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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 11, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 11, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - April 11, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE We have expressed the view in these pages that the extraordinary market action of March 27 had many of the earmarks of the sort of initial selling climax which characteristically occurs in the early stages of a bottom formation. We acknowledge that there are those pessimistic observers who may argue with this view, but, accepting it as a hypothesis, it is worthwhile to ask what sort of market action we might then expect over the near term. The charts below show the market action of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average following various reference dates, each of these reference dates marking the occurrence of a previous initial selling climax. In all cases, the Dow has been adjusted to make it equal to 759.98 (the March 27 close) on the reference date. The time scale has also been adjusted to show the equivalent time period in 1980. In each chart, the actual action of the Dow for the ten trading days since March 27 so far has been shown by a dotted line. REFEPfNCE . 28 19G2 , REFERENCE DRTE . AUG 29 1966 REFERENCE DATE . or, LI 19N RE'FERENCE CATE NO'I 2 1!77 79 so 80 80 lSO …uN 80 Lu.. 80 an soY lJUN 80 an MAT 80 JUN an It is interesting to note that in almost all cases there has been an initial rally approximately equivalent or, indeed, in 1970 and 1974, substantially greater than the present one. What is also interesting, however, is that all instances, with the exception of 1970, involved the return to an area somewhere around the initial low. In 1962 and 1977-78, the market moved below the initial lows to today's equivalent of about 705. It is possible to analyze these past cycles in some detail, but One point clearly stands out. That is the fact that, if it is granted that the current process constitutes a base formation, the prospect of a move back to the old lows possesses a fairly high degree of probability. Moreover, as the charts show, such a move would not necessarily constitute evidence that a bottom is not, in fact, taking place. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (4/10/80) AWTsla 795.22 104.46 718.74 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of oplmon or ony other motler herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or IndlTlJctly, an offer or the ollCllollOn of on offer to buy or sell cny lecvnly referred 10 or mentIOned The moIler IS presented merely for the converJence of the 5ubSCllbcr Whde oNe believe Ihe sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represenT or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subsctlber should be based on hIS own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and ils olflccrs or cmployees, may now have, or may later lake, positions or lrodes In rC!spC!CI 10 any SCUrtlies mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be ddfcrenl from any views now or hereafter e)'p'essed In thIS or any olher I5Ul' Janney Montgomery 50011. Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as on ,vestment adVisor, may give adVice to I'S Inveslmenl adVISOry and olhe customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS r In any 01 her Issue fu'tner mformaTlon on any sewnly menllOned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 18, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 18, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - April 18, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 18, 1980 During th'estock market'sln()sf recent advancing -,-.-. first six weeks of 1980, the lack of market breadth, i.e., the relatively small number of stocks advancing, did not go unnoticed by analysts. Likewise, the pronounced breadth weakness once the declining phase began on February 13 was also widely noted. What has gone largely unremarked, is the extent to which this phenomenon has dramatically reversed itself over the short term, since about the end of March. Indeed, by one measurement, the market has shown better breadth over the past three weeks than at any comparable period since the rally in January, 1975, following the 1974 bottom. This statement in regard to a market which has recently declined almost 150 points and sits within a dozen points of that decline's low, requires some amplification. There exists something which may be called normal breadth action, and it is based on the relationship of the number of advancing stocks and the change in the Dow. The precise nature of that relationship over some 10,000 trading days since 1942 has been investigated by computer, and, using this relationship, it is possible, on any given day, to calculate an expected number of advances based on the change in the Dow. There exist relatively few time periods in which the number of advancing stocks repeatedly exeeed their expected value. This, however, has been the case to an unusual degree since March 31. In the 12 trading days between that date and April 16, the number of ad- vances was never greatly different from its expected value and often exceeded it by a large amount. By contrast, the 15 trading days between February 5 and February 26 included 13 on which the number of advances was significantly less than the expected number based on the Dow change. The contrast between the two periods is shown in the table below. POllANCES DPTE DJIA EXP. ACT'' bIFF. Feb 5 876.62 1. 53 Feb 6 881. 83 5.21 923 765 -158 Feb 7 885.49 3.66 879 802 – 77 Feb 8 895.73 10.24 1086 878 -208 Feb 11 889.59 – 6.14 5fi4 565 1 Feb 12 898.98 9.39 1056 744 -312 Feb 13 903.84 4.86 918 799 -119 Feb 14 893.77 -10.07 425 415 – 10 Feb 15 884.98 – 8. 79 465 382 – 83 Feb 19 876.02 – 8.96 469 351 -118 Feb 20 886.86 10.84 1107 868 -239 Feb 21 868.52 -18.34 159 434 275 Feb 22 868.77 0.25 757 374 -383 Feb 25 859.81 – 8.96 463 315 -148 Feb 26 864.25 4.44 885 654 -231 ADVANCES 'DATE- -, ..,. bJ 1A EXP-.-ACT–'!HFF-.– Mar 31 785.75 8.10 I04olT9o 150 Apr 1 784.47 – 1. 28 687 963 276 Apr 2 787.80 3.33 857 1018 161 Apr 3 784.13 – 3.67 601 718 117 Apr 7 768.34 -15.79 171 342 171 Apr 8 775.00 6.66 986 968 – 18 Apr 9 785.92 10.92 1129 1159 30 Apr 10 791. 47 5.55 951 1237 286 Apr 11 791. 55 0.08 757 963 206 Apr 14 784.90 – 6.65 509 497 – 12 Apr 15 783.36 – 1. 54 687 657 – 30 Apr 16 771.25 -12.11 314 747 431 – .- Typical of the February action were February 7 and February 20. On each of these days, the Dow advanced some 10 points, and over 1,000 advancing stocks would have been expected under such conditions. The actual number of advances was more than 200 lower. By contrast, the April period featured such days as April 1 and April 11. On each of these days, the average was essentially unchanged, a phenomenon which, on an historical basis, would produce some 700 ad- .ancing stocks. On each day, however, the number of advances was well over 900. ' A dramatic reversal of this sort is a fairly rll.re occurrence in the stock market and has often been associated with important lows. It will be interesting to see whether such an event occurs in the present instance. