c- '1T(IHEn.IL.' S RrEV I1.rEVVrER – 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 March 13. 1987 An interesting and fairly rare market event occurred this week as Inco and Owens-Illinois were —repUlCed in…theDowJones-Industrial-A verage -by- Boeinw….8ndGoca- Oolae- eventis-r-are- because Dows-Jones tends to treat new additions as a process roughly equivalent -to conferringsainthood, ,- something that should occur infrequently and only after due deliberation. On the occasion of the Dow's 100th birthday some three years ago, we took the occasion to pOint out that 6 of the 30 issues had relatively small market capitalization. Two of these departed yesterday. At that time, we also suggested the inclusion of McDonald's which subsequently took place As far as the latest changes are concerned. we find ourselves in agreement with the addition of Coca-Cola. We are less certain of the advisibility of adding Boeing to an average which already includes United Technologies. We would have preferred a technological company outside the aerospace area such as Hewlett Packard or Digital Equipment. The hlstory of the Dow, mirroring, as it does, the changing composition of the U.8. economy is, to us, an interesting subject. The first average of any sort started in July. 1884, and 1896 saw the emergence of the first purely industrial average, this sector, at the time, being considered junior to the blue-chip rail industry. T his first Industrial Average consisted of twelve stocks and. during its existence. contained such entities as Distilling and Cattle Feeding. Standard Rope and Twine, and Pacific Mail Steamship. It is hard to tie it into today's Industrials, since there were only twelve stocks, some preferred issues were included, and stock prices, until 1916. were quoted, like bonds. as a percentage of par. It was the termination of this practice that led to the creation on October, 4, 1916. of a new 20-lndustrial Average, which can be considered the forerunner of the current Dow. Various changes were made over the next dozen years, and. on October 1. 1928. the twenty industrials beca.me thirty. with ten new stocks added, and six SUbstitutions being made. Of these original twenty stocks. there is only one that today remains in the average with the same name and roughly the same business. That company is General Electric, also included in the original 1896 average. Two other original componenents remain but with changed names and, to a 1I..d-eg changej busiesse—U .8. Steel, nUSX Corporation. and American Can, now a financial services company, shortly to be renamed Primeriea. Six other present components arrived on the scene between 1916 and 1928. In 1924 the average became less than strictly industrial with the additions of and Woolworth. Allied-Signal (Allied Chemical). General Motors, Navistar (International Harvester) and Texaco (Texas Company) came on board in 1925. The expansion of the average to 30 issues in 1928 brought in four current components, Bethlehem Steel. Exxon (Standard Oil of New Jersey) Union Carbide. and Westinghouse were added at that time. The remaining 17 slots in the average have had various occupants in the years from 1928 to date. This week's addition of Coca-Cola. interestingly, provides the second entrance of that stock into the Dow, where it also found a home between May, 1932 and November, 1935. There exists a fair number of cases in which a company as left the average only to return once more. The case most frequently cited is IBM. which entered the average in 1932, was dropped in 1939 to make room for American Telephone-and returned in ,June, 1979. Various attempts have been made to calculate the astronomical heights to which the Dow could have risen during the 40 years of its absence. An accurate estimate would be difficult to come by. and we do not intend to try. In additon to IBM and Coca-Cola, five of today's components have been in, out, and again in the average. In all, 45 companies. besides the current 30 components, have spent time in the average. five of them on two separate occasions. It is our own thought. voiced here three years ago, that a few more changes should be made. It is possible that Dow Jones may be more willing to make future changes, having made seven in the past eight years. This followed a long period during which the components of the average remained largely unchanged. The 17 years from 1939 to 1956 saw no change whatsoever in the group, and only four changes occurred between 1956 and 1979. These were. the 1956 substitution of International lSaper for Loew's. the 1959 swap of Nahonal Steel and National Distillers for and wens-Illinois, and finally -the .1976 replacement of Anaconda by … MinnesotaMining … .. -In closing, it is interesting to speculate what problems may force future changes. The continued inclusion of low-priced Bethlehem Steel and Navistar seems to be inappropriate. (Both stocks could double. and the average would only rise a bit over 14 points.) In addition, the change in character of American Can and the recent addition of American Express gives the Industrials two components in the financial-services category. Most other average-makers have created a separate Financial Average to go witl-t Industrials, Transportation, and Utilities. Dow Jones, in 1970, changed the Railroad Average to a more comprehensive Transportation measure. The creation of a Dow Jones Financial Average seems to us. at least. appropriate. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTbh Cumulative Index (3/12187) Dow Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P 500 (1200 p.m.) 3740.77 2264.34 290.98 No statement or efpreSS!On of opinIon or any other mailer herein contl!ned IS, or IS to be deemed to be dnecHy Or mdlrectly. an oller or the sohc!tatlon of an offer to buyor sell any SeCunly relerred 1001 mentioned The matter IS prescntd merely for the convenIence of the subscflber WhIle we behevethe sourcesot our mformatlon 10 be reliable. we m no way represent or guaranleethe accuracy thereot nor 01 the statements made herem Any actlOnto be taken by the subscnber Should be based on hiS own uwestlgatlon and InformatIon DelafIeld, Harvey, Tabetl Inc, as a corporatIon and ItS officers or employees, may now have or may latc! take. POSItIons or trades m respect to any secuntles mentIoned m thIS or any tuture Issue. and such pOSItion may be dillerent from any vIews now or hereafter eJpressed In this Of any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc. whIch 15 regIstered wl1h the SECas an mvestment adVIsor, may gIve advIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependenHy of any statements made mthls or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentIoned herem IS avaIlable on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 March 20. 1987 The sharp rally which has been the feature of 1987's first quarter. carryIng through to an intraday peak of over 2300 on the Dow thIS week. was, when It erupted in January, a somewhat -5 u rp risin g – phenomenon—-H owev er.' as -we haY e attem p ted –to–POl nt-ou hin t his-s pace. -)t–\… as- not— '—I uncharacteristic of'recent rruuket action. As 1986 ended, we had seen two earlier-upside explosJOns emerge out of the blue, the fir'St in August, 1982 and the second in July, 1984. January. 1987 has turned out to be the third such case, and it is relevant. therefore. to measure 1987 market actIon so far against those two previous benchmarks. This we attempt to do in the chart below which depicts the first 100 trading days of the two previous rallies along with the first 54 (through yesterday) tradmg days in the current market. In order to facilItate the comparison, the 1982 and 1984 series have been adjusted so that their starting level IS equivalent to 1895.95. the figure at which the average closed 1986. Below the Dow chart, the action of our daily breadth index in the three periods is depicted on a sImilar basis. BASE FIJG 12 1982 (-0-) DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE BASE JULy 198ij1–) BASE DEC 31 1986(-) The most ObVIOUS generalizatIOn regarding the current market is that it falls just about halfway between 1982 and 1984 in terms of both breadth and percentage advance. The two previous cases began with sharp upside explosions and then flattened. whereas early 1987 produced a slow and steady rise in the Dow. so that. by mid-February. it had advanced, on a comparative basis. even more than in 1982. What dIfferentIates 1982 from the two subsequent cases is the sharp second legll , which started m October of that year. This. as the chart shows, took the indicator to the equivalent of 2600 before It fmally flattened and began moving sideways. It is the lateral move in the second half of theIr lifespan which makes the two previous advances relevant from a forecasting point of view. If past experIence is followed, the Dow could remain in a trading range centered around current levels at least until late May. We can expect, therefore, a dimunition of action on the upside but, based on past experience, there should occur little in the way of a significant correction. While the action between now and the beginning of the summer may be uneXCIting. It must be noted that, before the two previous upswings had run their course, they had each moved the Dow up around 65. versus the 20 move so far. If thIS precedent is followed, the current upswing could carry well over the 3000 level some tIme in the first half of 1988. AWTbh Cumulative Index (3/19/87) 3762.41 Dow Jones Industrials (12 00 p.m.)2314.63 S & P 500 (I200 p.m.) 296.31 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. NO stalemmll or expression of Opinion or any other matter herein contained IS Of IS to be deemed 10 be directly Of Indlrectty an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buyor sell any security referred to or menuoned The malj(IIS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber While we betlevethe sources of our Informallon to be retlable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the Statements made herein Any action to be taken bv the subscnber shoutd be based on hiS own Investlgallon and information Delafield Harvey, TabeH tnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees may now have, or may later tae POSitiOnS or trades In respect to any securrtles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue and such pOSitIOn may be dillerent from any views now or hereafter epressed In thiS Of any other Issue Delafield, Harvey Tabell Inc which IS registered With the SECas an Investment adVisor, may give advlcelo lIs Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In Ihls or In any other Issue Further information on any secunty menlloned herem IS avallable on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 March 27, 1987 The late Harold X. Schreder was, to our knowledge, the originator of the thesis that the 1—1ky -to-un d ers-tandin g -the-stock mark etlies .in,..th e .Jecognitiontha tI!!okis a!!,oin g -\ ob-ject. This is a formulation which is simple, yet profound. In a single sentenc-e, it -' -. justifies the use of technical analysis as an adjunct to the conventional fundamental approach. Fundamental analysis, it becomes apparent upon reflection, is largely concerned with levels. It is necessary only to consider the terms in which such analysis is usually couched—cheap or dear, overpriced or underpriced, etc. The technical approach, on the other hand, finds itself more concerned with trend or