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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 01, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 01, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - February 01, 1980
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r TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' 'MEMBER New YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February I, 1980 .., —–. tCe'r,t-nhat tne' market advan7e since the lows of last year, has been a much more restricted affair than would seem to be apparent at first glance. Certainly there has been nothing to complain about in the action of major averages, such as the S & P 500 which, on Wednesday, reached a new six-year high of 115.20. That particular indicator has now moved up some 32 from its February, 1978 low, a figure comfortably within the historic frame- work of bull markets. More importantly, it has moved well above two previous benchmark highs. The first such high was posted in September, 1978 at 106.99, following which peak the index dropped to 92.49 in November, 1978 before recovering its entire loss. The fall-1978 peak was, in turn, exceeded by a modest amount on October 5 of last year when a high of 111. 27 was achieved. This was followed by a drop to 99.87 in mid-November before new peaks were attained. During the past two weeks, the 50o-stock Composite, therefore, now finds itself well over 3 above its best level of 1979. It is worth examining, therefore', whether this is a performance that has been shared by a large number of its components. The answer is that this is not necessarily the case. There are some 535 stocks that are contained in the Composite and its subindices, the extra ones being accounted for by stocks which are part of subindices not included in the 500. Of the 535 stocks, 25'9, based on weekly closing figures, have managed to post new highs above their best levels of 1979. The obvious corollary is that 276 issues, better than half the universe of leading issues under study, have failed to do so. 39 issues, as a matter of fact, managed to find themselves at recent highs down 20 or more from their best levels of 1979. Included in this group is a diverse list of well-known names including, Avon Products, Coca Cola, Eastman Kodak, First Pennsylvania, Goodyear, Minnesota Mining, Polaroid, and Zenith. The occurrence in that list of more than a few of the institutional darlings of 1972 73 is, – –pineroiouor ,vineoww, not a coincidence. The inevitable corrective p-rocess, occasioned efglif10ng years past, isstill apparently with us-. -. – , – by the excesses — of that – The relative narrowness of the advance is perhaps even more striking when one compares the action of individual stocks at successive highs in 1978, 1979, and 1980 thus far. Due to a smaller available price history, we are dealing here with 213 issues, including all of the leading S & P 500 stocks. 69 of these issues have managed to follow the lead of the S & P 500 itself posting successively higher peaks in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Interestingly, however, a somewhat larger number, 76 of the 213 issues, showed 1979 highs lower than their highs of 1978, and 1980 peaks thus far, lower than their highs of 1979. Market leaders, in other words, were iust about balanced in number by an equal- sized group of poor performers. When one examines the 69 stocks which posted successively higher peaks, the narrow scope of the advance becomes even more apparent. 15 of those 69 issues are either in the oil industry or related to it. Eight more are chemicals, six are drugs, and five are in the forest products area. Electronics, machinery, gold, and defense stocks also find themselves represented. The issues posting successively lower lows constitute a somewhat more diverse group, although they appear to have a major common denominator in that large numbers appear to be related to consumer spending. 14 issues appear to fit into the general consumer category and another dozen are in the category of foods, soft drinks, and beverages. Another half-dozen are in retailing and four more can be categorized as leisure-time issues. An additional five are in the automobile and tire category. All of these groups, of course, fall into the broad consumer goods area. A detailed study of the market action of the past two-and-a-half years, in other words, suggests quite clearly an advance that has been lead by a relatively restricted number of issues which, due to their heavy weight in the averages, have been able to pull those averages to new high territory. This strength, some of it indeed quite exceptional, has masked fairly pronounced weakness in a number of important categories. There are, we think, at least two facts to be inferred from this. The first is that despite the favorable market climate that has existed since early 1978, stock selection has been a necessary component in investment success. It has not been, to date, at least, a bull market in which all major issues participated. The second question raised is whether the internal weakness documented above is sufficient to call into question the sustainability of the advance. As we have noted in past issues of this letter, we do not think that this is now the case. Continued narrowing of the advance's scope, however, will have to become, at some point a cause for concern. NOTE Comment on individual issues are based on techniCal factors only. Further information avail- able on request. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) 874.49 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 114.29 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (1/31/80) 837.14 AWTsla No statement or expression of OP'niOn or any other motter herem contolned IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the 501;ltollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the of Ihe subSCriber Whde oNe believe the sources of our Informa- tion 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of Ihe statements mode hcreln Any oclion to be lake'!. by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informollon Janney Monlgomery SCItt, Inc, as a corporotlon, and 115 officers or employees, may now have, or may ioler lah.e, positIOns or trades In respect 10 any seCVII,es mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Iha or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scot!, tnc , which 15 registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe 10 Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode In Ihts or In any other ISSue Further mformallon on any secVfI'Y menlloned herem JS ovo/Job/e on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 08, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 08, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - February 08, 1980
