted above. peaked in early… January. This year so far. the advance from the tDecember low has been under 5. If the rally extends itself to 10 (approximately 2300) In the early new year, it would be a bullish sign. Likewise. continuation of the advance in February-March would be a positive indication. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (12129188) AWTebh 2180.89 279.10 3902.53 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. No statement or expression of opinion Of any other mailer herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or menlloned The matler IS presented merely lor the convenience 01 the subscrtber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor oflhe statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on his own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and tts officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, posilions or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gl\o'e adVice to ItS Investment adviSOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request