—. — -.. – — . –. —- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER L – —-.– ! I I ! I 1 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMaER NEW YORI( STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMaER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – – – . – – – – – '- ——– -. -. … – –'W'–' — ..–'—–'-. …g ……..-., January-5T197-3 It is pleasant to return to one's desk after two refreshing weeks on a Vermont mountainside and find that the action of the market in the interim ha s been perfectly normal, with a minimum of unusual developments. just prior to Christmas, the Dow-jones Industnal Average, as lt had to do eventually, underwent the first recognizable correction in its sharp advance from an mtra-day low of 917.07 last October. When it reached a closing low of, interestmgly enough, exactly 1000, all downside objectives of the small top formed in early December had been reached, and the market, for the first time in over two months, had reached a measur- ably oversold condition on a short-term basis. Thus the rally of the past two weeks was the logical expecta- tion, and the process carrled the Dow on to a new hlgh for the move at midday Friday. The rally, unfortunately, was pretty much confined to the Dow-type blue chips. Week's end found both the transportation and utility indices signIflcantly below their peaks of November-December, and breadth on the advance was not as impressive as might have been expected considering that the Dow- jones Industrial Average rose thirty-six points in the three days around the New Year holiday. A perhaps relevant item is the fact that on Wednesday, when the Dow first posted a new high, eighty-five stocks on the New York Stock Exchange posted 1972-73 h1ghs. Now it is not this factor that 1S important. It is the fact that 1827 issues traded that day, and thus 1742 stocks dld not post 1972-73 highs. Moreover, even while the market was moving ahead sharply, a great many of the air pockets which began manifesting themselves last Summer again developed in Issues reporting disappointing developments of one sort or another. Moreover, as the market sails ahead to new peaks, breadth action stubbornly refuses to confirm the admittedly powerful strength shown by the Dow. Now none of the aloove constitutes an attempt to questlOn the validity of the current rally or to suggest that we do not believe in Its near-term continuance. We continue to feel that the Dow has an upside objective somewhere in the 0 1OSOIlOO-range-and that-that figurewill-be-attainedin-thereasonablynear-future ;the- advance bemg interrupted by only occasional minor corrections such as that of mid-December. We feel it is incumbent upon us, however, to be aware of what is actually happening in the market place and to try to draw conclusions from market action as the pieces in the puzzle slowly fall into place. It is quite obvious, for example, that the advance from the 1970 lows through the Summer of 1972 featured, by and large, the institutional quality growth stocks, and the great bulk of market gains achieved in that period were due to the normal bull-market process of marking up the pnce which investors were wllling to pay for a dollar of earnings in these issues. By mid-1972 that process had pretty well run its course, most of these stocks having achieved, by that time, record peak multiples. After the indecisive action of Summer and Fall a new phase developed COincidentally with the October- December rally. At thlS pOint, the market begain to pay attention the the hltherto-neglected slow-growth and cyclical blue-chip issues, and it is no accident that it was during this phase that the Dow, heavily weighted with these is sues, finally penetrated the 1000 level, attaining a new h1gh for the first hme in over six years. While all this was going on the growth leaders of the earller phase essentially moved sideways. As we said in our year-end forecast, the unanswered question for 1973 is whether leadership w111 broaden still further and eventually shift into secondary and tertiary issues. The growth stocks were, in general, fully exploited ruring the initlal phase of the advance. While there is probably a good deal more upslde potential remaining m some of the Dow blue chips and thus in the Dow average, it is probable that a good portion of this mark-up phase, perhaps the bulk of it, has already been seen. It is the speculatlve areas of the market place which as yet remain unexploited. Paradoxically, a source of strength may lle in the very fact that we have had, m the course of this 2 1/2 year bull market, two reasonably sharp correctlOns–during the Summer and Fall of 1971 and the ldentical period of 1972. In the course of these downswmgs many stocks underwent private bear markets of their own. Many mobile home issues, for example, are selling from one-third to one-half thelf 1972 peaks. It IS quite possible that a number of these stocks,after a necessary penod of rebasing,could be in a positlOn to resume upside leadership. As we have stated before, the answers are not yet ln, and we do not think it lS necessary at this pOlnt to guess the future in so far as investment strategy is concerned. The best technlcal action at the moment con- tinues to be shown by the h,gh-grade, moderate-growth and cycllcal stocks, and 1t is in these stocks that portfollo managers should concentrate their efforts. Future moves, mto secondary issues, lf they begm to show strength, or into a defensive posture, if such strength is lacking, can be taken when technical conditwns warrant. Dow-jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 1047.26 S&P(1200p.m.) 119.94 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL AWTrk No stolement or expression of opinion or ony other moller herein contOlned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreClly or Indirectly, on offer or tne soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informa lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guoranlee the accuracy thereof nor of the slatements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own InvestlgO/Jon and Informa/Jon Janney Montgomery Scolt, Jne, as a corporation, ond lIs offJcers or empJoyees, moy now have, Or may Jafer lo,,e, positions or trades In respect to cny securities mentioned, thiS or any future Issue, ond such position may be different From ony views now or hereafter expressed In Ihl or any o'her Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC os on IOvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory ond othel customers Independently of cny statements mode, thIS or In ony other Issue Further InformotlOn on any security mentIOned herein IS avolloble On request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMEFUCAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 12, 1973 1200 on the Dow. That's a Mdest Expectation for 1973. e ' -'.7.'