TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVllilON OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICA.N STOCK EXCHANGe August 13, 1982 The stock market remains in the same dreary bind in which it has found itself now for almost a year. It will be recalled that back on September 25, 1981, the Dow posted what was then a six-month bear-market low at 824.01. That low was followed by a moderately decent rally which continued into December, and held for almost six months until it was finally broken in late February, 1982. However, the new low produced little further action On the downsfde, . and the lowest point reached was 795.47 on March 8. An even less impressive rally followed, and by June the averages were again flirting with new lows. Finally, a close of 788.62 was chalked up on June 18. This third downward thrust was followed by a modest move into the low 830's in July. Now the Dow finds itself skidding to yet a fourth new low, with the lowest figure reached so far being the close of 776.92 on August 12. Thus we have a rather unique ll-month-Iong configuration of four separate lows, with each successive low separated from the previous one by at least a two-month interval. The last of these lows is lower than the first by something less than 6. This pattern, extending over such a protracted period of time, is an event without a great deal of precedent in contemporary stock-market history. The only roughly similar period that comes to mind is the late 1940's prior to the Junc,1949 low. Even in that instance, however, the swings were considerably wider and the rallying phses more dynamic. Since none of the declines in question have produced any follow-through, there has tend- ed to be a complete absence of those sorts of deeply oversold conditions which would suggest an 1–t-imminent–'-mar-k-et–t-uM-w-ln-OIle-4oI!ID.-Or–another J at -various -point S I the market–has ageJl.j;'Qo…,….-… exhibit some of the characteristics of major bear-market bottoms, but I at no time has it managed ……. to display a great number of them in particularly noticeable form. We displayed a chart back last June that suggested the market had remained in the low end of its recent trading range for a length of time comparable to that exhibited at past market lows, and we suggested then that this signified the presence of preconditions for a market reversal, although not necessarily that such a reversal was imminent. This week another statistic began to show numbers which, while not encouraging for the short term, tend to suggest that a low of some importance could be fairly close at hand. The statistic in question is the short-term trading index, a number widely available on quotation equipment, which consists of the ratio of two ratios, the advance-decline ratio divided by the upside-downside volume ratio. High figures tend to suggest a high degree of downside momentum and, when this figure is averaged over 10 days, a level of over 1.5 signifies unusual- ly high intensity. On August 6, this level was exceeded for only the fifth time since 1964. The other four occasions have all been associated with bottoms of some importance, the 1966 low, the 1970 Ibw, the 1974 low, and the Silver Thursday decline in 1980. A caveat should be notediin that, on three of the four previous occasions, the ultimate market low took place significantly later and at noticably lower levels than that which existed the first day the index moved above 1. 5. It occurred, for example, on September 7, 1966 and the final Dow low was a month later and 33 points lower. Likewise, the first occurrence in 1970 was on May 4 at 714 on the Dow, prior to a final low of 631 on May 26. In 1974 the first occurrence was on September 30, a week before and 23 points higher than the October low, which was later tested in December. Only in 1980 was the first occurrence of the 1. 5 reading at around the same timeasthe-ult-imate bottom. – – — '. — Based on these figures lower prices over the next month would not be t,,rribly surpris- ing. However, short-term-trading-index action would suggest that the culminatIOn of such a process could be a fairly important turning point. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m. ) 781. 49 S & P Composite (12 00 p. m.) 102.93 Cumulative Index (8/12/82) 1038,08 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein conh;lIned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, d,rectly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mollcr '5 presented merely for the convenlenct of the subSCriber While e believe the sources of our ,nformatlon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee thc accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on tliS own InvestigaTion and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, 05 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pOSitiOns or trades In respect to any secufltles mentioned In thIS or any future luue, cnd such position may be different from any VIIWS now or hereafter e)'pressed '1'1 thiS or any other luu!;! Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whuh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers .ndependently of any statements mode ,n Ih.s or In any other .ssue Further Informat'Qn on any secuflty menhoned herc, IS available on request

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEy 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCk E)(CHANGE,INC MEMBER A.MERICA.N STOCK EXCHANGe August 20, 1982 Holderncsc;. New Hampshire ' . rr.Ojre9fltnef1iazll.rdS'With-Which–onelearns'to-comctFterms-aftra-quarter-centq…of,.writin g .abut. -I the stock market is that it is no respecter of sche.duled vacatiohs. 'We' find ourselves' not -t6o-terribly surprised, therefore, to find the hubbub at Broad and Wall Streets this week made a sufficient din to penetrate the serenity of Squam Lake, New Hampshire. Not for the first time, then, we find ourselves taking a few moments of vacation time to produce some commentary on what seems to be going on at home. In one sense, there did exist an elenent of surprise in Tuesday and Wednesdayts eruption, since it . appeared, as of the last week at least, we could not have picked a more appropriate time for a short holiday. F9r the fourth time in a period of just under a year, a tepid rally attempt had fizzled in mid-July and the widely-followed stock market averages had once more drifted to new lows, down by typical bear market dimensions of some 25 from highs scored 16-22 months ago. Unlike other bear markets, however, there had not emerged since the first of the four lows took place last September, any of the frenetic downside action, the same evidence, that might have been expected as a prelude to the upside explosion which took place this week. In this sense, at least, the emergence of the rally precisely in the third week of August, 1982, came as a bolt out of the blue. i It was, on the other hand, overdue. We have been ooring our readers for some six months now try- ,j ing to think of new ways to say in this space that we thought the market oversold. We coupled these observations with the fact that cycle theory strongly called for a bottom of some importance to OCcur at some stage no later than the latter part of 1982. All that was missing