Viewing Month: December 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 04, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 04, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - December 04, 1987
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 1 December 4, 1987 – -;– Whethr-.-Lor -!lot .it…J.s… true-'o-that….one …picture is worth ..athous.!!nd words,thechar.t below captures almost perfectly our conception the dilemma facing today's investor. It is a 20-point-unit, point-and-figure chart tracing the last two years' action in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. It shows, in other words, each 20-point change in the Dow from early 1986 to date. Also included are some dates for key points on the chart. ,;noo O1l.o II -I I01'500 diOO a!oo 11& daoo a,oo II t''''00 \SOO ,'00 fa II III , 1500 It is interesting, with the Dow having on Thursday again moved below 1800, how much water has passed under the bridge since that figure was first attained. This was in March, 1986, and the remainder of that year was spent, for the most part, between 1780 and 1900. As 1987 began, the market went on a New Year's binge and reached 2400 in April. Four months later, on August 25, the bull-market high, at 2722.42, was achieved. The following month and a half produced the innocuous pattern which existed on October 12, 1987. The formation was rather obviously a top, but it was certainly a plausible assumption that the support in the 2400 – 2200 area might contain any decline. The following week, culminating in Meltdown Monday, showed us how ephemeral that support really was. Following that low, a two-day rally to 2027.85, so far the post-October high, took place. This was followed by a decline to 1800, a second rise above 2000, and the recent lateral trading range between 2000 and 1880. That range has just been penetrated on the downside. Here, then, is the dilemma. A great deal of work has been done in just seven weeks. An immediate upside penetration would call for an objective of 2400 for the Dow. This would be a worthwhile rally but, at its end, all upside objectives would have been reached. On the other hand, if that seven weeks of action is to be considered a top, two interpretations are possible. The first, including only action since November 2, would suggest that nothing worse than a test of the October low was in the offing, a test possibly occurring as we write this. A more pessimistic interpretation would suggest that the top began on October 21, and an objective in the 1600 – 1550 range is a possibility. At this point, though, further problems arise. If new lows are projected, one must take into account the possibility that the action shown constitutes a massive head-and-shoulders top. We hasten to add that we do not feel, at the moment. that this is a plausible interpretation. Known problems—the budget, the deficit, and the third world—seem insufficient, at their present magnitude, at least, to confirm so radical a projection. However, while the odds are strongly against this interpretation, one cannot pretend that the risk is not there, and the market analyst would be abdicating his responsibility if he did not call attention to it. The ancient Chinese curse, May you live in interesting times. n, may have special meaning for the investor in 1988, as he attempts to sort out the aftermath of the October collapse. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials Average (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (12/3/87) 1761.93 224.86 2899.32 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. –. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Iniormatton to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to betaken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue and such pOSition may be different from any VIews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered wllh Ihe SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to s Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informa\lon on any secunty mentioned herern IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 11, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 11, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - December 11, 1987
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 December 11, 1987 ThroughT..hursday 8fternoon—ofthisweek. at least.–t-he market was-able to-demonstrate – -mOderately improved performance. and it is at least arguable that a successful test of the mid-October lows was completed, Last Friday's close on the Dow—1766.74—was within 28 points of tile closing figure for October 19. A number of other averages, by the end of last week, had penetrated their previous lows, but. in almost all cases, by modest amounts. Depending on what average one chooses to look at, and whether the closing. intra-day, or hourly low is used, the statement can be made that a new low either was or was not achieved on December 4. In any case, all averages had declined, by that date, to the Vicinity of where they had been in mid-October. Immediately following this, on the first three days of tnis week, a fairly impressive sort of a rally took place. Over the three days, the Dow managed to tack on some 136 points. Although opening 50 points lower yesterday, the DJIA erased this loss and was ahead 15 points at mid-day. All this suggested that a successful