Viewing Year: 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 03, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 03, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 03, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE. CN 5209, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 January 3, 1992 We announced two weeks ago that we intended to defer our 1992 forecast to this issue, two days into the new year, citing as the reason our upcoming vacation. To be honest, however, this constituted only part o our reasoning. We hoped that, in those two weeks, the market would, finally, post a decisive breakout, one way or another, from the trading range which had contained it over most of 199s last ten months. It did. The rather amazing seven final trading days of 1991 are now a matter of record. The Dow tacked on more than 250 points, exceeding its previous high, scored back in October, by almost 100 points. The total advance for the month, from the November 29 close of 2894.68, was 9 47, making it the second-best December since the average bas been computed. (It advanced 10.78 in 1903.) Interestingly, this only placed the month's performance 47th among all 1140 months since 1897. Although December, as we have regularly pointed out, has the most consistent upward bias of any month, it has not tended to produce extreme upswings. The strength in the Dow was confirmed by other market measures, most crucially by breadth indicators, computed on both a daily and a weekly basis. The 336 daily new highs posted on the NYSE on New Year's Eve were the highest since March, 1986. The S & P 500, on December 26th, gave investors a Christmas present by closing above 400 for the first time in its history, and the rally was joined by secondary stocks, with the NASDAQ Industrials, along with other measures of smaIl-company activity, attaining new all-time peaks. Measures of market momentum, some of which bad flashed cautionary signals early in the month, promptly reversed themselves and turned dramatically positive. It was, of course, a year-end rally with a vengeance. At the year's close the Dow bad already moved ahead more than ten percent from its December low, a phenomenon which, in the past, has been a bullish harbinger for the year to come, as Bob Simplans pointed out in this space last week. This constituted the 94th instance in 96 cases of an advance spanning the year-end. With this sort of upside breakout it is almost mandatory, we think, to suggest that 1992 should be an upside year, and we accordingly pronounce this to be our current operating forecast. Such a forecast is consistent with the fact that it js a presidential election year, such years generally producing strength, at least in the second half. For whatever it may be worth, the decennial pattern is also encouraging, with six of nine years ending in 2 having been up and the average change for such years having been a five-percent gain. It may also be relevant that first-half weakness in such years is not unknown. Major bottoms occurred in July 1932, April 1942, June –1962 and of course August 1982 . When we attempt to answer the two obvious further questions, How long and How far, we begin to run into difficulties. Certainly the history of past bull markets suggests plenty of leeway for the requisite answers. The average performance of past cycle bull markets has been an 80 advance over thirty months. If we recognize the current upswing as such ao advance and its inception as October 1990, it has moved ahead so far only 34 over just fourteen month. From this point of view, more room on the upside certainly appears to exist. There are, however, problems in pinpointing substantially higher technical objectives. It is difficult, for example, to read the ten-month trading range as a base and thus derive there from an upside target. We are forced to go back to the post-1987 base, which, as we have repeatedly noted, has long suggested an upside target of 3500. The average fell well short of this target at its 1990 high. Attaining it this time around would involve nothing more than a 10 move from present levels. One further caveat should be noted. Most commentators over the past few weeks have expressed surprise at the markets strength in view of the desultory outlook for fourth-quarter profits and the already high valuation levels for common stocks. The operative paradox of 1991 has involved financial pages which loudly trumpeted recession and, in the next column, reported firmness in the equity market. In that sense the year has been the ultimate vindication for those fond of pointing out that it is, in the end, supply and demand which produce common stock prices. Various underlying reasons have been suggested for the relatively high level of investor confidence, a level which has produced rising prices in the face of an apparently weak. economic outlook. One possible reason, not widely noted, might lie in the only news story which competed with the recession for space. That was, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Peace Dividend IS a phrase not heard around Wall Street for some time. The reality of that phenomenon, though, may now be emerging in the marketplace. Another lesson from abroad. this one from Japan, may perhaps be relevant. Three years ago, at its all-time high, the Nikkei index sold at 62 limes trailing earnings. The Japanese enjoyed, in other words, a market that was willing to throw historical valuation standards to the winds. We are reluctant to predict such a phenomenon here, but its occurrence across the Pacific suggest it is at least possible. There can be little doubt that the current level of investor confidence is high, or that such confidence accounts for a goodly portion of the current level of stock prices. We realize, ourselves, that our current forecast is based on a continuation of that level of confidence. We intend, accordingly, to spend the year being watchful for events that might destroy this optimism with consequent unpleasant results. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 10, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 10, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 10, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 January 10, 1992 Chents (and the press) have become aware, over the years, that Delafield, Harvey, Tabell is the owner of a reasonably extensive data bank o -historical stockmarket information. -ll'fotmatjon.Tney-have aisoDCcomeaware that we actually exercise of searching through that data bank for what might be useful–or, at least, interesting information, We are, therefore, used to fielding questions that begin with When was the last time… as, for example, When was the last time the Dow advanced eleven days in a row The answer, as will be seen below, is, 'January, 1987'. The question was provoked by the rather astounding 1991-1992, yearend rally, which did, indeed, produce eleven consecutive daily rises for the DJIA, between December 18, 1991 and January 3, 1992. The exceptional vigor of this advance, even allowing for its taking place at the time of the year with the greatest upside bias, make it worth examining in some detail. The rally must be contrasted with the market climate which preceded it—a trading range almost ten months long in which the Dow held between, roughly, 2840 on the downside and a series of modestly higher highs between 3004 and 3077 on the upside On Friday, November 15th a 120-point, one-day decline suddenly erupted, and an unimpressive Monday rally was followed by yet lower prices. By mid-December the market was testing the bottom of the trading area which had contained it throughout the year, closing on December 10th at 2863.82 on the Dow, which, on the following day, went on to a somewhat frightening intra-day low of 2832.29–its lowest penetration since March. This almost classic technical test was successful—indeed eminently so. A tbree-day rally moved the indicator above the 2900 level on December 16th. Then, on the Monday of Christmas week, things really began in earoest, with an 88.IO-pomt, 3.00 percent advance, moving the DnA back above the 3000 level. Christmas Eve saw a 28-point nse and the two days after Christmas tacked on another fifty points, involving, on December 26th, a new closing high and, on the 27th, a move above 3100 for the first time in history New Year's week opened on December 30th with a 62-point, 2.01 advance and Friday saw the first close above 3200. The mild firmness of this week (WIth yesterday's trading producing a new high at 3209.53) was anti-climactic. So, when was the last time this sort of thing took place, and what new records were set We noted last week that the month of December, 1991 was the second best December in the history of the Dow, marginally bettered, jf any()ne cares, by December, 1903. What about those eleven consecutive advancing days Well, they were not a record either, but they represented a fairly mre occurrence. The record f()r consecutive advancing days by the DJIA is 13, scored on the 13 days ended January 20th, 1987. Second place goes to the .12 consecutive rises through December-12th,!970.Janumy-3rd,d992-marks-the-end-of-the-third-mstancc-()f-eloven ri,uIg days,-the ()ther tw() havlDg taken place m May, 1944 and January-February, 1955. (We have n() idea of the significance ()f the fact that f()ur ()f these five cases occurred in the December-January period.) It was, interestingly, consistency rather than explosiveness which set records. The best advance of the period, three percent, has been exceeded on 192 previous occasions. A round number that has attracted a fair degree of attention lately–since just about everyone now knows what market breadth is—is the figure ()f 1000 advances, this proportion of the 2100-odd stocks that n()w tend to trade on a given day being taken to represent a fairly g()od upside sessi()n. Fourteen ()f the ometeen days of the rally exceeded this figure as did eleven of the last thirteen. As was the case with the D()w, consIstency was the feature. The peak figure of 1410 daily advances on December 23rd had been bettered fifteen times in the past. (There were 1756 advancing issues on Oct()ber 21, 1987.) There are many ways of massaging breadth figures. (We suspect, with this week's plethora of requests, we've tned most of them.) It must first be noted that there is liUle p()mt in using a raw number such as 1000 advances. It is only recently that sufficient issues have begun to trade to allow 1000 advances to take place. One statistic that manages to relate the present to the past may be derived by l()()king for instances in which 50 ()r m()re ()f all issues traded post a rise. This occurs around the 1050-1100 level in present markets. Of the last seven trading days ()f 1991, six produced more than 50 gainers from among NYSE-traded issues. This is. since 1926, the 35th such occurrence. It is neither so rare as to be meaningless or so frequent as to be useless. It has taken place around imp()rtant bott()ms m the past, but also, less frequently, prior to important tops. Of this more later. First. however, it may be worthwhile to note an event of no significance. It has been noted by many techmcians, including ourselves, that year-end trading has abovenorma1 importance. There has emerged, however, a January Indicator, which says, 10 one version at least, that, if the first five trading days of January are up (as was, ()f course, the case in 1992), then January is likely to be up. This is true, but meaningless. Since 1897, the first five days of January have shown a rise in 61 ()f 95 cases. It is indeed true that m 43 of those 61 instances the m()nth ()f January was alS() up. H()wever, these 43 'right' calls could be made after the market had been nsing for close to a quarter of the month. It seems almost trite to observe that the predictive value of a five-day nse should be evaluated after that nse has taken place, in other words from the close of the fifth trading day to the end ()f the month rather than from the December close. When one loo. at the record in this way, it is discovered that, of the 61 times the January Indicator has predicted an up market, It has been wrong In 31. or more than 50 of all cases, Indeed a downward firstfive-trading-days is a better predictor of an up market, such a five-day penod haVIng preceded an upward remainder ()f January m 20 cases out ()f 34. Finally, what practical significance is to be read into all of thIs The record of consistently strong markets (such as markets exhibiting six of seven strong breadth days) is one which, as noted above, has characterized important market bottoms. Such techrucal strength in other words, while it may suggest a market that is overbought for the short-term is, more often than not, a precursor of intermediateterm strength. It is our Vlew that, in the current case, such should be the interpretation given the extraordinary last three weeks. It needs als() to be n()ted, th()ugh, that such strength has been–a g()od deal more rarely-ass()ciated with important tops, a phenomenon referred to in ancient texts as a blowoff. This sort of action, is, it must be stressed, relatively infrequent, but it serves to remind us that vigilance, even while maintaining optimism. IS appropriate. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 17, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 17, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 17, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (SOg) 967-2300 January 17, 1992 After a correction which lasted all of two days and amounted to less than one percent, the stock market once more sailed into —.-newhigh territory with a 60-point-advance en Tuesday-and a-12-point follow-up cn-e'-Wednesdly.-The new-alI-time closing peak. for the DnA is now 3258.50. The first thlDg that should probably be stressed in a technical market letter is that the week's action should hardly constitute a surprise. One of the basic assertions of technical analysis is that a trend, once established, tends to remain in force and that strength begets further strength. The time to start worrying about stock prices will be when they stop attaining new peaks for a couple of weeks, not when they are demonstrating the sort of momentum now being seen. A few further observations regarding the market's behavior may be appropriate. The Dow is now up just short of 30 since October 11, 1990, a period of 320 trading days spanning some fifteen months. It is apparent that this constitutes a cycle bull market, and its magnitude and length to this point are, as we have noted in this space, perfectly normal in an historical context. There is, however. something a bit unusual about the advance's shape. After posting that October, 1990 low, the average moved ahead sluggishly, attaining a peak at 2637.15 just after Christmas. It then corrected to a low, on January 9th, 1991, at 2470.30 barely a hundred points above the October level. Then the prospects for success of Operation Desert Storm became evident. In just eight weeks, 39 trading days, the Dow had advanced over 500 points, more than 20, to a March 6th level of 2973.27. It would cross and recross that level no fewer than 6 times during the summer and fall, finally, on December 10, 1991, bottoming at 2863.82, a hundred points under the nine-month-earlier high. From that point, in five weeks or 24 trading days, it has once more moved up 13.78 to a new alHlme high. The point we are trying to make here is that we are looking at an important advance, one that has lasted so far well over a year. Yet the bulk of the upside action in this move has taken place within two short periods, eight weeks in January-March, 1991 and five weeks to date in December, 1991-January, 1992. These two upswings occupied 63 trading days, just one fifth of the total trading days in the past fifteen months. Of additional interest is the fact that this action followed a major bear market which occupied in total 61 trading days, just three months, between July and October of 1990. We have a market, in other words, that, over the past year and a half has tended to move not in continuous trends but in fits and starts. One always has to consider the possibility that, in the old phrase, this is the way things are going to be from now on. It is possible. If one believes that the stock market will invariably do that which embarrasses the greatest number of investors, It is interesting –to note that tactiCal aSset atlocatiOOliaS beCOmaliuzzword in the trendier areas of the investment management community, Markets- whIch cbange directton on a dime–and this one has done so three times in the past eighteen months–make it awfully difficult to move large amounts of money out of, say, bonds and into stocks. There can be little doubt, we think, that this sort of asset allocation has been the key factor in the increasing demand for stocks which has fueled at least the latest phase of the upswing. We have noted in this space the paradoxical relationship between the stock market and what one reads in the daily press or hears on the eleven-o'c1ock news. The media has, for the past year, trumpeted the phenomenon of recession seizing with what seemed almost like rapacious glee on each new rise in the unemployment statistics, each new report of major corporations being inundated with red ink. In the face of this, the market throughout 1991 refused to go down and now, as we enter 1992, bas once more exploded to the upside. This explosion has taken place in the face of the dismal economic news noted above and at a time when equities may be said to be, at best, fully valued. Recent press comment has tended to exhibit frustration—-wondering what, indeed, is going on in Wall Street. We cannot resist once more restating the technician's credo—-that it is supply and demand that moves stock prices. Those prices are currently moving in an upward direction because, quite simply, demand is strong. There must always exist, in the conventional wisdom, a reason why stock demand–or supply–is manifesting Itself. The favorite explanatIon, for a couple of years now, has centered around interest rates. This, again, is not surprising. We have, over the past decade, moved from a point where 9O-lay treasury bills, for example, yielded over fifteen percent to today's return of under four percent. These rates have been reflected in returns on investment media more familiar to the public such as money funds and certificates of deposit. It is logical, therefore, that the most dynamic phase of the current rally began with the 88-point advance on December 23rd, following the Fed's reduction in the rediscount rate to 3 112. An aggressive easy-money policy. it was suggested. was going to slash the available yields on those instruments which compete with common stocks for investor funds. Martin Zwelg has convincingly argued that this process could produce a cash flow into equities of as much as 90 billion. To us, this seems a perfectly sensible explanation of the obvious demand for equities that has recently emerged. —The public, it is argued, has grown accustomed to a high rate of return on cash instruments, will seek the continuation of that return by shifting funds into bonds–which, given the current yield curve, still provide a relatively generous yield or into common stocks, which have been demonstrated historically to provide a long-term return in the vicinity of 10. It can be argued, of course, that such a shift is ill-advised, that It consists of an unsophisticated public trying to maintain a high level of return by assuming an increasing amount of risk—risk the investor is not really prepared to bear and which could produce future psychological shock. The long-term return on stocks has indeed been generous. There have been fairly protracted periods in the past, however, when that return was negative. Under this confusing set of circumstances, we think, it is best to allow the market to tell its own story. Technical analysis, we are firmly convinced, will continue to help point to the way things are really going to be from now on. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3262.52 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 417.92 Cumulative Index (1116/92) 7159.14 – No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 24, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 24, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 24, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 January 24, 1992 Our readers are aware of our (limited) belief in the periodicity of the stock market and our consequent interest in the phenomenon of the so-called four-year cycle. Thus the table below will be a familiar one. It is now about time to update it, and, depending on the interpretation one chooses, it can, paradoxically, be used to support either a super-bullish or a super-bearish forecast. Interestingly, the interpretation depends not on recent market action, but on how we treat events which took place over a year ago. The table (based on monthly average prices for the DJIA shows the 24 cycles (through December, 1987) that we have previously identified, plus two interpretations of cycle 25 which is either complete or still underway. Cycles are measured from low to low and the table shows the start, high and end dates and levels for each cycle. Next is shown the total length of the cycle in months, the number of months spent in an advancing phase, and the percentage that these comprise of the total. The percentage advance and decline for each cycle phase are given followed by figures relating the cycle to the previous one. Finally, there are averages given for three different periods, this In recognition of the fact that the cycles seem to be getting longer as time goes on. The first Interpretation of the table's final cycle is the bullish one. Its basic assumption is that July-October 1990 constituted a full-scale bear market. If this is the case, a new cycle began at that point, and we are only fifteen months into It. The table shows that the average cycle-bullmarket advance is 80 over 30-35 months. We leave it to the reader to figure out the implications of that precedent for the market. This scenario, though, causes a number of problems. Its 34-month length would make the completed cycle one of the shortest on record. Likewise the 54 advance, while baving some precedent. is on the low Side. These objections force us at least to consider the second alternative. Under thi'i explanation. the bull market. which began. m 1987, continues, the 1990 drop being only an intermediate term correction. This produces a 69 advance to date, more in line with past history, and this figure would of course increase with new market highs. The 49plus advancing months so far are admittedly on the high side, and we are now already past the average cycle length. Certainly, however, the scenario has some plausibility. The two conflicting interpretations. paradoxically, leave no middle ground. We are, according to the former, m the very early stages of a long bull market. The latter one places us well into the mature stage of such a market. with the consequent likelihood of a imminent major bear market. The reader is entitled. to ask whether this can possibly be construed as useful information. We think it is, We have made it clear recently that we think the market's immediate direction is quite clearly an upward one. Our investment position, therefore, while awaiting the resolution of the cycle dilemma. should be an aggressive one. Nonetheless, we think it important to keep the cycle background in mind as the intermediate-term market picture unfolds. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3236.14 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 415.95 Cumulative Index (1123/92) 7158.74 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 31, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 31, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 31, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 January 31, 1992 Market volatility has been the subject of a fair amount of discussion of late. Such discussion may have been further provoked by Wednesdays action, wherein Mr. Greenspan made some comments which the stock and bond markets. At least, took to be at variance with statements made by his boss the evening before. whatever reason be the Dow, at one o'clock had been up some 25 points – and was flirting with the 3300 level, went into a swoon in late trading and dropped some 47 points. Large moves encompassing more than an hour have also emerged. One recalls the 88-point, 3 rise in the DJIA on a single day just before Christmas. Less than a year ago, the Dow, on March 6, 1991 had moved more than 20 from its January low. This constituted only the third time since 1926 that a 20-plus move had taken place over that short a time span. n needs to be noted, though, that volatility can be defined in a number of ways. One of our own favorite measures, which we conceived back in 1982, is to look at the monthly standard deviation of daily log changes in the Dow. This has the advantage of sounding good since a fair number of people won't have the slightest idea of what we're talking about. It is, nonetheless, a fairly simple concept. A log change (the difference in the logarithms of two numbers) is analogous to a percentage change in that it is a valid comparison of the change in two figures regardless of the level of those figures. ('The percentage change from 15 to 16 is the same as that from 15,000 to 16,000.) The log has the additional advantage of making up and down changes comparable. A stock which