,— ,. …. ! —- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VOAK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 12, 1979 It would, needless to say, be possible, given the time and space,to put together a short book exploring the ramifications of the astonishing market events of the past week. Both factors, however, are limited, so we must content ourselves at this stage with what we hope are some relevant observations. It is first necessary, we think, to disabuse oneself of the notion that the shift in monetary policy announced by the Federal Reserve last weekend has any relationship to the behavior of the stock market any more tangible than the trigger has to the rifle bullet which it fires. Let it be remembered that it was only last summer that the market greeted the accession of Mr. Volcker to the Fed chairmanship' with one of the stronger rallies it had put on all year. This was, presumably, in anticipation of his instituting precisely those policies which were set in motion last weekend. The market seldom performs in a faShion vastly different from one for which it has prepared itself, although sudden and unexpected events — of which more below — can often greatly intensify that performance. Such was the case, we think, this week. Let us next consider the volume, a record 81 million shares on Wednesday, coupled with almost equally amazing numbers the rest of the week. This, in our opinion, is the least remarkable aspect of the whole affair. Recent volume figures, in relation to shares listed and to the historical record have, if anything, been on the low side. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that trading activity, an increase in which is a normal function of unusually sharp downswings, should have attained new records this week. Indeed we doubt very much that this particular record will stand for very long. Neither is the steepness of the decline all that unprecedented. The Dow found itself down 4.46 on Tuesday and off 5.38 for the three days ended Wednesday. Comparable drops, at various stages The factor that does, we think, set this week's market apart and which assumes paramount im- portance from an analytical point of view is the downswing's unusual broadness. On Tuesday, 1765 issues out of a total 'of 1937 traded moved lower. This instance, of 91.12 of all issues traded de- clining, is, for the record, the 7th largest percentage, over the 53 years that breadth figures have been kept. The 86 figure, which followed it on Wednesday is, itself, almost as unprecedented. Since this sort of downside breadth is, indeed, relatively uncommon, it is appropriate to ask, Of what stage of the market cycle is it characteristic The most important fact which can be noted is that it is NOT, historically, characteristic of the early stages of an ongoing decline. Examination of the record shows that, as a long downswing starts out and begins to gain momentum, trading days in which 70-8(1 of traded issues fall in price begin, to become a fairly regular feature. The sort of extraordinary downside breadth occurring this week has almost universally failed to occur until such time as the market approached a climactic bottom. Now with the major averages having reached new peaks just a week ago (and unweighted aver- ages some six weeks ago), it is somewhat fatuous to compare recent action to the sort of thing that occurs at the end of major bear markets. It does, however, tend to occur on one other sort of oc- casion, those rare instances where a market decline is related to a sudden and unexpected event. Examples which occur are the Kennedy assassination (75.8 of issues declining), the Eisenhower heart attack (92.88), and the outbreak of the Korean War (89.5). Perhaps the most parallel is the announcement of the Treasury-Fed accord of March, 1951 (82.5), probably the last instance of a shift in monetary policy comparable to the present one. In all of these instances, a decline which might have been stretched out over a relatively long period was compressed into a short space of time given the impetus of a particular event. It is worth noting that all of the instances mentioned above were, shortly, followed by recoveries which took the market to new highs. – – ——–. Now we are not here either suggesting such a recovery or indicating that new lows in the present downswing may not continue to occur over the near term. We think, though, that the record does suggest the inadvisability of precipitate action in response to last week's events. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (10/11/79) 845.22 105.30 743.86 AWT sla No statement or expression of opInion or any other mattcr herein Contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or mdlrectly, on offer or the solICItation of on offer to buy or self any sewflty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for Ihe canverlencEo of the subsctlber While we believe the sources of our II'1formo- tlon to be reliable, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be tal-en by the subscnber should be based on h own Ifwesligolion and 1I'110rmCllion Janney Monlgome-y Scoll, Int , os 0 corporation, ond lIs officers or emplo(ees, may now hove, or may laler loire. positions or trades 'n respect to any seCUfilies menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may glye adVice to ItS InYcstment adVisory and olhel customers Independently 01 any statements mode 11'1 thIS or 11'1 any olher Issue Further II'1formohon on any secvflly menhoned herein IS aVailable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 906 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEfl NEW VOAK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE October 19. 1979 , . October 8-12 abated somewlfat-th'is week. – It -would-be -difficulf; however; 'to desCribe-theweek's – action as providing any sort of convincing reversal evidence. Modest new closing lows were posted on Monday and Tuesday, and Friday morning's trading saw renewed downside pressure. Although fairly dynamic rally attempts were mounted during various times during the week, all failed to display any sort of follow-through. It was certainly impossible to read, in the week's activity, any augury that near-term lows had been seen, much less that any meaningful rally attempt was in prospect. None of this, however, is particularly relevant to putting the decline of a fortnight ago in its proper context. The meaningful question centers on whether last week's sudden collapse sug- gests an end to the irregular up-market which began in early 1978, or whether it constitutes merely a sudden, sharp, and unexpected blip on what will ultimately be recognized as an on- going uptrend. We made a preliminary attempt last week to determine just where previous declines of similar vehemence fitted in to the long-term market cycle. The result, we think, is interesting and merits some further expansion. We noted last week that on Monday, October 9, 91.1 of issues traded moved lower in price and pointed out that this was the seventh highest figure since breadth statistics have been main- tained. The near record was followed on Tuesday, October 10 by a day on which 86 of all issues traded declined. The relative rarity of such occaSIons is underscored by the fact that, since 1946, there have been only 147 trading days on which more than 75 of-all issues changing hands moved lower. The essential point which we tried to make last week was that these occurrences generally have been characteristic of two sorts of occasions 1) the terminal phase of major declines, and 2) declines which take place in reaction to sudden and unexpected events, a of two-weeks–ago. 