– – –,. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 18. 1983 A reader of. the business news of the past two weeks might well have gotten the impression that much of it should have appeared under the byline of Scheh 'razade. The financial news seemed to con- –s!srlargely oflOOrtales-of'thTSneiKs-ofAraby meetingin solemn assemblage-in an attlll!fptta-!lxlhe—– —, price of crude oil. Their eventual arrival at a 29 price earlier this week was greeted by the stock market with a predictable yawn. but later weakness. led by oil stocks. wound up being generally attri- buted to a feeling that the set price would not. in fact. hold. Though our own oil-industry expertise is close to nil. we see no reason why it should. This con- clusion need be based on nothing more sophisticated than what we are taught in elementary economics about price setting by cartels. The sine qua non of success in this effort is the ability to set effective production quotas. which is exactly the way it was done in the bad old days when the Texas Railroad Commission filled the OPEC role. It is becoming increasingly obvious that this is beyond OPEC's capabilities. Theoretical production ceilings have been set at a level significantly above current pump- ing levels. Those levels of production are. in turn. estimated to be ahead of current consumption at a time when inventory is widely agreed to be excessive. While world economic recovery will mitigate these factors somewhat. demand will still probably rise sluggishly. As one writer pointed out. the homeowner who has recently installed insulation is not going to rip it out because the price of heating oil has come down. Thus. our skepticism concerning the 29 figure. and our feeling that the reports of the demise of OPEC are not exaggerated. To leave economics and turn to a field which we know something about. however. we doubt that any of the above constitutes part of the most crucial consideration at the present time for investors in oil stocks. True. the earnings prospects for most oil-related companies are cloudy at best. but. on the other hand. the stocks are not overly expensive. and much of the uncertainty regarding those earnings may already be built into price levels. What is more significant. in our view. is the overall technical position of these issues. The table below shows the percentage changes in the S & P 500 plus four oil- related S & P group indicies between five significant market points. the 1976-77 high. the 1978 low, the 1 -1.980..Jrigh..Jhe I 982Jo.w…and..a..J.eCe.nLp1'ice. In the. case o the grOUP indicies monthly averalle,p.rice.s are used. The table covers the highs of the last three maJor market cycles. smce the current pnce IS high to date of the current cycle. Basically. a clear-cut pattern emerges. PERCENTAGE 1976-7 High- '1978 Low- CHANGES1980 High- 1982 Low- S & P 500 r978 Low -19.41 1980 High 61.70 1982 Low -27.11 Date 50.04 Oil Int'l -13.06 105.59 -41.47 17.05 Oil Domestic -19.20 109.12 -49.80 22.67 Oil Well Eqpt. & Svcs. – 9.37 245.27 -61. 71 21. 89 Offshore Drilling – 9.98 302.97 -52.00 12.21 On tJleir decline to tTle 1978 low. ml)st oil issuM outperformed the market and- ..lroppe4. much le.ss than the S & P 500. This was followed by distinctly superior performance on the subsequent rise to the 1980 high. oil stocks by and large showing up as the leaders of that bull market. the last completed major market cycle. On the subsequent decline to the 1982 low, the pattern reversed itself. and oil stocks again led. this time on the downside. dropping by a considerably greater percentage than did the 500. On the present cycle. the pattern continues. with the recovery to date being definitely sub-par compared to the 50 rise in the S & P. The point is that it is normal technical action for relative strength to perSist from one cycle to an- other. Oil stocks generally outperformed the market on the 1976-1978 decline and continued this out performance in the 1978-1980 advance. Likewise. their poor relative action in the 1980-1982 drop has been continued so far in the 1982-198 rising phase. and the normal expectation should be for this to continue for the remainder of that phase. Another way of looking at the same phenomenon is to say that. having undergone a major decline in 1980-1982. it is necessary for oil issues to build a base before they can be considered ready for another major advance. The normal way'irCwhich-such-oagebuilding-isaccomplishedis for a group to sit out the upside phase of the subsequent cycle or. in some cases. more than one subsequent cycle. In other words, present price behavior, which consists of oil issues moving more or less laterally while the rest of the market advances sharply. is perfectly normal and indeed should be -expeted to continllP. The present technical outlook for oil stocks does not involve a great deal of long-term price vulner- ability. Indeed. they probably scored their effective lows last August. although it is highJy possible that these lows might be tested at a future date. The name of the game in a bull market. however. is capital enhancement, and, in this particular bull markft at least, oil and oil-related issues mny turn out to be inferior vehicles for that purpose. AWTrs .. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1122.00 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 150.18 Cumulative Index (3/17/83) 1718.02 No stalement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indlfec1Ir.' an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenienc of the subscriber Wht e we believe the SOluces of our Informa han 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe slalementr. mude herein Any odlon to be taken by Ihe subscriber should be based on his own IIlVesllgallan and Informollon Janney Monlgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporailon, and 115 officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pos.Jhons or trades In respect to any senlfltJes. mentioned In thl or any futulI' Issue, and such posilion may be different flom any Views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Iss\Je Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advISory and athel ruslamer' Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informallon on any secuflly mentioned herem IS available on request