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 769.11 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 101. 21 Cumulative Index (4/17/80) 713.26 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No statement Of of opInion or ony olher motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Ind,rectlr on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mOiler 1 presented merely for the converlence of the subscriber Whl e we believe the sources of our Infarma han 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements mude herem Any action to be taken by the subscflber should be based on hu own mvestlgotlon and mformallon Janney Montgomery ScOIl, Inc, as a corpo/allon, and lIS off.cers or employees, moy now have, or moy later toke, POSitiOns or trode5 m respect to any mentioned In It'liS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereJfter In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh '5 registered With the SEC as on InveStment adVisor, may give adVICe to .ts Investment advlso,), and olhel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mcroncd herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 25, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 25, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - April 25, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE April 25, 1980 Every so often, far too seldom in an uncertain world, things turn out as they are supposed to; the good guys win, the hero marries the heroine, and everyone lives happily ever after. This satisfying 'arrangementctendscto-J)e the rule inthe in the-vola-' – tile world of finance, events occasionally transpire the way folk wisdom tells us that they should. The textbooks inform us that formation of a stock market bottom generally follows a particular sce- nario, The first act of this scenario is a selling climax characterized by a large one-day or intraday loss, heavy volume, and, in terms of prevailing mood, uncertainty and panic. This climactic washout is then supposed to be followed by a relatively dynamic rally which, after a time, loses momentum and peters out. The next act is a further decline, this time more desultory and on reduced volume. Such a decline should return approximately to tpe area of the original low — the so-called test — at which point additional demand, again on increasing volume, is supposed to manifest itself. It is interesting to examine the past four weeks of trading in the light of this description. On March 27, in a panic atmosphere caused by the collapse of silver and other commodities, the Dow reached an hourly low at 3 o'clock of 739.59. Almost all of this loss was recovered in the final hour of trading as volume expanded to 63 million shares, one of the highest levels on record. The rally continued to a close of 785.75 two days later and to 791. 55 on April 11. As the rise continued during the first week in April, volume gradually petered out, dropping under 30 million shares on April 3 and 7. Over the period between April 14 to April 21, the Dow showed consecutive declines with volume re- duced still further, as low as 23 million shares on the first day of the decline and never reaching higher than 39 million shares on April 16. By this Monday, the Dow had closed at 759.13, a closing figure actually lower than the close of March 27 and precisely within the range which the climax rally had covered four weeks earlier. Prices had been even lower an hour before the close, but improved somewhat in the final hour of trading. It is precisely from such a level that, conventional wisdom advises us, demand should materialize, the market staged its amazing,2erformance us;of last Tuesday. The Dow wound' up 30'.72 points which, as the newspapers duly lnformed' was – terms of points gained, the fifth largest rally in history. Volume expanded to 47,920,000 shares, and prices continued to firm for the remainder of this week. As of this writing, even the Iranian fiasco has shown little effect on this firmness, with prices off only moderately in early Friday trading. For the time being, at least, the textbooks have been vindicated. A few comments seem called for. The first is that we are taught in grammar school that percentage change is a more accurate way of comparing figures than raw change. Thus, comparing Tuesday's 30-point gain to past rallies overstates its relative significance. The rise was 4.05 in the Dow and 3.46 in the Standard & Poors 500. These figures have been exceeded by six rallies in the Dow and 11 in the 500 in the modern (post-1942) period. In the 1920's and 1930's, however, rallies of this mag- nitude were fairly common occurrences. There were eighty rallies of better than 4.05 in the Dow between 1926 and 1940, the record, for what it is worth, being 15.34 on March 15, 1933. If one eliminates the volatile pre-World War II period, however, and looks solely at what has happened since, the comparison is still interesting. Of the six Dow-Jones rallies which bettered Tues- day in terms of percentage advance, five occurred as the initial rally from the climax low of major bottoms in 1957,1962, 1970, 1974, and 1978. The sixth, November, 1963, was the rebound from the Kennedy assassination low. Here the current market is, in an interesting way, at variance with the past. As noted above, Tuesday's rally must be considered the aftermath of a test rather than an initial climax, that obviously having occurred on March 27. No such rally in the modern era has ap- proached this one in magnitude. The closest approximation would be the rally of June 28, 1962 of 3.79 or the 4.02 rally of October 19, 1974. Both these occurred well after the initial climactic lows had been made. Finally, although it would be an incredible pessimist would did not view the last month's action as constructive, it is still only a month. Time is required for bases to form, and even at this point, the base so far formed is insufficient to support anything more than moderately higher levels. Further- more, the success of one test of previous lows does not necessarily suggest the unlikelihood of further tests, and indeed, we would think that something like another test would be necessary to broaden the base so as to indicate worthwhile upside possibilities. In other words, we continue to regard the ex- tension of the base formation period into mid-summer, in accordance with the normal election year pattern, as the most likely course of events. Undoubtedly, somewhere along the line, the market will do something to confuse the current conventional pattern. Nonetheless, action so far is, to say the least, refreshing. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 794.97 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 104.20 Cumulative Index (4/24/80) 741. 49 AWTsla No statement or eXpreSSion of opinion or any other matter herein contamed IS, or 15 to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly, on offer or the sohCltotlon of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or men honed The molter IS presented merely for the conVel'llCnCE of the subSCriber While 'c bclilevQ the sources of our Informa tion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of thc statements mude herem Any acllon to be token by Ihe subscriber should be hosed on hiS own Investlgollon and Informallon Janney Montgomery kott, Inc, as a corporation, and ,ts offICers or employees, may /lOW have, Or may laler loke, pOSlllons or trodes In respect 10 any SeUIIIICS men honed In Ihls or ony future !Ssue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Isue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which 1 registered wllh the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give to lIS mvestment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statemcnts made In thiS or m any other Issue Further mformatlon on any securrty mcnlloned hefeln IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 02, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - May 02, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER -, 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NF!!W JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 2, 1980 One of the most important tasks of the market analyst is the development of a forecast, that is some -to–behave -in.t-he, fut-ure.-..-A-usefulpreambleo-to-.Suc , forecast, in many cases, is ari analysis of tlie way in -which the market has behaved in Hie past along with an attempt to set this known behavior within the context of the economic background which went along with it. The object of such an exercise is to find out just how much of that economic background is built in to the current level of stock prices. Modern academicians, who theorize about the economic perfection of capital markets, would have us believe that, at any time, all known information is built in- to a given price level. The technician, needless to say, denies this assumption, but there is no doubt that, at any given time, the stock market reflects a number of assumptions about the current economy. The attempt to detect just what these assumptions might be is often an interesting one. The market's behavior is, of course, a matter of record. Most recently, that behavior has been not at all bad. We have tried in the last four issues of this letter to reflect the fact that, based on histor- ical precedent, action since March 27 must be viewed at least as an attempt to form a bottom of some im- portance. This attempt began with the classic intraday selling climax of March 27, continued with the subsequent test of that low on April 21, and was also suggested by extraordinarily good market breadth during iust about the entire month of April. Assuming the success of this bottoming attempt, it will mark the end of the third market correction since the fall of 1978. These three corrections have all had similar characteristics. All were relatively minor to intermediate-term in scope, ranging between 11 percent and 16 percent, declines well below the historic norms associated with major bear markets. All took place rather quickly with only a few weeks between the high and the initial climax low, and all, finally, started from the level of 900, plus or minus a few points, on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. Before these three market drops, the only identifiable decline of more than short-term proportions was the two-year drop in the averages which took the Dow-Jones Industrials from 1014.79 on September 21, 1976 to 742.12 on February 28, – – –,–19780–l'-his-decline-was-of–bearmarket-pr-Opol't-ions-iIht…. 19 on the S & P 500), and its 18-month length was not unusual in the light of recent downswings. Nonetheless, it could hardly be considered a broad decline in that, during the period, many stocks advanced in the face of the fall in the averages. In one sense, it has been six years, since 1974, since we have had a classic bear market, defined as an instance in which almost all stocks decline sharply over a protracted period of time. All of the above, we think, has been taking place against a rather interesting economic background. As examples of that background, it is only necessary to cite three news stories which appeared during the past week. The first of these was the Iranian misadventure, the second was the news of financial difficulties being undergone by' a major U. S. bank, and the third was the sharp drop in March by the Commerce Department's composite index of leading economic indicators, marking the continuation of an ongoing decline that has been underway since October, 1978. The stock market's response to all three of these developments was, essentially, to ignore them. Even the weakness which set in late Thursday afternoon, while possibly associated with the last of the three items mentioned above, did not begin until the later part of the day's trading, whereas the news had been a prominent feature of the morn- ing's papers. It is worthwhile asking why this should be so. The record of stock market responses to wars and rumors of war is a mixed ,one, and there is no particular reason why the market should have declined in the light of what happened in the Persian desert. It seems axiomatic to us, however, that a more technically vulnerable market might well have done so. Those of us familiar with economic history have been trained to regard signs of strain in the banking system as a major concomitant of disaster. The stock market has apparently developed suffici- ent faith in the viability of the current system so that the emergence of such strains can be shrugged off. The lack of response to increasing evidence of recession can probably be attributed to surfeit. We have been hearing about the impending recession for more than two years now. Surely most of the investment decisions made on the basis of that recession were, in fact, made a long time ago. One of the attributes of a bear market has always been an almost pathological sensitivity to news that was even remotely bad. In contrast, ignoring bad news often constitutes evidence of underlying strength. Viewed on the surface, we think, it is very difficult to find anything good about the sort of economic news to which we been recently treated. The market's lack of response to that news is, we think, a factor which must be viewed constructively. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 810.07 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 105.45 Cumulative Index (5/1180) 747.51 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No stolement or ellprenlon of opinion or ony other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or IndHec1ly, an offer or the solicitation of an oHer to buy or seJi any secufliy referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presenled merely for the convef'lence of the subscriber While -He believe Ihe sOurces of our Informa tlon 10 be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stolements mude herein Any odlon 10 be laken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgallon and mfC)rmatlon Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporation, and Its offICers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSllIOM or trades In respect to any SeCUfitles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered wllh the SEC os on Inveslment moy give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or In ony other Issue Further mformotlOn on any seCl.J1!ly menhoned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 09, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - May 09, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANoe, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – May 9, 1980 – … -.. '.!– Our quadrennial exercise-in analysis of the election-year stock market pattern was published somewhat earlier this time around than has normally been the case in the past. Back on November 16, we set forth our usual table detailing the stock market history of each election year since 1900 and duly arrived at the conclusions that this study normally tends to show. One of these conclu- sions pointed out the tendency of such years to have a flat or downward bias in the year's first half, a tendency which will apparently again be the case in 1980. ;;;- We generally couch this study in terms of the average price for each month in an election year, expressed as a percentage of the previous year-end close. In February of this year, the average prices for the Dow and S & P 500, respectively, were 104 and 107 of their year-end closes. The recent decline caused the average price for the Dow in April to be 94 of its yearend figure, and the comparable statistic for the S & P 500 was 95. Some recovery has taken place, but the average price for May so far is below its year-end figure in both instances. As the stock market sorts itself out, the political scene seems to be doing so also. It now appears probable that, despite media-attracting death rattles by the minor candidates and their satraps, Messrs. Carter and Reagan will be the contenders next November. The historical record of third-party candidacies, moreov.er, would suggest that, despite Mr. Anderson's efforts, one of the aforementioned two gentlemen will govern the United States beginning in 1981. We consider ourselves unqualified to comment on political subjects except insofar as they relate to the equity market, but it can be noted that the action of that market so far can be inter- as afforam-g -camp. -'l'nere -nave jeen seven elmrt10n years -1u this century in which the average April price was lower or about the same as that of the previous year-end. Those years were 1916, 1920, 1932, 1940, 1952, 1960, and 1968. In six of the seven cases, as was the case this year, the decline was modest, under 10, the only large drop being in 1932. What is interesting about the seven years, however, is that ,five of them saw the replacement of the incumbent Presidential party, Wilson by Harding in 1920, Hoover by Roosevelt in 1932, Truman by Eisenhower in 1952, Eisenhower by Kennedy in 1960, and Johnson by Nixon in 1968. The two exceptions were the reelections of Wilson in 1916 and Roosevelt in 1940. Conversely, of the seven occasions during the century when the party controlling the White House changed, five saw flat-to–lower stock markets in April. The two exceptions to this rule were the replacement of Taft by Wilson in 1912, and notably, the replacement of Ford by Carter four years ago, an interesting exception to the election-year pattern since it produced the strongest four-month rally of any of the 20 years under study. As far as the stock market is concerned, the most relevant conclusion of our election-year study at the moment points to the tendency toward a strong second half for the year, regardless of who winds up getting elected. As we pointed out last November, in 16 of the 20 election years, the .average price for December was higher than tlTe average price for June. Likewise, the Decem- ber average price was higher or the same as the April average price in 15 years of the 20. In five of the seven years in which the market was lower in April, it had recovered significantly from those lows by the year end. The only two cases where the market continued down from its -r April low figure were 1920 and 1940. –'-0' This letter, as its readers know, has been inclined toward the view that recent market action constitutes a base formation attempt which could, of course, result in a rally to take place later this summer. Such a pattern appears consistent with a year in which a presidential election is taking place. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/8/80) 809.90 105.40 771. 78 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT sla No statement or expressIOn of oplnlon or any other motler herein contamed 15, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soliCltallon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlloned The mOiler IS presented merely for the convef'lenCe of the subSCriber While 'lie believe the sources of our Informe- han to be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any oct Ion to be token by the subscriber should be based on 1'115 own investigation and Informallon Janney Montgomery Seolt, Inc, as 0 corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may loter lake, positions or trades In respect to any rrenlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posdlon may be different from any views nov. or hereafter expressed In thiS or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers independently of any stotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS ovailable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 16, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - May 16, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER -, 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 elVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – May 16, 1980 -. '.-.