direction. Such an approach likens the action of the stock market to that of an airplane, recognizing the fact that it is less important to know a plane's altitude than whether it is climbing or diving. Columbus discovered the new world not by precise navigational tools, but simply by sailing west. This distinction is particularly relevant to today's stock market. As this letter has been pointing out ever since the process started, the extraordinary upside momentum generated by the rise of the past three months is characteristic of the take-off stage of a major upswing. By and large, bull-market tops do not occur On increasing upside momentum, but on the waning of that momentum. Consideration of the market's direction leaves the analyst no choice but to pronounce the outlook, for as far ahead as we can see, as calling for higher prices. It must be noted, however, that consideration of the market's current level leads to a point-of-view somewhat less optimistic. The S & P 500 closed on Thursday at 300.93. This figure is 20.2 times the approximate 14.82 earnings that average produced in 1986. The dividend for the 500 was about 8.35 which affords a yield of only 2.77 percent. Modern history has seen the S & P PIE ratio above 20 on only a few occassions. The first 1—I—-aon4e6wadsembientewe-,ennt Oc fie tober S ,P;19T38JjeanndexFt eobcrcuurarreync1r9w3n9-saaroouunndd-tt1hieeltloip1lo1'fkaet'bsu-lpleam'ka-r;kne-ttha-ned'pSruemcmeedri-nog,f-,-I–I 1946, and the final case lasted over a year between April, 1961 and April, 1962, precisely at the time the market was topping prior to the 1962 bear market. Likewise yields of less than 2.8 have, in the past, tended to precede market tops. The return of the S & P fell below this level in November-December, 1961, November, 1968, and between April, 1972 and February, 1973. What are we to make of these two contrasting outlooks' The first lesson, we think, is to avoid excuses. The writer's father, another old-time observer, was fond of remarking that stock prices, while partially dependent on earnings and dividends, are also dependent on a third factor—investor confidence. A product of such confidence is a tendency to rationalize, often quite creatively. It is now suggested, for example, that the S & P 500 is worth 20 times earnings because the Japanese stock market is even higher. A common excuse, which had prevailed up until recently, was that rising bond prices were bullish for stocks, and those whom the wire services call at the end of the day were able to explain just about every advance in the average using this explanation. It is heard less now that the S & P provides a yield approximately half that of T-Bills. Since we are technicians, we prefer to keep the level of stock prices in mind as a background factor and rely on the technical pattern as our guide to the intermediate-term outlook. This approach has historical justification. In 1961-2, the S & P PIE ratio remained above 20 for over a year, and the index advanced over 13 from the first occurrence. In addition, higher PIEs (although not as high as the present one) have often been reduced by earnings improvement. The 500 was at 19.6 times earnings in early 1959, but a subsequent earnings rise lowered that valuation. A t the moment our readers know. we assess the technical outlook as highly bullish. However. we intend continuously to remind ourselves of the rather rich prices being paid for present earnings and dividends. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTbh Dow Jones Industrials (1200 pm) 2369.46 S & P 500 C12 00 pm) 300.11 Cumulative Index (3/26/87) 3816.04 No statement or expreSSion 01 opInion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be directly Of Inchrectly an offer or Ihe sohcllallon of an otler 10 buy or sen any secl.Jflly referred toor mentioned The malle'ls presented merely lor the convenience 01 the subSCriber Whlfe we beheve the sources of our information 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the aCcuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aCllon 10 be laen by the subSCriber should be based on hfs own 1Twestlgallon and Inlormallon Delaflefd Harvey, Taben Inc as a corporal Ion and lis offiCers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, pOSitions or trad(!s In respect 10 any securities menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dltferent Irom any VI(!WS nowor heJeafler (!Kpressed In tl1ls or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc which IS registered with the SECas an Investment adVisor, may give adVice lOlls mVestmenl adVISOry and other customers Independ(!nlly of any slatemenlS made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secuflty men\loned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 April 10, 1987 -.–.-Rn !lo'!-9en!.-!.oy-.J.!t e!ntstircl.!.3JL.–,mA.ag5 t02-e om 9l't …….. of Blue-Monday record, with the 30 Dow Jones stocks collectively opening 92 points below their ' previous close and the final figure for the Dow down more than 57 points. Three days of mild recovery followed, and then last Friday, after early weakness, exploded with an almost-70-point advance. Continued strength on Monday of this week produced a first-ever close above 2400, but this penetration held for only one day as the index backed off to 2339 yesterday. Much of this action qualIfies, by historic standards, as unusual volatIlity. Intra-day volalllity is a subject we first examined at the end of January after the first phase of the extraordinary 1987 rIse. We hypothesized, that, at the very least, an acceptable proxy for market volatility was the spread between the Dow's intra-day high and intra-day low expressed as a percentage of the close. Inspection seemed to indicate that anything above 3 