.-,! TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!140 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 25. 1983 A,lluther newbuIJ-!llarket.higb h,!s–R,IJ,,1!chJey.ed,,!asti'1tF….l1!1'l'J9nsI.ndus!.r;iala!,d – Transportation Averages. (The S & P 500. at Thursday's close , remained fractionally under its March 7 peak.) This latest ascent took place. for thO! most part, without fanfare, being largely produced by rallies which suddenly emerged on Wednesday afternoon and in the last half-hour of Thursday's trading. Volume increased only moderately, to the 90-million-share level versus the 60- 80 million shares which had been recently typical. All this is as it should be. Under current bull-market conditions. the achievement of new peaks is. indeed, a routine event. It will be when long periods go by without the achievement of new highs that investors should begin worrying. The 50 upswing which the S & P has scored since August can be divided into three phases. The first was a just-under-40 move between August 12 and November 9. This was followed by two rises of roughly 10 magnitude. November 12-January 10 and January 24 to date, each one being preceded by a relatively mild correction. 7 in November and 4.6 in January. Such relatively mild shocks are generally the worst that can be expected during the earlymiddle stages of a major advance. It is normal to expect each successive advancing phase in the series of upswings composing a typical bull market to show less and less dynamism. This has been only partially true in the pres- ent case and, indeed, the present rise. from January to date, has displayed exceptional vigor. This can be demonstrated by the following table based on the action of 1351 individual issues. These issues are divided into deciles based on performance, from the best-acting 10 to the worst- acting 10. The averag'e performance of each of thes-e deciles is then,computed for each of the three rising phases. and this performance-is shown -relative-to the performance of the S -& P 500. For reasons of data availability. the first phase is computed only from September 9. rather than the August 12 low. i. CHANGE i. CH,NGE i. CHflNGE 9/9/82 DECILE llL2L82 RfLrHIVE 10SlIE 11/23/82 .. RELATIVE lOSU 1124/83 – RELATIVE 3L23L83 105&1- 1 58.58 15.!4 37.15 )4.20 10.16 28.38 2 36.45 16.36 21.03 9.61 26.53 15.90 3 29.94 10.82 l'j,J 4.4 19.94 9.87 4 25.43 5 21.19 6.97 3.35 11. 78 9.08 1.23 –1 .. 2 15.33 11.7 el.64 () 6 16.79 -0.40 6.35 -3.69 8.18 -0.5) 1 7 13.03 -3.60 3.80 -,6.00 4.17 –4.59 8 9.22 -6.86 1.06 –8 f 48 ( 51 -7.94 9 3.99 -11.32 -2.56 -11.76 -J 40 -13.3 10 -11. 38 -!4.42 -11.78 -20.10 -19.76 -26.50 S&P 500 17.26 10.42 9.j7 The first phase bf the rise. the figures clearly show. wss by far the most .dynamlC, with even the ninth decile posting a 4 advance, and with the best-acting 10 of all stocks rising, on average, 58 over a two-month period. This works out to a 1400 annualized rate. It is, literally. almost impossible to show a loss during such rare market phases ,which fact is the genesis of the old adage Never confuse brains with bull markets. Predictably. the second phase of the rise from Novem- ber to January was less dynamic;with the best-acting 10'-of aU'stocks risin-g(6nly)37-';'nd'the . worst acting 20 actually posting losses. On the third phase. contrary to expectation however, the performance of the average issue actually improved. The sverage percentage change for the first seven deciles was better than it had been previously, as was the action of those segments relative to the S 1\ P. The one predictable event to emerge was increased selectivity. The losses posted by the worst-scting issues increased sharply. More of this sort of thing should manifest itself as successive intermediate-term upswings are posted. . AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1148.12 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 153.70 Cumulative Index (3/24/83) 1751. 23 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No ,totemen! or expression of opinion or ony other mailer herein contained IS, or 1 to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the oll(llotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The malter IS presenled merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While Ne believe the sources of our Information 10 be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any oct Ion to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invelilgollan and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and ItI officers or employees, moy now have, or may later take, positions or trades In relpcl to any seCUrities menhoned m Ih,s or any fulure Issue, and such pesltlon may be different from ony views now or hereafter clpressed In thiS or any olher Issue Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered Ih thc SEC as on mvestmenl adVisor, moy give adVice to Its ,nvestment adVisory and othel customers Independently of ony stotements mode H\ Ihls or m any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS avollable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMEAICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – March 31, 1983 …….,. – —'Wlf'jeiierlillyao notciii'iirlQer -It part -onfur-tiiBK'toTIjiiibble-;-WitlLOUr -collellgues'm-the in8r'Kef'-''''' commentary profession. Indeed, since they are our colleagues, we hope we possess some appreciation of the difficulty of their task. There have; over the years, regularly been forecasters whose market scenario has varied widely from our own, and we have never had intrinsic argument with such forecasters, since there have been numerous occasions when their scenario has been a great deal more accurate than our own. However. we consider ourselves. by profession, market historians. We require, therefore J of any market scenario that it have some grounding in historical reality — real trading as it actually took place, rather than some cloud cuckoo land of the market as the forecaster would like it to be. A case in point is Wall Street's current obsession with the 100-150 point correction. This currently fasionable prediction calls for a decline in the aforementioned range which will constitute nothing more than that — a corr'\Ction —, after which the bull market can happUy proceed on to new highs without anyone's having to worry about it. Such an eventuality is, of course, indeed possible, but whether it is plausible in terms of the real world is something else again, since, in 40 long years of market history, there exist precisely three comparable instances. Let us pursue this a bit further. The high for the Dow, one week ago, was 1145.90. A 100point correction would amount to 8.7, a 150-point correction 13.1. Since April, 1942 there have been 11 recognizable bull markets including the current one. Within those 11 bull markets there have been 49 identifiable corrections of 5 or greater. The table below provides some more detail on these periods. Bull Markets April 1942-May 1946 NO. OF CORRECTIONS Over 5–8.7 8.7–13.1. 13.1 4 1 –0- Stsrt of Correction. Feb. 1946 Months After Market Low 46 Advance BefQl'6 Correction 122 Oct. 1946-June 1948 3 2 0 Feb. 1947 4 .13 June 1949–Jan. 1953 4 0 1 – —'bcSCepTt9. 