test had taken place. The underlying momentum of the rise, however, left something to be desired. Breadth figures were considerably below their norm on the three rallying days, and volume failed to increase significantly. This latter statement is especially true when one adjusts for yet another complexity which has entered the current financial equation. That, of course, is the Japanese tax Jaw, which causes large blocks of high-yield stocks nominally to change hands around the ex-dividend date. Performing a rough adjustment on the past two weeks' volume to correct for this anomaly, it turns out that average trading levels for Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday were about the same as they had been in the prior week's declining markets. This raises questions, since true reversals tend to be characterized by rising volume along with rising prices. A more important emerging characteristic of teday's markets is increased volatility. It is —–ironic that-we–shoul-d-bediscussing-thissubject-'sincej'for-some–twoars–whileheDowwa,;s,;—–1 making new highs, the popular press repeatedly discussed upward price moves in terms of points rather than, properly, in terms of percentage. We complained about this long and loud, and pointed out that, observed correctly, market volatility in the mid 1980's was not at all unusual. Meltdown Monday, however, changed all that. Since October 19, the market has, demonstrably become more volatile. Indeed. we have been somewhat blase about this. Thursday's action—with the Dow down 50 shortly after the opening, followed by a 65-point advance and the subsequent loss of just about the entire rise—seemed almost normal considering the experience of the past eight or nine weeks. One test of volatility, which we performed this week, involved extracting from our data base the 100 largest advances and 100 largest declines for a single day since the inception of the modern Dow Jones Industrial Average. As we all know by now, October 19 tops the list of declines with nothing else even close. The 22.6 percent fall is almost twice as great as that of October 28, 1929, and, in one day, almost managed to equal the two-day collapse of October 28-29 in that year. Moreover. no fewer than four one-day drops in the past two months managed to make the list. The 156-point drop on October 26 ranked sixth, and two other declines, on October 16 and November 30, qualify for inclusion. This compares to just four cases in the entire modern era—1949 to 1986, a period of 37 years, Seventy-four of the 100 declines occurred during the years 1929 to 1933. Thus, the market seems to be producing swings of a magnitude not common for almost 60 years. Analysis of record market advances tells, roughly. the same story. The 186-point rally on October 21 was the fifth largest rise in modern history, and two other recent rises—October 20 and October 29—a1so make the list. Like its downside counterpart, the list of 100 greatest advances is dominated by five years, 1929 to 1933, which produced 71 of the 100 cases. The question, of course, is what, precisely, we should make of all this. For the technician, life would be much easier if it were possible to dismiss it as a temporary aberration that will, eventually, go away. We are not all that sure, however, that this is the case. If we are entering a period when market moves must be compared to those of the early 1930's, rather than the more recent experience, a good many technical market parameters are going to have to be substantially revised. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. AWTebn Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 1860.08 S & P 500 (1200) 253.34 Cumulative Index (12/10/87) 2909.43 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sohcltatlon of an offerto buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience at the subsCriber While we believe the sources of our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracythereo! nor of the statements made herein Any action 10 be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformaliOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a corporatIOn and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSlbon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further InformabOn on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 18, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 18, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - December 18, 1987
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'U'& \ ( ! U E L L ' S &lRD'tIE'U' LIE'U''U'IER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 December 18, 1987 — -This…. pa-rticular-'.issue -of -our;'.mar-ket letter,-!