Viewing Month: January 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 03, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 03, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 03, 1992
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE. CN 5209, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 January 3, 1992 We announced two weeks ago that we intended to defer our 1992 forecast to this issue, two days into the new year, citing as the reason our upcoming vacation. To be honest, however, this constituted only part o our reasoning. We hoped that, in those two weeks, the market would, finally, post a decisive breakout, one way or another, from the trading range which had contained it over most of 199s last ten months. It did. The rather amazing seven final trading days of 1991 are now a matter of record. The Dow tacked on more than 250 points, exceeding its previous high, scored back in October, by almost 100 points. The total advance for the month, from the November 29 close of 2894.68, was 9 47, making it the second-best December since the average bas been computed. (It advanced 10.78 in 1903.) Interestingly, this only placed the month's performance 47th among all 1140 months since 1897. Although December, as we have regularly pointed out, has the most consistent upward bias of any month, it has not tended to produce extreme upswings. The strength in the Dow was confirmed by other market measures, most crucially by breadth indicators, computed on both a daily and a weekly basis. The 336 daily new highs posted on the NYSE on New Year's Eve were the highest since March, 1986. The S & P 500, on December 26th, gave investors a Christmas present by closing above 400 for the first time in its history, and the rally was joined by secondary stocks, with the NASDAQ Industrials, along with other measures of smaIl-company activity, attaining new all-time peaks. Measures of market momentum, some of which bad flashed cautionary signals early in the month, promptly reversed themselves and turned dramatically positive. It was, of course, a year-end rally with a vengeance. At the year's close the Dow bad already moved ahead more than ten percent from its December low, a phenomenon which, in the past, has been a bullish harbinger for the year to come, as Bob Simplans pointed out in this space last week. This constituted the 94th instance in 96 cases of an advance spanning the year-end. With this sort of upside breakout it is almost mandatory, we think, to suggest that 1992 should be an upside year, and we accordingly pronounce this to be our current operating forecast. Such a forecast is consistent with the fact that it js a presidential election year, such years generally producing strength, at least in the second half. For whatever it may be worth, the decennial pattern is also encouraging, with six of nine years ending in 2 having been up and the average change for such years having been a five-percent gain. It may also be relevant that first-half weakness in such years is not unknown. Major bottoms occurred in July 1932, April 1942, June –1962 and of course August 1982 . When we attempt to answer the two obvious further questions, How long and How far, we begin to run into difficulties. Certainly the history of past bull markets suggests plenty of leeway for the requisite answers. The average performance of past cycle bull markets has been an 80 advance over thirty months. If we recognize the current upswing as such ao advance and its inception as October 1990, it has moved ahead so far only 34 over just fourteen month. From this point of view, more room on the upside certainly appears to exist. There are, however, problems in pinpointing substantially higher technical objectives. It is difficult, for example, to read the ten-month trading range as a base and thus derive there from an upside target. We are forced to go back to the post-1987 base, which, as we have repeatedly noted, has long suggested an upside target of 3500. The average fell well short of this target at its 1990 high. Attaining it this time around would involve nothing more than a 10 move from present levels. One further caveat should be noted. Most commentators over the past few weeks have expressed surprise at the markets strength in view of the desultory outlook for fourth-quarter profits and the already high valuation levels for common stocks. The operative paradox of 1991 has involved financial pages which loudly trumpeted recession and, in the next column, reported firmness in the equity market. In that sense the year has been the ultimate vindication for those fond of pointing out that it is, in the end, supply and demand which produce common stock prices. Various underlying reasons have been suggested for the relatively high level of investor confidence, a level which has produced rising prices in the face of an apparently weak. economic outlook. One possible reason, not widely noted, might lie in the only news story which competed with the recession for space. That was, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union. Peace Dividend IS a phrase not heard around Wall Street for some time. The reality of that phenomenon, though, may now be emerging in the marketplace. Another lesson from abroad. this one from Japan, may perhaps be relevant. Three years ago, at its all-time high, the Nikkei index sold at 62 limes trailing earnings. The Japanese enjoyed, in other words, a market that was willing to throw historical valuation standards to the winds. We are reluctant to predict such a phenomenon here, but its occurrence across the Pacific suggest it is at least possible. There can be little doubt that the current level of investor confidence is high, or that such confidence accounts for a goodly portion of the current level of stock prices. We realize, ourselves, that our current forecast is based on a continuation of that level of confidence. We intend, accordingly, to spend the year being watchful for events that might destroy this optimism with consequent unpleasant results. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 10, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 10, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 10, 1992
