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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 01, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 01, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - January 01, 1975
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– – —— PERCENTAG! CMANGE ,OR TM! DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE 'ROM 1899 DATE VEAR.END DDW PERCENTAGE CMANGE ….. ….. .- 1900 11'.50 O.75 1101 113.20 -&.37 1102 &1.95 ,-1.98 1903 4&.90 .211.29 1104 119.50 118.19 1105 93.05 33,88 1'0& 111.40 1,45 1901 19'08 59.35 85.110 .37.13 44,23 19' 98,00 111,49 19 10 80.95 .t1.40 1911 80.85 -0.12 1912 88,10 8.97 .1913 19'1 4 17,10 -12.49 –;—c .;'- – -,.,. – ' —'55;00 –', —-.— .28 .116 —- 'C, 'F' 1915 191& 1911 1918 19lC1 11120 1921 1122 11123 19211 1'25 192& 1927 1928 11129 1930 91,00 '8,50 70,20 82,115 105,80 12.20 9,80 17,10 14,10 115,45 154,55 157,20 202,110 300,00 248,118 1f1I1,58 111,36 1,55 -28.73 17,45 28,32 .31,7& 10,53 2t.fl8 -3.0' 22,11' 33.87 1.11 28.15 118,22 .1,17 .33,77 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1113& 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 , ' 77,90 59,93 99,90 104.011 -11111,13 179.90 120,85 154,7& 150,24 131,13 110,1& ..- – – 52,fl7 .23.07 116.119 4.14 .38.53 – '.- 24,82 .32,82 2S.011 82,12 .12.72 .15.38 -, – c — 1'112 111113 1944 1945 1911& 19117 19118 1949 1950 119,40 135,81 152.32 112,91 177,20 lS1.1& 117,30 200,13 235,41 7.111 13.S1 12.09 211.65 -8.14 2.23 -2.13 12,88 17,63 1'51 2&1,23 111,37 1952 1953 211.90 280,90 e,42 .3.77 1954 1155 195& '157 4011,31 113.'6 1188,40 20.71 – —- ' – —'—j;— 1958 581,811 33,511 1959 1Cl&0 79,3 615,SI 1&.76 .9,311 1'&1 731,111 18.71 19112 652,10 -10,81 19113 762,95 11,00 111111 19115 8111,13 111,57 969,2& 10,88 1I&! 785,' -18,111 19., 905,11 15,20 19&8 9113,75 4,21 19&1 800,36 .15,11 1970 838,92 4,S2 1971 810,20 6,11 1'72 1'13 tll711 1020,02 850,86 616,211 111.58 -16,58 … ,.!l7

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 03, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 03, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - January 03, 1975
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,——————————————————————————————————————. TABELL-S MARKET LETTER J 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF' MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE – – -.– .—. – …r —–'''''O'';;;'—-January319-75 — –,Q- –,-..,.- For some years now, we have studied the familiar seasonal tendency of the stock market to stage a year-end rally, and It has been the custom of this letter around the New Year to point out some of the conclusions that can be derived from a study of this phenomenon. We have suggested that an exhaustive study of chart patterns,slnce the Dow-Jones Industrial Average first was computed In 1897,indlcated that such a rally, however miniscule, Invariably had taken place. As a reference to this exercise, the table on the reverse page shows the yearly percentage change of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average since 1900. A number of Interesting facts about the market action of the year-end may be noted. (1) – As stated above, an Identifiable year-end rally has taken place In every year since 1897. This rally often has been of great magnitude with advances as great as 28 having been recorded. It also, on occasion, has continued with only minor interruptions for as long as six months into the new year. However, on other occasions, It has been of only a few days' duration, reaching a top extremelyearly. Thus, In 1960, 1962, 1970, and, most recently, in 1973, the rally reached a peak in the first week in January. In 1961, 1954, 1967, and 1971, it continued into February or March. (2) – There has been a persistent tendency for the rally to begin early in years when the market has been up, and late in years when the market has been down. In recent upward years, 1959, 1963, and 1967 are examples, the rally commenced from early December. In recent downward years, 1962, 1966, anqJn1969, ,tt b,egpILlate inthe–year. Ift,he,yead,!lly!Msyear startec;L earlyon !2.ep!2L–,. 6, 1974, a down year, 1975,llke the year 1974,will be an exception-to this rule. (3) – The important thing to watch in connection with market action in the early months of the new year is the low for the previous December. This low ha s ,been broken in forty-five years out of the past seventy-four. However, in twenty-six of these forty-five cases, It was broken In January and February. Since 1937, it has never been broken later than mid-March, with the exception of 1965 and 1974. Thus, If the market is able to hold above Its December low for the first 2 1/2 months of the year, chances become good that this low w!ll not be broken. For example, In 1969, 1970, and 1973, the December low was broken early In January. In 1963, 1964, 1967, and 1971, and, most recently, 1972, It never was broken. 1965, an up year, and 1974, a down year, as noted above, were unusual with the December, 1964 closing low of 857.45 being broken in June when the Dow closed at 840.59 and the December, 1973, low of 788.31 being broken In July when the Dow closed at 770.57. (4) – In years when the December low has been broken, the subsequent trend has been downward two-thirds of the time. 1962, 1966, 1969, 1973, and 1974 are typical cases. Again, 1965 was an exception. 1970, of course, was a down year In the first half. (5) – The magnitude of the rally is an Important clue as to the year's market trend. For example, an advance of 10 or more from the December low has been followed by an upward or neutral market In thirty-one of the thirty-seven years that such an advance has occurred. An advance of less than 10 from the December low before an identifiable correction takes place has been followed by a downward market In twenty-five of thirty-seven years. In 1963, 1964, and 1971, the year-end rally approxImated 10, and In 1972 it was 17. In 1962, 1970 and 1973, for example, it was less than this figure. (6) – The length of time-In which ,the rally continues Into the,new year also is Important. For example, In twenty years the rally continued Into March or later. In seventeen of these twenty years the eventual trend was upward. In 1964 and 1972 the year-end rally continued into March and in 1961, 1963, 1967 and 1971 Into February. The most recent painful exception as previously noted was 1974. This year, therefore, the previous' December closing low of 577.60 becomes an important reference point to watch. On Thursday of this week the Dow-Jones Industrial Average closed at 632.04. The fact that this average has already advanced 9.43 must be viewed constructively. If the rally increases in magnitude and continues into February or March, historically a good market year would be indicated. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 636.19 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) 70.83 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (1/2/75) 365.15 RJS/jb No )'clement or (!xprenlon of opinion or any other moIler herein conTained IS, or 15 to be deemed to be, dIrectly or indirectly, on offer or the SOliCllollon of an offer to buy or sell ony security referr to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the conve(llenre of the subSCriber While oNe believe the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own InvestigaTion ond InformatIOn Janney Montgomery 5011, Inc, 05 a corpora han, and Its offICers or employees, may now hove, or may later toke, posItiOnS or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSITion moy be different from any views now or hereafter eopressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whu;h IS registered Wllh Ihe SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othel customers mdependently of any slalements mode In Itus ar In any other Issue Further information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 10, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 10, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - January 10, 1975
