Viewing Month: August 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 05, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 05, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - August 05, 1988
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 August 5, 1988 . s .ess!.s. Bush ad Dukakis prepare to square orf in November, various Sources have raised the question -of whaf the -election or- eitlier gentlemen rrilght -mean'for the slock- marker Wehave.'-therefore—– — I updated the table below, which last appeared here eight years ago. The table shows the percentage change in the stock market for one. two. thre-e. and six-month periods and one. two. three, and four-year periods following the October close of each Presidential election year since 1900. Summarized at the bottom of the table are a number of averages. The first shows the average percentage change in the market for all years since 1897 over the periods in question. The second shows the average change for the various periods following election years. Following this are averages for perioda follOwing election years which elected (a) a Republican, and (b) a Democrat; and periods following election years in which (a) the incumbent party was returned to power, and (b) a new party was Installed in power. PER C E N T C HAN G E o V E R -Y-e-a-r 1900 President -M-c-k-i-n-l-e-y- P–t-y R -1–K-o-n-t-h 12.79 -2–M-o-n-t-h 19.77 -3–K-o-n-t-h 13.16 -6–K-o-n-t-h 28.39 -1–Y-e-a-r 9.16 -2–Y-e-a-r 11.89 -3–Y-e-a-r -4–Y-e-a-r -23.56 6.76 1904 Roosevelt R 14.26 10,44 13,17 20.70 32.90 47. 41 -8,46 30.94 1908 Taft R 5.78 4.39 1.89 6.98 20.04 2.71 -8.17 9,91 1912 Wilson 0 1. 36 -3.13 -7.71 -13.42 -13.68 -21. 27 44.50 57.42 1916 Wilson 0 1.30 -9.19 -8.78 -10,88 -28.78 -18.26 13 .68 -18,79 1920 Harding R -10.49 -15.30 -10.38 -7.19 -13.82 13 .14 421 22.50 1924 Coolidge R 7.03 15.81 18.41 15.33 50.41 44.51 74 .64 142,32 1928 Hoover R 16.35 18.97 25.92 26.62 8.47 -27.29 -58.19 -75.45 1932 Roosevelt 0 -8.97 -3.18 -1.62 25.46 42.42 50.82 125.75 186.25 1936 Roosevelt 0 3.40 1.53 4.83 -1.65 -22.02 -14.37 -14,28 -24.03 1940 Roosevelt 0 -2.68 -2.59 -7.79 -14.17 -12.47 -15.26 2.72 8,86 -gn — ! Roosevelt 0 0 12.91 27.35 15.44 23.65 28.72 ,..7.67 0,-49 19.29 3909 42.74 m !h – 1960 Kennedy 0 2.91 6.12 -r 11.69 16. -; 21.29 -a0-61l95-7823 13.21 3475 20.95 1.62 30.13 50.44 1964 Johnson 0 0.27 0.12 3.41 5.64 10.05 -7.56 0.76 9.08 1968 Nixon R 3.43 -0.91 -0.67 -0.23 -10.12 -20.66 -11. 91 0.33 1972 Nixon R 6.56 6.75 4.55 -3.57 0.11 -30.38 -12.50 0.98 1976 Carter 0 -1.84 4.12 -1.09 -3.94 -15.19 -17 .87 -15.47 -4.19 1980 Reagan R 7.45 4.27 2.46 7.92 -7.78 7.27 32.53 30.60 1984 Reagan R -1.53 0.35 6.58 4.20 13 .83 55.53 65,11 76.75 A–V-E-R-A-G-E-S All Years 0.71 2.03 2.99 4.37 6.67 13.78 19,18 26.04 Election Years 2.39 3.13 3.43 5.16 4.86 6.40 18.54 30.91 Republican Elected 5.46 6.42 6.88 8.69 8.13 12.34 13.12 28.73 Democrat Elected -1.29 -0.82 -0.12 0.92 0.94 -0.74 25.05 33.65 Incumb. Reelected 3.12 3.74 4.76 4.42 7.10 6.54 11.75 19,46 New party 1.33 2.24 1.50 6.22 1.64 6.19 28.35 47.59 1 – —- There eXIsts a conventional wisdom which asserts that the assession of a Republican president is bullish, and that of a Democrat bearish, for the short term. while the oPPosite is true for the long term. This theory probably first arose following 1928 – 1932, when the Hoover administration began with a burst of market strength and ended with the worst four-year reeord of the century. while the first Roosevelt administration. ushered in with a sharp one-month decline. produced the best stock-market rise on record. There does. however. appear to be a Pavlovian tendency for the market to rise In November when a Republican president has been elected. The average 5.46 one-month rise in the 12 years which ushered in GOP occupancy of the White House is quite spectacular when compared to the average 0.71 for all 92 years under study. Indeed. for all periods up to 6 months. the performance in Republican-victory election years has been at least twice as gOOd as the normal case. Beyond six months. the Republican-vs.-Democrat statistics tend to lose significance. The long-term record for the Democrats is. indeed, marginally better. but the difference has been reduced in recent years by two fairly respectable performances in the two Reagan administrations. Indeed analysiS of longer periods leads one to question the existence of any election-year correlation. For example, the period 1948 – 1964 was one of a generally rising stock market, while the 1964 – 1980 period was relatively flat. Each of the two eras saw two Republican and two Democratic administrations. In the former period, the market advanced regardless of the presidential party. and, during the latter. did nothing under both Democratic and Republican preSidencies. Over three and four-year periods. the record seems to show that more important than the party elected is the question of whether a new party has been placed in power. The average four-year performance during those administrations where the White House changed hands has been almost twice as good as the average for all years. ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTebh DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones lndustnals (1200) 2114.33 S P 500 (1200) 271.06 CumUlative Index (8/4/88) 3916.27 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter Is presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor ollhe statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and infOrmation Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporal!On and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtrons or trades In respect to any secunffes mentioned In thiS or any future ISSue, and such poslllOn may be different Irom any views nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, mFlyglve adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independenlly of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securrty mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 12, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 12, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - August 12, 1988
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'11'1Bl1En..n..' s reil IRl 1E'11' n..1E'11''11'1E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 August 12, 1988 The 1988 summer rally has, so far, been conspicuous by its absence. With a decline of 85 points in the first three days of this week, the Dow found itself, on Wednesday, almost —- 125-poffits;-or-5-77;-beIowrn-e-poBtcrasnIlig1ionr5801-WIlicll-irchalRedU'j)'OnJiITY–5-.——I-1 From a technical point of view, the market's status has returned to where it was a fortnight ago. On July 27, the DJIA posted a low of 2053.70, which constituted a decisive downside breakout from the trading range that had contained the average through late June and July. On the following Friday, we devoted this space to noting that breakout and suggested that consequent market action would likely involve a testing of the late-May lows (1941.48 in the case of the Dow). As has been the case with many attempts to pinpoint shcrt-term action over the past year, this one proved, temporarily at least, to be embarrassing. The July 27 low proved to be the springboard for an 80-point rally, whiCh, however, lasted only a few days before the market turned and plunged to new short-term lows this week. One technical question which must be answered is whether or not the brief interruption in the decline, noted above, has produced further deterioration in an already-weak market pattern. Our own view is that it constitutes only a rally into overhead supply, and, therefore, the distributional pattern has not been broadened. Continued breadth and momentum weakness have, it must be noted, taken place. Despite this, we continue to feel that a test of May levels is the worst-case immediate prospect and are comfortable awaiting the results of that test. The trigger for the decline, Tuesday's increase in the discount rate to 6 1/2 from 6, is rather interesting. The market may have been recalling that the last discount-rate change, on S!ptember 4, 1987, was also an increase and preceded October 19 by some six weeks. Actually, the use of discount-rate changes as a forecasting tool has a long and honorable history among market technicians. Increases in the discount rate are one component of the Three-Steps-and-a-Stumble rule formulated by Edson Gould many years ago. —I—-'This-rule–stated–thathreesuccessive'Tisesin'cither-i.the'-discount'rate, margin———-I requirements, or reserve requirements, generally constituted a precursor of an important stock-market decline. The latter two components, unfortunately, seem to have become obsolete. There have been no changes in margin requirements since 1974 or reserve requirements since 1980. Nonetheless, in recent years, discount-rate raises have a fair record for pointing to future market declines. One indication ariSing from the discount-rate rise may be a clue as to the thinking of the Federal Reserve Board under the new Greenspan chairmanship. Navigating between the Scylla and Charybdis of inflation and a choking-off of the six-year economic expansion, the Fed has obviously chosen the former as the primary evil to be avoided. This is interesting. Recent figures for the CPI do not appear to suggest out-of-control inflation and, in our own view, most recently-released indicators suggest an economy that is healthy without excessive signs of overheating. Our own hope is that the Fed does not wind up being too dogmatically concerned with its anti-inflationary goal. The fragility of the present banking structure and, indeed, of the stock-market structure (which, as far as we can see, is not all that different from what it was last October) seems to us to make them vulnerable to excessive monetary tightness. It may well be, of course, that the Fed is only sending a signal. Borrowed reserves constitute a relatively small portion of the total and, at 6, the discount rate, as the Board of Governors pointed out, was out of line with market rates. As far as monetary aggregates are concerned, there is little indication, so far, of any change in the moderately expansive policy, which seems to have been in place since March. Of course no one looks at monetary aggregates anymore. Long gone are the days of the Volcker administration when the whole office gathered around the broad tape at 4 o'clock every Wednesday.