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 January 10, 1992 Chents (and the press) have become aware, over the years, that Delafield, Harvey, Tabell is the owner of a reasonably extensive data bank o -historical stockmarket information. -ll'fotmatjon.Tney-have aisoDCcomeaware that we actually exercise of searching through that data bank for what might be useful–or, at least, interesting information, We are, therefore, used to fielding questions that begin with When was the last time… as, for example, When was the last time the Dow advanced eleven days in a row The answer, as will be seen below, is, 'January, 1987'. The question was provoked by the rather astounding 1991-1992, yearend rally, which did, indeed, produce eleven consecutive daily rises for the DJIA, between December 18, 1991 and January 3, 1992. The exceptional vigor of this advance, even allowing for its taking place at the time of the year with the greatest upside bias, make it worth examining in some detail. The rally must be contrasted with the market climate which preceded it—a trading range almost ten months long in which the Dow held between, roughly, 2840 on the downside and a series of modestly higher highs between 3004 and 3077 on the upside On Friday, November 15th a 120-point, one-day decline suddenly erupted, and an unimpressive Monday rally was followed by yet lower prices. By mid-December the market was testing the bottom of the trading area which had contained it throughout the year, closing on December 10th at 2863.82 on the Dow, which, on the following day, went on to a somewhat frightening intra-day low of 2832.29–its lowest penetration since March. This almost classic technical test was successful—indeed eminently so. A tbree-day rally moved the indicator above the 2900 level on December 16th. Then, on the Monday of Christmas week, things really began in earoest, with an 88.IO-pomt, 3.00 percent advance, moving the DnA back above the 3000 level. Christmas Eve saw a 28-point nse and the two days after Christmas tacked on another fifty points, involving, on December 26th, a new closing high and, on the 27th, a move above 3100 for the first time in history New Year's week opened on December 30th with a 62-point, 2.01 advance and Friday saw the first close above 3200. The mild firmness of this week (WIth yesterday's trading producing a new high at 3209.53) was anti-climactic. So, when was the last time this sort of thing took place, and what new records were set We noted last week that the month of December, 1991 was the second best December in the history of the Dow, marginally bettered, jf any()ne cares, by December, 1903. What about those eleven consecutive advancing days Well, they were not a record either, but they represented a fairly mre occurrence. The record f()r consecutive advancing days by the DJIA is 13, scored on the 13 days ended January 20th, 1987. Second place goes to the .12 consecutive rises through December-12th,!970.Janumy-3rd,d992-marks-the-end-of-the-third-mstancc-()f-eloven ri,uIg days,-the ()ther tw() havlDg taken place m May, 1944 and January-February, 1955. (We have n() idea of the significance ()f the fact that f()ur ()f these five cases occurred in the December-January period.) It was, interestingly, consistency rather than explosiveness which set records. The best advance of the period, three percent, has been exceeded on 192 previous occasions. A round number that has attracted a fair degree of attention lately–since just about everyone now knows what market breadth is—is the figure ()f 1000 advances, this proportion of the 2100-odd stocks that n()w tend to trade on a given day being taken to represent a fairly g()od upside sessi()n. Fourteen ()f the ometeen days of the rally exceeded this figure as did eleven of the last thirteen. As was the case with the D()w, consIstency was the feature. The peak figure of 1410 daily advances on December 23rd had been bettered fifteen times in the past. (There were 1756 advancing issues on Oct()ber 21, 1987.) There are many ways of massaging breadth figures. (We suspect, with this week's plethora of requests, we've tned most of them.) It must first be noted that there is liUle p()mt in using a raw number such as 1000 advances. It is only recently that sufficient issues have begun to trade to allow 1000 advances to take place. One statistic that manages to relate the present to the past may be derived by l()()king for instances in which 50 ()r m()re ()f all issues traded post a rise. This occurs around the 1050-1100 level in present markets. Of the last seven trading days ()f 1991, six produced more than 50 gainers from among NYSE-traded issues. This is. since 1926, the 35th such occurrence. It is neither so rare as to be meaningless or so frequent as to be useless. It has taken place around imp()rtant bott()ms m the past, but also, less frequently, prior to important tops. Of this more later. First. however, it may be worthwhile to note an event of no significance. It has been noted by many techmcians, including ourselves, that year-end trading has abovenorma1 importance. There has emerged, however, a January Indicator, which says, 10 one version at least, that, if the first five trading days of January are up (as was, ()f course, the case in 1992), then