- . be-en – for those whose business 'it is to comment on the stock market. For the entire period, we have been duly warned of the imminence of an economic contraction ,and , until recently, at least we are told, evidence of that contraction has failed to manifest itself. With the existence of a downturn now widely recognized, most discussion now centers on the probable extent and depth of the future slide. The one question not now being raised regarding a recession is Is it over It is, of course, patently obvious that the answer to this question as of mid-May, 1980, is No. It is, however, in our view, less than obvious that the question is inappropriate and quite probable that it will become more appropriate over the coming months. , We have pointed out before and will reiterate again the fact that those of us who predict reces- sions are not predicting a future event. The reason for this is that recessions are recognized after the fact. In all cases to date, the peak of a recession has not been formally recognized by the NBER until well after it has occurred, and very often, the recession itself remains unrecog- nized until well after the whole process is over and the economy has again turned up. The ques- tion for the past two years has not been when a recession would begin but when it would become obvious that a recession already begun was well under way. It is that point that has now been reached, and the job of the forecaster, at the moment, is not picking a peak but a trough. Part of the difficulty in the current analysis of economic time series lies in the fact that their recent behavior has, in many ways, been quite different than their behavior in the past. The NBER's various indices of economic activity have tended, since World War II, to feature sharp reversals and identifiable peaks and valleys. What has generally not been a feature of these ser- ies is broad flat periods with no clearly identifiable trend. It is, however, just this sort of I numbers recognize the fact that this sort of behavior makes cycle identification difficult. Thus, I' the long delay in recognizing the onset of a recession which has been a two-year topic of discus- sion. The Bureau's leading indicator composite, however, has been in a rounding to flat formation since early 1978 with an actual peak having been reached in October, 1978. The coincident com- posite has been flat since the beginning of 1979, with a peak having been reached in March of that year. Housing starts peaked in the second quarter of 1978 and are currently at a little better than half their peak level. The rate of inventory change turned down at around the same time and turned negative last fall. Inflation-adjusted money supply was flat throughout 1978, turned down that fall, and has been trending downward ever since. The point is that, assuming the present is ultimately identified as a period of economic contraction, its peak will most likely be seen as taking place well over a year ago. We are, meanwhile, seeing various pieces of evidence that point to the maturity of the process. The recent behavior of short-term interest rates, widely described as extraordinary, suggests one such instance. Their behavior, admittedly unprecedented, is less than extraordinary, when one pictures a Federal Reserve concentrating more and more on monetary aggregates and less and less on interest rates. At a time when the talk is still of monetary restraint, the Fed may be becoming an actual supplier of funds to the banking system. Under these circumstances, behavior of inter- est rates is simple evidence of reduced loan demand due to an economic contraction in its advanced rather than its early stages. It must be remembered, moreover, that economic indicators foreshadow bottoms with a much shorter lead time than is the case with tops. In a fair number of cases, the delay in getting the figures out is just about the same as the lead time. -Thus the -condition at the bottom of a reces- sion is the announcement of new lows by most indicators. It is well to keep this in mind at the moment, since this is precisely the condition which is likely to obtain for the next few months. We do not think that the action of the stock market over the past two years suggests that it has ever disbelieved in the existence of a recession or that the recession was going to be unusu- ally mild. We suspect, therefore, that its response to the obviously forthcoming announcements of economic contraction may be more positive than many analysts suspect. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 822.70 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 106.89 Cumulative Index (5/15/80) 787.68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No slalement or expression of opinion or any other motler herern contarned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convellence of the svbscrlber. While Ne believe the sovrces of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or gvarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude he'eln. Any action to be taken by the svbscrlber shovld be bosed on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and ItS officers or employees, may now hove, or mol' later tae, positions or trpdes In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any VieNS now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and olhel customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 23, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - May 23, 1980
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TABELLS MARKET LETTER .., 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE May 23, 1980 attempting to identIfy place. – Often-these leadersh-ip shifts take place coincidentally with short-to-intermediate-term market reversals, thus making their idenhfica- tion all the more difficult. This has been especially true in the present instance. the market advance which began in early March, 1978 at 86.90 on the Standard & Poors 500 and which has continued, so far at least, through the high of 118.44 reached on February 13 of this year, a fairly conventional bull- market advance of 36. . That advance, so far, has consisted of at least three identifiable upward phases, since it was inter- rupted twice by identifiable intermediate-term corrections which took place in the fall of 1978 and in the fall of 1979. A like correction, of course, took place in February-March of this year and, since a new high is still a long way from being achieved, the question remains open as to whether that correction and the subsequent rally through yesterday, remain part of a two-year-old bull market or some other sort of process. There is no doubt, however, that the two-year period in question, even measured to current prices has not been a bad one for holders of well-selected equities. Measuring from a base date at the end of the second quarter of 1978, some 12 weeks after the bull market began, the Standard & Poors 500 was, as of this Wednesday, up almost 13. As would be expected in such a period, action has been diverse. Of 103 S & P mdustrial groups, 35 are actually down over the period and 20 have advanced less than the S & P 500. Forty-eight groups turned in an advance in excess of that of the average, with the best move so far being a 113 advance by gold issues. The low for the recent February-March correction was made on March 27, and, on