-bound, by- tradition, often-rnakes-ratherdull,! reading, and the task of its preparation is equally boresome. This is true because it is customarily a recapitulation of the prior year's market action, something we have always felt constituted a necessary preparation for the next week's year-end forecast. Any year. however, which includes a market like that of October 19, 1987, has to be considered, to say to least, one of above-average interest. Despite the continued flow of punditry focusing on Meltdown Monday, the largest one-day decline in modern market history. seems, after only two months to be beginning to fade from investor consciousness. This is partially due to the short time period into Which the 1987 decline was compressed, but, on a deeper level, it can also be accounted for by remarking on the simple fact that 1987. even though it includes October's record-setting drop. will, in all probability, be an up market year. It is necessary to remind oneself that the 1986 close for the Dow was 1895.95. Indeed, the highest figure attained by the average throughout that year was the December high of 1955.57. It is, therefore, tempting to regard the first ten months of 1987 8S 8 sort of pipe dream in Which all manner of ethereal events took place until we awoke to reality in November with the Dow just about where it was when the whole thing began. This temptation, we will attempt to suggest, is one that should be avoided. It is, of course, easy, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, to explain how bizarre the 1987 rise through August 25 indeed was. A market, which was at least fully valued at 1986 year-end, had succumbed to total irrationality by mid-summer. The justification, presumably, was that, in a period when takeovers were thought to have the power to make all those in their vicinity instantly rich, was the notion that equities should sen at their so-called breakup value. That concept, which can now join its many predecessors in the graveyard of stock-market illusions, was one sriffn.nUs for -e.-ma-r1et which -rose–over-ei.ghtmontho;–with-no-correction-greater-than-6–l-l-2-or—-I one lasting more thsn ten days. Nor did it appear during a mild September downswing that any change in this pattern was was imminent. Indeed, on October 2, the Dow was, at 2641. within 81 points of its all-time high in August. The next three weeks, of course, will become part of market legend. The first week of October produced a 158-point loss, and things began to lOOk serious. The next week shaved another 236 points off the Dow, and what had been serious approached the catastrophic. This was all before Monday's debacle had even taken place. The 508 points lost on that day, plus Tuesday's underlying weakness with its intra-day low of 1616 for the Dow, were finally halted by Wednesday's sharp rally. The high for that one-day move and the prior low have set the outer limits of the Dow's trading range to date. Regular readers of this letter are aware of our opmlOn that the only period of market history with which one can compare those three weeks is October. 1929. They are also aware of the current similarities to that market which we have been pointing out for over a year. In February, 1986. we reiterated our one conception of the 1929 market by saying, nOur own view is that the stock market debacle, which lasted for ten weeks, is one phenomenon. a market collapse Which certainly differs from a host of others in magnitude but not necessarily in nature. The thirteen years of depression which foUbwed are, in reality. what evoke the shudders which mention of the year 1929 induces today. We felt, and still feel, that October, 1929 was an internal market event which did not necessarily have to be followed by 1930-1932 and ten years of subsequent depression. We think. most importantly though, that the same can be said about October, 1987. Should we then simply dismiss that awful month as nothing more than a temporary aberration We do not think so. As we have pointed out in the last half-dozen issues of ' this piece; increased volatIlity. almost equal to that of October, continues to be a feature of today's stock market. That volatility, like the decline itself, can only be compared to the swings Which typified the 1920 's and 1930's. If 1t continues—and there is no evidence that it is ceasing—we may be forced to look at the equity market in entirely new ways. Recognition of this fact will be crucial in formulating a 1988 forecast. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 1956.40 S & P 500 (1200) 246.14 Cumulative Index (12/17/87) 3021.68 A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL!! No statement or e)(presslon of Opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicrtallon of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentlOfled The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements made herein Any action to 00 taken by Ihe subscnoor should be based on hiS own mveshgalllm and mlormallOn Delafield, Harvey, TabelJ Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(pressed In Ihls or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may gIVe adVICe to tIS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request I. I lid ,R ,,,

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 23, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 23, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - December 23, 1987
