Viewing Month: May 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 01, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 01, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - May 01, 1987
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIA TlON OF SECURITIES OEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 . May 1. 1987 It remains to be seen whether the adage about April showers and May flowers will hold true I—.-cfor…..the …stock…..market–in4-B8-7T- Thelatest eI!ain-on… the… ma.r-ket's,..pa-I!sde… tGOk- theform-of-a7….-27– —-; decline over 14 trading daysr. following that one bright shining moment when the Dow closed above 24M on April 6. Thursday's market strength suggested that the decline might, for the time being, be over, although a test of the lows in the low-2200 area cannot be ruled out. The most readable downside targets for the Dow were in the 2170-2090 range. and the upper part of this range was approached intra-day last week. The next major problem facing the technician will be determining whether April's action constitutes a correction in an ongoing bull market or the begInning of a top formation. Central to this will be an analysis of the next rally. As part of this process. we will be looking at indicators such as these shown below. DOH JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE BRERDTH Market breadth produced a bullish confirmation when. after reaching a new low on the last day of 1986. it recovered to a new bull-market high above its earlier April peak. The only wornsome feature is the mild divergence between March 26 and April 3 and the steep decline which has since occurred. We would be disappointed, for example. to see the breadth index move below its bottom of last December. something it could do with a few sharply declining days. Eventually. for the bull market again to be confirmed. it will have to move ahead to a new high. As far as new highs and lows are concerned. the lO-day average in January broke 8 short-term trend line and achieved a level above its August peak. Subsequent action, however. produced a decline below the zero level. a reading which. while not immediately bearish;; is generally associated with the later stages of a bull market. Ability to move above its January high. where a couple of days saw more than 200 new highs being achieved. would also indicate an ongoing uptrend. May-June action, traditionally, is a time of testing. If the averages can spend the next two months re-basing and commence a rally. with internal strength in the indicators shown above, continuation of the bull market will become a probability. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. AWTbh Dow Jones Industrial (1200) 2298.29 S & P 500 (1200) 289.59 Cumulative Index (4130187) 3662.91 No stalemCfll or expression of OPiniOn or any other matter herem contamed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the SOlicitation of an oller to buy or sell any security referred toor mentioned The mattellS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent 01 guarantC'E! the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herem Any aCllon to be taken by the subscllber Should be based on his own Investigation and mlormallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a COfpora1l0n and ItS ofllcers or employees may now have or may later lake poslhons or trades In respect 10 any seculilies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be d,ltercnt from any views now or heH!afler e.pressed In thiS 01 any other Issue Delafield Harvey, Tabelf Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, mayQlve adlce to ItS Investment adVISOry and other CUSlomerS Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further In/ormation on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 08, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 08, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - May 08, 1987
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— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS. INC (609) 987-2300 May 8, 1987 One of our favorite definitions of market technician has always been market -historian!L.-The- twoterms-arenot 'totally-synonomousrbut'theyare-,.ea'SOfi9.bl-rclOlle. A – – – – – 1 – – major portion of the technician's art has always involved the collection of historical patterns of market behaviour which have, in the past, tended to be precursors of some form of subsequent behaviour. Historical data, often very extensive, has therefore, always been grist for the technician's mill. Very often, however, new phenomena, for which little or no historical data exists, emerge upon the investment scene. The best that the analyst can do in such cases is to use his own intuition as a guide to what, if anything, the new data may be foretelling. There are, in our view, two current factors severely impacting the stock-market scene where such intuition must largely be used as a substitute for historical analysis. These factors are, first, the emergence during the 1980's of derivative instruments and, secondly, the burgeoning U.S. trade deficit. Derivatives, for those unfamilar with the term, is a catch-all description referring to the futures and option contracts which have come to play so important a part in today's market milieu. It may be argued that such products fail to qualify as lacking history, given the flood of data which they produce every market day. However, their fairly recent introduction and the fact that they have not existed in their present magnititude—a magnitude in which the shares represented on a given day by derivative trading exceed NYSE volume—through a complete market cycle argue that there is a great deal about their long-term market effect that we must still attempt to guess. There is, at least, some small room for doubt as to whether or not these instruments, in fact, possess any social utility. The justification for the existence of financial markets has always been, it seems to us, that they represent the conduit through which thenations's.ayiQgs can be channeledinto Ilro.