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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 03, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 03, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - August 03, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 OIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – DA'I'-E ,.,.,-;– DiHA 4/10/79 5/14/79 5/22/79 6/01/79 7/09/79 7/23/79 8/01/79 878.72 825.02 845.37 821. 21 852.99 825.51 850.34 DATE 4/10/79 5/14/79 5/22/79 6/01/79 7/09/79 7/23/79 8/1l1/79 -DJI-A '878,72 825.02 845.37 821. 21 852.99 825.51 850.34 – ,- 233.25 104.26 222.15 98.61 233.49 100.41 233.10 101. 83 251. 56 107.75 247.52 107.31 256.72 108.49 ASE NASDAQ NASDAQ INDEX COMPOSITE BANKS 181. 53 176.17 181. 75 188.00 201. 71 195.28 198.74 134.22 128.99 131. 90 131. 76 139.15 137.57 141. 90 108.19 105.06 105.83 105.21 109.36 110.87 112.31 August 3, 1979 -500 '- 103.34 115.34 98.06 109.40 100.51 112.04 99.17 110.23 47 115.68 101. 59 112.31 104.17 115.17 NASDAQ VALUE LINE INSURANCE COMPOSITE 143.13 136.43 139.09 137.69 152.94 149.79 155.17 110.8'8 107.10 109.42 109.29 114.83 113.60 116.52 NYSE CE 60.30 57.68 59.48 59.47 65.51 63.78 66.35 CUM INDEX 756.10 716.00 731. 35 731. 01 771. 04 756.31 778.19 This letter has often been accused, with some justification, we must admit, of attempting to stupefy the reader with numbers. Despite this, we hope that our beginning this week's exercise with a solid panoply of such numbers will be forgiven. We think array of figures above tells a story, if the reader will take the time glance at it. A Bubtitle for these comments, we suppose, could be What Average Do You Like We have above the history of a dozen at'selected-dates over the past ,four months, – trying to include most market indicators that possess any regular following plus our own Cumula- tive Index. (We have included the Dow in both halves of the table for ease of comparison.) The point of the whole exercise is really quite simple. The msrket, we are told regularly, has been locked in a trading range ever since mid-April and remains well below its April high. This state- ment is quite true for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. It is, however, false for every single one of the other averages listed above. ' Indeed, the most significant thing the table above shows is that almost all of the market indi- cators were, as of Wednesday's close, well above their highs' of last April and at new highs for 1979. The only exceptions to this rule were three widely-followed barometers, the two Standard 81 Poors indices and the ASE index. All three of these, however, had attained new high territory on July 9 and had moved, as of the middle of this week, to within an ace of achieving still higher peaks. In other words, what shows up as a series of swings within a trading range on the Dow turns into an almost uninterrupted uptrend when other indicators are inspected. We think this point should be emphasized only becuase, as a preliminary to figuring out where one is going, it is necessary Ilrst to ascertain where one is at the moment. In terms of the Dow, we are in a market that has been faltering for the best part of a year. The last new high on this index was made last September; its high of April was below that peak, and as the table shows, it has spent all summer swinging back and forth below the April high. Yet almost any other indica- tor one chooses to inspect has spent the best part of the year moving ahead to new peaks. It should be unnecessary to have to restate the rather simple fact that a market that is making new highs is a bull market. The awesome array of numbers abtlve shows, it seems to us, that that is precisely the market environment we were in as of this Wednesday. Now another obvious fact is, of course ,-that all bull'markets top and the pres- ent one will be no exception. However, as noted above, it is important to take note of where we are. If a process of market deterioration has begun—a contention that is at least debatable— it should be in a much earlier stage if we recognize the fact that the market, as measured by the bulk of indicators, is attaining new peaks and has been doing so for some time, rather than lan- guishing as the Dow and other widely followed indices might suggest. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 846.16 S & P Composite (1200 PM)- 103.88 Cumulative Index (8/2/79) 780.53 AWTsla …. – , No statement or expressIon of oplnlon or any other matter hereIn contained IS, or to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the soliCItation of on offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converllenee of the subsCilber While Ne believe the sources of aur information 10 be reliable, we 1M no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude heretn Any action to be token by the subscnb('r should be oosed on hiS own tn\leshgatlon and Infarmahan Janney Montgomery Seoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, poSitions or trades In respect to any S!unhes mentioned In thIS or any luture Issue, and such POSItIon l1'l(ly be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other ISSue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS regIstered With the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may give adVice to Its nwestmenl adVisory and othel customers tndependently of any statements mode In or In ony other ISsue Further tnformatlon on any secvnty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 10, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 10, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - August 10, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ..' 909 STATE ROA.D, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEM6ER N.EW val'l.l(; STOCI( EX.CHANGE, INC MEM8ER AMERICAN STOCI( EXCHANGE – August 10, 1979 gest that the Dow-Jones Industrial Average had been understating the performance of the stock market. That exercise tooK the form of comparing the recent action of a dozen representative market averages to their highs of last April. The upshot of the whole thing was the demonstra- tion that, of all the major widely-followed market indicators, the Dow-Jones Industrials, and only the Dow-Jones Industrials, remained significantly below their highs of last spring. All the other indicators had exceeded, or were close to exceeding, their April highs and could fairly be des- cribed as being in uptrends dating back to lows made between October and December of last year. This week's market performance put the coda on that particular piece of analysis. In an upswing which, on the Dow, meas ured 17 points over the first three days of this week, the market moved ahead sharply with volume increasing to the 45-million-share level. All the averages we cited last week participated, and all are now comfortably above their April highs, again with the sole exception of the poor Dow Industrials which, as of this writing, were yet to exceed that peak at 878.72. There is no longer any point in coloring a general description of the market because of the inferior action of a collection of thirty stocks, however important those thirty