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1Li\ ISlIE n.. n.. ' S 1ri1ilLi\IRlM 1E1 n..IE11IEFJ 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 December 23, 1987 ——- –….- … Our readers Bre aware th8t as a rather memorable 1987 draws to a close. tradition dictates the issuance of a 1988 forecast. This task tends to vary in difficulty. Sometimes December will find the stock market in a clearly identifiable trend, and the forecasting task becomes relatively simple. Other Decembers have produced 8 technical outlook somewhat more clouded. and. in such cases in the past, it would have been our preference not to issue any forecast at aU. Such junctures have occasionally resulted in predictions which turned out to be gloriously wrong. One such case occurred in December, 1975 when, with the Dow having posted a steep gain in the prior year and beginning to show signs of exhaustion, we projected that 1976 might be an inside year, one in which neither the 1975 high nor low would be exceeded. This particular fearless forecast was made on December 26, with the Dow at 854 versus a 1975 high of 881. As 1976 began, the market took off like a rocket, reaching a new high on the third trading day of January, and moving above 1000 in early March. One of our colleagues has called us Mr. Inside ever since. However, despite having been once burned, we think the inside-year forecast is, at this pOint, the most plausible one for 1988, and once more we are willing to stick our neck out with such a forecast. It has, actually, a few things going for it. The 1987 closing high (2722.42 on August 25) and low (J738,74 on October 19) are further apart than has been the case in any year since 1938, the high figure being 156 of the low one. Along with many similar measures, it has the flavor of days long gone by. Such a spread has not occured since 1938, but, between 1897 and that date, a wider annual range occurred on no fewer than 13 occasions. Leaving volatility aside for a moment, the current outlook is, we think. suggested by a number of fundamental and technical indications. The Dow, as we are painfully aware, reached 8 low on October 19 and a subsequent high of 2027.75 two days later. For the remainder of 1987, tnat range has contained the average, with an apparently successful test earlier this month. Given increased –dailyand- intraday volatility;—an-extemrtve-pot!lJltial -b-asei'oNn/ftioYlllas beeiltraceaoliCinjtisr- over two months. If we are to assume that improving technical action over the past two weeks forecasts an imminent breakout from this range, the pattern is broad enough to suggest upside objectives in the 2500 – 2600 range, significant indeed, but still well under the 1987 high. What might happen thereafter can only be guessed at, but such a rise, followed by the formation of a new pattern of some sort, could well occupy a major portion of 1988. The argument against a new peak next year can also be adduced from a valuation approach. As we discovered, much to our regret in the fall, pIe ratios for the major averages were, in mid-summer, 1987, at historically high levels and yields had reached extraordinary lows. As we write this, reasonably optimistic forecasts for 1988 earnings are being issued. In the past, however, market optimism, once shattered, rarely repeats its former excesses for many years. We would, therefore, expect rising earnings to be valued more conservatively than was the case a year ago. Along with arguments favoring the absence of a new high in 1988, we should also examine the case for projecting no significant new low. Such a case can, we think, be drawn from the improving technical action demonstrated over the past fortnight, which at least suggests that the eventual breakout from the 1987 trading range will be on the upside. Needless to say, our current forecast would have to be radically revised were a breakout attempt to fail and the expected strong year-end rally not to be forthcoming. As is the case with the first part of our forecast, fundamentals also seem to argue that the 1987 low might hold. Readers know that we have been forced to compare the present market with that of 1929, and that it is our strong belief that both the initial 1929 break and the October 1987 meltdown were essentially technical, market-related phenomena. The 1930-1932 collapse, on the other hand, was based on a whole series of economic events which did not, we now know by hindsight. necessarily have to occur. The great depression, which dragged stock prices to further new lows for two long years, arose from failure to understand the severity of the economic forces at work. The risks, at the moment, are real. but it is, in our view, possible to avoid a similar failure in the year ahead, although it is too early to ascertain whether we will be so fortunate. If such is the case, however, the pattern of the 1930's will probably not repeat itself, and the 1987 low could effectively hold. ANTHONY W. T ABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials S & P 500 2005.63 253.32 AWTebh WE WISH YOU ALL A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR! No statement or expression of op'nion or any other maner herein contained IS, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, dlreclly ormd.rectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or menllOncd The matter IS presenled merely for lhe convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Informallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee lhe accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and mformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corporation and !Is officers or employees, may now have or may laler take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securities menllOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered Wllh the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to 115 investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Furlher Informa\!on on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 31, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 31, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - December 31, 1987
