Viewing Month: March 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 02, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 02, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - March 02, 1973
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 2, 1973 – We have s uggesleorrl th'e 'PaSt' that' fbf piij'Po es-of' srock mark'ef ariaysis ,-a s K1ngtl1e trghe questions rates a close second in importance to getting the right answers. The market seems to'us at the moment to be posing two relatively crucial questions. The fact that both are, based on data currently in hand, essentially unanswerable does not, in our view, distract from the necessity of framing them. If nothing else, such framing will make clear what we should be looking for as stock market action unfolds. The first relevant question is, of course, the obvious one, centering on where and when the steep stock market slide which began in mid-January will bottom out. As we have previously noted, we think that this question is easier to answer from a timing point of view than in terms of an ultimate downside objective. The market has now reached the sort of oversold condition that has occurred in a relatively few, easily identifiable periods in the past, and the length of time that such periods have, historically, persisted is limited. Already such a condition has obtained for the entire month of February, and persistence of this sort of thing for much longer than six to eight weeks has, on the record, been relatively rare. It would thus be logical to assume that at least a temporary hiatus during the month of March might ensue. All of this, however, says nothing about the level at which a bottom might take place. Another documented characteristic of oversold conditions is the ability of the market to plummet precipitously while these conditions exist. February's market was just another in a long series of examples which have documented how, under certain conditions, huge losses in security values can be posted over relatively short periods of time. Thus while it is reasonable to assume the decline may cease before – –to()many'days' have-pa s t7it4 is—st1l1lue'stiunabI1l7We'-thlni';'wneth-erth-e-cess-aUon wl1l-take-pla-ceat levels anywhere near present ones. We are already being treated to the familiar spectacle of sporadic attempts to bottom. We saw a relatively spectacular one in early February, following the resolution of the international monetary crisis. If failed after three days, and the market moved lower. Another attempt was made on Wednesday and ,Thursday of this week when the Dow moved up over a twenty-point range. This attempt also fizzled. lis this is written Friday, another attempt is underway. Contrary to widely-held belief,there are no fixed rules as to what shape a bottom may take. Serious declines have, on occaSion, ended with highly visible and obvious selling climaxes, MayJune 1970 being a notable example. However, bottoms have often been less obvious, and it is often necessary to wait a good many days after the fact before trying to pinpoint them. The second major question being posed, we think, relates to the nature and importance of the bottom which will ultimately take place. As long as one continues to view the present decline in the framework of a minor drop occurring in the advanced stages of a major bull market, it will be inferred that the bottom will not be a particularly important one. There is now some evidence, at least, that the present decline is a good deal more severe than that. We cited last week the sharp drop posed by our cumulative index which continued to slide this week to a level below 840. That index has now lost some 215 points from its 1971 high. To put this in perspective it should be noted that the total drop in the 1966 bear market was only 285 points from an approximately similar level. Viewed m terms of this severity then, the ultimate bottom could come to have more significance than, have hitherto have been willing to ascribe to it. Yet it must also be noted that, other than the severity of the decline, precious few of the phenomena that one might expect to accompany a major bottom have so far been present. Institutional cash position remains low, customer debit balances began a mild decline as recently as last month, and short 1nterest has to date risen practically not at all. Thus the question of the significance of the coming bottom, as does ,the question of its level, remains essentially unanswered. There are periods when it is unwise to be dogmatic in absence of hard evidence, and the present one is, we think, a claSSic example. Refuges from the market's current uncertainty are available not only in the obvious form of cash, but in the form of solid values with relatively low market volatility. We would prefer to utilize these refuges until the current Situation clarifies itself. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 949.80 S & P (1200 p.m.) 110.92 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opiniOn or any other motter herem contained IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the so,cllol,on of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converlenclO of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hl own Investigation and Informalion Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its off,cef or employees, may now have, or may later toke, posItions or trades In respect to any seCUflhes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 0 on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to lIs ,vestment adVISOry and olhel customers ,dependently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further ,formation on any security mentioned herein IS aVailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 09, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 09, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - March 09, 1973
