TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 29, 1982 In our discussion last week of the prospects for a super-cycle bull market, we mentioned that the stock 1-'emscafrikpettiomnignhit1,syinoryfa,cst,'b8etpoviasreidanfcoer such With an event, having been in a major bear market since 1966. cU.rrertt neaalilies,-wrucn teI1ustlie Dow is'fliiiingwith an This alF,–lr- time high. The bear market, of course, is in terms of the Dow after adjustment for inflatiOn' and a chart of the averaQ'eS. so adiusted. appears below. The GNP deflator is used to adjust the index to first-quar- ter-1966 dollars making the high in that quarter equivalent to the actual Dow. PREPARED Bf DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TqBELL After the adjustment, last August's low becomes not 776.92 but 281. 54. The recent rise has taken this not to 1000 but to 362. The history of the average since 1966 becomes one of a long and relimtless de- cline composed of three approximate-50 drops, the first two of which were followed by only partial reco\ eries. The total decline from the 1966 high is 71. 7 ,roughly in a league with the bear market of 1929- 1932, which produced an 85.8 decline. It is interesting to note where the Dow, after inflation adjustment, is today in comparison with prior levels. Its current 362 figure compares with a 1929 high of 858. It sold above its current level for almost. the. entire period .1935 1940, . not. generally. considered. a. banner, era rfor. the, stock market. Following World War II, it moved above its current level in 1951, so that last August's level represents a 31-year low. It can be argued, moreover, that this.desultory performance has produced uncommon value. It is pos- sible to adjust Dow-Jones earnings as well as prices for the ravages of inflation, and, when. this adjust- ment is made, the record low price/earnings ratio was reached two years ago,in 1979, when the Dow sold at 6.4 times inflation-adjusted results. This was Ii lower level than had been the case in mid-1949. By the third quarter of 1981, the Dow had returned to 6.9 times inflation-adjusted-earnings,close to that record low level. Since then ,of course, the p /e ratio has expanded, as the market has moved ahead and earnings, especially after inflation adjustment, have dropped. It has risen to around 12.3 for the third quarter of this year. However, it must be remembereo that this figure is based on recession earnings and will probably be reduced sharply in an economic recovery. It goes without saying that the market is anticipating such a recovery and could be in for a shock were it to fail to materialize. Nonetheless, recent history strongly suggests that, especially given a de- cline in inflation, the next decade could turn out to be one of considerably better stock prices. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 984.36 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL C NP.flPl!Q\I!.(l Um..l4.M't 1'11 iWt,…e.rrflJStllf'l1dipf lWe9c156I'P680-Jm'eonntyloontheedr mThot,/QLo),.t3..reVK,lt1f,onretcselnnteedd IS, or IS 10 be merely for the deemed to be, canvenlenctS of directly or Indlfectly, thc subscriber WhIle on 'Ie offer or belIeve the solicltahon of the sources of our an offer mforma- tlon to be rel,able, we m no way represent or guarantee thc accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any act,on to be token by the subscrober should be based on hiS own mvest,gahon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporat,on, and ,15 officers or employees, may now have, or moy later toke, positions or trade In respect to any securities mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be difFerent from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whIch ,s registered With the SEC as on mvestment adv,sor, may gIve adVice to ,ts mvestment adVisory and other rustomers mdependently of any statements made m thiS or In any othcr Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – .. !..-.. r'f – – -…… VIi – – – – – – – I -II Nber-5-;T982—–.—.–…. As wns eminently predlctnble. the finnnciul press went bananas on Thursday, heralding the fact that the DOW-Jones Industrials had achieved n newall-time high. exceeding the closing (and also the hourly and intrndny) figure for January 11, 1973. We were also duly mformed that, in the process, the Dow chalked up its largest (points not percentage) gain on record, moving ahead 43.41 points on Wednesday. While these pieces of information may have the salutary effect of providing filler for newspaper space, they are, as far as the Investor is concerned. about 3G close to useless as it is nossIble to t!'et. That investor remruns faced wIth his perennial problem. What, given this action, becomes the proper attitude toward the stock market As an aid in this dilemma J two basIc principles of technical analysis emerge as relevant. They are as follows 1. Great stock-market strength is usually a precursor — not of immInent weakness — but of still further strength. 2. Major market cycles, once underway, tend to persist for long periods of time. We discussed some of the figures leading to the first conclusion in our letter of October 1. At that tIme, we cited the fact that bull markets tend to be characterized by sharp and volatile take-off rallies which proceed without a correction of as much as 5. Since then, it has, of course, become obvious that the take-off rally began with the actual low on August 12 (this is not always the case) and h s to date, remamed m effect, with a 37.1 advance so far. It has thus exceeded the comparable taIe-off rally for the last bull market, 1978-1981, which was only 16.8 and, for that matter, the 22 take-off rally of the 1966-1968 bull market. It has, however, challed up just about the same percentage advance as the 1962 and 1974 take-off rallies (30.3 and 32.5 resectively), and it still falls significantly short of the fi!'ures for four other bull markets since World War II. which have seen take-off rallies of as much as 60. It must also be recalled that such initial rallies tend to be only the first phases of bull markets which, . once the initial rallies are comolete continue to proceedsimtificantly higher, albeiC at a slower rate with somewhat larger and longer corrections.