throughout this entire period was any sort of climactic evidence. By this point, the.reader.will not..doubLhallegaU.eredthaLwe seethis evidence as having been pro- vided this week. This is, in fact, the case. The most widely-held statistic was the record-setting 38.81 points by which the Dow advanced on Tuesday. It is, of course, obvious to elementary school children that such figures, to have meaning, must be stated in terms of percentages. Even by this standard, the results were impressive. The 4.90 advance was the second best for the post-World-War II period, ex- i,- ceeded only by a better than 5 up move on May 27, 1970. What is more important is that, over the past 35 years, advances, oft1us approxjmate magnitude-have—inv-aPiably…….oeen-associa1ed….with…major…..cy.cleboHoms.I-.J Also required for the reversal evidence J as we have long pointed' out in this space, are 'extraordinary 1 breadth and volume statistics. Both emerged this week. Tuesday's 1564 advancing stocks constituted 1 81 of issues traded. Once again, with a single exception, this advancing percentage has been associated ; with the beginning of important upswings. Concerning volume little needs to be said. 100 million, like one thousand on the Dow, is another one of those round figures that assumes inflated importance based solely on its number of digits. Indeed, it is quite obvious to anyone who has studied trading patterns, that it was only a matter of time that this threshhold would be exceeded. The threshhold was not exceeded. It was shattered, Wednesday's figure being 43 above the former record. More importantly, the figure was well over twice the recent average, the usual litmus test for major reversal volume. All of the above factors remain true, incidentally, despite the wild gyrations and assorted rumors that are welling about as this is written. As we have always done, writing at similar market Junctures in the past, we duly noted the caveats. A phrase we are fond of dragging out at such times is effective bottom It, and we think such an occurrence is likey to have occurred a week ago as evidenced by this week's action. Bottoms have, in the past, however, assumed varying shapes and patterns. In May, 1970, for example, the climactic action of May 26 marked the market's actual low and a minor test attempt in July was all that followed. May, 1962 and October, 1966, however, were followed by full-scale tests both of which involved new lows. It is, therefore, far too early a stage to trumpet confidently that 776.92 on October 12 was the low of the 1981-82 bear market, or even that the majority of stocks have seen their lows. even though this latter, at least, may well be the case. Another mildly contrary factor is that August tends to be a less-than-propitious month for such an occurrence. Indeed, a study of all major cycle bottoms since 1897 shows that in no case has the actual low occurred in August. A final note of warning. Pay no attention to the excuses. The factor widely cited as the reason for the rally was lower interest rates or, more properly, forecasted hwer interest rates. This, of course, – is nonsense;-Themarketwent-up,quite SImply because forsome months now,it hasbeen in a technlcal position to do so. Interest rate forecasts have come and gone throughout that period with little or no effect. With the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, we now know that the oversold condition ,had reached a sufficient extreme this week for forecast of lower rates to have a tinder box effect J This is important. .,1 We think the next major move in the stock market is likely to be upwards, ThIS mayor may not be accompanied by lower-long rates. If the failure of lower rates to materiahze causes skepticism regarding the ongoing stock rally, so much the better. '. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 847.03 S & p Composite (1200 p.m.) 110.31 Cumulative Index (8/19182) 1102.57 ANTHONy W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL .. No statement to buy or sell oarnexsperceussriItoyn of opln!on referred to or tiny other Or menlloned maHer herein The matter !s contained presented 15, or !S to be merely for the deemed to be, convemenCf; of d!rectly or Ind!rectly, the subSCriber WhJJe on He offer or the sollc!tot!On of on offer beJleve the sources of our mforma- t!on to based be on hrleslloowbne,nwvee1Ilng0n1o10w aayndrepInrefosremntato!ornguJaarnanneteye the accuracy thereof nor of Montgomery Scan, Jnc, as the statemenTs a corporation, mude hereIn Any and lis off!.ers or ad!on to be taen by employees, may now the subsct!ber have, or may should be later take, posItIons or Trades In respect to any r.ecurlt!es mentioned In thiS or any future !Sue, and such posItIon may be different frOm any vIews now or hereafter epressed In thIs or any other !Uue Janney Montgomery ScolT, Jnc , whIch !s regIstered wuh the SEC as an Investment advIsor, moy give adllice to .ts Investment advlOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode !n thIs or ,n any other !ssue FUr1her !I'\formol!on on any seo…. !ty mentIOned herem !S available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE The first wrlting Job afforded the author of thIS letter. long before our lnvolvement In the stock market. was writing about sports. At the hme, there were two recognized schools of sportswriting. known as the Gee-Whiz and the I1What-the-Heck schools. The former, origInated by the late Grantland Rice. tended to trent every sporting cantcst as n memorable clash of titans, forever to be engraved on the pages of hlstory. The latter, dominnnt today, tended to recognIZe that children's games did not. most of the time. mean vel'Y much in the overall scheme of things. The two sChools hnve their counterpnrts In stock mflrkct commentary, and most of the time. the cynical view is the approprlllte one. SInce, in the great majority of cases, what the market does OVer short periods is of httle significance. Occasionally, however, there comes a time when the gee-whiz re- act i on IS To uesn. tiareblylnsno.prwoapirti-natncd, – and see the past fortnight must certmnly be one sort of reachon to what has gone on over of those the past instances. two weeks consti- tues the only attitude that is rationally implausible. It is. of course, possible that recent action consh- tuted only some sort of bear-market rally. Such an interpretation, however. 