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——————————————————————————————————— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 9, 1973 -,- ,,- What has been a longstanding topic of debate in investment circles reached the front page of the Wall Street Journal last week. The headline of a long lead article, written in that publication's usual thorough and cogent style, noted that the yen of big investors to buy growth stocks alarms some analysts . Thus a phenomenon which is, to our mind, of overriding importance to both the market forecaster and the investment manager reached mass-circulation status. We confess that we are of one accord with the Journal in the opinion that the subject is worth focusing on, and we therefore propose to devote this and a number of subsequent issues of this letter to considering it. It is no doubt best to begin by defining just what it is we are examining in terms as close as possible to those a proponent of growth stock investment might use. There are, such an advocate would inSist, out of all the many equity issues available to the investor, a relatively select few which have, over a long period of time, demonstrated the ability to achieve consistent year-to-year and, indeed, quarter-to-quarter earnings increases, these at a rate, moreover, substantially in excess of the average long-term return for all equities. This ability may be due to any of a number of factors, which may include excellence of management, the power to earn an aboveaverage return on invested capital, a proprietary or technological advantage in an industry growing faster than the economy as a whole, or a combination of these. In any case, the theory would run, the uniqueness of these companies makes them particularly appropriate vehicles for conservative long-term investment, the price being paid—and this is usually implicit rather than stated in the defence—being of little, or, at least, secondary, consideration. The Wall Street Journal article quoted an officer of one of the larger New York City banks as saying, high piE's .. . don't bother me a bit. It's much more ortnt- to -getbehindthe-Pf-to s ee 'how'muclrl.-di-scounHn- Ctl!! e.-'trnino–nctten-usedl—I defense of growth stocks is that they are one-decision stocks. The only decision, \n theory, which must be made is the one to buy—not two separate decisions as to where to buy and where to sell. Thus the theory, and it is our intention to spend some time examining its implications. Yet for any discussion to be complete, more than just the theory must be examined, for equally or perhaps even more important is the extent of its acceptance. Thus, as a 1969 S.E.C. study quoted in the Journal pOinted out, amounts ranging from 40 to more than 50 of the total capitalization of IBM, Xerox, Avon Products, Sears Roebuck and Eastman Kodak, were at that time concentrated in the hands of some 200 institutions. Today's figure is probably larger. Clearly this sort of concentration has had implications for past and will have implications for future markets. We intend, therefore, to consider two separate questions. First, is the one-decision, unique- growth-stock theory going to be a viable way of managing assets in the 1970's, and second, does the fact that large amounts of assets are in fact being deployed in accordance with the tenets of the theory impose hitherto non-existent risk for equity prices or new dangers to the institutional structure of securities markets It is important, we think, to separate one question from the other. Whatever one's opinion as a market analyst may be as to the effect of the concentration noted above, it should not dissuade him as an investment manager from deploying funds for their maximum effectiveness, and, if that effectiveness is to be achieved in the classic growth stocks, so be it. On the other hand, blind commitments to theory should not operate to bias the manager's judgment as to risks being taken. Before commencing our discussion in detail in next week's letter. we should, in all candor, confess a few of our own biases. One centers on a healthy skepticisim regarding the one-decision theory. -'The job of the investment manager can be defined as the making of deciSions, and we know of few other areas where one confidently announces that he will do his job more effectively by doing it less. We have noticed few one-decision advocates offering to halve their fees in return for making half the number of decisions. Our second bias involves philosophical doubts as to the viability of universally-held theories. In the vernacular, if we were all so smart, wa should all become rich, and many investors, quite obviously, have not become so. These are, however, but philosophical objections, and, in rebuttal, the growth-stock advocate can, and properly, point to a hard record of exceptional actual results. We shall examine these results—and, more importantly, the probability of their future dupllcation—in our next issue. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 969.45 . S&P (1200 p.m.) 113.62 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreSSton of opinion or ony other maHer herein conloll1ed 15, or n 0 be deemed to be, directly or mdHectly, on offer or the SOllCllolion of on oHer to buy or sell any secvr1ty referred to or mentioned The moiler 1 presented merely for the corwerlenc of the subscrIber While oNe believe the sources of our Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any actIOn to be talren by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformallon Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or emoloyees, may now have, or may later toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any eCUfltles menlloned m thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other 'Sue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc which IS regIstered With the SEC as on mvestment adVisor, may give adVICe to lIs Investment adVISOry and othel customers mdependently of any statements made Ul thIS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 16, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 16, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - March 16, 1973