- – – – – – r … – As far .as time is concered, fully realizing we are repeating ourselves, it is worthwhile once again to hamer away t some obVious ;facts of stock-market cycles. The current market cycle, it must be remembered, is still just 12 weeks old. Typical cycles, we remind our readers once again, last just under four years from low to low, based on the record of 23 such completed cycles since 1896. This suggests that, if the current cycle conforms to the averarre, the next major stock-market low will not be seen until Mav, 1986. There are, furthermore, only three exceutions in the 23 past instances to the !,eneral rule that such cycles spend at least 50 of their time advRJ1cing, indeed, on average, some 60. Again, ability to achieve this average in the present case would produce a 27-month advance, and the target date for the next major high would be December, 1984. Now despite the fact that the above two precepts are clearly implied by an historical record stretch- ing back almost a century, most investors, we think ,intuitively feel that somehow it will all be different this time. Undoubtedly most investors felt the same way at comparable stages of the 23 previous cycles, which is, of course, why the cycles tend to manifest themselves in the first place. There is, of course, little doubt that part of the steepness of the recent rise can be attributed, not to secular trend, but to a recent increase in volatility. This volatility will, no doubt, lead to some short, sharp corrections as it did a week ago Monday and this Thursday afternoon. Such corrections will undoubtedly continue to en- gender the feeling that the whole process may be over, an event which, as we noted, is unlikely to occur for another two years. It is possible to make some projections regarding the extent of this particular take-off rally although such projections are far less important than recognition of the rally for what it is. A logical, medium- term uoside tarl!et for the Dow would be aooroximatelv 1130, following which it would be logical to expect a more protracted, although certainly by no means final, market correction. It is possible to make such a guess on the assumption that what has happened since August of this year constitutes the initial advance in. almost. certainly , … arcycle-.-turn .and …….very. possibly. a rsuper-cycle ,turn. If this is 1 the ,case, …according to the Elliott Wave Principle and other models, such an advance should take place in five waves, three advances interspersed with two corrections. It is easy to demonstrate that four such waves have occured so far, the first from August 12 (776.92) to September 15 (930.46), the second to September 30 (896.25), the third to October 21 (1036.98), and the fourth to October 28 (990.99). The fIfth, It IS lOgICal to sur- mise, is currently under way from that level. ', Now if the above projections holds true, and it is, of course, subject to modification by events, even the correction following this rally should bottom at levels somewhat higher than present ones. The clear argument continues to be in favor of a fully-invested position. AWTrs ANTHONY W. T ABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p. m.) 1052.61 S & P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 142.18 Cumulative Index (11/4/82) 1473.74 No statement or expression of opinion or any other moiler herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or Indlrec1ly, on offer or the 50licltotlon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to Or mentioned The moiler 15 presented merely for the convenienCt; of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informa- han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accurocy Ihereof nor at the stolemenls mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on h own Invesllgohon and Informohon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, os 0 corporation, and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may loter toe, pOSitions or trode, In respect to any securrtles mentioned In thl or any future Issue, and such POSition moy be diFferent rom any views now or hereafter exprened In Ih,s or any other Iue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh 15 re91lered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give ad…,ce to lIs ,nvestment adVisory and other customers ,ndependently of ony statements mode ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further ,nformat,on on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE i , '' .- , November,.,12,…1982 . .. We alludelllast week, to the fact that most investors, incor'ectly-in our Vlew, feel essentially un- comfortable with the current market due to the sharp upward adjustment in prices that has manifested itself over the past three months, Thus concern was being expressed this week about recent volatile intraday swings and the fact that no new high had been made since the last closing peak of 1069.45 was posted on the Dow on November 3. When one backs up a bit, the triviality of this concern becomes ap- parent. The market has gone all of seven trading days so far without the achievement of a new high and has posted a correction of a staggering 2.63. Now even the most fragmentary observation will re- veal that past bull lIarkets, even in their most dynamic phases, have gone considerably longer than seven trading days without a new high being posted and have been punctuated by corrections of consid- erably greater magnitude. We think it pointless to worry, therefore, about the ever-so-slight indications that the market is encountering a shade more difficulty in achieving upside progress than has been the case from August to date. Meanwhile, let us use the hiatus to examine what the market has, in fact, been doing over the past several months in terms of the semi-esoteric discipline of trend analysis. This analysis operates on an assumption, in contravention to one beloved by academicians, that the market is in fact imperfect in an economic sense — that it does not adjust instantaneously to new information, but instead is acted upon by forces which move in the direction of such an adjustment over time. It is, of course, never possible to know precisely the exact nature of these forces. The best one can do in an imperfect world is to produce estimates. It is, for example, a known fact that between August 12, 1982 and November 3, 1982 the Dow Jores Industrial Average moved from 776.92 to 1065.49. A line can be mathematically computed so as to be as close as possible to all of the closing Dow figures within that period. That line starts at 828.83 in mid- August and rises at a rate of 3.48 lloints per day. ILis also.possible to measure how much the actual figures have devated from this line.