TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 March 13, 1992 Two weeks ago in this space we recalled an essay which had appeared over a thousand issues of this letter ago, in April, 1972. At tht tiJ1le seJt sixti!ional gI'9wth fVOritesLOf the day. a g1!pwhich wecnntinUl.dt('Lfol1owRntLwhich,some timeJatr. … we dubbed Vestal Virgins, cribbing that name from someone, probably Alan Abelson. The general conclusion of the piece was that the six issues in question were more or less richly priced and that much of their advance over the prior 18 months, which had been substantial, In was due to the market's marking up of their prices reviewing that letter 20 years later, we discovered rather,th-an-a-ct-ua-l e-ar-nings -gro-wth. —————–, that, of these six stocks, all respected favorites of professional money managers in the early 1970's, five had, over two decades, actually declined in price. Then, last week, we came upon another interesting phenomenon. We discovered that, by choosing six new stocks, using the same criterion-institutional popularity–we had used 20 years before, we could virtually duplicate the letter of 1972, leveling the same criticisms that we VESTAL VIRGINS llli Avon Products Coca-Cola Eastman Kodak Home Depot IBM Merck Polaroid Microsoft had at that time. It now becomes necessary to ask the obvious Sears Roebuck Philip Morris question. Is the market msking the same mistake it made 20 Xerox Wal-Mart Stores years ago Now history does repeat itself but the repetition is seldom all that simple and there are, we think, a few differences between the way the market is treating today's vestal virgins and the way it treated, in the late 1960's and early 1970's, the six issues which have now achieved a somewhat frumpy middle age. In looking at the price/earnings ratios for the current favorites last week, we noted that they ranged between 53 and 16, with an average multiple of 35. In April, 1972, the six earlier darlings of the mvestment community were carrying pIe's between 32 and 72, with a mean of 52. Clearly the current outbreak of growth-stock mania is a less violent manifestation. .- – B a s e d purely-on-rccollection,-we-have a-.imilarimpression of today's markct-climatevis-a-vis-that-of-the-1970'3Back then;—- .- learned articles were being published about the One-Decision theory of equity investment, which held that stocks needed only to be bought and never sold. (We suggested, at the time, that money managers subscribing to the theory should halve their fees, an idea which never caught on). It is our impression that no similar mystique exists at present. Today's managers, it seems to us, may justify their holdings of growth stocks based on projections into the future of past impeccable records, but they seem, at least, to worry a little bit about the prices being paid, rather then exhibiting the blithe unconcern about those prices typical of the 1970's. Ultimately, the event that did in the old-time growth favorites was the sudden emergence of their vulnerability to the business cycle. To the absolute horror of most investors, the earnings for most of them actually declined in the 1974 recession. The result of this was not only price collapse in the 1973-74 bear market, but a subsequent failure ever to regain the luster they had once possessed. When earnings for the six–for widely varying reasons–turned erratic during the 1980's, the situation was further exacerbated. The result is the fact that the group is today selling for less than it did two decades ago. In contrast to this, it must be noted that the six current favorites have, by and large, gone through the recession of the early 1990's with flying colors, posting continual quarter-to-quarter earnings gains in the face of a weak economy. For as long as they can continue this performance, it is likely that investor confidence in them will remain at its current high level. Should any of them tum out to be vulnerable to external economic forces, it could be subject to the same sort of debacle that finally afflicted the vestal virgins of 1972. For ourselves, we retain the belief that we had 20 years ago-the conviction that investing is more complicated than finding issues whose earnings have been rising for ten years and huying them on the theory that they are thus likely to rise for another ten. The real challenge in growth-stock investing, we continue to feel, occurs in identifying such issues at an early stage rather than a later one. Of the six current favorites, Coca-Cola, Merck, and Philip Morris have, admittedly, been around for sometime. Wai-Mart, though, was not listed on the NYSE until 1972. Home Depot had its initial public offering in 1981, and Microsoft went public only six years ago, in March, 1986. It is easy to recognize today that these companies possess admirable records. It was less easy when they were a -good deal smaller. . — – –. – – – We concluded a series of letters on growth stocks in 1973 with a quotation, as follows. Selectivity took on a new character by reason of the overshadowing emphasis placed on expected future growth as the prime criterion of an attractive investment. There was nothing wrong with these… ideas, except that it was almost impossible not to carry them too far. With encouragement from the past and a rosy prospect in the future, the buyers of 'growth stocks' were certain to lose their sense of proportion and to pay excessive prices. We think it is a valid point today, although we first used the quote in 1973, and it comes from Benjamin Graham, wnting in 1951 about 1928-29. Citing another ancient sage, we went on to note that Bernard Baruch had once remarked that, in times of market optimism, it is useful to keep repeating to oneself that two and two make four. It will not, we think, be unhelpful to keep this advice in mind during the 1990's. ANlHONY W. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3219.14 DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poor's SOO (1200) 404.64 Cumulative Index (3/12192) 7332.23 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herem contained IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subsCriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, HaNey, Tabel1 Inc. as a corporahon and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respecllo any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any futum Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, HaNey, Tabe!! Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its investment adviSOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISsue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 March 20, 1992 It was the best o/times, it was the worst o/tm,es… it was the season o/Light, it was the season of , —- D.akrress,,tJvasJhespring a/hope, it.wasdhe wmter-of.despair..'!-, – -'- — —.—. – – . – Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cttles Mr. Dickens' famous quotation could be used, in 1992, as the lead for A Tale of Two Markets.' The two markets are those of -a'IItho- tl.S. and Japan, and, indeed, the contrast could not be greater. True, it is certainly possible to interpret the tenpoint, point-and-figure pattern for the Dow, shown at left, as representing a short-term top, with this week's early strength constituting a move into overhead supply. That's the bad news. The good news is that the downside objective in the low 3,OOO's represents strong support, and any move to that level would constitute a buying opportunity. In any case, our U.S. market remains within a few percentage points of its all-time htgh. Across the Pacific, however, the story is entirely different. The Nikkei Index peaked on December 29, 1989 at 38,915, at which level it was up over 1000 from only 3,355 in 1974. Meltdown Monday of 1987 in New York produced only a minor blip in Tokyo which, at its peak, had exceeded is 1987 high by 46 while the Dow, by 1989, had barely equalled its 1987 peak. From there, the divergence began. Tokyo .od to-acccmpany-Wall-Street-into'Ilew-high territory – – Dew JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE in 1990, and when we, in October, 1990, were down 10 POINT barely 20, the Nikkei was off 48 at 20,221. On Tuesday of this week, it broke below that low to 19,837. Indeed the Japanese bear market is one of record-setting proportions. The 48 fall is not only the biggest drop in Japanese market liistory, but one of the largest on record for any market. Our biggest decline in recent years is the 45 drop of 1973-1974, and even september-November, 1929 was under 48 . Our friends across the Pacific are clearly playing in the big leagues when it comes to bear markets. Nor, can the outlook, from a technical point of view be srud to be alii that encouraging. At right is shown a WOO-point P&F cbart of the NiKkei, and that last posting at 20,000 looks, for the moment at least, to be addller. We would certainly want to await evidence of technical strength before' buying into that particular chart pattern. Ironically, the current conventional wisdom holds that an all- powerful Japan can do Just about anything it pleases, as far as its economy is,concerned. It is stated tbat they will not allow tbe Tokyo market to go down much further, much as another they' was going to stave off the ongoing market decline in the early 1930's. lhdeed the history of that era might well be studied by the Japanese powers tHat be. What was essentially a stock-market phenomenon in the fall of 19'29'turned into something a good deal more pervasive 10 1930-32. We in tlie'lllnrted States managed to avoid this outcome in 1987. It is devoutly to be'wislied that the Japanese will prove as successful in the early 1990's. It has always been the contention of the technician that stock markets tend to lead, rather than follow, the economy. By tbe time Americans were beginning to become aware of Japanese competition, the Nikltei, which, wben tbe Tokyo Stock Exchange opened in 1949, was NIKKEI INDEX 1000 POINT selling at tbe same level as tbe Dow, was at ten times the DnA's level. Now that Japan-bashing has become tbe polibcal fad of tbe day, it suddenly emerges that Japan's Stock Exchange has undergone one of tHe largest collapses in the history of finanCIal markets–a phenomenon providing a qUlte different impression of that country's economy fiom the one we tend to derive from the daily press. At the very least, the devastation of the Nikke. may be suggesting that the long outpmGrmance of the U.S. stock market by Japan's may be over. AN1HONY W. TABELL, CMT JJ)ow, Jones Industrials (1200) 3268.11 DELAFIELD, HARVEY. TABELL Standiml & Poor's 500 (1200) 409.78 Cmulative Index (3/19/92) 7394.73 Nostalemenlor expression of opinIOn or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or mdlrectly, anoner or the soliCitation 01 an offer to buy or sel! any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be reliable, we In 00 way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgaliOn and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporallon and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any secUrities mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such pOSllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to liS mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any o1her Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 March 27, 1992 Since dramatically breaking the 3,000 level in the fall of 1991, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, after a decline of been6.93, has continued to advance, albeit at a slower rate, to a recent high of3,290.on March 3—Fithin t!lis-nrltime''-I frame from'last flill to-date coiiStinitiilg ito tradfug days,- there-lillie someobvioushortte;m–;'han in the group and sector leadership of the market. As these shifts continue to unfold they should be monitored closely and should be of interest to all of us. The table below enables us to compare fhis period from October 1991 to date with the most recent twelve-week changes for Standard & Poor's Industry Group Indexes as of fhis Wednesday. The start of the October 1991 period is coincident with the then record October 18 high of 3,077.15 on the DJIA. The figures on the left show the 33 best performing groups out of a total of 95 from October 1991 to date and is ranked in that order. The table on the right is ranked on the past twelve-week changes, or from the start of fhis year, and shows the best performing groups for that period. PRCM Dec ll. u n umt t CEI'J. 1 41..121 I 40.364 1 31.387 … 35.609 5 30.738 Ii 26.231 '7 25.8 8 12.197 51 21.364 10 Z0.6517 11 20.376 CSQ.PIlCIM OCt 115 lnl RARX … 37.983 z 55.215 1 61..742 22 16.832 8 21'.735 42 8.818 11 l2.41U , 29.137 16 21.364 6 30.368 11 2.. ..016 ..,.,. .- BL'BCT'RO'lrCOICOS',msi.s.'.aa.a.s.. OIf ….. BUILl BZCUIDDQ GBlf. !IJ'l'OU AD'l'O PUTS- ArrBIl IGRIB'l' RLBCft01ttcs ,SBMlcarmtJCTORS BIlAVT D'I1l'f 'l'BlJCQ PA2'1'S …………,.,. '.S..O..'….,T.O,.U..D …. 'lIDnCM OCt 16 1991 1 61.7U 2 5'.llS 3 52.280 .. 37.983 5 30.710 , 30.'68 ,. 251.137 8 27.735 II 25.370 10 24.850 11 24.096 PRall Dec 31 1991 RARX t CB3 3 37.387 2 40.36 14 17182 1. 41.l.l1 20 11.900 10 Z0.6'7 8 3.l.191 5 30.738 53 O.7!i19 62 -3.U7 11. 20.376 fIJOSBIIOU) P 10 A BIm Ma.TEIlIALS 12 18.'182 II 17.370 15 31.52.5 26 PUBloUlBDIJ umwsPAPBJlS) 2 24.003 13 22.288 lt 22.048 15 16.186 7 25.968 11..377 ii J Jc ,'LDIIG 24.003 A 15 11.S2S 21.364 TKS i ; i PAPEIlPORBST PR.ODaCTS 18 13.389 n l.1.!il67 SDUPBRABOLPD PDRQ.DIJCfS 17 19.337 18 11.149 18.407 BICLtll)DQ I.B.H 7.10 -; 19 13.200 45 8.1'73 –L– '; –ii5lO. IlRS'l'1lD2Am'R I.&zstmB-TIHl''''''''''-'''' -ig,– 2 18.783 21.3' 1.659 U.468 70 -5.840 25… t– i it; – POBI.XSBIm nmfSPUBRS) 22 11.377 At11'CMlBILB 16.832 35.609 IIJRBY cmrrmr. BARJlI ,. ..AB8TMJRARl'!I t.BIBURB TIMR BMU (CCIG'09IT8) OFFICI RQOIPMEm' 10 BlJlIPLUS aMGDlC1AL SBRVICBS ALUMNUM ,…,..,.,. ..ptlBLISHIPO CKEMICALS HBTALS MISCllLLMBOOS ' YDIVBRBIFIBD 23 11.112 Zt 10. ,fifi 25 10.126 26 10.018 27 SI.llS 28 7.051 29 6.867 30 6.396 11 6.221 32 6 .172 33 5.667 7.541. 20 l.7.660 1.7.056 9.883 16.101 3.915 4.123 16.509 50 6.962 00 '2.622 57 5.659 PIJIILISBIRJ OrPIa BQUlJIMBIff strPPLIBS 1QIIOAQ IILl)Q MTBIlDILS CCIMPO'l'D. BOP'l'IWllI SBRYICBS GBNBRAL MBRCHANDISB CBJUlCS IIDTBL/..,…. ll2'1'AXL1 SPBcrALT!