-!lucliYe capital imces!ment.S,econdar.y t. markets, thus, can be thought of as an ancillary necessity—much as a broad and liquid used-car market serves to facilitate the sale of new automobiles. Derivative instruments, however, depending, as they do, on the existence of secondary markets, exist at one further remove from the financial industry's basic function of raising new capital. Such instruments can, of course, be justified on the basis that risk is endemic to financial markets, and that derivatives represent an efficient means of offloading a portion of that risk onto those willing to assume it. There is, however, a counter-argument suggesting that speculative capital can better be channeled directly into new investment and that the existence of derivatives may, indeed, be diverting such capital from its highest and best use. Needless to say, no historical data exists to suggest a resolution of this debate. Intuition, moreover, suggests the existence of certain problems for which there is no clear solution. Implicit in option and futures contracts is the assumption that the other party to the contract will be able to honor his obligation. This has always been the case so far, but one lesson of history is that financial institutions tend to be less than immune to failure. We can only guess at how such a failure, on the part of a party to large numbers of derivative contracts, might affect markets for those contracts and secondly, the stock market itself. In the case of the trade deficit, we have no history to guide us simply because it, also, in the past, has never reached its current proportions. Furthermore, the workings of international money markets have always been somewhat obscure. (It was once suggested that only two people in the entire world fully understood these markets—a partner in the House of Rothschild and a clerk in the Bank of England—and they disagreed.) It is widely assumed that the current collapse of the U.S; dollar'versus most foreign-currencies does not augur well for the U.S. economy. We have, however, obvserved very little in the way of hard data suggesting precisely what effect ongoing dollar weakness might have on the economy and why it should have that effect. The course of financial markets has always been determined by a combination of repetition of old phenomena and the emergence of new ones. Such an emergence is likely to be crucial at some stage of the current environment. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrial (1200) 2320.17 S & P 500 (1200) 295.57 Cumulative Index (5/7/87) 3715.07 No statement or epresSjon of OPinIon or any Olllel matter herein contained 1, or IS to be deemed to be dlreclly or mdlrectly, an offer or the SOliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred loor mentioned The maIler IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber WhIle we beheve the sources 01 our Inlormatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and ItS olflcers or employees may now have, or may later take, poSItions or trades m respect 10 any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be dllferent Irom any views nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield Harvey TaOOIl Inc, which IS registered wllh the SECasan Investment adVisor, mayQlve adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mlormatlon on any security mentioned herein IS avaUableon request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 15, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 15, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - May 15, 1987
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 May 15, 1987 –,.. S hart-term -market-actionl-Bomewhat–lessthan… ex citin g….,overthe..-pas tfew 4 weeks. .ha. non ethel es s .. …,.-\ been' satisfactory The most likely interpretation of the recent trading pattern, in our view, is that it constitutes a consolidation phase—necessary after the rather extraordinary rise of the first three months of the year. A fair amount of reaccumulation has already taken place. sufficient to suggest a move to new highs, although not by a great deal. The most plausible upside objective for the Dow, for example, is around 2425. Obviously, existing base patterns could broaden around current levels and, thus, ultimately suggest more worthwhile objectives. Patterns for the various averages. however. are somewhat less than uniform. The Transports, for instance, have a pattern similar to the Industrials but appear to be well ahead as far as timing is concerned. The DJTA achieved a new closing high of 976.04 yesterday, and it is currently close to most readable objectives. The Utilities, which may be taken as a proxy for interest-sensitive issues, behaved much worse than the Industrials on the recent decline, posting a fall of almost 16. They have since begun what well may be their own reaccumulation phase, but a good deal more broadening will be required before any meaningful move can be expected. There are, essentially. two viewpoints from which to observe the action of any market. These correspond to the axes on conventional charts, the vertical axis of price and the horizontal axis representing time. Thus one way to view the action of the Dow is to note that it advanced 26.88 in 1987 through April 6. Another view notes that this rise required 66 trading days. The most useful aspect of timeframe, however. is not duration, but consistency of action over a given period. It is meaningful to state, in other words. that, between December 31, 1986 and April 6, 1987, there were only nine intervals of a day or longer in which the Dow failed to post a new high, and the longest of these intervals was just eight days long. It is this sort of relentless push to new highs that characterizes dynamic bull markets. just as much as does a sharp percentage advance. Viewed in this framework, one of the most critical facts regarding todays market is that 28 trading days have now elapsed since the last new high was posted on April 6. For almost six weeks, inotherJ..word9-;-t-hereha9x-isted-uncertaint-y-a9-to …whet-her-o-p–not,……on-A-pPil-6-.