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I I , TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – – – – – —- – – – – – – – – – – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 8, 1980 It is not unusual for financial headlines to feature the phrase, Dow-Jones Average, and' such was that did the newsmaking, but the Dow-Jones Transportation Average, which turned in a performance reminiscent of the days of Daniel Drew and Jim Fisk. That other Dow-Jones average posted a 10plus point gain on Wednesday and was ahead by as much as another seven points on Thursday before succumbing to profit taking in subsequent trading. Reaching an intraday high of 301.42 on Thursday, the Transportation index is now, with its recent strength, the second major indicator to score what has been, over the past decade at least, a rare achievement, i.e., a new ail-time high. The previous peak for the average, at that time consisting of 20 railroads, had been at 281. 75 on December 2, 1968. The lranspostation Average, therefore, follows the New York Stock Exchange Common Stock Index, which recently moved to a newall-time peak above its high of early 1973. Other major indices currently find themselves at varying levels with respect to their all-time record levels. The American Stock Exchange Index, of course, left all previous benchmark highs somewhere back in the distance a year-and-a-half ago. The next major attempt at all-time high territory will probably be made by the various Standard 8. POOl'S averages, led by the S 8. P Industrial Index. That particular indicator, which closed on Thursday at 131. 62 reached its all-time closing peak on January 11, 1973 at 134.54. The more widely-followed 500-stock Composite has a bit more territory to cover prior to reaching newall-time territory. The 500 also reached its high in January, 1973 prior to the 1973-74 bear market. That high, however, was at 120.24 versus a Thursday close of 116.28. The Dow Transportation Average and the American Stock Exchange Index are the only two indicators which peaked in 1968-69 and which have now achieved new highs. Most broad-based indicators attained record levels in 1968 and have never come close to bettering those levels since. For averages of this type, the 1970-73 rally, which took the Dow and S 8. P 500 to their all-time records was nothing example, peaked just under 190 in late 1968 and never rallied above the middle 120's in 1971-72. It finally managed to better that peak in this month's trading but still remains a long way below its alltime high of 12 years ago. Our Cumulative Index, a weighted average of all NYSE stocks, peaked out at over 1460 in 1968. Its 1971 rally high was at 1050, and at current levels of 843.94, it is a good ways away from making an assault even on that level. As we have stated in the past, we believe that, in many ways, this index is the most accurate mirror of what has really happened to the average listed common stock over the last dozen or so years. It is difficult precisely to analyze the meaning of this week's extraordinary strength in the Transportation indicator as far as the general market is concerned. The move was, to begin with, an energy move as much as a transportation move, the strength being led by railroads with various forms of energy association. Some domestic oils enjoyed rises during the week even more spectacular than the rail issues contained in the Dow average. Irrespective of this fact and of the recent change in components of the Transportation Average, that average, now in an area free of overhead supply, is apparently still working off the implications of a substantial base formed between 1973 and mid-1975 with its low point at the 1974 low. The ultimate upside target of that base has always been 360 which, while it suggests that we may have seen the bulk of the move in this area, still leaves room for a 20 advance from current levels. It is hardly possible, in the present climate, to regard this as an unlikely prospect. Meanwhi' with all this talk of neWall-time highs, what about the poor old Dow-Jones Industrials, which, for many, constitute the market, rather than the more esoteric indicators we have mentioned above The Dow-Jones Industrial Average finds itself still below its high of September, 1979 which, in turn, was lower than its peak of September, 1978. That peak was, moreover, below the 1976 high which, in turn, was below the all-time record of 1973. Furthermore, that high, it must be noted, was not all that different from the indicator's previous peaks in 1968, and indeed 1966, the first time the venerable Dow touched the magic 1000 level. As we have suggested in past issues of this letter, we suspect it will require a substantive effort at new highs by this index before the existence of a bull market is widely recognized. On a short-term basis, the DJIA has been moving sideways since early January and failed once more in Thursday's strength to better the 890 level. At the inoment, a break below 870 would suggest a possible distributional formation and a test of the base in low 800's. While this eventuality may be unlikely in light of the strength in the other averages, it remains, at least, a possibility. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S 8. P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (2/7/80) 884.47 116.36 843.94 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No statement or expressIOn of opInion or any oll,er motler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, on offer or 'he sol,cltollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The moiler IS presenled merely for Ihe converlenCf of Ihe subscriber While we believe the sources of our Informotlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy Ihereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ocllon to be laken by the subscrtber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Janney Monlgomery Seolt, Inc, as a corporation, and 11 officers or employees, moy now have, or may laler toke, or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or ony future Inue, and such paslhon may be different from Clny views now or hereafter clI'pressed In this or any other hsue Janney Montgomery ScalI, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Inve51ment adVIsor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adVISOry and olhel cvstomef5 Independenlly of any 5/olements mode rn thiS or In any other ISsue. Further information on ony security mentioned herem IS avollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 15, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 15, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - February 15, 1980