-UPARBL PAPER POUST ftODtJC'l'S 16.509 16.101 15.418 15,011 11.838 13.858 12.768 30 U.646 31 12.436 12.132 J3 U.t67 6.396 9.31.5 4.354 13 17,370 35 5.328 56 -1.368 15.621 5. -1.658 ..746 9.353 1.3.389 An inspection of the left-hand table shows the list has been dominated by the consumer-durable, transportation and natural resource sectors of the market. Not surprising, is the under representation on fhis list of the consumer non-durable sector, last year's place to be. Also conspicuously absent is the entire energy sector. Substantial gains in groups related to machine tools, electronics and autos from October 1991 to date have relatively outperformed the S&P 500 Average by a significant amount. Other groups, however, have dropped in rank when measured from the first of this year. These groups would include soft drinks, toys, cosmetics and retail related groups. – The right-hand table, while continuing to favor the consumer-durable sector, shows an interesting number of new names to the list. These groups would include aluminum, chemicals, and metals, to name a few. Many of these groups were among the worst performers last year, but have, in the last twelve weeks, moved into the top fhird of the list and certainly bear watching. The central theme to be developed from this type of periodic exercise is to monitor group and sector rotation onan ongoing basis ill order to refleCt iDteal changes occurring within-tii k market. The importance of these internal changes will continue to help us identify new leadership in a maturing bull market and, conversely, will show potential sector and group deterioration which would signal a correction or significant change in the stock market. Robert J. Simpkins, Jr. Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) Standard & Poor's 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (3/23/92) RJSaa 3252.91 406.36 7379.92 No slalcmenl or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and Information Delafield, Harvey Tabel1lnc ,as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posilions or trades In respect to any securrtles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS regIStered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce to Its Investment adVlSory and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any security mentioned herlln IS avaltable on requesl

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 April 3, 1992 We have been fortunate enough to have been able to use this letter. over theyears.a.IILavehiclefnrthe-('-elebrationof-2.n1!mb'!'! cinappy niilestcines.- We celebrate-yet another chleS;;;n ihi.;week with th acquisitin of Delafield, Harvey, TabellInc. by the , U.S. Trust Corporation. The occasion stimulated us to dig into our files with a curiosity to see what had been said in these letters at prior important turning points in the careers of its authors. The first isaue of this publication appeared on December 2, 1944. This, therefore, is approximately the 2,469th i.aue, and we Will. in just a couple of years, celebrate 50 years of continuous publication. That first letter announced that, This letter…WIll attempt to forecast the pnce trends of the general market averages and… recommend purduJses or sales of individual securities. … The opmions expressed WIll be based not on the fondamental outlook for the securities…mentwned, but simply on the writer's interpretation of their technical market action.' It i. difficult to imagine just how radical a concept this was in 1944. Indeed, it was aufficiently so that the issuing firm found it necessary to terminate each isaue with a di.claimer which stated that 'the opinions… are the personal mterpretations of charts by Edmund W. Tabell and…not presented as the opinions of Shields & Company.' The first such opinion expressed was that 'the major trend of the market ISfavorable. a forecast which turned out to be reasonably accurate since the Dow, which closed that day at 147.50 was at 212 by 1946. As a matter of marginal interest. that initial isaue. entitled Technical Market Action was printed on plain wlute paper. The switch to light blue paper with a darker blue border was made ten months later, for reasons unrecorded at the time. We have seen no reason at any later time to make change in tlns format, and the publication has always been known informally as the blue tetter. IF The first milestone celebrated Edmund Tabell's association in December, 1948 with Walston, Hoffinan & Goodwin (to become Walston & Co. 1D 1953.) It was also the first to carry the title, TabeU's Market Letter, which has continued ever since. That issue suggested the likelihood of a decline (from \73) to the 170-160 area for the Dow. It went on. however, to say, … the major… trend IS up. The trading range of the past 2 112 years, in which the averages have ranged between 160 and 195 is a major accumulation area. It will eventually result… in a definite upsule penetration of the range and an… advance to the 240-250 level. (The DnA. of course, reached 161.60 in June. 1949. The upside objective mentioned proved to be conservative.) The present author's byline first appeared on the letter in 1955. Ironically our specialty, in those long-ago days of our youth a CoPpe;Co. – – -was the preparation of conventional fundamental individual.stock.reDorts.We.c.an still.recall..the I.bo'.thatowe!!tintothefirstofothese – pieces, recOnm;endation ofth Mag;,,;. The writing of the letter became a shared duty of both Tabell's, pere etfils, for the next decade until, in 1965. it became our sad duty to announce the untimely death of its founder, Edmund Tabell. We have noted before that many of the concepts pioneered by him in those early days have remained part of our analytical equipment on into the 1990's. There occurred, in August, 1970. the next major transition. We teamed with Mat Delafield (of Delafield & Delafield) and Ash Harvey (of Montgomery, Scott & Co.) to form Delafield. Harvey, Tabell. at the time a division of the latter firm. Three long-time associates of the founders. Bob Simpkins, Joe Hanlon and George Crane. joined us. The stock market, and prevailing conventional wisdom, did not make that founding any easier. As we noted at the time, We have come through a trying period… Stock pnces have plunged 11Wre precipitously than at any time since the 1930s….1t is all too easy to bearish… but, with most stocks having declined anywhere from 30 to 90 from fairly recent highs, it is silly to pretend that the market is sailing along totally oblivious to surrounding deterioration. (We believe) that intensive investment management can produce above- averoge results in the months and years ahead. and… that… the equity market might be a pretty interesting place in which to be. It was the task of that letter. as we saw it then, to shore up confidence. Our next benchmark later. 13 years later. celebrating the formation of Delafield, Harvey, Tabell as an independent firm in October. 1983. was presented with precisely the opposite problem. After recalling the 1970 letter. we S81d. 