stocks might be. lt must, we think, be considered as given that an uptrend dating back to last fall is in progress. What, then, is the next task to be accomplished The next benchmark, it seems to us, is almost a year old now, and consists of the highs made last September. The current position of most market indicators in relation to those highs is some- what of a confusing jumble. The Dow, of course, remains well below its September, 1978 peak of 907.74. Most indicators reflecting the action of transportation issues have exceeded their com- 1 managed to do so in this week's strength. Indicators based on utility stocks have, for the most equiuled or ex- ceeded their September peaks, although it must be admitted that this fails to take them to new bull-market highs, utility averages, by and large, having topped out in 1977. Financial indices find themselves comfortably at new bull-market highs, and broad-based indicators other than the Dow are, generally, ,flirting with those highs, although they have not yet exceeded them. In this class are the S & P 400 and 500, each of which, at this week's peak, was about a point under its September top. Our Cumulative Index, at around 790, is below its September high of 835, but the relative volatility of this index would suggest that further market strength could easily bring it to new high territory. What is the point, the reader msy well ask, of playing all these games with prior benchmarks We think there is one and that it is valid. For so long as large numbers of market indicators re- main below their highs of a year ago, it remains possible to interpret the market action for all of 1979 thus far as a rally within a bear market. According to this theory, the upswing which began in 1974 topped out last September, and all that has taken place since October-December of last year is nothing more than an interruption in a continuing downtrend which started a year ago. We suspect that many investors and market analysts have a vested interest in this particular inter- pretation, since it serves to confirm the rightness of what statistics tell us they have been doing for the past year or more, i.e., raising substantial amounts of cash. For so long as market action fails to demonstrate conclusively that this view is incorrect, there will be little action taken to alter portfolio stances based upon it. A sharp move above the September highs, on the other hand, might have some of the attributes of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Such a rally might-have a tendency to make large large numbers of cash-rich investors feel uncomfortable, and the market results could be both dynamic and sur- prising. We have, ourselves, never believed the bear-market-raUy theory as applied to 1979, and we continue to take the view that last September's highs will be exceeded by significant margins in the case of most indices and, by a modest amount at least, in terms of the Dow. We think that any weakness that might ensue will follow the attainment of such highs rather than precede it. We see no evidence at this point that such weakness is likely to be severe, although it is possible that such indications might accumulate in due course. For the time being, in any case, we would advise those, who; unencumbered by cash, are able to do so, to relax and enjoy what appears to be the present continuation of a less-than-two-year-old bull market. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (8/9/79) AWTsla 860.49 105.69 789.84 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement k10 buy or sell or any security of OpITlIOn or any other referred to or mentioned motter herem The mater 1 contoll'led presenled ,S, or ISO be merely for the deemed'0 be, convellenC(' of d Hec y 0 r Ind Irecti,, the subscriber While on we obfefIerevoer thhe soliCitatiof n e hsourcbs o,b of onnf or ffer 1101'1 to 00 based on hiS we If\ no way re(erent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any ochon to be to en y own',nvest,gat,on ar,d 'nformatlon Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, and Its officers or employecs, may now ovehes, uorSfCtmI oey lot p ;sed d'pOSltlOni or trades Ifl respect to any se,urltlcs mentioned ,(I thiS or ony future ,ssue, and such position moy be different from rh,s or any other ,ssue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS reglstl.'red With the SEC os on Investment odvlsor, mOf give a v Views te to Its nIonwv7sbienc;e0od er VISO t othcr rustomers Independently of ony statements mode In thIS or In ony other Issue Further information on ony security mentioned herein IS OValo e on reques —

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 17, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 17, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - August 17, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE August 17, 1979 in relation -to the-former hlghs-oian-assortmeid of wldely'followed market indices, suggesting that ' the penetration of those highs would admit of no interpretation other than that the market has been in a major upswing dating back some 18 months. The past fortnight of market strength has left just about all of those prior peaks safely in the dust, and indeed even the Dow, which, as we have been pointing out, has lagged just about everything else in sight, moved last week to new high levels for 1979, although it still has its September, 1978 peak of 907.74 to work on. There will, however, be no further discussion of past peaks and mythical bear-market rallies in this space. The time has come to get on with it. Not to put too fine a point on the whole thing, the Standard & Poors 500-Stock Index closed on Wednesday, August 15,1979 at 108.25. It closed on March 6,1978 at 86.90 and has, therefore, in the interim, advanced 24.57 percent. This is well beyond the threshold which the historical frame- work suggests as appropriate for defining major swings. Within 'this framework, therefore, a major bull market existed as of the close of last Wednesday, and any previous prior interpretation was, by definition, wrong. It will have been no less wrong in the unlikely eventuality that market turns immediately down from Wednesday's close, and that high turns out to be a major peak. For those in- vestors who have been operating on the rally-in-a-bear-market theory, the only possible suggestion at this point is that appropriate adjustments be made forthwith. Getting on with it, as suggested above, involves asking the questions appropriate to any reason- ably mature bull market, i. e., How Far and How Long Let us, first, offer a few thoughts on the latter subject. This letter has long leaned toward the interpretation that March, 1978 constituted a cycle bottom We firsi,Jiuggesi – – dence In favor cif -this hypothesis has accuriiulated' fairly usionon…ApriLl4 ,-19'18 ,andevi—f ever since, having, in our view, become just about conclusive this week. It is generally agreed that stock market cycles tend to have an identifiable periodicity, giving rise to the familiar term four-year-cycle. The four-year appelation is somewhat inexact, since the average length of the 19 cycles during this