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.- . ,! I ,j I L — – TABELL'S MARKET LETTER — – —- – I , ; I I . – I , 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 10, 1975 – , ' 'It1,,always-prea-santtCneturn7from'va'calibnilndlfndflfat- tlie-maI'KeCna's-actea'S'atTsIattotllyin -, one's absence, and satisfactory is certainly an adequate description of the market's behavior over the past three weeks. The year-end rally materialized on schedule and with heartening vigor. As was noted in last week's letter, a year-end advance In excess of 10 percent has often been a harbinger of a good market year ,and this has now occurred, the advance from the December 6 low of 577.60 to the high as of this writing being about 14 percent. Before waxing too euphoric, however, it should be noted that, from a technical point of view, the severest test for stock prices lies ahead, and the mar- ket's ability to pass this test will go a long way toward determining price probabilities for 1975. – It is thus worth examining recent price action In some detail. The base or platform from which the year-end rally started began its formation around mid-November. During the latter two weeks of Novem- ber, the Dow, having broken from 675-650 level, held, on an intraday basis, between 600 and 625. In the first week of December trading, it broke to around the 575 level, exceeding Its October low in the process by a small margin. Until the year-end rally finally erupted in the last week of 1974, most of December's trading took place in roughly the 590-605 area. Since the base constitutes two separate trading ranges, that of late November and the one in December, there are two possible upside projec- tions. The first of these is arrived at by counting only December trading as part of the base. Under this Interpretation,the upside objective was around 640-645. If the November portion of the base is included, however, the objective becomes broader and centers around the 670 area. These two alternate interpretations, it seems to us, are of more than just passing interest, because the area between current levels and the 670 level on the Dow is one of tremendous technical signifi- 1 .,..cance. Wen the.,arket brokepy fr, S9 levlin te bloodb,-th,oUas smmer, the ,decllnce was arrested during the latter part of August at roughly the 650 level. With the exception of a short ' two-day break in early September, most of the trading during the latter part of August until the end of September centered around the 650-675 level. The break to the October lows and the subsequent re- bound back to the 650-675 level took only two weeks in early October, and the market then spent an- other six weeks where most of the trading again centered around 650-675. We have, in other words, ten weeks of trading — trading, incidentally, in which volume was running at its highest level of the year — in which the Dow was approximately at its current price level. It is an elementary fact of technical analysis that this area constitutes effective overhead supply, and, therefore, the market's behavior at the present juncture will be interesting. Friday morning's rally, which pushed the index into this supply on heavy trading, exceeding by a considerable margin the narrow 640-645 objective, is constructive. Continued ability to press into the supply with vigor and attain its second rally objective of 670 would also augur well for the technical health of the Dow. Even were this to occur, however, the most severe test would lie ahead. We think it illogical to expect the Dow to penetrate the entire overhead supply of August-November (supply which extends all the way up to 690) on the first attempt, and we expect that, even if the market continues higher from here, that some consolidation or correction will be necessary as the supply of last fall exerts its effect. Could the supply ultimately be penetrated, however, the outlook would be rosy indeed. Last summer's decline was sharp and on low volume, so that if the Dow were able to move above its fall high, no meaningful resistance would be encountered until around the 850 level and, indeed, 850 is the logical upside objective if one views the double bottom of October-December as — a potential'base. ICshould be noted that'lfan-advanc-e-to 850 were to materiallze,-lt-wQuld-constitute- roughly a 47 percent move off the December lows, normal for the Initial phase of the bull market. The above, it should be noted, is in no sense a prediction but rather a statement of the sort of potential which exists, As of this writing, of course, the market has just begun to push into the overhead supply at 650-675, It remains a long way from breaking above that supply at 690. It may very well not do so, and the shape of the base for the next advance would then be quite different from that described above. The potential, nonetheless, is there, and we think it should be factored into the in- vestment equation as we move into 1975, Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (1/9/75) 389.19 AWT/jb 657.78 72.57 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement or expression of opInion or any olher matter herein conhllned Is, or to be deemed 10 be, directly or ondnec1Ir,' on offer or the sohcltatlon of on offer 10 buy or sell onr, seclomly referred 10 Of mentioned The motter ,s presented merely for the converdence of the subscriber Wh, e we beheve the sources of our Informa\'On to be rel'ab e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements m..,de herein Any actIOn to be toen by the subscnblJr should be based on h,s own Invest'got,on and information Jenney Montgomery Scott, Inc, aS a corporation, and Its officers ar employees, may now have, or may loler toke, posltlon! or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future sue, cnd such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC 0 on Irwestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode ,n thiS or In any other Issue Further Informahon on any security mentioned herein 