'Thirteen years ago we were two months past the low of the worst bear market in the memory of most investors. Last mght, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average achUNed the highest close in its hIStory. (1268.80) That high moreover represents the peak so far of a bull market which has, by many measurements… been the most dynamic one on record SUlce the 1920s. We noted that 'we do not… think that bull market is anywhere near its end.' We auggested, however, that at some point. it would almost cenamly be necessary to remind readers that there exist such things as bear markets and that common stocks do not go up forever. And now, finally, we join the U.S. Trust Corporation. It is a time, as was true at those prior milestones, that investors are facing new, and, to a degree. unfamiliar challenges. We have a U.S. stock market demonstrating record levels of valuation, strange things going on jn 9,!,eas markets,and ohvious signsof-political unrest and distrust of-the status quo., Our new parent, however, is, to say the least, not unfamiliar with dealing with just such challenges. It noted in a recent annual report that 'since 1853, U.S. Trust has had a tradition ofpreservmg and growing assets in good times and in bad. Our name. which has never changed, IS synonymous with mtegnty, strength, stability, a quality onentation in all undenakmgs, and a long-tenn, vaiue-oriented approach… In investment management, we have QI1 outstanding record of long-tenn success achieved through a consistent, disc!plined investment approach implemented over time. IF There eXISts, we are aware, a currently fashionable wisdom which holds that intensive and dedicated management cannot produce above-average results and expresses doubts regarding the viability of a consistent, diSCiplined investment approach. Our readers are aware that we disagree vehemently with this thesis, and it is obvious from the above that U.S. Trust shares this disagreement. We are proud to be joining with them in an effort to utilize our combined skills in aiding our clients to cope with the investment challenges which lie ahead. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3211.31 ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT DEELD,HARVEY,TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 398.31 Cumulative Index (4/2/92) 7258.16 .- No slatement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any securrty referred to or menhoned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the slatements made herem Any acllOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own mvesligatlOn and mformatlon Deta/lald Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporaliOn and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posltmns or trades In respect to any securities merltloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posl\!on may be dlNerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey. Tabelilnc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secufJty mentioned herein IS avallabte on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 April 10, 1992 We published in this space three weeks ago two charts. The first of these was a short-term (lO-point-unit), point-&-figure chart rI– of the-Dow-which.-wesuggested,-hnd-broken-cut-cf-wh&t—a.ppcarcd to bc-minor-topTTh-5trei1glli-ofl1rarweek-(the A'lerage-..vas'wlue–I,, mid-32oo's) constituted, we thought, a move into overhead supply and was, therefore, likely to dissIpate. The second chart in that letter was one of the Nikkei Index, and we noted that the Japanese indicator's move below 2O,000–at which level it had already been cut almost in half–was, to say the least, ominous. This week, of course, Japan hit the front pages. By Thursday, the Nikkel was at 16,Soo–iown 18.5 over just 13 tradmg days before a sharp Friday rally retraced part of the loss. The Japanese market is admittedly volatile, but this was one of the deepest plunges in its history. The U.S. market encountered a few equally steep drops in the 1930's. The only one remotely comparable in recent years would be, of course, the DJIA's fall of 34 in 11 days in October, 1987. As far as Tokyo is concerned, we have little highly original to say. Technical analysis is now a widely-practiced discipline, and many of our colleagues have noted the depressed volume on the fall so far, suggesting that large sellers are not bemg accommodated and the unlikelihood of a near-term bottom. On the fundamental side, experts are divided on the potential impact of an ongoing Japanese collapse on U.S. stock prices and, indeed, the outlook for the Japanese economy. Some of these experts are, of course, the same ones who were suggesting a few years ago that the Japanese were financial geniuses who could commit no economic wrong. In any case, let us reexamine the technical position of the U.S. market, this time with a 20-point unit chart as shown at left. It depicts the almost- straight-line advance in which the Dow, which was well under 2900 in early December, was, by the second trading day of 1992, above 3200. (The S & P 500, on that date, was less than a point away from its all-time high, which would be scored two weeks later.) For all nf QQ so f lIv the market hasl1l9yed sideways, or, in the case of the S & P, sideways with a slight downward bias. This week's Japan-insprred weakness decisively penetrated that sideways trading range on the downside. There is a very simple conventional interpretation of this pattern -that it is a top which should be measured across the line A-B, yielding a downside objective of 2900. There are, of course, a DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS MID 1991 couple of additional pomts which need to be made. 20 POINT First, the breakout could be false—see mid-December 1991 for an example of such an occurrence. Second, an alternative reading is possible. If one accepts our original interpretation of three weeks ago, that the top was complete at that time, and the subsequent upside action was merely a failed move into overhead supply, then the downside target is more conservative— approximately 3040. In either case, we think that yesterday's and this momings probe back into the mid-32oo's is likely to be turned back by the overhead supply as was the one which preceded .t. Technical analysis is, in part, the study of trading ranges, and the reason we show a bit of history on the chart above is to show part of the long trading range which contained the market for almost all of the last three quarters of last year. Again, to review the action, the Dow moved up from a pre-Desert-Storm low under 2500 in early January reaching above 3000 by early April. It subsequently made four downside probes at 2900-2860 before rebounding each time. For the record, some 39.4 billion shares traded between the time the Dow first moved through 2860 in mid-February 1991 and the attainment of a new high on the day after Christmas. The tenets of technical work hold this to be support-an area of demand. Similar areas of support, from approximately the same time- I period, exist for most of the other major ave….ges, around 1250-1150 for the Dow Transports (1348) and at 390-375 for the S & p Composite (404). We expect this support to hold. The tops for the averages count mto it, not below it. These readings seem to be confirmed by the patterns for individual stocks. For the most part the potential tops do not seem, at the moment. to be of major proportions. Moreover, a great many of last year's market leaders, some of which have taken moderately severe beatings, have reached their downSide targets and their vulnerability from these levels appears limited. Our current favored scenario, in other words. is for a minor- intermediate, not a serious market drop. ' We expect, therefore. that the stock market will be a buy if and as the support levels mentioned above are reached. Nonetheless, as is always the case, the behavior of the market at those support levels will be Important. FaIlure of demand to materialize at those reduced prices could raise some serious questions, ANTiiONY W. TABELL, CMT DELAAELD,HARVEY,TABELL Dow Jones Industrials (12.00) 325447 Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 404.32 Cumulative Index (4/9/92) 7221.64 No statement or expression 01 opinion or any other matter herein contaIned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer artha sohcllatlOn of an offer to buy or sell any securrty referred 10 or menlloned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be laken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporallOn and rts officers or employees, may now have or may laler lake. pOSitions or trades In respect to any securrtles menhoned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, labell Inc which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 April 16, 1992 We stated conclusively last week, buttressing our argument with a chart, that the stock market was vulnerable to a correction, – foin!! fiJrthel' toSt!geec;t Jh2.t.Sl!cb jI .