falls 10 and then rises 10 is lower than where it started. A stock which falls and than rises by log ,\0536 (equivalent to 10) has returned to its starting place. I The concept of the standard deviation is no more complicated. We are in need here of a tools which make useful statements regarding groups of numbers–in this case, changes in stock prices. We all learned in grammar school how to figure an average (or mean)–add up the numbers and divide by the number of observations. This we do here, computing for each month the averages of the daily changes in the Dow. An average, though, is less than fully descriptive, A randomly selected group of men, for example, might have an average height around six feet. A group equally composed of jockeys and basketball centers might have the same average height, but it would be a quite different group, and the standard deviation helps explain that difference. In any case, a chart of the indicator is shown below. DOW JONES INOUSTRIAL AVERAGE I I-,……..-. vJ rV!'J,JI '\ I 'I Jill 0 N, STANOARD DEVIATION OF AIL Y LO CHANGES MONTHL Y 1946 – DATE , – . —- It reveals little volatility in recent markets, the January figure being well within the normal range. This, actually is too bad, since a high degree of volatility has, in the past, been characteristic of strong markets. Shown by vertical lines on the chart are the penods in the past when the indicator reached 1.5 or better. These occurrences took place in 1946, 1955, 1962, 1970, 1974, 1982, and 1989, only the most recent such occurrence taking place at a high–in August, 1990. The indicator almost reached the 1 5 level at the bottom three months later, however. This is interesting in terms of the cycle theory discussed last week, since it would suggest that October, 1990 did indeed see the start of a major bull market. ANTIiONYW. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3232.33 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 4\0.03 Cumulative Index (1130/92) 7217.51 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 07, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 07, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - February 07, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC 16091987-2300 February 7, 1992 At the start of major upswings, it is common to find oneself wondering whether stock prices are going to continue rising forever. Of course, they never do it is a farily obvious truism that the initial phase of any market rise is the most dynamic one, barely managed a new shining high on Tuesday of this week, and it was joined by everybodys favorite new indicator, the NASDAQ Composite. The S&P 500, however, has not managed a new high since it reached 420.77 back on January 15, and it was actually down all of 2.85 last Friday, at 408.79. On Tuesdays rally, it could do no better than recover less than half the ground lost. Breadth figures, likewise, have been les ebullient since mid-January. We noted at the time that the last seven trading days of 1991 each saw more than 1000 NYSE advancing issues. This particular threshold was in fact attained on 16 of the 23 trading days between December 12th and January 15th. Since then, over 16 trading days, there have been only two such occasions. The new high list has also become somewhat smaller in the current stage of the rally. The final two days of last year saw well over three hundred new 52-week highs being posted. This declined to 200 in mid-January, and Wednesday of this week produced only 151 new peaks. The size of the daily new-high table may be less interesting at this point than its composition. During the initial surge from the December lows, that list tended to be comprised of familiar and deservedly well-loved names. One got the impression that portfolio managers, awed by Mr. Greenspans Christmas present, felt the compulsion to be instantly invested and, pending a search for new names, simply utilized the old ones. Six examples of stocks that may have been the beneficiaries of this approach are shown in the table at right. For the most apart they reached their peaks in early to mid-January, decline by a minor but not insignificant amount and have since, much as has been the case with the S&P 500, recovered only a small part of their losses. Among the actual 151 occupants of the new peak list were a number of less-than-familiar names. There was, for example, Chrysler (perhaps as a Japan-bashing play), Goodyear, Maytag, and Bank of Boston, which would have been, just over a year ago, a candidate for the new-low rather than for the new-high list. Also present were a number of home building issues, apparently on the theory that the combination of cheap money and the Presidents new-found fondness for passive losses would prove irresistible. It is, from a technical point of view, still far too early to suggest tat any sort of permanent shift in market leadership has occurred. Many of last years institutional favorites have already broken out of small tops and reached their downside objectives. In the case of those that have not yet done so, the existing portential distribution areas do not, for the most part, suggest any more than minor corrections. once bitten, twice shy is a reasonably good aphorism to recall when considering these issues. At many times in their long advances, which, for most of them, span the entire decade of the 1980s, it has been tempting to suggest that they were relatively fully priced and that a change in leadership might be imminent. In each case, after a period of nothing worse than sideways action, they returned to their familiar position on the list of new highs. There exists no evidence at the moment that they will not once more do so. Of course, such a process does not go on forever. The sort of pattern exhibited by the consumer-growth stocks used to be called, as veterans of the 1950s and 1960s will remember, a stairstep pattern, a series of uptrends interspersed with lateral movements Many of the investment paragons of the day produced such charts. Only, of course, the names were different. At that time, the stocks being thought of as growth issues included Dow Chemical, International Paper, and Rohm and Haas. Later the growth tag got hung on the so-called nifty fifty, such as Avon Products, Eastman Kodak, and Xerox. Market patterns both change and remain the same. Meanwhile, as we noted above, one must recall, while the skyrocket phase of bull markets tends to be of short duration, such markets historically possess a long and rewarding life. Likewise, shifts in market leadership occur and will almost certainly occur again. There generally exists, however, plenty of time for those leadership shifts to manifest themselves. Anthony W. Tabell, CMT Delafield, Harvey, Tabell No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request. Stock; January High; Subsequent Low; Recent Coca Cola; 83 3/8; 71 1/8; 79 1/8 Home Depot ; 71 7/8; 60 3/4; 65 1/8 Johnson and Johnson 117 3/8; 102 1/4 ; 107 1/8 Merck ; 169 3/4 ; 149; 156 1/4 Philip Morris; 82 1/2 ; 75 ; 78 1/2 Wal-Mart Stores; 59 1/8 ; 53 3/4 ; 54 3/4

