TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK E)(CHANOe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE \ March 16, 1973 – – – – –,.. ….,.,.- ..r ' .–,- – -'. -,'';' -.- – .-…. — ….. – .;;-, -, – We noted last week that the advocate of growth stock investment could produce a highly impressive record of results over the past two decades. An investor of 15,000 in IBM in 1949 would be a millionaire today, and the investor who placed a like amount in Xerox in 1958 would now be worth 3 million. It is difficult to argue with such numbers. Yet it is perhaps worthwhile to take a hard look at the record, using as an example the most immaculate of vestal virgins (as one analyst called growth favorites this week), International Business Machines. Compo Annual Compo Annual Price Change Growth Rate Earnings Change Growth Rate 1949 6.25 .33 1961 150 1564 26.5 1.96 494 16.0 1972 400 167 9.4 11.03 462 17.0 The table above compares IBM's price and its earnings for three years, 1949, 1961, and 1972. What is worthy of note is the compound annual growth rate of earnings. It was better for the period 1961-1972 than for 1949-1961. Yet, for the first period,IBM increased 1564 at a compound annual rate of over 26, whereas since 1961 it has appreciated at an above-average but hardly astonishing rate, 9.4. I. B. M. D J. I. A. . Ratio Price Earnings P/E Price Earnings P/E of P/E s 1949 1961 6.25 150 .33 1.96 I18.9 76.5 200.13 731.14 23.54 31.91 8.5 22.9 2.22 3.34 1972 400 11.03 36.2 1020.02 65.00 15.7 2.30 .estaUstics..,abovedocumenLsomeof.1herea-sons.forthis performanGe-d-ispar-i-ty-.-I-n-4-94-9,..IBMwas— -.- selling for 18.9 times earnings, and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was selling at 8.5 times. Thus, IBM's multiple was 2.22 times that of the Dow. By 1961 the Dow multiple had almost tripled, to 22.9, and IBM, by then everyone's darling, was selling at 3.34 times the Dow multiple, producing a pie ratio of 76.5. Since that time the market forces have been working in the 'opposite direction. The Dow pie has declined to 15.7 and IBM has retreated to almost the same multiple in relation to the Dow that it had in 1949. POINTS CHANGE DUE TO I 949 196 1 196 I 19 72 Earnings Change 30.75 694 Improvement in DJIA PiE ChangeIBMP/EasofDowP/E Total Points Gain 62.75 50.25 143.75 – 266 -178 250 If we break the price changes for IBM over the two periods into those due to earnings growth, changes due to a shift in the Dow p/e, and changes due to shifts in IBM's pie relative to that of the Dow, some interesting numbers emerge. Only 30 pOints of IBM of the 143 point gain from 1949 to 1961 was due to earnings improvement and, had it not been for the other factors, the stock would have sold at 37 not 150. Almost half the 1949-61 gain came from a change in the general-market price/earnings ratio and more than a third from a change in IBM's relative position. By contrast, for the 1961-72 period, had IBM retained its 1961 multiple, it would have tacked on 694 pOints to sell for 844. However, the drop in the Dow knocked off 266 pOints of this gain and the change in relative position another 178 pomts thus making the total gain only 250 points. The only point that these figures underscore is that the truly spectacular gains in growth stock invest- c-ment come from purchase early-in the growth curve—not later. IBM,'in 1949, it will be recalled;-had—-' yet to produce its first computer and in 1958 Xerox was a tiny over-the-counter company with a few pat- ents on a largely untested process. By the time the growth process is finally recognized and companies achieve the size of IBM, now a 9 billion operation, it becomes less and less logical to project the growth curve infinitely into the future, and thus a logical process of multiple erosion occurs. There is moreover scant eVIdence that the process of general erosion of multlples, as shown by the decline of the Dow pie since 1961,is not a continuing process. With this factor working against the investor,rather than in his favor as it did over the 1961-71 period, it becomes all the more important to select stocks early on the growth curve. This, however, is a process which pos es problems, some of which we hope to discuss next week. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 966.44 S & P (1200 p.m.) 113.96 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or exprenlon of Opinion or any otner motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ,nd,rectly. on offer or the SOIIC.lollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony seCUriTy referred to or mentIoned The molter IS presented merely for the converlenclS of the subcrlber While we believe the sources of our Informa lion to be reliable, we Ifl flO way repreent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemefl!S mode herem Afly action to be laken by the subSCriber should be based Ofl hiS OWfl InvestlgollOfl cmd InformatIOn Janney Monlgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employces, may now have, or may latcr lake, positions or lrades m respect to any secufltles menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dIfferent from any views now or hereafter epresscd In Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its IIwestment adVISOry and other customers mdependefllly of any statements mode Ifl Ihls or m any other Issue Further mformorlon Ofl any security mentioned herein s available on request

– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK. STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 23, 1973 FOr thef sTxth s-essionina-row- the-stbcrrratket ifbs-otbeQaliea-ttng-'Cr('fsing yesferday cae 925.20 down 13.17. In the short period of less than three months the Dow has declined 126.50 points from its January 11 closing high of 1051.70 or 12.03. During this time the market has twice unsuccessfully tried to rally from a short-term oversold condition and now seems posi- tioned to attempt a third assault logically from the 920-905 area. During this decline a change in leadership appears to be evolving from the high multiple growth sector to commodity oriented securities. Our discussion of growth stock investing last week centered on that paragon of growth issues, IBM, and tried to develop the point that, while its action from 1949 through 1961 had been spec- tacular, its action since that time had been only somewhat above average. Our point was that, while those who were lucky enough to invest in IBM early in its growth had amassed great sums in the process, those who invested later, during the time t he stock was becoming the core holding of most large institutions, have done less spectacularly well. Truly spectacular results, we suggested, are achieved by identifying growth issues at a relatively early stage. An opportunity for such identification was provided in the spring of 1965 when,within a month of each other, two small companies were first offerred to the investing public, Memorex at 25 a share and McDonald's Corp. at a price of 22 1/2. Each share of Memorex then offerred has since increased through splits to three shares, and each share of McDonald's to 18.3 shares. At the time of their offerring there were distinct similarities. Memorex 1965 earnings were to –!;!,,5..l/2t;il)1e…thosE'l-QLtwoyears.before.and-those..of-.McDGna-1-d-'–s-thr-eet-imesthe-1-963-f-igure-.