century through December, 1974 has been 42 months. During the post-World-War-II period, they had tended to be somewhat longer, averaging 51 months, this greater recent length having caused some difficulty in identifying the March, 1978 cycle lows, that date having completed a cycle only 43 month long. Assuming it is now possible to measure forward from March, 1978, a 42-month cycle length would call for the next major low to occur sometime in the fall of 1981. The extention of the cycle to the post-war average of 51 months would postpone that low until the spring of 1982, Now cycles, of course, are measured from'low to low, and the date of next low is of limited prac- tical interest at this time. For so long as the cycle remains in an up phase, we are interested in identifying the eventual high. We are, in other words, trying to guess the shape of the cycle which , began a year and a half ago. It has been characteristic of recent cycles, since the late 1960's, that they spent only a bit more than half their alotted lifespan in an advancing phase. If this holds true in the present instance, a peak could occur as early as 21 months after March, 1978, in other words, as soon as December of this year. On the other hand, a return to the genral post-1942 pattern would suggest a cycle of 50 months,spending 80 percent of its time in an advancing phase. This takes us out 40 months from March of last year or into the summer of 1981. Taking the longer view, what we are really questioning here is whether or not the long secular sideways (down in real-dollar terms) movement in stock prices, dating back is, in fact, over, or whether yet another downswing within the framework of that secular environment is in store. We think this question is a single most important one that can be posed at the moment for the equity investor, and we intend to re-examine some of its ramifications in future issues of this letter. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 884.22 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 108.17 Cumulative Index (8/16/79) 806.14 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWTsla No statement or eo.preS510n of op'nion or cny other mailer herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be. directly or on offer or the soliCitation of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the conVellenCE of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our Informo tlon to be rellOble, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihclreof nor of the statements mude Any action to be laken by the should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Janney Montgomery ScolI, Inc, as a corporation, and .ts officers or employees, may now have, or may loler lake, pOiOlllons or trodes III respect to any securities mentioned III this or any future Issue, and such position may be dlfferelll from any views now or hereafter el'pressed III thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or III any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 24, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 24, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - August 24, 1979
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MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEFI New YORk STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AME RICAN STOCK EXCHANGe August 24. 1979 We began last week a discussion of the so-called four-year-cycle pattern of stock market . ap exam.inatio.n Wltflln the contextoftliat pattern. – TO'set the stage for'future discussion O'f this hypothesis. we are setting out below our own interpretation of the cycle pattern for the 20th Century. This particular interpretation is. we admit. partially subjective. although it is largely grounded on a series of specific and rigorous assumptions. The table shows the dates and the Dow-Jones Industrial Average at the high and low points of 22 cycles we identify since 1896. (Monthly average prices are used.). The key is the third column which shows the number of months between each cycle low and the previous low. The obvious average cycle length of just under four years gives rise to the familiar name. The final two columns show the number of months each cycle spent in an advancing phase and the percentage of total cycle length within that phase. The wide variation in this last column shows that while the cycles. measured from low to low. were of similar length. their shape has varied widely. DATE OF LOW DJIA MONTHS LOW LOW-TO-LOW DJIA HIGH DATE MONTHS OF HIGH LOW-TO-HIGH AVERAGE Jun 1896 Jan 1901 Nov 1903 Nov 1907 Oct 1911 Mar 1915 Dei 1917 !!.ug,1921 Jul 1923 Nov 1929 Jul 1932 Sep 1934 Apr 1938 Apr 1942 Nov 1946 Jun 1949 Sep 1953 Dec 1957 Jun 1962 Oct 1966 May 1970 Dec 1974 Mar 1978 26.94 55.02 Apr 1899 44.91 54 55.98 Jun 1901 31. 81 34 72.52 Jan 1906 40.35 48 71. 90 Nov 1909 55,94 47 67.32 Dec 1912 53.27 41 107.71 Nov 1916 69.61 33 113.94 Oct 1919 66.!l1L 44 104.30 . .Mar-1923 89.30 23 364.93 Sep 1929 232.60 76 288.17 Apr 1930 46.19 32 107.26 Feb 1934 90.54 26 188.40 Mar 1937 112.85 43 151. 96 Nov 1938 97.79 48 207.32 Jun 1946 168.94 55 191. 05 Jun 1948 165.59 31 288.44 Jan 1953 261. 90 51 514.64 Jul 1957 436.92 51 728.44 Dec 1961 572.64 54 985.93 Jan 1966 778.10 52 968.39 Dec 1968 691. 96 43 1026.82 Jan 1973 596.50 55 994.37 Sep 1976 756.14 39 867.94' Aug1979' 33 61 5 15 26 54 24 57 12 29 20 61 22 50 19 83 74 97 5 16 19 73 30 70 8 17 50 90 19 61 43 84 46 90 48 88 43 83 26 60 32 58 21 53 17' 'TO DATE It is apparent that placing a cycle low in March. 1978 is not wildly out of the context of the pattern. As we noted last week. its length is relatively short compared to recent cycles. but not that far out of line with the entire 80-year history. What is more significant is that the alternative interpretation seems to be running out of time. 56 months have now passed since the low of December. 1974. If another cycle low is yet to be made. the length of the present cycle has already exceeded 20 of the 21 swings,listed above. The only cycle longer than 56 months was the one which culminated in 1929. Not being a proponent'of disaster chic. we think that com- parison of that partiCUlar swing to the present one is specious. Our interpretation has interesting implications. A cycle low at 756.14 would provide the first reversal in the series of three lower lows at 1966-1970-1974. The next key question is whether the advancing phase can exceed the four previous cycle highs clustered around the level of just under 1000 on the Dow. The fact that only 17 months have been spent advancing so far would suggest that some time may remain within the framework of the current swing to make that attempt. The ultimate length of the advance will provide some crucial interpretations of the over- all pattern as well. and we shall be discussing these in future issues. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 876.54 S & P 500 (12 00 PM) 108.15 Cumulative Index (8/23/79) 810.66 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL AWTsla No ltotement or e)(pre5SIOn of opinion or any other molter herein contolned IS, or IS to be d!!emed to be. dHecily or ,ndlrectly, en offer or the 501,C.tollon of on offer to buy or sell ony secuflty referred 10 or menlloned The moller IS presented merely 'for Ihe converlence of the subscriber While Ne believe the sources of our Informo lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy Ihereof nor of Ihe slotcmenl mllde herein Any action to be 10k en by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Inveshgatlon and Informahon Jonney Montgomery ;011, Inc, as a corporatIOn, and 11s officers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In Ihls or any future Issue, and such position noy be different from any views now Of hereafter expfessed In Ih,s or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC 0 on Investment adVisor, moy gIVe odvlce to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Funher mfo'motlon on any secu'lty menl10ned herein IS ovoilable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 31, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 31, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - August 31, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOAK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC AMERICAN STOCI( eXCHA.NGE August 31. 1979 – twenty-third in a series of such cycles since 1896. which have tended. from trough to trough. to average just under four years in length. For analytical purposes. a cycle is measured from one low to the next low. but what is. of course. crucial to a price forecast is the shape of a given cycle. That shape may be viewed from many different perspectives as the illustration at the right indicates. The first such perspective is the length. low to low. of the cycle. as illustrated in Figure 1. As we noted last week. the average for the entire century is just under four yours. and for the modern period. a bit over four years. Part of the difficulty in recognizing 1978 bottom stemmed from the fact that it completed a cycle of only 39 months. a length shorter 1.. ——- than the average but well within the range of 31- 55 months which has characterized all cycles in this century except for the 1920's. This length suggests the next major low may not occur before late 198101' early 1982. A cycle may also be characterized in terms of the time it spends advancing as Figure 2 shows. The present cycle has d-. occupied 17 advancing months to date versus an average of 28 months for the entire twentieth century. and 36 months for the nine cycles since 1942. Only three previous cycles during this century have spent fewer than 17 months in an advancing pha!!e. For over the entire eighty yellrs. market cycles have averaged 61perc-ent of their total length in an advancing stage. and for the post-1942 cycles. this average has been 75 percent. Figure 3 illustrates another cycle parameter. the extent of the total advance from trough to peak. That amplitude is 15 percent. (based on monthly average price) for the current cycle. and it is worth noting that only one of the 23 cycles under study (1946-1949) has produced a smaller advance. The range of those advancing phases has been 13 to a high of 309 in 1923-1929. The average for eighty years has been 80 and. for the recent period. 64. Even the three most recent flat cycles have averaged a 46 advance. These three fig- ures would suggest upside targets of 1350. 1240. and 1100 respectively. 5. It is also possible to view a move in terms of the relationship of the terminating low to the pre- vious low. as is done in Figure 4. The March. 1978 low was 126.8 percent of the December. 1974 nadir. an interesting figure since both the recent average and the average of the entire century are within 2 percent of it. Both the May. 1970 and December. 1974 lows were lower than the vious ones. and it is interesting to note that there has not been a single case in this century of more than two consecutive cycles scoring lower lows. There have. moreover. been only two cases in eighty years of two consecutive cycles showing lower peaks. along the lines of the right-hand illustration in Figure 5. This would tend to argue against the current.upswing's peaking out short of the Septemb.er . 1976 high of 994. average price.). For eighty years. cycle highs have averaged 126 of the previous peak. This would suggest a possible target of 1250. , .. .. In summary. while there is precedent for the current market advance s termmatmg WIthin the near future. the average experience for this century would suggest that it has a good deal further to go in terms of both time and amplitude. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (1200 PM) Cumulative Index (8/30/79) 885.67 109.16 813.17 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL AWTsla No ,tolement or expression of opinion or cny OTher matter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly. on offer or the soilcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the converlence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guorontee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mode herein Any octlon to be token by the ubscrlber should be based on hl own InvestigaTIon ond Informotlon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, moy now have, or may lofer toke, positions or Irodes In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from ony views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any atker Issue Janney Montgomery Sco11, Inc, wklCn IS registered wltk tke SEC as on invesTment odvisor, may give odvlce 10 ITS Investment adVisory and ather customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In anv other lSue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS avollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 07, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 07, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 07, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF '.., … I\Ul Jiw,,,! .,4,ll,om,,,J' J!c, MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE September 7, 1979 -. market, especially in recent years, is for market weakness to develop dUring'the month of September. Apparently, traders returning from their Labor Day holiday believed in this pattern as, on the first two trading days of September, 1979, what had been a reasonably strong stockmarket turned into somewhat of a rout. The Dow started out on Tuesday with a 15-point decline, and weakness continued throughout most of the day Wednesday with prices having slipped another 13 points by 3 o'clock. A fair por- tion of the loss was erased in strength in the last half hour, and Thursday saw an extention of that recovery. Nonetheless, the decline was of reasonably serious proportions, amounting to some 22 points on a closing basis and 32 points from Friday's intraday high through Wednesday's intra- day low. ' It all occurred, as we said, following a market which had displayed above-average strength, at least through mid-August. It is true that most major indicators had spent the latter two weeks of that month consolidating, and Friday's closing level, while a new bull-market peak on a closing basis was not the high for the move based on intraday figures. On that basis, the Dow had reached a peak of 893.60 on August 16 versus