5179-5D3-eJcul.yT916915-7'—-1…3…..,,li3….,.'1-..0..,……,.SAeupg.t. 11995559;…,..24–'22—-9,162'—1 June 1962-Feb. 1966 2 1 0 May 1965 35 75 Oct. 1966-Dec. 1968 2 1 0 Sept. 1967 11 27 May 1970-Jan. 1973 3 0 1 Dec. 1974-Sept. 1976 4 1 0 July, 1975 7 53 Feb. 1978-April 1981 5 1 2 Nov. 1979 21 21 Aug. 1982- 200 33 IT. '5 The table shows, for each bull market, the number of corrections broken down into three cate- gories, those between 5 and 8.7, those in the 8.7-13.1 range (the equivalent of 100-150 points today), and those greater than 13.1. 33 of the 49 corrections, some two-thirds, were less than 8.7 in magni- tude. Five exceeded 13.1. There were;lndeed, 11 cases, one correction in five, which fell within the range in question. Thus, a 100-150 point drop would appear, at least, semi-plausible until we examine the figures further. As the table shows, at lest one such correction did occur in 8 of 11 bull markets. For those eight cases, the right-hand three columns show the date on which the fhmt such correction'stsrtea, the months which the market had advanced when the correction began, and the percentage by which the market had advanced on the correction start date. The current market has advanced by some 50 over seven months. There are only two cases of a correction of this scale occurring within seven months of the low. They tend, quite obviously, to occur much later. Likewise, there are only three cases of an B. 7–13.1 correction having occured before the market had advanced further than the present one already has. A correction of the magnitude in question, in other words, quite clearly tends to occur at a much more advanced stage of the typical bull-market-cycle than the one in which we now find ourselves. A 100-150 point correction occurring today would have only three past precedents, February, 1947, September, 1967, and November, 1979. , It is out of this historical framework that we have evolved our own scenario which recognizes the fact that bull-market corrections tend to start out by being small (The two we have had in this market SO far have been around 6.) and gradually to increase as the bull market approaches maturity. Most of the corrections in the above table of greater than 13.1 have been at the tail ends of bull markets, also. Our own view, therefore, is that (a) a correction of greater than, say 6 (60-70 points) is unlikely to occur over the near term and that (b) were such an event to take place, It would be mUdly discouraging rather than constituting a healthy sign. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1144.87 SloP Composite (1200 p.m.) 154.49 Cumulative Index (3/30/83) 1748.72 No statement or expression of opmlon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dlr(ctly or indirectly, on offer or the ollcltallon of on offer to bvy or sell any seclrIly referred to or menlroned The molter is presented merely for the convenience of Ihe svbscnber While we believe the sources of ovr Informo lion to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the slatement mode herem Any action 10 be token by the vbscnber should be based on hiS own InveSllgatlon and mformalron Janney Monlgomery Stott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now hove, or may loler loke, positions or trodes In respect to any secvnhes mentioned In Ihls or any fulvle Issue, and svch position may be dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Stoll, Inc, which IS reglslered w.th Ihe SEC os on ,nveslmenl adVisor, may give odvlce to 11 tnveslmenl adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statemenls mode In thiS or In ony olher Issue Further Informollon on any sewrtly mentioned herein IS available on request

r TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE April 8, 1983 While the market exhibits short-term dullness and the financial community worries about an antiC.i,Il!.t..ed intermediate-term correction, an event is taking place that could have a profound effect on most I t….,—l';klt;;111'A'';,,n;Wf;et-hhe-a-.vlenvt.oestmbeanbclik,('eutipme-a-1nodr…e.xmoasmt .irneead-erssonmOfefi17k'y,''O'l'''',t;;J'''t''.!X;.'(.'..;..t,ed!y'-;,–,;'1I-.. It has long been a theory of this letter that the market changed behavior radically in the mid- 1960's. Prior to that time, each successive major high and low had been higher than the corresponding figure for the previous market cvcle. Starting on FebruJlry 9, 1966 \l(e saw the first of a series of buUmarket highs in the vicmity of 1000 on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, and, in 1970 and 1974, new cycle bear-market lows were scored for the first time. In contrast to the secular rising trend of the previous 25 years, the secular trend for the Dow for the past 17 years has been just about flat. We first drew attentIon to this phenomenon in 1971. It has continued unabated since. If one assumes that the flat trend began with the 1966 high and continued, at least, through last August1s low, it can be described mathematically via a computed trendlirre. the central, thick line shown on the chart below. That line starts at 864.28 in 1966 and its slope (.0025 points per day) is so flat that it can barely be seen on the chart. It has risen, after 4,303 trading days, only to a current value of 875.08. DOH JONES INDUSTRIAL RVERRGE MONTHLY I– I -'L ltrLII,I — III I II! What is interesting about the chart, however, are the three lines drawn above and below the cen- tral computed trendline. These lines are based on a statistical measure called the standard error of estimate. and they measure the amount by which a given series deviates from its central or estimated value. The standard error for the 4,303 days of market history under study is 79.6931 points. The six outer lines on the chart are drawn, respectively, I, 2. and 3 standard errors above and below the central estimate. What is cruciaI9Sthat the Dow spent mosf'of last month above its estimated value by more than three times the standard error. It has done so only once before, on the downside, in 1974. Assuming the Dow observations to have been distributed normally. some two-thirds of the 4.303 days should have shown a close one standard error from the computed trendline. and some 95 should have been two standard errors. Something over 99 should be wlthin three standard errors. As of January of this year, the actual data conformed almost precisely to these theoretIcal estimates. It is, as the chart clearly shows, no longer doing so. In other words, 1114.16, which happens to be the present computation plus three standard errors. is a crucial figure. Continued ability to hold above this figure will tell us little about the shape of the future market trend. It will however suggest one fact of tremendous importance, that the flAt secular trend that perfectly described the market for 17 years from 1966 through 1982 is no longer in effect. –oI1 )\WT rs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.11114. 