- This gauge is pro 'by something called the standard error of the estimate, and it is, in fact, 27 points. In normal cases, 95 of the actual observations will vary by no more than twice this figure in either direction from the line itself. It is thus possible to view action between August and November as an upward sloping channel some 108 points (4 times 27 points) wide. What we have so far is nothing more than an accurate description of what took place over a given period. It is of interest, however, to know whether what has since transpired remains consistent with that description. We can test this by projecting the channel out in time to the present day. Doing this, we find that, as of today, its outer limits are approximately 1000 and 1108. It is thus possible to make the statement that current market action remains consistent with the assumption that this trend, If the trend is projected further outward in time,it produces some pretty startling figures. Its central value in two weeks will be 1082, in a month, 1121, in six months, 1470 and in a year, 1888. These somewhat euphoric numbers suggest that the true force currently operating on the market possesses somewhat less of an upward bias than the current projection indicates. This is probably true. It is our practice to recompute the upward trend each time a new high is achieved. Usually, as this is done, the computed upward slope becomes less, and the standard error increases, thus providing less optimistic projections. It is possible, however, to achieve useful estimates of the forces acting on the market by using this method. It is also worth mentioning, while on the subject, the longer, super-cycle trend to which we have referred in the past and which has been in effect since the mid-1960's. This trend can be expressed as an extremely wide channel of about 350 points on the Dow with a current central value of 885 and outer limits of 1078 and 722. Since the mid-1960's, the Dow has been largely contained within this channel and indeed remains' in it, although currently flirting with the upper limit. IT) order to say with a great deal of certaintythat. that. trend ,was .no .longerin ,effect,a . good , deal of . further, strength .would,be .required'. Indeed, the Dow presently would have to move above the 1200 level. Between 1080 and 1200, there exists a gray zone. (For those familiar with statistics, this is the area above the computed regression line by between two and three times the standard error.) The trend would also be called into Question were the Dow to trade in this zone for a protracted period of time, in this instace, bemg as much as a year. Since this is' a not-impossible eventuality, considering the early stages of the upswing, it is a factor which will have to be watched. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1051. 88 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 141. 08 Cumulative Index (11/11/82) 1505.36 No statement or expreS10n of opinion or Clny other matter herein onlOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or Sl!ti any security referred to or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber Whdelle believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own Investlgallon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporollon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poslhons or trades In respect to any secvrltles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSItIOn may be different from any vIews now or hereafter eJ(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered wilh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment advls.ory and olhel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on ony secuflty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY OB540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 19,982 -I ThFsubjecto-CtliiSletter, and, we hope, a numberof follow.on-Ietters, will be-interest rates. Now this, we realize, constitutes another one of those introductory sentences perfectly calculated to send our readers into a state of utter torpor. Those readers will have been bombarded with enough esoteric discussions of this particular subject to have reached the point of utter satiety. Yet the statement, for this publication at least, has some degree of applicability. We have not mentioned interest rates, except in passing, for some three months. We doubt that many of our brethren in the financial-punditry field are able to make a similar statement. For indeed it has been just about impossible to find any financial commentary, in the daily press or elsewhere, over the past few months, that has not explained the action of the stock market, often solely, in terms of interest rates. We hear on one day that the White House (the White House) expects a drop in the discount rate, and the market goes up. The next day the rumor is denied, and the market promptly retreats. One would indeed suspect that market analysts have forgotten everything they had previously learned and have taken up Fed-watching as a full-time occupation. Prefering to concentrate on our own area of expertise, technical analysis, we have eschewed this particular sport and tried to stick to our knitting. The last time we did mention interest rates in this space was in the final paragraph of our letter of August 20. After voicing the opinion that the Dow had reached an effective bottom the week before, we said, Pay no attention to the- excuses. The factor widely cited as the reason for the rally was lower interest rates or, more properly, forecasted lower in- terest rates. This, of course is nonsense. The market went up quite simply because for some months now, it has been in a technical position to do so. Interest rate forecasts have come and gone throughout that period with little or no effect. n In retrospect, this would appear to rank as one of the more wildly incorrect pronouncements we have made in a long career of sticking out our neck. As we all know, since we penned those particular words, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average 1–Iows-ta;gtehde90ane-adra-rye-cTorredas3u7ry advance betwe BillYiela was e 