a peak of no better than 890.10 on Friday. Thus, for two weeks, the market had essentially been moving sideways. The occurrence of this sort of action, especially with the arrival of September, might appropriately have caused nervous analysts to remember the action of just a year ago. At that point, -c -1- September 11. Two days of relatively mild weakness followed, after which a five-day decline trimmed some 40 points from the index by the end of September. For the rest of September and through early October, a consolidation and rally attempt brought about a renewed move to close to the old peak in mid-October. This was followed, however, by the vicious Halloween Massacre. downswing in the last two weeks of October which, at the lows, had trimmed better than 110 points from the Dow. It took the entire remainder of 1978, some two months, for prices to reaccumulate for their subsequent recovery in the spring. In view of all of this, it is certainly worth asking the question of whether there exist similarities between the present market pattern and that which obtained during the summer and early fallof 1978. Our own view is that such is not the case. The 1978 decline, as noted above, had been preceded by a distributional pattern that built up during the entire month of August. In terms of point-and-figure activity, this distribution was substantial in its own right. The failed rally attempt in early October broadened that distribution still further. Nothing remotely similar exists in the present instance. As indicated above, the distribution preceding the present decline had lasted only two weeks, the current market's having displayed above-average vitality through mid-August. By the end of this week's two-day debacle, all existing downside objectives had been reached, and the rally attempt which occurred, was, therefore, a logical expectation., Now it is, of course, entirely possible that the sudden onset of weakness,this.week,signalized,-the start of some sort of distributional pattern which has yet to be built. There were, indeed, a number of disturbing elements in the downswing, not the least of which were the negative breadth figures of 4 to 1 on Tuesday and almost 7 to 1 on Wednesday. Any event such as this week's decline memorializes the analyst to be especially alert to any signs of ongoing deterioration. Such deterioration, however, had not yet proceeded to the disquieting stage as of last week's end. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 )M) Cumulative Index (9/6/79) AWT sla 868.69 106.92 794.32 No totemenl Of expressIon of opinion or any other motter herein COntOined IS, or IS 10 be deemed jo be, directly or indirectly, on offer or Ihe solic.tot.on of on offer to buy or sel! any securIty referred 10 or mentIoned The matter IS presented merely for the convefl'e'1l;e of the subSCriber White NC behevc the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the slaements mude herein Any acllon to be Token by the subscriber should be ball'ld on hiS own Invcst'gat,on and mformatlon Janney Monlgoncry Stott, Inc, os (I corporaTtOn, and Its or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or Trades In respect fa any seCUrilles menhoned tn thtS or any fmure lSue, and sucli POSITion moy be dtrerenT from any vIews now or hereaftet c)pressed in th or any other Issue Janney Montgomery ScoT!, Inc, which tS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investme.,t and othe, customers Independently of any statements mode 11'1 th.s or 11'1 on… other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 14, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 14, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 14, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INe MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 14, 1979 Stock market action is a phenomenon often seen thM'g!, a darkly, and the significance .'u,''''''''''o ,LV,' ',I .-, have recently been discussing in this space the four-year-cycle pattern in the StoCK market, and, as readers of that discussion will be aware, it has only recently become evident, 18 months after the fact, that a bottom of major significance in terms of that cycle probably occurred in the spring of 1978. While it was possible, of course, to suspect that this was the case for quite some time, evidence became overwhelming only this July and August as most indices moved to new bull- market highs and time began to run out on the possibility of new cycle lows being attained within any sort of a sensible time frame. Ironically, it is only in the light of this recent interpretation that we can now go back and reexamine some of the market events of 1978, events whose meaning was relatively obscure at the time, and attempt to place them in their proper perspective. The first event whose meaning was unclear at the time of its occurrence was the actual bottom itself, which took place in early March. Identification of that bottom as a major turn was far from easy. We have been rereading, for example, our own comments at the time. We did note on March 17, 1978 the fact that the steepest portion of the 1977-78 downtrend had been reversed, but we were unsure as to whether this was of short or long-term significance. The following week, commenting on possible reversal evidence, we said, All these signs. . are subtle and a good deal less dynamic than the strength of last December which later proved to be a false rally. Certainly, more confirmation in a number of areas would be appropriate before it is possible, from a technical point of view, to adapt an unreservedly bullish stance. Shortly thereafter, some six weeks after the actual low, we first drew attention to the possibility that a bottom in terms of the four-year-cycle might have occurred, but noted also, the total absence to date of technical signs of a major bottom. Quite obviously, in short perspective, the portents were somewhat less t hIm clear, In any case, the 'had ronntin,.rl its auv, rlllM'lg the summer of 1978, , on the Dow, above 900 by mid-September. This led to the second phenomenon whose mean- ing was difficult to interpret. In a surprisingly sudden downtrend, the market moved sharply lower during October as the Dow plunged to new lows under 800. There then occurred, during the first week of November, 1978, an almost classic selling climax of the type which historically has featured bear-market bottoms. Indeed, based on a number of measurements, the first week in November, 1978 reached an oversold condition which surpassed any comparable condition since 1926, including the entire period of 1929-32. All of this was easily recognizable to the technician, and our letter of that week commented on it. However, we were forced to go on to say, We are compelled to raise a more-than-moderately disquieting point. It all took place at the wrong time. The textbook climax action of last 'week occurred, not after a major downswing, but very close to a market top scored just last September. This, and the fact cannot be ignored, is totally without precedent for the last 30 years. 