45 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 151.41 Cumulatlve Index (4/7/83) 1737.18 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or exprenlon of opinIon or any other matter hereIn contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dHecily or l!'Id,recily, on offer or the 501lc.101l0n of on offer to buy or sell any security referred fo Of mentioned The maUer IS presented merely for the convenience of lhe subscriber While we bel.eve Ihe sources of our In(ormatlon 10 be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy lhereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any action 10 be token by Ihe subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgallon and information Janney Montgomery Scotl, Inc. os a corporation. and Its offICers Of employees, moy now have, or may later toke. positions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrllle mentioned In Ih,s or cny fulure Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ih,s or any other Issue Janney Monlgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Inveslment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its Investment odvISory and olhel C'Uslomers Independently of any slalements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Furlher informatIon on any seCl.Hlty menlloned herein IS available on request

.- 1ArBELa..' s &l1iUii\RET LeTTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE –e-'– , – – ,, -.–April,151983,, n iViost'maJor stock-market indices moved ahead this week to cycle and 'alltime nighs, once again underscoring the folly of becoming obsessed with putative corrections under bull-market con- ditions. More importantly, however, the move by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average back to the middle 1100's returned that indicator to the zone we discussed last week, the area which calls the continued viability of the 17-year, flat trading range into question. Evidence for the existence of a new super-cycle environment thus continues to accumulate. The emergence of bull-market conditions became apparent shortly after the August low. Since that time, as the upswing began to take on characteristics of its own, it has become obvious that the market's behavior is more characteristic of the sort of up market seen during the 1950's and 1960's than the more recent, comparatively tepid bull markets. If this is the case — a point we have been making for six months now — we are still, only seven months after the low, in the very early stage of the cycle. It is necessary to keep reminding ourselves that bull markets typically last two to three years. It remains unlikely that this one will terminate anytime during the near future or, indeed, that a correction of anything more than minor proportions will occur until a much later stage. Given this scenario, the upside penetration of the 17-year trading area is likely to become more and more obviously decisive. It is almost impossible, in our view, to overestimate the importance of this apparent change in the cyclicl environment. We have become so used to the sort of markets that have prevailed since the middle 1960's that we tend to forget that things can, indeed, be different. It is neces- sary to examine dusty chart books to remind ourselves that between 1949 and 1966 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average advanced from 160 to 1000. The same sort of advance, taking the 1974 low as a benchmark, would produce a price of 3600 for the Dow. 1-4——-\We-supposeiti..-necessar-y.toadd,thatt-he.abO)1eJs.not aforecast,.As'.eI!ointed out last week, all that exists at the moment is a growing chain of evidence that the 17-year super cycle of 1966-1982 has come to an end, This evidence tells us nothing about the sort of environment that is likely to replace it, and, indeed, the current bull market and the subsequent cycle bear market will probably have to proceed to completion before we have any firm guidelines with which to work. The 1949-1966 period is cited purely as an example of the sort of fortune-building vehicle the stock market can be. That period, however, is not a figment of the imagination. It happened, and something like it could, happen again. It is necessary, of course, to ask ourselves why this should be occurring at this particular point in time. The post-World-War- II super-cycle bull market grew, we now know, out of a series of wrenching adjustments, which began in 1929 and included a depression and a world war. It began also from a period of profound undervaluation of common stocks. It is difficult to compare historical periods, but it is at least arguable that the adjustments of the past 17 years have been comparably profound. We have seen, since the middle 1960's, the shattering of many tenets of conventional investment wisdom, a shattering comparable in many ways to the destruction of faith in common stocks which took place in the 1930's. 1968 saw the demise of the gunslinger investment manager, and 1974 laid rest the one-decision-stock theory, under which theory supposed professionals blithely paid blatantly unjustifiable prices for Favorite- 50 stocks, many of which are nowhere near those prices 11 years later. The magnitude of the price correction produced by these changes is properly understood when one recalls that the past 17 years of no upside progress in common-stock prices has occurred in the midst of a wildly inflation- ary environment. Most investors are familiar with the inflation-adjusted chart of the Dow which shows a constant-dollar decline between 1966 and 1982 almost as great as that of the 1930's. The resulLof this, of course, was to produce, in the late 1970's and early 1980's,a valuation level for equities measurably comparable to that which existed in the late 1940'8-;– — —– — – — Given this background, the possibility of an end to the almost-two-decade adjustment in the early 1980's and the emergence of a subsequent new environment is less surprising. We have cited beforethe ancient Chinese curse May you live in interesting times. n The 19HU's may plulluse JU'l such a time for the stock market. AWT rjs ANTHONY W, TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1169.21 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 158.52 Cumulative Index (4/14/83) 1793.82 NObSlalemenl or e)(prelon of opinion ar any olner moIler herein contolned IS, ar IS Ie be deemed to. be, dmctly or Indirectly, an off!;!r or Ihe ollcilolton of on offer toon uyo or sell on security be hellob e, we In referred no woy Ie or m(!nlloned The malter presented merely represenl or guo'ontee Ihe accuracy thereof nor fOf Ihe c.onverlence of the subscriber While oNe believe the 50urces of our tnfarmoof Ihe statements mude herein Any oct, on 10 be token by the subscnber should be PnoOselhonosn or 1 I own rades inVestigation IrI reSpect 10 and any eI-ncIfJorrlmIIaStiomnen tJiaonnnedeyIrIMtohlntgoormaenryy Scoll, future Inc, 0 0 Issue, and corporation, and lIS off,eers or sucn position moy be different employee5, mo.,. from any views now now nove, or moy later teke, or hereafter eypressed In I IS or onV her;dsue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered WITh the SEC as on Investment odvisor, mQV give adVice to 1\1 Investment adv'SQry ond cthel Cl./stomers In epe ently of any statements made fI'l thiS or fI'l any ather IsstJe further IMformolton on ony security mentioned herem,s avadable on requesf