– – Their subsequent records were also to be similar. From 1965 through 1969 Memorex increased its earnings from 45 cents (based on current capitalization) to 1. 86, an increase of 313, and McDonald's posted at 225 increase, to 39 cents from 12 cents. With these records, it was not surprising that the market performance of each stock should be spectacular. By year-end 1969, less then five years later, the price of Memorex was 1700 above its initial offering price and McDonald's was 1000 above that level. As we all know the roads since then have diverged. While the computer-peripheral business has encountered well-advertised problems. McDonald's has been able to continue stuffing hamburgers into the maw of the American public at an ever increasing rate. Thus, since 1969, it has increased in price from 14 to a high, so far of over 80, while Memorex, which sold at 50 at the end of 1969 is today around 10. Thus, investment in growth issues in their early stages may be no more an investment pmacea than buying them after growth becomes relatively certain. As we saw last week, the latter process does not tend to achieve overly dramatic results. This week's exercise is desinged to show that the former, while it can be spectacularly successful, also runs the risk of equally spectacular losses. It may well be argued, of course, that investment of an equal amount in both McDonald's and Memorex at almost any time sine 1965 would have produced astounding gains, the Memorex loss being more than offset by the tremendous performance of the restaurant company. We are a bit skeptical, however, of the practical possibility of having achieved such results. McDonald's is one of the more unique success stories of recent markets, while a host of small companies which have surfaced over the past few years have run into troubles similar to thos e of Memorex. Another point we hope is illustrated by the above is the fallacy of the one-decision theory. Certainly neither of the above issues could have been bought in their early stages as one- decision stocks. Certainly, in 1969, a decision had to be made, as Memorex problems started to develop, and, conversely, a positive decision to hold McDonald's was necessary all through the period. As we pointed out two weeks ago, decisions are the crux of the investment manage- ment process, and the manager who thinks he can invest so as to avoid them is, to our way of thinking, deluding himself. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 918.80 S&P (1200 p.m.) 108.29 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrk No stotement or e)(preSlon of opinion or ony other molter herein contained '5, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or .nd,rectly, on offer or Ihe sollCltollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The moTler IS presented merely for the conver-Ience of the subSCriber While .,e believe the sourccs of our Information to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomcry Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later lake, positions or lrades In respect to any seculltles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Seott, Inc, which IS regIStered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further ,nformat,on on any secunty mentioned herem IS avollable on request

TABIELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 30, 1973 As mentioned in last week's market letter the short-term oversold condition of the stock market sug- gested a rally logically from Hie 920 – 905 area -The-!narket accommodated-us-the first four tradin-g – . sessions of this week, highlighted yesterday by the anticipation of President Nixon's address on econ- omic and foreign affairs. As in previous short-term oversold rallies this year, a possible test of the previous low of 922.71 on March 23 should be anticipated. Should this low be violated, of greater signi- ficance from a longer-term point of view would be the penetration of the October 16, 1972 low of 921. 66. We have been commenting in our last three letters on SOme of the problems posed by growth stock investment from the point of view of the individual investment manager. Despite these problems, it is evident that the theory has gained a wide degree of popularity, especially among those deploying substantial sums of money. We should like in this issue to consider some of the implications of this popularity for the character of future securities markets. Last April, a major New York City bank announced in a New York Times interview that, of the 6.1 billion it had under management, one-third was invested in the common stock of just ten major companies. Of these ten, at least seven, IBM, Eastman Kodak, Xerox, Avon Products, Johnson & Johnson, Sears Roebuck, and Schering-Plough fell into the category of familiar senior growth favorites. What was absolutely intriguing was the size of the positions. The best way to gain an idea of their magnitude is to compare them with average monthly trading volume for the issues in question. The IBM position amounted to almost three months trading volume, the Kodak position to two and one- half months trading volume, and the Avon Products holding to almost four months trading volume. These, it must be remembered, are the positions held by only one bank. Probably a dozen other insti- tutions are in a position to have holdings of roughly comparable size. The obVious conclusion are .these positionsareeffectively un.saleable.. . .. The incisive and witty Alan Abelson fantasied in Barron's a few weeks ago what might happen were a number of large institutions simultaneously to attempt to sell even a small portion of their holdings in growth favorites. The effect, he said, could be similar to ames s of wounded elephants trying to stampede out the same porthole. Actually, it would not be necessary for the elephants themselves to do the stampeding. One of the unique market statistics of 1972 was the substantial rise in margin account debit balances, at a rate far greater than any similar rise in the past. This in itself was not all that surprising. What