TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMEAICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – '1l'itnp-ossitiletoptiJjlih'9. . y 28-, 1982 lOr 'b y'H–.wltnout. Jp'l1g- a lew pres- entations WhICh seem to recur wIth a certam degree of regularity. The appearance of the table below tends to coincide with the rhododendron season, since it is generally issued as a prelude to a discussion of the summer-rally phenomenon. The table shows the number of times the Dow advanced and declined for each of the 56 one-month and two-month periods since 1926 and also he average percentage advance for each period. As can be seen, the market advanced in July m 36 of 56 years and in August in 35 years, or in considerably more than 60 of the instances in question. By contrast, for all months the markethas advanced only 56 of the time. The av- erage percentage advance for the 672 months since 1926 has been 0.43, whereas July has averaged a 1.88 advance and August a 1.26 advance. The two-month period ended August shows a similar upside bias. It is our custom to point out that this tendency toward a summer rise is not the most statistically significant item in the table. December is more likely to show an advance than either July or August, and the 'tendency toward a decline in September is lilewise greater than the summer rally probability. However, the predispostion of the market to advance in July- August and decline in September is, it seems to us, of special interest at this time. aQeMcQtbecds i12261281) IwcMootbeeods i122612811 EodMootb daDces Declioes Qe.cageZCbs … daQces DeclQes cagelLCb9 January 36 20 1. 03 Fpbrusr March Apri 1 29 27 -0.10 25 -0,05 25 1.09 Ms 28 28 -0.79 June 28 28 0.89 July 36 20 1. 88 Allsfust 35 21 1..6 September 34 -1. 37 October 9 27 -0.57 November 34 0.63 Deceolber 41 15 1 2 — — —– TOTAL 380 292 0.43 37 32 27 34 32 26 35 38 32 25 33 39 — 390 19 2.i. 29 24 30 21 18 24 31 23 –1-7 282 2.35 0.9 -0 !5 1.10 O.5.! 0.06 2,72 3.29 -0.15 -1.90 0.10 1. 87 —– 0.89 As our readers are aware, our current view of the equity market can be summed up in the statement that it is presently probing for a major bottom which may have already occurret! in March or may occur at some not-too-different level at some future date. The studies of the four-year cycle which we have been presenting in this space suggest that, if such a bottom has not yet occurred, it should not be delayed much beyond September. Now, presumably due to the tendency toward a summer rally, there is no case on recortl of a major cycle low's having occurred in the months of July or August. (The low based on average price in 1932 was in July, but the actual closing low was in June.) This raises some interesting questions regarding the test and lor penetration of the March 8 low, which we regard as a possibility. Either that test should come- within the-next-month, thuB completing the.bear -market cycle which be(Jl-n in November, 1980-April, 1982, or it is likely to be deferred until September. Any attempt by the market, therefore, to probe new low territory during June should be regarded with special significance. If the conventional signs of a major bottom present themselves and the ensuing summer rally is especially vigorous, we will probably be able to identify the resultant pattern as the takeoff point for a new bull market. Should the more recent tend- ncy toward low volume and desultory market action continue, together with a-tepid sort of summer rally, it then becomes probable that a major turning point might well be deferred until sometime in the Fall. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 821.35 S & P Composite(1200 p.m.) 112.10 Cumulative Index (5/27/82) 1109.03 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL (,,- I ' No statemenT or expression of opinion or any other molter herein Contained IS, or 1510 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe solle.totlon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The matter 15 presented merely for Ihe convemence of the subSCriber Whde we believe the SQ1,HCeS of our mformo tlon 10 be reliable, we jI'J 1)0 way reprc5cnl or guarantee Ihe accuracy Thereof nor of the s\olemenls mude hercln Any action 10 be token by the subSCriber shOuld be bosed on hiS own investigation and InformaTion Janney MonTgomery ScalI, Inc, 0 0 corporation, ond ,Is officers or employees. may now hove, or may IOler fake. pOSitions or trades In respect to any SeCUritIes mentioned In thiS or ony future IHue, ond such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter c..-prcssed In thiS or any other lSue Janney Montgomcry Scott, InCh' which IS registered With, 'h'h SEC ,os on Investment adVisor, may glvedodhlce to Its In,',bm, '0' Od,.'ql,',Y, ond othel customers Independently of any llolements mode In t IS or In any Olhc( Issue urI er In ormation on ony secuflly menllone erem IS ova a e n …

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE — -.- – June 4, 1982 Readers of this letter will note that a certain optimistic tone has been creeping in to some of its pronouncements. a tone which may not have been —-1.incldeh('Wr!'!,t neiidnphon of-th,S''nfOrep'Osifi'V'eStance, present. fIle- siOCl smaayr.JsHixome goannt-htOsinoaveg-ao.u;;e;A;;l-m;';o;ss;t;ocuo— …. east, and has duly moved from a closing high of 869.20 on the Dow in early May to a low under 815 this week. Despite the recent desultory action, our perception remruns that the stock market now finds itself in a better technICal posItion than was the case, for example, last September. We are not attempting here to indulge in an exercise in masochism, and we are fully aware of the highly dIS- quieting nature of the market's short-term behavior. Indeed. it is demonstrating at the moment what is, traditionally. the worst sort of technICal action — declIning on sharply reduced volume. It is most assuredly not our intention to forecast an immedIate cessation of this decline. The ques- tion is how one should treat the prospect of lower stock prices, and it is our feeling that, more than at any time in the past nine months, it should be regarded as presenting a potential buying opportumty. -. Our perception is that, overall, the market now finds itself In the process of a base forma- tion with rotating group leadership. The nature of thIS process can be, at least partially, described by the chart below, which shows the S & P 500 and what we call our Group ExpanSIon Index. GROUP EXPANSION INDEX , — , L- The index is calculated by taking, for each of llll S & P industrial groups, the difference betweenits current price and its 52-week lowandexpressingthis as a'percentage,of its 52-week range. For each group, then, we have a figure between 0 and 100. The average is the Group Ex- pansion