1 available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 17, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 17, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - January 17, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMSER NEW VOAI( STOCI( EXCHANGE, tNC MEMBEA AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 17, 1975 '.,; .The marketspentmost.oflast week'consolidating the gain achieved'on-the sharp upward gap' – …. of a week ago Friday when a near record 25.9 million shares changed hands. Monday and Tues- day showed moderate declines in response to the cross-currents produced by the announcement of President Ford's economic program, followed, on Wednesday and Thursday, by modest recovery in the Industrial average. Significantly, perhaps, the Wednesday and Thursday advances in the Transportation index were less than modest, and that index, closing on Thursday 156.01, posted a new high for the move from the December lows. The carrier index is now within a fraction of its November high of 156.61. However, although its action this week generally paralleled that of the Industrials, the star performer of 1975 so far has been the Dow-Jones Utility Average. That index started the year with a 3. 26-point move, which constituted a percentage advance of a rather amazing 4.7, and followed it up on January 3 with a 3.3 move. After a few days of consolidation, it posted a 2.6 rise last Friday. These upside fireworks, by a group traditionally regarded as staid and non- volatile, constitute a unique facet of of the first two weeks of the new year. Actually, the record of superior performance on the part of the utilities goes back some time now, all the way to the end of September, 1974. At that time the Industrial average reached a temporary bottom of 627.19 before posting a four-day rally to 674.05. The rally failed to hold, and, as we all now recall, the average later plunged to new lows, making a low on October 4th of 584.56. The Utility index, however, performed quite differently. It reached a low along with the industrials at 57.93 on September 13, but continued to rally longer, reaching 63.62 on September-23,' six-days-later, As the-industrials posted- newlows, the -utilities-moved-down orly'-' modestly, to 60.49 on October 1, and shortly thereafter moved ahead to new highs. Later, in December, as the Industrial average moved through its October low to reach 577.60, the Utilities never moved lower than 65.86, 14 above their previous bottom. It may well be charged that all this is of purely academic interest except, perhaps, to owners of utility stocks. Such, we think, however, is not the case. A study of major market bottoms in recent years shows quite clearly that pronounced strength in utilities has been a distinct charac- teristic of all of them. For example, the January 2 Utility rise of 4.7 constitutes the second largest one-day rise in the history of that index since 1949. The largest one-day rise, interest- ingly enough, was a 5.16 upmove posted on May 28, 1962, now recalle.d as a significant mar-' ket turning point. Likewise, the upswing from the May 26, 1970 lows was characterized by a 2.89 upmove in the Utilities on July 8, 1970. If one measures the action of utilities over a longer period, say ten days, the results are equally interesting. The two largest ten-day moves in the history of the Utility average termin- ated on October 15, 1974, and January 10, 1975, respectively, moves of 15.3 and 17.2. The next largest 10-day move was 10.87 for the ten days ended July 11, 1962, and the next largest, 9.84 for the ten days ended July 20, 1970. A study of all such moves over the past 25 years suggests that they strongly tend to be clustered around market bottoms, especially when they occur, as in October and December of last year, when the market has been declining for some time. — A closer study shows that'similar conclusions hold when one-looks at the Utilities exhibiting- – – pronounced strength in comparison to the I ndustrial average. If one charts the ratio of the Utility average to the Industrials, one finds if has been rising sharply ever since the fall of 1974. Protracted rises of Similar magnitude have taken place around major market turning points in the past. The record of utility strength presaging major bottoms is not totally infallible. Indeed, just to give one example, the utilities began to show strength in February, 1970, well before the sickening plunge to the final bottom in May. On the record, however, we think the pronounced similarity of present utilities action to that of major bottoms in the past is hard to ignore. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 650.34 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 71.51 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (1/16/75) 405.83 AWT/jb No stalement or expreulon of opinIOn or any other motler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the SOII(;llollon of on offer to buy or sell Clny security referr to or mentioned The moiler IS presented merely for the conver-tenCt; of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our informa- tion to be reliable. we In no way represent ar guarantee the accuracy thereof nor af the &lalemenls m\lde herein Any act.on 10 be loken by the subscriber should be based on hiS awn IIlveshgollon and IIlformatlan Jonney Montgomery Scott. Inc . a 0 corporolcon, and Its offICers or employees, may now hove, or moy later toke, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, (1nd such position may be different from ony views now Or hereafter expreued III thrs or ony other rswe Janney MOntgomery Scott, Inc. whICh rs regrstered WIth the SEC oS on rnvestment advrsor, may give adVIce to 115 ,vestment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode III thiS or In any other Issue Further ,nformotlon on ony security mentioned herein IS avadable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 24, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 24, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - January 24, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMeE,. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE -…. — -…o- . . . Janua-ry —–..;,- .-. — .; .- -…..