'l'-hel—I– point is that recent action hardly falls into the first category mentioned above, since it took place within a week of the major indices' achievement of new buH-market highs. It seems, therefore, highly likely that it must be placed in the second category. It is, therefore, worth noting that most declines of this type were shortly reversed by moves to new highs before too long a time period had elapsed. We have tried to underscore this on the chart reproduced on the reverse side of this letter. The chart condenses the history of the Dow since 1946 and notes, together with the appropriate percentage, each of the 147 trading days on which 75 or more issues declined. A look at previous major bear markets reveals quite clearly that days showing an extraordinarily high percentage of declining issues were not characteristic of the ongoing stages of those downswings. When such days occurred during bear markets, they tended to occur at points very close to the terminal phase. Moreover, as the chart quite clearly shows, extraordinarily high percentages have been common characteristics of the ongoing stages of upswings, often initiated by.unexpected surprises such as the Eisenhower heart attack in 1955 or the Kennedy assassination in-late 1963. It is this sort of action that is, to us, evoked most clearly by the events of a week ago .. Another point suggested by the chart is the extraordinary frequency of broadly declining days during the late 1940's and early 1950's. This was, of course, a period in which the market was moving irregularly, much as it has of late. It was, likewise, a period of considerable contro- versy in regard to appropriate monetary policy and its relation to inflation, a period which cul- minated with the accord of March 9, 1951 with which the Fed ceased its policy of inflating the money supply by artificially supporting low interest rates. It was also the last period in which stocks. battered by monetary uncertainties and talk of impending recession /depression. sold for -the sort of historically low level which characterizes equity prices today.- – – —- While we would be reluctant to push this analogy too far. it is apparent. we think. that last week's action, on the record, hardly constitutes evidence of a major downside reversal. Indeed. it is a phenomenon. as the historical record amply shows. not at all uncharacteristic of an ongoing upswing. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (10/18/79) AWTsla 825.68 102.98 735.19 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or ,s to be deemed to be, clrcdly or mdlrectly. on offer or the sol,cltollon of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentIOned The molter 15 presented merely for Ihe of the subscrIber While we beheve the sources of our Informo flon to be relloble we In no woy represent or guarantee Ihe occurocy !hereof nor of the stotements mude hereIn Any actIon to be by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own',nvest,gotlon and Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporotlon, and Its off,cers or employees, may now have, or moy loler toke posItIons or trades In respect to ony secufliles mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, ond such posItIon may be dIfferent from ony. vIews now or hereafter elpressed In thIS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, moy gIve adVICe to Its Investment adVisory a,!d other customers Independently of any stotements mode In thIS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on any securlly mentIoned hereIn IS ova liable on request ' I..u ' I 01 '' 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 )965 )96-7 1968 1970 1971 1972 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 – – –r 1- . —-….J

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEft NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEM8EA AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 2, 1979 . 2!1e of the Great'Crash was the way m which'lt'allseemed'to'come to-a-culmination'-this week;Trus climax was undoubtedly due to the fact that Monday was the precise anniversary of 1929's Black Tuesday, when the Dow plunged some 30 points on a record 16-million-share volume. (There – was also a Black Thursday on October 24, when, although the decline was only 6 points, volume reached almost 13 million shares.). The market, in 1979, celebrated the anniversary by doing nothing on the lowest volume in 5 months. This particular fascination with the last week in October exemplifies what we have always considered to be a misconception of history, The same sort of mindset is typified by a recent Broadway play in which a character, obviously living in the lap of luxury, picks up a newspaper and suddenly announces with a gasp, We're ruined. The most widely-read chronicle of the period, John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash, concentrates exclusively on six weeks in October and early November of 1929, almost as though all of the relevant events which reshaped economic history took place within that month and a half. Unfortunately, it just didn't happen that way. As we noted last week, the stock market set records in those six weeks which are unlikely ever to be broken. The impact on the economy and on the life of the average American lasted for over a decade. For the record, the whole process started on September 3, 1929, the day after Labor Day, when the Dow closed at 381.17. Prices had worked lower (about 10) by mid-October, and by the end of the day on Black Tuesday, the Dow was at 230.07. Further weakness brought it to a close of 198.69, a total decline of 48, on November 13. What is generally lost sight of is that prices then recovered substantially over a period of si;months., On April 17, 1930, the Dow had risen almost 50 to 294.07, some 23 below the ,, —revels – — its prior high following the first rally after the bottom in the 1974 bear market. In other words, what took place between September, 1929 and April, 1930, while it set records which still stand today in terms of magnitude, still had many of the elements of normal stock market corrections. What was unique was what took place afterwards ,not over a period of six weeks but over a long dreary two-plus years. From that Easter weekend high in 1930, prices moved inexorably lower at an almost steady pace. By October, 1930, the 1929 low, set almost a year earlier, had been broken,and the dreary process of almost steady decline set in. In contrast to the record- setting trading pace of 1929, volume slowly dried up and, by 1932, was averaging less than a million shares daily. The unwinding continued, for the record, to a closing low of 41. 