Index. Like a breadth index! it is useful at tops tending, as the chart shows, for example, in 1979-80 and 1980-81, to lead declines in the market. The Expansion Index, also, we, think, gives a true picture of what has been taking place since last September. It will be noted that its trend SInce last September has been essentially flat, and its performance has been at least marginally better than that of major stock -market indicators. Its lows in September and March were almost equal, and it moved to a new high around the December figure in early May, despite the fact that the averages did not approach this level. It currently remains well above its March low, while the Dow and the S & P are fairly close to new bottoms. Examination of the components also shows that fewer groups are in the lowest decile of their 52-week range than was the case either in March or September. We think. in other words. that the expansion index suggests our concept of an ongOing base formation, and that the prospect of near-term lower prices should be viewed in the context of this process. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 811. 93 S & P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 111.11 – ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (6/3/82) 1101. 61 No statement or expreulon of opmlOn or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be. dlredly or Indirectly, on offer or the !Oltcltollor of on offer to buy or sell any seCUfily referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for Ihe convenumCf of Ihe subscriber While we believe the sources of our mforma- flO to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stalefT'ents mude herein Any adlon 10 be laken by Ihe subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, ,,sltlons or trades In respect to any securities menltoned In thiS or any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In ' t or any olher Issue Janney Monlgomery Scott. Inc, whICh IS registered Wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its mvestmenl adVisory and otner C\J3'flIers Independently of any stotements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further lI'Iformatlon on any seoJrlty mentioned herein IS aycliloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OBS40 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANOE It is perhaps appropriate at this stage, with the Dow between 795 and 800 (as we write this on Thursday around 3 p. m.), to deliver a short lecture on elementary technical analysis. That statement, on reflection, is a bit presumptuous since, as its practitioners are fond of pointing out, such analysis is, largely, an art rather than a science, and we, therefore, have no right to constitute ourselves as the definitive word on the subject. What we will discuss, then, is technical analysis as it is practiced in this quarter. One of the subjects with which technical work concerns itself is that of breakouts, and we, indeed, spend a good deal of time tracking these phenomena. Currently, the Dow is (again, at this writing) flirting with breaking its March 8 closing low of 795.47, having closed on Wednesday exactly .10 points above that figure. This breakout, if it takes place, will be widely heralded as constituting something decisive. The resultant puffery will be approximately akin to the flap which has occurred in recent days about the breaking of the 800 support level, 800 being a figure whose entire technical significance consists of the fact that it ends in two zeros. It is similarly safe to predict that the next time the Dow gets to 1000 for the umpteenth time, and of course it, some day, will, there will emerge an even greater hoo-hah, since 1000 ends in three zeros. Such are the wonders of financial commentary. What, then, is really going on here As we all know, the stock market, as measured by most averages, has essentially held in a trading range which now goes all the way back to last September. The high for that range was achieved in December of last year at 892.69 and until 1—t-t-hia–Mal'ch-it6-low-haefined.-by4e…geptember-25closin;;figuIe of 824–01'Back-thi-o—-II—I Spring, we experienced a similar downside breakout which brought the Dow to the March 8 low mentioned above, thirty whole points below its September figure, all accompanied by the same predictions of the end of the world which will undoubtedly emerge if we now break below 795. Our own view of the limitations of technical analysis and indeed any other sort of analysis, is that those limitations prevent us from being so confident to offer a prediction as to precisely what number will be reached on the downside or on what day the averages will reverse themselves and turn upward, either on a short, intermediate, or long-term basis. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that market averages (and this criticism applies to the whole repertory, not just one single average) have, in recent years, become less and less useful as a frame of reference for describing the investment environment. As recently as 1976-1978, the averages managed to stage a totally conventional bear market in which a major subset of stocks totally failed to participate. Indeed, this subset, consisting largely of speculative issues which, history told us, shouHl have been bear-market leaders, actually moved up — directly counter to the prevailing downtrend. Recent diversity has been slightly less distinctive, but we have, nonetheless, since last Fall, witnessed a market climate in which individual stocks have posted major upside breakouts during period when overall action was just about as dull as conceivably could be imagined. Without getting tied down, then, to a short-range prediction, we think it is possible to make a couple of statements. First of all, we think that the low for the bear market which began in November, 1980 – April, 1981 is relatively near at hand, should be scored no later than this Fall and very possibly much earlier, conceivably this month. Secondly, we do not think that that low, especially in, tlIl! of sensibly .managod Jnestment. portfolios, is like!y t-2e Sb.tantively different from pnce levels currently prevruling. What IS, of course, absent IS any eVIdence of an imminent reversal, and here, again, uncertainty rears its ugly head, as we are aware of no way of telling in advance just when such evidence will present itself. We will thus confine ourselves to the two statements above which suggest that today's price level, when, sometime in the future. it is viewed in retrospect. will prove to have been a relatively attractive one. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 809.55 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 110.98 Cumulative Index (6/10/82 1075.48 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or expression of opinion or any other molter hercm contamed IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be. directly or indirectly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any sCC\lrlty referred 10 Of mentioned The mall!!r IS presenled merely for the convenienCE of the subcrlber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Inve5llgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trodes In respect to any securities menlloned In thiS or any future luue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on IIlvestmenl adVisor, may give adv,ce to Its Inveslment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode III thiS or In any other U5ue Further mformatlon on any security menhaned herein IS available all request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY OBS40 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE – . . . .J.llnrJ8…..1982…..,…-.- I , We speculated 'last week on the possible furor 'which might emerge were-theDow to post a new low below that of March 8. On Thursday the event duly occurred, with a close of 791. 48, some four points below the March figure, being recorded. As we noted a week ago, we doubt that this event possesses transcendent significance, but, paradoxically, it does make the task of the market technician somewhat easier. We can now date the 1981-1982 bear market as having extended at least through June 17, and we can begin to watch for those events which should normally accompany the posting of a major low. Such lows have, in the past, bee,n accompanied by the registration of what may be called an extreme oversold condition, Numerous measurements may identify the existence of such a condition, and the table below shows the extreme values reached by four of these measurements during ten test periods in the past. These test periods include every major cycle low since 1946. Each is three months long, ending ten days following the recording of the cycle low. For each indicator the actual date on which the extreme value was reached is given. The four indicators chosen are as follows 1. The lO-Day Advance-Decline Oscillator, This is simply a 10-day total of the difference between advancing and declining stocks. In the table, previous values are adjusted to make them comparable to the number of issues traded today. 2, The lO-Day Percentage Change Oscillator, This is a simple measurement of the percentage move over a ten-day period lor the Dow. 3, The 25-Day Volume Ratio This indicator measures the ratio of volume on a given day to a 25-day moving average. Most oversold periods tend to feature at least one extreme high-volume day. 4. The 10-Day Avrg of CloslnK. Fires for Short-Term Tradin Index This is the well- Sta rt End rate VallJe late Valtje Date Value Date Value JUL 9 46 MAR 13 49 JUN 14 53 JUL 22 57 MAR 26 62 JUL 7 66 FEB 26 70 SEP 6 74 NOV 28 77 MAR 17 82 OCT 9 46 JUN 13 49 SEP 14 53 OCT 22 57 JUN 26 62 OCT 7 66 MAY 26 70 DEC 6 74 FEB 28 78 JUN 17 82 REP 10 40 JUN 6 49 AUG 31 53 OCT 21 57 MAY 29 62 AUG 29 66 MAY 26 70 SEP 16 74 JAN 16 78 JUN 9 82 -6613 -5135 -5841 -5777 -7202 -8211 -7321 -4494 -4477 -3907 SEP 10 46 JUN 13 49 AUG 31 53 OCT 22 57 MAY 28 62 AUG 29 66 MAY 26 70 OCT 4 74 JAN 16 78 JUN 9 82 -15.07 SEP 4 46 -5.79 MAR 29 49 -5.02 SEP 15 53 -6.83 OCT 11 57 -10.72 MAY 29 62 -8.12 AUG 30 66 -10.42 MAR 25 70 -12.85 OCT 10 74 -7.15 MAR 10 78 -4.67' JUN 11 82 3.19 2.46 2.25 2.08 3.19 1.65 1.63 1.78 1.37 lo38 OCT 11 66 MAY 5 70 OCT 3 74 JAN 16 78 MAY 28 82 161 171 176 131 139 The figures speak for themselves without the necessity for a good deal of comment. In almost all cases, the extreme values for the four measurements recorded so far have failed to approach those values typically associated with major lows in the past. Even relatively soft bottoms, 1978 and 1949 are typical examples, have tended to produce somewhat more deeply oversold conditions than the present market has registered to date. Indeed, the low posted last September, one which has now been exceeded by a moderately significant amount, produced more deeply depressed conditions than have been scored in the present instance, On the other hand, we are not that far away from registering those values which one – would-normally associate' with a bear'marKet's end, -As we'have stated in the past, 'we feel it would be more bullish for a deeply oversold condition typified by the sorts of measurements shown in the table to appear sooner rather than later. The appearance of such conditions in the next few weeks might suggest the possibility of a low's being posted now rather than deferred until, possibly, in the Fall. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 788. 8i ' S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 107.29 Cumulative Index (6/17/82) 1086.12 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No slolement or expression of opInIon (lr any other matter hereIn contOlned IS, or I to be deemed to be, directly or IndIrectly, on offer or the solICItatIon of on offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter tS presented merely for the conventence af the subscrtber Whtle we belteve the sources of our Informahan 10 be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements rflLde herein Any octton to be tolren by Ihe subscrtber should be based on his aNn mvestigallon and Information Janney Montgomery Scolt, tnc , OS a corporaHon, and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, pOSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentIoned In thIS or any future ISSUe, and such pOSItIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other tSSUe Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whtch tS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may give advtce to us tnvestment odvlsory and olhet customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or to ony other Issue Further infOrmation on ony securtly menttoned herem '5 aVailable on request .;;;

