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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 20, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 20, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - June 20, 1980
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.; .!' ' .. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCi!TON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMDEA AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 20, 1980 – – With thesfoCkmarket, -arleasttlirougnWednesday,having acted reasonalily -ins perhaps- – worthwhile stepping back and trying to reassess the longer-term picture. The chart below attempts to do this. It shows our interpretation of what constitute the major swings in the S & P 500 from June, 1949 to date. It is drawn to scale both horizontally and vertically with the vertical scale being loga- rithmic so that equal percentage changes show up as equal vertical distances. The horizontal scale is based on trading days and covers some 8,350 days ending approximately in April, 1982. lJL!' 100 \ /gO 197'-) 00 70 GO 50 40 SEP 14 1953 20 JUNE 1949 – ORTE I1033 DAYS 1177 OArS 1101 ORrs I1043 oRlS The length of each completed cycle in days is shown at the bottom of the chart, the cycles being measured from low to low. The consistent length of the swings to date is quite interesting and explains the popular, if not quite exact, concept of the four-year cycle, there being approximately 1,020 trading days in a four-year period. Most analysts would agree, we think, with the interpretations shown on the chart through 1974. For the most recent period, not surprisingly, there are conflict- ing interpretations. We have chosen to date March 6, 1978 as the end of a completed cycle, 863 trading days in length. This is somewhat shorter than the others but not out of line when contrasted with the experience of the entire century. If our interpretation is correct, the new major cycle which began on March 6, 1978 is now 579 trading days old. As the chart shows, this is barely half of its expected length of 1,043 days based on the average of all the cycles shown. An alternative view, of course, is that we remain in the cycle which began in 1974. If that is the case, that cycle is now 1,442 trading days old and would not be complete until another major low is reached. For this reason, we reject that interpretation. To our mind, the crucial issue is interpreting the cycle which we date as beginning two years ago. As the chart quite clearly shows, the four cycles through 1966 spent the bulk of their time in advancing phases. The three completed cycles since have tended to peak around the middle of their term. If the current cycle follows the pattern of those three recent ones, an imminent or even past peak is a logical expectation. If, on the other hand, it conforms to the earlier cycles and spends the bulk of its life in an advancing phase, a great deal more room exists on the upside. We, therefore, intend to try to dis- sect this cycle further next week. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 869.62 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 114.17 Cumulative Index (6/19/80) 852.79 AWTsla No statement or of OpinIOn Of any other molter herein conlolned IS, or IS 0 be deemed to be, directly or ,ndlfectly, an offer or Ihe soliCitation of an offel to buy or sell any seturity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlenCij of the subs!;nber While we believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude hen!!n Any actIOn to be by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hi' own Invesllgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os 0 corparollon, and liS officers or emploees, may now have, or may later toke, po,llonl or trades H'I respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to IS Investment adVisory and olher cuSlomerS Independently of any statements mode In Ih,s or In any other Issue Furlher ,nformation on any seturlly mentioned herein (s cVOllable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 27, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 27, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - June 27, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE June 27, 1980 In this space last week, we examined the record of seven major stock market cycles from June, 1949 to in-thissPl'l!e thaCa newsuch-cyCle- u began on March 6, 1978. The purpose of this week's letter will be to examine that cycle in greater detail. The chart below shows the action of the S & P 500 on the current cycle, with its major high and low points drawn to scale. As can be seen, it has consisted so far of four major upward moves, the last of which has recovered almost all, but not all, of the previous ground lost. The crucial issue, of course, is whether the current rally will carry on to new peaks and thus represent a continuation of the cycle. – NO 19GB SEP 1976 JRN 1973 jJ, J! 9S, DFr JtJL 19S) DEC 190 1 FEB 1906 ' FB P Jg, HIN 19L1qSFP 1953 F 15 , OCT 1957- !lIN 1962 II IN 10620C1 1966 r y \ r r 10 19BO 100 .JllL MAR NOV 7 1979 MAR 27 1980 NOV 14 1978 In terms of length, it seems convincingly arguable that the current cycle has a good deal longer to go. The horizontal bars drawn through the middle of the chart show the length, in trading days, of each of the previous seven major cycles. It is visually obvious that each one lasted considerably longer than the present one. Even were the present cycle to duplicate the short lengths of 1966-70 or 1976-78, it would still have well over a year remaining. However, cycles are measured from low point to low point, and the key question is whether the high of Feburary 13 constituted the peak for the current cycle. The relative times of the previous cycle peaks, again drawn to scale on the chart, are shown by the vertical tic marks on the top of the chart. It may be noted that both the 1974-78 cycles and the 1966-70 cycles peaked at about the same relative point that the present market had reached last February. Duplication of the 1970-74 cycle, with its peak in January, 1973, would result in a high to be reached fairly shortly. If, however, the earlier cycles were duplicated, the ultimate peak of this one could still be a year and a half away. As the chart shows, the peaks of 1953, 1957, 1961, and 1966 lie well to the right of the present market on the time scale. Most interesting, however, is the level of the various highs in each previous cycle based on percentage