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK E)(CHANOe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE \ March 16, 1973 – – – – –,.. ….,.,.- ..r ' .–,- – -'. -,'';' -.- – .-…. — ….. – .;;-, -, – We noted last week that the advocate of growth stock investment could produce a highly impressive record of results over the past two decades. An investor of 15,000 in IBM in 1949 would be a millionaire today, and the investor who placed a like amount in Xerox in 1958 would now be worth 3 million. It is difficult to argue with such numbers. Yet it is perhaps worthwhile to take a hard look at the record, using as an example the most immaculate of vestal virgins (as one analyst called growth favorites this week), International Business Machines. Compo Annual Compo Annual Price Change Growth Rate Earnings Change Growth Rate 1949 6.25 .33 1961 150 1564 26.5 1.96 494 16.0 1972 400 167 9.4 11.03 462 17.0 The table above compares IBM's price and its earnings for three years, 1949, 1961, and 1972. What is worthy of note is the compound annual growth rate of earnings. It was better for the period 1961-1972 than for 1949-1961. Yet, for the first period,IBM increased 1564 at a compound annual rate of over 26, whereas since 1961 it has appreciated at an above-average but hardly astonishing rate, 9.4. I. B. M. D J. I. A. . Ratio Price Earnings P/E Price Earnings P/E of P/E s 1949 1961 6.25 150 .33 1.96 I18.9 76.5 200.13 731.14 23.54 31.91 8.5 22.9 2.22 3.34 1972 400 11.03 36.2 1020.02 65.00 15.7 2.30 .estaUstics..,abovedocumenLsomeof.1herea-sons.forthis performanGe-d-ispar-i-ty-.-I-n-4-94-9,..IBMwas— -.- selling for 18.9 times earnings, and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was selling at 8.5 times. Thus, IBM's multiple was 2.22 times that of the Dow. By 1961 the Dow multiple had almost tripled, to 22.9, and IBM, by then everyone's darling, was selling at 3.34 times the Dow multiple, producing a pie ratio of 76.5. Since that time the market forces have been working in the 'opposite direction. The Dow pie has declined to 15.7 and IBM has retreated to almost the same multiple in relation to the Dow that it had in 1949. POINTS CHANGE DUE TO I 949 196 1 196 I 19 72 Earnings Change 30.75 694 Improvement in DJIA PiE ChangeIBMP/EasofDowP/E Total Points Gain 62.75 50.25 143.75 – 266 -178 250 If we break the price changes for IBM over the two periods into those due to earnings growth, changes due to a shift in the Dow p/e, and changes due to shifts in IBM's pie relative to that of the Dow, some interesting numbers emerge. Only 30 pOints of IBM of the 143 point gain from 1949 to 1961 was due to earnings improvement and, had it not been for the other factors, the stock would have sold at 37 not 150. Almost half the 1949-61 gain came from a change in the general-market price/earnings ratio and more than a third from a change in IBM's relative position. By contrast, for the 1961-72 period, had IBM retained its 1961 multiple, it would have tacked on 694 pOints to sell for 844. However, the drop in the Dow knocked off 266 pOints of this gain and the change in relative position another 178 pomts thus making the total gain only 250 points. The only point that these figures underscore is that the truly spectacular gains in growth stock invest- c-ment come from purchase early-in the growth curve—not later. IBM,'in 1949, it will be recalled;-had—-' yet to produce its first computer and in 1958 Xerox was a tiny over-the-counter company with a few pat- ents on a largely untested process. By the time the growth process is finally recognized and companies achieve the size of IBM, now a 9 billion operation, it becomes less and less logical to project the growth curve infinitely into the future, and thus a logical process of multiple erosion occurs. There is moreover scant eVIdence that the process of general erosion of multlples, as shown by the decline of the Dow pie since 1961,is not a continuing process. With this factor working against the investor,rather than in his favor as it did over the 1961-71 period, it becomes all the more important to select stocks early on the growth curve. This, however, is a process which pos es problems, some of which we hope to discuss next week. Dow-Jones Industrial (1200 p.m.) 966.44 S & P (1200 p.m.) 113.96 AWTrk ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or exprenlon of Opinion or any otner motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ,nd,rectly. on offer or the SOIIC.lollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony seCUriTy referred to or mentIoned The molter IS presented merely for the converlenclS of the subcrlber While we believe the sources of our Informa lion to be reliable, we Ifl flO way repreent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statemefl!S mode herem Afly action to be laken by the subSCriber should be based Ofl hiS OWfl InvestlgollOfl cmd InformatIOn Janney Monlgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employces, may now have, or may latcr lake, positions or lrades m respect to any secufltles menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dIfferent from any views now or hereafter epresscd In Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give odvlce to Its IIwestment adVISOry and other customers mdependefllly of any statements mode Ifl Ihls or m any other Issue Further mformorlon Ofl any security mentioned herein s available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 23, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 23, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - March 23, 1973