for this statistic fell into the exceptional category. This threshold was exceeded on both January 22 and January 23, with the latter date setting a post-1974 record at 7.2. More recently, the March 30 dechne, the April 3 rise, and the April 7 drop also qualified as unusually volatile days. Investigation indicated that such volatility had an almost uncanny forecasting record for as long as six months ahead. The chart below shows the Dow on a weekly basis from mid-1974 to date, with the vertical lines at the bottom showing the highest weekly figure attamed by the high-low sprelld. It is apparent at a glance that such action has tended to precede upward markets. There have been, in the period shown, 120 days when the high-low difference was greater than 3 of the close. On III of those occassions the Dow was up 125 trading days (approximately six months) later. The occurrence of high intra-day volatility, -therefore, foreshadowed an upward market 92.5- of the time. By contrast, examination of all 3106 trading days since 1974 reveals that over the following six months the DJIA rose only 63.6 of the time. The likelihood of the association between volatility and market rises being a chance phenomenon would be analogous to the chance of drawing a sample of 120 marbles from a jar and finding that 111 of them were white when the jar was known to contain only 1977 white marbles and 1129 black ones. For statistic freaks the chi-square for this statistic is 43.17, suggesting that the probability of a chance occurrence is a great deal under 1 in 2000. We confess that we have no rationale for this relationship despite the impressive statistical record. That record, however, suggests that the volatility displayed early this week indicates higher prices over the next six months. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC, AWTBH Dow .Jones Industrials (12 00 pm) 2338.21 S & P 500 (1200 pm) 293.53 Cumulative Index (419187) 3756.77 NO Slalemenl or e.quesSlOn of Opinion or anyolher malter hemin contained IS or IS 10 be deemed to be directly or indirectly an offer or the soliCitation of an offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter 15 presenled merely for the convenience of the Subscllber While we beheve the sources of our Informahon to be reliable y'eln no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Inveshgallon and information Delafield Harvey TabeH Inc as a corporahon and Its olhcers or employees may now have or may (ater lake, pOSlhons or trades In respect to any seculltles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and SUCh pOSlhon may be different from any views now or helealter epressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey, TabeH Inc whiCh IS registered With the SECas an Investment adVisor may give adVice 10 ItS Inveslment adVisory and othe' customers Independently of any statemenls made In !hl'l or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any SeCufI\y menlloned herem IS available on request

11&\ ISUELL S Ia1lI 1RlEII LEIIII1E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 April 16, 1987 -.- – Last .week!s. mar.ket saw .w.hat-was,-at-leasta-tempor-ar-y,-end-to-what-had. been-t-he-most . serious correctionof 1987 -so' far -It' culminated with a decline of over 50 points on Monday followed by a Tuesday, intra-day low of 2213.64 before a rally in the final half hour trimmed the day's loss. The Monday decline, it was widely noted, was the fourth greatest point decline in history. History, in this case, is not that long a period, since the three daily downswings which surpassed Monday all have occurred within the last nine months. Regular readers of this piece are already aware of the bee in our bonnet in regard to the practice of reporting declines in points, a practice which tends to make routine market action seem more significant than it is. Quite obviously, with the Dow well over 2000, swings in both directions will continue to set records for amplitude in Dow points. The proper way to compare today's market changes with previous ones is to express such changes as percentages or, if one wants to be esoteric, logarithms. Even using the proper tools, however, the drop through last Tuesday was, by historical standards, exceptional. The Dow moved from a close of 2405.54 on April 6 to a Tuesday close of 2252.98. This is a drop of 6.34. Declines of 6 or greater are, obviously, fairly common occurrences, but what sets the latest case off from its predecessors is the fact that it was compressed into six trading days. A drop of such magnitude, in so short a time, is a somewhat rarer beast. Measuring short-term declines of different lengths is not an onerous task. It requires simply that the move be measured in terms of compounded percentage per day. This percentage, in the present instance, works out to a daily fall of 1.08. Declines of -6verlcom pounded QVeronetwo, or even tnree-day perloo'''sC–a-r''e',-'''a'''s'-''o'''n''eo—I–1 would suppose, fairly regular market occurrences. However, cases where such a drop is extended to six days and beyond are relatively few. In the entire Post-World-War-IJ period there have occurred only 80 such declines, this over 41 years or 10,584 trading days. (During the 1920s and 1930s, it is well known, markets were much more volatile. Thus, in only 20 years between 1926 to 1945, 230 declines of greater than 1 compounded daily occurred.) What is interesting about the steep declines of the post-1945 period is the strong bias in favor of their taking place at or around important market bottoms. Our letter of last week noted the extraordinary correlation between intra-day volatility, measured by the spread between intra-day high and low, and subsequent market strength. The occurrence of steep