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE. tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGe April 22. 1983 The major stockmarket indices continued last week to move into newall-time high terri- .-,.- JoO'.Onjg,e;effcLoJ..thtsongoJnL!ltrengthwasthatit…llpJllU,entJym,uted.for.thetimeL, ..J behlg. tile widespread' forecasts of imminEint corriiction ,.,' By ;contrast;-Thursday's-New -York ..,…, Times headed its market summarY by saying Analysts predicted the Dow will break 1200 by the end of the week. This happy event had not come to pass at this writing. and it mayor may not do so. However. it hardly qualified for the Fearless-Forecast-of-the-Year award. since the average had closed at 1191 the night before. and a nine-point rise in the current environment cannot be ,considered a particularly earthshaking event. Contrary opinion. of course. tells us that the time to worry about a correction will be when all concern about one has disappeared and forecasts become uniformly bullish. It will. therefore. be interesting to see what happens when the market. as it inevitably will. starts failing to post new peaks for a week or two. If the correction talk reemerges at that stage. we will be duly encouraged. Meanwhile. on an objective basis. the upside momentum which the market continues to be able to display. even seven months into the aEIvance, remains somewhat spectacular. Three short-term corrections. in the 5-6 range. have taken place. At no time. however. from August 12 to the present. has the market displayed deterioration which could be characterized as intermediate-term in scope. To detect swings of intermediate-term magnitude. 65 days of data have. in the past. constituted a useful time period for study. For example. a 65-day moving average of each day's percentage of advancing issues constitutes a useful measure of the market's behavior on a medium-term basis. This figure peaked last November when. for the 65 days ended Novem- ber ,12.)t,showedthat 48.5 of all issues traded had, estingly enough. this was the second highest'peak the osnenaveesrnaagse,evadevr arnecaecdheedacShIndcaeyb. reIandtenri- statistics have been maintained. The only time it has ever reached a higher level was June 21. 1933. at which time the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was at 95.91. on its way to 194.40 four years later. Indeed. the figure has managed to move above a peak of 46 on only eight occasions prior to the recent one. In most cases these peaks have been scored in the rela- tively early stages of major bull markets and at times when there still remained a great deal of room on the upside. A recent example was in February. 1971. like the present less than a year after a major (May. 1970) low. The Dow at the time was at 887 versus an eventual high of 1050. What is particularly significant. however. is that. on an absolute basis. intermediate- term momentum. even after having pulled back. 'as could be expected. from its high of Novem- ber. remains highly positive. The 65-day average percentage of advances dipped just below 43 last week and has now again risen above it. This 42-43 level even though down from highs reached last November is still a higher figure than has ever been attained in many past bull markets. Furthermore. almost invariably. there have existed. in past upswings. inter- mediate-term pauses where the 65-day percentage of advancing stocks has dropped into the high 30's. say to the 37-38 level. These pauses have themselves generally taken place well before the ultimate highs were reached and have often been accomplished without a great deal of correction for the averages. Even this very early sort of sign of loss of momentum has not yet occurred. It continues to seem to us that the expectation of serious weakness at this stage is like – – seeing a finely tuned racing'car'proceeding-down the track-at-full speed-and deciding to-jump in front of it. Before such weakness occurs. there must occur some sign of loss of upside momentum on an intermediate-term basis. This has conspicuously'' failed to take place. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1200 p.m.)1194.95 S P Composite (12 00 p. m. ) 160.44 Cumulative Index (4/21/83) 1826.63 No statement or eXpres.llOn of opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the ohCllatlon of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or menlroned The motter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While e believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subscrtber should be based on hiS own invetlgallon and Informalton Janney Montgame'Y Scott, Inc, as a rporallon, and It officers or employees, moy now hove, or may later lake, posItion. or trodes In respect 10 any s(!Cunlles mentiOned In Ihls or any future ISSUe, and such poslllon may be different from any views now Or hereofter epressed In thl, or ony other ISsue Jonney Montgomery Scott, tnc which ' reglslered wllh the SEC 0 an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Inveslment advISOry and olhel cvstomers Independently of cny slalements mode In thiS or In cny olller Issue Further information on cny seomty mentioned herein IS ovolloble on requeSI

. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVHill0N OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – April 29, 1983 We are, to be honest, unable to think of a great many advantages to getting old. One of ! – —-t-he..;-few,such, .,.for-the-st0ekar,ket-obs.er-ver,atc-Ieast ,-is..,a.longerexperiencewithdifferentsorts of market enVironments.. HaVing celebrated, this week, the 29th anriiversary-of 0';1' e'ritrance into the securities business, We have found ourselves perhaps a bit less astounded by the market's be- havior since last August than some of our younger colleagues. When we started our Wall Street career, in the dark ages of 1954, the industry was populated with hoary veterans of 1929, who regularly assured us that The trouble with you kids is that you've never seen a bear market. We find ourselves, today, being able to chide anyone with less than 17 years experience for their lack of understanding of the past seven months on the grounds that they have never seen a bull market. We cite our approach to galloping senility, not simply to appear avuncular, but because we think, at this stage, the point is relevant. We have, in recent issues of this letter, documented the thesis that the market's recent extraordinary strength suggests that we are entering a new super-cycle environment very different from that which prevailed between 1966 and the summer of 1982. We have, we trust, made it clear that there exists precious little evidence at the moment to suggest exactly what the shape of that environment will be. Nevertheless, the last extant ex- ample of a different sort of market environment is the one which prevailed, approximately, between 1949 and 1966. Since we were, ourselves, actively staining our hands with stock-chart ink during a goodly portion of that period, it may be helpful to try to convey some sort of flavor of just what the good old days were actually like. The watershed date, which may, historically, wind up being compared with August 12, 1982, was June 13, 1949. On that day the Dow-Jones Industrial Average closed at 161. 60. It then com- menced an advance which lasted exactly one year throuS'h June 12, 1950. It reached 228.38 for a 41 increase, which compares not unfavorably with the .present 56 rise since last August. To those 'who think that bull markets need corrections, the period is instrUctIve. In that entire one-year period there were five identifiable corrections. The largest one was 2.86, and the longest one lasted for nine days. The longest period of the entire year during which the market failed to post a new high was five weeks in February-March, 1950. This happy state of affairs might have gone on longer were it not for an unusual event — the outbreak of the Korean War. This caused a correction of all of 13 over a relatively short 22- day period. However, four months later the Dow was again at a new high and continued to move on to new peaks regularly for another 15 months, albeit this time interspersed with more frequent and deeper corrections — eight such instances up to January, 1953, the deepest one being 7.81. There then ensued what has come to be called a bear market, largely only because purists like ourselves insist on dividing the market up into four-year cycles. It lasted nine whole months and brought the Dow down 13 once more. After this interruption, the advance resumed, and a year later, in January, 1954, we were again at new highs. The process of achieving new highs continued another 31 years, with seven identifiable short-term corrections in the process, two of which were marginally over 10. After another 14 months of back-and-forth swings in a trading range, the first bear market approaching 20 in magnitude occurred from July to October of 1957. We are talking here, remember, about a period of just over eight years — eight years be- fure the Dow ever posted a decline of greater than 13. It did so only twice, and only two periods of as much as a year went by without the Average posting a new high. The total advance was 222, the equivalent of a move of the Dow to 2500 from the August, 1982 low. It was followed, moreover, by two further major-cycle bull markets, which space does not permit recounting here, but which continued for another nine years. Some individual stock advances during-the -eight-year, 1949-1956 period were truly' spectacu- lar. International Paper moved from 3 3/4 to 40. Aluminum was then considered a growth industry, and Reynolds Metals moved from 1 3/4 to 55, a 3000 rise. Now even in the light of this sort of record, the malet's behavior since August is pretty exceptional, and we wish to take nothing away from it. However, to those of us who are aware from experience what bull markets can really be like, it is slightly less surprising. The major lesson, moreover, afforded by those early years is that exceptional strength, once begun. tends to persist. It is a lesson worth keeping in mind as the market continues to post new highs. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m. ) 1215.17 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 162.99 Cumulative Index (4/28/83) 1850.56 NQ slalement or exprenlon of opinion or any other molter herein contained IS, or 15 to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCItation of on offer to buy Qf sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the conventence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of OUf Informo tlon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporotlon, ond liS offuers or employeu, may now have, or may loler toke, POSitions or trodes In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned In thIS or any futurc Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. which IS regIStered With the SEC as on ,vestment adVisor, may give advlCc to Its tnve!otmenl advisory and othel customers Independently af any statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further Information on any !ealrlly menlloncd herein IS ovalloble on request

I I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCk eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe …. May 6, 1983 ———–,..i-.-i-r.——–'-,–c—'—07-;————I It would 'be pardonable if Monday's market action caused for the-investor, a slight -sense of deja vu. Purportedly in response to a less-than-sanguine market opinion expressed by an analyst for a well-known brokerage house, the Dow interupted its march to new highs by declining 21. 87 points or 1. 78. This recalled, to our mind at least, January 7, 1981, on which date it will be remembered, a pessimistic forecast by a somewhat more free-spirited analyst led to a 23.80 point, 2.37 decline m the Dow. Th,S week's reaction was consiLlerably less explosive. January, 1981 produced not only a larger decline, but an all-time New York Stock Exchange volume record, which lasted for a year and a half. In the present instance, all we got was the ninth largest decline since the bull market began last August (Tlie record, on October 25, 1982 was 3.5) on a volullle level that was noticably reduced from that' whi;h .had been OJrevailing for the previous fortnight. All this may have been due to the fact that the forecast in question was couched in considerably less apocalyptlC terms than was its predecessor. Indeed, it expressed confidence in the long.' term health of the market, but, according to the Wall Street Journal, expressed the opinion that stock prices might be headed for some months of interim weakness. We have a certain tendency to be wary of opinion's of this sort. As forecasters ourselves, we fmd it useful to engage in a bit of self-examination and to try to identify