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 14, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 14, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - February 14, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 February 14, 1992 Almost two months into 1992, the continued stock market rally has, indeed, provided us with a dramatic start to the . new year. A start that has left those concerned with the severity of the recession, levels of interest rates, and the dollar decline on world currency markets wondering what has happened. It is certainly logical to expect this rally can continue. The results to date of the seasonal tendency of the stock market to stage a year-end rally would support this assumption. So far the advance of the DJIA from the December 10th low of 2863.82 has been an impressive 14.42, taking place in just 44 trading days, while the OTC lodustrials bas advanced an even more impressive 22.48 for the same period. The continuation of the extent of the advance into February coupled with the magnitude of the advance argues well for higher levels in the stock market for this year. Also, this being a presidential election year, the election-year pattern has demonstrated a mildly bullish tendency, with history suggesting tbe market rising in the second half of the presidential year. If the investor is willing to make the assumption that an ongoing bull market is in place, the performance of small stocks, from a technical point of view, should he an important element of this continued advance and is to be monitored closely. In order to show the improved relative action of small stocks verses large stocks we bave computed a ratio using as a proxy the OTC lodustrials and the S&P 500. The action of the two averages themselves is shown by tbe thick and thin lines at the bottom of the chart, while the upper line plots the ratio. The relative performance of small stocks verses large stocks should basically he viewed with a long-term perspective. As can be seen from the above chart using hindsight, one did significantly better owning small stocks from tbe 1974 low through mid-1983. From mid-1983 to late-1990 investing in the large issues which make up the S&P 500 bad been the place to be. However, since late-1990 the OTC IndustriallS&P 500 ratio in the upper part of the chart bas sbown a marked change technically, reflecting the positive relative strength in the OTC lodustrials issues (small) verses the S&P 500 issues (large). – This positive change has in fact become 1I!.0rep!,,l)ur.ed in recent months.1t is alsolhe…fullt—- —protracted period of time since mid-1983 thst the small stocks measured agalnst large stocks ha-;; -ciwly beeii the relative performance leaders. Because small stocks tend to display more stock market volatility in an up market than do large stocks it would not be unlikely for the improvement in the above ratio to continue. However, if we assume the cycle, that has kept the above ratio in a clearly defined downtrend since mid-1983, has been reversed in late-1990 (small stocks are acting relatively better than large stocks), it now becomes equally important to identify any deterioration in the small stock sector. As we know, conversely, volatility of small stocks in down market can decline more sharply. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3241.95 S&P 500 (1200) 412.45 Cumulative lodex (12/27/91) 7314.62 Robert J. Simpkins, Jr. Delafield, Harvey, Tabellloc. RJSaa No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 21, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 21, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - February 21, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY OB5435209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 February 21, 1992 It is our custom to warn readers at the outset when the subject matter of thIS letter is about to turn somewhat —– csctenc.- ,V/e-are-duly a!..nouI!.ing-.-.-therefore,thttoday topicwill.;;,.bemil1t;tlrujanism. Those jntereste!i splely in 9! .. .- practical matters may aim this edition at the nearest wastebasket and return next week. . – . What prompts this excursion is a recent hospital stay which afforded us the opportunity to read the book which critics left and right are assuring us constitutes required reading for all intelligent Americans. That tome is The End of History and the lAst Man by Francis Fukuyama. (It replaces last year's similarly required reading, Alan Bloom's The Qosing of the Amencan Mind.) Mr. Fukuyama can be characterized as a secular millenarian, which means, quite simply, that he believes in progress. His time frame for that progress, however, exceeds in length even what those of us who comment on financial markets are accustomed to call the very long term. That time frame is, indeed, the entire span of human history. As his title implies, Fukuyama believes that history is not necessarily a permanent process but one which has been (and is) moving toward an end. That end is political and essentially consists of the emergence of classical liberal democracy as the societal organization for most, if not all, of the world's peoples. This argument is, to say the least, provocative and, rrl911 additionally, complex, based, as it is, on, among a number liberal Democracies Worldwide of other things, Hegelian dialectic. Occasionally, however, he treads on ground familiar to the market technician and Year Number uses trends and projections to prove his case. For example, 1790 3 we found the table at the right, taken from the book, to be persuasIve. It shows the number of democratic governments 1848 5 extant in the world in various years between 1790 (when 1900 13 there were only the United States, France and Switzerland) Oa;)d 1990This1s-the'end.that-FuJc.yamabelieves-history is-.