was interesting was that it took place without any increase whatsoever in other measures of specu- lative activity such as American Stock Exchange volume and indices of low priced stocks. It seems at least a tenable conclusion that the new breed of margin trader went where the action was and was in there competing with the institution for a select list of growth favorites. Now the margin trader, historically, is a nimble creature and he is going to be quick to leave the scene when institutional sponsorship of one of his holdings begins to lag. The result, market theory tells us, should be increased volatility in issues of this sort, and is indeed is precisely what we saw throughout 1972. The phenomenon of rotational collapse as various growth issues fall from favor has been a concomitant of recent markets. We would expect the phenomenon to increase rather than decrease in frequency. Meanwhile, virtually unnoticed amldst all the hubbub, there exists a whole host of companies, the majority actually, whose earnings, for one reason or another, have not in recent years displayed the consistent earnings growth so desired by the growth-stock theorists. Lack of demand has brought the price of many of these-companies to twenty-year lows in relations to their earning power. More – importantly, it can be argued, it may have effectively shut many companies off from the capital market. With public demand for equities sharply reduced, it is difficult to market new is sues if they are not acceptable to the large buyers with a predilection for such. The extent to which concentration in growth stocks has depressed the prices of issues not falling into that category can be measured by the wave of announcements by companies of intent to purchase their own stock. In all too many cases, prices have apparently been depressed to the point where these companies find stock retirement a preferable alternative to expansion. The phenomena cited above are only a few of the apparent results of institutional concentration on growth issues, and we do not think all the implications of this concentration are yet obvious. It seems, however, that as long as the trend continues, market disruptions of the sort mentioned above .-' are likely to be commonplace. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 955.30 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1200 p.m.) 112.16 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTrk No statement or e,.;prelSlOn of opInion or any other matter herem tontolned IS, or lS to be deemed 10 be, directly or IndHedly, on offer or Ihe 50Iu;llol,on of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the conver,ena of the subscriber While -Ne believe the sourc;es of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Aoy action to be laeo by the subSCriber should be based on his own Inveshgollon and Informollon Janoey Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporohon, ond Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toj.,e, poll,on or trades In respect to any securllle meotloned In thiS o any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any VICWS now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,ch IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode, thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentIOned hercln IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe .- – April 6th. 1973 – – – – ;; – – — -.– – Only an incurable optimist could fmd anything good to say about the short-term action of the equity market. True enough, a week ago the market managed to stage Its strongest minor rally since the dechne began in January. That four-day advance, which carried the Dow up some 31 pOints from a closing low of 922.71 to a peak of 959.14, dIsplayed measurably better breadth and volume than either of the two rally attempts which had proceeded it, the weak one In early March and the steep but abortive three-day rise to over 1000 mid-February. DespIte this evidence of better demand, however, the ultimate fate of the most recent rise was the same as that of the prevIOus two. It rose precisely to the top of the downtrend channel which has characterized all of 1973 trading thus far and promptly faded. By Wednesday, the S & P 500 had moved into 1973 low territory and on Thursday the Dow-Jones Industrial Average followed, posting a new low for the downswing on an hourly bas is. While all this was going on. internal measures of market strength were turning in sub- par performances Declining stocks and downside volume predominated through all of last week. and there was little evidence of the demand previously evidenced at the 920 level. as the Dow sank to that level for a second tIme. At week's end the Dow was again flirting with its historical low pOints of July and October. In view of the aPl'arent lack of demand. the odds — .. — -…-;'–T—-''''' —- —………..,,—-.——-;—— L ,. -. r – ….. – in favor of those lows holding would seem slim indeed. As if the story being told by the averages was not bad enough, there is a conSiderable body of evidence which suggests that the decline since January has indeed been worse than simple inspection of major market indices would suggest. The drop from the early January highs was, as of Thursday, 12.2 in terms of the Dow-jones Industrials and 9.7 In terms of the S & P 500. By contrast. our cumulative unweighted index of all New York Exchange stocks has fallen from a high of 976.52 in january to a recent low of 789.80 — a decline of 19.1. This measurement of the drop since january comes extremely close to being of major bear market proportions. Paradoxically, the only glimmer of light on the horizon is the fact that the dechne has been as vicious as it, in fact, has. There are, after all, two ways of vieWIng market pnce, firs t In terms of trend and secondly in terms of level. As noted above the current picture as regards to market trend could hardly be worse. As far as level is concerned, there is at least some suggestion that vast numbers of stocks were, at last week's lows, at prices that might be termed objectively cheap or even indeed rediculous. Let us consider this in terms of our unweighted index. At Thursday's close, that index was lower than it had been at anytime since 1964 with the single exception of the period May-October 1970. It was, in other words, lower than it had been at the 1966 low, when the Dow bottomed out at 735, and it was withIn 15 of its s'ummer-1970 low when the Dow reached 63i. None of this IS to say that the market cannot go lower. It is simply a statement of analytical fact which it WIll be helpful to recall in the emotional climate whIch lower prices, if they occur, WIll produce. We find ourselves, under