what we are really saying when we issue a forecast. Suggesting a significant interim correction while still looking for considerably higher levels is, it seems to us, in reality, saying something like the following I, of course, am clever and perspicacious enough to recognize the fact that the market is reasonably –1—-0,al.ued-a1Td-headed-highehere'-CXists-OUt-1heI e, -howe, e., a-hcrd-of-idio-t-sTwho-are-going-to-do—t-1 me the favor of selling stocks down to lower prices so that I, in my wisdom, may take advantage of those lower prices and buy them. There are, unfortunately,two likely possibilities in such a scenario. The first is that the ignoramuses who are going to drive the market down are not really waiting out there in the wings. The other possibility is for the ignoramuses to turn out to be smarter than the forecaster. At the moment, the opinion that a correction is imminent appears to be a fairly widely-held one. Based on the figures compiled by Investors Intelligence, Inc. as of April 12, three weeks ago, almost 50 of forecasters leaned in that direction. This was, interestingly, the highest percentage of forecasters expressing such a view since June, 1976. Historically, when the consensus opinion is basically bullish but favoring a near-term correction, one of two results tends to occur along the lines suggested above. Either the anticipated correction totally fails to materialize, or it does, indeed, emerge and then matures, along the way, into a full-scale bear market. We think this principle has a good chance of holding in the present case. It remains, of course, to choose between the two alternatives, and regular readers of this letter will be aware of our firm belief in the former, more optimistic one. We find ourselves reminding our readers ad nauseaum that this particular bull market is only eight months old, and instances of bull markets with such a short lifetime are comparative rarities. There indeed exists only one such to our knowledge, the Baby Bull Market of 1938. That particular upswing produced a 60 advance without substantial correction, over a seven-month period ending in November. 1938. The aftermath was a slow, steady erosion of prices .which lasted for the next 3! years and ultimately, in April, 1942, retraced the entie rise and brought the market back to a new low. Now we think that comparisons between today and 1938 produce precious little similarity. For one thing, the recent rise has taken the Dow to newall-time peaks, while the 1938 market was only a partial recovery. Furthermore, the 1938-1942 period was essentially the product of an aborted economic recovery, and our own faith in the viability of the current expansion remains essentially unshaken. Thus our own skepticism regarding a significant correction followed by new highs. Such a view it seems to us is dangerously close to allowing the trees to obscure one's view of the forest. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL AWTrs DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m. )1226. 30 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 165.30 Cumulative Index (5/5/83) 1888.81 No statement or expreSSion of opmlon or any olher maUer herein conlOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly. on offer or thc soliCitation of on offer to bvy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The molter IS presented merelv for the convenlenc of the 5ubscflber While He believe the sources of our information to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herem Anv action to be laken bV the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or may loler toke, POSitions or trades m rupect to any seCUrities mentioned 10 thiS or ooy future nsue, and such POSition may be different from any vle ….s now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery ScaU, tnc , which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, mav give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers IndependentlV of any stolements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformollOn on any seC1.Jr,lv mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCIC EXCHANGE ….. May 13, 1983 Our readers are, by this time, certainly aware of the importance we attach to the fact ,that in the process of attaining new, all-time highs in recent months, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has decisively broken out of a trading range that goes back 17 years to 1966. We can think of no bet- ..te'lITf'iratizihllig-imj5Ortancetnah-t63tIeainthech1i.rtOeloW-'r.iiSs-thepage. It- is''a20'''-'''—!f-.-. pomt-umt, pomt-and-flgure chart of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average covering the period 1966 to date. . It demonstrates graphically that the 17 years of trading prior to early this year constituted, essentlally,a lateral trading area which has been significantly penetrated with the recent move to above 1200. For those unacquainted with the mechanics of point-and-figure charts, their uniqueness lies 1–11-..111 ..theJactey…arEl-Ilime..\las..,..JJlehart above is constructed by plotting each 20-point f1uc tuation in the DHIA, regardless of the time intervals between each-such fluctuation. The lateral width of the chart is determined solely by the necessity to move sideways one unit on the graph each time a 20-point reversal of the previous trend takes place. The analytical usefulness of point-and-figure charts (We maintain them for every NYSE and ASE stock and a large number of OTC issues.) stems from the fact that there tends to be a relationship between the lateral extent of a given trading range and a subsequent upside or downside move. In other words, if a given trading range consumes a certain number of units horizontally and is then penetrated on the upside, the subsequent upward thrust will often tend to be around the same number of units. The practical difficulty in interpretation consists of deciding where, within a given range, to apply this counttl for short, intermediate, and long-term moves. If one were painstakingly to count the entire range on the chart above he would find that, through mid-1982, it extends horizontally for 168 units. Since each unit on this particular chart is 20 points, the indication is a 3360-point move from, roughly, the 800 level, yielding an upside objective of 4160. Astronomical as this figure may sound, we have no trouble conceptually. When we start talking about numbers of this magnitude, we are, quite simply, expressing faith in the continued growth of the American economy over the very long term. We continue to hold this faith and, consequently, are ready to accept the validity of the objective, given a long-enough timeframe. The figure IS of little practical use, however, since it is obviously not going to be attained