(orrection might carryasJow 8!i1thp..-300(1.2900 level. The-Dow.! which had lose4 gn th y before . we wrote the letler at 3224, promptly advanced over 125 points by this Wednesday. Now 125 points these wiys is under four percent, and we therefore remain only slightly embarrassed. Nonetheless, we must now decide whether to abandon our skepticism or to keep it in place for the time being. When one looks at anything other than the Dow, the rally becomes a bit less impressive. The S & P 500, at Wednesday's close of 416.28 remains below its two-month-old high. Our daily breadth index peaked on the same day as the S & P back in February and remains far enough below that high so that a number of days of positive breadth will be required to produce a confirmation. Least impressive was the fact that when the Average touched above 3300 for the first time m its history on Tuesday there were all of 59 daily new highs scored on the NYSE. (The figure improved slightly to 94 on Wednesday.) How low was this on an historical basis To find out, we took aU the days since 1951 when the Dow had posted a new 200-day high, as it obviously did on Tuesday and Wednesday. There have been, for the record, 899 such days. The 59 new highs on Tuesday constituted 2.63 of the 2,243 ISSUes traded. Only sixteen days in the past forty years had shown a lower figure. Intuitively, we thought this less than encouraging, so we listed out all of the 30 new-DJIA-high days on which the new-high percentage was less than 3. They are sbown in the table below. New of Percent Change 1n DJIA After Date DJIA Highs Issues Tr 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months DEC 26 1952 288.23 11 1.01 -0.59 -0.09 -7.76 -2.89 DEC 30 1955 JUL 30 1959 JUL 31 1959 488.40 673.37 674.88 34 2.86 -4.27 4.15 -0.03 -0.18 36 2.98 -1.49 -5.98 -4.15 -6.13 22 1.84 -1.75 -5.52 -4.30 -6.45 AUG 3 1959 678.10 33 2.78 -2.02 -5.30 -5.76 -706 DEC 31 1959 679.36 26 2.04 -8.35 -8.48 -5.00 -9.96 IIJA'. 5 -685 47' II I-I- 'OI J Ol. -,'60,-,,-.-l7 og—,–56,..,. -5 .6ll-.llO..9()' I 0 DEC 13 1961 734.91 36 2.72 -3.15 -2.75 -17.83 -1182 FEB 15 1963 686.07 37 2.82 -1.82 4.92 2.64 14.47 SEP 19 1963 743.22 33 2.54 1.02 3.12 9.82 13.71 DEC 5 1963 763.96 40 2.98 0.74 5.48 708 15.91 JAN 28 1964 787.78 30 2.26 147 4.30 7.82 12.12 FEB 7 1964 FEB 11 1964 NOV 9 1972 NOV 16 1972 OCT 7 1983 OCT 16 1985 791.59 792.16 988.26 1003.69 1272.15 1369.50 39 2.95 1.97 4.43 6.04 12.84 27 2.03 2.74 4.80 6.08 13.17 40 2.22 4.55 -2.13 -3.80 -1.39 50 2.79 2.35 -3.04 -9.37 -5.47 19 0.95 -423 -0.24 -7.97 -4.65 46 2.32 4.33 11.11 29.97 28.26 OCT 30 1995 JON 16 1987 OCT 10 1988 OCT 18 1988 JAN 5 1989 JAN 6 1989 JAN 9 1989 JAN 11 1989 JAN 13 1989 MAY 15 i990 MAY 29 1990 JON 15 1990 APR 14 1992 1375.57 2407.35 215896 2159.85 2190.54 2194.29 2199.46 2206.43 2226.07 282245 2870.49 2935.89 3306.13 58 2.86 7.28 11.78 33.01 30.74 58 2.93 3.17 7.01 -26.61 -18.30 48 2.52 -1.59 1.46 676 24.15 44 2.24 -3.83 3.07 7.03 24.68 53 2.71 6.54 5.22 15.33 25.06 48 2.43 6.24 4.74 14.15 22.93 59 2.97 5.53 4.79 11.77 22.56 55 2.81 6.20 4.46 11.16 21.97 59 2.96 270 3.84 10.62 2171 38 1.89 3.81 -2.25 -11.75 3.19 51 2.55 -098 -10.81 -11.34 3.51 37 1.85 2.18 -11.01 -11.09 1.15 59 2.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 The results turned out IDlxed. As the table shows, m the majonty of cases. 18 of 30, low numbers ot new highs resulted m desultory markets over the coming year. There were two periods in the forty years, though, when the market was able to surllve such occurrences—in 1963-4 and in 1988-89. The rest of tbe time small numbers of new highs tended to suggest below-average market results. Whether this will be the case at present we would not care to guess. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible to suggest that the paucity of new highs on the week's advance IS less than encouraging. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT Dow Jones Industnals 3366.50 DELAflELD. HARVEY, TABELL Standard & Poors 500 416.04 Cumulative Index (4/15192) 7295.48 No statement or e)(presston of opinion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indlrectty, an offer or the sollctlallon of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merelV for the convemence of the o;ubscnber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor althe statements made herem Any action 10 be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSllIOns or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue and such poSllion may be dlHerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Oelafleld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may give adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other lSue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on requesl

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 April 24, 1992 In Febrwuy-March, we published a series of four letters on the 20-year price history of six prime institutional favorites of 1972, ,.. s!Oks Fe..hadseltl9 at)haUiq1ed !lub v.estal..Yigin. Th poir!cofth,,!Cise wI! tat, over twoddesoCa greal uu ……11 I market, the group had actually declined in pnce- TIle letters produCed a fairliheary response, 'some of it, predictably, accusing us of sacrilege. It may, therefore, be of interest to expand on a theme we alluded to briefly in the first of the letters, the exact process by which the six stocks were turned from favorites into outcasts. Purely as an example, let us consider the chart at the left of one of the six favorites-mM. A few features of the chart's rsther ingenious construction need to be noted. The line of connected solid dots traces IBM's earnings per share, and the scale is so constructed that the earnings and price coincide at a pie rstio of exactly 15. Thus the level of the stock's pie can be gauged by the price's distance above the earnings line. Additionally, the thin solid is a relative-strength line, rising when the stock is perfonning better than the S & 1955 to 1961 was of the honeymoon phase of the stock market's romance with Big Blue. Earnings were increasing (and would !!!!li!!!1 to increase through 1964) at rate of 20 per annum. At' 1961 high, the stock sold for what would be its high pie of almost 80 times trailing 12- month earnings. Phase two was a slowdown in earnings growth. The rate from 1964 to 1974 was around 14. The 1961 premium never reappeared and for most of the decade the stock's pie was in the 30's, extending briefly to above 40 at the 1969 high. Note that in terms of relative performance the stock actually reached its high in that year. Thus between 1969 and the January 1973 Ingh, the stock was actually