the circumstances, more inclined to feel comfortable about the market than any surface indicators of short-term technical actIOn would suggest that we should be. Markets whIch are plunging to histonc lows are always uncomfortable ones. They prove, however, in retrospect, to have been markets in which abundant bargains were available. Dow-jones Ind. (1200 p.m.) 930.52 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 109.13 AWTkd No slolemcn! or expression of oOlnlOn or ony other matler herem tonlcllned '5, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe 5011(101001'1 of on offer to buy or sell any secvnly referred 10 or mentioned lAe motter IS pre5ented merely for the convelIenC5 of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Informalion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgol1on and information Janney Montgomery ScoII, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later tole, POSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter erpressed In thiS or any other lSue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS reg,stered w,th the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its ,nvestment adVISOry and other rustomers Independently of any satements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security menhoned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCk eXCHANGE April 13, 1973 We have been attempting in recent letters to show that the averages, over the past three years, have — -pElrformed- a-great dEla1-better thanth-eavera-gestock- An- examination-of-the-individua1-ts sues in the Dow– Jones Industrials shows an even more unusual situation. The average, since the May 1970 lows, has actually outperformed most of the stocks contained in it. Over the period May 26, 1970- January 11, 1973 the Dow rose from 631. 16 to 1051. 70 for a total rise of 420.54 points. The first column of the table below shows how many of the 420.54 pOints were contributed by mh company. The second column expresses the point-rise contributed by the stock as a percent of the total rise, and the third column accumulates those percent figures. Finally, the last three columns show the price of each stock on the two dates together with the percent change. Before discussing the implications of the table it is necessary to point out some of the statistical properties of the Dow. The method of computation causes higher-priced stocks to have a greater weight than lower-priced ones. Thus a 10 rise in duPont would cause a 10 .4-point rise in the Dow while 'a 10 rise in Anaconda would cause only a 1. 3-point rise. This property accounts for the interesting fact that General Foods, which was lower at the end of the period than at the beginning, actaully contributed two points to the rise in the averages. The table raises some interesting points. The average was up 66 over the period, but only ten ofthe thirty components managed to post a percentage rise better than this figure. The lesser weight given low- priced stocks is made apparent by the table. Allied Chemical, for example, has performed better than duPont but it contributed less than eight points to the rise in the averages while duPont contributed 48. Most graphically, however, the table demonstrates the narrowness of the advance. One-third of the entire rise in the Dow was due to the action of three stocks, one-half of it due to the action of five, almost two- thirds to seven issues and three-fourths to ten. Quite clearly the phenomenon of relatively narrow leader- —!;shipexists-,–within;!heaIJC!geitself. Points Rise . – 4' ,,- — -of – – Cum-'- — Price Stock Eastman Kodak QQDtrUll.ltsg 51. 35 Total Rise 12.2 lative 12.2 5/26/70 575/8 1/11/73 1473/4 Change 156 Dupont 48.00 11.4 23.6 1001/4 1841/2 84 Proctor and Gamble General Electric 42.45 41. 79 10.1 9.9 33.7 43.6 401/4 301/4 (A) 1143/4 73 5/8 185 143 Sears Roebuck Standard Oil California 39.88 25.43 9.5 53.1 513/8 1213/8 136 6.0 59.1 393/4 843/8 112 Exxon Westinghouse Electric 22.65 19.86 5.4 64.5 513/8 4.7 69.2 27 (A) 911/8 461/4 77 63 Chrysler General Motors Union Carbide United Aircraft Texaco American Brands Swift Allied Chemical International Harvester International Pa per American Telephone Alcoa Goodyear Bethlehem Steel General Foods Woolworth Owens Illinois U.S. Steel Johns Manville International Nickel Anaconda American Can 13.82 13.39 11. 89 9.62 8.83 8.76 8.26 7.91 7.83 7.69 6.55 5.48 5.27 4.13 2.24 2.14 1. 78 1. 71 1.64 1.35 .36 -1. 50 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.3 1. 0 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 (0.3) 72.5 75.7 78.5 80.8 82.9 85.0 87.0 88.9 90.8 92.6 94.2 95.6- – 96.8 97.8 98.3 78.8 99.2 99.6 100.0 100.2 100.3 100.0 19 5/8 59 1;2 29 1/2 27 241/8 295/8 223/4 16 1/4 283/8 333/4 431/8 50 211/2 22 1/4 333/8 (A) 26 1/2 383/4 303/4 263/4 333/4 223/8 35 43 7/8 83 50 3/8 437/8 395/8 45 371/4 30 1/8 417/8 361/8 545/8 59 5/8 303/4 29 1/2 291/2 301/4 417/8 333/4 295/8 361/8 23 323/8 124 39 71 63 64 52 64 85 48 7 26 19 43 32 – 12 14 8 10 11 ., 3 8 Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.)956. 73 S&P Comp.(1200 p.m.) 111.83 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opinion or any OTher molter herein (onTomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or the sollCltoTlon of 07 offer 10 buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the converlenCE of the subscrIber While He belleve the sourcbs of our hn'ldmb' han to be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any actIon to be token by the su sen ber s. au e bosed on h.s own poslllons or trodes Invesllgotlon In respect to and mformatlon Janney Montgomery any seCUrities menhoned In thl5 or any Seoll, future Inc, as a lssue, cnd corporatIon, and Its offICers or such pos,t,on may be dIfferent employees, may from cny v,ews now now ohravhee,reoorJtmerayeJlopr,eersetodkhe,n, thl or any other lssue Janney Montgomery s.cotl, tnc , whICh l5 regIstered w,th the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIve adVICe to ,ts ,nvjstment a VIOryon 01 er customers Independently of cny statements mode ,,\ th.s or In ony other Issue Further Informa'lon on any securtty mentioned herein IS avcI able on request '