9n. August12and Nov 51, Certificates of ember 3. Deposit r e On the turned day the mJlJkeLlIllldeits 12.25, and the Dow-Jones 20-Bond Average stood at 60.18. Today T-Bill. and CD yields have declined to 8.36 and 9.10, and the Dow bonds are at 71.10. Meanwhile, as noted above, almost all extant explanations for the stock-market rise have centered upon the concomitant fall in interest rates. After all of this, we still are not sure we want to apologize too strenUOUSly for our statement of last August. We will pmnulgate herewith two rules regarding the stock market and stock-market experts. The first rule is that nobody really knows exactly why the stock market behaves as it does day-to-Eiay. The second is that everyone thinks he does — or at least finds it his professional interest to pretend that such is the case. Thus since, over the past three months, the stock market has been rising and interest rates have been falling, the world's easiest cop-out has been to relate the two phenomena. The only trouble with this, is that, for those of us with long memories, it doesn't wash. Al- though one would scarcely believe it from the breathless commentary, there have been times in the past, other than the past three months, when the stock market has risen and risen quite substantially. There has, at those times, invariably existed a conventional wisdom which has informed us, with utter certainty, as to why the rise had been taking place. Those expbmations have varied widely from bull market to . bull market, and they have often, indeed most of the time, centered on factors other than interest rates. Indeed, some of us can remember when the stock market went UP in response to such things as steel pro- duction and carloadings. But we are giving away our age. It is not our intent to claim that there exists no relationship between interest rates and stock prices. Indeed, one can be demonstrated, but, in the process of such demonstration, it becomes appar- ent that the relationship is at best limited. This is an exercise we have engaged in in the past and one which we intend to reiterate in the sequels to this letter. A more fundamental difficulty is the fact that there exists no universal agreement on the funda- mental questions ofl why interest rates go up or down and what it means when they do. In this repect economists are' subject to the- same rules cited for' slockcmarket expertsab-ove. It is possible ,- for example, to cite at least four widely respected yet contending schools of economic thought which vouchsafe entire- ly different explanations for interest-rate phenomena. Recent published explanations have tended to bor- row freely from all of these schools, citing whichever one appeared to be most helpful in supporting the point the analyst was trying to prove. We think, in other words, that there remain pitfalls in a too-facile linkage of interest rates and the stock market. We will try to provide more concrete warning against these pitfalls in subsequent issues. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1033.38 S & P Composite (12 00 p.m.) 138.34 Cumulative Index (11/18/82 1489.73 No ,Iolemen or expreS'lon of opinion or any olner mailer herein contained Is, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or mdHedlr,' on offer or the sollCllallon of an offel 10 buy or II anr. security referred to or mentioned lhe matter IS presented merely for Ihe convenlen of Ihe subscllber Whl e -He belIeve the sources of our mlorma- han 10 be rel1ab e, we .n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe Slolements mude herem Any actIon 10 be laken by the subscllber should be bosed on his own mvestlgotlon ond Informollon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and Its offIcers or employees, may now hove, or moy laler lake, poslt.ons or trades In respect 10 any seculilies menlloned In thIS or any future Issue, ond such pOSItIon may be d,fferenl from ony vIews now or hereafler expressed In thIS or any other luue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc., whIch IS regl!tered WIth the SEC -os on Illvestmellt odvlsor, moy 9,ve adVICe to lIs Inveslment adVISOry and olhel CVlomers mdependently of any statements mode In thIS or In any olher Issue Further InformatIon on any secullty mentIOned hereIn IS available on request

————————————————————————————-., TABELLS MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE It.7' .J November 26, 1982 — … We took the opportunity, last week, to launch a critique of the market's addiction—or at least market-letter writers' addiction—to the subject of interest rates. This turned out to be fortuitous, since this week's price behavior manifested mild withdrawal symptoms, the Dow responding to a lowered discount rate by moving below 1000 for the first time in over a month. To digress for a moment, the Dow level now of major significance from a technical point of view is 980. A move be- low that level, a possibility considered unlikely a couple of weeks ago, could suggest a correction of intermediate-term proportions. We concluded our comment of last week by suggesting that a fundamental diffIculty in tying market moves to interest rates stemmed from the fact that there existed no universal agreement on the basic question of why interest rates behave as they do. This disagreement extends to a number of related phenomena, also touching upon stock price movements, sup.h as inflation and the effects of substantial Federal deficits. Since market commentators tend to view these factors from wildly varying perspectives, it is perhaps worthwhile to enumerate those differing perspectives, to identify; in other words, t/1e various sets of players in the game. The first such school of thought may be called, simply, the old-time conventional wisdom. In this view, interest rates are simply a product of Federal Reserve policy, tight money meaning higher interest rates and easy money, lower. Deficits are said to produce higher rates, via the process of crowding out, government-financing demand excluding private borrowers from the marketplace. A contrasting school of thought, however, is the monetarist view. This school would admit that 1 n1. atstLe..JI1th(Ubort .run ,a Jl-t9ducL.2!..Fed P.9Jjcy.H9wever.,JtsdiB.QipJefLcontendthe–I intermediate-term effect is for easier money to produce increased business activity, consequent greater loan demand and, therefore, higher