on this cycle. for nearer-term objectives, one must turn to narrower portions of the trading range. The first such portion existed between 1981-1982 at 780-880. It is 10 units wide and, measured across 840, yields an upside objective of 1040. The market paused at that point in November-December of last year, but has now comfortably exeeded it. It therefore becomes necessary to go back to the trading range of 1976-1980 between 740 and 900. The upside objective of that range is 1340.Tak- mg- the range between 1973 and 1976, one which, technically inclined readers will be aware. demonstrates the familiar head and shoulders pattern, yields a target of 1700. Our original thinking last Fall was that the former objective would prove a valid one for the current cycle, with the latter to be reached on a subsequent cycle starting perhaps in the latter part of the 1980's. This may yet prove to be the case, but the prOblem is that, just eight months into the bull market, we are already fairly close to the initial target. It becomes possible, then. that the 1700 figure will prove a valid upside objective for the current upswing, to be reached, cycle theory would suggest, sometime in 1984-5. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12'00 p.m.) 1217.69 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 164.77 Cu'mulative Index (5/12/83) 1898.66 No statement or expressIon of opInIon or cny olher motter herem contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indIrectly, on oHer or the sollclloloon of on cffer 10 buy or sell cny security referred 10 or me'llloned The molter IS presenled merely for the convenIence of the subscrIber While Ne believe the .Clurees of our ..,formatIon 10 be rellcble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy thereof nor of the Iotement mud!! herein Any odlon to be token by Ihe subscflber should be hosed on his own Investlgotlon cnd mformollon Jenney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a COfporotlon, cnd olllcers or employees, may now hove, or may Joler loke, POSitions or trodes In reSpect loony secUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, ond such POSltIO'1 may be different from ony VleoNS now or hereafter el'pressed III thiS or ony other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment ad150r, moy give adVice to Its II'lvestment odVlsory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thl or 11'1 any other IS5ve fVflher Information on any securrty mentioned herem IS avoiloble on request,

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MMBEfl NEW VOl'll( STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC MEMBEfl AMERtCAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 20, 1983 When the history of Wall Street for the past decade or so is finally written it may come to be known for the proliferation of new financial instruments. Taking only equity-related devices, we have witnessed, first. the birth of options followed by interest-rate futures, stock index futures, and fmally options on futurs.—————————- –I InsofAr a's the technican IS concerned. these instruments represent newly available numbers, and it is his job to analyze any and all numbers relating to the stock market. In this connection, we were ask- ed to give a talk last week before the annual seminar of the Market Technicans Association on the rela- tionship of stock-index-futures prices indices to the indices themselves. We will try here to summarize ., some of the conclusions reached. It is easy to theorize where a stock-index-futures contract should sell, given the current Interest- rate structure. Basically, it should sell for a premium over the actual index, depending on expiration date and gradually eroding to zero as expiration approaches. Historical analysis of the data, however, suggests that it does not, in fact, do so. By contrast, index-future prices seem to behave as a senti- ment indicator and, apparently, as an indIcator of uninformed sentiment. They tend, in other words, to sell at excessive premiums at short-term market highs and at low premiums or, often, at discounts at market lows. .-wc———— -.——–,H- 90 OAT PREMIUM INDEX 14 OAT AVERAGE) The above graph shows the S & P 500 over the past year, together with an invention of ours called the 90-day premium index, which is simply an average of the percentage premium or discount on the two nearest futures contracts for- that index, rweighted according to their -time to expiration. The periodsof discount and of excessive premium are shaded. It is interesting to compare the extreme values on this mdex with the short-term peaks and troughs of the S & P 500 itself. Note, for example, the period, August-October, 1982. A few days prior to the August low, index-future premiums moved to discounts and continued to remain at generally low values all the way through the steepest part 01 the rlse. l're- miums did not become excessive until mid-November, coincident with the first short-term top of any signi- ficance in the current bull market. Both the tops and the bottoms of the trading-range swings between November and January tended to be signaled by extreme values for premiums, and the final extreme high value was reached in late Febru- ary, just before the market flattened out prior to its recent rise. Interestingly, just prior to that rise, futures again began selling at a discount. signaling the most recent upward leg. Their current value is now neutral. Whether this relationship will remain, as investors become more used to interest futures, is a point which will remain moot. However, for the time being, at least, the technician would appear to have gained a new short-term indIcator of some value. ANTHONY W. TABELL AWTrs DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Do' IOneS Industrials (12. 00 pm) 1187.40 S Soplaslten(b!laf. 06nEm py alher matter 16-&Q S5-.tcllned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sollCllollon of an offer e ta OVY PJ-slf''y .1ecurifY, jt!(j'!,r1 q.r menlloned The rqqA,,'AICls ..pJfsented merely for the convenience of Ihe subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our mtormaUmli16IDW61IdIJK;lQiK If\ '&i ….lJl .senl or guoronlee.L1fl'oYl!ec6'r6cy thereof nor of the statemenls mude herem Any action to be taken by the subKt.ber should be based on hiS own Inveshgollon and information Jonney Mohtgomery Scolf, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or may loler lake, poslhons or trades In respect 10 any securities mentioned m thIS or any future Issue, and such pos,tlon may be different from any views now at hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lis Investment adVISory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other .ssue Further information on ony security menlloned herein 1 ovollable on request