the day before, the S & P 500 was at 98.68, from which point it had advanced just over 9 as of Wednesday. As could be expected over a shorter period, action has been more uniform with only 12 S & P industrial groups having shown declines over the two months involved. The largest advance to date has been the 34 -t The following table shows, on the lefthand side, the ten best-acting groups for the period June, 1978 through this week, together with their percentage change. Also shown is the percentage change for the recent rally, starting on March 26. The righthand table is the reverse of the first one. It shows the ten best acting groups on the short-term rally with their comparable performance for the two-year period. An examination shows some intersting shifts in leadership. Industry Gnoup Change Change Industry Jun 78-May 80 Mar 80-May 80 Group Change Change Mar 80-May 80 Jun 78-May 80 Gold Oil-(Crude Prod.) Machine – Tools Metals-Misc. Oil-Domestic Oil Well Equipment Home Building Offshore Drilling Distillers Textiles Apparel (S & P 500) 113 109 102 86 82 74 69 66 65 57 13 7 13 -2 -1 3 8 17 9 19 -2 9 Savings & Loan 34 4 Mobile Homes 27 -14 Tobacco 25 30 Retail Stores-Drug 24 8 Cosmetics 23 -15 Sugar Refiners 22 33 Investment Cos. -Bond 22 — Soaps 20 -10 Household Appliances 20 -15 Soft Drinks 19 – 7 (S & P 500) 9 13 Quite clearly the key word for the two-year rise to date has been energy. No fewer than four of the ten-leading groups for the June, 1978 – May, 1980 period have been associated with the oil industry. Interestingly enough, however, most of these long-term leaders have not behaved exceptionally on the recent rise. Three of the ten leading groups are actually down over the past two months, and three m0re have advanced less than the Standard & Poors 500. The only group whiCh came close to making both lists is Distillers, which just missed inclusion in the righthand half of 1Ihe table. If energy dominates the lefthand list, lower interest rates dominate the righthand side, where such groups as Savings and Loans, Mobile Homes, and Bond Funds stand to benefit. Five of the ten leaders over the past two months were actually down over the two-year period, and only two have been above- average performers for that period. Strength in the oils on Thursday may alter the picture somewhat, but it is quite obvious that the character of the market has changed quite rapidly since last March's lows from what it was over the past couple of years. It remains to be seen, of course, whether this shift in leadership will remain a permanent phenomenon. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 847.95 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 109.95 Cumulative Index (5/22/80) 801. 38 AWT sla No statement or expression of opinion or ony other matter herein conlollled 1, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sohcltollon of on offer to bvy or sell ony seevnty referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for Ihe convel',ence of the subscriber While oNe believe the wurees of our informa- tion to be rellGble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slolemenl mude herem Any aCTIOn to be taken by Ihe subscriber should be bosed on hiS own Invesllgollon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, fnc , as 0 corporaTion, and ,Is officers or employees, moy now hove, or may loler lake, positions or trades In respect to any mentioned In thiS or any fu!ure Issue, and pas.on may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS regisered ,,h the SEC os an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers ,ndependently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menhoned here.n IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 30, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - May 30, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE May 30, 1980 market rise from March, 1978 to date. As we noted last week, the S-& P 500 during that period has scored three soccessive higher highs at 106.99 in September, 1978, 111. 27 in October, 1979, and 118.44 last February. These were punctuated by three lows at approximately similar levels of 92.49 in November, 1978, 99.87 in November, 1979. and 98.22 on March 27. During this entire period, group action has shown mazing consistency. More than half of the S & P Industrial groups, 47 out of the 90 under study, have maintained consistent uptrends or downtrends during this period. A consistent uptrend is defined. in this case, as having scored a higher high at each of the three highs mentioned above and a higher low at each of the three lows. 26 groups qualify. Downtrend groups, of which there are 21, are defined as having a consistent record of three lower highs and three lower lows. These statistics, in our view, unrlerscore the principle that long-term, relative trends tend to remain in force. The following table lists the 47 groups referred to with the uptrend group on the left and the downtrend group in the right. For ease of reference, each group is indexed so that the first column, its September 13, 1978 price, is equal to 100. The most recent price is shown in the righthand column. 9 11 10 11 2 3 5 13 15 3 7 13 26 28 78 78 79 79 80 80 80 9 11 10 11 2 3 5 13 15 3 7 13 26 28 78 78 79 79 80 80 80 Aerospace 100 82 105 96 141 117 118 Automobile 100 84 95 83 79 67 66 – Aluminum –DiatiHers 100 92 122 104 151 123 134 Auto Ex GM 100 86 89 77 74 60 55 4 Heating & PL 100 76 107 96 116 97 111 Brewers 100 81 87 72 86 71 84 Conglomerate 100 81 106 95 119 95 112 Soft nrinks 100 84 79 73 74 63 73 Copper 100 90 140 117 212 142 150 Cosmetics 100 88 86 74 67 62 77 Instrumentation100 87 125 112 149 123 129 House. App. 100 84 93 77 81 65 82 Semi-Conduct. 100 81 113 104 129 105 113 Foods 100 87 91 82 87 74 89 Fertilizers 100 75 133 121 171 131 145 Home Furnish. 100 99 99 81 93 74 74 Gold 100 80 135 117 206 171 194 Retail Dept. 100 85 92 83 89 75 90 Home Bldg. 100 58 114 95 147 103 123 Merc. 100 83 85 76 72 62 73 Machine Tool 100 77 126 122 202 168 173 100 89 88 80 80 69 84 Machin. Ind. 100 80 107 96 120 100 107 Steel 100 82 98 81 97 80 84 Metal Fabric 100 73 113 94 126 96 116 Tires & Rubb. 100 89 85 72 75 62 70 Metals Misc. 100 88 140 117 211 148 162 Ve'1(Ung 100 79 80 71 74 56 67 Oil Crude 100 82 160 156 212 165 195 Electric 100 92 88 81 78 72 88 Oil Domestic 100 91 139 136 196 158 154 Telephone 100 97 90 85 84 77 87 Oil Inti 100 93 122 115 147 125 146 Excluding ATT 100 93 95 88 90 77 89 Oil Well Equ. 100 88 126 121 169 143 156 Air Trans. 100 68 71 60 60 51 56 Steel Ex US St 100 84 106 88 109 90 94 Truckers 100 70 77 64 67 58 68 Sugar Refin. 100 74 115 98 147 103 136 Bans (N. Y .) 