a sub-market performer. Armageddon for IBM and the rest of the nifty fifty started, of course, in January, 1973, and the markdown of the pie from 40 to 13 took the price (adjusted) from 90 to 36. It is interesting to note that earnings growth continued through the third quarter of 1974, a few months after the stock had made its low. The decline apparently was in anticipation of nothing more than flat earnings for a year in 1974-5. For the next decade, to 1984, earnings growth returned to the same 14 rate which had charscterized the latter 1960's. What disappeared, however, was the market's willingness to pay a generous price for those earnings. The proximity of the price and earnings lines for the last twenty years indicates the multiple remained in the region of fifteen. This continued for a decade, although actual earnings decline did not begin until around 1985. What we think all this illustrates is the rather uncanny ability of the market to anticipate. IBM's pie reached its high m i961, four years before the eammgs-growth rate began to slow in 1965. Its high price relative to the S & p occurred in 1969, four years ahead of the 1973-4 break. That break, in tum, was already over by the onset of the flat earnings year. And for ten years, 1974-1984, the market refused to pay an above-average pnce for the stock although earnings were growing at a 14 rate and would not begin to decline until the mid-1980's. Note that when we use the word market here, we are referring to hard, cold numbers–price/eamings ratios, relative strength. the sorts of tlungs quantitative analysts tend to look at. While demonstrable deterioration in these factors was taking place, the public adulahon of one-declslon stocks was soaring to new heights. Also demonstrated, we thInk, IS the importance of investor confidence as a factor, along with standard fundamental data, in detennining stock prices. Technical analysis, of course, IS one velncle through which we may attempt to measure the level of this confidence. ANTHONY W. TABELL. CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3344.81 DELARELD. HARVEY. TABELL Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 410.61 Cumulallve Index (4/23/92) 7213.97 No slatement or expression of opinion or any other matter herem contained 15 or IS to be deemedto be. directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offerlo buy orsell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posllions or trades In respect to any secun1les mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey Tabelllnc, which IS registered with the SEC as an Iflvestmenl adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 …. – – May 1, 1992 The Ne\!YO!iimesJ in its market story on WedItesday, tookJt upon itself to pronounce the demise of the small-stock market (and found itself subject to the usuarpuiidit's embariassmenl wheiitheOTCrFdustrirunose twelve-points iliat a&Yr—Diliiy-m.rlCetSiOries – -.. must, by necessity, focus on the short term, ana it is indeed a fact that most OTC indices posted new lows for the year early this week, attaining levels not seen since last December. It is also true that the average holder of smaIler stocks over the psst, say, eighteen months, hss, even at today's prices, probably done rather well. The tables at left, while containing a lot of numbers, do, still, manage to afford some perspective as to the action of the NASDAQ Industrials vs. the DJlA and the S & p in recent markets. START DATE AVG OCT 1987 1738.74 JUL 1990 2999.73 OCT 1990 2365.10 DEC 1990 2637.13 JAN 1991 2470.30 APR 1991 3004.46 OCT 1991 3077.15 OEC 1991 2863.82 JAN 1992 3264.98 APR LOll 3181.35 . APR 29th 333318 DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS Percent Change To JUL OCT DEC JAN APR OCT DEC JAN APR 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1221 1991 1992 LOll 73 36 52 42 73 77 65 88 83 – — -21 -12 -18 0 3 -5 9 6 12 4 27 30 21 38 35 – — —– — — —- – – — – -6 14 17 9 24 21 —– – 2-2 — – 25 16 32 —2 – -5 —-7 9 6 1-4 – — 29 6 3 11 —3 APR 29TH 92 11 41 26 35 11 8 16 2 -5 The tables show, for the three averages, the percentsge changes between various key market dates since 1987. The starting date for each period is read down the rows and the ending date across the columns. Thus, between the 1987 bear- market bottom and Isst Wedoesday, the Dow Jones Industrials were up by some 92, from 1738.74 to 3333.18. The S & p 500 wss ahead by 83 , and the NASDAQ Industrials were the leader, but only modestly, among the trio, ahead by some 114. STANDARD AND POORS 500 Percent Change To Better performance by smaIler stocks, then, was a phenomenon that JUL OCT DEC JAN APR OCT DEC JAN APR APR began later in the bull market, in mid- START OATE AVG 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1991 1991 1992 LOll 29th cycle in October, 1990. The OTC Index OCT 1987 224.84 64 31 48 39 74 77 67 UL-368.95.,.—20—-.-10–J6682 -ocf 1990 295.46 – 12 5 32 35 27 87 73 83 e V . – -7- – , . . 1 2 . . , – – . — 42 34 39 dropped off a good deal more than the Olher tWo iii'the'Jiily'OCfOlier, 1990tieli! – -OEC 1990 331.73 – -6 18 20 13 27 19 24 market, but recovered more sharply, – – -JAN 1991 311.49 – 25 28 20 35 27 32 18 vs. 12 on the initial leg of the – – – -APR 1991 390.45 – 2 -4 8 1 6 upswing. Then, in the first eleven – – – – – -OCT 1991 397.41 '.-6 6 -1 4 – -DEC 1991 373.22 – – – – – 12 5 10 – – – -JAN 1992 420.77 – – – – -6 -2 months of 1991 the smaIler-stock index rocketed ahead by 83 vs. 30-35 for – – – – – -APR LOll 394.50 – — 4 the Dow and the S & P. 1991, indeed, – – -APR 29th 412.02 – – – – – – – wss the year of the over-the-counter stock. Start Date AVG OCT 1987 28830 JUL 1990 51060 OCT 1990 34410 OEC 1990 40610 JAN 1991 387.50 APR 1991 57370 OCT 1991 629.80 OEC 1991 586.20 JAN 1992 741.90 APR LOll 605.10 APR 29th 617.50 NASDACI INDUSTRiAlS Percent Change To JUL OCT OEC JAN APR OCT OEC JAN APR 1990 1990 1990 1991 1991 1991 1991 1992 LOll -77 19 41 34 100 118 103 157 110 -33 -20 -24 13 23 15 45 19 – — – 18 13 67 83 70 116 76 – -5 42 55 44 83 49 — – — – – — – — — — – — – — – 49 63 51 91 56 – 9 2 29 5 — -7 18 -4 – — – — — — 27 3 – –18 — APR 29th 114 21 79 52 59 7 -2 5 -17 -2 Between the November- December 1991 low and February of this year the NASDAQ issues continued to outperform. putting on a 27 rise, better than both the senior averages. At that point, however, a distinct shift in leadership took place. The.S & P peaked in January 1992 aod hss not been able to regain that peak. Likewise, the OTC Index reached its high in February. Interestingly, breadth indicators also reached their highs in mid-February and have been lagging ever since. The Dow. however, went on to a new high in mid-March and wss thus only 3 under its January peak at the low of Isst month. It is-also, therefore, close to an all-time high. The S& P underperformed the Dow on the January-April !ownswing. and the NASPAQ I, '- -Industri.us completely reversed theiifield. dropping off 18 in February-April duriog what was essentially a sideways performance by the other two averages. There is, therefore, no simple answer to the question of how secondary stocks have performed. Ovtr the long term, taking the current cycle ss a whole, they have been average performers. Over the intermediate term, approximately the last year, their action has been stellar. And over the short term-the past couple of months. they have