- .1f-…1-'9…1.. ..9….,f-.2,-'5—lI''I' reaching. Now what is the world does all of this have to do with the stock market Well, perhaps more than a little. 1940 1960 13 36 The salient feature of Fukuyama's world view is a profound optimism. He takes his stance against current conventional thought in the book's very first sentence, which is, The 1975 1990 30 61 20th century, it is safe to say, has made all of us into deep historical pessimists. All of us, for the purpose of this exercise, can be taken to include market technicians, who are, when one thinks about it, occupationally committed to a pessimistic, or at least a cynical, world view. Our bible is Charles Mackay's Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, which is, at bottom, the chronicle of repeated and inevitable human folly in lusting after a millennium. Our pitiful species has brought forth John Law, the South Sea Bubble, the Holland Tulip Bulb Mania, and the stock market of the 1920's. Much more seriously, it has, in the political arena, produced Naziism and Communism. History, the pessimist would offer, suggests no progress but repetitive aberrant behavior. In light of its current action, one can accuse the equity market of paying more attention to Fukuyama than Mackay. In its present optimism, it is willing to value existing equities at record levels in relation to earning power and, at the same time, voraciously devour just about every new issue that Wall Street is able to churn out. Our readers are aware of our view that the burning investment question of the day is whether that optimism can be justified. It is just conceivable that the rationale for such a justification may lie in Fukuyama's political scenario of emerging worldwide democracy. The major 'world event predicted by absolutely no one half a decade ago is the collapse of Communism. In many ways it seems we remain unable to come to grips with this phenomenon. What will a world without a cold war and where vast new markets hunger for the fruits of Western prosperity be like It may, indeed, be millennial. Whether this sort of optimism constitutes a partial justification for the market's being where It is is a question which the market analyst will need to address, employing, in the process, techniques a good deal more prosaic than Fukuyama's magisterial historical sweep. However, any justification for looking into the 21st century with unbridled optimism must be of more than passing interest to the stockmarket observer. ANTHONY W TABELL, CMT DELAFffiLD,HARVEY,TABELL Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3281.53 Standard & Poor's 500 (1200) 413.07 Cumulative Index (2/21/92) 7350.31 AWT'aa No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 28, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 28, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - February 28, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609 987-2300 February 28, 1992 iiiaWe co;trast..f iu letter last wthtimi.;';;d pessi;;;Wic view70numai\-n-ature-' The-former oelief iSthat learns from history, and, therefore, as time goes on, progress takes place. The less sanguine view of human character holds tht we simply go on repeating the same old mistakes. We have now reached the approximate 20th anniversa,, of one. of the financial community's monumental mistakes. This was the theory of one-decision, growth-stock investment, which saw Its heyday around 1972. On April 14, 1972, we selected in this letter six typical growth favorites of the Price Current Percent day, using them as examples of the market's Stock 4/14/72 Price Change tendency to project and discount future earnings growth. The six issues along with Avon Products. 124 48 -61 their two-decade-ago prices adjusted for stock splits, their current price, and approximate percentage change are shown in the table at Eastman Kodak IBM 54 45 -17 80 88 10 right. A number of points need to be made. The most crucial is that the six names were Polaroid Sears Roebuck 58 30 67 43 -26 -55 not selected today in order to prove a point. Xerox 145 79 -46 They were chosen 20 years ago on the grounds of their being archetypes of the favored institutional investment vehicles of the day, the flagship holdings for conventional conservatively managed portfolios We do not think anyone who recalls the early —1970'5 witl-q'UitiDlewllhour choice. (We are pertecfly\vilhng toi'djnir thiit7'a-nhe time. we mlgh(Have1h'Osen olher issuesoTCthe—'— same basis. for example a pharmaceutical stock such as Merck whose adjusted 1972 high was 16. However, we will go With the picks actuaJJy made at the time.) The end result, in any case, is that we have here six issues selected 20 years ago by the consensus view of the best and the brightest minds on Wall Street as the best available long-term investment opportunities. Over the intervening period, a great deal of water has passed under the bridge. The Gross National Product has increased fivefold. The market value of listed stocks on the New York Stock Exchange has risen from 791 billion to over 3400 billion. The total return for the average stock ha. hoen in the vicinity of II percent compounded annually, which, over 20 years, works Ollt to growth of 700 percent. The Dow lones Industrial Average has tripled Concurrently, of six issues universally thought to be most attractive by the investment management comtnunitY.,,fi,'e hove derlined ill price Ol'er 20 years, and the sixth (IBM) is essentially lmrlmnged Now first of all. we hasten to point out that we did not. in any way, suggest in April. 