advance from their individual lows. These levels are shown with the tic marks on the righthand side of the chart. It can clearly be seen that all five of the cycles shown attained percentage advances much greater than the advance from March,1978 to date. The reason the other two cycles, with peaks in 1953 and 1957, are not shown is that they both involved advances in the area of 100, off the top of the chart. In terms of cycle analysis, therefore, it seems to us that the market is currently at a crucial stage. Ex- tension of the present advance to new highs would suggest that the now-two-year-old market cycle continues in its upward phase. If this is the case, the historical record would suppport the likelihood of a protracted period of advancing prices with further substantial percentage increase. A reversal, however, would raise the likelihood that the peak of last February was comparable to those of 1968 and 1976, and the outlook would then have to be rated as considerably less than sanguine, with a retracement of at least the entire advancing phase of the cycle a distinct possibility. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 879.86 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 115.83 Cumulative Index (6/26/80) 865.80 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AW'f!No. ssitoatement or expresSIon of opInion or any olher moiler herein contOlned 15, or 15 to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihc soI ICltatlOn 0f on a ff er to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the of the subscriber While -Ne believe Ihe sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorl'nlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporotlon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securities menhoned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such posItion moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Iflvestmenl adVISor, may give adVice to lis Investment advl10ry and other customers rndependently of any statements made rn thiS r In any other Issue Furlher Information on any securrty mentroned herein rs avollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 03, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 03, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - July 03, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STA.TE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JER6EY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – July 3, 1980 -For. – on mutual fund activity provided by the Investment Company Institute. The figures for stock- oriented funds, as we adjust them (see note below), have generally provided a rather dreary pic- ture. There exists, however, in the past two months, an early and very tentative indication of a possible reawakening. – ' The history of mutual fund activity since 1954 can be partitioned, very much like the stock market itself, into two eras, with the dividing line somewhere in the early 1970's. In every single month from October, 1954 through April, 1971, mutual fund sales exceeded mutual fund redemptions. Over that period, a total of 27.6 billion of public savings flowed into equity-oriented funds. This cash inflow, coupled with a generally rising stock market, caused fund assets to increase from 5.3 billion in the fall of 1954 to a peak of almost 60 billion in early 1972. The period since 1971-1972 has generally been the direct opposite of the one discussed above. May, 1971 saw the first month since the figures were compiled in which more mutual fund shares were redeemed than were sold. This pattern very quickly became the rule rather than the excep- tion. In the 119 months from that date through this March, redemptions exceeded sales in 94 of them. With a flat-to-declining stock market in effect, assets reached a low of 31 billion in Sept- ember, 1974. They have since increased to 41 billion. Under these conditions, quite obviously, mutual fund managers were required, on balance, to become net sellers of common stocks. From August, 1971 through last month, stock funds as a whole have been net sellers of 17.66 billion worth of equities. It can hardly be totally accidental that a stock market Which has had to absorb this amount of selling from a single source has been unable to generate a great deal of upside move- ment during tne-decade ill quesuon. . Most recently, however, a glimmer, however faint, has appeared on the horizon. Stock mutual funds enjoyed an influx of new investment money both in April and May of this year. This consittutes the first consecutive string of two months in which sales exceeded redemptions since 19741975. The sales side of this equation provides an even brighter picture. January sales of stock mutual funds were 522.3 million and the figure exceeded 500 million again in April. The January figure, interestingly enough, constitutes the best single month for equity fund sales since October. 1971. The only reason that the funds' cash inflow picture during 1980 has not been more positive is that by and large redemptions have increased along with new sales. However, the analysis of past figures reveals that this fits into an historical pattern — one normally associated with the early stages of market rises. During such periods in the past, both sales and redemptions have tended to increase together. As the market rise continues, sales tend to continue strong while the increase in redemptions slows down. If this turns out to be the case in 1980- 81, the results will be interesting indeed, since stock mutual funds would inevitably become net buyers of equities rather than net sellers as has been the case for the past decade. Over the short term, there exists even more potential for such an eventuality. Despite the fact that funds enjoyed a cash inflow of 88 million in April and May, they were net sellers of 550 million of common stocks, in the process raising their liquid reserve position to 10.13 of assets. Under these conditions, should the cash inflow continue, a switch to net stock purchases by equity funds could become an important market factor. There exists, also, an impressive reservoir of public savings which might be diverted to stock funds in the future. As almost everyone is aware, money market fund assets now exceed 70 billion. Almost 10 billion, in addition to this, is invested in bond and municipal-bond funds. It is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility that declining interest rates could cause a shift of some portion of these vast amounts of funds to equities. NOTE All of the above figures have been adjusted by us. This adjustment essentially involves the elimination from the Investment Company Institute statistics of bond and municipal-bond funds for so long as figures for these funds have been separately available. The numbers, therefore. may differ from those reported in the press and other sources. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (7/2/80) 879.86 116.25 866.70 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of opinion or any other molter herein contained 1, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the 50ile,lollon of on offer to buy or sell ony secunty referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for the converlenct of the While He believe the sources of our Informe tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hIS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any securities menl10ned In thIS or any future Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereofter expreued In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reg!Slered With Ihe SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may give adVice to 115 Investment adVisory clnd othel customers IndCpc!ndently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 11, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 11, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - July 11, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE r July 11, 1980 In the it-maybe elementary fmancIal mathematIcs. . … here;yith ,a on .- – – The stock market has been rallying of late in response to lower short-term interest rates, albeit the unprecedented bond-market rally of this spring appears now to be entering a correctionary phase. Much of the bond-market strength, however, has been concentrated in short-term instruments, and long-term bonds are still priced to yield relatively generous returns on an historical basis. A reason- able working estimate of yields currently available from taxable bonds of high quality would be 12. Stocks, by contrast, provide current returns nowhere nearly so generous. How, then, to justify the purchase of stocks at current levels and, by extension, the sharp rally in the stock market since last March, at a time when the prospect for dividend improvement is hazy at best The obvious Justification is that bond income remains fixed while stock dividends presumably will grow. This argument can, of course, be pushed to excess, as it was, for example, in the early 1970's. In considering the purchase of a low-yielding stock versus a higher yielding bond, two key questions need to be asked. The first is how many years of dividend growth will be required before the yield for the common based on purchase price is equal to the presently available bond yield. The second is how many years will be required before the total return from the equity investment will equal that which would have been available from purchase of the bond. ' , ,I Growth Ra tel C–u-r-r-e-n-t–Y-l-d-. H 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 —-2— —-4— —6– —8– -1-0— -1-2— 14 —– 16 18 20 126/200 64/101 43/69 33/52 27/42 22/36 19/31 17/28 16/25 14/23 91/151 46/ 77 31/52 24/40 19/32 16/27 14/24 13/21 11/19 10/17 71/121 36/ 62 24/42 19/32 15/26 13/22 11/19 10/17 9/16 8/14 5 6/-99–1-9/-50-1-9/-34-14/.2 1 4 2/-13–1-/-1 45/ 81 23/ 41 16/28 12/22 10/18 8/15 7/13 6/12 6/11 5/10 36/ 65 18/ 34 12/23 10/18 8/15 7/13 6/11 5/10 5/ 9 4/ 8 28/ 52 14/ 27 10/19 8/14 6/12 5/10 5/ 9 4/ 8 4/ 7 3/ 7 21/ 40 11/ 21 7/15 6/11 5/ 9 4/ 8 4/ 7 3/ 7 3/ 6 3/ 6 15/ 29 8/ 16 5/11 4/ 9 4/ 7 3/ 6 3/ 6 2/ 5 2/ 5 2/ 4 10/ 19 5/ 11 4/ 8 3/ 6 2/ 5 2/ 5 2/ 4 2/ 4 2/ 4 1/ 3 The table above attempts to answer these questions. The column headings show various hypothetical dividend-growth rates and the row headings show various assumed current stock yields. For each junction point, the figure to the left of the slash shows the number of years required until dividends grow so that the yield on purchase price for a stock purchased at the current yield shown is equal to 12. The figure to the right of the slash shows the number of years required for the total return on the stock (assuming reinvestment of dividends) to equal that of a 12 bond (assuming reinvestment of interest). To cite an example, a stock currently yielding 5, with an anticipated dividend growth rate of 10 annually, would begin to yield 12 on cost after 10 years. After 18 years, the total return would be equal to that of a 12 bond purchased at the same time. How does this all work out in terms of actual yields available today As the most simple-minded possible example of available stock yields, we examined the dividend figures for the 20 largest companies on the New York Stock Exchange, taken in terms of market value, with no more than one representative of any single industry allowed in the sample. The average current yield for those 20 companies is 5.14 with a range between 1.1 and 9.5. The average historical dividend growth rate has been 11.075 measured from the final quarter of 1969 through the first quarter of 1980. The range of growth rates has been from 2.5 to 23. A theoretical portfolio constructed using those parameters would, after nine Ybars, provide a yield on cost in excess of 12. After 16 years, the total return would exceed that of a 12 bond assuming reinvestment of income in both cases. It should go without saying, of course, that the growth rates cited above are historical, and future projection is, at best, hypothetical. It should also be noted, however, that the above example considers income only and not potential capital gains from stocks, which presumably would accrue over the long term along with dividend growth. It is interesting, however, that if historical dividend growth rates can be projected into the future, over a reasonable period, the income from high-quality stocks might well exceed that of first quality bonds even at current near-record interest rates. j , Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 886.01 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 117.11 Cumulative Index (7/10/80) 885.00 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No stalemenl or e)(preSSlOn of opU'lion O( ony other molter herein contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or ,nd,rectly, On offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy Of sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Informo- tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIOn to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn and information Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may loter toke, posltlons aT trodes In respect to ony Securities mentioned Ln thiS or ony future Issue, and such posItion may be different from any views now or herllafter eprllssed In thIS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further mformallon on any sentlaned herein IS available on