22 on the Dow on July 8, 1932. Volume on that day was 720,000 shares. In the fall of 1929, financial news centered on what was going on at Broad and Walls Streets. Starting in 1930, the focus was a good deal less narrow. In December of 1930, for example, the Bank of the United States failed, the first of 10,000 banks that were to disappear over the next three years. The Gross National Product was beginning a slide that would just about cut it in half by 1933, Unemployment, 3.2 in 1929, was on its way to 25. The stock price erosion of 1930-32, in other words, was amply justified by what was taking place in the real world. The Great Crash which we celebrated this week was, in other words, purely a stock market phenomenon, albeit the most resounding such phenomenon of all time. The Great Depression which began to evidence itself in mid-1930 and whose effects continued throughout the entire decade in the 1930's, was quite another animal indeed, touching the bulk of the American population which had never had anything to do with the stock market in the'first place. Bear markets of similar shape, if of considerably lesser degree, have occurred regularly since 1929 and will undoubtedly continue to occur just as regularly in the future, and investors have by and large learned, and will have to continue to learn, to live with them. The proper cOlcern of economic policy, it seems to us, is not preventing the repetition of 1929, but preventmg the repetition of 1930-32 and its aftermath. It was that period which taught us a lesson we have learned perhaps all too well, with the result that the problems we face today, centering around inflation, while no less real than those of the 1920's, are of an entirely different stripe. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (11/1/79) 819.28 102.52 709.42 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWTsla No sto!emenl or expreSlon of opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdnec!ly, on offer or the sOllcltotlon of at) offer to buy or sell ony referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the of the subscriber Whde we believe the sources of our Informo- tlon to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgohon and information Janney MOnlQomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corporatIOn, and lis officers or employees, may now have, or moy later to..e, pOSitIOns or trades In respect 10 ony secvfltles mentioned In thiS Clr any fulure Issue, ond such poslhon moy be different from ony views now or hereafter In thiS or cny other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, wh,,h IS registered wllh the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its mvcsfmenl adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode In thts or In any other ,ssve Funner informatIOn on any secuflty mentioned herem IS aVailable on request

.. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW .JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANQE. tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE .;..'B'a November 9, 1979 isiiu'essummer; ;;-cdevcteih,llumterof 'Of this' cussion of the four-year cycle in stock prices. At that time, the Dow was sailing along in the upper 800's, most other major indices were achieving new highs, and the market had not yet been beset by reversal of Federal Reserve policy, accompanying astronomically-higher interest rates, renewed lunacy in the Middle East, or any of the other assorted woes that have since contributed to the erasure of most of 1979's gains. The point we attempted to prove then was that the market, in terms of the four-year cycle, had posted a major cyclic low in March, 1978 at 742.12 on the Dow, and that we were, therefore, in a new cycle barely a year and a half old. The reasoning ran somewhat along the following lines 1. There had existed an identifiable cycle pattern with approximately four years between lows covering the entire stock-market history of the 20th century, with some 22 such cycles identifiable. 2. The last obvious low in terms of this pattern had occurred in December, 1974. 3. A new low within the cycle that began in 1974 would make it the second-longest such on recordand cause a number of other distortions which would not fit into the pattern. 4. Therefore, that cycle ended in March, 1978, and a new one began at that point. On the Friday previous to the Federal Reserve announcement, the Standard & Poors 500 was at 111. 27, up 28 from its March, 1978 low, and the Dow, which had been lagging, was within 10 points of its high of a year earlier. The foregoing interpretation of the facts, therefore, appeared reasonably secure. At the moment, however, the Dow finds itself a good deal closerto its low of 20 months ago than to its recent high, and the S & P has retraced more than half of the ground nouncements of last August. ., The answer is that we see no particular need to revise our prior interpretation. We still feel that a cycle low can probably be placed in the spring of 1978 and that the cycle which commenced at that time remains in effect. We will be inclined to hold to this interpretation even were the Dow to test its lows of March, 1978 in the 740 area, an eventuality which must now be considered pos- sible if not probable. The only thing that recent action may be doing, it seems to us, is raising some questions about the precise shape of the cycle in which we now find ourselves. We pointed out last summer that, while the four-year-cycle pattern was indeed, without undue stretching of the data, identifiable, the shape of the cycles involved had varied widely. The bulk of them, of course, had divided neatly into those upswings and downswings we have come to call bull and bear markets. A number, however, which had, by any rational interpretation, to be considered part of the overall pattern, could not be so easily categorized. The period October, 1946-June, 1949 is a case in point. The cycle is obviously delineated by two lows at approximately the same point on the Dow on the dates noted. During the cycle, the Dow never advanced very much, its best level being achieved in June, 1948, some 18 above its