1978, therefore, saw two events which were extremely difficult to interpret at the time of their occurrence. The first was an apparent stock market bottom in the spring featured by a total absence of the sort of reversal signs normally associated with such bottoms. Second, those reversal signs finally occurred — but not until six months later in October-November, and they occurred at the conclusion of a short, medium-scale decline, rather than, conventionally, at the end of a major downswing. Perhaps it is our own obtuseness, but it did not occur to us, at least until recently, to view the two phenomena as being associated. Now, however, it becomes possible to view all of the 1978 action as a sort of double bottom, in whiCh the major averages reversed themselves at an early stage, totally without the usual climactic indications and in which the rest of the,market performed a cyclical reversal at a higher level and with all the conventional fireworks some six months later. This view fits neatly into the cycle pattern, which, we suggested above, only became apparent with the strength of last summer. This whole exercise of groping our way toward an explanation of the events of the last 18 months is not, in our view, totally academic. If this view is indeed the correct one, it would suggest that, from a technical point of view, the present cycle has a good deal longer to go both in terms of time and amplitude. Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 877.22 S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 108.49 Cumulative Index (9/13/79) 798.02 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL AWT sla No statement Of expression of opinion or ony other moiler here'n contOlned IS, or ,s 10 be deemed Ie be, dnedly or mdllectly, on offer or the SOllCltollon of on one' to buy or sen any secunty referred to or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the convel'lenCE of the subscriber While Ne bolleve the sources of our Informa tlon to be reliable, we In 1'10 way represent or guarantee the accuracy there! nor of the statements mude herem Any acTion to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own mvestlgatlon and Information Janney Mon!gomery Seoll, Inc, as 0 corpO(atlon, and liS offICers or employees, may now have, or may later teKe, POSitions or trades In respect to cny securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be d,fferent from any views now or hereafter e…pressed In this O( ony other ,nue Jenney Montgomery coH, Inc. which IS registered wllh the SEC as an lI'\Vestment adVisor, mey give adVICe to Its Investment adVISOry ond othel C1.Istomers Independently of any Statements mode In thiS or In any olher Issue further information on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 21, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 21, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 21, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBeR NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBEA AMEAICAN STOCK eXCHANGe September 21,.1979 is, , necessary that- we- shOtiIa; gold. The reader is herewith warned that this letter is probably the wrong source from which to gain en- lightenment on this particular topic. We have referred to gold in the past as,the barbarous relic and have noted with approval the late Premier Khrushchev's dictum that its Ultimate suitability would be for lining the walls of public washrooms. Such statements regarding a commodity which has advanced in price 150 in the past two years and 25 in the past two weeks is, our gold-loving friends tell us, a fair indication of our perspicacity on the subject. Actually, we have no apologies to make for the above record. Throughout a long career, we have failed to recommend and indeed recommended against probably thousands of investment vehicles that have appreciated as fast or faster than gold has done in the recent experience. We find ourselves no more or less chagrined at having missed gold than having missed last year's over-the-counter flyers. We are, in other words, prisoners of our unfortunate inability to regard the yellow metal as a religion rather than a commodity. There exist, however, substantial areas of agreement between our own position and that of avid believers in the gold mystique. Our skepticism regarding the metal rises from the fact that' we do not believe that the world would necessarily be a better place were gold to be adopted as a monetary standard. We do, however, share with the gold bugs a profound skepticism of the ability of governments to maintain a stable currency. ' This skepticism will be understood by anyone who takes the trouble to read history, starting with the Emperor Hammurabi who was only the first in a long string of rulers to practice debase- ment of the coinage. That gold should be rising in price at a time when currency debasement or'ising. To attribute its most recent action simply to reasonable and urlarlle doubts regard- g the ability of governments to manage their own affairs, -however, betray's, in our view, nothing more than profound ignorance of markets. To any reasonably detached observer, the whole situation is rather familiar. . The sane and sensible rationale for the investment purchase of gold noted above has long since disappeared, to be replaced by rumors about mysterious doings by Arabs, repeated by people who never met an Arab in their life. The obvious current motive of gold purchasers is that of being able to sell it to someone else at a higher price, preferably as soon as possible. Such purchases may, indeed, for the time being, prove to be justified. On a pure momentum basis, we would suggest that the near-term trend for gold is as likely to be toward higher prices as toward lower. We would, however, strongly caution against the notion that speculation on the gold market constitutes protection against inflation or indeed against anything else. We see gold, in other words, as nothing more than one of a series of commodities large num-, bers of investors have, in recent years, decided might provide protection- against what monetary authorities are doing to them. One area, 'of course, that has conspicuously failed to provide such protection is common stocks which, of course, accounts for the relative lack qf interest therein. It has been noted, however, that mindless projection of past trends is seldom the key to invest- ment success. In terms of classical wisdom, the current flight from currency' should portend nothing short of disaster for the equity market. The problem for those of us who study equity price action is that stocks refuse to act as they should on their way to a disaster. Indeed, in a long-term sense, precisely the opposite appears to be the case, suggesting ,that in the future, unlike the past, the neglected area Of common stocks may provide the best available shield against currency debasement. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 PM) S 8. P Composite (12 00 PM) Cumulative Index (9120179) 890.87 110.22 801. 