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 19, 1973 We recently concluded a series of four of these letters in which we discussed some of the ramifications of the theory of growth stock investment. We should like, in this issue, to draw a few tentative conclusions based on that examination and to offer a few of our own thoughts on investment philosophy for the 1970's. There is, of course, nothing new under the sun. The following quotation is an appropriate summary of what we have, in our series, indicated was taking place overthe pastfew years. Selectivity took ana new character by reason of the overshadowing emphasis placed on expected future growth as the prime criterion of an attractive investment. There was nothing wrong with these … ideas, except that it was almost im- possible not to carry them too far. With encouragement from the past and a rosy prospect in the future, the buyers of 'growth stocks' were certain to lose their sense of proportion and to pay excessive prices. The above is not Anthony Tabell writing in 1973 about 1971-72. It is Benjamin Graham writing in 1951 about 1928-29. As readers may have gathered from our previous letters, we find ourselves, on this issue at least, comfortably in Dr. Graham'S camp. But, if mindless projection of growth rates is not the simple key to investment success, what is an alternative philosophy We offer herewith three principles 1) Two and two make four. 2) There are no one-decision stocks. 3) Investor confidence varies more than earnings. Let us examine some of the implications of these three suggestions. It was Bernard Baruch who first suggested that in periods of market optimism it was necessary to repeat to oneself that two and two were four. We are, in other words, willing to accept the intuitive conclusion that, when large numbers of buyers are agreed that a given method of investment is a sure road to suc- cess, that method cannot prove viable over the long term. The enforcement of this principle is the function of the marketpla'Oe, and it is our belief that the market will be no less (OffIclent in thi s task in the future than it has been in the past. It should be made clear that what is being said here lmplies no cntlCism whatever of the fundamental merits of recognized growth issues, suggests that they should not sell at some premium over other issues or affirms that they cannot under any circumstances be attractive purchase candidates. What we are suggesting, along with Graham, is that the concept that such issues represent appropriate investment vehicles for conservative accounts, regardless of the price being paid, is, to put it mildly, ludicrous. Secondly, we think the suggestion that tnere exists a class of one-decision stocks, where all that is necessary is to buy and hold, constitutes a abdicatic of the investment manager's responsibility. Were the investment manager perfect, his initial selections for purchase would, of course, be only those stocks which were going to provide the maximum long-term rate of return, and these could be held effec- tively indefinitely. Investment managers, however, are far from perfect. Each initial purchase memorial- izes the manager continually to decide whether to hold or not to hold, depending upon whether the original expectations are being fulfilled and to what extent the market price discounts these expectations. Finally, as we have pointed out, the biggest factor in price change, over relatively long periods of time, tends to be caused not by earnings but by investor confidence in those earnings — this confidence being most readily express ed by the statistic of the price/earnings ratio for individual stocks. This fact has two implications. The first provides the reason for our conviction, which will surprise no one, that technical analysis is an indispensible factor in the investment decision-making process. It is equally important in evaluating common stocks to have some idea of what the market is likely to pay for future earning power as it is to forecast what that earning power is gomg to be. Technical work, we think, is a most useful guide in making such a projection. The second implication of investor confidence variability is that price level, in relation to earnings and in turn to comparable valuation of other stocks,must be a prime criteria in investment selection. It is axiomatic that a stock having a low multiple, thus suggesting low investor confidence, ha s more potential on the upside should investor confidence increase and less risk on the downside should it continue to deteriorate. Willingness to ignore the price being paid, even in companies of the most pristine quality, involves,in our view, another abdication of the investment manager's responsibility by reason of the assumption of unneccessary risk. It may be suggested, of course, that recent markets have hardly tended to prove the soundness of these tenets vis-a-vis the Simple-minded growth approach and, indeed, may even have suggested the opposite conclusion. We continue to believe, however, that the principles above represent viable gUlde- posts to a successful investment philosophy. Dow-Jones Industrials 963.35 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P Compo 112.17 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrk No statement or expression of opInion or ony otner motter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony secunty referred 10 or mentioned The ma!!er IS presented merely for the converlenCl; of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the aurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be Token by the subscriber 'hould be based on hiS awn inVestigation and infOrmation Jonrey Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employee may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to ony ,ecufltle, mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dIfferent from any Ylews now or hereafter e'pressed In thl or any other sue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 0 on onyeslmenl adYlsor, may glYe odYlce to Its Inyestment odYIKHy and othel customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In af'ly other Issue Further If'lformotion on any security menllof'led herein IS aVailable on request ——.,