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 18, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 18, 1980

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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ..- ……. 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE July 18, 1980 — -level-on occurred, carrYing the average to its highest hivel in 22 months. The significance of this event has not, of course, gone unnoticed in the investment community. In the last three years, each time the Dow has rallied to this area, it has met with resistance, and on three occasions, serious corrections have ensued over relatively short periods of time. -Da-te 09/08/78 11/14/78 10105/79 11/07/79 02/13/80 04/21/80 -DJI-A 907.74(H) 785.26(L) 897.61(H) 796. 67(L) 903.84(H) 759. 13(L) Points -122.48 -100.04 -144.71 Change -13.49 -11.15 -16.01 Trading Days 48 24 47 Breadth (A-DIU) 721. 18(H) 669.36(L) 692.16(H) 644.16(L) 667.13(H) 621. 16(L) It would, therefore, not be unprecedented over the short term to see the market again retrace a portion of the strong advance in the Dow which, in the period of 63 trading days, has seen the Dow advance from a low on April 21 of 759.13, to a new closing high on July 17 of 915.10, or approximately 20.55. From a short-term technical point of view, the three-month rally has done just about all that could be expected. When the longer-term outlook, however, is examined, a number of building blocks seem to be . ,tn. . .. .,.. .., e. .., 80's, As of this letter are aware, a recent examination of the four-year-cycle a new major cycle began on March 6, 1978 where the Dow closed at 742.72. Our conclusion sug- gested, in part,, .in terms of cycle analysis, therefore, it seems to us that the market is at a crucial stage, Extension of the present advance to new highs would suggest that the now-two- year-old market cycle continues in its upward phase. If this is the case, the historical record would support the likelihood of a protracted period of advancing prices with further substantial percentage increase. Our interpretation of the four-year-cycle would seem to be confirmed by the market action of this week. It is interesting to note that the cyc Ie which began on March 6, 1978 is now 598 trading days old, While the average cycle length of the seven cycles studied in the post-war experience is 1043 days. The decisive penetration of the overhead supply between 850-900 which has repeatedly turned back all attempts at a meaningful advance for the past three years indicates substantially higher long-term objectives, The point-and-figure chart of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average on the reverse side of this letter properly puts into perspective the potential significance of the recent strength in the market. Since the three-year trading range of 900-760 on the DJIA was penetrated by a 920 posting on the upside, it is possible to project long-term upside objectives in excess of 1200 on the DJIA, This is not to say that there are not possible areas of concern on the horizon. Breadth of the market action, although recently in gear with the DJIA short-term, must be watched closely. Classic breadth analysis suggests potential bearish implications when a new high in the market averages is unconfirmed by a like high in breadth, While the Dow-Jones Industrial Average moved to new high territory yesterday, our breadth index at approximately 655 remains below the levels of September, 1978 (721.18), October, 1979 (692.16), and February, 1980 (667.13). This sort of action could set the stage for a divergence of the classic sort. It should be remembered, however, that breadth divergences historically have taken place over protracted periods of time, and there have often been lags between new highs in the averages and ultimate confirmation by market breadth, How this breadth action evolves should be watched closely as it could give a major clue to the long-term performance of the market. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 921. 59 S 8. P Composite (12 00 PM) 121. 97 Cumulative Index (7/17/80) 916.73 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL RJS sla No statement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein conlolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly Of indirectly, on offer or Ihe 501lCllahon of an offer 10 buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe convel'lence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informohan to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof ncr of the statements mude herem Any action TO be la'.en by lhe !oubscnber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now halle, or may later toke, pOSitions or trodes In respect to ony secuntles mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSItion may be different from any IIlews now or hereafter expressed m Ihls or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC as on Inllestment odvlsor, may give adVice to lIS Investment adllisory and athel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informallon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request i 10100 1100 1'-'00 eoo lOC 0;;0 600 J )O ac.o /00 0 , l1li ,, DOW JONES 1l'Jl!U0 I -AT INDEX , 20 POINT , .i ( f / ! IV

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Tabell’s Market Letter – July 25, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – July 25, 1980