-As one trader remarked on.Thursdays newsticker,we nowhave a rate-driven market. The discount rate increase triggered, successively, collapsing bond – prices, falling stock prices, and, by Thursday, an eruption of prime-rate increases. Most of the financial community was never really comfortable with monetary aggregates, and derivative products are not the first import from Chicago, which traditional Wall Street has viewed with suspicion. Under these conditions, money-supply figures may well turn out to be more useful. In any case, from a technical point of view, continued probing for support appears the most likely course for the market, with nothing more serious in the immediate offing. Prognostications beyond this point await the projected test of the three-month-old lows. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (8/12/88) 2038.23 261. 61 3810.35 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained 1, or IS to be deemed to be, directly Of Indirectly, an offer or the sohcrlatlon of an offerio buyor sen any securrty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our mformallon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be laken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and mformallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporation and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dlfferen1 from any views now or hereaflerexpressed In thiS or any other Issue Detaeld, Harvey, Tabell Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give advice to rts Investment adVISOry and other cuS10mers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further InformaMn on any secUrity mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 19, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 19, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - August 19, 1988
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———————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 August 19. 1988 ———-1— – –I t-is-t-lle–teehniciaa'-s-jeb -to—..intee8t -himself L-iRrcane …s tatis tics 80we…shouldnot b-e accused of being off our rocker for having it occur to us. this week, that a great many recent trading days had seen more than 500 NYSE issues wind up unchanged on the day. This was brought to our notice. quite honestly. by the accident of 500 being a round number. but it did lead to some interesting exploration. Examination shows that 500-plus unchanged issues has, indeed, been a frequent occurrence lately. the figure having been attained on 36 of the 84 trading days since April 21. Prior to that (with two holiday-related exceptions) there had been no such day since 1985. when 20 cases were clustered over a three-month period between August and October. Through yesterday there have been. in market history. 500 or more unchanged issues on a total of 90 trading days. the first in 1982. There appeared. moreover. to be a tendency for them to occur in clusters such as the present one. We decided, therefore, to look at the phenomenon over a longer period. For the figures to be comparable, it was, of course, necessary to express the number of unchanged issues as a percentage of all issues traded, and based on current trading patterns. where around 1950 – 2000 issues usually change hands. 500 translates to about 25.5. We then looked at the 16.888 trading days since 1926. and discovered that 2667 (or 15.8) had seen unchanged issues amount to more than 25.5 of the total. The tendency of the phenomenon to occur in groups was striking. We defined a cluster of such trading days as a continuous series during which there occurred no two instances more than 25 days apart. We found no fewer than 6 clusters of 100 days or longer with 2071 or 78 of the number of days occurring within such clusters. 1063 days occurred during a six-year period between 1939 and 1945. and there was a 342-day strmg in 1951-1954. A check of other sources disclosed that we were not the first to inspect this particular phenomenon. It is discussed in a highly-re,commendedrecent…book….;T;;h;e;;;;En;;cy;;clopedia;of…..