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 December 31. 1987 For some years now, we–'have studied the familiar seasonal tendency of -the stock market to stage a year-end rally, and it has been the custom of this letter to point out some of the conclusions that can be derived from a study of this phenomenon. Since 1897, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average was first computed a rally. however small. has begun in December and continued into the new year in 88 of 90 cases, the two exceptions occurring in the mid 1970's. The following facts about the year-end rally may be noted. 1. The year-end rally often has been of great magnitude, occasionally continuing through the entire subsequent year without a 5 correction being recorded. This was the case in 1985. It has frequently continued, with only minor interruptions, for as long as six months into the new year. In many cases, with 1987 being the most recent, the rally continued into February, March or beyond. However, on other occasions, it has been of only a few day's duration. reaching a top extremely early, as was the case in 1983-4 when the rally peaked on January 6, which turned out to be the high for the year. In the bear-market years of 1960, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1981, and 1982, the rally reached a peak by the first week in January, and, as noted above, the 1976 and 1977 year-end rallies failed entirely to carry into January. 2. There has been a persistent tendency for the rally to begin early in years when the market has been up, and late in years when the market has been down. In recent upward yeats, 1967, 1975. 1979, 1980, and 1985 are examples, the rally commenced from early December. In recent downward years, 1962, 1966, 1969, 1977, and 1981, the rally began late in the year. 1986 was an exception, an upward year where the year-end rally started on December 31. This year's year-end rally probably started on December 4, and, strange as it may seem, 1987 is, indeed, technically, an up year. 3. The important thingto watch-in connection with the maI!-ket action in the- early months of the new year is the December low. This low has been broken in 52 years out of the past 87. However. in 30 of these 52 cases, it was broken in January and February. For example in 1970, 1973, 1977, 1978, 1981, and 1982, the December low was broken in early January. Since 1937, it has never been broken later than mid-March with four exceptions 1965. 1974, 1981, and, of course, 1987. Thus. if the market is able to hold above its December low for the first 2 1/2 months of the year, chances become good that this low will not be penetrated. 4. In years when the December low has been broken, the SUbsequent trend has been downwards two-thirds of the time. 1962, 1966, 1969, 1973, 1974. 1977, and to some degree, 1984, are typical cases. 1965, 1978, 1980, and, most recently, 1982 are exceptions. 5. The magnitude of the rally is an important clue as to the year's market trend. For example. an advance of 10 or more from the December low has been followed by an upward or neutral market in 39 of the 45 years that such an advance has occurred. An advance of less than 10 or more from the December low before an identifiable correction takes place has been followed by a downward market in 30 of the 42 years. In 1985, 1986, and 1987, the year-end rally was well in excess of 10. In 1962, 1970, 1973, and 1977, as examples, it was less than this figure. 6. The length of time in which the rally continues into the new year is important. For example, in 27 years, the rally continued into March or later. In 23 of these 27 years, the eventual trend was upward. In 1964, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1985, and 1986, the year-end rally continued into March and in 1961, 1967, 1971, and 1980, into February. This year, interestingly, the market had already, on December 23, advanced 13.5 from its December low of 1766.74 on December 4. Thus, if the rally continues into January, the greater-than-10 advance will be a bullish indication. Continuance of the rally into February-March will. on the historical record, be furtner cause for optimism. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (12/30/87) S & P 500 (12/30/87) Cumulative Index 02/29/87) 1950.10 247.70 3059.52 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. WE WISH YOU ALL A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR! No statement Of expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy orsell any security referred to or menhoned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and mformal1on Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitIons or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS Of any future Issue, and such poSlllOn may be – – , -dlfferentlrom any views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Oelalleld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give adVice 10 ItS Investment advISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In Ihls or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any secunty mentioned hereIn IS available on request

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