low. The Standard & Poors 500 achieved a number of successive lows during the period in question and wound up significantly lower at the end of the cycle than at the time it had begun. Yet, since the period in question was 31 months long and was both preceded and followed by bull markets of considerable amplitude, there was little choice other than to call it a completed cycle. Recent market action at least raises the possibility that the current period may have a similarly irregular shape. This is, again, a possibility rather than a likelihood. With many downside objec- tives having been reached at the moment, it is certainly conceivable that, following a period of base formation around current levels similar to that which took place in October-December of last year ,- most major indices will recover to new highs above those of early October, thus conforming to the conventional pattern. Even should this not be the case, however, we still feel our current inter- pretation of the cycle picture is the correct one. The main point is that, if this interpretation is correct, any further weakness from current levels should not be viewed with alarm and would not be likely to lead to a decline of significant amplitude. Indeed, in terms of our conception of the pattern, any such weakness would have to be viewed as a buying opportunity. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (11/8/79) 804.61 101. 27 703.11 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly .or Indirectly, an offer or the sohCltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any Hlcurlty referred 10 or mentIoned The motter IS presented merely for the converqencc of the subscrIber While we believe the sources of our mforma- lion fa be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of fhe statements mude herem Any oct Ion to be by the subscflber should be based on hiS own InvestlgOTlon and mfarmatlon Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, mav now have, or may later positions or trades m respect to any securrtles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positron may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Ir'Ivestment adVisor, may give odv,ce to Its Investment odvlsory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode 'n thiS or 'n any other Issue Further mf.ormot,on on any security mentioned herem IS ovorloble on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORk STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 16, 1979 Political commentators have widely noted the recent tendency for presidential campaigns to – —- beginearlier -and -earlier-Indeed,- at – peIgning liaS-already begi.tn–in earnest W';-are-thus publishirig below', somewhat earlier than usual, our study of market behavior during presidential election years. The table shows, for each election year since 1900, the president elected and his party, followed by the average price for each month, expressed as a percentage of the previous December's close (i. e., 110 means the market was up 10 and 90 means it was down 10). Year President Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 1900 McKinley R 101 103 lO4 105 100 98 98 99 97 100 108 114 1904 Roosevelt R 102 99 99 101 99 99 103 107 112 118 125 126 1908 Taft R 105 100 105 111 117 117 123 126 125 126 134 138 1912 Wilson D 100 99 lO2 106 105 105 106 109 109 109 108 103 1916 Wilson D 99 98 97 96 98 99 98 99 102 105 107 103 1920 Harding RII 99 91 97 96 91 89 89 86 89 89 85 77 1924 Coolidge R 103 104 102 100 99 101 101 113 112 110 115 119 1928 Hoover R 99 98 103 110 113 108 108 112 120 123 131 132 1932 Roosevelt D 103 101 102 76 66 59 63 89 102 88 87 82 1936 Roosevelt D 102 108 112 112 104 108 116 118 120 126 130 128 1940 Roosevelt D 99 98 97 98 85 76 80 82 86 87 88 85 1944 Roosevelt 1948 Truman D 102 101 105 101 105 109 112 110 108 111 110 115 D 97 92 94 101 106 110 108 104 103 106 100 99 1952 Eisenhower R 102 100 100 100 100 102 105 106 104 104 105 109 1956 Eisenhower R 97 98 104 105 103 102 107 106 103 102 100 102 1964 Johnson D D 102- -103- 105- i6i -i09 – -10-8 –11-1 –110 — ii1- R7 –;-1 113 – 115 –112 1968 Nixon R 98 94 92 99 101 104 104 101 105 108 109 110 1972 Nixon R 102 103 106 108 107 106 104 108 107 106 112 115 1976 Carter D 109 114 116 116 116 116 117 115 117 112 111 115 lncumbent party did not control Congress. lncumbent party not re-elected. The twenty years show an approximate normal distribution. Twelve are bull markets, three (1920, 1932 and 1940) are distinct bear-market years, and in five years the trend was flat. There appears to be a tendency toward a flat trend or moderate weakness in the first half. Eleven of the twenty years showed little market change through June. Indeed, only in the three years which evolved into bear markets was the first half action predominantly on the down- side. It is worthy of note that a downward bias tends to occur on two sorts of occasions, first, when the incumbent president loses the election, and, second, when the incumbent party does not control Congress. However, 1972 and 1976 were both exceptions to this latter rule and 1976, possibly due to its unusual circumstances, produced the second strongest first half on record. The first statistic suggests that the market may be a good forecaster of election returns. Only in 1976, of years when the incumbent lost the election, was the market up more than 5 in the first half. Thus early strength next year might provide heretofore missing comfort for President Carter. . The most consistent fact about election year markets, though, is It definite tendency toward a strong second half. Indeed, as the table shows, in 16 of the 20 completed years, the average price for December was higher than the average price for June. Even in two of the three bear markets, 1932 and 1940,the market rallied in the second half from the June lows. In 1912 and i976 the JuneDecemberdifference was mliiiScule-Oiify iri1920 and 1948 -were-there distinct declines from June to December. In terms of 1980, we have recently been suggesting that the market now finds itself in an upward cycle which is not likely to be completed before the end of that year. Thus second-half strength, regardless of irregularity which may be the outgrowth of recent near-term action, would be consistent with our current view of the cyclical picture. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 819.62 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 104.15 Cumulative Index (11/15/79) 726.73 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL AWT sla No statement or e;.;preSSlon of opmion or any other motter herein contained IS, or Is to be deemed to bo, dlrcctly or mdlrectly, on offer or the SOIIC.totlon of on offer to buy or sell any seclJrlty referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converenct of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our tnformo- lion 10 be reliable, we In no way represenl or guorantee the occuroy thereof nor of the sTatements mude herem Any OcTIOn to be tok.en by The suoscnber should be based on hiS own Investlgohon and mformatlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, cnd Its or employees, may now have, or may loter take, POSitions or trades In respect 10 any SeCUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, ond such position may be different from any views now or hereafter eypressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scoli, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC os on Investmenl adVisor, may give adVICe 10 lIs ,nvestment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of ony statements mode tn thiS or In any other Isue further information on any mentioned herein IS aVailable on request

'TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF ME.MBER NEW YORI( STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE November 23, 1979 With the passing of October, 1979, the epidemic of Great-Crash nostalgia, recently raging abated-somewhato–We wlma' 'couple of recentletters'of the'subject ,and wepromfsi; hereWith that this will be the last such' effort. We could not, hOwever, allow the 50th anniversary of the 1929 market break to pass without one final comment. There have been those seers who have,argued the case for an imminent repetition of 1929. There is, in our view, one simple, and perhaps overriding, argument ,against this particular view. That argument is that, by and large, such a repetition has already taken place. 1300 1200 JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE 1100 1000 CONSTANT 900 BOO 700 600 00 00 ,- 929 11939 199 1.954 1959 1196 iI969 1979 The chart above Shows the history of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average'since 1929, with one simple adjustment. The actual Dow is converted into constant 1972 dollars, using the GNP deflator. The results are, to say the least, interesting. In constant dollars, the Dow, in the period 1929-1932, declined approximately 84. In January, 1966, the Dow, in 1972 dollars, was at approximately 1302. Today, 14 years later, it is, in those terms, at approximately 486. This is a decline of almost 63, which, if not equalling 1929, certainly approaches it. As the chart quite clearly shows, in percentage terms, what has taken place over the past 14 years is far more serious than any past drop, with the single exception of 1929-1932. This process finds the Dow average price for November, 1979, below its adjusted 1974 low and were 1ast seen in early 1954.-The constant-dollar Dow sold Blmost as high as its current figure in 1945 and higher in 1937 and 1940. It presently finds itself at less than half of its 1929 peak. This is pretty gloomy stuff for the ThankSgiving season, but ironically, as market analysts, we find ourselves encouraged. Cycles, such as the one that has covered the past 14 years, do not go on forever, and we think it arguable that the current one may be close to running its course. We have pointed out elsewhere that earnings and dividends on the Dow, even when translated Into constant dollars, have performed much better, especially recently, than the Dow, itself. We expect this ultimately to be reflected in much better performance by the Average. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S 81 P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (11/21/79) AWTld 811.69 104.46 723.16 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or exprcsslon of opinion or any other motter herein contained IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on oHer or the 501,cltatlon of on offer 10 buy Of sell any referred to Of menl!oned The molter IS presentud merely for the Cor'lvellencs of the subSCriber While oNe believe the sources of our hnforb' han to be relloble, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any action 10 be folen by the subSCriber soul e based on hiS own mveshgallon and Informotton Jonrley Montgomery Scott, Inc, as 0 corporotlon, arld lIs officers or employees, mly now have, or may later tol-e, pOSitions or Irades m respect to any seCUrities mentioned m Ihls or any fulvre 'ssve, and such poslt.on may be different from any views now Of hereafter erpressed m thiS or any other Issve Janney MontgOMery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, moy give adVice 10 ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently at any statements mode ,n thiS or In ony other lSr,V!'l FvrlneT mtolmal.on on any secvf\l)' mentioned hexem o\imlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER NEW VOAK STOCI( EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE November 30, 1979 -.—…..'-.,'. . — , i!.. .. .. market'action- has turned-reasonably positive ;-lendings01lle-credence to-the belief that the second unusually sharp, short-term decline to occur in the course of the current market cycle may well be over It may be overly simplistic to draw analogies between market action this fall and that of the autumn of 1978, but the parallels are, in many ways, astonishing. Both 1978 and 1979 enjoyed the usual seasonal pattern of summer market strength. In 1978 the Dow high was reached on September 11 at 907.74. This year an initial peak was made on the Friday prior to Labor Day at 887.63, and this high was modestly exceeded for just a few days in early October. Both highs were followed by short and vicious declines, the extents of which surpassed the expectations of most analysts, the writer included. In 1978, the Dow declined 12.7 in 36 trading days; this year the comparable decline was 11. 3 over 25 trading days. Both declines took place on high volume (a record 81 million shares in the initial phase of this year's drop), and both were un- usually broad (7 of the declining days this year showed in excess of 1200 declining issues). 