08 AWTsla No statement or e)(prenlOn of opinIOn or any other motter herein contolned IS, or to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the OIICltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any scctmry referred to or menlfoned The morrer JS presened merely for Ine converlence of the subscher Wfule we believe Ine sources of our Informa- flon to be reliable, we III no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of thc stotements mod!! herein Pony adlon to be by the should be bcued on hiS own mveshgatlon and Information Janney Montgomery Scofl, tnc, as a corporaTIon, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later poSitions ar trodes In reSpect to ony sCQJntles mentioned In thiS or any future 15sue, and such poSition may be ddferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any (lther Issue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS reglslt!red With the SEC os on Investment adVisor, moy give adVICe to Its Investment odvlOry ond othel customen Independently of ony statements mode In thiS or 10 any other Issue Further mform(\lon on any securrty mentioned herem IS aVailable On request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 28, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 28, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - September 28, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBEfI NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE September 28, 1979 It is often dangerous to anthropomorphize an institution such as the stock market, but, if one looks — '-lWIS.st-weeks p-ricrreliaVior, -tne-overwhe1minlfimpressloniS'one -ofjjervousness7 Kaffiiftetlly is plenty to be nervous about. As suggested last week, it is difficult to pinpoint just what, precisely, 400-per-ounce gold means as far as the stock market is concerned. It is also difficult to assess the exact impact of short-term money rates approaching 12 except to suggest that they are hardly bullish. Such rates obviously continue to make alternative forms of investment relatively attractive vis-a-vis stocks and increase the borrowing cost of carrying stocks. The foregoing negatives are piled upon a skyrocketing rate of inflation, a rising money supply, and, as an election year approaches, continuing reminders of both the actual and alleged shortcomings of the present administration. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising to see a market which, after posting a near-record advance to a new high, as the Dow did on September 20, totally fail to hold that gain as it did in Friday's trading, and then plunge sharply as it did on Monday. Equally typical is a market such as Tuesday's which continued the previous day's slide, and then recovered almost totally in the final hour, fOllowed by one which extended the prior day's rally and then lost almost all that gain at the tail-end of the day. Meanwhile, the financial commentary seems to be focused more and more one these erratic short-term swings and less on basic trends and fundamentals. We have been trying to establish in these letters our belief that, as of mid-August at any rate, bull- market conditions existed. We have, in the past, likened the management of money under such condi- tions to the process of driving a car at night. The obvious requirements are that one should remain alert and carefully inspect that which is taking place within the range of one's headlights. Obsessive worry about what obstacles mayor may not lie beyond the range of the headlights can produce nothing but schizophrenia. The relative point in the present instance, it seems to us, is that, at least until headlights available revealed the stoc1\; market ahead to be free of obstacles. Whatever threats may have developed in the past three or four weeks seem — to be of potential rather than actual significance One fear, for example, that appears to preoccupy many investors is a repetition of the sharp intermediate-term crash of October a year ago. (Actually, if one is looking for significance in anniversaries, an even more significant one is occurring in September-October, 1979. That, of course, is the 50th anniversary of the 1929 crash, an anniversary which we do not intend to allow to pass without comment next month.) In any case, we pointed out a fortnight ago that the potential distributional pattern which had formed bore no resemblance whatsoever to that which had formed during the summer of 1978. Despite the fact that an area of potential distribution has continued to build, centering around 880- 890 on the Dow, that area is still of significantly less magnitude than the one which preceded last year's Halloween Massacre. Just as generals have a tendency to fight the last war, bearish analysts seem to be enamored with protecting us against the last down-swing. It is seldom a productive exercise. None of this is to say that areas of possible concern are, at the moment, totally lacking. For the technician, one such area must be breadth action which, since mid-August, has been, in a word, abysmal. This is taking place at a time when a fair number of market averages (although not the Dow against which breadth is usually measured) have moved into new high territory while all breadth measurements remain below their levels of September, 1978. This sort of action sets the scene for a divergence of the classic sort It must, however, be remembered that breadth divergences, historically, have taken place Over protracted periods of time, and there have often been long lags between new highs in the averages and ultimate confirmation by market breadth. We are inclined, therefore, to give this factor, for the time being, at least, the benefit of the doubt. Still another potential area of concern is the lack of confirmation of the Dow's new high by either the Transportation or Utility averages. Here again, it is perfectly true that such confirmation is lack- ing as of the present date. It is, however, certainly not impossible for later Utility and Transport strength to bring these averages once again into gear on the upside. What we are saying, in summary, is that any market which has advanced as sharply as the current one did during the summer rally of 1979 is vulnerable to a short-term correction. What needs to be assessed is the risk that such a correction, if it occurs, might develop into something of more serious import. Our own assessment, based on the evidence presently available, does not indicate such vul- nerability. We think, therefore, that a continued aggressive attitude toward the equity market appears warranted. ANTHONY W. TABELL Dow-Jones Industrials (12 00 PM) 886.60 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 110.18 \ Cumulative Index (9/27/79) 798.18 No stotement or expressIon of opinion or any other motter herein contOlned Is, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dIrectly or Indncc!ly, on offer or the 50licllollon of on oFfel to buy or sell any secunty referred 10 or mentIOned The marter presen1ed merely for the of Ihe subScriber While we beheve Ihe sourl;es of our Informa- tion 10 bl! reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herem Any aellon 10 be by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own ,vestlgollon and mformaHon Janney Monlgomery Scali, fnc, as a corporohon, and ,ts offICers Or employees, may now have, or may laler role, poslhans or trades 10 respect to any securlt,es mentioned In thiS or any future 's,ue, and such POSITion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In th,s or any olher Issue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, wh,ch IS registered w,th the SEC as an ,nvestment adVisor, may give adv,ce to Its Inveslment advlilory and olhe, customers Independenlly of any statements made In thiS or In any ather 'ssue Further Information on any secunly menhoned herein ,s avmlable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 05, 1979