1S totally inconsistent with the most recent 40 years of stock-market history. Unless we have evolved an entIrely new behavlOr pat- tern, it IS possible only to conclude that the 1980-1982 bear market effectively ended two weeks ago. The vigor and perSIstence of the last two weeksT rally not only puts it in the class with the sort of behavior that has occurred only at major bottoms in the past four decades,butindeed surpasses most prior instances. As of ThursdayTs close, the market had advanced over a ten-day perlOd by some 15. The last advance of greater magnitude for the same time-frame occurred in 1938. We have been accustom- ed to USIng 20 moves for the Averages as threshholds for bull and bear markets. We have had three- quarters of such a move jn the past two weeks. There do exist two instances in modern market history which appear roughly comparable to What has recently. The rallies which began on May 26, 1970 and October 4, 1974 were of vigor on a closing , wiped out about half the gam. October, 1974 was followed by a month of sideways action and a later full-scale test of the previous low. In both instances, however, the highs of the initial rally were comfortably exceeded within a matter of months. If we are to accept the premise that a new market cycle has begun, it is not too early to start thinking about some of the parameters. The average length of a cycle, low to low, is around four years with 50 or more of ItS time spent in an advancing phase, making a major top unlikely much before 1984- 85. As to where that top might take place, we find ourselves reluctant at this stage to hazard a guess. Bull markets have been compared to sex. When they are good they are spectacular, and when they are bad they are still pretty good. The last three have tended to fall into the latter category, running out of steam at around the magic barrIer of 1000 on the Dow Jones Industrial Average. They were, none- theless, periods during which above-average returns could be earned on equity investments, and we ex- pect the current case to be little different. The task for the investor at the moment, it seems to us, is to pOSItIon himself for a rise in equity prices. Projection of how great that rise will be is a task to be deferred for further analysis. A few thoughts on the makeup of individual-stock technical patterns, as compared with similar major-cycle bottoms. appear appropriate. There exists, it seems to us, more diversity among patterns than has been the case at most similar turning points in the past, the pOSSIble exception being the most recent upward cycle which began in March, 1978. This has both positive and negative implications. The pOSItive implications arise from the fact that there exists a cadre of potential leaders with sufficiently mature bases to support an immediate advancing phase. This potential leadership exists in those areas WhICh have shown the. most obvious relative strength over the past year, largely in the consumer non- durable and utilIty sectors. We would expect thIS pattern of leadership to continue at least in the initial stages. A second group of stocks, smaller in number than has been the case at past bottoms, are those lssues,.which.find …themselves thoroughly sold .. out but … with no appreciablebase. formations . Other. than tradIng rallies, we would expect little upside action from these issues in the early phase of the advance. Energy stocks are a typical case in point. Finally there exists a third group where further vulnerability still exists, largely confined at this stage to secondary and tertiary issues. Such a pattern (although the stocks were different) existed four years ago, and the result was a bull market moderated in its upside Intensity by severe intermediate-term shocks as the market progressed, i.e., October, 1978, October, 1979, March, 1980. Whether this sort of action will dupI1cate Itself as the current cycle progresses remains to be seen. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 887.75 S & P Composite (12'00 p.m.) 117.49 Cumulatlve Index (8/26/82) 1192.49 No stalement or expression of opinion or any ather maller herem conta.ned .S, or IS TO be dee'Tled to be, d.rectly or .nd.rec1ly, an offer or the SOliCitation of on offer 10 bl.lY Or sell any secl.lflty referred to or menTIoned The motter 1 presented merely for the convenienCE of the sl.IbSC(1ber While oNe beheve the sources of our m/orma tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or gl.lQlontec the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and mformctlon Janney Montgomery SeOll, Inc, as a corporat.on, and Its offICers or employees, moy now hove, or may laTer take, pOSitions Of trades m respect to any seCU(1t'es menltoned Tn thiS or any fultae !Sue, ond such pos.tlon moy be different from ony views now or hereafter eypressed m thl! or any other lSue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investmenl adv.sor, may g.ve adVice to Its .nvestment adVisory and othel customen Independently of any statements made In t I or In any oTher lSue Further mformaT.on on any security mentioned herem IS ovailoble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 3, 1982 L 'h ,'- .f ;,,' ,-th, domoot'oon trom a technical point of view. was that it ;, ,,; ,;'- a-strong likelihood thllt'the '98182 bear market had terminated and a new major upward cycle had begun. In light of recent further strength, it is perhaps worth documenting this assertion. The most dynamic upsIde action during the market's turn was concentrated in the eight-day period ended August 26. In that short space of time. the Dow moved up almost 100 points from its low, for a better-than-12 advance. Advancing stocks for the eight days constituted just under 62 of all issues traded. Average volume for the period was over 109.000.000 shares. representing an increase of 111 over the average volume for the previous eight days. For the time frame 1949 to date. all three figures set, or were close to. recods for any eight-day period. The following table documents the three sta- tistics. eight-day percentage advance. eight-day percentage of advancing stocks and eight-day volume increase. The figures reached a week ago plus the 20 other highest readings in the past are shown for each item. Also shown for the 20 past instances is the percentage change in the Dow six months follow- ing the end of the period in question. DATE ———– AUG !3 198 OCT 15 1974 AF'R 17 1975 JUN 1 1970 JUL 17 1970 JAN 31 1975 uc 'v 0 FEB 3 1975 NOV 2 196 JAN 14 1976 JUN 10 1974 AF'R 24 1978 APR 11 1968 JAN 7 1974 DEC 7 1971 AUG 25 1970 SEF' 26 1973 NOV 20 1980 MAR 7 1975 NOV 15 1955 AF'R 30 1980 DJ!A ; ADVANCE —— 14.66 12.05 10.31 10.16 9.82 9.63 7dO 9.01 8.34 8.6 S.08 7.80 7.73 7.61 7.36 7.30 7.12 7.11 7.08 7.07 7.03 AVERAGE DJ!A 6 MO. LATER —— 23.80 1.93 12.42 14.72 18.16 , 0' 16.17 18.06 8.22 -31.71 2.46 4.96 -9.70 11.31 14.63 . b. 93 -2.36 8.86 1.59 14.04 —— 6.75 DATE ———– JAN 10 1975 AUG 26 1982 JAN 12 1976 JLJL 10 1962 JAN 16 1967 D,C 7 1971 CO , ' v FEB 3 1975 JAN 7 1974 NOV 14 1962 JUN 4 1970 AUG 22 1962 OCT 21 1969 APR 11 1968 AUG 28 1970 OCT 15 1974 JAN 14 1963 p 6 1973 JUL 27 1950 JIJL 17 1970 JUN 15 1967 AVERAGE ;; OF ISSUES ADV'NG —— 62.48 61.96 60.10 59.'38 59.37 58.86 0 7 58.10 57.82 57.77 56.70 56.60 56.57 56.47 55.89 55.79 55.21 55.05 54.83 54.60 54.56 DJ!A 6 MO. LMER —— 32.34 177777 8.75 14.31 5.86 11.31 '16'.'1'7' -9.70 14.89 12.42 10.81 -B.78 4.96 14.76 23.80 4.73 -6.93 16. 9 14.72 -0.10 —— 9.68 DATE ———– AUG 26 1982 JUN 4 1962 JAN 15 1976 APR 11 1968 OCT 25 1962 JUL 3 1950 nH' 0' po JUN 30 1950 SEP 21 1949 AUG 31 1970 FEB 4 1975 APR 25 1978 AUG 25 1971 APR 21 1975 SEF' 1 1970 APR 6 1919 SEP 7 1973 JAN 16 1980 OCT 17 1957 'MAR 30 1949 SEP 19 1950 AVERAGE VOLUIi INCREASE —— 111.15 110.24 109.S 87.62 85.19 78.20 '74.5'5 73.93 73.43 71. 95 70.83 69.14 68.76 67.20 66.36 64.22 63.77 63.23 61. 93 55.71 DJIA 6 MO. LATER —— 9.37 8.72 4.96 25.63 10.88 0.';0 9.21 13.40 15.43 15.53 0.53 0.56 2.70 16.47 .60 -8.61 4.20 1. 