undergone a serious correction. All this fits in, however, with the basic thesis regarding smaIler stocks which we have voiced in this space since early 1991- when secondary stock indices such the NASDAQ, Value Une aod Wilshire 5000 first began poking up their heada. That thesis is that, having unperfonned the market since 1983, those stocks, on a relative basis, are now rebasing. This process, by definition, requires a number of wide swings both up and down. The 1991 surge and the recent weakness can both be viewed as part of this process, one that could ultimately lead to another six to eight-year upswing the the relative streogth of smaIler stocks. ANTHONY W. TABElL, CMT Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3354.87 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABElL Staodard & Poors 500 (1200) 413.90 Cumulative Index (4/30/92) 7304.88 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed \0 be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or men\loned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources 01 our Inlormallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc as a corporation and s officers or employees may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any lulure Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihls or any other Issue Oelalreld, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may give adVice to 115 Investment adVISOry and othE!r customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any 01her 1ssue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209. MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 May 8, 1992 The stock market is, as we know, a contrary beast, and it is seldom posslble to make definitIve statements about It. One of the few occasions on which one can -do-so is when-it attaiils-a-newhigh-after-a-prottacted nse (or a- new low-after a fall.) At that point it '- can be noted with certainty that a bull (or bear) market exists. The high or low in question may of course be the final one of the market swing, but, as of the day the benchmark is attained, it can be firmly asserted that a given trend remains in effect. Such was the case on Monday of this week when the Dow limshed at 3378,13, the highest close in its history, If one is enamored of intra-iay, rather than closing, figures, he could have made a similar statement on Wednesday, when that particular statistic set a new record at 3398.70. In any case, as measured by the Dow at least, we remained in a bull market as of this week. It is indeed possible to qUIbble about some aspects of this bappy state of affairs. Followers of the S & P 500 WIll note that the new-high award cannot be given to that particular average. Its close of 416.91 on Monday remained marginally below the 417.13 closing figure posted back on February 12th. The intra-day high of 418.53 achieved on Wednesday, moreover, failed to equal the like peak of 421 18, attained back on January 15th. In addition, as we noted last week, the action of secondary stocks has been abysmal. Even after a forty-pomt rally, the NASDAQ Industrials remain 13 under their February high. Even more disappninting has been the action of market breadth. The onset of the current UpSWIng last Chnstmas saw seven consecutive days with more than 1000 advancing issues, one showing over 1400 advances, one over 1300 and three over 1200. There have been only four days with more than 1200 advances since, three of them in early April, and 1000-1100 advances have of late been more common on good days. On a more quantitative basis, our daily breadth index remained. on Wednesday, SIX points below its bigh. Considering the fact that a two-point upmove in this indicator constitutes an extreme good day, it remains well away from an upSide confirmation. Signs of a loss of momentum are, therefore, present, but the bull market, by the definition noted above, remams mtacL That definition, however, the reader will have noted, IS a truism. What would be truly useful to know, of course, is how close, in time or extent, that bull market is to its ultimate end. Paradoxically, the answer to that question lies in how one chooses to answer yet another trurtquestion—when did the bull market begin This is an issue on which there is room for debate, even with advantage of over four years of -hindsighL Yet th';- o-u; of deba is, -;;.. tbhl,;;Wi;'.C'– – – – – — . – – ' – — — — – Let us explore the question a bit further then. It is obvious that! bull market began in the fall of 1987. Monday, October 19th, 1987 is a date which will forever have a place in the annals of financial history. (We prefer the record the actual bottom as having occurred in December when the S & P reached Its low, but the argument is academic.) Subsequently the Dow remained irregular through 1988, spent 1989 forgmg ahead to a new all-time !ugh in October of that year, and after some further Irregularity, contmued to just under 3000 in July, 1990 Using monthly average prices, the DnA was ahead at that point by some 54 There then occurred a setback–a short and sharp one. It was over in three months, but, in its course, the Dow dropped off by a bIt more than 20 on a closing basis and the S & P Composite by just under that figure. A twenty-percent decline has, in the past. been the rule-of-thumb criterion for identifying a bear markeL Was the break of July-October 1990 a full-grown bear, or was It simply an mtermediate-term correction' The answer is important. If Summer-Fall 1990 was merely an intermediate correction we are now looking at an upswing that is 52 months old. The average length over the entire 20th century for all full cycles, measured low to low, IS 45 months. The present elapsed duration is now approaching the length of the two longest bull markets in history–61 months in July 1982-August 1987 and 74 months in 1923-1929. In terms of amplitude, the market cannot be said to have advanced all that far, but its average-price rise, 72. is in the area of the century's average (81 ). If. however, a new bull market began in October, 1990, we are presented with an entirely different picture. That bull market is only 18 months old, far less than any recorded upswing since June, 1949. The range of bull-market durations since then has been 21-61 months, with an average of 36 months. The rise has been 33 so far-a number at the extreme short end of the range of this century's major bull markets and one which would suggest a good deal of further room on the upside. The question of what sort of bull market we are talking about, one that began m the fall of 1987 or one than commenced in October, 1990, is, therefore of critical importance. The primary argument against the optimistic view IS the minuscule length Gust 3 months or 61 trading days on a daily basis) of the putative 1990 bear market. On the other hand, as noted above, we are certamly stretchIng historical precedent by continumg to call everything that has taken place since 1987 a full, uncorrected upswmg. The fact that convmcing arguments can be presented on both sides makes looking at the present market in cycle terms a difficult exercise. In practical terms, though, we cannot use th.ts obscunty as an excuse to bury our heads in the sand. ThIs is especially true if we are entering an era of short and sudden bear markets, and 1987 (also 1990 if it was a bear market) fits this description. We can only