-!;j. 2-4 , 1975-'-.o- – , – –'– The major averages, over the past two weeks, have essentially moved sideways, with a rally in the Dow on Wednesday and Thursday erasmg much of the decline from the January high. Along with the Industrial Average, the Transportation and Utihty Indices have also essentially been moving m lateral trading ranges. None of this should be particularly surprising. We pOinted out in thisspace on January 10 that one of the major factors affecting future market action would be the existence of heavy overhead supply at the 650-675 level in terms of the Dow. It seems logical to us that what the Dow has been doing in its meandering of the past couple of weeks has essentially been chewing away at that supply. Where, when and how that overhead supply will be penetrated is, of course, one of the great unanswered questions insofar as the 1975 stock market outlook is concerned. The reader will note that we did not, above, raise the question of whether it will be penetrated. We have been reaffirming in this space for the past three months our belief that the trading range in which the market has held since October will ultimately be part of a base for an upside move. ObViously, impliCit in this contention is the belief that, at some pOint in time, the upside barrier which, last week, was effectively holding back prices will be breached. The question at the moment is whether this upside penetration can take place with only consolidation at current levels or whether a noticeable pullback is required, followed by a rebasing period and a later renewed attack on the supply. There exists at the moment no distributional top which would suggest a serious pullback, but this is not to say that one could not be formed were continued backing and filling to take place around current levels. Were such a top, in fact, to form and a downside penetration to take place, our own view is that it would be a wise move to be a buyer of equities as downside objectives of that top were reached. – ..;,- -It-wOtilcr, -however;-1'iOtbewithout-p'receaenftorconfinued c-6iiS6lidationatarou-nd-the640''' 60-1evlTo be followed by a renewed upside attempt. As of two weeks ago, the market, as measured by most shortterm indicators, had reached an extreme overbought condition — an overbought condition approaching record levels in the case of some indicators, especially of the sort which measure market breadth. The existence of such a condition at that time was not, in our view, necessarily bearish,since it is common and normal for the initial rally of a larger upmove to attain an extremely overbought level. At this pOint, the overbought condition has already been corrected, to be replaced by a neutral one in which the market, by most measures, remains neither overbought nor oversold. It is again not without precedent in the early stages of a bull market for an initial rally to be followed by nothing more than a return to such a neutral condition and then, after some consolidation, continue the advance. Thus, another attack on the overhead supply from levels close to current ones would not be unusual and could even be viewed as constructive. The above discussion has, necessarily, been in terms of the averages, yet it is an unfortunate stock market truism that at any given pOint in time the averages tend to mislead us in one way or another. We think that one of the ways in which the averages are misleading at the moment centers around the fact that, after a seven-year bear market, prices of most individual stocks have reacted to abnormally low levels. A larger percentage of low-priced stocks now exis1Son the New York and, certainly, on the American Stock Exchanges than at any time in recent memory. A recent check of the 1500 major companies which we follow on a regular basis, for example, showed that an astounding 1100 were selling under 20 a share. We think this fact is of some importance. Due to the construction of the averages, it is difficult for these companies, with their low market value, to have much effect on those averages'movement. Yet these vast numbers of low-priced stocks represent opportunities in the universe available to the individual investor. onClose scrutiny of the price patteI'1s of these issues reveals, in fact, ..that many areshowing technical Im- provement'which, 'in some cases, verges the-oralii8tfC-Coupled with thisisthe fact that percentage – — price volatility has historically tended to be greater for lower priced stocks. There is, in other words, available to the investor a fairly large number of possible purchases which could be highly profitable on a percentage basis and yet not affect the averages a great deal. The averages may, mdeed, mask some of the opportunities that have been and will be available to the individual equity buyer. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p. m.) Cumulative Index (1/23/75) 408.17 AWT/jb 659.89 72.31 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or exprenlon of opinion or any other molter herein contomed IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or Ihe sollcltotlon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converlenCI; of the subscriber While He believe the sources of our Informo- hon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the occurocy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesllga1!on ond Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and liS officers or employees, may now have, or moy laler lake, positions or trodes m respect to any ecuntles mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter epressed m thiS or ony other Issue Jonney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on mvestment odvlsor, may give adVice to Its mvestment odvlsory and other (Ustomers Independently of any stotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herein IS avalloble on requesl

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 31, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 31, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - January 31, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANOE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 31, 1975 As the late Jack Benny used to say so perfectly, Well. . .! eks-to-ck-mark.e.t.sp-erfQrmancecertain.yhadtobe-.ieed,,si-mpres sive. Star-ting , – the week with a 26-point gap advance on better than 32 million shares volume, the Dow consoli- dated in heavy trading Tuesday and then scored a further sharp advance to an hourly high of 711.20 Thursday morning before weakness set in Thursday and early Friday. In the process, not only the Dow, but also all of the other major indices, including our own Cumulative Index, broke decisively out of the trading ranges in which they had been holding since the early part of Octo- ber, apparently successfully penetrating the overhead supply which we and others had suspected might temporarily forestall the advance. For figure freaks, it was a week to remember. First of all, the volume. The 32,130,000 shares which changed hands Monday constituted an all-time high and the 31,760,000 share volume of Tuesday stands in second place. Wednesday's volume of 27,410,000 shares had been exceeded on only three occasions prior to this week and Thursday's volume on only one. The first three days of trading saw more shares change hands than had done so in any previous full week in the history of the New York Stock Exchange. In terms of average volume per issue traded, Monday's figure of 17,274 shares was the third highest on record. Breadth was almost equally impressive. The 1476 issues that advanced on Monday constituted the third highest total of advancing stocks in market history and almost 80 of issues rose — a statistic that, in the past, has tended to be associated with major turning points. Monday was, interestingly, the third