declines apparently shows the same sort of bias. The eighty post-1945 cases mentioned above were followed by a higher market six months later 70 out of 80 times. Just as was the case with last week's study this figure posesses a considerable statistical significance. To cite a few examples, the last two short-term drops which exceeded the present one occurred in September, 1986 around 1767 on the Dow. 125 trading days later, the average had advanced to 2258. Prior to last September, similar events were seen, in July, 1986, and December, 1982, the latter preceding the second upward leg in the bull market which had begun the previous August. It is interesting to note that, in the recent market climate, volatility has tended to occur around intermediate-term bottoms, major bottoms generally arising .0uLof a. ' period of exhaustion as in August, 1982 and July, 1984. The latest case of a series of 1-daily-compounded declines at a major bottom took place in the latter half of 1974, all, obviously, resulting in higher figures six months later, since the market bottomed in December of that year. The research we have done over the past two weeks points clearly, we think, to highly volatile markets being the precursor of higher prices. We have no reason to feel this will not be true in the present instance. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials 2275.99 S 8 P 500 Cumulative Index (4/15/87) 288.02 3626.19 No statement or epresslon of opinion or any other malter herem contamed IS, or IS 10 be deemed to be dlrec1lyor indirectly, an oller or the soliCitation of an olter 10 buy or sell any secullty referred to or mentioned The malter IS presented merely for the convenience of the SubSCriber While we beheyethe sourcesot our informatiOn to be reliable, we in no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor Of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber Should be based on hiS own InveS1!gallon and Intorma\!on Delafletd Harvey, Tabetl Inc as a corporal Ion and Its olltcers or employet'ls may now have, or may later take positions or trades In respect to any SCCUfilies mentioned rn thiS or any future ISSue, and such position may be d,l/emnl from any Ylews now or heleaftor expressed In thiS or any other Issue Dela/leld, Harvey Tabelt Inc, y'hlch IS registered With the SEC as an Investmenl adVisor, ma give adVice tOltS InYestment adVisory and othe' customers Indepelldently 01 any statements made In thl; or In any other Issue Furlher information 011 any securtly mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER —.– .. 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 April 24, 1987 – – – . – – – '' — l -.—-., -' ..-.,….,,- …..-.. At a time'when the DowJones Industrial-Average can rise 66 points'in a single day and then give up most of that gain 24 hours later, enough tall trees are sprouting to make for a reasonable difficulty in seeing the forest. At such a time, it can be helpful to take a step back and take as long a view as possible. Thus, it is probably worthWhile, at the moment, to make some observations regarding the market's very-long-term secular trend. With the Dow recently having sold at the 2400 level, it is easy to forget that average's long flirtation with the much lower level of 1000. It first closed near that figure in February, 1966, when the 1962-1966 bull market topped out at 995.15. The next major bull market ended on December 3, 1968 at 985.21, and the subsequent major advance, 1970-73, reached 1051.70 in January of the latter year. The bull market which ended in September, 1976 topped out at 1014.79 and that of February 1978-April 1981 peaked at 1024.05. The 1000-ceiling was not decisively breached until the Dow reached 1287.20 in November, 1983 before undergoing an intermediate-term correction, which, as technical theory tells us it should have, bottomed just above the 1000 level in July, 1984. What we have described above, of course, is the last secular trend, a trend which, as the repeated tops in the 950-1050 range show, was essentially a flat one. That flat trend lasted for some 18 years. Its predecessor was an uptrend which, between 1949 and the mid-60s, showed a 9-a-year annual rise. As far as we are aware, we were among the first to suggest that this sharp rise was probably over, first mentioning this possbility I – – I – – – . m;'.d.r anuar.y ,191-l. -T.hus, ofcourse,waS-oalmost,.f.iv.eyea.r-s.o.af-terthe-datewhich,-bb.y —–II-I hindsight, we know to have been the flat, secular trend's beginning. It is now almost axiomatic that the 1966-83 trading range has been replaced by a new upward trend. The point to be made, however, is that, even with four to five years of experience under our belt, we know very little about that trend's characteristics. One which can be noted is that corrections within this uptrend generally have tended to be relatively mild. If we take 1974 as the current trend's beginning, the first correction phase, that of 1976-1978, while producing a decline of 26 in the Dow, actually saw most secondary issues continuing to rise. The 1981-1982 decline, while measuring 24 in the DJIA, also saw large numbers of rising issues. The drop which ended in July, 1984, recent enough so that most of us remember it, produced only a 16 decline for the average. The next corrective phase occurred in the latter nine months of last year. These three quarters produced nothing more than a consolidation which repeatedly topped around 1800-1900 and never moved much below the mid-1700s. One of the characteristics of the new secular trend appears, therefore, to be the phenomenon of different, and possibly milder, corrections. Vicious declines such as 1970 and 1974 are, so far, conspicuous by their absence. We are aware that this constitutes a seductively dangerous form of new-era thinking, and we offer it, thus, only as an observation. We offered another such observation, noting that it, also, did not constitute a prediction, in a series of letters early last year covering the similarities between the current market and that of 1921-1929. Although we make no claim to have originated that comparison, we find that parts of it have been regularly repeated by an army of commentators over the last twelve months. Indeed it may be necessary to back off from this earlier observation specifically because it is becoming too popular. By contrast, a forecast of continuing relatively mild corrections, would be today, we think, a truly contrary opinion. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTbh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2260.51 S & P 500 (1200) 284.35 Cumulative Index (4/23/87) 3671. 06 No statement or cpfeSS\on 01 opinion or any olher matter herem contamed IS or IS 10 be deemed 10 be direct Iv or indirectly an ofter or Ihc soliCitation at an oller \0 buy or sel! any security referred 10 or mentioned The mattf!r IS presented merely lor thc convenience of Ihc subSCriber While we believe Ihe sources of our information 10 be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy theroof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be tafen bv the subscrlbar should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and information Delafield HaNey, Tabell Inc, as a corporal Ion and Its ottlcers or employees may now hHve or may later take poSitions or Irades In respect to any securities mentioned In this or any future Issue and such pOSition may be different from any views nowor hCleafler epressed In this or any other Issue Delafield HaNey Tabell Inc which is registered wllh the SEC as an Investment advisor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othe' customers mdependenHy of any statements made m thl'; or in any other Issue Fuflher mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on reQuest

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIA TlON OF SECURITIES OEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 . May 1. 1987 It remains to be seen whether the adage about April showers and May flowers will hold true I—.-cfor…..the …stock…..market–in4-B8-7T- Thelatest eI!ain-on… the… ma.r-ket's,..pa-I!sde… tGOk- theform-of-a7….-27– —-; decline over 14 trading daysr. following that one bright shining moment when the Dow closed above 24M on April 6. Thursday's market strength suggested that the decline might, for the time being, be over, although a test of the lows in the low-2200 area cannot be ruled out. The most readable downside targets for the Dow were in the 2170-2090 range. and the upper part of this range was approached intra-day last week. The next major problem facing the technician will be determining whether April's action constitutes a correction in an ongoing bull market or the begInning of a top formation. Central to this will be an analysis of the next rally. As part of this process. we will be looking at indicators such as these shown below. DOH JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE BRERDTH Market breadth produced a bullish confirmation when. after reaching a new low on the last day of 1986. it recovered to a new bull-market high above its earlier April peak. The only wornsome feature is the mild divergence between March 26 and April 3 and the steep decline which has since occurred. We would be disappointed, for example. to see the breadth index move below its bottom of last December. something it could do with a few sharply declining days. Eventually. for the bull market again to be confirmed. it will have to move ahead to a new high. As far as new highs and lows are concerned. the lO-day average in January broke 8 short-term trend line and achieved a level above its August peak. Subsequent action, however. produced a decline below the zero level. a reading which. while not immediately bearish;; is generally associated with the later stages of a bull market. Ability to move above its January high. where a couple of days saw more than 200 new highs being achieved. would also indicate an ongoing uptrend. May-June action, traditionally, is a time of testing. If the averages can spend the next two months re-basing and commence a rally. with internal strength in the indicators shown above, continuation of the bull market will become a probability. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. AWTbh Dow Jones Industrial (1200) 2298.29 S & P 500 (1200) 289.59 Cumulative Index (4130187) 3662.91 No stalemCfll or expression of OPiniOn or any other matter herem contamed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the SOlicitation of an oller to buy or sell any security referred toor mentioned The mattellS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent 01 guarantC'E! the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herem Any aCllon to be taken by the subscllber Should be based on his own Investigation and mlormallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a COfpora1l0n and ItS ofllcers or employees may now have or may later lake poslhons or trades In respect 10 any seculilies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be d,ltercnt from any views now or heH!afler e.pressed In thiS 01 any other Issue Delafield Harvey, Tabelf Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, mayQlve adlce to ItS Investment adVISOry and other CUSlomerS Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further In/ormation on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 May 8, 1987 One of our favorite definitions of market technician has always been market -historian!L.