interest rates, rather than the lower rates which the conventional wisdom postulates. There is also implicitly a suggestion in monetarism that deficits are, per se, of little importa..'lce, monetary growth being the major factor in changing output and inflation levels. Part of the problem is that monetarists, a number of years ago, won a, victory, albeit an uneasy one, in the political arena. Thus, the Fed is now officially charged to use money-supply targets as a policy determinant, occasionally thereby producing policy moves which, in the conven- tional view above, have the effect of increasing interest-rate levels. This is part of the reason why WaH Street has developed a cottage industry of Fed-watching. There then exists the supply-side view, which has a status among economic schools of thought roughly akin to that of a small over-the-counter growth stock. This school is willing to live with deficits produced by tax cuts, on the theory that these cuts will, ultimately, stimulate economic activity and thus lead to hcreased revenues which will eliminate the deficit. As far as interest rates are concerned, this school leans heavily on an inflationary-expectations theory and now seems to be coming to embrace a gold standard (a subject we will not get into here) as the proper pre- scription for dullinp; those expectations. There remains finally, of interest at least to students of ancient history, the Keynesian view. Greybeards among us can remember when this view, outside of Wall Street at least, constituted the received word. This acceptance reached its apotheosis a decade or so ago when Richard Nixon, of all people, proclaimed, We are all Keynesians now. From that point on, the road has been downhill. InterestinOly enough, however, this view would find itself in agreement with the emerging supply-siders in minir.1izinr the importance of a prospective Federal deficit, albeit claiming that the – – beneficence of this deficit stems from an entirely different set of economic effects. Interest rates; then, are a'phenomenon' explained 'in widelydifferihg'Ways 'oy'div-erse groups of presumed experts, representatives of all of which hold tenure on the best faculties. It is, therefore. unsurprising that current commentary on the subject should be a Tower of Babel reflecting the various points of view of the commentators. It is the thesis we intend to develop that this cacophony represents a frail underpinning for a theory of stock market behavior. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTlt Dow-Jones IndustrinIs (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p,m.) Cumulative Index 11/24182 1005.05 134.49 1469.19 No statement or expreSSion of opinion or any olher moNer herein conlo,ed IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be directly or mdHectly on oHer or the SoliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to Of mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for Ihe convenlenc!; of the subscriber WhIle -He believe the sources of our Informo tlon to be reliable, we m no way reprerent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any actIOn 10 be laken by the subscriber shOUld be based on hiS own ,vestlgolton and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. as a corpora/lon, and lIS offuers or employees, may now have, at may later toke. poslttons or trades In respect to ony secunhes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from ony vIews now or hereofter epressed In this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on ,vestment odvisor, may give odvJCe to 115 ,vestment adVisory and othel customers Independently of ony stotements mode, Itns or ' any other ISsue Further Informahon on any secuflly mentioned herein Is available on request .

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08640 OIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 3, 1982 A story in Tuesday's New York Times entitled Wall Street's Furious Swings is typical of recent commentary on market aotion. The general theme of the piece is that market volatility haa in- I —an;umberli!;!ac;tio'nthatar;eu!nusual..thTeoreiIfDoprlyei;iii;;,;with-dL1 out precedent, , is to exaggerate the caae. There are three problems, In our view, with the Times story. The first is that it covers only the period 1970 to date, a relatively restricted timeframe. The second touches a sensitive nerve as far aa this letter Is concerned. It persists in talking about daily point changes in the Dow, including a chart to prove that the average daily point change for November waa the highest in history, a fact which is true but meaningless. We state once again the ob- vious fact that daily changes, in order to be comparable over time, must be stated in turns of percent- ages or (see below) some comparable statistic. The article aIao talks at length about the market's volatility, and, we suppose, the applicable Webster's definition here is tending to erupt in violent action. It is indeed true that over the period August/October the market did erupt, going up by an unusually large amount in a short period of time. There seems, however, to be an implication that variability during this period was In fact unusual, and such is simply not the caae. To illstrate the distinction, a market which went up 10 points a day for a long period of time would be dynamic but not variable. One which alternated going up 20 points and down 10 for the same period of time would achieve the same result, but with variability considerably greater. How dOes the variability in today's market compare with paat periods We attempt to remedy the defects cited above in the following chart. First of all, the chart covers the period 1926 to date. Secondly, it meaaures daily log changes rather than point changes (percentage change would have been equally appropriate, but logs are a bit more precise). Finally, the actual figure charted is the standard deviation of daily log changes each month from their monthly mean. Readers unfamiliar with statistics need only be aware that the standard deviation is simply a measure of the amount by which a given group of numbers varies from its average. C;IANDARO Df. …. 