- . – HeadlYne-Barron's, January 8;-'1973 – Onward and Upward. Experts Now Say It's Just a Matter of Time until the Dow Index hits 1000. Headline-Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1971 There is a tradition which recommends casting a jaundiced eye on consensus forecasts, and in retrospect this was a wise attitude insofar as the second forecast quoted was concerned. The Dow did indeed, as we all know, ultimately reach the 1000 level, but the matter of time was 18 months, and a detour from 950 via 800 was involved. Now a consensus forecast has again emerged, typified in an excellent series of articles in Barron's, the headline of one of which is cited above. In the articles, a panel of ten experts discuss the generally excellent outlook for business in 1973 and the probability that this excellent business outlook could well produce higher equity prices. So far in 1973, at least, the market has done its best to bear the forecast out. President Nixon's announcement of Phase 3 at noon Thursday turned a dull trading session into a 15-pointadvance before profit-taking set in. One of the first things that the novice technician learns is not to fight markets which are as obviously strong as this one, even as the novice sailor learns not to spit into the wind. As AlanAbelson, one of the few stock market writers with a gift for turning a phrase,puts it in the same issue of Barron's, The Dow(has)a real bead on the Battle of Hastings (and ultimately, who knows, maybe on the Magna Carta). For our own part, we would be reluctant to base invest- ment policY-9!J.hlsl!tgqn-A.nythilg other.than,Cl,5'Qntjnul'!,Ua.Yorltble El-'!uity,climate,.. …,.-'. – Indeed, we countoursel;,es firmly i'the-cam'p of the optimists insofar as the 1973 economy is concerned. GNP posted an advance of just under 10 in 1972,and we are inclined to think it will do the same in 1973, probably with an accelerated rate of expansion in the first quarter. Real GNP should come close to duplicating the better-than-6 advance of last year. The essen- tial question is, of course, to what extent is the stock market already discounting these prospects There is a school of thought which says that the normal discounting process has been less vigorous in the present instance than in past bull markets and there is, therefore, a good deal more room on the upside. We confess to a degree of skepticism regarding this view. We have always believed that news on the front pages of national publications is generally pretty well reflected in equity prices. The rosy outlook for the upcoming year could be news only to a hermit. And yet if the market is going to run into trouble in 1973,there will have to be a reason. Some sort of monkey wrench will have to be thrown into the now-smoothly-purring machinery. Trying to guess what it might be is like searching a cloudless sky for the direction from which a storm may come. And yet we are willing, tentatively, at this stage, to offer a guess. If the market reacted violently to the Thursday's announcement, it paid no attention whatsoever to the previous day's statement by the Labor Department noting that December's wholesale prices expanded at an annual rate of 62.4, the greatest month-to-month rise in 22 years. Wholesale prices, moreover, tend to be a leading indicator. Inflation in other words is not dead, nor does it, apparently, sleep. Throughout 1972 the money stock has been growing at a rate well above the .,. average for the-past few years and, if Phase 2 did indeed have any success in holding priCes down, it is difficult to believe that Phase 3 will be more effective. The question is, if more economic intelligence like the December wholesale price raise is forthcoming, how will the admmistration and the Federal Reserve act The past record give little confidence. All too often, the reaction in the past has been to jam on the monetary brakes. Whatever effect this sort of thing had on the economy, the effect on the stock market was prompt and apparent, as 1966, 1969, and, to a lesser degree, 1971 attest. We have no intention of being worry warts, but if trouble, now invisible, is going to manifest itself, we would like to know, at least, in what direction to be looking for it. We think the inflation front is as good an area to keep an eye on as any. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200p.m.) 1051.63 S&P (1200 p.m.) 120.'46 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or c;presslon vf opmlon or ony other matter herein tontomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the soliCitation of on offN to buy or ell ony security referred to or mentioned The moiler u presented merely for Ihe converlence; of The subscriber While we believe The sources of our Informa Tlon To be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranTee The accuracy Thereof nor of The staTements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on his own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporallcn, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may fater tae, posllions or trades In respect to any securities menTIOned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any v,ws now or hereafter expressed on thlS or any ather Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gll.. e adVice To Its Invcstment adVISOry and othcl CI,Istomers independenTly of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further informaTion on ony security mentioned herem IS available on requesT

TABELL'S \ MARKET L LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe January 19, 1973 ,Th. mar,ket analyst is, by., training. accustome,d to relY.,on ,statistlc;s,. -YLtjl,er,e ar.e ti,mes when. numbers, especially the more obvious ones, do not seem to be telling the full story, and it is at these times that experience, intuition, and, to a degree, guesswork must be brought into play. Recent market action provides a case in point. It is, after all, just over a week since January 11 when the Dow-Jones Industrials posted a newall-time high of 1067.20, and the market at the moment is off only modestly from that high. One would expect last week's miniscule correction to have excited hardly a npple in the financial community and to be shrugged off with blithe comment about the need for consolidation after such a sharp advance. Yet the mood appeared to be profoundly different,and,only days after the high, the sort of concerns typical of the advanced stages of a downswing emerged. The feeling was inescapable that the message being telegraphed by the averages was 'somehow false–that the pattern of a strong bull market rally followed by a minor correction was not typical of the pattern of the average stock, or indeed the experience of the average investor. We decided, therefore, to repeat an exercise which we have performed in the past and to examine each stock on the New York and American Stock Exchangos at 1tS close on Wednesday of this week in relation to its high and low for 1972-73. This more intensive look at statistics tends to reaffirm the fact that now, more than ever, the averages are not telling the true story of the market. From the three numbers discussed above, Le. 1972-73 high, 1972-73 low and recent price, a number of interesting statistics may be derived. Among the most relevant are the percentage decline from the high, the percentage advance from the low, and the relative position within the c.tr;'!,';ling.r,mge between.highalow. Let. us examine .indiv.idually-each-of,these, number-s-f-orAhe. Dow and for those 2487 individual issues which we studied. 