. ; . – .—-,- TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AME RICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 27, 1973 Acouple 6f years ago we 'were-involved'ina minor auto-aCCident with a truck on-a m()untain road -in Montenegro. We found ourselves, knowing not a word of Serbo-Croatian, faced with the problem of discussing what should be done, with a truck driver, who, of course, knew not a word of English, The frustration produced by such moments is, as any traveler is well aware, exquisite. We find ourselves similarly frustrated at the present moment in trying to talk about the stock market—and for precisely the same reason, the lack of a common language which we can share with our readers to describe where the market has been and where it appears likely to go. For instance, we would have liked to have begun this week's letter by saying that the bear market continued—indeed, even accelerated—last week. Yet in terms of a shared frame of reference, the Dow Jones Industrial Average for example, the statement does not hold together. For the Dow, as of Friday at least, had not made a new low for a month and, in a rally which began on Thursday afternoon, completed what was apparently the second successful test of that low, Moreover, at its low of a month ago, the Dow was off by only 12.26 from its January high so that, by this standard, what has passed since January may qualify as a reasonably vicious intermediate-term decline but not, in historical terms, a bear market. Approximately the same pattern holds good for the S & P 500. Yet, as many of us are painfully aware, the situation is a great deal worse. We must refer again to our old friend, the cumulative index. At week's end, this index had reached an intra-day low of 764.03, compared with a January peak of 976.52 for a decline in excess of 21. Its pattern, moreover. was diametrically opposite to that of the popular averages. While these indices, at week's end, simply tested their lows of mid-March and early April, the cumulative index, which posted successivenew lows on both of. thesE'! .occasions, .moyed substantially .below those.bottomsthisweek, thus continuing what has, since January, been a steep a';d -nabated downtrend. What the index showed was the familiar picture of a major market decline in its more advanced and nastier stages. This contrast between the average stock and the popular averages is important, not only in de- scribing the market action of the past four months, but in formulating a forecast. If all we are lookmg for at this stage is an intermediate-term bottom, we will require a great deal less evidence than would be the case if we were trying to pinpOint the bottom of a major bear cycle. The triple bottom in the averages, if it holds, would constitute impressive evidence of the nd of an intermediate down- swing. Few indicators, at the moment, however, appear to have reached the levels we have become accustomed to associate with the bottom of a major bear cycle. Short interest, which, incidentally, declined last month, is still at a relatively low level. Mutual fund cash position, while it rose slightly in March, is substantially below the levels reached at the last two major-cycle lows. Margin debit balances have been declining sharply for the past three months, a phenomenon which one would expect in a major downswing, but this sort of decline has, in the past, persisted a good deal longer than the current one and has achieved a much greater magnitude than we have seen to date. The classic signs of speculative activity, American Stock Exchange volume, for example. are admittedly at levels normally associated with bear market lows, but then they have been at these levels for the past three years. As we have suggested in the past, one of the salient differences between the 1970-73 bull market and previous ones was the total absence of the individual speculator. The following three facts appear relevant to a forecast at the moment 1) The average stock has already undergone a decline of major-bear-market proportions. 2) The high-grade growth and bluechip favorites which dominate the averages have not yet posted such a decline. 3) The signs normally accompanying a major bottom are not yet present. The three facts lead us insistently to a question. Will the institutional favorites comprising the averages ultimately follow their less aristocratic brethren over the precipice There was some suggestion in last week's action that such may become the case as, for the lrst time, these issues joined in the decline. This possibility, of course, constitutes one of the market's major areas of vulnerability. It will, in most cases, require further evidence to complete distributional patterns in most of the classic growth issues. What remains unanswered, of course, is the extent to which a severe correction in this area of the market might spill over into other, already-deeply- depressed segments of the list. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 925.57 S &P Compo (1200 p. m.) 107.65 AWTJC ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No slotement or expresslon of opInion or any other moIler herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or IndHectly, an offer or the solicltollon of an offer fa buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The morter IS presented merely for the (onVe(llenl of the subscriber While e beheve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranTee the accuracy lhereof nor of The sTatements mude herein Any action to be Token by the Sub5crlber shOuld be based on hiS own Invutlgallon and Information Janley Montgomery Scot!, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laTer Toke, positions or trades In respect to any seufllies menTioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereafter e1pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery SCali Inc which IS regiStered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its tnvestment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode 'In th;s or tn any other Issue Further tnformatlon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

,.I TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 4th, 1973 The sharp market rebound of Thursday and early Friday constituted what is, so far, the most s'gnifi- cant attempt at a reversal of the downtrend in effect since January. Although many of the signs of a — c la-s s ic one-dayc IImax -were peesent, -additiona l–evlderfcewould be-deslrable-before 'suggestlng-that' the – reversal was one of Intermediate or major proportions. . As security analysts these days get to estimating earnings for 1973, at the same time examining the prices of the stocks whose earnings they are estimating, there is developing what could be called the gee-v.hiz school of financial analysis. For It Is, by this time, no surprise to anyone that the combirn- tion of a market downswing and an excellent 1973 economic outlook have brought many price-earnings ratios to their lowest levels In years. It Is interesting, however, to put this phenonmenon Into perspective. It will be recalled that the absolute historical nadir for price-earnings ratios in general was in 1949 when the certainty of a post- war depression caused wide-spread pessimism. The following table compares the PiE's of the thirty stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average with their PiE's for that long-ago year. The first three columns show the current price, 1973 estimated earnings and prlce-earmngs ratio for each of the thirty stocks. The next three show the 1949 price-earnings ratio, the pnce at which the stock would sell were 1973 earnings to be capitalized at that ratio, and the percentage difference of this price from the current one. Recent Earnings 1973 1949 1973 Earnings x PCT. Stock Price 1973-E PiE 1949 PiE Difference Allied Chemical 34 2.70 12.611.2 30 -11 Alcoa 57 5.00 11.4 10.7 54 -5 American Brands 40 4.70 8.5 8.7 41 3 American Can 32 3.25 9.8 9.6 31 -3 American Tel. & Tel. Anaconda 'BetfileheinSteel-'- 53 4.65 11.4 14.8 19 2.80 6.8 9.6 311—3-75—O-' 2.9 69 .27 .