-l 'J'-echnicaIMarket-ndicatoFS (-DGw- Jones-Irwin) by Robert W. Colby and Thomas a …… . ………………………….cr……….u…..nt..cz……………..Itt………. A. Meyers. Their analysis of the data is shown in the table at right. It tends. interestingly enough. to suggest that large Ull;HlIIIiED ISSIlS ,DEI MIl' IA PERIOD MIlnu IIIIUART tn! to MRCII Ift7 . . . . . . Rta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .u . . . . . . . . . . . .n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n . .U nUU numbers of unchanged issues are bullish for mERPRElI'ITlOII SIViIlIItVSTIJR'S TlfIE milE the longer term, and. conversely. that ——-.. small numbers of unchanged are bearish. GREJlR TIWI OR This significance holds true only for fIlM' EWN. 1D I .IH longer periods as the table shows. For 3 !lDIITHS PDfTHS 12 IIONIHS one-month and three-month periods. the significance of the indicator is shown as neutral. which essentially means there is no discernible statistical significance. As we get out to six-month and twelve-month periods, however, extreme values appear to become valuable indications. Colby and Meyers' terms. very bullish and I1 very bearish suggest a less-than-one-in-lOOO probability that subsequent stock-market action occurred purely by random chance. Our own analysis of a slightly different time period suggests that 22.5 or more of total issues traded being unchanged produces a 68.67 probability of the S & P 500 being up a year later …versus an overall probability of 62.52. The average 0.000 0.139 0.154 0.lb4 0.17'1 0.119 O.IU 0.1'1 D.ln 0.202 0.20B 0.213 0.219 0.215 0.212 0,240 0.241 0.' 0.271 0.2'2 0.139 0.154 0.1 0.172 0.119 o.m 0.\91 0.191 0.202 0.208 0.213 o.m 0.225 0.212 0.240 0,248 0,251 om 0.2'2 o.m IIMRIl IlEUUAt. UUTRAl IIEUTRAI.. MUTRAL MUIRA\. NEUTRAL mil NEUTRAL mITRAl IlEUtRAl HUTRAl IiUTRAl NEUTRAL NEUTRAL IlEUTRAl IlUTRAI.. SUSHILY IULlISH rtUTUt IIUTRAl. IUTRAl 'lERl BEAIUSH 'lUTRAl SLl6HTU BEARISH IIUIRAl NEUTRAl IIEUTRAl, nUlRN.. NEUTRAl MUTRAl MUIRA!. IIEU1RAL IIUlRAI.. NEUTRAL MUlRAl SlI&HTLl BIlLllSII !fEUTRAI.. IfEUlRAl IlEUTRAl !lUTRAI.. BEI'IRISH vm rEMISH YERr lIMISH BEARISH 'lERY SEMISH ym BURtSH YERY IEARISH 'lERr BEMISH BUlRISII VERY BUlliSH VERT BEMISH 'I1IY IURISH IEUTRAl IEMISH SliGHTlY BI.lUSII nulRAl. IEUTRAl IJ!RY JEMISH I(UTRAL IlEUTAAI.. IEUTnl SlISHTLY BULliSH IIEIIIRAL SlI6Hll Y BIJllISH I(lITRAl VERY BUUISH BIlLISH YRY IIUlUSH IIEUTRAI.. VRY MliSH ItlllSH VERY BtJl.lISH IIEUIRAl YERY BULlISII SLl6HTlT BULliSH VERY nliSH MLISH IllllSH vERy IULlISH ,. -iULlISll percentage change in these cases 18 10.56 versus an overall average of 6.32. While today's dull trading. therefore. tells us little about the immediate outlook. it appears to be a fairly bullish indication for the long term. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DEL …. FIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones IndustrIals 0200) 2033.25 S & P 500 (1200) 262.05 Cumulative Index (8/18/88) 3789.99 No slatement or expression of opinton or any other maner herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The maner IS presented merely for the conventence of the subScriber White we beheve the sources of our Informai!on to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor 01 Ihe statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own InvestlgallOn and Information Oelafteld, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corpora\Jon and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades m respect to any securities men\Joned m thiS or any future ISsue, and such posrtlon may be dlHerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independenlly of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue FUr1her Information on any securitY mentIOned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 26, 1988

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 26, 1988

Tabell's Market Letter - August 26, 1988
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 August 26, 1988 appropriately in our view, devoted its lead story, 27 on August 25, out, correctly, that. the months later, the 500-point drop on October 19, still looms over today's stock market. It is, therefore, worth considering just what the presence of this spectre means from a technical point of view. It is obvious to any experienced market analyst that the technical damage done during September – October 1987 was largely unprecedented. All one had to do was to thumb through a portfolio of charts following last October 19, and it became apparent that those charts, collectively, were at a state different from any that had existed within the memory of today's market professionals. Certainly, in long years of bull and bear markets, there had been innumerable past instances of stocks breaking down from major top formations and possessing absolutely nothing in the way of new, long-term bases. Never before, in our own memory at least, had so many stocks found themselves in this position at the same time. The only previous phenomenon comparable to last October was, of course, October – November 1929. The 22.61 fall of last October 19 was almost twice as great as 1929's largest single-day decline, and the two days of October 16 and 19, 1987 saw a larger drop than October 28 and 29, 1929. Overall, the 1929 drop turned out to