1. Percent Decline from High. The Dow closed Wednesday at 1029.12 some 3.5 down from its high for 1972-73,yet only 124 issues of 2487, fewer than 5 of the total, were, at Wednesday's close, that close to their high for the 13 months. The average issue had, as of mid-week, declined 26 from its 1972-73 peak. Almost 1000 issues were down 30 or more from their high, 326 were down 50 or more, and almost 100 managed to post declines 10 excess of 65. 2. Percentage Advance from Low. By this measure, the Dow at Wednesday's close, was up 16.5 from its low of 1972, made in early January of last year. The average stock had done somewhat better than this, and was up just under 25 from its 1972-73 low. However, th1s is at least in part due to the influence of a small number of outstanding individual performers (54 stocks were more than 100 above their lows) and the fact that individual issues tend to be more volatile than the average. Nonetheless, 1097 stocks, some 44 of the entire list, were up from their lows by a lesser percentage than the Dow and, despite the fact that we are within an ace of the high in a 2 1/2 year old bull market, only 444 issues were up 40 or more from their lows of the past 13 months. This must be conRidered a somewhat less than impressive figure. 3. Relative Position within Trading Range. The range of the Dow for 1973 has, as noted above, been between 1067.20 and 883.43, a span of some 183 paints. As of Wednesday's close, 1t was 145 points above its low, thus placing it in the upper 20 of the 183-point trading range. An examination of individual stocks in relation to their own trading ranges is revealing. Only 954 '-issues 'have'equalled the performance of the Dow'and remain in the upper 20 oftheir 1'972-73' ranges, and the average issue is in the lower two thirds of its range. 895 issues are in the lower half of their 1972-73 ranges, and almost 400 are in the lower quarter of these ranges. Now all of the above does nothing more than document the intuitive feeling that the performance of the averages is painting a rosier picture than the performance of the average stock. It is, however, worth noting that market advances tend to lose rather than to gain momentum as they mature. The rationale for investment in the stock market has always been the possib1hty of earning a greater-than-average return. Quite clearly, the expectable return in recent markets has, despite the performance of the Dow, not been all that exciting. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.)1019.49 S & P (1200 p.m.) 118.03 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAfIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreSMon of Opinion or ony other motter herein contOlned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, dlrertly or Indirectly, on offer or the S011Clloilon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convePlena of the subscnber While -Ne believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guo ron lee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscllber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomery 5;011, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thl or any future Issue, and such position mcy be different from any views now or hereafter e.(pressed In thl or any olher ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, moy give adVICe to IS Inve!olment adVISOry and olhel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

– – – – – – ,——— \ TABELL'S MARKET LETTER J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK. STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 26, 1973 Havmg just excited all sorts of fanfare by breaking through the magic 1000 level on the upside a few months -ago-; the Dow-Jones -Industrials-seerrre-d -bent'this-weekOn -reversing'that- magic-by-pene– trading 1000 in the opposite direction. As the reactionary trend of recent sessions continued, the market, after posting a tepid rally in response to the announcement of the peace settlement,plummeted some 14 points in Wednesday's trading. By noon on Friday, the decline had carried on below 1000, the Dow having given up another six points at 998.80. One piece of news that might have helped fuel the decline was the announcement last week of Decem- ber figures on mutual fund sales and redemptions. The fact that redemptions again exceeded sales by a modest amount provided no immediate downside spark since it was notably lacking in news value. There was very little dramatic shock element comparable to the summer of 1971 when it developed, in May of that year, that redemptions had exceeded sales for the first time in the history of recorded figures. Since that time, the pheromenon has become somewhat old hat. There has been a net out- flow from mutual funds in every month since February 1972, and the net excess of redemptions over sales for the full year has been in excess of 1.7 billion. Both the optimist and the pessimist can buttress their arguments with the most recent mutual fund statistics. It should be pOinted out first of all that the 1.7 blllion cash outflow is relatively mini- scule considering the almost 60 billion of assets that funds as a whole had on hand at the end of 1972. Moreover net redemptions during 1972 have apparently stabilized at a relatively low level rather than showing any tendency to increase. A look at the figures, however, tends to lend support to our long-held thesis that the basic market climate has changed drastically since the middle 1960's. The following table shows, in the first column, the net sales (sales minus redemptions) of all mutual Juncis ea ch,y,a,. si'lce.1.95 5and,.-inthe secondcolumn-,–t-he-aetua-l-net- purcnas es-of securities;-(iargely – common stocks) by those funds. MILLIONS OF DOLLARS YEAR SALES – REDEMPTIONS NET PURCHASES YEAR SALES – REDEMPTIONS NET PURCHASES 1955 764.9 635.7 1964 1528.8 1541. I 1956 913.9 860.0 1965 2395.7 1921.3 1957 984.8 953.6 1966 2666.7 1498.7 1958 1108.5 997.1 1967 1925.3 2330.6 1959 1494.3 1269.0 1968 2981. 0 2360.5 1960 1255.4 1142.2 1969 3056.6 2397.7 1961 1790.5 1783.0 1970 1638.2 1834.7 1962 1576.3 1241. 6 1971 413.3 1023.8 1963 953.7 927.5 1972 -1731. 3 -1727.9 The first thing we think it important to note about the table is the tremendous shift in basic market impact that has taken place between the late 1960's and 1972. Purchases by the fund industry grad- ually built up from a level of 635 mlllion in 1955 to around 2.3 billion for the years 1967-69. In 1972, net sales of securities were 1.7 billion, a total swing of 4 billion. It seems obvious that such a swing must have an impact on the overall market climate. Again, however, on the optimistic side,it must be noted that 1972,was byarrllarge,not that bad a market year. The market has obviously developed the capacity to survive a good deal of mutual fund selling. A second factor worthy of mention is the fact that thre have often been important discrepancies between the cash inflow to funds and the amount actually invested. Thus, in the most recent period, the funds invested considerably less than all of the cash they received during 1968-69, w,ereas they draw down on this cash reserve, investing considerably more than their cash inflow in 1970-71. For 1972 actual sales of securities were about equal to net redemptions. What about 1973 It would, unfortunately, be unrealistic to expect sales or purchases of secur- ities by the fund industry to be much different than the sales-minus-redemption figure. Although cash position was built up somewhat in the year,heavy purchases of securities by the industry late in the year brought cash down to 5 of assets, generally considered a relatively low figure. It is thus likely that mutual funds as a whole will have limited reserves to draw on for market support during the year ahead. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.)998.80 S&P (1200 p.m.) 116.08 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrk – No statement or expression of opmlon or any other matter herein contolned IS, or I to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menhoned The molter IS presented merely for the converlcnc!O of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarontee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporallon, and It officers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, POSitiOns or trades In respect to any seCUrities menlloned In thiS or any fulure Issue, ond such position moy be different from any views now or hereafter e'(pressed In thl3 or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may g.ve adve to .ts Invutment adVisory and othlI customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any oher Issue Further Informotlon on any security mentioned herein IS avollable on request

,———————— – . ..——– —-. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ,— — 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08640 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHA.NGE February 2, 1973 The market, it seems to us, has been suffering from a sort of schizophrenia over the past few -weeks. We commented on one-aspect-of this -two weeks ago, -when-we- pointed out that-, although the averages had made a new high only a week before, the mood of the finanCial community seemed to be one typical of the more advanced stages of a decline. As the downswing continued through this week, reaching a low of 981 on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average on Friday morn- ing the despair deepened, heightening the contrast with the euphoria of less than a month ago which accompanied the averages' attainment of newall-time highs. In one sense, this schizophrenia may be attributed to the vlOlent contrast existing at the moment between technical and fundamental factors bearing on security prices. The move to new highs in November, December and January was accompanied by growing fanfare about the rosy outlook for the economy in general and for corporate earnings in particular. During the ensuing decline, we and our brothers in the technical-analysis fraternity have been pointing out the abundant' symptoms of a market in less-than-perfect technical health. Now our own career in the securities industry has paralleled the growth in respectability of technical analysis, and we are naturally gratified that we and our confreres are being listened to. We may now, however, have to guard against the difficulty that has plagued ourfundamentalist brethren for years—the possibility that, at any given time, our projections may be at least partially discounted. The signs of technical malaise which have been so widely pointed out are, most certainly, real and they include, but are by no means limited to, the following factors. 1. Market Breadth – For almost a year and a half now, breadth has been, in a word, abysmal. –Ourbreadth index reached-itspeak -lnMarch; 1972 at if Tower level -Uran its April,197rhTgn-'It remained in a steady downtrend as the averages inched ahead to new highs in mid-1972, and, although it staged a modest recovery on the October-November rally, it failed even to approach levels it had attained as long ago as May. The recent high in the averages was not confirmed by breadth on a short-term baSis, and the index is now flirting with its October lows, attained when the Dow was at 930. 2. Maturity – The upswing from May 1970 was, at its mid-January peak, 665 trading days old. This plaes us In a time frame where, a bok at market history ells us, we should be seeking signs ci a Ililrla peek. 3.Illiquidity – The sudden collapses in market values of many issues caused by only modest changes in fundamental outlook have been as well documented as they have been painful to inves- tors in the stocks affected. 4. Penetration of December Low – This took place last week and, as we have suggested in the past, such a penetration, historically, has often foreshadowed a down market. Now as we stated above, all of these symptoms are real and, in light of them, we have abso- lutely no quarrel with an investment policy which would involve non-participation in any rally that might occur over the next few months. Investment policy, however, must be distinguished from a market forecast and we are somewhat suspicious of forecasts which suggest that a market already down 70 points in three weeks is going to continue to sink like a stone with no interrup- tion whatever. Among the mitigating factors are the fact that the averages have reacted to what should, for the time being at least, be a fairly strong support level andthat most short-term indicators have reached the sort of overso-Id condition from which- an advance historically has ensued. We do not discount, in other words, the short-term possibility of a rally from somewhere around current levels. As a general rule, at this stage of the market, it is not the magnitude of decline s which gives us a clue as to longer-term market directionbut the strength and character, or lack of it, on market rallies. We think, therefore, that close scrutiny of any future short-term advance will be important. If better breadth and new leadership develop, the market outlook for 1973 could vastly improve. If the advance consists, as recent ones have, of nothing more than a markup in the pie ratios of a narrow list of growth favorites, it will be more incumbent on us than ever to pay att- ention to the distressing technical symptoms noted above. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.)983.97 ANTHONYW. TABELL S&P(l200 p.m.) 114.54 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrk No statement or expreslon of opinion or CJny other matter herein contolned IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the soll(IIOllon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the conVel11cnC5 of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our In/orma lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Iheref nor of the stotements mude herein. Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be hosed on hlS own Investigation and Informollon Janney Mcntgomery SCali, Inc, 05 a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, posilions or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In thiS or ony future luue, and such position mey be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Inveslment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment odvlsory and other customers Independently of any stotemems mode In tflls ar In ony other Issue Further Informal Ion on any security mentioned herein IS ovolfoble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE February 9th, 1973 Despite sporadic intra-day attempts to rally, stock pnces still found themselves little in the way of significantspport in last week's trading. A five-point advance In the Dow on Wednesday morning was aborted anci-turn-d ;;to 'a-n Tl-p';-int dcii-ne,whi-ch continued with further sinking spells in Thursday morning's trading. Although a mild rally attempt Thursday afternoon failed to demonstrate a great deal of follow-through, some strength was evident in early Friday trading. The bear cub spawned last January 11th is now beginning to grow claws. In short, the decline, which has now extended to almost 9 in 19 trading days for the DJIA, is be- ginning to hurt. As drops of this na ture become increasingly pa inful, various reactions are possible. Some, unfortunately, border on the irrational. Two such responses can be characterized as the horrorific visIOn and the indignant bleat. The horrorific-vision sort of response could well. in the present instance, center around the well-advertised dOings in European money centers. A casual reading of the headlines of the past week would seem to suggest that the United States will soon be owned,lock, stock, and barrel, by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Indeed, one possible reason for the market's response to the heavy selling of dollars abroad IS the fact that very few people seem to have any precise idea of iust exactly what it means or does not mean as far as the U. S. stock market is concerned. There is an apocryphal story to the effect that only two people in the world really understand the tnternational money market, a clerk in the Bank of England and a partner in the House of Rothschild. They, it is said, disagree. Our own reaction to these developments is perhaps an overly simplistiC one. – Wewould suggest–that-the-ul-timateeffectwi-l-l be-I)-an upward-revaluation of- ma-jor- — . European currencies, which will, in turn, produce 2) another rise in the price of Volks- wagens. If this is catastrophic for the market. so be it. The second category of response, the indignant bleat, tends to come from those who consider market declines a personal affront. XY2 Corporation, they tell us, IS going to earn 10 per share. How, it is asked, can the ignorant stock market value It at 50 Translating this sort of plea into current terms, might produce the statement that the Dow- Jones Industrial Average Will probably, in 1973, earn 73 a share. How can it, as was the case at this week's intraday low, sell for only thirteen times these all-time record earnings The obvious answer to this one IS, simply, that it, in fact, did. As we have pointed out innumerable times in the past, earnings and dividends are not the only in- puts to market prices. Investor confidence is equally important and can be expressed numerically by the price paid for a dollar of earnings. That price, in the case of the Dow, was 13 last week, has been both higher and lower in the past, and wilL in all probability, be both higher and lower again. If we are to draw any optimism for the future from last week's events, we, for ourselves, would prefer to do it with hard statistical fact. Such fact is, in actuality, available. At iast week's low, the market had reached, in terms of a number of indicators, the sort of measurably oversold condition which has in the past characterized important bottoms. In terms of one such indicator -the excess of decllntng issues over advancing issues on a 10-day basis reached 25 of the tota I number of issues traded. This is, admittedly, a somewhat esoteric number. However, on the record, it has occurred comparatively few times 10 the recent past and, 10 the major- ity of those cases at least, some rally from then-existing levels has ensued. We are, thus, as we indicated last week, impelled to a degree of moderate optimism on a short-term basis. Further, as we suggested last week, it is generally not sharp declines that worry the techniCian, but weak ralites. A narrow and modest advance from whatever bottom is made over the near term would cause us to increase our skeptiCism regard- ing the futureco.nreof equity prices. Before we can make any such diagnosIs, how- ever, we mus t wait for such an advance to occur. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 972.61 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1200 p. m.) 113.98 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL N e ; el;presslon of opInion or any other moIler herein contolned I, or IS to be deemed to be, dorectly or Indirectly, on offer or the sollcllallon of on offer 10 buy or sell any securrty referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convellenCE of the subSCriber While NI! believe the sOU'ces of our Informo- tlon to be relloble, we In no woy represent or gUorantee the accuracy Thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any achon to be tal..en by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigaTion and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCurotles mentioned In thiS or any future ISSUe, and such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter e) pressed m thiS or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,ch .s registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to 115 Investment odvIory and other customers Independently of ony statements mode 'n thiS or In any other Issue Further InformatIon on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 16, 1973 The stock market spent the past two weeks putting on a performance reminiscent of an old-fashioned – -, roller-coaster-ride .-.-T-heprice- sk-id -which-hadbeen-going on'since-early January-halted-Thursday -a'week ago, as an eight-point decline, WhICh had reached an intra-day low of 954.17, was virtually erased in two successive afternoon rallies. There were followed by back-to-back 12-point advances on Friday and Monday and an astonishing twenty-point plus rise in the first half hour of Tuesday's trading. The rest of Tuesday was spent giving up the bulk of that gain and Wednesday saw the sharpest drop in sne twenty months, a 16-point decline in the Dow. Thursday and Friday showed continued weakness suggesting a test of the recent 1973 intra-day low of 954.17. No less an authority than the N'ew York Times informed us on Thursday morning that It wa s a performance that left Wall Street confus ed and bewildered. A good deal of the confusion and bewilderment obviously stemmed from attempts to connect the market's performance with what has come to be the fashionable financial buzz word, intemationalmonetary-crisis. If one assumes that market fluctuations are the result of that crisis and the subsequent devaluation, one's reasoning must run as fOllows A–As the crisis developed, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (1) skidded 113 pOints from its January high