1972—almost one thousand issues of this leiter ago—that the six issues chosen were likely to decline in price Indeed. we pecifically refused to pronounce any salt or judgement on the investment merits of the six isc;ues involved. We did have a number of things to say. at Ih1t time and in a lalcl scrieo;; of lettcre;. ahout the one-decision thesis, and we intend to reiterate some of them Meanwhile. it IS worth asking olllselves What, specifically, went wrong The universal attribute of these companies, looked at from the vantage point of the early 1970's, was that they had demonstrated, over the pnor couple of decades, superior, consistent, and above-average earnings growth. IBM from 1955 to the laic 1960's had grown at a better-than-20-percent compounded rate. Xerox had. since 1955, increased its earnings by approximately 15,000 percent Moreover, the growth had, in most cases, been steady. The six stocks had never turned in a down year and very few down quarters All this was interrupted by the lecession of the early 1970's, when, for the first time, earnings dropped off somewhat. (In the case of IB!v1, they only flattened). However, and we think this is important, e.1mings growth once again resumed, and all six companies went on to earnings peaks in the early 1980's. It was at that point, a decade later, that rising EPS figures ceased, and the typical performance for the latest ten years has featured flat or falling earnings. The market, however, anticipated the companies' diminished prospects for the 1980's some eight years in advance. Why, at this point. are we recalling our observations of 20 years ago It is because) if one believes that we go on repeating the same old mistakes, it is worth asking whether today's professionals are or are not repeating the abysmal error of their predecessors–not with the same stocks, of course, but with a new set of names which has become as sacrosanct today as the six in question were two decades ago. We intend to explore this question in future letters Dow Jones Industrials (1200) Standard & Poor's 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (2/28/92) AWT.aa 3284.88 415.15 7391.37 ANTHONY W. TAIlEtL, CMT DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

Download PDF

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 06, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – March 06, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - March 06, 1992
View Text Version (OCR)

–' TABELLS MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 r– March 6, 1992 In last week's leeter. we recalled a plece we had wnllen twenty years ago, at wille hme we selected ')IX favored growtl! fSsues of the day. II turned out fhar, after twenty years, jive of the su were down In pnce. We then dIScovered thar our twenty-year-old letter made equal sense today. M'GI new same–jollmvs lieJo'7S a repnnlo/ that letleihlhe-text -v-j;tU;iiVtclianged. -Ob-vioiiSly-;-w;Jla–Ve Picked SLX stocks,Usl;i,however, exactly tlie en/ena we used En 1972, a record of steady growth and universal insntutwnal approbatwn. 71,e three tables are ,denneal, subsn/unng the data for the new stocks and, of course, new (but comparable) dates for pnces and earmngs. TIle result IS as follows. Suppose an investor, at the end of September, 1990, had decided to construct himself a portfolio conslstmg of six wldelyrecognized growth stocks, Coca-Cola, Home Depot, Merck, Microsoft, Philip Morris, and Wal-Mart Stores He would have every reason to be pleased with his investment results to date. His portfolio value would be up 129, the first three columns of the table below showing the details, KO HD MRK MSFT MO WMT Price 9128/90 39 20 76 42 45 27 Current Price 80 63 151 123 75 53 Advance 105 215 99 193 67 96 Erngs 9/28190 1.94 084 435 1.74 443 1.10 Erngs YE 1991 243 1 20 5049 303 464 lAO Change 25 43 26 74 5 27 ThecI1.!claLquestion is …,.JVhy .d. !lnfQately.most lllvt9withsifi!.iJar P9olios woul'!. t'!.!l!nr, po41ti c about the merits of growth stocks. As the table indicates, however, market gains ranging from 53 to 215 were achieved on eammgs gains rangmg from 5 to (in one case) 74 The bulk of the portfolio gain was achieved, not through earnings growth, but through the normal bull-market process of marking up the price paid for a dollar of earmngs, Current Price Earnmgs 1991 That this process has advanced to a faIrly PIE Peak PIE 1987 mature stage is suggested by the table at left which KO 80 HD 63 2043, 1 20 33 21 compares the current pie raho of each stock to its peak pie ratio for 1987 As can be seen, three of 53 36 the six stocks are above that peak. The MRK 151 5049 28 40 implication, of course, is that further gains based on the market's willingness to pay a higher price MSFT 123 3.03 41 61 for earnings may be limited, MO 75 4,64 16 17 The table below takes 1992 estimated earnings for each of the six stocks, applies the WMT 53 lAO 38 34 highest multiple from the left-band table and indicates the price at whicb each stock would sell based on that mUltiple, As can be seen, the percentage advances from current levels on this basis are, in four of six cases at least, rather lilOlted Now it should be made clear what the above study is mtended to do. Most importantly, it is not intended to Price Eng. 1992-E Peak PIE Pot. FIx Chg make any judgment, pro or con, as to the current KO investment ments of the six companies. It IS also not meant to suggest that the target prices mentioned in the last HD 80 63 287 33 95 18 152 53 81 28 taole posses any practtcal value as the market makes new MRK 151 6.47 40 259 71 highs in a bull move, Le., that the purpose of bull markets is to discount rosy futures. It is also meant to suggest that, MSFT 123 402 61 245 99 in the case of such easily-selectable Issues as the ones above, tbe process of discounting may be reasonably well advanced. The investor's dilemma at this point is that MO WMT 75 53 5,57 17 95 26 1 72 38 65 23 further substantial multiple plays can probably be found only by recourse to less conventional stocks. Such recourse, quite obviously. entaIls the acceptance of a higher degree of risk ANTHONY W TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3237.48 DELAflELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 405,91 Cumulative Index (3/5192) 7363.19 No statement or expression of opmlon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer orthe soliCitatIOn of an offer to buyor sen any secUrity referred 10 or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our InformatIOn to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made hereIn Any action 10 be laken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Oelafield, Harvey, labelllnc, as a corporation and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades m respecllo any secufll18S mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such position may be dlfferen/ (rom any Views now or hereafter expressed In ttus or any o/her Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell fnc ,which IS registered with the SEC as an Inveslment adVisor, may glVe adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In Ihls or In any oher Issue Further Information on any secuTity mentioned herein IS available on request

Download PDF