be bigger, since, after a two-day rally, that market turned down again and, on November 13, found itself at a new low, 48 below its early-September peak. In contrast, the October 19, 1987 close, 36 below August 25, turned out to be the final low of that decline. A chart m the Journal article depicts this graphically. In addition, it makes another, and more important, point. The rally from November, 1929 to April, 1930 lasted for six months and then expired. On August 12, 1930, three weeks prior to the anniversary of the 1929 high, the Dow had pulled back to a level some 43 below that high, comparable to a figure of 1527 for the Dow today. By October, 1930 a new low had been posted, and the dreary decline to the lows of 1932 was underway . – – – – – – 1 -jl-..Jjy .contrast, today!s..market ,…ayearafterthehigh.–mains–,.elL.aboy.eitsnadiroUaslOctober As our readers are aware, this letter was discussing the possibility of a 1929 recurrence back in early 1986. At that time, we made the point that a repetition of September – November, 1929—purely a stock-market event—was a possibility. This, indeed, took place. We also suggested that the aftermath might turn out to be quite different from that of 1930 – 1932. It is thus interesting that the current market pattern is beginning to diverge from the earlier one. If we are to reject the 1930 – 1932 scenario, what, then, is the aftermath for 1987 likely to be We may have stumbled upon a clue in last week's letter when, it will be recalled, we looked at what appeared to be a high daily level of issues trading unchanged from their previous day's prices. We tried to quantify this phenomenon historically, but it is also interesting to consider mtuitively just what this particular manifestation might mean. It certainly suggests, it seems to us, an absence of either buying power or selling pressure in the case of a large number of stockS—ln other words, a lack of market interest or, in any case, a lack of interested market players. This is one defInition of a dull market. The Journal article came up with a number of others mcluding lowered volume, especially after adjustment for dividend captures and index arbItrage. It becomes significant, then, that our study last week of protracted periods with large numbers of unChanged stocks suggested that, once such periods were underway, they had tended to last for long stretches of time. One such period, indeed, persisted for six years, from September, 1939 to September, 1945. Interestingly enough, the Dow, well toward the end of this period, was at the same level at which it had started, a major market bottom having occurred just about at the mid-point of the interval. Essentially, it tended to be a period of sharply reduced volume with protracted periods when well under a million shares changed hands. The same can be said of the two-year stretch between 1948 and 1950, essentially a base-building period for a later major advance. When required to issue a market forecast for 1988 at last year-end, we suggested that this year. given the technical damage which had taken place. might wellbe occupied largely… with-rebasing, thus .. – turning out to be an inside yearn. one in which neither the 1987 high or low was exceeded. This forecast has proved to be correct so far. As the year goes on, technical evidence accumulates that this consolidation could be a protracted one, and there is, indeed, historical precedent for such a process continUIng for as long a another couple of years. Such a period could well be accompanied by many of the characteristics we have seen recently—dullness, low volume, and a general lack of interest on part of market participants. If this proves to be the case, it will be necessary, as the malaise grows deeper, to remind oneself that the financial community has endured suni1ar hardships in the past and has managed to survive them. Indeed, the aftermath of base-building is, by defimtion, a bull market. How long we may have to wait for such a market may be today's major unanswered stock-market queshon. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2017.78 S & P 500 (12 00) 259.78 CumulatIve Index (8/25/88) 3778.73 No statement or expresSIOn 01 OpinIon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or Indirectly, an offer or the sollclta\lOn 01 an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our InformatIOn to be rehable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acoon 10 be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own Invesllgatlon and Information Dela1leld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any securlbes mentioned In thIS or any 1uture Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed 10 thIS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS regIstered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further InformaMn on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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