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,…,; – – – – – – – – – -TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGe July 25. 1980 —– —— …. – ' . – . – ' -…….. … After rocketing 169'.5'4' points from'the Aiitil 21 closing low of- 759.13 on the Dow-Jones -Indus- trial Average to a three-year closing high of 928.67 on Monday of this week. it would seem logical to examine the significance of the short-term and long-term positions of the market after this remarkable 22.33 advance. —r Clearly from a short-term point of view. the market should be ready for a rest after its prolonged advance in the short period of just 64 trading days. The familiar 10-day oscillator of total advances minus total declines is useful in measuring past oversold as well as overbought markets. An inspection of similar overbought conditions in the last few years. coupled with the breadth characteristics of this advance which have fallen to date somewhat short of expectations. would suggest a short-term pause or possibly a retracement of the advance into the strong support area of 900- 880. Assuming our interpretation of the short-term position of the market to be correct. where does this leave us in regard to the long term secular trading range of the DJIA Last week this letter suggested the recent strength in the general market supported our bullish interpretation in terms of duration and magnitude of the four-year-cycle. The recent strength in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. confirming new highs recently registered in the Standard 8. Poors 500 and the New York Stock Exchange Composite. must be put in proper perspective against the long- term behavior of the Dow. As the chart on the back page reflects. the equity market from 1940 till 1966 was supported by a secular uptrend advancing at a rate of about 8.9 a year on the Dow. It was simple to manage money within this framework — bull markets were long and profit- able while bear markets,were short. and although irritating. new highs were registered within a reasonably short period of time. However. -computed 'from slope- — – — Jones has been virtually zero. The most statistically accurate description of the market on the averages for the past 15 years is that it is a wide. flat trading area. The continuation of this trading range concept has recently become challenged. The market has spentmost oJ its time in a trading range. for. the Jast lS,ye1!rs. between 800 and 900. despite occasional excursions outside these levels in either direction. As can be seen on the chart on the opposite page. there have been occasions since 1966 when it looked as if the trading range might be decisively penetrated. However. in each case there has been no follow-through (1973 and 1976 on the upside — 1974 on the downside). The current market strength presents again the possibility of the end of this secular trading range. We know the market. in terms of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. as well as the S 8. P 500 and the New York Stock Exchange Composite. has moved decisively above all the benchmark peaks that have been established since the bear market of 1976-78. Knowing the Dow has traded within the range of 800-900 during most of this period. it is important to note the recent strength in the Dow. Penetrating. on the upside. the three-year trading range which began in the fall of 1977 constitutes breakout from this trading area or base formation The three-year-old base formation indicates a plausible long-term upside objective in the Dow in excess of 1200. If this long-term objective were to be approached. the entire 15-year trading range (1966-1980) would. in turn. be penetrated on the upside which would indicate a brand new market cycle. This admittedly bullish sequence of events we have projected, because of the recellt shortterm strength in the general market must be taken at face value. There are a nu-fiber of other technical factors that must be evaluated before confirmation of a move outlined above may be considered. However. as a child must crawl before he walks. it becomes necessary for the market to first break out of its three-year trading range decisively before it can break out of its 15-year trading range. What is being observed is the market is again trying to take its first step. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 919.37 S 8. P Composite (12 00 PM) 120.97 Cumulative Index (7/24/80) 924.16 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS. JR. DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL RJS sla No statement or e)(pre5S10n of opinIon or ony other motter here'n contolned IS, or 15 to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indlrt!dly, on Offt!f or the SohClfotlon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred to or menlloned The molter IS presented merely for the conver-Iena; of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informo- han to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be to!..en by the subSCriber should be based on his own Investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and It5 offICers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect 10 any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery ScoT!, tnc , which IS registered With the SEC 0 on mvestment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lIs Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In tnlS or m any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security menhoncd herein Is available on request '00 Io-t,Io-)1momoo0()o('QJo') Oo(o(r-)- 0 0 t- 0 U) eo 0 0 CD 0 U) U) 0 0 U) II I I I I I I I I I T – '– 0 til I c 0 I 0 tn 1 I c 0 0; I I 0 U) N I 0 to N I 0u- I c 0 I — — .-J a.-J CD CD J OJ Z , aZ I 0r &-E OJ (J CO 0 U) I 096i' 6/6T fItS I usr 9t6f St6T nLSf ELSI VSI IL61 OLSf 696r' fI9S. 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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 01, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 01, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 01, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 1, 1980 The stock market advance proceeded in satisfactory fashion this week, with the Dow attaining a new cJos- on .Wednesday.. Somewber.e ,the ad5ance m!!y.laye .lost '!!pass.eDge.!, namely oil industry group whose comPonents have lieerlfeaders during mosf-cifthe 197980-market 'strength 10/3/79 11/7/79 2113/80 3/26/80 7/23/80 7/30/80 DJIA Change S & P 500 Change International Oils Change Ratio to S & P Domestic Oils Change Ratio to S & P Crude Producers Change Ratio to S & P 885.15 109.59 195.02 1. 78 245.3 2.24 455.9 4.16 796.67 -10.0 99.87 – 8.9 183.52 – 5.9 1. 83 239.3 – 2.4 2.40 445.0 – 2.4 4.46 903.84 l3.5 118.44 18.6 233.99 27.5 1. 98 345.5 44.3 2.92 603.7 35.7 5.10 762.12 -15.7 98.68 -16.7 199.63 -14.7 2.02 277.4 -19.7 2.81 470.5 -22.0 4.77 928.58 21. 8 121. 93 23.6 252.85 36.6 2.07 299.4 7.9 2.46 654.7 39.1 5.37 936.18 0.8 122.23 0.2 242.57 – 4.1 1. 