and then, (2), with no apparent change in the situation, advanced 42 points on an intra-day basis on Tuesday and Wednesday. B–With the devaluation, the market (1) advanced 23 points on Tuesday's opening and (2) declined 41 points on the rest of Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. It is hardly surprising that confusionard bewilderment should result from this sort of thinking. Actually, in order to put the market gyrations into perspective, all that is necessary IS a simple intellectual exercise, albeit that that exercise will constitute heresy in the eyes of many. It is simply 0-necessaryassume- that the market eveittsof the past two weeks had nothing-hatsoever- to- d—;;;ith -' the happenings in international currency markets. If we are only willing to make this assumption, a perfectly plausible scenario emerges. In order to outline this scenario it is first of all necessary to recall that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average spent eight months of 1972 trading, for the most part, between 925 and 980. It continued within this range as the outlook for 1973 became more and more visible. After eight long months it was, or should have been, obvious that this level constituted an equilibriu m demand level based on the existing supply/demand equation and on rather clearly defined 1973 prospects. Secondly, the market penetrated this range on the upside in a decisive rally in November and Dec- ember 1972. The widely-heralded reason for this was a sudden realization on the part of the stock market of the excellence of the 1973 economic outlook. The more skeptical among us might tend to suggest that more fundamental to the rise was the emergence of new short-term sources of demand, specifically a 100 million rise in debit balances in November and December and heavy mutual fund purchases in December despite continuing net redemptions. This advance took the Dow up some 14 over 91 trading days, rising at an average rate of 1.82 points per day. On an historical basis this constituted a fairly normal bull-market leg, but the rate was clearly unsustainable for any protracted length of time. The emergence of the consequent down- swing should hardly, therefore, been all that surprising. In any case, by middle of last week, the Dow had returned to the upper part of the equilibrium level which had contained it for eight months last year. The clash between the demand at that level and-the selling forces which had gathered momentum since January might w-ell be expected to produce fireworks just as it, in fact, did. While all of the above may help in clarifying recent market action, it does little, we admit, to answer basic questions about the future, largely because these questions remain unresolved by market action. It is still not known if new sources of demand for equities will emerge to replace those sources which were spent on the recent rally. One potential source of such demand might, of course, be foreIgn buyers who would find devalued U. S. stocks more attractive. This source has clearly not emerged as yet, however. Residual support at present levels plus the oversold condition to which we have drawn over the past two weeks should be sufficient to hold the market at least temporarily. Its future course will be determined by the emergence or lack of emergence of new demand sources. Dow-Jones Industria's (1200 p.m.)971.10 S&P (1200 p.m.) 114.38 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TA8ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No tatement or expreIQn c.F opinion or any other motter herem contolned I, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or I1ld,rectly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony securlly referred to or mentioned The motler IS presenlcd merely for the convcrlencc of the subSCriber Whde we believe the sources of our mforma tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the S;Olemenls mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later tOKe, poSitions or trades In respect to any securities me'1lloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different fro'TI any Views now or hereafter expreSSed In thiS or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs ,nvestment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herein IS Qvollable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER .6.MEAICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 23, 1973 It has often been claimed in recent months that the popular market averages have been g'iving'a dist.rted picture of the stock market's true performance. We have recently completed a study which unders-cores jusfhowclistorte;'Cl';infact' thalpiaurehas be.;;;– – c- – . -.– c – ,…– -.- According to the averages, the stock market scored a newall-time high just over a month ago. Measured another way, however, the average stock made its high—not this January, but over four years ago in December 1968, and it is currently trading some 40 below that high. Likewise, according to this measure, the high for the recent bull market was scored, not six weeks ago, but in April 1971, and we are now some 18 below that lEak. We computed the index on which we base the above statements as follows. Since May I, 1964 QUOTRON has made available a stock price change index which, essentially, shows the average dayto-day percentage price change for all issues traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It is computed, in essence, by adding the daily percentage change of all stocks and dividing by the number of issues traded. We have comput ed a market index by cumulating these percentage changes daily, starting with a base of 810.77 which is the level at which the Dow-Jones Industrials stood on April 30, 1964. The index in our opinion, gives a reasonably accurate statistical picture of the performance of the average New York Stock Exchange issue, as contrasted to indices such as the Dow and the S&P 500 which tabulate the performance of a limited number of issues. The table below gives the value of our cumulative index at major market turning points since 1964 and the level of the Dow for the same date. Percentage changes between each pOint are also given. Date April 30, 1964 Feb. 1966 High .–Dct.196Low Dec. 1968 High May 1970 Low April 1971 High Nov. 1971 Low Aprill972 High Oct. 1972 Low Cumulative Index Change 810.77 1094.85 35.0 8.0.3-.25—- ,26..6 3 1455.00 81.1 704.32 -51.6 1059.51 50.4 826.54 -22.0 1044.01 26.3 888.56 -14.0 DOW-Jones Industrials 810.77 995.15 44. .3. 