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…. ;;,.;- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAC, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEM8ER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANQE, INC MEMBEA AMEAICAN STOCK EXCHANGE . – -As expecfed iii – ..;. 15. 1980' . ,- advance which has characterized 1980 thus far was interrupted by a rather sharp correction which took the Dow down ten points on Thursday and a like amount in early Friday trading. Interestingly enough. the Dow's advance was rebuffed just short of its attaining a new high above its September. 1978 level. which has now been penetrated on an hourly and intraday. but not on a closing. basis. Possible very-short-term downside objectives center around the middle 870's where there is a fair amount of support. A decisive break below 870 at this point would be disappoiriting and suggest the possibility of a further correction. One of the facets of the recent stock market which has been noted by just about everyone in the punditry business is the recent advance's lack of breadth. The fact that the rise for 1980 to date has been fueled largely by wide moves in energy. natural resource. and defense issues with large numbers of stocks failing to participate is. by now. almost universally recognized. Most commentators have ascribed a bearish significance to this on the theory. not entirely untrue. that poor breadth is a precursor of market weakness. The trouble with this observa- tion is that it is somewhat superficial. Few writers have actually quantified breadth action and compared it to past periods to see if any significance could be ascertained. We have made an attempt to do this. and the initial results do. indeed. bear out the super- ficial observation. There have been very few instances in the past 52 years of stock market history where breadth has been as bad as it has been recently during a market which has advanced as much as this one has. Our basis for comparison is as follows. The recent rise began from lows reached on January 3. the second trading day of this year. From that day to this Wednesday. the Dow rose 10.18 and the S 81 P 500. 12.6. all this taking 1 – ' …. I L i s J l e c e s s a r . y. . market breadth. and as good a measure as any is the simple advan;e /decline ratio. computed by taking the daily advances. subtracting daily declines. and dividing the result by the number of issues traded. Such a figure can be computed for each of the 29 days in question. and the average ratio for the 29-day period then derived. That figure is 0.05794. It now becomes a simple task (assuming access to an electronic data bank of stock market history) to look for previous 29-day periods in which the Dow and/or the S & P advanced by amounts comparable to those mentioned above. and the average advance /decline ratio was lower. AS we noted above. such periods have been few and far between. One such instance occurred. ominously enough. in the late summer of 1929. We are inclined. frankly. to disregard it. along with a number of similar instances in the period 1931-33. Numerous studies have confirmed to our satisfaction that the volatility of that period makes such statistics irrevelant to the present. There have. however. been three instances in more recent times where a wide advance such as the current one was accompanied by equally desultory breadth. They are perhaps worth citing. The first was in September-October. 1939. an interesting comparison because of its relation- ship to war. in this case World War II. and the German invasion of Poland. The sharp rise thus produced topped out just about at that time and was followed by one of the sharpest declines on record at the fall of France in 1940. which. in turn. led to lower prices continuing to the summer of 1942. The next comparable rise did not occur until July. 1955. and, the aftermath of that one was a sharp break occasioned by the Eisenhower heart attack, followed by a move which took the market to new highs by a fairly significant amount in 1956. More recently. there was a compar- able rise in May. 1975. This also was followed by a sharp but temporary break and an ultimate move to new high territory. . . The point of all this may be. simply. that there is no point. A phenomenon which has only three analogies in 52 years of market history. with widely varying results in each case. is hardly one on which one can base reliable statistical conclusions. Our own disturbance at recent nega- tive breadth is as great as anyone's. and it is our intention to do further work on the subject along the paths outlined above. In light of the work done thus far. however. we are reluctant to voice knee-jerk pessimistic conclusions. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 886.60 S 8. P Composite (12 00 PM) 115.78 Cumulative Index (2/14/80) 840.69 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL AWTsla No stotement or expression of opinion Or ony other molter herein contained IS, or 11 to be deemed to be, directly or .nd.rettly, on offer or the sOlltltatlon of on oHer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the of the subSCriber While He believe the sourtes of our Informo- tlon to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guorantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be token by thll subscllber should be bosed on hIS own II1vesilgotlon and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 05 a corporation, ond It officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poslhons or trades In respllct to ony SeCurities mentioned 111 thiS or any future usue, and such POSition may be ddferent from ony views now or hereafter expressed 111 thu or any other Issue. Janney Mongomery Scoll, Inc, which IS reglsered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode 111 thiS or 111 any other ,ssue furthllf II1formotlon on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on requesl

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 22, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 22, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - February 22, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW 'tOAK,STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHANGE February 22, 1980 – —;, – …..,-……….— – ;z ,nA ' -Thursday's sharp' 18-point drop in the Dow-Jones' Industrial Average signalized, in .all probability, the end of the initial phase of the advance which began in early January and the beginning of the first corrective phase of 1980. Based on the present pattern, it is difficult to envision this correction turn- ing into anything of more than minor proportions. In the case of the Dow, a distributional pattern, which has been building through most of February, indeed exists, and suggests, at worst, a testing of the level from which the advance started, around 830-820. The pattern on more broadly based aver- ages is more difficult to read, but if anything, the downside implications in most of these indices are somewhat less serious than those of the Dow. Further vulnerability may emerge if distributional pat- terns broaden on the expected correction, but downside risk at the moment does not appear great. As readers are aware, overall stock market action at least until two weeks ago, has been positive ever since last fall. This firmness has been in sharp contrast to the action of the long-term bond market where trading has been described, not inappropriately, with words like disaster. At the beg- inning of last September, when most stock averages first attained highs which have since been comfortably exceeded, the Dow-Jones 4Q-Bond Average was at a level around 85. It closed Thursday at 66.63 for a decline well in excess of 20. u. S. Government Bonds are supposedly the safest of all investments. In the same period, Treasury 8!'s of 1994-99 have declined from 94 to just over 68. We have witnessed, in other words, a rather ,unique six-month period in which stocks have provided capital protection and long-term bonds have produced major portfolio losses. At current levels, yields on long-term taxable bonds are approaching the 15 figure. There is a reason for all of this which centers around the single word, Inflation, and we have gone through the rather dreary mathematics in this space before. Let us once more go through the motions of calculating the 'true return on a 15, 25-year bond to an investor in the 50 tax bracket. One needs to begin with the rather shocking reminder that, at continued 13 inflation, one hundred for this is to recognize that a bond selling at par today is, in effect, at a 97-point premium over its maturity value, and this premium must be recouped by a charge against income. That annual charge is 3.88 in 1980 dollars. A hypothetical investor, therefore, can anticipate a stream of 15 annual income increments for each 100 invested, out of which the government takes its tax bite, leaving him with 7.50. The value of this 7.50 continually erodes as inflation increases. It is 6.53 in the first year, 1. 