-the-mark-e-t-rea-ched-a—-I– major high. That uncertainty continues to exist. As far as intervals between new highs are concerned, a few generalizations may perhaps be useful. The initial phase of a given rise generally consists of a dynamic upthrust, during which time the intervals between new highs are short indeed. By contrast, as a bull market becomes more mature, one of two phenomena tends to emerge. The first is a long, intermediate-term correction which, of course, involves a protracted gap between highs. An example is the period between July. 1975 and January, 1976, part of the bull market which started on December 6, 1974, at 577.60, and rose to 1014.79 on September 21, 1976. The gap between the two peaks occupied 120 trading days. The dual highs were at around the 890 level, at which point a good portion of the entire bull-market move had already taken place. The second phenomenon which often occurs in the mature stages of bull markets is the appearance of repetitive periods of modest length separating new highs. Another example can be drawn from the 1974-1976 bull market referred to above. It posted a high of 1009.21 on March 24, 1976. It was 18 days until the next high at 1011.02, 55 days until that high was exceeded, and then another 49 days before the market reached its ultimate zenith at 1014.79. Similar examples may be drawn from previous bull markets. Between November, 1970, and April, 1971, a rise took place which produced no interval of longer than l days without a new high. At the end of this phase, three-quarters of the total bull-market move had already occurred. It is a bit more difficult to place the current year in prospective. All of 1986, or at any rate, the last nine months of it, essentially consisted of a sideways move with wide intervals' between new peaks. Previously. February-March, 1986 saw the Dow move from 1600 to 1821 with the longest interval between new highs being seven days. It is possible, therefore. that March-December, 1986 constituted a corrective phase for that move. It seems probable that. based on historical precedent, that this first emergence of a fairly wide interval between highs is not likely to signify that a top took place on April 6.- …..1t is possible that it does lndicate the start of a slower advancing phase, and may indicate that much of the upward move which began at the end of 1986 may be now behind us. If a top of importance is being sketched out at the moment, a characteristic pattern would be a whole series of minor new highs occurring a significant number of days apart. Such a process would, by nature, require a fairly lengthy amount of time. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2312.36 S & P 500 (1200) 291.89 Cumulative Index (5114187) 3733.30 No statement or ewpresslon 01 opmlon or any other mailer herem contamed IS or IS to be deemed 10 be directly or mdlrectly, an ol1er or the sohcltatlon of an olfer to buyor sen any secunly referred toor mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of thesubscnber While we believe the sources of our mlormatlon tobe reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be talen bylho subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and mformalion Oelalleld, Harvey, labell Inc, as a corporalton and ItS olflcers or employees, may now have, or may later tae, pOSItions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such position may be dillercnt trom any views nowor herealler e.pressed In Ihls or any other Issue Delafield Harvey labell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependcnlly 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 22, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 22, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - May 22, 1987
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 May 22. 1987 1–..,,, S.OIlJc4tY,—–prhpe n.sjdr it 0Eei –,,-a2'etirement project—someone is going to write 'a.. book with-'8 'titleon ,the order-of -The-Language-of'WaIl sfFeett;–OMofmemOre 'CliBr!!ling—– characteristics of the financial industry has always been its passion for coining original words or phrases to refer to its own activitIes. This practice antedates, by many years, the emergence of a securities market in the United States4 Consider, for example, the origin of those most familar of Wall Street terms, Bunn and Bear1l. The Oxford English Dictionary notes that the latter term, at least, was common at the time of the South Sea Bubble. It goes on to say, tiThe term 'bearskin jobber' then applied to the dealer now called the 'bear', makes it probable that the original phrase was 'sell the bearskin', and that it origniated In the well-known proverb 'To sell the bear's skin before one has caught the bear'. The OED is less specific on the emergence of the opposite term. but it is, at least, a reasonable guess that It derives from the then-current practice of pitting the two animals together in a fight, thus creating an obivous antonym for