88 2.08 12.03 —— 7.69 The upside bias is clear. In almost all cases, a performance comparable to the current one has resulted in an appreciably higher market six months later. As the table quite clearly shows. the end of most previous major bear cycles was, in fact, accompanied by action similar to what we saw during the last two weeks of August. 1982. The 1974 bottom, for example. produced a record-setting eight-day advance on the initial rally, plus subsequent record-setting advances on the early 1975 takeoff. These rallies also showed unusual upside breadth and two instances of above-average volume increase. Similar action was observed at 1970 and mostprevious majornbottoms. 1 – – The only instance in the table where strength remotely comparable to that shown recently resulted in significantly lower prices occurred in 1974. In that case. however, the June rally was accompanied by weak breadth and almost no increase in volume. As we noted last week. the exact shape of the pattern now forming remains unclear and, short- term, the bottoming process mayor may not involve lower prices. We think from a long-term point of view. however. that the recent strength can only be read as having highly bullish implications. AWT It Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (9/2/82) 925.77 122.74 1208.00 ANTHONY IV. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL No statement or expre,on of opmlon or any other mat1er herem cantamed IS, or .5 to be dee,,d ta be, directly or ,nd,rectly, On oHer or the ollcltotlo of On oHer to buy or sell ony securIty referred to or menlloned The motter I presented merely for the convenlenCtl of the subscflber While we believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be relloble, we III no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slatements mude hereIn Any actIon fa be token by the subSCriber should be boed on h,s own investIgatIon Clnd Informat,on Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, os a corporotlon, and Its offIcers or cmployees, moy now hove, or may loter lae, positIons or trades In respect to ony SeCUritIes mentioned In thIS or any luturc Issue, and such POSItIOn may be different from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In ti'us or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS regIstered WIth the SEC os on Investment odvlsor, may gIve odvlCe to Its IIlvestment odvlsory and othe, CVltomers IIldependently of any stctements mode ,n thIS or III any other Issue Further IIllormotlon on any security mentIoned hereIn IS oVOllable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 10, 1982 . IS, at b i' ottom, .W ,,!!un.s-Uf-nranrof4.ts-practiioners- a very SImple actIVIty. It consIsts, essent i ally ', , of tr y in gt,o'1'pirioi,nt,;d.,.;',0J,,', patterns of market behavior which, based on the past record, indicate certain probabilities (proba- bilities, remember, not certainties) for future behavior Thus, all of the statistics and verbiage we have been hurling at our readers in the past three editions of this letter can be summarized in one simple sentence — unusual upside activity tends to presage a better market. We think this fact can be amply documented ,and we have attempted to do so, from a number of points of view, ever since the market turned in mid-August. It certainly requires little or no expertise to recognize that upside activity since that time has been, to say the least, unusual. It requires little more than reference to a chart book to recognize that this unusual upside activity took place well into an obvious bear market that began in late 1981-early 1982. It is, further, not a great leap of intellectual effort to identify past similar bear markets, look for signs,during their course of roughly comparable upside activity and to suggest that such action has tended in the past to suggest a market reversal. We have thus reiterated the conclusion that the 1981-1982 bear market effectively ended on August 12, 1982 at 776.92 on the Dow. To many observers, however, the reversal pattern of August, 1982 appears somehow incomp- lete. All the way back to the 1930's, cycle-bull markets have tended to be initiated by explosive bursts to the upside such as the one observed last month. There has also, however, been a tend- ency for that unusual strength to be proJeeded by equally utIusuaI weakness. This, of course, was con- spicuous by its absence this time around, which is why last month's eruption was, at least to some degree, surprising. This raises another point about technicaly , however, a point which hel'ps to explain why we have always found it to be an intensely hallp';'mnO activity. Many aspects of m'lrket iOT',tendto, nn(Qanged over lo,g n' of time. Other ,, tend to chn.e with market ,,. It is of this that p ' tne t, with one of his more difficult tasks. It is, for example, arguable, that the tendency for bear markets to culminate with intense downside pressure is one which has been eroding now for a decade. It is possible to define intense downside actiVity as days on which 70 of issues traded decline or on which the Dow declines by more than 2. During the last two weeks of past cycle bear markets, three such days occured in 1953, four in 1957, six an 1962. and four in 1966. The 1970 bear market saw five such intensive downside days. By contrast. the bear market of 1974. despite the fact that it was the most severe since the 1930's. culminated with only a single day on which the Dow declined more than 2 and with no instances of an unusually high number of declines. Likewise. there took place no such activity during the tail end of the bear market which ended in March. 1978. It is thus less than unprecedented that the biggest daily downside move for the Dow in August was a 1. 58 decline on August 4 and the largest percentage of declining stocks in the two weeks preceding August 12 was 59. We think there is an obvious reason for this changing behavior pattern. and it arises from a change in the nature of the participants in the marketplace. Markets are. of course. a product of the collective action of humans. and another simple reason why technical anaylsis is useful is that humans are subject to emotions and emotional activity tends to repeat itself. In recent years. market activity has come to be dominated more and more by professional investors and less and less by individuals. These professional investors. despite their arguably greater knowledge and skill. remain as subject to emotion as the individual investor who prevailed in the marketplace in the 1930's One emotion which has tended to cause erratic behavior is fear. However. it has been suggested that .in ,the caseof the individual ,investor. the dominant, fear.is fear .0Llosing one's .money. while .in – thn case of the professional, paid to generate excess returns, it is fear of losing one's job. It is this fear of failure to participate on the upside that. in our view, has caused the buying panic to become more and more a feature of market activity over recent years. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12; 00 p. m.) 912.53 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 121.19 Cumulative Index (9/9/82 1230.18 No stalement or expreulon of optrUOn or ony other maHer heleln contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sollcltollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony secunty referled 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for Ihe convemena; of Ihe subscriber While -He believe the sources of our Informo- hon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accurocy Ihereof nOf of the stolements mode herein Any action 10 be token by the 5ubcnber should be based on hiS own InveShgohon and InformatiOn Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a torporo.on, and lIs offICers or employees, may now have, or may loler toke. pOIIIOnS or trodes In resPect 10 any secuIIHes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any olher Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, tnc, which IS regIstered With Ihe SEC os an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In Ihls Or In any other ISsue -Funher Informollon on any seCurity mentioned herein IS aVOIlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE AOAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEy 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 'Ne MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE r– September 17, 1982 tu stock set HaugH Dow had advanced almost 20. The fonowing table shows all first, column shoWlng the low for the move, the second the Ahl,,;.. omvoevre saS.Ince izthe tlie '; high, and the third the high which was reached during the first 24 days of the rally. Th column showing the percentage rise on each rally clearly documents the fact that the recent rise is without parallel unless we refer back to the experience of the 1930's. —-D-a-t-e—- NOV 13 199 , DEC 26 1930 JUN 1931 OCT 5 1931 JAN 5 1932 II JUL 8 1932 MAR 31 1938 APR 8 1939 JUN 10 1940 APR 8 1942 OCT 9 1946 JUN 13 1949 SEP 14 1953 OCT 22 1957 JUN 6 1962 OCT 7 H66 MAY 26 1970 DEC 6 1974 FEB 8 1978 AUG 12 1982 Low ——- 196.69 161.18 121.70 86.48 71.24 41.22 98.95 11.44 111.84 92.92 163.1 161.60 255.49 419.79 535.76 744.32 631.16 577.60 742.12 776.92 PrevIous Hl5ih After HHlh ——- 4 Da'/s ——- 381.17 !63.46 94.07 173.04 194.36 156.93 156.93 109.70 116.79 85.88 A8.78 59.63 194.40 11.00 158.41 132.30 155.92 123.86 138.12 99.72 212.50 175.94 193.16 173.59 293.79 272.80 520.95 734.91 ;! 995d5 8160137 985.21 720.43 1051.70 658.79 1014.79 773.82 1024.05 930.46 Da'.1s UntIl r. 20r. 7- Advance Adv RecoverY —— — —– 32.60 6 35.49 7.36 49 8.92 28.95 18 48.49 26.85 4 32.96 20.55 9 32.14 44.66 15 38.71 2.28 14 23.10 8.94 126 29.38 10.75 74 27.27 7.32 134 15.04 7.86 0 25.96 7.42 118 37.99 6.78 137 45.20 5.86 193 24.31 1 0 39 105 27.96 1/; l . 25.21 14.06 35 17.13 4.27 113 11.63 19.76 24 62.13 There were, during that time, several rallies comparable to or greater than August of this year, and, it must be noted. seven of them, 8S shown by the asterisks, were bear-market rallies, Many of them were even steeper than the current one as indicated by the number of days required for a 20 advance to take place. In all post-war bull markets such a rise, of course. ultimately occurred. but it generally took a great deal longer than in the current instance. What differentiates the present case from the 1930's bear-market rallies is the fact that it has recovered 62 of the loss from the previous high. This is one factor which, in our view. invalidates the bear-market argument and reinforces our contention that a cycle bull market began on August 12. Date of Low A D JUS TED H I G H AFT E R 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 1 Year 2 Yers .- -, APR 28 IN 845.23 910.62 OCT 9 1946 837.98 849.84 JUN 13 1949 832.88 881.0 SEP 14 1953 813.47 861.34 OCT 22 1957 819.28 832.59 JUN 26 1962 855.97 893.28 OCT 7 1966 845.09 856.82 HAY26–r970- 886 81——936 -.09 – DEC 6 1974 857.09 1024.70 FEB 28 1978 810.11 898.62 963.96 1144.90 1219.23 1776.75 878.70 889.94 920.00 920.00 946.20 1097.98 165.04 141.45 914.79 1069.73 1468.45 1584.16 848.84 1011.17 154.98 1360.12 951.88 1054.18 1205.04 1443.09 915.07 984.39 998.58 1028.36 964.6-6-1170-.40 -1-195.55-1294 .58 1155.06 1186.11 1364.98 1364.98 942.33 950.31 950.31 107.07 If such is the case the above figures may be of interest. They show the adjusted highs reached by each of the previous 10 cycle bull markets for various time periods after their inception. The adjustment is accomplished by indexing the low to the August 12, 1982 low, thus giving a frame of reference as to how far the current market might rally if previous markets were approximated. It should be noted that, in almost all cases. the market had moved to a figure above comparable current levels within six months to a year following the low. Also. in most cases, the final figure for the bull market produced highly significant rises. well above what has been seen so far. No suggestion is intended that the current market will duplicate any of the past upswings, but the possible magnitude is at least of some interest. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 924.22 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 123.30 Cumulative Index (9116182) 1246.20 No .statemont or exprtj!Jlon of opinIon or any otner rnoHer herem wntomcd )5, or IS /0 be deemed to be, directly or InclJrcctly, on offer or Ihe sollCltahOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The mottcr IS presented merely for the Convenience of the subscnber While we believe thc sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe ot;uroc;y thereof nor of the stotements mude hercln Any oellon to be token by !hc subscriber should be bosed on hl own Invesllgollon cnd Information Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as 0 corporation, and Its offIcers or employee, may now hove, or may loter loke, pos1t1on; or trodes In respect to ony SeCVrllles menhoned In It'1I5 or ony future Issue, and suth position mey be different from any views now Of hereafter expressed In thl or Clny other Issue Janney Montgomery StOll, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lis Investment adVisory and at he. CU5tame ondependently of any statements made jn thlt lr In any other ISsue Further information on ony security menfloned herem IJ aVQllcble on (equel! —

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER B09 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8EA NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHA.NGe Septe… mb-er.2-4, 1-982 It is perhaps worthwhile at this stage, some six weeks after the beginning of the 1982-198 bull market, to try to restate what seem to us to be some rather clear implications of technical analysis. We have tried to express these conclusions, admittedly in somewhat disorganized form, in the past five issues of this publication. A summary, therefore, appears in order. We had spent most of the year 1982, through August, trying to suggest that any rational study of the four-year, major-stock-market-cycle pattern, indicated a high degree of probability that the 1980-1982 bear market should terminate sometime before the end of the year. Through mid-August, we readily admit, there was precious little evidence being afforded as to when precisely that event might take place. We could only suggest that, as time moved inexorably on, its likelihood became greater. Then came the deluge. We have been trying to document, for the past five weeks, our con- clusion that the upside explosion of August-September, 1982 signified the actual emergence of the reversal we had spent most of the year aWaiting. We