86 in the tenth year, and 0.23 in the final year. With the 3.88. constant-dollar, annual charee against it, the income stream actually turns negative after five years and becomes increasingly negative for the subsequent twenty. The total calculated loss at the end of 15 years in constant 1980 dollars is 38.84, producing a real dollar return of zero and a capital shrinkage of 1.95 per year. Even for the tax-exempt investor who can buy a hypothetical 15 bond without a tax liability, the overall return is, in fact, slightly negative. In other words, if such an investor holds a 15 bond to maturity and inflatjon remains at 13, he will have earned no return in real dollars and wind up just about breaking even. To alter this dreary projection, one of two variables would have to change. The first possible al- teration, a consumation devoutely to be wished, would be a decline in the inflation rate. It would, however, be necessary for the inflation rate to drop to 6! to produce a simple break-even return on a 15, 25-year bond to an investor in the 50 tax bracket. It is also possible, of course, that if anticipated inflation remains at the 13 level, available long-term yields might increase. For our hypotheti- cal investor to reach the break-even point at a 13 inflation level, however, an annual yield of 31 would be required. In light of these figures, it seems to us, the sharp decline in bond prices over the last six months has been not at all irrational nor, in our view, has been the recently improved performance of comnion stocks. Current yields on equities may now be from a third t() a half that offered by bonds, but at least dividends offer the prospect of an improvement which may keep pace with inflation, and indeed studies which have appeared in the space have documented the fact that the recent history of stock dividends has tended to achieve this target. The recent rush of new funds to the stock market has come, it seems to us, as sort of a last resort, a realization that, for all the historic vicissitudes of the stock market, there may not be a better place to be. This is a new sort of justification for the purchase of common stocks, but it may well be a valid one. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 868.68 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 115.11 Cumulative Index (2/21180) 824.18 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No stotement or expression of opinion or any other molter here'n contolned IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be, directly or mdnec11y, on offer or the OI'Cllollon of 07 offer to buy or sell any secunty referred fo Or mentioned The moiler '5 presented merely far Ihe of the svbsc(lbe' While one believe the sovrces of our In,ormo- lion to be rellClble, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor ot Ihe statements mude herem Any act,on to be taien by the subscriber should be based on hiS own inVestigation and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its afflcers or employees, may now hove, or may later loke, poslhons or trades In respect 10 any sewrltles mentioned m thiS or any lutvre Issue, and svch pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereafter e.pressed In '''tiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery 5c01l, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 05 on Investme'1t adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adv1sory and othel cuslomors Independently of any statements mode on thiS or on any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security me'1tlaned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 29, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 29, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - February 29, 1980
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—————————————————————————————– TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEV 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK eXCHAGE. INC MEMBeR AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE '- .'- .. –M February 29, 1980 — – -;-,,–0- There can-be IIftle d6ubt now that when the stock market history-of'1980 is finally compileo, it will note the beginning of a new market phase somewhere around mid-February, probably starting on Feb- ruary 13, the day the Dow-Jones Industrial Average closed at 903.84 and reached an intraday high of 918.17. On that same day the Standard & Poors 500 attained a high figure above the 120 level. The first six weeks of this year were characterized by a dynamic, if somewhat narrowly-based, rally, which brought most broad-based averages back to new high territory and returned the Dow, at that high mentioned above, to the top of the trading range which had contained it since the summer of 1977. Since that time, the market has trended erratically lower, and enough technical deterioration has nOw taken place to suggest that the correctionary phase of the past two weeks is probably not yet at an end. In many ways the stock market story of the past two years has consisted of the Dow-Jones Indus- trial Average underperforming the market as a whole, and present indications are that the Dow remains subject to this same malaise. Of all of the major indicators, this familiar index seems to have the great- est vulnerability. Most of the February action in the Dow appears to have distributional characteristics, and a top that has now been completed by the recent break below 870 is fairly broad in scope. The DJIA began the year 1979 at a level just above 800 and took almost all of last year to inch its way up to the 900 level last fall. In a few short weeks in October-November, it gave up almost the entire gain. However, it recovered this loss almost as quickly and moved once more above 900 two-and-a-half weeks ago. The top formed now suggests at least the possibility of another return to the lower part of this range. A move all the way down to the 800 level would, at this stage, appear somewhat extreme, but there is at least the possibility that such a level might be approached. The strong, suggestion of the current pattern is that the long trading range which characterized the Dow's action since 1977 is, for the time being,not yet over. Other patterns seem to have considerably less vulnerability. 