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANQE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANQE -4 – June 25. 1982 There are many sorts of measurements which can be used to identify a sold-outll market – – one which. after a decline. finds itself in a long-term buymg range. Technicians tend to focus on those conditions which generally manifest themselves at times when the stock-market world seems to be ……..lng-abOii't-;'lis7't7-e.-.-theltihd..,ofsellinificlimaxpnenomenon- wliose aBsence we haveoeen n-otirtg'lh tclollliaSps-'—–I–t space for some SlX months, most recently last week. There is. however, another means by which an oversold market can be measured. It can be defined as a market which, although it may not be falling resoundingly. simply refuses to go up over an extended period of time. By this standard the present market eminently qualifIes. It posted a low in September, 1981, at a figure not too different from today's levels. and ever smce. with the exceptIon of two abortive rallies peaking m December and May. it has stubbornly refused to move up at all. Can we quantIfy this The sImplest way is to translate the Dow's daily close into a percentile of its range for some period — say the classic 200 days. This is done on the chart below. in which the shaded areas below the line represent periods when the Dow was in the bottom 45 of its 200-day range, while the areas above the line show periods when it was in the upper 55 of that range. 15 LEVEL WITHIN 200 DRY RRNGE There' have been only, ten instances since 1946. numbered, on the chart -below …. when the Dow' per- . centile remained below the 45 figure for a protracted period — a protracted period in this case being defined as 100 trading days or longer. Nine of these periods correspond with the nme major-cycle low points recorded since 1946. (The exception admittedly is the 1973 bear-market rally.) We currently find ourselves in the 11th such period in the past 40 years and it is, interestingly enough, the third longest on record. The Dow percentile first broke below 45 on July 2. 1981 and has not been above it since. remaining there for 249 trading days. Two past periods are longer — June 1969-August 1970 (305 days) and March 1977-April 1978 (278 days). However. it should be noted that. once we were 249 days into each of these periods, the market was. in both cases. past its low. By definition, of course. it was well past its low in all of the other, shorter instances. Now it must be emphasized that measurements of this type tend to identify rather than predict. Unlike the classic selling climax measurements referred to above, they tend to identIfy general areas from which the market has rallied in the past, rather than pinpointing specific turning points which suggest that an effective low has been posted. There IS. in other words. in this analysis nothing to suggest a specific bottom or the imminence of a rally. It nonetheless appears obvious that the market's refusal to rise significantly over the past year is a unique phenomenon. and that phenomenon has been umformly characteristic of major-cycle lows in the past. ANTHONY W. TABELL AW'I' .P. Dill. AFE'oI,….j;TA.iIlI.lIl'I.;JI.——– No slalement or ex.preulon of opinion or ony other mailer herem conillned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or indirectly, on offer or the solicltollon of on offer DoWVJuneBorI\11d.U'Btrrratgec(t;OO'rp.'mt. yhe80te65, presented merely for the conven,enc of Ihe subscriber Whde -He believe Ihe wurces of our Informa- sioIOa!' dtr9o.nb\p..H,t,.!lLnwM!',t\oegtlIn,dqlQlO)wUniJ'l,.I',rdl-r'rfelJn'rtT.ltolornguJoornannte't'.1i'',,6,',inJ'c..IumrearcyySCthaelir,eoIfn nor c, of 0 the statements 0 corporation, m..,de and Its herein Any officers or action to be laken by the subSCrIber should be employees, may now have, or may later lake, OUtt\ulativedqsnlfeJe(ta124v8gfllles menTlonEill 811l166- any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter ex.pressed In L-cttuilsltoomr earsnyInodlehpeernIdsesunetlyJoanf noenyy MstoantelgmoemnetsrymSacdoett,InInthciS, wortllcmh aISnyreogtihseterreISdsuWe ithFutrhteheSrECinfaosrmaantIOInnveosntmaennyt asdeVciusrolrl,ymmaeynlgliovnecdadhVeirceein'aISItsavInavIleasbtmleenotnadrVeqisuoeryt and othel

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE –..,,…..-,….,.. ,.,.-.,.,I——-,…..– -.July2;-lJ——,——-'I-, .. ' .. i A distinction which investors often fail to make is the one between forecattng and the formulation of investmellt policy. The former is an art onto itself, involving many possible disciplines, technical, economic, and fundamental. The latter 18 derlvative. It consists of using forecasts, along WIth other tools, to approach, as closely as possible, a desired invest- ment result. As market technicans, we find ourselves, perforce, in the forecasting dodge. We have, in the course of that career, issued a number of forecasts, whose ultimate outcomes have ranged from being correct — to an extent amazing even to us — to being gloriously, spectacularly, and totally wrong. When contemplating the latter category, we have been known to console ourselves by turning to that page of the Official Baseball Encyclopedia which tells us that Babe Ruth for many years held the major-league record for career strikeouts. One of the things we have always tried to do in the process of forecasting is to suggest, along with each forecast, a relative degree of certainty. The word relative deserves emphasis since, in this trade, the certamty of any forecast is invariably a considerable order of magnitude below 100. We are perfectly willing to admit that this degree of cert'ainty often falls sufficiently low to make an opinion vulnerable to accusations of hedging. The relative veniality of this sin in comparison to the strikeout is a matter best left to the reader's opinion. All of which brings us to a discussion of the formulation of investment policy as we enter the second half of 1982. It is a period in which the market has declined sufficiently to make I–'-'–s,aoef,ec..tQe statem'lnt thatH!8119.81lwill,.be…known,–histor.ically-. as a beap – markeL . 0 1' the -pasl,t—lF-. three quarters that bear market has posted three recognizable lows, in terms of the Dow, 824.01 on September 25, 795.47 on March 8, and 788.62 on June 18. It remains, of course, a possibility that the last one will, historically, come to be known as the bear- market low. It also, obviously, remains possible that one or more lower lows will be scored before the whole dreary process is over. On this subject, we resolutely refuse to issue a forecast since, in our view, the degree of certainty would be so low as to approach being nil. Now in line with the distinction discussed above, even the foregoing statement could constitute an investment-policy tool. Since the level of the ultimate low is uncertain, it may be argued, Why not simply remain invested in cash equivalents, which are currently providing record real rates of return In answer to this argument, a number of other quaSi-forecasts must be trotted out. One of these' is that we do not forecast disaster. There are those commentators who, re- calling that Ruth is remembered for home runs while his strikeouts are forgotten, tend toward a compulsion to swing for the fences. Currently, most of the brothers of this lodge are com- peting to see who can cite the lowest downside objective for the Dow. By contrast, our own analysis of individual stock patterns suggests that the risk of common-stock ownership at the moment is relatively low, and certainly unlikely to be greater than the risk normally attendant upon such ownership. Secondly, as we have repeatedly suggested, we think the current market cycle relatively mature, so that any low posted is likely to be scored soon — in our own view well before the end of 1982. Finally, as we attempted to suggest last week, on a — —long-term basis the market's internal – —- technical -.