-The- twoterms-arenot 'totally-synonomousrbut'theyare-,.ea'SOfi9.bl-rclOlle. A – – – – – 1 – – major portion of the technician's art has always involved the collection of historical patterns of market behaviour which have, in the past, tended to be precursors of some form of subsequent behaviour. Historical data, often very extensive, has therefore, always been grist for the technician's mill. Very often, however, new phenomena, for which little or no historical data exists, emerge upon the investment scene. The best that the analyst can do in such cases is to use his own intuition as a guide to what, if anything, the new data may be foretelling. There are, in our view, two current factors severely impacting the stock-market scene where such intuition must largely be used as a substitute for historical analysis. These factors are, first, the emergence during the 1980's of derivative instruments and, secondly, the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit. Derivatives, for those unfamilar with the term, is a catch-all description referring to the futures and option contracts which have come to play so important a part in today's market milieu. It may be argued that such products fail to qualify as lacking history, given the flood of data which they produce every market day. However, their fairly recent introduction and the fact that they have not existed in their present magnititude—a magnitude in which the shares represented on a given day by derivative trading exceed NYSE volume—through a complete market cycle argue that there is a great deal about their long-term market effect that we must still attempt to guess. There is, at least, some small room for doubt as to whether or not these instruments, in fact, possess any social utility. The justification for the existence of financial markets has always been, it seems to us, that they represent the conduit through which thenations's.ayiQgs can be channeledinto Ilro.-!lucliYe capital imces!ment.S,econdar.y t. markets, thus, can be thought of as an ancillary necessity—much as a broad and liquid used-car market serves to facilitate the sale of new automobiles. Derivative instruments, however, depending, as they do, on the existence of secondary markets, exist at one further remove from the financial industry's basic function of raising new capital. Such instruments can, of course, be justified on the basis that risk is endemic to financial markets, and that derivatives represent an efficient means of offloading a portion of that risk onto those willing to assume it. There is, however, a counter-argument suggesting that speculative capital can better be channeled directly into new investment and that the existence of derivatives may, indeed, be diverting such capital from its highest and best use. Needless to say, no historical data exists to suggest a resolution of this debate. Intuition, moreover, suggests the existence of certain problems for which there is no clear solution. Implicit in option and futures contracts is the assumption that the other party to the contract will be able to honor his obligation. This has always been the case so far, but one lesson of history is that financial institutions tend to be less than immune to failure. We can only guess at how such a failure, on the part of a party to large numbers of derivative contracts, might affect markets for those contracts and secondly, the stock market itself. In the case of the trade deficit, we have no history to guide us simply because it, also, in the past, has never reached its current proportions. Furthermore, the workings of international money markets have always been somewhat obscure. (It was once suggested that only two people in the entire world fully understood these markets—a partner in the House of Rothschild and a clerk in the Bank of England—and they disagreed.) It is widely assumed that the current collapse of the U.S; dollar'versus most foreign-currencies does not augur well for the U.S. economy. We have, however, obvserved very little in the way of hard data suggesting precisely what effect ongoing dollar weakness might have on the economy and why it should have that effect. The course of financial markets has always been determined by a combination of repetition of old phenomena and the emergence of new ones. Such an emergence is likely to be crucial at some stage of the current environment. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrial (1200) 2320.17 S & P 500 (1200) 295.57 Cumulative Index (5/7/87) 3715.07 No statement or epresSjon of OPinIon or any Olllel matter herein contained 1, or IS to be deemed to be dlreclly or mdlrectly, an offer or the SOliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred loor mentioned The maIler IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber WhIle we beheve the sources 01 our Inlormatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and ItS olflcers or employees may now have, or may later take, poSItions or trades m respect 10 any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dllferent Irom any views nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey TaOOIl Inc, which IS registered wllh the SECasan Investment adVisor, mayQlve adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mlormatlon on any security mentioned herein IS avaUableon request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 May 15, 1987 –,.. S hart-term -market-actionl-Bomewhat–lessthan… ex citin g….,overthe..-pas tfew 4 weeks. .ha. non ethel es s .. …,.