January is likely to be up. This is true, but meaningless. Since 1897, the first five days of January have shown a rise in 61 ()f 95 cases. It is indeed true that m 43 of those 61 instances the m()nth ()f January was alS() up. H()wever, these 43 'right' calls could be made after the market had been nsing for close to a quarter of the month. It seems almost trite to observe that the predictive value of a five-day nse should be evaluated after that nse has taken place, in other words from the close of the fifth trading day to the end ()f the month rather than from the December close. When one loo. at the record in this way, it is discovered that, of the 61 times the January Indicator has predicted an up market, It has been wrong In 31. or more than 50 of all cases, Indeed a downward firstfive-trading-days is a better predictor of an up market, such a five-day penod haVIng preceded an upward remainder ()f January m 20 cases out ()f 34. Finally, what practical significance is to be read into all of thIs The record of consistently strong markets (such as markets exhibiting six of seven strong breadth days) is one which, as noted above, has characterized important market bottoms. Such techrucal strength in other words, while it may suggest a market that is overbought for the short-term is, more often than not, a precursor of intermediateterm strength. It is our Vlew that, in the current case, such should be the interpretation given the extraordinary last three weeks. It needs als() to be n()ted, th()ugh, that such strength has been–a g()od deal more rarely-ass()ciated with important tops, a phenomenon referred to in ancient texts as a blowoff. This sort of action, is, it must be stressed, relatively infrequent, but it serves to remind us that vigilance, even while maintaining optimism. IS appropriate. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 17, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 17, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 17, 1992
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (SOg) 967-2300 January 17, 1992 After a correction which lasted all of two days and amounted to less than one percent, the stock market once more sailed into —.-newhigh territory with a 60-point-advance en Tuesday-and a-12-point follow-up cn-e'-Wednesdly.-The new-alI-time closing peak. for the DnA is now 3258.50. The first thlDg that should probably be stressed in a technical market letter is that the week's action should hardly constitute a surprise. One of the basic assertions of technical analysis is that a trend, once established, tends to remain in force and that strength begets further strength. The time to start worrying about stock prices will be when they stop attaining new peaks for a couple of weeks, not when they are demonstrating the sort of momentum now being seen. A few further observations regarding the market's behavior may be appropriate. The Dow is now up just short of 30 since October 11, 1990, a period of 320 trading days spanning some fifteen months. It is apparent that this constitutes a cycle bull market, and its magnitude and length to this point are, as we have noted in this space, perfectly normal in an historical context. There is, however. something a bit unusual about the advance's shape. After posting that October, 1990 low, the average moved ahead sluggishly, attaining a peak at 2637.15 just after Christmas. It then corrected to a low, on January 9th, 1991, at 2470.30 barely a hundred points above the October level. Then the prospects for success of Operation Desert Storm became evident. In just eight weeks, 39 trading days, the Dow had advanced over 500 points, more than 20, to a March 6th level of 2973.27. It would cross and recross that level no fewer than 6 times during the summer and fall, finally, on December 10, 1991, bottoming at 2863.82, a hundred points under the nine-month-earlier high. From that point, in five weeks or 24 trading days, it has once more moved up 13.78 to a new alHlme high. The point we are trying to make here is that we are looking at an important advance, one that has lasted so far well over a year. Yet the bulk of the upside action in this move has taken place within two short periods, eight weeks in January-March, 1991 and five weeks to date in December, 1991-January, 1992. These two upswings occupied 63 trading days, just one fifth of the total trading days in the past fifteen months. Of additional interest is the fact that this action followed a major bear market which occupied in total 61 trading days, just three months, between July and October of 1990. We have a market, in other words, that, over the past year and a half has tended to move not in continuous trends but in fits and starts. One always has to consider the possibility that, in the old phrase, this is the way things are going to be from now on. It is possible. If one believes that the stock market will invariably do that which embarrasses the greatest number of investors, It is interesting –to note that tactiCal aSset atlocatiOOliaS beCOmaliuzzword in the trendier areas of the investment management community, Markets- whIch cbange directton on a dime–and this one has done so three times in the past eighteen months–make it awfully difficult to move large amounts of money out of, say, bonds and into stocks. There can be little doubt, we think, that this sort of asset allocation has been the key factor in the increasing demand for stocks which has fueled at least the latest phase of the upswing. We have noted in this space the paradoxical relationship between the stock market and what one reads in the daily press or hears on the eleven-o'c1ock news. The media has, for the past year, trumpeted the phenomenon of recession seizing