1AfION m OAlli lOu UiRNUl.S DOW JONtS IhDU'irRIAL AVtRRM. MQNIHLY 192G . DArt The first item that Ule chart clearly suggests is that current volatility is miniscule compared with that demonstrated In the 1930's, particularly the periods 1929-1933 and 1937-1939. Secondly, current action Is by no means unprecedented in recent history. The standard deviation reached higher peaks in October as maio; m1a9r7k4t December turning 1973 Points May 1970, and May. an dccurrence which, 1962. Three of these. at least will be remembered it is our belief ,also occurred in August,- 1982. ,spection oJ 11)e chart will show other spikes around past bear market bottoms. Recent market volatility. therefore. is not at all without parallel. It is. rather. a. relatively un- frequent but nQt uncommon event consistently associated with major-cycle turning points. This associa- tlon, we think. is the most meaningful aspect of recent market action. AWTrs Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S A P'CompOl!lte (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (12/2/82) 1039.74 139.42 1507.77 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL No statement or expression of opinion or ony other mafter herem contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe soliCitation of on offer to buy sell anr. security referred to or mentIoned The motter IS presented merely for the convenience of Ihe ubscrlber. While we believe the sources of our Informa- tion to relloh e, we In no way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herem Any action to be token by the subSCriber shol,lld be bosed I own inVestigatIOn and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, 0 ( corporation, and lIS officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later loke, In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter e)preed In Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS rcgl5tered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advice to lis Investment adVisor.., and othel J of any stalement5 made In thiS or m an.., other ISsue Further Information on any seoJflty mentioned herem IS available on request

T TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMSER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe December 10, 1982 We have discussed, from time to time over the past month, the subject of interest rates or, morespeifcr!l.!IY.i''the-mock-market 's preoccupation-with-interefl!7ates !' A–f.gflt-aS!'-weindica- ted that one of our conceptual problems with this particular fixation was the fact fhat there existed at least four reasonably-widely-accepted explanations of why interest rates behave as they do and that, with supposed experts in near-total disagreement, there were distinct pitfalls in installing money-rate movements as linchpin of a theory of short-term stock market behavior. The stock market, over the past year at least, has appeared wholeheartedly to accept one par- ticular view, a view which we identified two weeks ago as conventional wisdom. According to this theory, interest rates, for at least as far ahead as the market cares to look, are solely a product of Federal Reserve policy. Unfortunately, quasi-officially at least, the Fed is not supposed to be looking at interest rates at all but at monetary aggregates. Thus', until recently, the market tend- ed to treat every decline in those aggregates as bullish, presumably on the theory that a resultant Fed pattern of less restraint would produce lower interest rates and thus better stock prices. Insofar as the federal deficit is concerned, the market also appears to have accepted the conventional wisdom, finding itself thereby locked in uneasy embrace with the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives. Thus, equity marts greeted the Reagan tax cuts with a profound lack of enthusiasm and have tended to respond positively to recent measures to increase taxes, thereby presumably coming closer to bringing the federal budget into balance. Now it is possible to point out, without necessarily agreeing with them, that there exist other schools of thought with regard to interest rates and deficits. Supply-side eomomists would have us believe, for example, that the tax cuts, if followed through, will stimulate the economy sufficiently so as to produce added revenues. Ironically, the demand-side, or Keynesian. theories of the 1930's would also tend to suggest that a massive budget deficit was a proper stance during a period of – – –seven–econlJlli1uontraution- L-et'us-assume-for-just-amOrfientthat–there-may-exist4!ome-merit–to….- either or both of these points of view. The result would be a 1983 economic recovery of some proportions. Ironically, most analysts agree, this would have a tendency to produce upward pressure on interest rates, and, therefore, if stock-market behavior is truly correlated with bond yields, we are forced to the quixotic conclusion that economic recovery would be bearish for the market. We happen to have some personal difficulty in buying this, and, as time goes on, we have a suspicion that the'market will also. What we are su,,)esting, in other words, is that recent market behavior can be more sensibly rationalized in terms of Ilnticipated economic recovery than in terms of interest rates. This theory is harder to quantify, since interest rates are falling day-by-day, and the recovery is still out there somewhere in the future. Nonetheless, it seems to us clear that the market is indeed making some sort of statement on recovery prospects. Earnings for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average are down, on an annualized basis, some 35-40 over the past five quarters. The market's response to this has been to post one of the steepest rises in its history. Now it is not our intent to deplore this phenomena. We are technicians and, therefore, do not think the market is irrational. Indeed, the historic lead time of stock-market bottoms on economic recoveries suggest'! that the market's record as 8 forecaster in this regard is at least as good as that of most economists. What we are saying is that built into recent market action there are some definite assumptions about recovery prospects for next year. Thus, future short-term fluctmtions may well hinge on the emerging validity of those assumptions. We have seen some manifestation of this sort of thing in the past few days as airline stocks went into a tailspin on analyst estimates, and a single earnings forecast caused a cataclysm in video-game stocks. – We 'expect' there will-be 'more 'snch'occurrences inAhe-future.