- co..ndi-tion is one of being —- rather deeply oversold. Given the above facts, it is only necessary to combine them with the demonstrable fact that the most generous returns afforded by equities are those which are earned shortly after major-cycle upside turning points. This, in our view, argues persuasively in favor of an investment policy increasingly tilted toward common stocks. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 796.52 S & P Composite (1200 p.m. 107.73 Cumulative Index (7/1/82 1078.27 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreulon of opinion or any other matter here,n contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sollc.lollon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motter 15 presented merely for Ihe convenience of the subSCriber Whde He believe the sourct's of our Informa han 10 be rehable, we In no way represeflt or guarantee the accurocy Inurea! nor of the &lolemenl5 mude herem Any cctlon to be token by the subscriber hould be bosed on hiS own IIweshgotlon and Informanan Janney Montgomery Scott, nc, as ( corporation, ond liS orflcers or employees, may now /love, or may later fake, poSitions or trodes In respect to any securities mentioned In thl or any future Issue, and such pOSition moy be different from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Iue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh 1 regIstered with the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVICe to Its Investment adVIsory and othel customers Independently of any statemenls mode 11'1 thIS or In any other Issue further InformatIon on any security mentIoned herem IS available on request

IrArBlIELL'S &IRlc(IEIr L I E T T ( E IRl 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIV'SION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – … rHose';'WiiOliavif6een IoIIowing our tecn-niCal comments onJuthlye a9c. flo1n,;o9!t!-8th2;e.stOckm,'a!r'RSet-'nCav-e-,–,,-….-,-, we hope, been able to infer our belief that its behavior is, at least, unusual and to some extent unpre- cedented. What we have had. for some nine months now. is a stock market which, while it has stubborn- ly refused to go uP. has not. on the whole. declined all that much. This behavior tends to produce a certain disorientation on the part of those of us who have observed the stock-market scene for the past three decades. We are accustomed to markets which. with at least some degree of directness. proceed to wherever they are going and then, rather quickly. reverse course and. correcting the excesses of the prior swing, move in the opposite direction. This. of course, is totally non-descriptive of the market's behavior since last September. Another unprecedented factor on the financial scene has been the current level of interest rates. Fixed-income returns in the vicinity of 15 — a rate, be it remembered, at which money doubles every five years — are totally outsIde the realm of experience of anyone currently in the securities business. Since we are currently experiencing two items essentially without precedent, there has existed' a tendency to link them together — witness Thursday's market in which a sharp rally in the bull market stimulated a like reversal in stocks. This linkage has led to three pieces of conventional wisdom regarding interest rates and the stock market which may be summarized as follows 1. There exists a so-called real interest rate. supposedly relatively stable. which can be computed by subtracting from nominal rates something called inflationary expecta- tions for which past inflation is often used as a proxy. With inflation, at least over the past nine months, slgnificantly below previous experience, this theoretical real interest rate is now approaching record levels. It is thus concluded that either inflation at the 1970's rate will reemerge or that interest rates will shortly decline. 2. The pernicious effect of high interest rates, especially on such economic sectors as the housing market is well known, and recovery from the present recession is, t-1I-!..th;;er;e;or;e;, impossible until rates come down. This js a view that has been repeatedIY'- expressed -iilOl'fiClRl Washmgton CIrcles. 3. Stock market recovery is impossible until such time as interest rates, which provide competition for potential equity money, move Significantly lower. Our view is that all of the above three pieces of conventional wisdom are demonstrably false. The real-interest-rate theory is one beloved by economists, who, for some 50 years, have es- poused it based on a priori reasoning that this is the way interest rates should behave. It has recently been reenforced by the a posteriori fact that. for the past 25 years or so. this is how they have. in fact. behaved. Over that quarter-century. both interest rates and inflation have been rising. but the lesson. taught in Statistics I. that correlation does not imply causation has apparently been lost. When one examines the relationship of interest rates and inflation from the Declaration of Independence to the mid-1950's the correlation vanishes into thin air. The real interest rate has in fact varied widely. and it is quite possible to find protracted periods during which it remained. for much of the time. not all that different from levels currently prevailing. As far as the necessity of lower interest rates as a precondition for economic recovery is con- cerned. this also tends to vanish in the light of historical reality. There exist numerous periods on record when vigorous economic expansion has gone on totally Oblivious to high interest rates. What high rat es do accomplish is to shift benefits from one group of beneficiaries to another. It is hard to argue that savers (not a miniscule group considering the 200 billion in money funds) are being destroyed by high interest rates. Borrowers, particularly recent mortgage borrowers, or those overextended, i.e., Braniff, are, quite obviously, hurt. However, it is hard to argue that a home, in addition to providing shelter. should simulataneously provide instantaneous riches. and the penalties for improvidence in a free market have always been, and probably should be, harsh. As far as the third conclusion is concerned. it is again demonstrable that high real rates of inter- est have existed concurrently with some of the largest