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– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW VORK. STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE March 23, 1973 FOr thef sTxth s-essionina-row- the-stbcrrratket ifbs-otbeQaliea-ttng-'Cr('fsing yesferday cae 925.20 down 13.17. In the short period of less than three months the Dow has declined 126.50 points from its January 11 closing high of 1051.70 or 12.03. During this time the market has twice unsuccessfully tried to rally from a short-term oversold condition and now seems posi- tioned to attempt a third assault logically from the 920-905 area. During this decline a change in leadership appears to be evolving from the high multiple growth sector to commodity oriented securities. Our discussion of growth stock investing last week centered on that paragon of growth issues, IBM, and tried to develop the point that, while its action from 1949 through 1961 had been spec- tacular, its action since that time had been only somewhat above average. Our point was that, while those who were lucky enough to invest in IBM early in its growth had amassed great sums in the process, those who invested later, during the time t he stock was becoming the core holding of most large institutions, have done less spectacularly well. Truly spectacular results, we suggested, are achieved by identifying growth issues at a relatively early stage. An opportunity for such identification was provided in the spring of 1965 when,within a month of each other, two small companies were first offerred to the investing public, Memorex at 25 a share and McDonald's Corp. at a price of 22 1/2. Each share of Memorex then offerred has since increased through splits to three shares, and each share of McDonald's to 18.3 shares. At the time of their offerring there were distinct similarities. Memorex 1965 earnings were to –!;!,,5..l/2t;il)1e…thosE'l-QLtwoyears.before.and-those..of-.McDGna-1-d-'–s-thr-eet-imesthe-1-963-f-igure-.– – Their subsequent records were also to be similar. From 1965 through 1969 Memorex increased its earnings from 45 cents (based on current capitalization) to 1. 86, an increase of 313, and McDonald's posted at 225 increase, to 39 cents from 12 cents. With these records, it was not surprising that the market performance of each stock should be spectacular. By year-end 1969, less then five years later, the price of Memorex was 1700 above its initial offering price and McDonald's was 1000 above that level. As we all know the roads since then have diverged. While the computer-peripheral business has encountered well-advertised problems. McDonald's has been able to continue stuffing hamburgers into the maw of the American public at an ever increasing rate. Thus, since 1969, it has increased in price from 14 to a high, so far of over 80, while Memorex, which sold at 50 at the end of 1969 is today around 10. Thus, investment in growth issues in their early stages may be no more an investment pmacea than buying them after growth becomes relatively certain. As we saw last week, the latter process does not tend to achieve overly dramatic results. This week's exercise is desinged to show that the former, while it can be spectacularly successful, also runs the risk of equally spectacular losses. It may well be argued, of course, that investment of an equal amount in both McDonald's and Memorex at almost any time sine 1965 would have produced astounding gains, the Memorex loss being more than offset by the tremendous performance of the restaurant company. We are a bit skeptical, however, of the practical possibility of having achieved such results. McDonald's is one of the more unique success stories of recent markets, while a host of small companies which have surfaced over the past few years have run into troubles similar to thos e of Memorex. Another point we hope is illustrated by the above is the fallacy of the one-decision theory. Certainly neither of the above issues could have been bought in their early stages as one- decision stocks. Certainly, in 1969, a decision had to be made, as Memorex problems started to develop, and, conversely, a positive decision to hold McDonald's was necessary all through the period. As we pointed out two weeks ago, decisions are the crux of the investment manage- ment process, and the manager who thinks he can invest so as to avoid them is, to our way of thinking, deluding himself. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 918.80 S&P (1200 p.m.) 108.29 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTrk No stotement or e)(preSlon of opinion or ony other molter herein contained '5, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or .nd,rectly, on offer or Ihe sollCltollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The moTler IS presented merely for the conver-Ience of the subSCriber While .,e believe the sourccs of our Information to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Janney Montgomcry Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later lake, positions or lrades In respect to any seculltles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Seott, Inc, which IS regIStered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further ,nformat,on on any secunty mentioned herem IS avollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 30, 1973

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 30, 1973

Tabell's Market Letter - March 30, 1973