1980, for the Dow-Jones Transporta- tion Average, consisted of a straight-line move from around 245 to 305. There is nothing,in the current a retracement of -this move. The former has already taken place; the latter would carry the Transportation Average some 10 points below its current levels. In the case of Standard & Poors averages, the 500-Stock Composite and the 400-Industrial Index, the tops are more recently formed and suggest a lesser decline. A possible downside target for the 500, now above 112, would be 109, and the 400, currently at 128, could reach the 123 level. Neither of these prospects should cause panic in the streets. The above projections are, of course, short term, and subject to the normal margin for error that accompanies all short-term forecasts. What is more important is to try to fit the present prospect into a long-term pattern. As far as the broad-based S & P indices are concerned, both appear to be in well-defined major uptrends. There is absoloutely nothing in their patterns to suggest that the current weakness constitutes anything more than a minor correction within those uptrends, and, indeed, were the downside targets mentioned above to be reached, both averages would be on strong support levels. In the case of the Dow, as we suggested above, the present outlook is eminently within the context of the sort of pattern that has characterized that indicator for some three years. In neither case, in other words, does there appear the probability of weakness of more than intermediate-term proportions. The present outlook moreover, does not appear to be greatly at variance with our own view of the long-term cyclical picture. Readers of this letter will be aware of our espousal of the theory that stocks reached a major, four-year-cycle bottom in March, 1978. That cycle reached its second anniversary this week. We are perfectly willing to admit that this suggests the mature stage of an advancing mar- ket cycle. However, markets tend to spend a good deal more than half of a given cycle in an advancing phase. Thus a further attempt at new highs once the short-term weakness has spent itself would still be a normal expectation. Neither is the current outlook out of line with a normal election-year pattern. Indeed, the January- February strength .was a bit unusual in that election-year markets have tended to find themselves sub- ject to irregularity during the first half of the year. It may indeed be this sort of irregularity that is showing itself at present. The significant part of the normal election-year pattern is the tendency toward strength in the second half of the year. A corrective phase at this stage would set the stage for just this sort of eventuality. In summary, we think the current technical picture raises the possibility of further market weak- ness over the short term. The more important point, however, is that we see little evidence at this point of any sort of major deterioration. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (2/28/80) 858.28 112.83 800.76 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 07, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 07, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - March 07, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER New VORK STOCK eXCHANGE 'NC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE March 7, 1980 !Ve. tw.o ..w.eeksagoto. … bonds, suggesting that, assuming the continuance of a continued inflation-ary' environment such as the – recent one, these yields were, in fact, illusory. We went on to point out that, in such an environment, the anticipated yield to most investors on a 15 long-term bond might actually, in real-dollar terms, be negative. An obvious question thereby raised conCerns what, in comparison, might be the comparable yield for com- mon stocks The fOllowing table is admittedly a rather complex statistical exercise, but it attempts to answer that question as fairly as we know how. For each year from 1951 through 1979, the table shows, first, the actual dividend paid on the S & P 500, second, the Consumer PriCe Index, and third, those dividends in real-dollar terms, deflated to 1967 dollars by the CPI. The fourth column, in recognition of the fact that dividends tend to fluctuate over the short term, smooths that fluctuation by taking a five-year average of the deflated figure. The final three columns are the annual percentage rates of change in that five-year average taken over, respectively, five, ten, and twenty-year periods ending in each year. YEAR S & P 500 CONSUMER DEFLATED 5 – YEAR DIVIDENDS PRICE INDEX DIVIDENDS AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE OF CHG 5-YEAR 10-YEAR 20-YEAR 1951 1952 1. 41 1.41 79.3 80.0 S1. 78 1.7fi 1. 57 1. 68 1953 1954 1955 S1.45 1.54 1.64 80.5 80.1 80.4 S1.80 1.92 2.04 1.78 1. 85 1. 86 1956 1.74 82.7 S2.10 1.93 4.21 1957 1958 1.79 1.75 85.2 86.7 2.10 2.02 Sl.99 S2.04 3.48 2.70 1959 1.83 88.0 2.08 S2.07 2.31 1961 1962 1963 2.02 2.13 2.28 89.9 91.0 92.5 . .1 8 2.25 2.34 2.46 S 2. l-0—… 2.13 1.99 2.17 1.75 2.26 2.13 3.09 2.61 2.41 19fi4 15 2.50 2.72 93.6 95.4 2.67 2.85 S2.38 2.51 2.86 3.70 2.58 3.0fi 196fi 2.87 98.fi 2.91 2.65 4.49 3.23 1967 1968 S2.92 S3.07 101.6 10fi.4 2.87 S2.89 2.75 2.84 4.85 4.fi3 1.28 3.37 1969 1970 1971 3.1fi 3.14 3.07 112.9 119.1 123.1 2.80 2.64 2.49 S2.86 S2.82 2.74 3.7fi 2.32 0.67 3.11 3.01 2.56 2.83 1972 3.15 127.3 2.47 2.66 -0.71 2.03 2.32 1973 3.38 138.5 2.44 S2.57 -1.98 1. 28 1. 84 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 3.60 3.fi8 4.05 4.fi6 5.07 5.70 155.4 166.3 174.3 186.1 202.9 229.9 2.32 2.21 2.32 2.50 2.50 2.48 S2.47 2.39 S2.35 2.36 2.37 2.40 -2.90 -3.28 -2.98 -2.35 -1.59 -0.56 0.38 -0.52 -1.17 -1.54 -1. 78 -1.74 1. 47 1. 25 1.01 0.85 0.76 0.75 The obvious caveats must be noted. The table, of course, shows the past record, and there exists no past history of inflation at the current rate. Second, the table shows that constant-dollar dividends peaked in 1966 and have not exceeded that figure since. The five-year rate of change has been negative since 1972, and the ten-year since 1975. The twenty-year rate of change remains only marginally positive. There are, however, some positive elements. It must be remembered that the last three columns show the rate of increase or decline in the dividend stream. Since the dividends are deflated, a zero rate of change would suggest that stocks have provided a constant positive rate of return in real dollars. Even where the rate of change is negative, the real-dollar dividend return on stocks can be considered positive if the yield exceeds that rate of change. This has almost invariably been the case. There is, therefore, on the record, some justification for anticipating a positive rate of return after infla- tion from long-term common stock portfolios. Such may be the justification for the relatively better action of stocks in recent years. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (3/6/80) 826.62 108.05 767.84 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No llolement or el'pf(!slon of opinion or any other matter hereIn contained ', or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ind,rectly, on offer or the soliCItatIon of on offer to buy or ony security referred to or mentIoned The molter IS pre!oented merely for the of the subSCriber WhIle we belIeve the sources of our Informa- tIon to be relIable, we In no way represent or guarantee the ocnrrocy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any actIon to be token by the subscrIber should be bosed on hIS own investIgatIon and InformatIon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 05 a corporatIon, and Its offIcers or employees, may now have, or may loter take, posItIons or trades In respect to any seCUfltles ment.oned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posItIon moy be different from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Inue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, whICh IS regIstered w.th the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may gIve to Its Investment adVIsory and other customers Independently of any statements mode ,n thLs or In any other Issue Further informatIon on any security mentioned hereIn IS ova liable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 14, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 14, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - March 14, 1980