985.21 631.16 950.82 797.97 968.92 921.66 Change 22.7 —2.'2' 1 32.4 -35.9 50.6 -16.1 21.4 – 4.9 Jan. 1973 High 979.26 10.2 1051.70 14.1 Feb. 21,1973 870.64 -11.1 974.34 – 7.4 A number of mteresting points can be raised. First of all, the Dow understated the performance of the market between April, 1964 and February, 1966 by a relatively small amount, and produced a fairly accurate representation of the 1966 bear market. It is following this point that discrepancies begin to appear. First of all, as we all know intuitively, the period from October, 1966 to December, 1968 was a period of speculative turmoil, probably unmatched in recent decades. Our cumulative index suggests this, showing a whopping 81 advance while the Dow dramatically understates it, posting onl)' a 33 advance. Likewise, the action of the Dow failed to show the true viciousness of the 1968 – 1970 bear market. Its 36 decline was substantiallyeceeded by the drop of over 51 in our cumulative index. From May 1970 to April 1971, the 50 rise shown by the Dow was a reasonably accurate representa- tion of the performance of the market has a whole. However, since that time, the Dow has been perform- ing a great deal better than the average st'ock, as measured by the cumulative index. That index posted a 22 decline in April-November 1971, versus only a 16 drop in the Dow, and its rise from November, -1971 to April of 1972 failed to reach.a new high in contrast to new,peaks posted.by. the Industrials. During the summer of 1972,the Dow dropped only 4.9 while the cumulative index declined 15, and the advance of last fall in the cumulative index was only 10 versus 14 on the Dow, marking a second failure by the cumulative index to post a new high. Since the January high, the cumulative index has dropped another 11 versus only a 7 decline in the Dow, and it stands, interestingly enough, at a level approximately equal to that of the fall of 1964. The action of this index simply underscores the fact that the period since May, 1970 has been a difficult one for equity investment despite the fact that the averages have turned in a rather conventional bull-market performance. It also emphasizes, in our opinion, however, the fact that the average stock is at the moment fairly reasonably priced on a historical basis. The index shows that we have come a long way in recent years toward correcting the excesses of the late. 1960's. That correction may not yet be complete, but at least it is, according to this measure, well on the way. DOW-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1200 p.m.) 113.95 AWTrk DELAFIELD HARVEY TABELL ', No ,tolement or expresSion of opinion or ony olher motter herein contolned IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, dlreC1ly or Indirectly, on offer or the SO\lcltollon of on oHer to buy or sell ony 5el;unty referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converlenCI! of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on his own InvestigaTion and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as ) corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positiOns or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In Hlis or any fulure Issue, and such position may be different from any views now ar hereafter expressed In th or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS regisTered with the SEC os on Inveslment adVisor, may gIVe adVice 10 lIs investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements made In thiS lr In any other Issue Fvrther Informallon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 2, 1973 – We have s uggesleorrl th'e 'PaSt' that' fbf piij'Po es-of' srock mark'ef ariaysis ,-a s K1ngtl1e trghe questions rates a close second in importance to getting the right answers. The market seems to'us at the moment to be posing two relatively crucial questions. The fact that both are, based on data currently in hand, essentially unanswerable does not, in our view, distract from the necessity of framing them. If nothing else, such framing will make clear what we should be looking for as stock market action unfolds. The first relevant question is, of course, the obvious one, centering on where and when the steep stock market slide which began in mid-January will bottom out. As we have previously noted, we think that this question is easier to answer from a timing point of view than in terms of an ultimate downside objective. The market has now reached the sort of oversold condition that has occurred in a relatively few, easily identifiable periods in the past, and the length of time that such periods have, historically, persisted is limited. Already such a condition has obtained for the entire month of February, and persistence of this sort of thing for much longer than six to eight weeks has, on the record, been relatively rare. It would thus be logical to assume that at least a temporary hiatus during the month of March might ensue. All of this, however, says nothing about the level at which a bottom might take place. Another documented characteristic of oversold conditions is the ability of the market to plummet precipitously while these conditions exist. February's market was just another in a long series of examples which have documented how, under certain conditions, huge losses in security values can be posted over relatively short periods of time. Thus while it is reasonable to assume the decline may cease before – –to()many'days' have-pa s t7it4 is—st1l1lue'stiunabI1l7We'-thlni';'wneth-erth-e-cess-aUon wl1l-take-pla-ceat levels anywhere near present ones. We are already being treated to the familiar spectacle of sporadic attempts to bottom. We saw a relatively spectacular one in early February, following the resolution of the international monetary crisis. If failed after three days, and the market moved lower. Another attempt was made on Wednesday and ,Thursday of this week when the Dow moved up over a twenty-point range. This attempt also fizzled. lis this is written Friday, another attempt is underway. Contrary to widely-held belief,there are no fixed rules as to what shape a bottom may take. Serious declines have, on occaSion, ended with highly visible and obvious selling climaxes, MayJune 1970 being a notable example. However, bottoms have often been less obvious, and it is often necessary to wait a good many days after the fact before trying to pinpoint them. The second major question being posed, we think, relates to the nature and importance of the bottom which will ultimately take place. As long as one continues to view the present decline in the framework of a minor drop occurring in the advanced stages of a major bull market, it will be inferred that the bottom will not be a particularly important one. There is now some evidence, at least, that the present decline is a good deal more severe than that. We cited last week the sharp drop posed by our cumulative index which continued to slide this week to a level below 840. That index has now lost some 215 points from its 1971 high. To put this in perspective it should be noted that the total drop in the 1966 bear market was only 285 points from an approximately similar level. Viewed m terms of this severity then, the ultimate bottom could come to have more significance than, have hitherto have been willing to ascribe to it. Yet it must also be noted that, other than the severity of the decline, precious few of the phenomena that one might expect to accompany a major bottom have so far been present. Institutional cash position remains low, customer debit balances began a mild decline as recently as last month, and short 1nterest has to date risen practically not at all. Thus the question of the significance of the coming bottom, as does ,the question of its level, remains essentially unanswered. There are periods when it is unwise to be dogmatic in absence of hard evidence, and the present one is, we think, a claSSic example. Refuges from the market's current uncertainty are available not only in the obvious form of cash, but in the form of solid values with relatively low market volatility. We would prefer to utilize these refuges until the current Situation clarifies itself. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 949.80 S & P (1200 p.m.) 110.92 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opiniOn or any other motter herem contained IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the so,cllol,on of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converlenclO of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hl own Investigation and Informalion Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its off,cef or employees, may now have, or may later toke, posItions or trades In respect to any seCUflhes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 0 on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to lIs ,vestment adVISOry and olhel customers ,dependently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further ,formation on any security mentioned herein IS aVailable on request

——————————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 9, 1973 -,- ,,- What has been a longstanding topic of debate in investment circles reached the front page of the Wall Street Journal last week. The headline of a long lead article, written in that publication's usual thorough and cogent style, noted that the yen of big investors to buy growth stocks alarms some analysts . Thus a phenomenon which is, to our mind, of overriding importance to both the market forecaster and the investment manager reached mass-circulation status. We confess that we are of one accord with the Journal in the opinion that the subject is worth focusing on, and we therefore propose to devote this and a number of subsequent issues of this letter to considering it. It is no doubt best to begin by defining just what it is we are examining in terms as close as possible to those a proponent of growth stock investment might use. There are, such an advocate would inSist, out of all the many equity issues available to the investor, a relatively select few which have, over a long period of time, demonstrated the ability to achieve consistent year-to-year and, indeed, quarter-to-quarter earnings increases, these at a rate, moreover, substantially in excess of the average long-term return for all equities. This ability may be due to any of a number of factors, which may include excellence of management, the power to earn an aboveaverage return on invested capital, a proprietary or technological advantage in an industry growing faster than the economy as a whole, or a combination of these. In any case, the theory would run, the uniqueness of these companies makes them particularly appropriate vehicles for conservative long-term investment, the price being paid—and this is usually implicit rather than stated in the defence—being of little, or, at least, secondary, consideration. The Wall Street Journal article quoted an officer of one of the larger New York City banks as saying, high piE's .. . don't bother me a bit. It's much more ortnt- to -getbehindthe-Pf-to s ee 'how'muclrl.-di-scounHn- Ctl!! e.-'trnino–nctten-usedl—I defense of growth stocks is that they are one-decision stocks. The only decision, \n theory, which must be made is the one to buy—not two separate decisions as to where to buy and where to sell. Thus the theory, and it is our intention to spend some time examining its implications. Yet for any discussion to be complete, more than just the theory must be examined, for equally or perhaps even more important is the extent of its acceptance. Thus, as a 1969 S.E.C. study quoted in the Journal pOinted out, amounts ranging from 40 to more than 50 of the total capitalization of IBM, Xerox, Avon Products, Sears Roebuck and Eastman Kodak, were at that time concentrated in the hands of some 200 institutions. Today's figure is probably larger. Clearly this sort of concentration has had implications for past and will have implications for future markets. We intend, therefore, to consider two separate questions. First, is the one-decision, unique- growth-stock theory going to be a viable way of managing assets in the 1970's, and second, does the fact that large amounts of assets are in fact being deployed in accordance with the tenets of the theory impose hitherto non-existent risk for equity prices or new dangers to the institutional structure of securities markets It is important, we think, to separate one question from the other. Whatever one's opinion as a market analyst may be as to the effect of the concentration noted above, it should not dissuade him as an investment manager from deploying funds for their maximum effectiveness, and, if that effectiveness is to be achieved in the classic growth stocks, so be it. On the other hand, blind commitments to theory should not operate to bias the manager's judgment as to risks being taken. Before commencing our discussion in detail in next week's letter. we should, in all candor, confess a few of our own biases. One centers on a healthy skepticisim regarding the one-decision theory. -'The job of the investment manager can be defined as the making of deciSions, and we know of few other areas where one confidently announces that he will do his job more effectively by doing it less. We have noticed few one-decision advocates offering to halve their fees in return for making half the number of decisions. Our second bias involves philosophical doubts as to the viability of universally-held theories. In the vernacular, if we were all so smart, wa should all become rich, and many investors, quite obviously, have not become so. These are, however, but philosophical objections, and, in rebuttal, the growth-stock advocate can, and properly, point to a hard record of exceptional actual results. We shall examine these results—and, more importantly, the probability of their future dupllcation—in our next issue. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 969.45 . S&P (1200 p.m.) 113.62 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreSSton of opinion or ony other maHer herein conloll1ed 15, or n 0 be deemed to be, directly or mdHectly, on offer or the SOllCllolion of on oHer to buy or sell any secvr1ty referred to or mentioned The moiler 1 presented merely for the corwerlenc of the subscrIber While oNe believe the sources of our Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any actIOn to be talren by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformallon Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or emoloyees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any eCUfltles menlloned m thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other 'Sue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc which IS regIstered With the SEC as on mvestment adVisor, may give adVICe to lIs Investment adVISOry and othel customers mdependently of any statements made Ul thIS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request