bull markets of the past 200 years. Analysts who correlate interest rates with the stock market have a tendecy to view both stocks-.and senior securities – IL as similar financial instruments, -both purchased with an eye toward financial return properly adjusted for risk. This is, at best, an inadequate explanation of what motivates investors to buy common stocks. This. however. is sufficiently complex to be the subject of another letter. What is, in our view, unsustainable over the next ten years is the continuance of a 1970's rate of inflation. This is something that the record tells us has never occurred and which current political auguries suggest that the American people quite simply will not put- up with. Periods of relative price stability following long rises in prices in the past. have been regularly accompanied by relatively high real interest rates. suggesting that those who are forecasting Significantly lower rates at any time during the near future may well be misled. What such periods do tend to produce is sharply rising stock prices. The impossible combination, i.e., a rising stock market accompanied by continuing high interest rates, is something that historical analysis with a sufficiently long perspective tells us is not only a possibility' but a probability. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 808.89 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 108.20 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL Cumulative Index (7.8.82) 1070.63 No statement or e)(preUlon of opInion or any other moiler herein conTained Is, or IS 10 be deemed TO be, directly or mdlrectly, an offer or The SOIICITat,,,;- f an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The molter IS preented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While -Ne believe the sources of our formahan to be reliable. we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of ,Ihe statements mude herein Any octlon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlon and Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporaTion, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pOltlons or trades 1M respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from ony views now or hereafter e)(pressed In thiS or any other 1Ue, Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on investment advisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode rn thiS or In any other Issue Funher Informtlon on ony securoty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAO, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 16, 1982 It may be nothing more than the summer rally, a seasonal phenomenon which cannot have -gone unremarked-by….egu!ur read1lr1POf 'thiB'-leHer7but-heock-maI'ket-celebrated..,the-4th -OfJ uly – -.— or at least the post Independence Day period — by- ijutting on its'own '-fir'eworks -display. If the display was somewhat less than spectacular than those of us with long memories recall and would like to have seen, it was at least somewhat better than the continuous fizzle which characterized the first half of 1982. Anyone who tri'3s to read the classic signs of a take-off rally into the last couple of weeks action is. it must be said, wearing glasses of a definite roseate hue. The 1118 advances chalked up on July 9 and the 1061 rising stocks of June 12 fall far short of the sort of breadth statistics needed to get the juices really flowing. Likewise, although July 12 provided the third highest first hour on record, its final total of just under 75 million shares was still only 1. 4 times what volume had been averaging for the past 25 days. The parameters for this statistic, it will be recalled, are that 1. 5 is a mildly encouraging level, and something over 2.0 is required to produce wild excitement. Nonetheless, after reaching its last low of 795.57 on June 9, the Dow was up some 30 points from what can be considered a successful test of that low at 796.99 on the Friday prior to the 4th-ofJuly Holiday. It is true that the stock market exhibits repetitive behavior patterns, and, indeed, if this were not so, we technicians would have to find respectable employment. Nonetheless, subtle new differences do emerge over time, and we are getting to be at least receptive to the idea that some such differences may be emerging in 1981-1982. It is, for example, quite easy to identify the culprit which caused the admittedly-crummy breadth action, as the market turned On heavy volume at the end of last week and the beginning of this. That culprit was the Oil group, abetted, to a lesser extent, by other natural resource stocks. On the day the market staged its dramatic intraday turn, most domestic oils wourd up posting multi-point declines. This should not have been too -surprising ince-uils-have-been-mildly-out-of-gear-wiHlt-oo-arl,et fep 'almest–twe..s.-In-gener—-I ai, most issues topped in November, 1980 well before the Dow's peak in April, 1981. They were the downside leaders in the 1981-82 bear market, obscuring at least mildly respectable performances by fairly large groups of other issues. In a way this fact is not even new. Rigorous academic studies have proved oils, as a group, tend to display relatively low covariance with the rest of the market and have done so over a multi-decade period. The disparity, however, appears especially noticable in the past couple of years. Meanwhile, if the market is failing to display the classic signs of an irrational-panic, oversold condition followed by a takeoff rebound that we, and many other technicians, are hoping for, it continues, at the very least, to set new records for remaining oversold for a protracted period of time. We noted in this space two weeks ago the fact that the Dow has remained in the lower portion of its 200-day range for near record lengths of time. Another measure of the market's extended oversold condition can be found in the statistics on new highs and new lows. Back in early October, 1981 706 issues posted new 52-week lows, a number constituting just over 33 of all issues traded. The low of March saw 451 new weekly lows and June's figure was 349. This week will constitute the 40th consecutive week in which weekly new lows as a percentage of issues traded refused to post a new peak. Now this is, of course, a common happening when the market is advancing. However, it is fairly rare during bear-market periods, which can be defined, using high-low statistics, as periods where new highs never reach more than 10 percent of all issues traded. The latter has also been true since last October. It is the longest consecutive period that both conditions have remained true in the past 40 years. It is, in fact, only the seventh occurrence since 1942 where the condition has persisted for 30 weeks or longer. Of the 'previous ones -it 'should be 'noted -that -five 'were -associated' with major bear-market bottoms, 1942, 1946, 1953, 1962, and 1970. The other occurred following the Halloween Massacre of 1978, a unique phenomenon which, while intermediate-term, possessed many of the qualities of a bear market. There is, in summary, going to be no pronouncement from this quarter that the market has achieved its ultimate low. It mayor may not have done so. It seems to us, however, that the preconditions for such an event are indeed present, and it is likely that overly scrupulous attempts at pinpoint timing will, at this stage, be a somewhat unrewarding exercise. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL DOW-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 826.10 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 110.31 Cumulative Index (7/15/82) 1091.72 No stolement or expression of opinion or any other moiler herCln contolned 15, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe sol,e.lot,r' Of on offer to buy or 5ell any secunty referrl!'d to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for The convenience of Ihe subscriber While '0 believe the sources of our Informahon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuraty thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any octlon to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informatron Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later Toke, P051trons or trades In respect to any securrtles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSitron may be different from any VIIlWS now or hereafter expressed In ThiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which 15 registered With the SEC as an Inestment advisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS ovorlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATe ROAD, PRiNCETON. NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl(. STOCK EXCHANGe, INC. '-'EMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANQE – I.,…….. –…,.L-'.,….; The' month ofiily lias featured7notlier 'One -o'f'tlfose-rounJdu-ltyrip3s0-,whi1c9h82have-been.uf-l.,Uf.'tratinll;.–lr investors for the better part of the past year. In terms of the Dow Jones Industrial A'verage aftr testing the bear-market low (788.62 on June 18) at a level of 796.99 on July 2, the market, ';'as able to stage a modestly respectable rally reaching a closing peak of 833.43 on July 20. Since that time, in six consecutive trading sessions of losses, just about the entire gain has been given up with the average having reached an intra-day low of 801. 46 on Thursday. This action is, in our view, moderately disturbing for the short term but not necessarily all that important insofar as our longer term view of the market is concerned. That view can be re- stated quite simply. It is and has been that we expect a major cyclical low to be posted sometime prior to the end of 1982, probably no later than early this Fall. There have been three major attempts so far to score such a low in September, 1981, March, 1982, and June, 1982. All three of these attempts were, at roughly the same level, just under 800. We do not look for any future low to penetrate significantly below that level, although such a low could well be modestly lower. Our view of the September-to-date process, then, is that it constitutes a base formation — not a pre- lude to disaster. At the same time it must be noted that at no time since last September has the market present- ed any evidence of scoring a terminal bottom nor has it demonstrated any worthwhile rallying tend- ency. As noted above, the aborted July advance is simply another one of a series of failures on the part of the market to demonstrate any sort of significant upside breadth or vigor. Indeed, the latest burnout can conceivably be viewed as an indication that the final downward probe in the on- going base-formation process may be delayed until September or October. This pn.ihHit,, is underscored by the fact that the reversal occurred in July, traditionally a We have noted in the pa that, of the 12 calendar months, onl Sept- ember and December appear to have highl. ;, ne . ''' latter upward. The tendency toward a rally during the Summer is, however, at least, moderately pronounced. Of 56 Julys since 1926, the market, as measured by the Dow, hfs advanced in 36 and declined in 20. The average change for the 56 Julys has been 1.88 which is the largest average change for any of the 12 months. The month's past history of showing an advance 64 of the time is second only to the record of December. It is also possible, unfortunately, to draw some tentative conclusions from the failure of the expected July rally to materialize in 1982. A good July has, in the past, tended to be a fairly decent harbinger of things to come. There have, for example, been 15 cases since 1926 when July showed an advance of 5 or greater. In 12 of the 15 years that such was the case, the Dow subse- quently posted an advance from the July close through the December close. Indeed, in only one case, 1937, did a strong July rally lead to a significantly weaker market. In that year a 9.62 advance in July was followed by a 35 collapse over the rest of the year. With that exception, the worst subsequent performance was a decline of just over 6. The average change in the Dow for the final five months of those 15 has been 4.35, three times as great as the 1. 63 average for all five-month periodS starting in August, 1926. On the other hand, a July failure such as the one we have, this year, experienced, tends to augur considerably less well as far as the rest of the year is concerned. There have been 26 years in the past 56 where the July advance was 2 or less or where July posted a decline. Subsequent five-month action shows an only slightly-better-than-even record, the market having advanced in these cases 14 times and declined 12 times. This is a fairly disappointing performance conSidering the fact that, overall, the market has shown 35 advances and 21 declines over the final five months anof the .year. The average performance for the 21 five-month periods following a weak July has been a miniscule advance of 08 versus average advance for-56 years'Of1736;- – – ,– – – – Another way of looking at the same numbers above is to say that, of 21 instances where the market declined between the end of July and the end of December in the past 56 years, only three, or 14, were proceeded by a July advance of 5 or greater, while 12, or 57, were preceded by a weak advance, such as the one that occurred this year. Now, as we noted above, we are not here forecasting significantly lower levels. As we have been suggesting, cycle theory strongly suggests