continue to watch present action closely–especially trackmg the loss of momentum which seems to have recently mamfested itself as noted above. ThIs IS our responsibility as investment managers. As market historians we will eventually have the opportunity to fit the pieces into an overall cycle pattern. but not, it would appear, until a somewhat later date. AN1HONY W. TABELL, CMT DELARELD,HARVEY.TABELL Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3367.40 Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 415.96 Cumulative Index (517/92) 739505 No statement or expression of oplmon or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and InformallOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporalion and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posllIOns or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslliOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other ISSue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell tnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor may give adVice to Its Investment advISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any oher Issue Further information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

TAaELLS MARKET LETTER 5 VAUGHN DRIVE, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 May 15, 1992 Long-time (especially Ym-Iong-time) readers of this piece will recall that a few special things take place in – Presidential election years7wlfiCll;- of-couise7is the-casif(lrI9920ife SUCbevent is oilr annual effort to predlCftliewinner of the election for which exercise we are able to claim a record of 100 accuracy which, we regularly assure readers, is a great deal better than our record at forecasting the stock market. That effort, however, will be reserved, as usual, for November. We have also attempted, in a number of letters in the past, to make the more practical assessment of what the stock market was saying about the election and what election years in general have tended to tell us about the prospects for the stock market. Our first effort in this quadrennial exercise appeared a bit earlier this time around than is normally the case. Back on November 15th, we set forth our usual table detailing the stock-market history of each election year since 1900 and duly arrived at the conclusions that this study tends to produce. One of these conclusions was that there was a tendency for election years to have a flat or downward bias during their first half. Despite the recent surges to new highs for the Dow Jones Industrials, we think that flat is an adjective that can properly be used to describe the 1992 stock market thus far. We conducted the November study by looking at the average price for each month in election years, expressed as a percentage of the previous year's close, using the Standard & Poors 500 as a benchmark. The 500 closed 1991 at 417.09, and its average price for the month of April was 407.40, or 97.68 of the 1991 close. This, as we shall see in a moment, may in fact have some significance. Just as the market has been flat, the recent absence of competition on the political scene has made that area dull. It is all but certain that President Bush and Governor Clinton will be the major-party candidates in November. In a news- starved media, much has been made of the candidacy of H. Ross Perot. Those (like stock-market technicians) who are accustomed to look at the historical record will recall the names of Henry and George Wallace and John Anderson and remain.somewhat.underwhelmed. . Insofar as the relationship of the stock market to election year outcomes is concerned, action so far cannot be said to be encouraging to President Bush. There have been nine election years in this century when the average April price was lower or about the same as that of the previous year end. Those years were 1916, 1920, 1932, 1940, 1952, 1960, 1968, 1980, and 1984. In seven of the nine cases the decline was modest, as was the case this year, under five percent. It was seven percent in 1960, and in only one year, 1932, did a large drop take place. What is interesting about these nine years, however, is that six of them saw the replacement of the incumbent Presidential party. Thus, Wilson was replaced by Harding in 1920, Hoover by Roosevelt in 1932, Truman by Eisenhower in 1952, Eisenhower by Kennedy in 1960, Johnson by Nixon in 1968, and Carter by Reagan in 1980. The three exceptions were the reelections of Wtlson in 1916, Roosevelt in 1940, and Reagan in 1984. Taking the reverse view, of the eight occasions during the century when the party controlling the White House changed, six saw flat-to-Iower stock markets in April. The two exceptions to this rule occurred when Taft was replaced by Wilson in 1912 and when Ford was replaced by Carter in 1976. That particular year constitutes an exceptional one in a number of ways since it produced the strongest rally in the first four months of any of the 23 election years under study. We have, of course, long noted the fact that, regardless of the party winning the election, there exists a fairly strong tendency toward a strong second half. As we pointed out in November, in nineteen of the 23 election years we surveyed, the average price for December was higher than the average price for June. Likewise the December average price was higher or the same as the April average in eighteen years out of the 23. In seven of the nine years in which the market was lower in Apnl, it had recovered significantly by year end. In only two cases did the market continue down from its April low figure, in 1920 and 1940. Even in the exceptional years when the market trended lower in the second half, the decline was not very severe. The only instance of notable second-half weakness in any of the 23 years under study took place in 1920 (the election of Harding) when the average December price was 20 lower than that for April. We have been not1Og here of late the distinct signs of loss oftechnical momentum which have characterized 1992 so far. This loss of momentum has, of course, produced the fairly exceptional case of a market which has failed to advance 10 the initial four months of the year. The election year pattern for the market would seem to argue that the lost upside momentum might well be regained as we progress into 1992's second half. It WIll be interesting to see whether that pattern holds true or 1992 produces one of the rare exceptions. ANTHONY W. TABELL, CMT DELAFlliLD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 3355.42 Standard & Poors 500 (1200) 411.43 CumulatIve Index (5114/92) 7395.61 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, dlrecUy or Indirectly, an ofter or the sollcltallOn 01 an offer to buy Of sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Information \0 be rehable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any actIOn to be laken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informallon Oelafleld, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have or may laler take, posrtlons or trades In respect to any seCUrities menlloned In thiS or any future Issue and such poSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to tts Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependentlv 01 any statements made In Ihls or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menlloned herem IS available on request