1978, as we now know, was only a temporary interruption in an ongoing uptrend which sent the S & P 500 and most other market indicators on to new highs in the summer of 1979, although the widely-followed Dow never exceeded its September, 1978 high. The drop a year ago was followed by a rather conventional sort of base formation which occupied the entire last two months of the year and involved two subsequent tests of the October 31, 1978 low', one in mid-November and a second in mid-December. Both these tests turned out to be successful, and the market broke out of its base formation in early January, 1979 and continued moving steadily ahead until last summer. There are a number of similarities in action so far in 1979. There have, to date, been three on November 7, and the last test at 807.42 a week ago. This process has produced,a lateral formation between, roughly, 800 and 820 on the Dow, and this week's market strength has produced an upside breakout from that formation. It would be dangerous to push the analogy too far, however. The base formation produced thus far is not nearly as broad as the one that emerged during the last two months of 1978. The most optimistic upside objective that can be read so far is in the mid-840's. While we think the odds favor this modest target's being attained, some real questions exist as to the sort of pat- tern that might subsequently form. The most constructive eventuality would be for further strength, to the 840- 850 level, fOllowed by some activity holding, roughly, in the range 830- 850. This sort of action would broaden a possible head and shoulders pattern which, undoubtedly, by the time it was completed, would be sufficiently broad to signal new highs. It is far too early, however, especially in a period where unexpected news developments have become the rule rather than the exception, to rule out the possibility of yet another test of the lows around 800. Such a process, while not negating the thesis that we are presently in a base-formation period, could carry that base-formation period on in time well into December and possibly into the new year. Once again, as was the case in 1978, the Dow is under-performing most other market indicators. To date, for example, the Dow has recovered only a third of its total loss, While the S & P 500 has retraced just about half of its overall decline. Both the Transportation and Utility averages have out-performed the Industrials on the rally, and indeed, the latter are not all that far from retracing their entire loss and posting a new 1978-79 high. There is no suggestion that this .. the part of the Dow,is not likely to continue into the future. Individual stock patterns, meanwhile, develop satisfactorily. A month to six weeks ago, stocks were moving into minor downtrends in almost record proportions. In a relatively short space of time, large numbers of these stocks have reached downside objectives, formed new bases, and indeed, broken out of those bases on the upside, suggesting, at the very least, a test of their 1979 highs. Indeed, in a fairly substantial minority of cases, new 1979 highs have already been attained. . Short-term forecasting is a hazardous occupation at best, and, as noted above, we are hesitant to speculate on the exact form of the current base-formation pattern. We do feel, however, that despite its suddenness and viciousness, the fall-1979 correction may wind up being no more significant, in a long-range sense, than its year-earlier predicessor. Dow-Jones Industrials(1200 PM) 827.39 S & P Composite (1200 PM) 106.54 Cumulative Index (11/29/79) 757.96 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla .,… -.- No statement or expression of Opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlrectlv or Indirectly, on offer or the of on offer 10 buy or sell cny securtty refe-red 10 or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the converlenct of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion 10 be reliable, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements moJde he eln Any oc110n 10 be token by the subSCriber should be based on hl own investigatiOn ond Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scott. Inc, as a corporollon, and 11 officers or employees, may now have, or may loter toke, POSitionS or trades In respec1 to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future lI;sue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thl5 or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

–J TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISiON OF MEMBER New VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 7, 1979 — — '1' —–;..- — …. …–..- … The investment art-has hlways incorporated a number of separate disciplines, and one aspect thereof that has gained increasing attention as such a discipline has been called market timing.- It is probably not accidental that the investment community's interest in this subject began to emerge around 1974, shortly after most portfolio managers had been ravaged by the 1973-74 bear market, an experience which, hindsight revealed, could have been avoided by the simple process of fleeing from equities at some point in 1973. Market timing, as a distinct aspect of the investment art, has also been sanctified by the growing body of quantitative work lumped together under the heading of modern portfolio theory. It is possible, using the sophisticated, performance-tracking teChniques developed as tools of this theory, to separate portfolio returns into those attributable to success in forecasting the stock market and those attributable to astute selection of indi- vidual portfolio components. There is nothing new about this, of course. An old bit of stock-market folk wisdom likens the behavior of stocks to boats in a river with a strong current. Each boat individually will benave in a manner differing from the others, but they will all be similarly affected by the action of the current, just as all stocks, whatever their behavior in relation to each other, will be affected by swings in the general market. Stock selection is thus an effort to choose the most powerful boat, whereas market timing is a judicious attempt to haul all one's boats out of the water when the cur- rent gots too strong. Like all disciplines, market timing has developed its own set of protocols. One of theseis the f'sct..,that a fo suggest -that securities – – – are ,amply priced and that risk-return ratios might be more attractive in other areas is an effort likely to gain little notice. If one announces, however, that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is likely to get to, say. 400, one is almost guaranteed a wide hearing. Thus, the past few years have been rife with apocalyptic visions of what is going to happen to the stock market. There has also been a hearty minority of seers willing to forecast dramatically higher prices for the Dow. All this has taken place in a market which, over the past three years or so, has done, in terms of averages. precisely nothing. When a particular area of investment management approaches the status of a fad, it often becomes practically worthless. This has been just about the case with efforts to time the market since 1976. Let us consider the history. The recovery from the 1974 lows to 1976, while selective, was con- ventional. However, from September, 1976 to spring 1978, we had what amounted to a bear market in terms of the averages, coinciding with a rather strong upswing in secondary stocks. The market started up again on a broad basis in March, 1978, only to be interruptedy an intermediateterm correction which erased almost all the gains over a period of a few weeks in the fall. 1979 saw an almost exact repetition of the