trading day this month on which more than 1400 issues rose. What has happened should, from a .technical point of view, be clear even to the rankest nov- ice at technical work. As noted above, almost all of the major stock-market indices have now ' ''-p)'sted d-efs1l7elrpsldebr,a1.outs-'-from-ttadTflg'ranges tna-t 'oreol5v!OlIsly -of some'lmPOrtance;Tl1e only further evidence which could be presented of a shift in momentum to the upside would be a successful pullback, that could and should hold above the 650-675 area which formerly con- stituted supply and now must be affirmed as a major demand zone. It is possible, of course, to dismiss the whole thing as a false breakout,and, indeed, false breakouts have taken place in the past and will take place again. If upside breakouts were never false, technical analysis would be an easy task, and none of its responsible practitioners have ever claimed that to be the case. The point is that, more often than not, breakouts arereal rather than false. It seems to us a perversion of technical work to try to predict the occasional exception. Investment policy should, therefore, it seems to us, be clearly predicated on the assumption that the market trend has turned decisively upward. The next question that should be asked is how far can an upside move be expected to carry. There has been a plethora of forecasts in re- cent months which seemed to delight in amazing numbers, both on the upside and the downside. We have been reaffirming in this space our own skepticism of the more far-out downside fore- casts which were being offered prior to last week's upside penetration. We are equally skepti- cal of some of the highly optimistic upside figures being talked about in some quarters. As we have said before, our thinking on a logical upside target centers around the 850 level on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. This level is plausible for a number of obvious reasons. First of all, it represents an area of heavy overhead supply in which the Dow traded through much of the latter pa of 1973.and early,)974.. Thereis')1'ycgJl!.S!, .. vrylit!1-9erh,e!,9 spply until.thit level is reached. Furthermore, most of the upside objectives readable on the various graphs of – the Dow center around the 850-870 area. These are confirmed by readings of the chart of the New York Stock Exchange Index, now around 40, which counts to a level just under 50, this being the area of early-1974 supply comparable to that at 850 on the Dow Industrials. The S & p 500 and 425-stock indices, interestingly perhaps, have somewhat inferior patterns to that of the Dow and NYSE indices, although both clearly suggest higher levels. What will happen when and if the 850 level is attained, we can leave to the soothsayers. The point is that the technical evidence now suggests an upside move of worthwhile proportions. The task for the investor at the moment is to place himself in a position to take advantage of it. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 699.70 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 76.56 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (1/30/75) 435.26 AWT/jb No statement or expression of opinion or any other molter herein contomed 15, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or Indorectly, on offer or the SOllcllollon of on offer to buy or sell cny secvrlty referred 10 or mentioned The mOiler IS presented merely for the convellence of the subscrtber While oNe believe the sources of our lnformo hon to be reliable, We In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mode herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own InvestigaTIon and informatIOn Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, as 0 corporation, ond Its officers or emoloyees, moy now hove, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securthes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, ond such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereoher expressed In thiS or any other ISsue Janney Montgomery Sco1!, Inc. which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment odvlsor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers Independently of any statements mode If\ thiS or In any other Issue Further Informotlon on ony seolflty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 07, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 07, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - February 07, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 7, 1975 . It was sl!Pposedly.Leo. Dyrocher ,who toldhis banplayrJ1 thaJ.the way to win games was to 0. .., .- put lots of crooked numb;j-So,,th'e -sCorebard. In -any case,the stock market has been posting a few crooked numbers of its own recently, numbers which in many ways are historically unprecedented. For the month of fanuary, for example, the Dow advanced from a December close of 616.24 to 703.69, a 14.2 rise. This constitutes the largest percentage advance chalked up during any January in the past fifty years. It also constitutes the seventh largest advance for any month at all over the last half century. The rapidity of the advance since the Dow posted its low in early December is also largely without precedent. From its December 6 bottom of 577 60, the average rose to 717.85 this Wednesday, a 24.3 rise over a period of 41 trading days. There are only four previous instances since 1926 where the index has posted as great an advance in so short a time, all of them going back to the 1930's. One of them, it must be admitted, was in January, 1930, when the market put on the largest rally within a bear market in history before ultimately proceeding to the 1932 debacle. However, the other three instances where greater advances were posted over a 41-trading-day period were in August-September, 1932, the spring of 1933 and July-August, 1938, all periods which constituted major turning points. For those who think the recent advance has been dynamic, incidentally, it is interesting to note that there was one 41-day period in August-September, 1932 in which the Dow advanced more than 80. It is possible to offer a partial explanation for the rapidity of the recent rise on the grounds that the market in the past couple of years has become noticeably more volatile, a thesis which can be supported in anyone of a number of ways. Nonetheless, after a quarter-century period in.which.it .hasbeen.necessary,to cuse.a,filterofless. than.20.to define.major bulland.bear-mar-kets, an almost-25 advance in two months must be considered striking, to say the least. Trying to explain away such an advance as a mere rally within an on-going downswing seems to us, in light of history, to be tenuous at best. There is also very little in the historical record to support the contention that, due to the rapidity of the rise, a fairly substantial correction must, in fact, ensue. A study of the seven major bull markets since World War II demonstrates that all of them tended to post substantial and lengthy rises before a