-\ been' satisfactory The most likely interpretation of the recent trading pattern, in our view, is that it constitutes a consolidation phase—necessary after the rather extraordinary rise of the first three months of the year. A fair amount of reaccumulation has already taken place. sufficient to suggest a move to new highs, although not by a great deal. The most plausible upside objective for the Dow, for example, is around 2425. Obviously, existing base patterns could broaden around current levels and, thus, ultimately suggest more worthwhile objectives. Patterns for the various averages. however. are somewhat less than uniform. The Transports, for instance, have a pattern similar to the Industrials but appear to be well ahead as far as timing is concerned. The DJTA achieved a new closing high of 976.04 yesterday, and it is currently close to most readable objectives. The Utilities, which may be taken as a proxy for interest-sensitive issues, behaved much worse than the Industrials on the recent decline, posting a fall of almost 16. They have since begun what well may be their own reaccumulation phase, but a good deal more broadening will be required before any meaningful move can be expected. There are, essentially. two viewpoints from which to observe the action of any market. These correspond to the axes on conventional charts, the vertical axis of price and the horizontal axis representing time. Thus one way to view the action of the Dow is to note that it advanced 26.88 in 1987 through April 6. Another view notes that this rise required 66 trading days. The most useful aspect of timeframe, however. is not duration, but consistency of action over a given period. It is meaningful to state, in other words. that, between December 31, 1986 and April 6, 1987, there were only nine intervals of a day or longer in which the Dow failed to post a new high, and the longest of these intervals was just eight days long. It is this sort of relentless push to new highs that characterizes dynamic bull markets. just as much as does a sharp percentage advance. Viewed in this framework, one of the most critical facts regarding todays market is that 28 trading days have now elapsed since the last new high was posted on April 6. For almost six weeks, inotherJ..word9-;-t-hereha9x-isted-uncertaint-y-a9-to …whet-her-o-p–not,……on-A-pPil-6-.-the-mark-e-t-rea-ched-a—-I– major high. That uncertainty continues to exist. As far as intervals between new highs are concerned, a few generalizations may perhaps be useful. The initial phase of a given rise generally consists of a dynamic upthrust, during which time the intervals between new highs are short indeed. By contrast, as a bull market becomes more mature, one of two phenomena tends to emerge. The first is a long, intermediate-term correction which, of course, involves a protracted gap between highs. An example is the period between July. 1975 and January, 1976, part of the bull market which started on December 6, 1974, at 577.60, and rose to 1014.79 on September 21, 1976. The gap between the two peaks occupied 120 trading days. The dual highs were at around the 890 level, at which point a good portion of the entire bull-market move had already taken place. The second phenomenon which often occurs in the mature stages of bull markets is the appearance of repetitive periods of modest length separating new highs. Another example can be drawn from the 1974-1976 bull market referred to above. It posted a high of 1009.21 on March 24, 1976. It was 18 days until the next high at 1011.02, 55 days until that high was exceeded, and then another 49 days before the market reached its ultimate zenith at 1014.79. Similar examples may be drawn from previous bull markets. Between November, 1970, and April, 1971, a rise took place which produced no interval of longer than l days without a new high. At the end of this phase, three-quarters of the total bull-market move had already occurred. It is a bit more difficult to place the current year in prospective. All of 1986, or at any rate, the last nine months of it, essentially consisted of a sideways move with wide intervals' between new peaks. Previously. February-March, 1986 saw the Dow move from 1600 to 1821 with the longest interval between new highs being seven days. It is possible, therefore. that March-December, 1986 constituted a corrective phase for that move. It seems probable that. based on historical precedent, that this first emergence of a fairly wide interval between highs is not likely to signify that a top took place on April 6.- …..1t is possible that it does lndicate the start of a slower advancing phase, and may indicate that much of the upward move which began at the end of 1986 may be now behind us. If a top of importance is being sketched out at the moment, a characteristic pattern would be a whole series of minor new highs occurring a significant number of days apart. Such a process would, by nature, require a fairly lengthy amount of time. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2312.36 S & P 500 (1200) 291.89 Cumulative Index (5114187) 3733.30 No statement or ewpresslon 01 opmlon or any other mailer herem contamed IS or IS to be deemed 10 be directly or mdlrectly, an ol1er or the sohcltatlon of an olfer to buyor sen any secunly referred toor mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of thesubscnber While we believe the sources of our mlormatlon tobe reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be talen bylho subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformalion Oelalleld, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporalton and ItS olflcers or employees, may now have, or may later tae, pOSItions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such position may be dillercnt trom any views nowor herealler e.pressed In Ihls or any other Issue Delafield Harvey labell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependcnlly 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on request