the figurative bear. More than a few financial terms go back that far. The term bankrupt, for example, derives from the fact that Venetian money changers occupied benches around a central square, and it was customary, when such a dealer became insolvent, to break his bench. Banca Rotta, the Italian for broken bench, was ultimately incorporated into English as bankrupt. Many financial terms in common use today originated in the early part of this century. Apparently, the mysterious phrase the interests, or the equally mysterious they, came into being during that period when they were busy manipulating stock prices. More colorful terms also became common. Pulling the plug referred to what took place after market manipulators had finally distributed the last least of their holdings in a given stock. Equally colorful was the term bucket shop, used to describe a broker-dealer whose practice it was to accept customer orders for securities but not to execute them. A fascinating sidelight to this practice was that many bucket-shop operators, who were effectively betting against their customers, were, in fact, quite successful. This was probably an early manlfestation of the principle that the small, 1——'–nansoph1sticated;rrvestor-was-likely-to-lose Lmoney.Ortechnioians–thisled ,…toihe….tabula.tiofta-.n! I interpretation of odd-lot statistics and a whole host of other indicators which later emerged under the general classification of sentiment indicators. The common belief behind all such indicators is that there exist classes of market participants who tend to be wrong at major turning points. One such participant, we regret to report, apparently is the market-letter writer, since there exists a very successful indicator based on the opinions of these pundits, who tend, as a group, to be bullish coincidentally with market tops and to display maximum bearishness near important lows. Colorful terms have, of cours,e, continued to be coined right up to the present. Gunslinger came to be used in the 1960's to denote an aggressive portfolio manager. (The words aggressive and defensive as cliches to apply to money managers are also of fairly recent origin, arriving from the academic world, which has, of late, become an important contributor to financial jargon.) The current takeover boom has, of course, supplied its own colorful terminology. The stock of a company subject to a takeover is said to be put in play. The first reaction of its officers is generally to provide themselves with a golden parachute, and , if possible, forestall the takeover with a poison pill. If all of this fails, the company may seek out a white knight who is willing to make a higher bid and, not coincidentally, retain the current management. Many financial terms are, unfortunately, misuses of perfectly valid English words. Consider arbitragell , used to descnbe the practice of speculation on takeovers. For a short while, this practice was called II r isk arbitrage which is, of course, an oxymoron. The usage sanctified by the years for the word arbltrage has been to describe a riskless transaction which takes advantage of price differentials between two markets by the the simultaneous buying and selling of a security in the different locations, Thus the arbs, who now face problems a good deal more serious, can also be accused of corrupting a perfectly good word. Interestingly, a new phrase, program trading, has had to be coined to identify what is, properly, an arbitrage transaction. As noted above, academia has contributed a number of phrases, one of the most widely spread of which is beta. This, of course, is properly a mathematical term (such terms, for some reason, are often Greek) used in a process called regression analysis.- By this -time, the lay investor knows -011——- he needs to know about the term—that a high beta denotes a volatile stock and a low beta indicates one likely to be less risky. We once noted in this space that one of the more attractive characteristic of the English language is its richness. Our own industry, happily, makes its own small contribution to that richness by the new usages it has brought to the language. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2242.46 S P 500 (1200) 282.64 Cumulative Index (5/21/87) 3604.13 No statement or expression 01 Opinion Of any other maltel herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be directly or Indirectly an olter or the sollcltahon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources 01 our Informalron to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of Ihe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Iflvestlgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey Tabett Inc as a corporation and Its officers or employees may now have, or may laler lake, posilions or trades Ifl respect to any securities mentioned Ifl thiS or any future ISSue and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey Tabell Inc, which IS registered wllh the SECas an Investment adVisor, may give adVice lOllS Investmenl adVISOry and other customers Independently of any slatements made Ifl thiS or m any other Issue Further mlormalton on any secuflly menhoned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – May 29, 1987

Tabell’s Market Letter – May 29, 1987

Tabell's Market Letter - May 29, 1987