have tried to suggest repeatedly that the sort of upside activity seen since mid-August has been,in the past, characteristic of major market reversals and, by and large, only major market reversals. We have, therefore, reiterated the conclusion that a new bull market effectively began on August 12, 1982. Indeed, in a sense, that prophecy has already come to pass. For the past 40 years of stock market history at least, a 20 filter has been a usable tool for defining bull markets. Since, as of this week, we were already up by more than that amount from the August low, the new bull market is not now a conjecture; it is a matter of record. moment, simply that of trying to define how far the bull market will carry and for how long it will continue. We do not, howevel', regard this problem as being of pressing urgency at this stage. Indeed, it is sufficiently precise at the moment to say nothing more than that, based on the historical record, it is likely to continue a good deal further and a good deal longer. The shortest major-cycle upswing on record since 1942 lasted for 21 months — which time frame carries us into May, 1984. The least dynamic upswing during the same time period irvolved a 32 advance on the Dow, which sort of advance from the August low would still take us appreciably higher than we are today. It should, of course, be noted that we are Citing here the least impressive bull markets of a 15-year period during whiCh a secular flat trading range has generally tended to put a damper on bull markets. As we noted last week, if that secular trading range is over, (and we do not think there is yet any evidence that it either is or is not) a rise equivalent to the typical bull markets of the 1950's and 1960's would take us to around the 1400-1500 territory on the DJIA. For some reason, however, most market commentary that we have seen does not tend to focus on these sorts of numbers. Bemused by the fact that the market has traveled as far and fast as it has, much analysis has centered on the inevitability of some sort of correction. Now we fully agree that such a phenomenon will, at some point, emerge. This is nothing more than another way of saying that markets do not persist in one direction forever, an obvious fact which the investor does not need a technical market letter to ascertain. There, indeed, at the moment, exists a possible short-term top formation on the Dow which can be read to a downside target of approximately 885. It is, further, possible that this top may broaden and indicate a correction of even greater magnitude. It is also, it should be noted, equally possible that the formation will not turn out to be a top at all but simply-. a consolidation prior to -yet another upside.thrust -to somewhere in the upper 900's. Indeed, another characteristic of bull markets during the 1950's and 1960's was that they tended to proceed to their ultimate destination without producing corrections of a magni- tude much greater than 5-7. Under the circumstances, then, excessive concern regarding s correction may be a waste or intellectual energy. In investment management, as in any other field, there exists a proper time for everything. The present, in our view, is a proper time for devoting oneself to the task of maximizing those unusual investment returns available only during major upward cycles. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 921. 08 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 123.53 Cumulative Index (9/23/82) 1248.32 No statement or expression of oPrfllan or any other matter here.n contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dHec;tly or Indirectly, on offer Of Ihe Olltllol\on of On offer to buy Or sell any securrly referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the ConvenrenCi of the subscrIber Whlle.ne believe the sources of our Informa- lion to be rellcble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements m.lde herem Afly oehon 10 be taken by the subSCriber shOuld be bosed on hiS own investIgation and mformotJon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, ell a COrporatIon, and lIS officers or employees, may now hove, or rnoy later toke, POSitions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned III Ihls or ony future Issue, and such posilion may be difFerent from lny views now Or hereaher expressed In thiS Of (lny other Issue Jonney Montgomery 50011, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investment adVisor may give adVice to Its Investment odvlS.ory and othel cvstomers Independently of ony slatemenh made In thiS or In any other ISs\Je Further informaTIOn on any se(urlt menTioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE hniriilg; ',', or'ali 4. ii over 7 ;'i day it may;- th, dig once more into history to try to assess the downside possIbIlities. to.- be' useful We begm with the assumption. extensively adumbrated in previous issues of this letter, that August 12. 1982 saw the start of a new bull market. One of the almost universal characteristics that we Can altach to bull markets is the presence of a lengthy and extensive take-off rally. The percentage advance of this rally and its length in weeks for each of the eight previous bull marKets'is shown in the talble at right. In all cases except 1978-1981, the initial advance lasted a great deal longer and carried considerably further than the current one has to date. Thus, if we assume that such a rally began in midAugust, it would have a good deal further to go before correction 1949-1953 1953-1956 1957-1961 1962-1966 1966-1968 1970-1973 1974-1976 1978-1981 INITIAL RALLY Advance 41. 3 60.0 59.3 30.3 22.2 42.1 36.2 16.8 Length in Weeks 57 66 83 31 30 42 14 14 (a correction is, throughout this discussion,defined as 5 or greater) takes place. Here. however, it becomes necessary to introduce a complexity. Not all take-off rallies shown in the above table have started from the absolute low point of the previous bear market. In five of the eight cases. there has existed a volatile basing period during which a significant portion of the initial BASING PERIOD advance from the low was retraced. The rele- Advance vant statistics appear in the table at left. T.p.ngth in Days Retraced While three past' bull markets took off immedia- 1949-1953 1953-1956 tiftri !e before taeoff, -d 1957-1961 38 80 two retraced the entire move. Based on current 1962-1966 83 72 technical patterns, we think a full retracement. 1966-1968 28 148 i.e., a testing of the low of 776.92, is a highly 1970-1973 29 57 unlikely eventuality at this stage. A correction 1974-1976 44 108 on the order of those which took place in 1957, 1978-1981 – 1962, or 1970. however, has to be regarded as, at least. a possibility. What argues against this is the timing factor. 