process. a long laborious upswing, followed by the Saturdaynight-massacre correction, which erased most of the gains. In this sort of environment, it seems to us, efforts at market timing have been somewhat less than productive. It was, we suppose, possible to call the 1976-1978 downswing, except that, in doing so, one missed the myriad of upside opportunities available in secondary stocks. It would have been theoretically desirable to avoid the corrections that occurred in the fall of 1978 and the fall of 1979. However. the sharp reversals which characterized the first, and the second one so far, made this sort of effort difficult at best from a practical standpoint. The period from 1974 to date, in other words, has been one in which it has been basically profitable to ignore efforts at market timing and concentrate on the selection of undervalued issues, especially those less well known. It has, ironically, been a period in which most professional investment effort has been directed in precisely the opposite direction. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (12/6/79) 839.59 108.42 769.29 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or of opinion or ony other moiler herein contolned 15, or IS 0 be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soircltalton of to buy or sell dny tecurlty referred to or mentIOned The mattcr IS presented merely for the ad' thhe Into be reliable we In no woy represent or guarantee the occuracy Ihereof nor af the statements ml.l e ereln ny a hll Ion el0 e a en be I I tak on hiS own 'investigation and information Janney Montgomery ciposltloM or trades 1/\ respect to ony secuntles menlloned In thl5 Of any Scolt, future Inc, as a Issue, and corporation, and ,ts officers or such POSit. on moYdbe different efrmo-pnloyeneys, may now thl! or on other Issue Janney Montgomery Scot!, Inc, whICh IS registered With Ihe SEC as on mvetment a v,sor, may give 0 vIC 0 rsed other C'lJstomtHS of eny ';'etements mede In thiS or I!\ eny other Inue Further information on any secullty mentioned herein IS available on request

/' TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE December 14, 1979 ;.;.there'exist somethmg-w— -more tliim 1,700 back issues thereof. We freely confess that there have been times when, lackin inspiration, we have borrowed, in whole or in part, from one of those back issues. Having arrived at that time of the year when it is customary for us, in preparation for an annual forecast, to review the year just past, we are tempted simply to present last year's review with the figures updated. The similarity between market action in 1978 and 1979 is, indeed, truly remarkable. Both years showed pronounced strength through the end of the summer. Both experienced sharp declines in the fall, and, based on the record to date, both those declines bottomed out toward the end of the year. In both years, moreover, broader measures of price performance, especially those weighted heavily in favor of secondary stocks, outperformed the more familiar market indices. It is thus worthwhile at this time to review, not just 1979, but the two-year-period 1978-79. If the measurement used in such a review is the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, the result is, to say the least, desultory. On December 30, 1977, the Dow closed at 831.17. As of this writing, it stands at 838.31. Over two years the average price change for 30 premier U .8. industrial companies has been almost exactly zero. This would be bad enough, were it not for the fact that over the same two-year-period the Consumer Price Index has in9reased by approximately 22 percent. Applying this index to the Dow produces a decrease of 17.8 percent in real-dollar terms. Even when the generous and improving dividends on the DJIA are taken into account, the net annual return for the index -3 A percent..in-r-eaL.dollar-s. As we noted above, however, broader indices have, indeed, outperformed the Dow. Our Cumu- lative Index, a measurement of the price change of all NY8E-listed issues, which closed 1977 at 673.36 is now just about 100 points higher, having increased some 15 percent over the two-year- period. This gain is, admittedly, less than the rise in the CPI, but nonetheless, the rate of return for the Cumulative Index, with dividends included has, over the past year, been positive, approximately 2 percent in real-dollar terms. What, it may be asked, is so exciting about 2 percent. We are reminded of the gambler who continued to play the obviously-crooked roulette wheel because it was the only game in town. In an era of rampant inflation, there have been precious few games other than the stock market for the investor. Take, for example, long-term bonds, exemplified by U.8. Treasury 8's of 19962001 which two years ago were 99t but which stand now around 81. The inflation adjusted rate of return on this safest-of-all investments has been a negative 5.22 percent. Investment in shortterm instruments, when adjusted for inflation, has produced a lesser but similarly negative rate of return. , Our President has reminded us that life is unfair and, although it would be nice to be able to preserve real capital without risk, such has not been nor is it likely, in the future, to be the case. Equity markets over the past two years have, at least, offered the possibility of preserving real capital and income. Other vehicles have, of course, been available, and yes, we know about Krugerrands, Louis XIV furniture, etc., etc. Hindsight shows a positive return for such vehi- cles.- We have some -d—o..u..b…ts over theiruseful-ness, -in a practical sense, -f-or th-e -futu-re. The proverbial bottom line, as we see it, is approximately as follows. The two-year performance of the stock market has, admittedly, not been one calculated to induce euphoria. It has, however, been possible, through hard work and a willingness to search for security values beyond conven- tional, well-known issues, to use the stock market as a vehicle for preserving purchasing power in the face of rampant inflation. Equities, moreover, have been one of the few such vehicles available and, therefore, a positive attitude toward common stocks through 1978-79 has, in retrospect, not been ill-advised. The central question posed for the forecast, which we intend to issue next week, is whether this will continue to be the case for the year ahead. Dow-Jones Industrials (11 00 AM) 8 & P Composite (11 00 AM) Cumulative Index (12/13/79) 838.31 108.11 775.15 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY TABELL AWT sla No statement or e)(prelon of opinion or ony other molter herein contomed IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or ond'f('ctly, on offer or the sol,cltollon of on offer 10 buy or sell (my security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the conveJ'llenCE; of the subscriber While we believe the SOluces of our informa- tion to be reliable we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nyr of the statements mude herein Any action to be tok!!n by the subscriber should be based on hiS own'lnvestlgotlon and Informollon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corpcrotlon, ond Its officers or employees, moy now hove, or may later lake, POSitiOns or trodes In respect 10 ony securities menlloned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views r,ow or hereafter expressed In Ihls or ony olher Issue Janney MonTgomery tott, Inc, which IS registered Wllh the SEC as on rnvestment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS rnvestment adVisory and othel customers independenTly of ony statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further rnformotlon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM8ER New VORK STOCK EXCHANGE INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 21, 1979 .