with what seemed almost like rapacious glee on each new rise in the unemployment statistics, each new report of major corporations being inundated with red ink. In the face of this, the market throughout 1991 refused to go down and now, as we enter 1992, bas once more exploded to the upside. This explosion has taken place in the face of the dismal economic news noted above and at a time when equities may be said to be, at best, fully valued. Recent press comment has tended to exhibit frustration—-wondering what, indeed, is going on in Wall Street. We cannot resist once more restating the technician's credo—-that it is supply and demand that moves stock prices. Those prices are currently moving in an upward direction because, quite simply, demand is strong. There must always exist, in the conventional wisdom, a reason why stock demand–or supply–is manifesting Itself. The favorite explanatIon, for a couple of years now, has centered around interest rates. This, again, is not surprising. We have, over the past decade, moved from a point where 9O-lay treasury bills, for example, yielded over fifteen percent to today's return of under four percent. These rates have been reflected in returns on investment media more familiar to the public such as money funds and certificates of deposit. It is logical, therefore, that the most dynamic phase of the current rally began with the 88-point advance on December 23rd, following the Fed's reduction in the rediscount rate to 3 112. An aggressive easy-money policy. it was suggested. was going to slash the available yields on those instruments which compete with common stocks for investor funds. Martin Zwelg has convincingly argued that this process could produce a cash flow into equities of as much as 90 billion. To us, this seems a perfectly sensible explanation of the obvious demand for equities that has recently emerged. —The public, it is argued, has grown accustomed to a high rate of return on cash instruments, will seek the continuation of that return by shifting funds into bonds–which, given the current yield curve, still provide a relatively generous yield or into common stocks, which have been demonstrated historically to provide a long-term return in the vicinity of 10. It can be argued, of course, that such a shift is ill-advised, that It consists of an unsophisticated public trying to maintain a high level of return by assuming an increasing amount of risk—risk the investor is not really prepared to bear and which could produce future psychological shock. The long-term return on stocks has indeed been generous. There have been fairly protracted periods in the past, however, when that return was negative. Under this confusing set of circumstances, we think, it is best to allow the market to tell its own story. Technical analysis, we are firmly convinced, will continue to help point to the way things are really going to be from now on. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3262.52 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 417.92 Cumulative Index (1116/92) 7159.14 – No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 24, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 24, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 24, 1992
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 January 24, 1992 Our readers are aware of our (limited) belief in the periodicity of the stock market and our consequent interest in the phenomenon of the so-called four-year cycle. Thus the table below will be a familiar one. It is now about time to update it, and, depending on the interpretation one chooses, it can, paradoxically, be used to support either a super-bullish or a super-bearish forecast. Interestingly, the interpretation depends not on recent market action, but on how we treat events which took place over a year ago. The table (based on monthly average prices for the DJIA shows the 24 cycles (through December, 1987) that we have previously identified, plus two interpretations of cycle 25 which is either complete or still underway. Cycles are measured from low to low and the table shows the start, high and end dates and levels for each cycle. Next is shown the total length of the cycle in months, the number of months spent in an advancing phase, and the percentage that these comprise of the total. The percentage advance and decline for each cycle phase are given followed by figures relating the cycle to the previous one. Finally, there are averages given for three different periods, this In recognition of the fact that the cycles seem to be getting longer as time goes on. The first Interpretation of the table's final cycle is the bullish one. Its basic assumption is that July-October 1990 constituted a full-scale bear market. If this is the case, a new cycle began at that point, and we are only fifteen months into It. The table shows that the average cycle-bullmarket advance is 80 over 30-35 months. We leave it to the reader to figure out the implications of that precedent for the market. This scenario, though, causes a number of problems. Its 34-month length would make the completed cycle one of the shortest on record. Likewise the 54 advance, while baving some precedent. is on the low Side. These objections force us at least to consider the second alternative. Under thi'i explanation. the bull market. which began. m 1987, continues, the 1990 drop being only an intermediate term correction. This produces a 69 advance to date, more in line with past history, and this figure would of course increase with new market highs. The 49plus advancing months so far are admittedly on the high side, and we are now already past the average cycle length. Certainly, however, the scenario has some plausibility. The two conflicting interpretations. paradoxically, leave no middle ground. We are, according to the former, m the very early stages of a long bull market. The latter one places us well into the mature stage of such a market. with the consequent likelihood of a imminent major bear market. The reader is entitled. to ask whether this can possibly be construed as useful information. We think it is, We have made it clear recently that we think the market's immediate direction is quite clearly an upward one. Our investment position, therefore, while awaiting the resolution of the cycle dilemma. should be an aggressive one. Nonetheless, we think it important to keep the cycle background in mind as the intermediate-term market picture unfolds. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3236.14 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 415.95 Cumulative Index (1123/92) 7158.74 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 31, 1992

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 31, 1992

Tabell's Market Letter - January 31, 1992
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 January 31, 1992 Market volatility has been the subject of a fair amount of discussion of late. Such discussion may have been further provoked by Wednesdays action, wherein Mr. Greenspan made some comments which the stock and bond markets. At least, took to be at variance with statements made by his boss the evening before. whatever reason be the Dow, at one o'clock had been up some 25 points – and was flirting with the 3300 level, went into a swoon in late trading and dropped some 47 points. Large moves encompassing more than an hour have also emerged. One recalls the 88-point, 3 rise in the DJIA on a single day just before Christmas. Less than a year ago, the Dow, on March 6, 1991 had moved more than 20 from its January low. This constituted only the third time since 1926 that a 20-plus move had taken place over that short a time span. n needs to be noted, though, that volatility can be defined in a number of ways. One of our own favorite measures, which we conceived back in 1982, is to look at the monthly standard deviation of daily log changes in the Dow. This has the advantage of sounding good since a fair number of people won't have the slightest idea of what we're talking about. It is, nonetheless, a fairly simple concept. A log change (the difference in the logarithms of two numbers) is analogous to a percentage change in that it is a valid comparison of the change in two figures regardless of the level of those figures. ('The percentage change from 15 to 16 is the same as that from 15,000 to 16,000.) The log has the additional advantage of making up and down changes comparable. A stock which falls 10 and then rises 10 is lower than where it started. A stock which falls and than rises by log ,\0536 (equivalent to 10) has returned to its starting place. I The concept of the standard deviation is no more complicated. We are in need here of a tools which make useful statements regarding groups of numbers–in this case, changes in stock prices. We all learned in grammar school how to figure an average (or mean)–add up the numbers and divide by the number of observations. This we do here, computing for each month the averages of the daily changes in the Dow. An average, though, is less than fully descriptive, A randomly selected group of men, for example, might have an average height around six feet. A group equally composed of jockeys and basketball centers might have the same average height, but it would be a quite different group, and the standard deviation helps explain that difference. In any case, a chart of the indicator is shown below. DOW JONES INOUSTRIAL AVERAGE I I-,……..-. vJ rV!'J,JI '\ I 'I Jill 0 N, STANOARD DEVIATION OF AIL Y LO CHANGES MONTHL Y 1946 – DATE , – . —- It reveals little volatility in recent markets, the January figure being well within the normal range. This, actually is too bad, since a high degree of volatility has, in the past, been characteristic of strong markets. Shown by vertical lines on the chart are the penods in the past when the indicator reached 1.5 or better. These occurrences took place in 1946, 1955, 1962, 1970, 1974, 1982, and 1989, only the most recent such occurrence taking place at a high–in August, 1990. The indicator almost reached the 1 5 level at the bottom three months later, however. This is interesting in terms of the cycle theory discussed last week, since it would suggest that October, 1990 did indeed see the start of a major bull market. ANTIiONYW. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3232.33 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 4\0.03 Cumulative Index (1130/92) 7217.51 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained is, or is to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned. The matter is presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber. While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein. Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on his own investigation and information. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. as a corporation and its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades in respect to any securities mentioned in this or any future issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed in this or any other issue. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc., which is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor, may give advice to its investment advisory and other customers independently of any statements made in this or in any other issue. Further information on any security mentioned herein is available on request.

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