34 trading days have elapsed since August 12. Two of the previous basing periods were shorter than this, and two others not much longer. Only the 1962 double-bottom formation. which lasted from June 26 through August 23 of that year at.d involved a swing from 535 to 616 and back to 558 on the Dow was considerably longer. Another statistic regarding corrections in bull markets is perhaps relevant. The length of the typical initial rally elaborated above shows that substantial corrections do not tend to take place until an upswing is fairly well advanced. Furthermore. as we have suggested in the past, they do not tend to be very large until the bull market has ultimately run its course. The table below shows the total number of 5 or greater CORRECTIONS AFTER BASE FORMATION corrections in each pre- Number Largest Decline Average Decline l\v,I'f'—iLi'jB,n,ID,h, vious bull market, to- 194!f-1953 6 13.5 7.9 – 44 gether with average 1953-1956 4 10.0 6.8 11 length in days and 1957-1961 4 12.6 10.5 38 the average percent- 1962-1966 3 10.5 7.5 28 age decline. Again, -with the–..exception….of 1966-1968 4 19701973—-4 9.9 -13.4 8.0 …- …… 9;2 – 29 50 1- 1978-1981.such 1974-1976 6 10.2 6.3 23 corrections have 1978-1981 11 16.0 8 4 21 historically been relatively mild and relatively rare. All of this argues against excessive stubbornness in waiting for further downside activity in the present instance. There does indeed exist a top on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, broadened since we first mentioned it last week, which suggests a downside objective of 870. This would be a retracement of 40 of the initial advance and argues that a basing period would, in fact. be a feature of this parti- cular market bottom. Conversely. however, from a bullish point of view, it would also suggest that the characteristically long take-off rally has not yet started, and such a rally, beginning from just under current levels would, based on the historical record, be dynamic indeed. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 897.53 S & P Composite (12.00 p.m.) 120.57 Cumulative Index 9/30/82 1232.14 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or exprealOI1 of opinion or ony other motter herein contained IS, or .s 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the ol,c,tatlon of on offer to buy or lell ony security referred to or mentioned The matter IS prelented merely for the convernenco of the subSCriber While e believe the sources of our Informa- lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nOt of the llatements mude herein Any Ocllon 10 be taken by the subscnber should be based on hIS awn investigation and Iniormahon Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, ond .Is off.cers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POSitions or trades In respect to any SeWfilles mentioned lI'I thiS or ony future Issue, and such pOSII'On may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In lh,s or any other Issue Janney Montgomery SCalI, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIve adVice to Its lI'Ivestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any stalements made In Ih,s or In any other Issue furl her information on any security meniloned herein IS available on request

–c— – – – —,-., TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON .N. EW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHAI\fQE I—-i r t …… -p'.,…… t.'r—- —————0–c– -october.8';7I9-g2,o,-c.'.'.—.-.–;,.c.-. . .—.,..—-I One of the oldest Wall Street adages is Don't fight the tape. Since last August, disbelievers in this maxim have been compiling a record comparable to the opponents of Joe Louis in his prime. Those who were awaiting further extension of the correction which ended on September 30, having taken the market down a shade over 4 over a two-week period, were greeted this week by a 37-point rise on Wednesday, which took the Dow to a new bull-market high, followed by another session of record upside volume on Thursday, further extending the gain. We admit that we succumbed to the temptation ourselves, albeit mildly; in our last two letters, and wound up getting knocked clear out of the ring. We had been noting the existence of a top formation on the Dow, suggesting a downside objective as low as 870. This, of course, was never even approached. The point is that the formation in question, interpreted in vacuo, did indeed exist. What the week's events prove is that a powerful major trend can and often does override a short-term contratrend pro- Jection. It is possibly useful at this stage to expand just a bit on some of the statistics documented in this space last week. It now becomes obvious that what can be considered the take-off rally of this particular bull market began coincidentally with the low on August 12. We elaborated a week ago on the historical length of such take-off rallies. If such a rally is defined as ending with the first 5or-great er correction, the last two instances, in 1974 and 1978, continued for 14 weeks. This record would imply that a 5 correction might take place as early as this November. We pointed out, however, that the six previous bull markets had featured take-off rallies of 30-83 weeks in duration. If we are willing to ignore the more recent experience, therefore, it is perfectly logical to project that the market will continue to rise, without a correction of as much as 5, until sometime between February of next year and early 1984. Investors are therefore advised to reread the first sentence of this letter. – \Vhyt-may-wellbe..askecL.-should.n nf th;. betakinll .place Thursday's lead Wall Street Journal story assayed an explanation with the headline Stocks Surge Anew on Favorable Reports ,01 !tates and Earnings. Well now. Interest rates are indeed declining, and bond markets were almost as ebullient as the stock market. We are old enough to remember, however that the dean, of Wall Street security analysts, once wrote a book devoted to the theory that stock earnings should be capitalized at twice the current yield on high-grade bonds. According to this particular piece of wisdom, if the level of the Dow is to be tied to interest rates, it is currently worth about 330. As far as earnings are concerned, the Journal did cite the case of two large companies reporting higher third 1juarter results. It did not note that earnings for the Dow for the first six months are down almost exactly 50 from a year earlier, and, overall, not much third-quarter, or indeed even fourth-quarter, improvement is expected. It is nice to believe that the stock market behaves in response to such things as earnings rund rates/ In truth, it moves in response to the availability of funds, coupled with investor perception of these fundamental factors. A recent incident probably tells a great deal more about the reason for the stock narket's be- havior than all of the financial community's conventional analysis. A friend of ours ventured, this week, to the local bank to withdraw his All Savers Certificate. He waited in line for half an hour. The point is that, with some 8 billion of these instruments maturing this month, potential stock-market funds were indeed available. Investor perception regarding the market's future, fueled in large part, no doubt, by the publicity attending the August rally, caused some portion of these funds to find its way into equities rather than other instruments. Now this reasoning, we will be the first to admit, is pure theory and we canll')t document it. It is nonetheless perfectly logical, given the end result which showed up on the ticker tape this week. Yet another Wall Street cliche is the impertinent answer to the question Why did the market go up. It is, More buyers than sellers. This is yet another way of citing the two factors mentioned above, availability of .funds and investors' willingness… to-v-commit those funds, 1 plus a third .factor, un- willingness by sellers to supply stock except at higher prices. The historical record cited above suggests that such factors, once having emerged, tend to persist for protracted periods of time. We know of no reason why this should not be true in the present instance. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 971.85 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 129.63 Cumulative Index (10/7/82 1289.81 or 'fNo stofement Or expreUlon of opinion Or any other 10 buy Of sell any secunty referred 10 or mentioned matter herem The molt Cp ontol ned td IS, bd d b d to he eeme to e, Ireetty or mdHeclly, on offer or the SolICllotlon of on offer lion to be bosed on re hiS l loble own ' , we nve s I l n lg no w allan o J re nd nrfeasreaIt;nguJae CheJr,sr issene;emllrneoYr or of Ie the convenience of the subSCriber WhIle we believe statements mdde herein Any adlon to be taken the sources of OUf Informa by the ubscrlber should be lihpoSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In HilS or an futur thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott Inc which s reglsie d tlhSSch' 0S50 corporation, an Its officers or such positron moy be different employees, may from any views now now have, or may (ater toke, or hereafter expressed In customers Independently of any sotements made 'In tl1;5 or rn ny othe ressu'l F ,as an. rnvestment adVisor may give adVice to lIs Investment advl!'oty and Othel r I u er rn ormO,lon on any securrty mentioned herern IS ovorlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – )ctober 15, 1982 — .. ..———-..-.-r..'.—————.—7-..-..-..——–;.——————,I Is the stock market rise of the last two months the biggest in history The—answer is no, ' but it is probably tied for third. In order to ju;tify the above statement, we have to engage in some fatrly complex definition. The Dow, through Wednesday, was up 30.65 in just over two months. It will be noted that, in the previous sentence, we dealt with two variables, the percentage rise and the length of time re- quired to accomplish that rise. In order to compare markets it is necessary to combine these two variables into a single statistic which can be done by using annualized rate of change. It is thus possible to say that over the past 61 days the Dow has risen at an annual rate of 384.53. (This is, it should go without saying, a description, not a prediction.) Annualized rates of change of this magnitude are fairly common animals over short periods. For periods as long as two months they are a distinct rarity. We allowed our computer to spend the evening one day this week calculating the annualized rate of change for every period between 30 and 120 days starting on every date since 1926. This involved the comparison of some 1. 38 million such time periods. The essential conclusion is the one stated above. The present rise is exceeded in magnitude by only two rallies, the first being the granddaddy of them all, the one which began on July 8, 1932 and produced a 94 advance in less than two months to September 7. The annual rate of rise from July 7 to September 7, 1932 was 4782. A rate of rise as great as the present one was maintained over almost a four-month period. A sharp reaction fOllowed that rally, and, in February, 1933, another advance began, taking the Dow up 117 over just under five months. Various two-month periods in that rally saw annual- ized rates of change in excess of 1500. 1—-li–JNo-other -stock -market adv.ance since..1.926..has..producedadyances…significanlly. greater -than, the recent one. The bull market of 1938 produced a 60 rise over seven and a half months. The initial stages of that rise were at rates roughly comparable to the present over a number of two- month periods. In subsequent history, from 1938 until this Aue-ust, no comparable rate of rise emerged. The take-off rallies of bull markets during the 1950's and 1960's were occasionally characterized by annual rates of rise in excess of 200 for one-month periods. Over periods of as long as two months, no single rally in the postwar experience prior to the present one was able to produce an advance much greater than 100-125 at an annual rate. It seems that, on a sober statistical basis, the present market is worthy of the headlines it has produced. The other facet of the recent market which has produced headlines is volume. Here, also, it is necessary to go back many years in order to locate precedents. One way of making volume comparable over long periods of years is to relate it to the number of shares listed, i. e., to measure turnover. As of the end of August, 1982, just over 39 billion shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The high daily NYSE volume for that month was 137.3 million shares. Dividing this by the number of shares listed gives a daily turnover ratio of .351. The last time that this figure was exceeded was in September, 1939. Now if one goes back far enough, such a turnover ratio is fairly common. It was exceeded, often by considerable margins, during every single month between 1926 and 1930. Indeed, in 1901 annual turnover was 319, suggesting that a volume of trading comparable to the ,'ecent one was apparently almost a daily occurrence. However, subsequent to 1933, turnover began to de- cline secularly. Eight scattered months between 1933 and 1939 saw high daily turnovers greater than August, 1982. As noted above, there has been no comparable instance since. Until last month the peak turnoverof'ihe postwar perlodhildoeen .275anOctober 10;r979. The 1950's peak was .219 on September 26, 1955. The present market rise, therefore, has produced some critical tasks for the technican We are accustomed, in most cases, to deal with the present-day stock market in terms of post-Wurld- War-II experience. This is clearly inadequate in the present instance, and, in order to find parallels, it is now necessary to return to the markets of the 1920's and 1930's. Obviously, we will be exploring the implications of this task in future issues. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrial Averages (1200 p.m.) 996.50 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 134.32 Cumulative Index (10/14/82) 1365.68 No statement or expression of opinion or any other moiler herein contained IS, or I to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menhoned The moiler 15 presented merely for the convenience of the subcrrber Whde -He believe Ihe sources of our InformoIton to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of Inc slalements mode herem Any oerrcn to be token by Ihe 5ub5Cf/br should be based on hiS own Invesllgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 0 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, pos!llon5 or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In thiS or any Future Issue, ond such POSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, which IS registered With Ihc SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to 11 Investment adVisory ond othel customers Independently of ony slatements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request