–Earnings devel- opments have a considerably longer historic' record as explanations of market behavior than do interest rates. We would expect the importance of such developments remaining in line with expecta tions to reemerge in a983. AWT rs ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.) 1027.59 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 140.57 Cumulative Index (12/9/82) 1525.51 No ,tatement or eXpreSSion of opinion or any other motler herem contolned 15, or 1 to be deemed 10 be, dlrettly or Indtrectly. on offer or the solICitation of an offer to buy o( sell any security referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convenunce of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slalemenh mude herein Any action 10 be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own IOvestlgotlon and 1Oformotlon Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades 10 respect to any securities mentioned 10 thiS or any fu1\Jre 1Sl1fl, and such palhon may bl,l dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter elpressed In thiS or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered Wllh the SEC as on 1Ovel1ment adVISor, may gIVe adVice to 115 Invcstment adVisory and olhel CUSlomeu Independently of any stalements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further information on any security menhoned herein 1 available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE – December 17, 1982 We intend, this year as always, to issue a two-part year-end forecast, the first part – , consisti'.! g-ofa -reviw of-past-histol'y-.-Our-normalpl'actice -in-suh-reviws-'-has-been-simply–.\- to cover 'the' previous year. In thinking about this overthe past few weeks, however, it be- came apparent to us that an historical review germane to the present stock market situation should cover a much longer period of time, in this case all the way back to the late 1940's. Moreover, in the past few days, it became equally apparent that such a review would also be required to focus on a much shorter timeframe, i.e., the past six weeks. With this in mind, let us begin. Space limitations allow an only cursory summary of stock-market history between June 13, 1949 and September 21, 1976. Suffice it to say that during this period there occurred seven bull markets. The first four of these (the fourth ended on February 9, 1966) had two essen- tially universal characteristics. (1) Each one produced SUbstantive new highs (293.79 in 1953, 521. 05 in 1956, 734.91 in 1961, and 995.15 in 1966). (2) Each one proceeded to where it was ultimately going without much in the way of correction. With a single exception, the largest bull-market correction during that period was 13.55. These corrections, furthermore, tended to take place in the late stages of advances rather than the earlier ones. The picture changed with the next three bull markets. Rather than producing signifi- cant new highs,each of these three advances topped out at roughly the same level at which the 1966 market peaked, 985.21 on December 3, 1968, 1051. 70 on January 11, 1973, and 1014.79 on September 21, 1976. Corrections, however, followed the same pattern. They tended to be in- significant and occurred late in the process, if at all. This brings us to bull market number eight, which began in February, 1978. As far as the level at which it peaked is concerned, it followed the pattern of the previous four. Its lligJl–was1024.05-On…,ApciJ-2'7,…..J..981..It,howv.er-.-addd–neww.tinkle,-'f-hel'e—wl'e,-inthe-.4-….. three years between low and high, three notable and significant corrections, September-October 1978, October-November, 1979, and February-April, 1980. They brought the Dow down 13, 11, and 16 respectively, and, instead of being clustered toward the end of the rise, were evenly spaced throughout the advance. Each one brought the Dow back to a level very close to its February 28, 1978 starting point. Furthermore, of interest from the technician's. point of view, each one featured noticable selling climax indications (remember Silver Thursday 1980), whereas the actual start of the bull market, in 1978, had featured few such indications. There then followed the bear market of April, 1980-August, 1982, and we continue firmly 1) believe that the ninth bull market in this series began on Agust 12 of this year. Interest- ingly enough, like 1978, it began with little activity and reduced volume on the downside, how- ever spectacular the subsequent upside action may have been. Its initial rise, as we have pointed out ad nauseam, was steeper than that of any of the advances discussed above. The question which remains unanswered centers around the nature of its corrections. We had been leaning toward the view that such corrections would be similar to those of the first seven bull markets discussed above, miniscule and late. As noted, however, the last upswing established the precedent of corrections occuring early and being relatively deep. This, inevitably, forces us into consideration of the past six weeks. On November 3, the Dow made a high, 1065.49, roughly equivalent to that of the past five bull markets. It has, since then, been moving sideways and has formed what can be considered as a potential distributional top suggesting a decline of intermediate-scale proportions. None of the major averages has yet broken out of this top, although a fair number of individual stocks have indeed done so. The question which an.historical.review engenders, therefore is whether the 1976-78 precedent of severe intermediate corrections will be followed or whether the current – upswing will tend to behave along the lines of most others since World War II. The even more basic follow-on question is whether, if the former is the case, the scenario of a major bull market's having begun in August, 1982 is altered. It is these questions that will be explored in our forecast next week. AWTrs ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 998.25 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 136.29 Cumulative Index (12/16/82) 1477.39 A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL No stalemen' Of expression of opinion or any other matter herein conlolned IS, or Is to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the SohCllotron of an offer to buy or sell any secvnly referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler rs presented