100 85 94 82 87 76 90 Textile App. 100 89 126 111 148 135 126 Toys 100 79 126 103 152 111 121 Nat. Gas Dist. 100 89 114 103 134 107 120 Railroads 100 86 113 103 143 119 130 Invest. Co. 100 85 105 94 113 98 111 It may be indicative of a shift in leadership that none of the uptrend groups to date has been able to post a new high above its February 13 figure. Twenty-two of the ninety groups under study have, in fact, been able to achieve this, but none of these twenty-two are groups that have fallen into consistent uptrend patterns over the past two years. As a matter of fact, ten of the groups which have achieved new peaks above those of last February appear on the rie-hthand list indicating that their trend may be reversing. These are Cosmetics, Household Appliances, Foods, Retail Department Stores, General Merchandise, Soaps, Electric, Telephone, Truckers, and Banks (N. Y .) . Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (5/29/80) 843.43 109.95 814.28 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTsla No statement or expreSSIon of OpiniOn or any other moiler herein contomed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly Of ind,rectly, on offer or Ihe soliCItation of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the conVellenCE of Ihe subscriber V/hlle we believe the sources of our informa- tion 10 be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the acwracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and informatIOn Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, POSitiOns or trades In respect to any securiTies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSITion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advlSar, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any stotemenlS made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on any secuflly men honed herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 06, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 06, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - June 06, 1980
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, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl( STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AME RICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – June 6, 1980 — O W ' . F'- ' – -;- One of the more faniiliar s'tock'–market aphorisms is that 'a given- market does not seem'to want to- go down. Imprecise as this phrase may be, it nonetheless constitutes an accurate -description, and it can certainly be applied to market action over the past couple of weeks. After having advanced some 100 points from the double closing bottom around 760 recorded on March 27-April 21, the Dow embarked upon what could have been a correction with a 14-point declme on May 29. A normal rebound from that decline last Friday was followed by two declining days to a modest new low of 843.77 on Tuesday of this week, followed by a 14.25-point advance on Wednesday. Thursday's trading had moved the aver- age back to new high territory before profit-taking set in late in the day. The apparent lack of desire to go down remains, for the time being, apparent. There is some irony in all this since the apparent trigger for the latest rally was the official an- nouncement by the National Bureau of Economic Research that January, 1980 constituted the beginning of the seventh recession m the United States economy in the post-World War II period. This recession has, for the past two years, been the most widely advertised non-event since the Second Coming. We have been told from many quarters over those two years that the stock market, in view of the obviously impending recession, was not the place to be. Over that period, the market, with its usual perversity, tended to act rather well. Finally this week, with the actual emergence of the long-awaited Armageddon, the market's response was a move to new highs for the current rally. It is not our intention with these comments to minimize the significance of the official onset of the recession, although we do think the action of the past two years demonstrates once again the utter futility of trying to mix economic prediction and stock market prediction. The recession does, we think, have some importance in an attempt to determine just where we are in the present stock market cycle. It must, first of all, be noted that the dating of the present economic contraction is, at least, interest- ing, and we must confess to lack of total agreement of those august gentlemen who picked January, 1980 as a precise start'date. As- we hoted in.tms space three weeks ago;' the NBER's own mdex otCOinaaent- -,- economic indicators peaked in March, 1979, and various other indices commonly associated with recession peaked somewhat earlier than that. An honest reading of figures on economic activity during 1979 sug- gests that the trend for the year was absolutely flat rather than either up or down, an occurrence which, we noted, was more or less without precedent in the post-war period. Under these circumstances, it seems to us, any date over a ten-month period could have been chosen as the start date for the reces- sion. For whatever reason, the NBER chose to fix on the latest date possible. This is not without significance as far as the stock market is concerned since there does, in fact, exist a relationship between recession peaks and stock market lows, the former generally leading the latter, although in many cases, by not very much. Thus the recession peak in July, 1953 preceded a stock market bottom in September, 1953, and a peak in August, 1957 led an initial stock-market low in October, 1957. Since, as discussed above, an obvious stock market bottom of some significance occurred on March 27, the two instances cited would constitute precedent for linking that bottom with a recession beginning in January. It is true that the last two recessions, 1970 and 1974, demonstrated longer lead times, but it is also true that neither of those two recessions was as well advertised in advance, nor were they preceded by long, flat periods such as 1979 where some of the correctionary forces associated with the contraction could exert themselves. We do not regard it as improbable, therefore, that, when the history of these events is finally writ, the market low of two months ago will turn out to be the one associated with the 1980 recession. Coincidentally with all this, the market, from a technical point of view, finds itself at a crucial stage. The two-month rally which we have just enjoyed has, to date, done just about all that could be expected of it in light of the base formed in April. We have been citing, for some time, objectives in the mid- 800's in the Dow, and those objectives have, of course, been attained. We now find ourselves, once more in the overhead supply between 850 and 900 which has repeatedly turned back all attempts at a meaningful advance for the past two years. , We think, in other words, the market has done all that could be expected of it in the way of a normal technical rebound, and from here on it will have to demonstrate its own intentions. Prior to the decline which characterized February-March, 1980, the entire trading range of the 1978-1980 period was looking more and more like a base formation presaging much higher levels. That prospect was temporarily quash- ed by the debacle of last winter. If the recovery from that debacle continues as impressively as it has so far, however, the hypothesis of a 1978-1980 base formation would come to have renewed validity. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (6/5/80) 860.67 113.09 829.92 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No statement or expreS510n of opinIOn or Clny other moIler ht'r/!In contolned 15, or 15 to be deemed to be, direcTly or Ind,retlly, on offer or the sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell ony SCCUrity referred to or mentioned The mottcr 15 prcsented mercly for the conVel'lCnce of the subscriber While -HC believe the sources of our Informo tlon to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guarontee the accurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hl own Investlgotlon and Information Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and I'S officers or employees, moy now have, or may later loke, positions or trades In respect to any securilies mentioned III thiS or any future Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihl Of any olhcr Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on Inesl-nenl adVisor, may give adVICe 10 ItS Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independenlly of ony statements made III th.s or In any other Issue Further Informotton on any security mentioned herein LS aVOlloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 13, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 13, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - June 13, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAI( STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE – -. We live, apparently, in an era of perversity. We have been officially pronounced to be in the mIdst of a receSSlOn; each day's newspaper brings us news of rISIng unemployment. inventory glut, and other manifestatIOns thereof; in the midst of all this, the stock market continues to rise. Nor is the stock market the only institution that seems to be defying conventional WIsdom. Ever since the accession of Mr. Volcker, we have been warned of monetary restraInt being exercised by those in authority. One by-product of monetary restraint, we were all taught in school, is rising interest rates. Yet the past two months have been characterlzed by a drop in interest rates possibly unparalleled in the entire financial history of the UnIted States. YIELDS ON SELECTED SECURITIES Pf.RCf.'l1 VERAGES OF DAILY RATES ENDED FRIDAY MONEY STOCK (MIA) 2\ 0 200 -Ll ';',,,1,, I AVERAGES OF DAILY FIGURES i SEASON ADJUSTED I ' U-J.-18 0 HE '- I I 1–t- -t–t———-rlII ,., -\-4l,L–1rI- ' tI- ' WAY l ,' In. !—-t-1-4–I—–t—–II AI \ u, r\l, ' I I ! /0J . 0'i i , i /1.., \ Y \I .t i ro I, / \ ' I\ I ' C ' 'Jt,. V i -1–1—–t- i \. 11 0 , – 1-.10 – — , ,1—r\- J' ! f— , ' I i i i — f— —11—' . – t' —,, ,I! , , c' ' I! I! '1'1, W. I' J .I, ,i , ' I 'n 1 II 'ItO I) l' IS I l S 10 ., n II no P lS . , ' ' ' WOV,n r i 'LLI UL Xl w..R .I,Pft 1980 6 e.D 0 ' I IS lQ .1L' 11 10 10 ,. 1 Ie )(I ,. 18 15 U r 11 I i 1 18!J- DATA CUIIJ'!NT OATA IlElI! ,N WOV lIS 1980 150,.,.0 OF QQVRS 11 15 RElEAS API! …..y JUN JUL AUG SEP 0C1 NOV DEC JoI.N fEB IAAA .rA l'01HI 1C/80 The lefthand chart tells the interest-rate story. Prime rates plunge almost daily. CD and Commer- cial Paper yields have been cut in half since early April. The yield reduction for long-term bonds, while less pronounced, has been in the area f 200 basis points. Ths is, of course, a theoretical sign of monetary ease, not monetary restraint. Restraint is, however. quite real if one looks at the right- hand chart which is the history of MlA, the simplest monetary aggregate. We have actually seen an irregular plunge in the money supply since about mid-February. Continuance of current trends would suggest that it might develop into the sharpest money-supply contraction of the entire post-war period. Somewhere there must exist an explanation for this paradox. There s one, we think, and it arises from what seems to be a gradual shift in attitude on the part of the monetary authorities. In years past, the Fed's preoccupation was with interest rates as a gauge of the tightness of money. Today, that preoccupation is being shifted to monetary aggregates. We are coming to realize the extent to which these two phenomena are over the short term, mutually exclusive. Keeping interest-rate changes gradual, one of the FedIS major concerns in the past. led to sluggiSh changes in the behavior of money stock. Attention to money stock leads, as we are learn- Ing, to wild gyrations in interest rates. — As the recession persists, we think this dichotomy will continue. Bank loans and borrowed reserves have been plummeting. The Fed, we think, will have to take measures to moderate the money-stock decline which has been going on since February. A reduced demand for funds will mitigate against this. It may well be that despite the wild gyratlOns on the lefthand chart, that we ain't seen nothing yetI! as far as dechning short-term interest rates are concerned. Meanwhile. as yesterday's New York Times pointed out, there exists something approaching 500 billion in bank certificate accounts and money market funds whose yields are plunging and may continue to do so. The attractiveness of these investments, at least from a return point of view. is, we think. hardly likely to improve. Herein may lie a partial explanation of the stock market's behavior in the face of woeful economic news. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12.00 PM) Cumulative Index (6112/80) AWT .sla 873.21 115.65 845.54 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or of opinIon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be. directly or ondorectly, an oHer or the 501lcltoloon 01 on oHer to buy or sell any lecuflty referred to or menhoned The moiler IS merely for Ihe COnVef'lllnCt! of the Whlle.Je believe the Ources of our Informo tlon to be rehable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of Ihe statemenls mude herem Any act,on to be taken by the subKnber should be based on hiS own ,nvestrga/ron and rnformcrhon Janney Montgomery S'ott, Inc, as cr corporatron, and rts offrcers or employees, may now have, or may laler lake. or Irade' In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future ISSue, and such poslt,on may be d,fferent Irom ony views now or h8reolter In thiS or any other IHue Janney Montgomery Scot. Inc, wh,ch IS reg,stered wllh the SEC on Investment adVisor, may g,ve adVICe to Its ,nvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Further Information on any seo.lflty mentioned here'n IS ovarlable on request

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