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.', TABELL'S MARKE.r, LETTER' 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORI( STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE . March 14, 1980 'thes-teepnessOf 'the94 28-poillf decline- .. – in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which, since its recent high of 903.84 posted on February 13 of this year has, in the short period of 21 trading days, declined 10.45 to a low of 809.56 on Thursday of this week. This letter recently discussed the possibility of market weakness over the short term, citing the possibility of a move to the 800 level. The correction best measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average five-point unit chart indicates a downside objective of 805795. However, to date, all the available technical evidence does not 'suggest any sort of major long-term deterioration from these levels, particularly in the broader-based Stardard & Poors and New York Stock Exchange Composite averages. The market, quite obviously is oversold short term, by any measure that might be applied. The familiar 10-day advance /decline oscillator which on March 7 reached an oversold condition of -5806 is by no means a record. This was, however, recorded on October 27, 1978 when the 10day advance/decline oscillator reached -9382. To make these figures more compatable historically, they could be adjusted for the number of issues traded, as we have done in the past when discussing long-term breadth of the market studies. However, for this exercise, raw advance /decline data is used, which does not distort the results significantly, only limits the observations to recent periods. A study of the history of this oscillator over the years reflects a tendency of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average to rally after these oversold levels have been reached. 10-Day -Total DJIA Percent DJIA Percent DJIA Percent Date Adv-Dec DJIA 30 Dars Change 60 Days Change 120 Days Change . Aug 29 1966 -6,288 767.03 758.63 -1. 095 796.82 3.884 847.88 10.541 May 26 1970 -6,259 631.16 682.09 8..069 723.99 14.708 768.00 21. 681 Nov 26 1973 -5,898 824.95 834.79 1.193 846.84 2.654 818.84 -0.741 Oct 27 1978 -9,382 806.05 817.65 1. 439 846.41 5.007 856.98 6.318 Oct 22 1979 -6,682 809.13 824.91 1. 950 863.57 6.728 000.00 0.000 Mar 7 1980 -5,806 820.56 O.OU 0.000 000.00 0.000 000.00 0.000 . To justify this statement, with the help of our computer, the table above lists every oversold condition where a plurality of declines outnumber advances by 5800 or more to include the most current oversold condition. . It is interesting to note that there have been only six of these observations ever recorded, all occurring over the last 15-year period. The remainder of the table lists the DJIA close as of each oversold condition and then reviews the performance of the DJIA 30,60, and 120 days from the oversold condition. A casual inspection of the table shows the DJIA has advanced from the oversold condition in 12 of the 14 time periods observed. The two periods not advancing were down an average of less than one percent. The average advance of the 3O-day period was 2.31, 60-day period was 6.60, and 120-day period 9.45. Clearly what this data suggests is the tendency for markets to rally from their ultimate sharply- oversold condition. If we assume the March 7 figure of – 5806 was the ultimate oversold condition, and if we apply the above logic to our current market, we become not so concerned as to where the market is going on the downside from here — as mentioned earlier, 805-795 has seemed possible — but rather the behavior of the market after it rallies from its current oversold condition. It would seem, therefore, any clues for any further long-term deterioration would manifest itself from higher levels rather than the current 800 level. ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 809.22 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 105.10 Cumulative Index (3/13/80) 746.89 RJS sla No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or ,ndlrec1Ir,' an offer or the soJlcllohon of on offer to buy or scll ony secunTy referred 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the conver'lenC! of the subscriber Wh! e e believe the sources of our mforma lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee The accuracy Ihereof naf of Ihe statements mude heleln Any cctlon to be token by the ubcrlber should be based on hiS own mvest,gat,on and mformollon Janney MonTgomery Scott, Inc. os a corporotlon, and ItS officers or employees, moy now hove, or moy later toke, poSlhons or hades ,n respect to any SecUfltll.lS mentioned m thiS or any fulure lSue, ond such position moy be dlfferenl from onv views now or hereofler c)(pressed m Ih,s or ony other Issue Jonney Montgomery Stoll, Inc, which 15 regiStered With the SEC as on Inveslment adVisor, may give adVICe to la Investment adVisory and olhel customers Independently of any stalements mode In It-us or m ony olher Issue Further Information on ony.securlty menlulned herein !5 ovollable !;In request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 21, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 21, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - March 21, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBEFI NEW VORl( STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE The short-term weakness in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average continues. From the recent high of 903.84 on February 13 of this year. the DJIA has declined 115.19 points to 788.65 in the short period of 22 trading da'ys. averaging durmg this period a 5.24-point per day decline. During the declme In the DJIA (-12.74) comparable performances were registered in the broader-based averages such as the Standard & Poors Composite (-13.66) and the New York Stock Exchange Composite (-14.09). Last week's market letter examined the technically oversold condition which exists in the current stock market environment and tried to compare this condition to past oversold markets. The basic tenet presented last week, that markets tend to rally from their ultimate sharply oversold condition, If has. of course,' not changed. The only thing that has changed is the market has become more sharply oversold. On Monday of this week. the 10-day advance/decline oscillator reached the previous week's fIgure was -5806. Coincident with the oversold condition of the market mentioned above, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average penetrated the 1979 low of 796.67 reached November 