- II 30 ,-.J '-63- Chrysler 33 5.50 6.0 3.7 20 -39 du Pont 171 10.00 17.l 11.7 117 -32 Eastman Kodak Esmark 136 3.85 35.3 12.0 46 23 3.45 6.7 7.3 25 -66 9 Exxon 97 7.25 13.4 7.4 54 -44 General Electric General Foods 60 3.25 18.4 8.8 29 25 2.20 11.4 9.2 20 -51 -20 Genera I Motors 72 8.50 8.5 4. 1 35 -51 Goodyear Tire 26 2.85 9.1 4.8 14 -46 International Harvester 29 3.90 7.4 6.0 23 -21 International Nickel 30 1.75 17.1 13.5 24 -20 InternatlOnal Paper 34 2.75 12.3 4.1 II -68 Johns Manville 22 2.80 7.9 8.2 23 5 Owens Illinois 34 4.25 8.0 11.1 47 38 Procter & Gamble 102 3.70 27.5 16.2 60 -41 Sears 98 4.35 22.5 8.5 37 -62 Standard 011 of Ca lifornla Texaco 84 38 7.00 3.60 12.0 10.5 6.0 5.8 42 21 -50 -45 Union Carb.de 42 3.90 10.8 12.2 48 14 United Aircraft 37 4.50 8.2 7.2 32 -13 U. S. Steel 33 3.60 9.2 4.4 16 -52 Westinghouse 34 2.45 13.8 5.7 14 -58 Woolworth 21 2.85 7.4 12.3 35 66 Some of the results do, Indeed, Justify the gee-whiz reaction, notably the fact that no fewer than eight of the thirty components of the Dow are today available at lower mult.ples than was the case twenty-four years ago. As the table clearly shows, however, the vulnerability of a number of stocks could be great. That vulnerability, moreover, .s not confined to stocks with relatively high multiples. One would expect to see Eastman Kodak and Sears vulnerable to PiE erosion. However, the table also shows us that many current multiples in the 8-12 range would Indeed be subject to further decline If 1949 stan- dards were to be applied. None of this is meant to suggest that large numbers of stocks are Hkely to sell at 1949 levels–al- though the fact that eight are already doing so should give us pause. We do suggest,however,that a sense of historical perspective Is useful prior to becoming overly excited about current multiples. DMow-JlonOeOs Industrial (1200 p.m.) 110.84 p.m.) 953.49 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, 'HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression (;iF Opinion or (Iny other matter herem contomed IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dllcctly or wdlrectly, on offer or Ihe 5011(lIo110n of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred to or menhoned The moHer IS presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber Whde oNe bellevebhe sourcs ofbour hnfln tlon to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee based on hiS own'lnvestlgotlon and mformotlon Janney the accuracy thereof nor of Montgomery Scott, Inc, as the statements a corporation, mude herem Any and Its officers or actIOn to be token y the su scn er s au employees, mOf now ha'he, or may later t ke e, poSlllOnS or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or ereadf ter exprete hln thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Sco!l, Inc, which .s registered wl'h the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give advll;e 10 Its Investment a VlSOry an ot er customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on ony security mentioned herein IS avodable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I .J 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08640 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 11, 1973 – – Seven'';-eeks-nowhave elap5e'crsrnceMar6h-2i, vJnen tJ1eTI6wJones-ltrdustrlalAverage- for- -. the first time pierced the 920 level and then rebounded sharply. During those seven weeks we have had no fewer than three tests of 920, and on each of those tests the average has met strong demand and rebounded sharply. The latest such instance was two weeks ago on April 26, 27, 30, and May 1st. In each of these four trading sessions, the average pushed well below 920 during the trading day, and during each session sufficient demand was manifested to push the index back up above that level. These four days were followed by a new rally which attaied a peak of 965 on Wednesday before being turned back by the failure of the O. p. E. C. talks. The fact that the market has, effectively, gone seven weeks without posting a new low makes it tempting to assert that the unpleasantness which characterized the first three months of 1973 is now pa st and that we expect the stock market, having found st rong support, to mount a fairly sharp and worthwhile rally. Unfortunately, we feel, the eVidence in favor of this contention is, as yet, insuffiCient. If what has taken place during April-May 1973 is ultimately to turn out to be a bottom of some importance, it's characteristics will be altogether different than those of most major bottoms in the past, that of May-June 1970 being a typical example. The selling climax char- acteristics of the low of May 26, 1970 were sufficiently obVious so that three days after the fact we could say in this space, We think, in summary, the effective bottom has been reached' What has been taking place over the past seven weeks is considerably less striking. – M-,)re()L,the weeks ollow!!, May 6,170 !.!ovided a continous chain ()t!2.'!.lishi- dence which has been asbsent in the present instance. As- just one- example-let us lookaCtne — weekly new low statistics for the nine weeks following May 1970 and the seven weeks since March 23, 1973. WEEK ENDED NEW LOW WEEK ENDED NEW LOW 5/29/70 1322 3/23/73 966 6/5/70 129 3/30/73 475 6/12/70 6/19/70 227 209 4/6/73 4/13/73 607 333 6/26/70 345 4/20/73 333 7/6/70 477 4/27/73 681 7/13/70 7/20/70 501 115 5/4/73 598 7/27/70 65 As can be seen from the table, the week following the market rebound in 1970 new lows dried up to 129, remained under 300 for another two weeks and never increased above 501 during a short decline in July. By contrast we have had two weeks with over 600 new lows since March, and even in the week ended May 4, when, incidentally, the Dow advanced 31 pOints, 598 issues posted new 1973 bottoms. Quite clearly a large number of stocks remain in downtrends. Thus, before we are to forecast with any certainty that a major market low has been attained, more eVid-ence will be-necessary. A sharply declining number of ne; lows would be one link in such a chain of evidence, as would the ability of the Dow to move above the 970 level, an area that has been as effective at turning back rallies as 920 has been in reversing declines. Were these and a number of other technical indicators to turn positive, we would indeed be happy to forecast a rally of some proportions. Lacking such evidence, however, we feel compelled to suggest that, for the time being, reserves to be maintained. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 934.23 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 108.88 AWTRK ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or cny other matter herein contolned 15, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solu;ltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned the mOiler 15 presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While oNe believe Ihe sources of our Informolion to be rIllOble, we m no way represenl or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the Slolements mude herem Any octlon to be token by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgotlon end mformatlon Janney Montgomery l;olt, Inc, os a corpora/Ion, and I/S officers or employees, moy now hove, or may later lake, positions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereofter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of cny statements mode ,n thIS or In any other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE May 18, 1973 The five-month old downswing plunged to yet another new low early this week with Monday's t&'l9ingprducing.an,18;J)9int\!eyn il1he pognd a,cQntinuaji9non uesdi'lym()lning which brought the index below the 900 level for the first time since 'the market drop began.Tuesday-after- noon and Wednesday produced a fairly typical rebound, an intra-day peak of 927.83 being scored at mid-week. As has been the case in the recent past, however, this advance failed to follow through, and by the end of the week prices were again trending lower. Following the early rally, the words selling climax were being heard in a few quarters. By no stretch of the imagination could the claSSic technical definition of a selling climax be applied to Tuesday's and Wednesday's markets. Such action requires, among other things, a substantial increase in volume on both the downside and the upside, substantial being defined as a two-to- three-fold rise. Tuesday's advance in volume to 18 million shares from 13 million shares the previous day hardly qualifies. As any market decline begins to gather momentum, the basic question posed to the forecaster centers around how far it may be expected to go. Before answering this question in the present in- stance, it is perhaps best to back off and reexamine once more the longer-term stock market picture. Regular readers of this letter will be well aware that just about everything we have said about the stock market over the past 2 1/2 years has been within the context of a particular thesis— that the secular trend of the stock market can best be described by a broad, relatively flat trading range in terms of the major averages. We first expressed this view as early as January 1971 when we stated in this space, the equity market from 1942 until 1966 was buoyed by a secular uptrend advancing at the rate of about 9 a year on the Dow. Sure, there were bull markets and bear -.-'mbeaarrk'emtsaiwkeitthsi,nal.ththeo.fr'agmhepwaionfrki.oLsthhaotrtupatnrd.enqdu,ibkluYt trheecobveulel.dm-a-rkTheets;-we eire.rleoanfgevafnddendcyn-aamtiicJianed-mthomeen;- however, that the secular uptrend is no longer with us. Indeed, computed from 1966, the slope of the DJIA has been virtually zero. The most statistically accurate description of the market on average for the past five years is that it is a wide, flat trading channel. Nothing has happened in 2 1/2 years to change this view. If the market is, then, to hold within a trading range that range is, so far at least, defined by two pOints on the DJIA, the high of 1067.20 made early this year and the low of 631.16 scored on May 26, 1970. If we assume that the market is vulnerable to a return to the lower part of that range, the downside risk from these levels is substantial indeed. Unfortunately, the existence of such a risk is suggested by a number of technical factors. The most peSSimistic possible reading of the DJIA pattern indeed suggests a return to the 1970 low, and, as we suggested early this month, capitalizing the earnings of the Dow components at their lowest historical multiples would also suggest such an eventuality. There are, further, suffiCient poor technical patterns extant1D suggest that the risk of lower levels is a real one. Yet we are reluctant at this point to offer numbers as low as this as a forecast, and we feel compelled to suggest that, even were a decline of this magnitude to take place, that the stock market would not, throughout such a decline, be acting as badly as the averages would suggest. Our cumulative index, which we feel is much more descriptive of the average stock than is the DowortheS&P,was, at the end of this week, atalowof717.55vs. a 1970 low of 677.65. Quite clearly, for a great many stocks, the.process of correction back to-,or in.some cases SUb stantlally below–the lows of 1970 has already taken place. IUs in the higher-multiple, institutiona'- quality favorites where the largest gap between present prices and the lows of 1970 exists. It Is in these issues we feel, as our readers are well aware, that the risk is greatest. It must further be pointed out that, when talking about a trading range with a lower limit of 630, we are making allowances for conventional bull and bear markets within the context of that trading range. Certainly the market in the present instance is deeply oversold, and we would be willing to believe any evidence that pOinted to a intermediate-term rally were such evidence to manifest itself—which. it should be pointed out, since January it has consistently refused todo. Meanwhile, however, it seems to us the risk implicit in the apparent longer range pattern must be kept in mind. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 900.21 S&P Comp (1200 p.m.) 104.37 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TAB ELL No stotement or expres(o of opinion or any other moiler here'n contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, On offer or the ollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any aCTion 10 be laen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own InvesllgaTlon and Informallon Janney Mcntgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offlcrs or employees, may now hav, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secl,lrllles mentioned In ThiS or any future ISsue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as em InVestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel ClJstamers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request