merely for the convenlenCtl of the subscrrber WhIle we believe the s.ources of our Information to be relIable, we In no way represent or guarantee the occurOI;'( thereof nor of the statements mude hereIn Any action to be token by the subscrrber should be based on h,s own InVestIgatIon and information Janney Montgomery Scoll. Inc, as a corporallon, and lis offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect 10 any securItIes mentlonl!d In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter eypressed In thiS or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regIstered With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment odvls.ory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In Itlls or rn any other Issue Further Information on ony security mentioned herem IS aVailable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY OB540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE December 31, 1982 For some years now, we have studied the familiar seasonal tendency of the stock market to stage a year-end -'-'co'ncJusionsthat can raB be y, and it has derived,from been th a study eoCctu!st1oimspohef ntohnisfflie'tnteornt-op-oOinUtYoourtisgoimnaelofsttuhdeoing- back to when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average first was computed in 1897, indicated that such a raIly, however miniscule, invariable had taken place. However, two recent periods, 1976-77 and 1977-78, provided exceptions, with the DJIA, in each case reaching its year-end raBy high prior to the first day of January. The last four years have seen the resumption of the usual year-end rally pattern. The following facts about the year-end raBy may be noted. 1. The year-end raBy often has been of great magnitude, occasionally continuing through the entire subsequent year without a 5 correction being recorded. It frequently has continued with only minor interruptions for as long as six months into the new year. In 1961, 1963, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1975, and 1976, the raIIy continued into February, March, or beyond. However, on other occasions, it has been of only a few day's duration, reaching a top extremely early. Thus, in 1960, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1981, and 1982, the raIIy reached a peak by the first week in January, and, as noted above, the 1976 and 1977 year-end ralIies failed entirely to carry into January. 2. There has been a persistent tendency for the rally to begin early in years when the market has been up, and late in years when the market has been down. In recent upward years, 1967, 1975, 1979, and 1980 are examples, the rally commenced from early December. In recent downward years, 1962, 1966, 1969, 1977, and 1981, the rally began late in the year. This year, an up year, the December low occurred on December 16 at 990.25. 3. The important thing to watch in connection with the market action in the early …..,. monthsofthe.newyearistheaforementioned3igurj)..thaJ!reviousDecembeJ'.,….,,……, low. This low has been broken in 50 years out of the past 82. However in 29 of these 50 cases, it was broken in January and February. For example, in 1970, 1973, 1977, 1978, 1981, and 1982, the December low was broken by early January. Since 1937, it has never been broken later than mid-March with three exceptions, 1965, 1974 and 1981, when it was finally penetrated in August. Thus, if the market is able to hold above its December low for the first 2t months of the year, chances become good that this low will not be broken. 4. In years when the December low has been broken, the subsequent trend has been downwards two-thirds of the time. 1962, 1966, 1969, 1973, 1974, and 1977 are typical cases. 1965, 1978, 1980, and most recently, 1982 were exceptions. 5. The magnitude of the rally is an important clue as to the year's market trend. For example, an advance of 10 or more from the December low has been foIIowed by an upward or neutral market in 35 of the 41 years that such an advance has occurred. An advance of less than 10 or more from the December low before an identifiable correction takes place has been followed by a downward market in 29 of the 41 years. In 1963, 1964, 1971, and 1980, the year-end rally approximated 10, and in 1972, it was 17. In 1962, 1970, 1973, and 1977, for example, it was less than this figure. This year, the rule failed to hold, with a year-end rally under 10 being followed by an up year. 6. The length of time in which the rally continues into the new year is important. For example, in 23 years, the ral1y continued into March or later. In 19 of these 23 years, the eventual trend was-upward.-, In1964,-1972,1975,and 1976 — the year-end rally continued into March and in 1961, 1967, 1971, and 1980. into February. This year. therefore, the December low. reached December 16 at 990.25, will become an important reference point to watch. If the Dow is able to advance from this low by 10. roughly to the 1100 level. or continue a rally into February or March, the long-term historical implications would be bulIish. RJS rs Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1100 a.m.) 1047.09 S & P Composite (1100 a.m.) 140.28 Cumulative Index (12/30182) 1516.70 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS. JR. DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contOlned Is, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or Ihe ollcLto!lon of 0 offer to buy or sell onr. security referred to or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for Ihe convenience ollhe subSCriber. While we belIeve the sources of our ,formo 1101'1 10 be reHob e. we ' no way represent or guorentee the euracy thereof nor of the slotements mude herem Any actIon 10 be token by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own Inve51lgotlon and ,formohon Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporatIon, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poSItions or trades m respect to any securitIes menTIoned m This or any future Issue, and such pOSItIon may be different from any vIews now or hereafter e.opressed In Ihn or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered With lhe SEC as on ,vestmenT odvisor, may gIve adVICe 10 lIs ,vesTment advISOry and olher customers Independently of ony ,tolements mode Il'I Ihls or Il'I any olher Issue Further InformatIon on any serunty mentIoned hereIn 1 ovmlable on ruest