correction of a s much as 5 took place. The only exception to this rule has occurred when a fairly sharp drop took place early during the base formation period, and it is arguable that we had a case of this sort of thing in November of last year when the Dow, having posted a 15 advance, dropped off to a new low in December although the other averages held their October low. In any case, the record is as follows. The 1942-1946 bull market advanced 57 over 365 trading days before any correction greater than 5 occurred. The bull markets of 1949-1953 and 1953-1956 were similar. The former posted a 282-day, 41 rise before a 5 correction was seen and the latter, a 326-day, 60 rise. In the advance from October, 1957, to December, 1961, there was a 5 1/2 decline ovr 13 trading days early in the base formation period in December, 1957, but this was followed by a 409-day, 60 advance — again without a 5 reversal. During 1962-1966, two substantial declines took place during the June-October basing period but, once this was complete, the market scored a lSI-day, 30 advance. In the 1966-1968 period, the October low was followed by a 22 advance over 145 trading days, and, in the most recent bull market, that of 1970-1973, the Dow,.after a 7 decline-in July,. 1970;'advanced'42 over 205 trading days,until April; 1971;' before any 5 downswing occurred. As noted above, the market is becoming demonstrably more volatile, and under these condi- tions it is perhaps optimistic to set 5 as a possible limit for a correction. Nonetheless, the record supports a strong tendency for major market advances to complete their initial phases with- out much in the way of correction on the way. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 707.84 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 78.02 Cumulative Index (2/6/75) 449.09 AWT/jb ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL No statement Of expression of opmion or cny otner motter herem contomed IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly. on offer or the 50llcllollon of on offer to buy or sell onr. serunly referred 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the converlenc of the Suhscflber V/h.le -He beUeve the sources of our Informolion 10 be rehab e, we ,n no way represent or guarantee the accuracy Ihereof nor of Ihe Ialemenls mode herem Any acllon 10 be laken by the subsCriber should be based on hiS own IOvesligollon and ,nformal Ion Janney Monlgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may later toke, poslllOns or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any fulure Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this or cny olher Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered with Ihe SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry cnd olhel customers Independently of cny stotements mode 10 thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on cny secvnly menhoned herein IS available on requesl

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 14, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 14, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - February 14, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 14, 1975 – , – It Ain't Necessarily So Ira Gershwin, f2!gy and Bess Technicians get understandably tired of tilting at the same old windmills but it is, unfortunately, time to have a go at another one. As we enter 1975, the fact that the U. S. economy is in a recession is known to just about everyone. The corollary that corporate profits will be down in 1975 is just about as well known, and again, just as in every period of declining prefits in the past, we see the endlessly repeated litanies about the declining profits picture having unfavorable implications for stock prices. The financial community spends millions of dollars in attempts to forecast earnings on the impliCit assumption that, somehow, aggregate earnings and aggregate stock prices are, in the short run, correlated. Not only ain't it necessarily so, it just ain't so at all. Switching from Gershwin to Al Smith, let's look at the record. Earnings for the Dow-Jones Industrial Average were first measured on a quarterly basis starting in 1929. Thus we are able to measure percentage changes in 12-month earnings starting with the first quarter of 1930 running through the third quarter of 1974. a total of 178 quarters. For four of these quarters, in 1932-33, earnings were negative and comparisons are thus distorted. This leaves us with 174 quarters which can be studied. Of those 174 quarters, 12-month earnings for the Dow declined in 60 of them. Was this bearish for stock prices Hardly, and indeed, the scale is tilted slightly in the opposite direction. In slightly morethanhalL of .tllosLq!l,!rters, 39f. 60,-!1rices .roseJatherth'lnfe!l. .Thu ,paradox – – ically, a foreca-st of declining -ea-rnings is, however marginally, bullish for stock pries. (A bit- of the same tendency is manifested on the upside. Of the 114 quarters in which earnings rose, 46, or more than a third, saw declining prices). The reason for all this, of course, is that the market anticipates rather than follows. It is, sensibly, willing to pay higher prices for recessionary, below-normal earnings and is less willing to place a premium on rising, above-normal earnings. Thus, Dow-Jones earnings have been expanding steadily for three years through the third quarter of 1974, having almost doubled in the process. Yet, in 10 of those 12 quarters, the PIE ratio, the price paid for those earnings, has declined, the net result for the three years being a 280-point drop on the Dow. This is a fairly graphic example of the fact that multiples tend to move in a direction opposite to earnings. This is amply borne out by the record. In the 174 quarters since 1930, the quarter-to-quarter change in the PiE ratio has been in a direction opposite to the change in earnings in 125 of those quarters. In the 60 quarters in which earnings were down, the multiple increased 45 times and decreased only IS. The fourth quarter of 1974 is a perfect example of this sort of tendency. Although the final figure is not yet in, 12-month earnings will probably be down for the first time in three years. Stock prices, nonetheless, rose over the quarter and will probably wind up doing the same In the first quarter of 1975. It can be shown, moreover, that the multiple is a great deal more important in determining the course of prices than are earnings. As noted above, falling earnings produced falling prices less than half the time and rising earnings, rising prices only about two-thirds of the time. Yet, in 129 out d 174 quarters, multiples'a-nd prices nave -ilioved -in tile sa-me direction. ,,- To forecast multiples, as we have noted in the past, it is necessary to turn to technical work and, in our own view, at least, that work suggests higher prices, at least over the intermediate term. Such higher prices, a product of the market's willingness to place a higher valuation on the below-normal earning power of a recession, would be a phenomenon totally consistent with the historical record. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (2/13/75) 455.37 AWT/jb 733.26 81. 68 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No stotement or expression of opInion or any other motter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to he, directly or Ind.rectly. on oHer or Ihe solicllollon of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for Ihe convel'lIcnce of thc subscriber Whlfe we believe the sources of our Informahon to be rehable, we In no way represent or gualantee the accuracy theref nor of the itatemenls mude herein Any cchon 10 be token by the subscriber should be bosed on hiS own ,nveSl,gahon and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporohon. and ,ts officers or employees, may now have, or may laler take, pOSitions or trades In respect to any sccullhes menl16ned In Ih,s or any future Inue, and such poslhon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In Ihll or any other ,ssue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS reglStercd wllh the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its IOvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mode ,n Ihls or rn any other Issue Further rnformatlon on any security mentioned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 21, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 21, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - February 21, 1975
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– – -…– -…- . .— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08!540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERtCAN STOCK EXCHANGE February 21, 1975 Long-time readers of this letter will be aware that It has, m the pa st, been somewha t crltica I of the large, institutionally-favored growth stocks as investment vehicles and even more critical of the so-called — rie-deCiii6n theory tflat;—fi1tfie early1970-' s7iea.-tOWh-at-we oeffevealooe-excess-iifereUance onthem- —.;.. by many investment managers. In March-April, 1973, we devoted a senes of five letters to examining the impllcatlOns of this concept and trying, as best we could, to refute it. Smce that time a great deal of water has pa ssed under the bridge, and it is perhaps worthwhile to reexamine the growth favorites of a few years ago and make some assessment of their current prospects. The table below shows the price perform- ance of eight representative growth favorites compared to the DnA from theIr 1973 high to their low of 1974 and from that 1974 low through this week. 1973 HIgh 1974 Low Change 2/19/75 Change DnA 1067 573 – 46.3 736 28.5 Avon Products 140 19 – 86.7 35 89.9 Coca Cola 150 45 – 70.2 75 67.5 Eastman Kodak 152 60 -60.1 85 39.9 IBM 365 150 – 58.S 21S 44.7 McDonalds 77 21 – 72.4 41 94.7 Merck 101 47 – 54.0 73 56.6 Sears, Roebuck 123 41 – 66.3 63 50.9 Xerox 170 49 – 71.2 77 57.6 As far a s these issues' performance during the bear market wa s concerned, our earlier fears were borne out. All eight issues declined by a greater percentage than did the Dow, and, in some cases, that decline was 1 1/2 to almost 2 times as great. However, that relatively inferior performance picture has changed dramatically since last fall's bottom, and the eight Issues involved have been leaders on the up- ,sldec,aILoLtheJlJhaYing.movd-ilheac!Jl.y. more,than the Dow and some a period when the Dow was up only 2S–'Thls price improvement' has having come cl coincided with ose ups itdoe dborueb. jlki nogu tds ufrri norgn; fairly impressive base formations which, although they do not suggest anything like a return to the 1973 highs, do suggest somewhat higher prices over the intermediate term. It IS when we go beyond price that the comparison becomes interesting. The table below shows the price/earning;ratio and its ratio to the Dow-Jones pie for the three dates m question. PiE Ratio to PiE Ratio to PIE 1973 Hi DnA PiE 1974 Low DJIA PiE 2/19175 RatlO to Dill PiE DJIA 15.9 5.S 7.4 Avon Products 64.S 4.1 9.7 1. 7 IS.3 Coca-Cola 47.0 3.0 12.9 2.2 21.7 Eastman Kodak 44.S 2.S 16.S 2.9 23.5 IBM McDonald's 41.4 S1.S 2.6 5.1 12.1 12.9 2.1 2.2 17.5 25.1 3.4 Merck 51.0 3.2 16.7 2.9 26.2 3.5 Sears, Roebuck 34.6 2.2 9.6 1.7 14.5 1.9 Xerox 53.S 3.4 11. 7 2.0 lS.5 2.5 As can be seen, at its 1973 high, the Dow was selling for 15.9 times earnings and the growth stocks were selling at premiums from anywhere from two to five times the Dow's PiE. These premiums, as the table shows, completely disappeared in the bear market, and, with a single exception, the ratio of the growth stocks' pie to that of the Dow was lower at the 1974 lows than it had been at the 1973 hIgh, des- pite the fact that the Dow multiple had declined to 5.8. This erosion of premiums explains a good part of …, –thehugeJprice declines forthe growth,lssues. iff T , ; 7' – – .. …. What is interesting, however, is that, at recent prices, the premiums of early 1973 had just about re- turned. The only exceptions are Avon Products and Xerox, which are still considerably lower in relation to the Dow than they were in 1973. All of the other stocks now have premiums over the Dow just about as great a s they enjoyed at their 1973 highs. None of this is intended to suggest lower prices for the growth issues and, indeed, as noted above, technical work suggests somewhat higher levels. It does, however, suggest that future appreciation for these issues is going to have to come largely from Improvement in the earnings muillpies the market is willing to accord the average rather than an increased premium for growth stocks in relation to the average. NOTE The above comments are based on technical factors. Further mformation on all issues is available on request. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m. 1 S & P Compo (\200 p. m.l ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY TABELL Cumulative Index (2/20/75) 457.97 AWT/jb No statement ar ellpreSIOn of opln'on Of any other matter herein contained IS, or ,s to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the saficltallon of an offer to bvy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The mal1er IS presented merely for the Convefllenc(; of the subscr,ber While -Ne believe the sources of our Informa- tion to be rel,able, we In no woy represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the stotements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgotlon and ,formation Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporollon, and ,ts officers or employees, may now hove, or may later take, posilions or lrades In respect to ony secuntles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any v,ews now or hereafter ellpressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment OdVISor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othe, customers Independently of any stotements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on cny security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 28, 1975