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TABIELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 30, 1973 As mentioned in last week's market letter the short-term oversold condition of the stock market sug- gested a rally logically from Hie 920 – 905 area -The-!narket accommodated-us-the first four tradin-g – . sessions of this week, highlighted yesterday by the anticipation of President Nixon's address on econ- omic and foreign affairs. As in previous short-term oversold rallies this year, a possible test of the previous low of 922.71 on March 23 should be anticipated. Should this low be violated, of greater signi- ficance from a longer-term point of view would be the penetration of the October 16, 1972 low of 921. 66. We have been commenting in our last three letters on SOme of the problems posed by growth stock investment from the point of view of the individual investment manager. Despite these problems, it is evident that the theory has gained a wide degree of popularity, especially among those deploying substantial sums of money. We should like in this issue to consider some of the implications of this popularity for the character of future securities markets. Last April, a major New York City bank announced in a New York Times interview that, of the 6.1 billion it had under management, one-third was invested in the common stock of just ten major companies. Of these ten, at least seven, IBM, Eastman Kodak, Xerox, Avon Products, Johnson & Johnson, Sears Roebuck, and Schering-Plough fell into the category of familiar senior growth favorites. What was absolutely intriguing was the size of the positions. The best way to gain an idea of their magnitude is to compare them with average monthly trading volume for the issues in question. The IBM position amounted to almost three months trading volume, the Kodak position to two and one- half months trading volume, and the Avon Products holding to almost four months trading volume. These, it must be remembered, are the positions held by only one bank. Probably a dozen other insti- tutions are in a position to have holdings of roughly comparable size. The obVious conclusion are .these positionsareeffectively un.saleable.. . .. The incisive and witty Alan Abelson fantasied in Barron's a few weeks ago what might happen were a number of large institutions simultaneously to attempt to sell even a small portion of their holdings in growth favorites. The effect, he said, could be similar to ames s of wounded elephants trying to stampede out the same porthole. Actually, it would not be necessary for the elephants themselves to do the stampeding. One of the unique market statistics of 1972 was the substantial rise in margin account debit balances, at a rate far greater than any similar rise in the past. This in itself was not all that surprising. What was interesting was that it took place without any increase whatsoever in other measures of specu- lative activity such as American Stock Exchange volume and indices of low priced stocks. It seems at least a tenable conclusion that the new breed of margin trader went where the action was and was in there competing with the institution for a select list of growth favorites. Now the margin trader, historically, is a nimble creature and he is going to be quick to leave the scene when institutional sponsorship of one of his holdings begins to lag. The result, market theory tells us, should be increased volatility in issues of this sort, and is indeed is precisely what we saw throughout 1972. The phenomenon of rotational collapse as various growth issues fall from favor has been a concomitant of recent markets. We would expect the phenomenon to increase rather than decrease in frequency. Meanwhile, virtually unnoticed amldst all the hubbub, there exists a whole host of companies, the majority actually, whose earnings, for one reason or another, have not in recent years displayed the consistent earnings growth so desired by the growth-stock theorists. Lack of demand has brought the price of many of these-companies to twenty-year lows in relations to their earning power. More – importantly, it can be argued, it may have effectively shut many companies off from the capital market. With public demand for equities sharply reduced, it is difficult to market new is sues if they are not acceptable to the large buyers with a predilection for such. The extent to which concentration in growth stocks has depressed the prices of issues not falling into that category can be measured by the wave of announcements by companies of intent to purchase their own stock. In all too many cases, prices have apparently been depressed to the point where these companies find stock retirement a preferable alternative to expansion. The phenomena cited above are only a few of the apparent results of institutional concentration on growth issues, and we do not think all the implications of this concentration are yet obvious. It seems, however, that as long as the trend continues, market disruptions of the sort mentioned above .-' are likely to be commonplace. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 955.30 ANTHONY W. TABELL S&P (1200 p.m.) 112.16 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTrk No statement or e,.;prelSlOn of opInion or any other matter herem tontolned IS, or lS to be deemed 10 be, directly or IndHedly, on offer or Ihe 50Iu;llol,on of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred 10 or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the conver,ena of the subscriber While -Ne believe the sourc;es of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Aoy action to be laeo by the subSCriber should be based on his own Inveshgollon and Informollon Janoey Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporohon, ond Its officers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toj.,e, poll,on or trades In respect to any securllle meotloned In thiS o any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any VICWS now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,ch IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode, thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentIOned hercln IS available on request

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