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TABELL'S, MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – May 29, 1987 – – – –4.'-hose–ef-us… forwhom-, ,…..in-!'Our- youth,;military—-serv-ice-was–compulsory,–quickly learned.-that-C-t-he – armeo forCes-hiiCl'their own way ofdoing things. One such'praclice- was themefhod usecrto move troops from one place to another, fondly recsled as hurry up and wait. This procedure required a unit of troops to fall out on five minutes notice and march, often at double time, to some location where its members could hang around for some three or four hours. This was, of course, followed by another speedy formation and a quick-march to another location. The process could be, and often was, continued ad infinitum. The stock market seems. of late, to have begun to behave in accordance with the hurry-up-and-wait principle. Much of its time appears to be spent drifting idly around a given level until, at some point, an outside impetus, often programmed trading, moves it sharply in one direction or another. Once the outside force is dissipated, the market tends to resume its lackluster drift at some new price level. It can be argued that this sort of spastic motion is also being exhibited on a longer-term basis. Market dullness prevailed for the latter nine months of last year. This drift was both preceded and followed by sharp and dramatic upward moves. An important question being posed to the technician today concerns whether or not yet another period of drift has been initiated. A case can be made for this hypothesis. Some eight weeks have gone by without a new high's being posted, and, during those eight weekS, the Dow has etched out an identifiable trading range, between a low of around 2200 and a high of approximately 2350. The average's high of 2405.54 on April 6, was immediately followed by a drop of 150 points over a six-day span, reaching 2252.98 on April 14. A rebound to 2337.07 a week later was retraced by a 100-point fall to an April 27 closing low of 2230.54. The intra-day bottom on that day was 2180.54. Early this month, ending on May 6, a rise to a closing high of 2342.19 took place and was immediately followed by a drop to 2215.87 on May 20. As this is written, we are once again flirting with the 2300 level. —–norl1el'-toputall of'tlrislmospective,- itInay-lie lrelpfur't'eview-market action-since,–II- the historic low of 776.92 on August 12, 1982. We can, with the benefit of hindsight, trace out three rsllying phases which have brought us to the point at which we find ourselves today. The first such rslly continued through November 29, 1983 and brought the DJIA to 1287.20, a 65.68 advance. Breadth peaked five months before the market, in June, 1983, when secondary issues began their precipitous fsll. The entire advance took place over 329 trading days. The extent of the second advance, from July 1984 to mid-1986, was almost identical if measured to the high on March 27. It moved the average ahead by 67.66 over 423 trading days. The high for market breadth occurred in the early part of the subsequent trading range, on April 21. Finslly, we have the current advance. So far, it has not produced a rise anything like the two earlier ones. The market has risen only 27 since the end of the year and 37 if measured from the low of 1986. It has occupied only 66 trading days so far. We do have the possiblity of a breadth divergence with daily breadth having peaked on March 23, a week before the averages. It can certainly be contended that the advance should resume shortly with a breakthrough to new highs. The advance from year-end has covered nothing near the ground covered by the two previous rsllies and it has, so far, lasted only one-fifth as long. The totsl correction to date, 7.88 between April 6 and May 20, is no more serious than many similar corrections which occured within the context of the two prior uptrends. Another argument in favor of an ongoing upswing is the existence of a breadth high as recently as late March. Such highs, as we have recently noted, tend to precede highs in the averages by many months. If, however, a new high or. at least, an upside breakout above 2350 does not occur shortly, the possibility of a new, intermediate-term market phase would have to be explored. The first upswing in the present bull cycle was corrected by a farny severe decline in the averages (15). That decline was precipitous and, indeed, nowhere during its duration did a rally of more'than 5 take place. The 1984-1986 rally, by contrast, was corrected by only a trading range which, indeed, had a modest upward bias, with each consecutive peak being slightly higher than the previous one. So far, present action looks something like a repeat of that phase, and would begin to look more and more like it if the roughly-2200-to-2350 trading range continues for some period of time. The worst possible course of action at the moment would be a correction of 1983-1984 severity or worse. For reasons outlined above, this appears to be the least likely scenario. Were an immediate break below 2200 to occur, however, it would have to be regarded as at least a possibility. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWTebh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2317.20 S & P 500 (1200) 291.94 Cumulative Index (5/28/87) 3675.84 No statement or expresSion of Opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be directly or mdlrectly. an offer or the soliCitation 01 an offer 10 buyor sel! any secunty referred toor menlloned The malter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on his own mvestlgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and Its officers Of cmployees, may now have, or may later take, posilions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned In this or any future Issue, and such position may be dl1lerent from any views now or hereafter c)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to Its Investment adVISOry and other cuSlomers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on reQuest

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