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 28, 1975

Tabell's Market Letter - February 28, 1975
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK eXCHANGE February 28, 1975 For the first time in 1975 so far, investors were reminded, this week, that it is possible for the stock -market to-do .something besIdes-go up .In .a–sharp two-day'decline.inMondays–and 'Duesday' s ctrading., the – ' Dow gave up some 30 points descending from 749.77, the high for the rally to date, to a Tuesday close of 719.18. Much of the ground lost, however, was regained in Wednesday's and Thursday's trading. The decline, although the sharpest to' interrupt the upswing so far, was still a relatively mild affair. True, more than 1000 stocks declined on both days but this contrasts, interestingly enough, with the fact that we have had no fewer than 12 days since the rally started on which the market saw more than 1000 ad- vances. Volume was also relatively light, dropping to an average of 20 million shares versus the consid- erably higher levels which previously had been chalked up on the upside. What was interesting was the nervous reaction which seemed to permeate the financial community. This, in our experience, is a fairly typical phenomenon during the first moderate decline following a major market bottom. The memories of the bear market remain too much with us, and a couple of sharply-down days awaken fears of its revival, even though rational analysis tells us that this is unlikely to be the case. From a technical point of view, the drop has little Significance. It met support where one would ex- pect it to do so, at around the 710 level and the most probable course of action from there on out would be the building of a new short-term base, preparatory to further attempt at new bull market highs. About the only thing that would suggest that something more serious was in the offing would be a downside penetra- tion of 700 which would indicate a test of the support at around 675. For the moment, at least, we would tend to regard this latter course as a possibility rather than a probability. What the week's weakness may be suggesting is some moderation of the rather amazing rate of advance that has characterized the rise so far. The DjIA is up, after all, some 30 since the rally began on the 6th of December, this in a period of just 54 trading days. Since the first of the year there have been only fouLperiods .when .the market decJi!)ed, .,-srneasurjOdbybr.e9gtil, fortw9or .moJ-econ.eutiv.e tr-,ding days and the longest period we have seen so far in which the market failed to make a new high has been under two weeks. Concomitant with the rally and undoubtedly a partial cause ( although not, as many analysts seem to believe, anything approaching the entire cause) has been an almost unprecedented rally in short-term interest rates. The prime rate, as we all know, has dropped from a level of 12 to under 9 in just five months. The treasury bill rate, almost 9 late last summer, has plummeted to close to 5 in recent weeks, and other short-term interest rates have been descending with almost equal rapidity. We have returned, and we think this is of some Significance, to the normal yield curve in which longer bonds offer yields in excess of shorter ones. The so-called reverse yield curve of last summer was, of course, an expression of investor expectations — of the fact that relatively high short-term rates were not expected to be per- manent. The fact that long and short rates are now in a more normal relationship to each other may indicate that the rally in short-term instruments may be close to at least a slowdown. As we said above, all this is suggestive, not of the fact that the rally is over, but that its most dy- namic phase lies behind us. The initial rally of a bull market historically does nothing more than recoup the most irrational phase of the previous bear market. It was, after all, only last September that the Dow was selling under six times earnings and protected dividends were offering 10-12 yields. It is certainly arguable that such levels were, by any objective standards, irrational, and the rally has done nothing more than make them another episode in the history of the stock market's occasional aberrations. Typically, as an upswing moves into a less ebullient phase, stock selection becomes more and more important. This is particularly so in the present instance. As the present rally has progressed, more and more stocks have moved into the clearly defined minor uptrends, and we would expect this phenomenon to continue– The problnn is that-many of these iswhijetheir-technrcaTpafferns su'gge'st higher levels do, not, as yet, appear to have sufficient base patterns to suggest major upside reversals. We recently compiled a list of stocks in major downtrends where the minor-uptrend objective is less than the price that would be required to score a major upside breakout. The list mcludes 328 issues, a fairly sizeable num- ber. Quite obviously, some of these will broaden their bases and evidently attain major-uptrend status . .A great many others, however, are probably best regarded as sales on strength. Luckily, however, as the market moves into the sort of sedate phase where selection becomes impor- tant, leadership tends to become more clearly defined and, from a technical point of view, the process of stock selection becomes somewhat easier. If in fact we are now entering into such a phase, it will be incumbent on the investor to adjust his portfolio, which by now, certainly, should be aggressively com- mitted to equities, to take advantage of it. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) 730.84 S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) 80.80 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (2/27/75) 454.42 AWT/jb No statement or e)presslon of opinion or any other mOiler herem contained IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, drrectly or tndlrectl(., an offer or the soliCitatIOn of on offer to buy or sell ony security referred to or mentioned The molter IS presented merely for the convellIenCe of the subSCriber Whl e we believe the sources of our informatIon 10 be relIable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude hereIn Any actIon to be token by the subSCriber should be based on h,s own investIgatIon and Informollon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporatIon, and Its offIcers or employees, may now hove, or may later lake. posItIons or trades In respect to ony securtt,,!s menhoned In thIS or any future ISSUe, and such posItIon may be dIfferent from ony vIews now or hereoker expressed In thu or any other Issve Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regIstered Wllh the SEC as on Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVICe 10 .Is Investment adVIsory ond othe. customers Independently of any statements made In thIS ar In any other lssve Fvrther informatIon on any security menhoned hereIn IS (wodable on reqvest

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