7 of last year. This confirmed the down- side count from a top formation indicating an 805-795 objective on the five-point unit point-and-figure chart of the DJIA. The next benchmark which looms on the horizon is the February 18, 1978 low of 742.12, less than' 50 points away. Although further short-term weakness is a distinct possibility, it would appear tech- nically that the DJIA is in need of a rest. This would seem to suggest an immediate assault on the 1978 February low is unlikely. in fact, an oversold condition of historically large magnitude. coupled with technical downside objectives being reached, would argue for a rally. It has been the contention of this letter that the broader-based averages such as the Standard &' Poors Composite and the New York Stock Exchange Composite shown above reflect technical patterns which are conSIderably less vulnerable than the Dow-Jones Industrial Averages which, for the last two years, has underperformed the market. In the case of the Standard & Poors Composite (103) the short-term top recently formed indicated a possible downside target of 106 and has been exceeded. The New York Stock Exchange Composite (59) also reached the downside count from its short-term top. In both cases neither of these averages indicate a future prospect that should cause concern. The above projections are. of course, short. term. What is more important. however, is to try and place the present market condition into longterm perspective. As far as the broad-based Standard & Poors Composite and the New York Stock Exchange Composite are concerned. both patterns appear to be in well-defined major uptrends. There is nothing in these patterns to suggest that the current weakness constitutes anything mOre than a minor to mtermediate correction withIn these uptrends, and since the downside targets mentioned above have been realized. both averages are currently trading on strong support levels. The short-term technical deterioration that has taken place since the end of February would appear to be running its course. Selective individual stocks are moving into logical support levels which would suggest purchase. The correctionary phase has not changed our long-term technical outlook. Dow-Jones Industrials (11 00 AM) 790.61 S & P Composite (11 00 AM) 103.07 Cumulative Index (3/20/80) 724.66 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or exprenlon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or to be deemed to be, dlreclly or Indirectly, (Ill offer or the of an offer to buy or any security referred to or mentIOned The molter Is presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informa tlon to be relloble, we In no way represent or guarantee the thereaf nor of the mude herein Any to be loken by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own Investigation and Information Janney MOntgomery Scolt, , as a corporation, ond It offICers or employees, moy now have, or may later take, posll!ons or Ir!;ldes In respect loony seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be ddferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihl! or any other Issue Jannty Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os an Investment adVisor, may give odvtce to Its Investmenl OdVIKlty and olhel customers Independently of any stalements mode In ,I-lIS or In ony other l5ue further IIlformatlon on any 5eC\Hlty mentIOned herein IS avaIlable on reque5t

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Tabell’s Market Letter – March 28, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 28, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - March 28, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANoe, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE One of the reasons that a study of the stock market is fascinating is that it is almost always a blend of the new and the old, the unprecedented and the familiar. This week's action constituted a particu- larly pointed example of this combination. Few, if any, stock market pundits that we are aware of had looked to silver and other commodity prices as a possible catalyst for a collapsing stock market. Yet it turned out to be the collapse of the Hunt brothers silver holdings which produced one of the more fascinating stock market afternoons in recent memory, an afternoon in which the Dow plunged some 16 points in the penultimate hour of trading and gained back some 20 points in the final hour. If the intervention of precious metal prices into equity trading was a new phenomenon, the effect it produced was an old one. Single-mindedness and massive long positions held on borrowed money are phenomena as old as markets, and the effects they have produced have caused similar consequences over the years. Thus, from a technical point of view, Thursday's trading was straight out of the textbooks, constituting the familiar phenomenon known as a selling climax. The occurrence of this particular classic example, we must quickly point out, does not necessarily suggest that the stock market saw its absoloute low of 729.95 intraday for the Dow on Thursday after- noon. Market history is replete with what are known as multiple-climax low points, and many of them have occurred at levels somewhat higher than those which turned out to be the ultimate low. The first identifiable climax in 1974, for example, took place in August when a 27-point, 6-hour decline was fol- lowed by a 12-point, 6-hour rally. This occurred around the 680 level approximately 100 points above the ultimate low. Three similar climaxes followed, including the record one in October in which a 12.2point, 3-hour decline was followed by a 55-point, 6-hour rally. However, in comparison with recent re- versals, it must be noted that Thursday's action appears most similar to those ultimate climaxes of 1974 or to trading action in late November. 1978 when a rally over a 5-hour p-eriod. – – . – – … We have in the past in this letter used the technique of suggesting that an effective bottom has been reached. Some thought has gone into the use of this phrase. It is an attempt to recognize that a sell- ing climax represents the start of the process of probing for a bottom and that the process of probing may take a multitude of shapes and forms. Almost invariably the process includes, somewhere along the line, a test of the climactic lows and, as noted above, often a significant penetration of those lows. That penetration is usually temporary, and the ultimate recovery generally proceeds above the climax levels, but the period of uncertainty that normally follows a sharp market decline can produce all manner of results. This reminder is, we think, applicable in the present instance, since we do not foresee that the uncer- tainties which have been interjected into the commodity markets plus the chaotic credit market conditions which have accompanied the past six weeks' collapse are going to go away over night. Our feeling, however, based on Thursday's action plus the historically oversold condition which prededed it, is that the preliminary stages of a technical rebuilding process have probably begun. Part of the reason we do not project significantly lower prices is that, in our view, individual stock patterns do not show the same sort of massive distributional characteristics that were present prior to earlier major declines such as those of 1968-1970 or 1973-74. In a longer-term sense, most issues have returned to the lower part of what we think will ultimately be regarded as base formation levels, rather than having broken down following long-term up moves, with no visible support. None of this is to say that the stock market has not suffered severe technical damage over the past six weeks. This is, indeed, the case, and a numb'lr of unanswered questions remain which can be resolved only by the future pattern as it emerges. It is, nonetheless, well to remind ourselves that selling climax conditions are a product of panic and uncertainty. It has always been the course of wisdom not to succumb to the sort of atmosphere produced. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (3/27/80) 764.08 99.08 660.57 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No stotemenl or of op,nion or any other matter herem conlc'ned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ind,rectly, on offer or the lol,Cllotlon of on oller to buy or sell ony securIty referred to or menlloled The moiler IS presented merely for the conver-Ientc of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informo- lion 10 be rehoble, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ocllon to be by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesligotlon and Informatlan Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hove, or may loter toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such paslhan moy be dlfferen from any views now or hereafter expessed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll. Inc , which IS registered w,th the SEC as on ,nvestment adVisor, may give adVice to ds Investment adv,sory and othel cuS\omel5 Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein ,s available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – April 03, 1980

Tabell’s Market Letter – April 03, 1980

Tabell's Market Letter - April 03, 1980
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —— ————-. 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORl( STOCk eXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE April 3. 1980 – – ;–;—— …… -..) .—-. – – -. In what must be considered normal technical action followil1g the classic intraday selling climax of March 27. the market has paused and given us some breathing space. The 17-point rally on the Dow on Friday. followed by the eight-point extension which began this week's trading. constituted a typical technical rebound. and demand. by and large. continued to manifest itself. albeit on reduced volume. for the remainder of the week. On an intraday basis. the Dow had recovered. by Wednesday. some 66 points from its March 27 intraday low of 729.95 to an intraday peak. so far. of 796.40. This constitutes a 35 recovery of the 188 points lost since the February 13 intraday high of 918.17. The task now at hand. of course. is to attempt to divine some meaning from the rather unpleasant six weeks that constituted late February and March. The first point to be made is that the decline was surprising. not in its occurrence, but in its extent. Signs of technical deterioration suggesting the probability of some sort of correction were evident in early February and were duly noted in this letter. At the same time we drew attention to this possibility. however. we also suggested that the maximum foreseeable downside target was somewhere around 800. As it turned out. this was off the mark by some 70 points. not the first time in our forecasting career that we have been taught an object lesson in humility. It is perhaps too early to reach conclusions as to precisely why the decline extended consider- ably further than technical portents would have suggested. A plausible reason. it seems to us. however. was the interjection of the metal-price collapse into a market whose major concern had been with interest rates and a credit crunch. The fact that the market this week ignored the arrival of a 20 ;–t current price expectations. It was perhaps trie unexPected silver crisis of a week ago which brought the Dow from its logical stopping place in the low 800's. a level at which it had been trading in mid-March. to the extraordinary intraday bottom attained on March 27. All this. of course. is past history. and it now remains to make some assessment of the probable future course of equity prices both over the near and the long term. In this regard. the most relevant fact at hand. we think. is the extraordinary oversold condition which prevailed as long as two weeks ago. Technicians have a tendency to point to oversold conditions when the market is declining. usually as part of some prayerful attempt that the de- cline may reverse itself. The greatest analytical value to be derived from such conditions. however. occurs once a significant rally. such as the one that began a week ago. has taken place. If such a rally is accompanied by meaningful breadth and volume (and we think such was the case in the recent instance). it is. at least. suggestive of the fact that the process of probing' for an intermediate-term bottom has begun. We do not think. in the present case. that the process will be a simple one or one which the market will undergo totally without trauma. Almost invariably. the record tells us. the process of forming a base involves. somewhere along the line. a test of the initial reaction lows. In some cases those lows have simply been approached. In many other cases on record. it must be noted however, the lows made on the initial reaction have been penetrated by a fairly significant amount. We would not care to suggest that such will not be the case in the present instance. It seems to us. in other words. that the market is now facing the necessity of forming a base. the exacLshape of which is so far-unclear-.–That process will. we think. -take time. and it would- be illogical, based on past precedent. to expect it to be over much before sometime this summer. As the formation takes shape. the ultimate upside prospects will become clearer. Dow-Jones Industrials S & P Composite . Cumulative Index (4/2/80) AWTsla 784.13 102.15 704.59 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL No sfatement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contatned 15, or 1510 be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the OIllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The molter 1 presented merely for the conver'!enc!; of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be reltoble we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slolements mude herein Any action to be toen by the subscriber should be based on hiS own 'lnvestlgollon and ,nformat,on Janney MOnlgomery SCali, Inc, as 0 corporation, ond lIs officers or employees, may now ha,'e, or may later toke, posHlons or trodes In respect to any SeCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Inue, and such pOSition moy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed , this or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment odvlsor, may give adVice 10 lIs adVisory and othel customers Independently of any stalemenlS mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein 15 available on request

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