— .. our,,cu1tQmary wenoted-t1ieTact -mar.o . ket had-, during 1978 and 1979, provided a vehicle by which real purchasing power could have been preserved in the face of rampant inflation and other disruptions. We stated that the crucial question for a forecast centered around whether this would continue to be the case during 1980. We believe that it will be. To a great extent, our reasons for this feeling are based on negative rather than positive elements. Let us consider for a moment precisely what equity markets have had to contend with over the past couple of years. There has existed, first of all, the unprecedented inflation referred to above. Exacerbated by this inflation, interest rates climbed to record levels throughout almost all of 1978 and 1979, only to have the noose tightened yet another notch by the shift in Federal Reserve policy this fall. Monopolistic OPEC pricing practices have escalated the rise in energy costs to almost crisis proportions, and, while all of the above was going on, we have been treated to, if not an actual recession, a two-year-long series of advertisements of a recession impending. Finally, on top of all of the above fundamental disruptions, there emerged this fall a madman in the Middle East rattling the sabers of possible war. Throughout all of this, the stock market has, at least, not gone down. The reasons it has not gone down are, we think, clear if one takes a long enough historical view. The fact is that, by the middle 1970's, stock prices had reached levels generally attained only at quarter-century intervals, levels which, in the past, we now know, have discounted im- pending disaster. Under these circumstances, it was at least believable that the market could, as it did, survive a string of events which, in other times and places, would have been sufficient to send it into the worst sort of tailspin. a!;.ysmally.J9.w – the 19'74'' 76 rebound,- and a consequent difficulty in recognizing the fact, as we pointed out last August, that a new stock market cycle, in all probability, began in March of 1978. Our belief in this cycle identification leads, we think, to further grounds for optimism. It is extremely diffi- cult to square the suggestion of a market top in 1979 with a cyclical bottom in March, 1978. In order to do so, one would have to posit a cycle either shorter than all other such cycles in this century or with a shorter advancing phase than all but three. It would be necessary to visualize a cycle which produced the second smallest rising phase on record and a third consecutive cycle that failed to achieve a new high, a phenomenon that has not occurred in the 20th century. This leads to the likelihood, in our view of the currently available evidence, that the previous highs for the major averages, the 1978 high of 907.74 on the Dow, and the 1979 high of 111.27 for the S & P 500, are likely to be exceeded some time in 1980. It is the timing of that occurrance and, consequently, the shape that the 1980 market pattern is likely to take that appears to be the most uncertain element in the picture. As this is written, we continue to hold a fairly optimistic view as far as the short-term outlook is concerned. We expect, in other words, a conventional year-end rally, one which will carry forward to somewhat higher prices in the early part of the upcoming year. The real question is whether, in view of tpe technical damage done during October, it might then be necessary further to test the 800 level and build a base for a broader advance in the second half of 1980. Such an eventuality would be consistent with the election-year tendency discussed here a couple of months ago. Could the market extend the year-end rally to and through the 900 level, and in the process, correct the potential breadth divergence caused by this fall's decline, the resulting pattern could be favor- able indeed. The suggestion then would be that .the current cycle would turn out to be fairly conventional in extent, extending in time throughout most of the year ahead and leading ultimately to considerably higher prices. The strength of the year-end rally, a subject which we will discuss next week, will be an important clue in determining which of the above two eventualities ensues. We noted above that the market has spent two years ignoring highly negative fundamental factors. Should those fundamental factors prove, during 1980, to be less serious than analysts now foresee, the technical potential exists for a very good year indeed. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S 81 P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (12/20/79) 841. 81 108.03 779.23 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL .' No statement or expressIon of opmlon or any other motter herein con tamed IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the soilcltohon of on offer to buy or sell any securoty referred to or mentioned The molter Is presented merely for the of Ihe subSCriber Wh.le 'i'le believe Ihe sources of our Informo- t.on to be rel.oble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the sotements mude here.n Any act.on to be by the subscr.ber should be bosed on h.s own Invest'gotlon and ,nformat.tln Janney Montgomery Scolt, Inc, as a corporat.on, and .ts offICers or employees, mav now have, or may later lake, pOSitions Of trades In respect to any securities ment.oned ,n th,s 0' any future Issue, ond such POSItion moy be from ony vIews now or hereafter exprcned In thIS or any other lSsue Janney MOntgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered WIth the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVICe to Its .nvestmenl adVIsory and other customers Independently of any statements mode 1M thiS or In any other Issue. Further informatIon on ony security Mentioned herein IS ovollable on request