98 286.3 – 4.4 2.34 639.1 – 2.4 5.23 The above table shows the Dow, S & P 500, and three major oil industry indices at selected dates since last October. It clearly documents the relative strength of the oils last fall and early this year. All three oil indices declined less than the broader averages in October-November, and advanced by considerably greater amounts on the February rise. In March, however, some weakness set in. Domestic oils and pro- ducers declined by more than did the Dow or the S & P, and the drop in international oils was about the same. On the rise through July 23, domestic oils participated hardly at all, and the rise in the other two was not spectacular. Last week's action showed fairly sharp declines in all three oil indicat9rs as the major averages movea ahead. . — .0 – – -' The table below shows some relevant technical statistics for major international and domestic oil stocks. It documents the fact that 10 of the 15 stocks shown have, so far, been unable to move above their highs of early 1980, and also shows that, at this week's lows, most stocks had moved off fairly sharply from their re- cent highs. Moreover, in the past fortnight, most issues have formed tops or potential tops. Where these exist, the downside objectives of those tops are shown in the table together with the downside breakout point if such a breakout has not already occurred. Early 1980 Spring 1980 High Low Recent High Recent Low Breakout Downside Objective Exxon 67 55 72 69 Gulf Oil 54 35 45 39 38 Mobil Oil 89 57 80 73 70 60 Royal Dutch 92 67 92 87 Standard Oil, Calif. 85 62 81 73 66 Texaco 41 30 39 36 35 32 Atlantic Richfield 53 41 49 42 38 Cities Service 37 29 39 32 30 Conoco 58 41 59 52 48 46 Getty 97 66 90 81 78 68 Phillips 61 38 51 40 38 Shell 38 28 40 34 32 Standard Oil, Ind. 60 46 65 57 Cc 54 48 Sun Co. 45 31 40 37 Union Oil 62 45 61 55 52 45 The point that must be noted is that the tops, so far, are small, and in most cases, existing patterns do not suggest objectives below the lows of last spring. Thus, the worst that can be inferred about oil issues at the moment is that they may continue to show weaker relative action than they did in early 19791980. Were the tops to broaden, however, and large numbers of oil issues penetrate their spring 1980 lows, the technical implications could be a good bit more serious. It must be recalled, for example, that oil and oilrelated issues comprise almost a quarter of the S & P 500. Weakness in this area, therefore, could constitute a heavy drag on the performance of the general market. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (7/31/80) 932.59 121.11 932.18 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of op'nion or ony other maHer herein contolned 1, or IS 10 be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, an offer or the sol,cllol.on of on offer to bvy or sell any secunty referred to or mentrcned The metier IS presented merely fa/ the converlence of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarontee the accuracy thereof nor af the statements mode herein Any action to be tolren by the ubscrlber &hould be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corpo'atlon, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may later toke, POiltlonl or trades In respect to any seCurities mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such position moy be different from any views now or hereafter e,.pressed In thl' or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give odvlce to liS Investment adVisory and othet customers independently of any statements mode in Ihll or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 08, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 08, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 08, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – .. — — — Paradoxically, stock market action of the sort displayed last week makes us feel old, reminding us that our stock market career extends back to the dear, dead days of the 1950's and 1960's. As always appears to be the case in reminiscence, it was a better and a simpler time. Many of the trappings of today's financial markets were as yet uninvented, or at least, undiscovered. Options, exchange-traded ones at least, were nonexistent. Modern portfolio theory was unheard of, and beta was still a college fraternity. This, at least, had the advantage of not requiring a graduate degree in mathematics for successful portfolio management. The most complex mathematical skill required in those days was the calculation of compound growth rates, which could then be projected indefinitely into the future. Another attraction of that bygone era, at least to one whose professional expertise centers around common-stock analysis, is the absence — or so it seems — of alternative investment media. Gold remained the exclusive province of croaking prophets of gloom and doom to whom no one paid much attention. Commodity trading went on unnoticed in dusty tombs, located in lowrent areas on the fringes of the financial district. The noun collectible had not yet been invented, and most people thought of their homes in terms of shelter rather than annual price appreciation. Investmentwise, (Come to think of it, we don't think the suffix -wise had been invented then, either.) the stock market was the place to be. Ttiere eXlstedthen, tliosEi' with-long memories will recall, a breed Of money managers tionately known as gunslingers, whose function consisted of charging inordinate fees for making investors richer than they deserved to be. This even worked for a few years, until sanity, painfully in the case of a good many clients, returned, and it was discovered that the Midas touch was a good deal less prevalent on Wall Street than many had thought. At any rate, one of our friends among this crew had the habit, when the tape was clattering away merrily, to exclaim to all who would listen, Nobody should have any cash except for subway tokens. A faint — a very faint — whiff of this sort of flavor could be detected in the stock market of last week. We know now, of course, that the era referred to above, like all speculative bubbles, came to its inevitable denouement over the past decade. Our thinking about the stock market inevitably tends to be colored by recent events rather than earlier ones, and, as the Dow-Jones Industrial Average moves toward the 1000 level for the umpteenth time, it is difficult not to view the advance with a certain degree of skepticism. This skeptiCism is particularly engendered by the atmosphere of the past two years, during which, three advances, not unlike the one from this spring, were quickly and surprisingly aborted by almost complete retracement. In the light of this sort of recent history, it is perhaps useful, as we have tried to do above, to remind ourselves that nothing is permanent, and there was, in fact, another time when the market behaved differently. Certainly, at some stage, there will take place a stock – market rise which will not find itself quickly turned back after what, by historical standards, is a rather paltry advance. We have spent the last decade, in this letter, speculating on just when such an event might happen. We intend to continue to address the question. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 959.47 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 124.31 Cumulative Index (8/7/80) 952.06 AWT sla ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or C)(prenlOn of opinion or ony olner motter herein contOlned IS, or Il 10 be deemed 10 he, directly or indirectly, on offer or the 501lCIIotion of on offer to buy or sell ony secunty referred to or mentioned The molter 1 presented merely for the converlena of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our mforma hon 10 be reliable, we III no way represent or guarantee thC! accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any OChon to be token by the subscriber shOuld be based on hiS own Investlgotlon and Information Janney Montqomery Scott, Inc, as a oorporC/lorT, and liS offICers or employees, may now have, cr may latcr toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future usue, ond such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or ony other Issue. Jonney Montgomery Scott, In(, whICh IS registered With Ihe SEC as an Irwestmenl adVisor, moy give adVice to lIS 1Ilves!menl adVISOry and other cvlfomers Independently of any Slotements mode In thiS or rn any other Issue Further Information on onv securrty mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 15, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 15, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 15, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE August 15, 1980 '-The atwariance-with 'rest 'of the financial-com- munity on a -number of basic propositions. 'There eXists, for example';- conventional wisdom which states that a market which has moved up sharply is, precisely because of this fact, vulnerable and in need of a correction. The technician, by and large, would argue that market strength is a healthy condition which is more likely than not to continue. The strength of the past four months has some claim to uniqueness. The Dow has moved up 27 over 78 trading days, through August 11, with the largest correction during that period being 2.21 . The only instance of a steeper rally in almost 40 years is the 36 move which took place over just 68 trading days between December, 1974 and March, 1975. In an effort to establish a benchmark for pre- vious rallies to compare with the present one, we have identified in the table below all rallies since 1942 which have continued for 78 days or more without a 5 correction or which have advanced more than 27. There are 22 such instances. Starting Date DJIA High After 78 Dals Subsequent Advance High No. of Days Later Advance From First High – Apr 28, 1942 Nov 30, 1943 Sep 14, 1944 Mar 26, 1945 Jun 13, 1949 Jul 13, 1950 Dec 4, 1950 1Mar 14, 1955 Feb 12, 1957 Dec 17, 1957 Oct 25, 1960 Oct 23, 1962 Nov 22, 1963 Jun 28, 1965 Oct 7, 1966 Jun 5, 1967 Jul 7, 1970 Nov 23, 1971 Dec 6, 1974 Oct I, 1975 Jun I, 1979 Apr 21, 1980 92.92 129.57 142.96 152.27 161. 60 197.44 222.33 2.5,5.-12 391. 36 454.82 425.65 566.05 558.06 711.49 840.59 744.32 847.77 669.36 797.97 577.60 784.16 821. 21 759.13 108.91 139.65 152.53 169.08 183.29 231. 81 255.71 284.19 459.42 506.04 458.65 653.62 684.86 820.25 945.84 849.89 943.08 783.68 959.18 786.53 949.86 893.94 964.08 17.2 7.0 6.7 11. 0 13.4 17.4 15.0 11. 2 17.4 11. 3 17.8 15.5 22.7 15.3 12.5 14.2 11. 2 17.1 19.1 36.1 21.1 8.9 27.0 145.82 150.50 161. 52 206.97 228.38 235.47 263.13 408.89 487.45 520.77 678.10 734.91 726.96 938.23 995.10 909.63 943.08 950.82 971. 25 786.53 I, OIl. 02 897.61 287 33.9 106 7.8 63 5.9 166 22.4 204 24.6 20 1.6 45 2.9 248 43.9 57 6.1 26 2.9 332 47.9 206 12.4 73 6.1 292 14.6 79 5.3 67 7.0 127 21.3 51 2.2 62 6.4 10 0.4 The first three columns in the table above show the Dow at the start of each of the 22 rallies, the high it had reached after 78 trading days, and the percentage advance to that high. The next column, which is the crux of the table, shows the subsequent high reached before a correction of 5 took place. The last two columns show the number of days the Dow continued to advance, uncorrected by 5, and the percentage advance at the subsequent high from the high which had been reached after 78 days. As the table shows, there are numerous instances where rallies comparable to the present one have taken place, and where the index continued to advance for periods of as much as a year with percentage increases in excess of 20. It must also be emphasized that the figure in the column ('ntitled Subsequent High refers only to the high reached before a 5 correction took place. In most instances, that correction was mild, and the following advance took the market to new highs, often by substantial amounts. It is also worth noting that every period in the past 38 years that we have come to identify as a major bull market began with a rally meeting the criteria suggested above. This included the markets of 1942-1953, 1953-1956, 1957-1961, 1962-1966, 1968-1972, and 1974-1976. The record would suggest, in other words, that the sharp market strength since last April, rather than indbating that the averages are vulnerable to a serious correction, leads, based on the historical record, to precisely the opposite conclusion. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (8/14/80) 963.99 125.50 968.48 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No stalement or expression of opinion or any olner molter herein contolned 'S, or IS to be deemed to be, d'redly or Indorectly, on offer or the 50lu;llollon of of offer hto buy or sell any secvrlty referred 10 or mentIOned The mottcr IS presented merely for Ihe converlence of the subscriber While oNe believe the wurces ofbour n hon to be relloble we III no woy represent or guarontee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any octlon to be taken by the svbscfl er s au e based on hiS own'mvcstlga!ion and Information JonnC!y Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may naw hove, or may later tdke. positions Of trades In respect to any seeuntles mentioned Ir' thiS or ony future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hefeaJter expredse hln thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Seolt, In.c, which IS registered with the SEC as on mvestmerlt adVISor, may give adVice to !IS Invedment a vlSoryan at el customers Independently of any stalemel'llS mode 1M thiS or In any olher Issue Further information on ony security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 22, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 22, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - August 22, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCk eXCHANGE – August 22, 1980 Technical colleagues whose view of Jess than sanlWine have drawn cattention to the action of market breadth indicators; pOintingouf the'existence of a breadth divergence-and adduc- ing from the existence of this phenomenon a significant degree of vulnerability for the stock market. This view is not without merit. Breadth action does, in fact, raise questions, and those questions must be dealt with if one is to do a cnmprehensive job of formulating a forecast. Breadth statistics (advances and declines) have been studied for many years, and the conventional analysis is well documented. It involves the construction of a breadth index, based on advancing and de- clining stocks, which, in a healthy market rise, is supposed to confirm new highs in the averages by itself achieving new highs. Failure to do so is considered a sign of potential market weakness. Such a classical divergence is documented on lines 2 and 4 of the table below, which shows highs and lows at selected points since 1974 in the Dow, the S & P 500, and our own daily breadth index. As the table shows, both the Dow and S & P achieved new highs in April, 1976 with breadth having peaked out two months before in February. After a decline into June, the subsequent rally took both averages to new highs by significant amounts, but breadth failed to achieve a new high. This constituted the classical sort of bear market signal'BREADTH DATE DJIA DATE S & P 500 DATE INDEX 1. Low 12/06/74 577.60 2. High 04/21/76 1,011.02 3. Low 06/09/76 958.09 4. High 09/21/76 1,014.79 5. Low 11/10176 974.04 6. High 12/31/76 1,004.65 7. Low 02/28/78 742.12 8. High 09/11/78 907.74 – –9—.-f;ow——-11-1 10. High 10/05/79 897.61 11. Low 11/07/79 796.67 12. High 02/13/80 903.S4 13. Low 04/21/80 759.13 14. High OS/15/80 966.72 10/03/74 62.28 04/05/76 103.51 06/07/76 98.63 09/21/76 107.83 11/10/76 98.87 07/19/77 101. 79 03.06/78 86.90 09/12/78 106.99 1-11-1-4-17-8- -92749 10/05/79 111.27 11/07/79 99.S7 02/13/S0 11S.44 03/27/80 9S.22 08/15/80 125.72 12/06/74 02/24/76 06/02/76 09/22/76 11/10/76 07/22/77 03/06/78 09/11/78 08/31/79 11/07/79 01/28/S0 03/27/S0 08/15/80 997.68 1,092.36 1,074.23 1,091. 39 1,079.62 1,106.76 1,083.86 1,121.14 l,098.9S 1,044.12 1,067.09 1,009.74 1,065.41 A bear market did, indeed, ensue. The Dow declined from Over 1000 to 742 and the S & P from 101 to under 87 as shown at line 7. However, breadth behavior was strange and unprecedented. Breadth reached new highs in July, 1977 (line 6) despite total failure on the part of either average to approach its old high on that rally. Although the averages collapsed in the fall of 1977 and the spring of 1975, the decline in the breadth index was minor and the first leg of the subsequent rise, shown on lines 7 and S in the table, brought breadth to a level which constitutes its high to date, despite the fact that the related highs for the averages were considerably lower than peaks reached subsequently. Lines 9 and 10 of the table show the Halloween Massacre which reached its low in mid-November, 1975, and the subsequent rally in 1979. The Dow recovered almost all the ground lost, the S & P made a new high, but breadth conspicuously failed to do so. The decline and rally on lines 11 and 12 show the new peaks achieved in the indices early this year with breadth remaining below its peaks of late 1978 and late 1979. Yet again, on the last two lines, the phenomenon has repeated itself. The best rally of the series has taken place on the averages, carrying both to post-1978 highs and the S & P to an all-time high. The breadth index, however, has remained below no fewer than three prior peaks stretching back over a two- year period. The question is what are we to make of this. It can, of course, be construed as a divergence in the classic sense. The problem is that, as far as breadth is concerned, a sort of mini-bear market has, in fact, alredy taken place. Breadth had retreated, as of last April, almost back to its low of late 1974, correcting just about all the subsequent advance. It is, at least, conceivable that the breadth correction that never took place in 1976-78, when the averages fell sharply and breadth hela firm, finally arrived in 1978-80, when the averages performed relatively well and breadth indices collapsed. Such an interpretation is admittedly less than an obvious one, and it is certainly one open to argument. It must be supported, in our view, by reference to cycle theory, an exercise we intend to attempt in future issues. It, nonetheless, does succeed in explaining the behavior of breadth without the sort of bearish prognosis which conventional analysis would call for. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (8/21/80) 963.23 126.56 971. 46 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of opinion or any other molter herein contOlned IS, or 1 10 be deemed to be, dHecl!y or mdHec1ly, on offer or the sol'cltatlon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony scc;urlly referred 10 or mentioned The mailer Is presented merely for the conVCllencc of the subscriber Whilo we believe the sources of our informatIOn to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be tolen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporahon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke. positions or trades In respect to ony seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Inue, and such p051lion may be different from anv views now or hereafter e)(pressed 1n thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, hlCh IS f(!glstered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVIS(;Hy and othel custam(!U Independently of any statements mode In thl or In any other Issue Further ,nformation on ony security menl!oned nereln IS available on request

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