that, even if the December close is lower than today's, the market, at that stage, will already have bottomed. It is difficult, however, to view July's action as being other than disappointing in a near-term sense. AWT rs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S II P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (7/29/82) 813.17 107.63 1076.61 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No staTemenT or expressIon of opinion or any other malter here'n contOlned IS, or 15 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indlrlc'ly, on offer or the SOI'C,lollon of on offer 10 buy or seH ony security referred 10 or metltloned The moiler 1 presented merely for Ihe convenience of the subSCriber WhIle we believe Ihe sources of our .tlformolion 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action 10 be loen by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own rnvestlgohon and rnformot,on Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and ,Is offIcers or tmployees, may now hove, or may laler loke, pos1tlon or Ifode In respllct loony seeu(l!l(!S menlloned In In,s or any future Issue, ond such position moy be different from ony ….,ews now or nereolter exprl'ssed In thiS or ony otner Issue Jonney Montgomery Seoll, Inc. , wnlen IS registered wltn the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to lIS Invelment adVisory and othel CUltomer1 mdependenlly of any statements mode In thiS or many otner ISsue Furtner information on ony security mentioned nereln IS ovolloble on request -,

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEFI NEW YORK STOCk; EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHAIliGE August 6, 1982 The headline for the stock market summary in this mornin Wall Street Journal read, Broad ,,.,.. -1lh 10'.. .h .ROO.r.l.in A . ri'neii'is that even-Cbe utltiual, Thursday's activity .'1',,.01de,,s;;e''r' ved.'Itfh-eth-eh,pArllln' 'The Dow Jones Industrial Average indeed moved below the 800 level, having been trading for the past four weeks moderately above it. This event marked the 62nd time in history that the Dow has crossed through 800 in one or the other direction. The string of successive 800-crossings goes back more than 22 years. On February 28, 1964, the average first closed above 800, never having previously traded there. This marked the first of the series of moves back and forth through that level, leading to crossing number 62 on Thursday. If one eliminates those crossings which occurred within a month of each other, it is possible to reduce the actual 62 occasions to 21 cases where the Dow passed through 800 and then remained substantially above or below that figure. For the record, these 21 cases are set out in the table below. The table lists the date of each crossing, its direction, the subsequent high or subsequent low in each case and the number of trading days until the next crossing which remained valid for longer than a month. Direction of Trqcding, Days D-a-te Crossing Subsequent High Subsequent Low Until Next Crossing February 28, 1964 up 995.15 – 626 August 22, 1966 down – 744.32 9J January 5, 1967 up 985.21 – 730 January 9, 1970 down – 631.16 228 December 2, 1970 up 950,82 – 247 November 23, 1971 down – 797. 97 ' —-.2D6.19n -i,uP–105U.JO–.-'r;—-,u December 5, 1973 down – 788.31 11'9 December 6, 1973 up 891. 66 – May 29, 1974 August 20, 1975 January 6, 1978 April 17, 1978 down up down up 1014.79 907.54 577,60 742.12 – 311 601 69 138 October 31, 1978 down – 785,26 37 December 22, 1978 up 897.61 – 221 November 7, 1979 down – 796.67 2 November 9, 1979 up 903.84 – 87 March 17, 1980 down – 759.13 28 April 25. 1980 up 1024.05 – 470 March 8, 1982 down – 745.47 8 March 18, 1982 up 869.20 – 57 The table is not without interest. On only two of ten occasions when the average moved be- low the 800 level, was the subsequent downward move of significant dimensions, these two occasions, of course, being the bear marke1sof 1970 and 1973-4. On the other hand, when it passed through on the upside, the resulting move was generally fairly substantial. The average subsequent low, following a downside move through 800, has been 741. 80, The average high following an upside crossing has been 953.78. Downside moves also were of generally shorter tiuration. The mean length of time which the average has remained below 800 after a downside crossing is 78 trading days. On the other hand, it has remained above 800 after upside transitions for an average of 346 days. It is also interesting to tabulate where the market wound up subsequently after it moved through 800 on the downside in the past. We have examined the record for approximately three months, six months, one year and two-year periods and it is rather interesting. Fo llowing past downside breaks, the Dow wound up above 800 after three months seven times out of ten; six months later it was above 800 seven times of nine, eight times of nine a year later, and in all cases it-was above 800 two years later. The average price was 827 three months following a downside break, 818 six months later, 860 a year later and 888 two years later. Now none of this does anything more than suggest the obvious fact that 800 represents a level near the bottom of a trading range which has contained the Dow for some time. Nonetheless, it dres tend to put the recent downward move in perspective, and suggests that it is hardly a unique historical event. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 796.99 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 105.12 Cumulative Index (8/5/82) 1065.43 No lclement or expreUlon of opinion or any other molter herein contOlned 15, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sollcllC'l,on of on offer 10 buy or sell ony seC\.lflly referred 10 or menhoned The motter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscriber While loll! believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be relloble, we In no way represent or guorantee Ihe occurocy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any ocllon to be token by the subscnber should be bosed on hiS own Inve1190110n and Informotlon Janney Montgomery Sc;ott, Inc, as 0 corporotlon, and 11 offlc.ers or employees, may now hove, or may laler lake. pOSitIOns or trodes In resped to ony securities mentioned In Ihl5 or any future rssue, and such posrtron may be drfferent from any vrews now or hereofter expreHed m ttllS or any other rS'ue Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc. whIch I' regrstered With the SEC 05 on rnvestment odvrsor, may grve adVIce to It! mvestment advrsory and other customers mdependently of crny stcrtements mode rn thiS or rn any other rssue Further rnformatron on any securrty mentroned herem 15 ovollable on request