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 05, 1979

Tabell's Market Letter - October 05, 1979
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER – 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER STOCK EXCHANGE October 5, 1979 Our readers are undoubtedly aware that this letter's attitude toward the stock market has, for some time, one. When the market outlook appears positive, however, it is necessary to be aware of potentiBl clouds-onAhe -liorlzon–;- and one–suchC1ouil, -as of market breadth. This action does, indeed, raise a few mildly disquieting questions, but, before becom- ing overly concerned, it Is, perhaps, worthwhile examining recent breadth behavior in some detsil. Perhaps the most important point that can be made is that there are currently two separate and distinct developments as regards breadth which have possible negative implications. The first of these is longterm in nature and has been present for some time. The second is shorter-term and of relstively recent vintage. Let us first examine the shorter term problem. The following table shows the major short-term swings in both the Standard 81 Poors 50o-Stock Index and our breadth index since the low of October, 1978. New highs both in the breadth index and in the 500 are indicated with an asterisk. SiP 500 BREADTH DATE SloP 500 BREADTH Oct 31, 1978 Nov I, 1978 Dec 6, 1978 Jan 26, 1979 93.15 96.85 97.49 101. 73 805.17 811.79 813.60 819.61 Apr 10, 1979 Jul 9, 1979 Aug 31, 1979 Sep 20, 1979 103.34 104.47 109.32 110.51 821. 75 822.88 831. 62825.24 Classic breadth theory, it will be recaJIed, suggests potential bearish implications whenever a new high in the market averages is unconfirmed by a like high in breadth. As the table quite clearly indicates, each new high in the S 81 P since last October has been confirmed by a new breadth peak with the single exception of the last one, the September 20 high of 110.51 which found the breadth index some 61 points below the peak it had attsined on August 31. The following table is constructed Blong the same lines and goes back to the beginning of 1976. This longer-term perspective reveals still another difficulty. DATE S&P 500 —–.Jan-1-4-,-1-97G – Feb 4, 1976 Feb 20, 1976 Apr 5, 1976 Jun 21, 1976 Jul 14, 1976 Sep 21, 1976 Dec 15, 1976 Jan 3, 1977 101.91 102.10 103.51104.28105.95107.83 105.14 107.00 BREADTH 804.12 818.43 824.15 820.21 815.77 821. 72 823.85 829.84 836.15 DATE Jun -27. 1977 Jul 22, 1977 May 17, 1978 Jun 8, 1978 Aug 17, 1978 Aug 25, 1978 Sep 11, 1978 Aug 31, 1979 Sep 20, 1979 SiP 500 100.98 101. 67 99.60 100.21 105.08 104.90 106.98 109.32 110.51 BREADTH 836.94839.4U 840.22 841.07 849.40849.76 853.78 831. 62 825.24 The highs of early 1976 in the S 81 P 500 were confirmed by new breadth peaks up through February 20. However, four-successive new market peaks in April, June, July, and September of 1976 were unconfirmed by new highs in the breadth indicator. This, on the record, suggested a bear market as far as the S &P was concerned, and indeed, one ensued, since the average dropped from 107.83 to a low of 8Y.19 in March, 1978. It was a peculiar bear market, however, since, as the- table shows, each successive short-term peak took breadth to new highs even though the 500, at each peak, tended to be lower. As the market moved up again to a high of 106; 98 in September, 1978, breadth continued to achieve new peaks. There then ensued the break of September-October, 1978 which took Blmost a year to recover. When the 500 finaJIy managed to achieve a new high in the end of August this year, breadth, Blthough it had risen satisfactorily as the first table shows, was still unable to rise above its September, 1978 peak. Needless to say, it remsins below that peak today. Let us examine each of these divergences. The first one is ,- indeed, disturbing, and the six-point difference between breadth on September 20 and its higb of three weeks earlier is an unusaJIy wide one. It must, however, be noted that this particular divergence is barely a month old Hlld could easily be erased by a couple of weeks of markets which demonstrated across-the-board strength. The second divergence is indeed real, but its implications are, in our view, somewhat ambiguous. We discussed a couple of weeks ago the theory that the period March-September, 1978 constituted, in many ways, a sort of double bottom. If this is the case, the fsilure of breadth to better its September, 1978 high is of little-consequence since divergence. are normBlly measured from the start of bull markets. Also, the superior action of the breadth during 1977 and 1978 is historicaJIy unprecedented. Although breadth has not yet bettered its own high, made in September, 1978, it is, at current levels, comfortably above its level of September, 1976, the last time the 500 achieved a major high. The unusuaJIy strong breadth action during the 1976–78 bear market, in other words, has made current interpretation somewhat difficult. We are trying here to put breadth action in perspective, not to paint an overly rosy picture. Recent breadth has, perhaps, placed the market in a position where it must prove itself — by putting On a raJIy sufficiently dynamic to rsise breadth to new peaks. This would not be at an difficult in the current context. On the other hand, it is becoming just about a necessity if the doubts referred to above are to be dispelled. Dow-Jones IndustriBls (12 00 PM) S & P Composite (12 00 PM) 897.18 111.09 ANTHONY W. TABllLL DELAFiELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (10/4/79) 801. 57 AWTsIa 1 'fNo statement Or expresSion of opinion or any olher motter herein coni d to buy or sell any secvrory referred fo or mentioned Th off olned IS, 10 b he dd eeme 10 be, dlreetly or indirectly, on offer or the SOllCllotlon of on offer tlon to be reliable we In no way re re t em er IS presente mere Y or t e of Ihe subscriber While we believe the sources of our Inforrna bosed on his own 'investigation and nor of the stotement!, mode herein Any action 10 be token by the subscriber should be positions or trades m H!Spect to any SeCUrities mention dYm ttl go ery co t, nc, os 0 corporation, ond Its offIcers or employees, moy now have, or mcy Icter tOke, 1hlS or any other ISsue Janney Mont orne Sc II I e IS or any future ISsue, and such POSition may be different from any Y'eWl now or hereafter eypressed In CVltamers mdependenlly of any , 'm 's which IS With, 'h'h SEC ,os on mvestment advisor, moy give adVICe to lis mveslment adVisory and othel I or In any 0 er Issue urt er In orrnotlOn on any seruflly mentioned herern 15 aVailable on requeu

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