Walston &Co.- .;;…; Inc. Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchanges OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABELL'S MARKET LETTER February 2, 1968 Market action continues mixed, confused and erratic. The early part of last week's trading featured mild weakness in the averages and in most stocks, along with severe bloodlettings in a great many of the now tarnished glli.mor issues.' A rally starting late Thursday, which featured glamors, paled on Friday as traders quickly moved to take profits. While we are extremely dubious as to any prospect of major recovery in the former leaders, . we must confess that it is hard at this time to predict any major disaster for the market as a whole. We continue to view the complex process now taking place as a shift in market leadership into the kind of stock mentioned in last week's letter. – – Accordingly, 'we'are'mak-ing'a' number of'changes-in-our-Recommendedi;ist.—Two- issues, American Potash and Mead Johnson, have been merged and are being removed as of their last price prior to the merger. Another merger issue on the list is Pennsylvania Railroad, and we are retaining the combined Penn-Central in the list. Also for the time being, we are retaining both Olin Mathieson Chemical, and the spun-off Squibb-Beech Nut which holders of Olin Mathieson received. Three issues, Cincinnati Milling Machine, Ex-Cell-O. and Kelsey Hayes, are being deleted effective with today's prices. The following issues are being added to our list. To the High-Quality-Long-Term Growth section of the list we are adding NA TIONAL DAIRY (37 1/4), the largest international packaged food company. Famou brand names like Kraft and Sealtest are being introduced on a world-wide basis and with overseas expansion efforts accelerating, prospects appear bright for continuation of the im- pressive earnings uptrend. To the Price Appreciation section of our Recomme ed w! are adding the follow ing issues, all of which seem to present the combinenJ a tr c lV chnic!11 patterns and interesting fundamentals. P. ARVIN INDm5TRIES (33 1/2) a e in radio and TV manufac- . . ture, auto parts and systems, etc., has portable hea . gs …. oro. PopulatlOn expanslOn and upturn in auto sales suggests CANADA DRY (33 1/8) I n drink field, importer and distributor of scotch whiskey under h J I k bels and a distiller of domestic liquors. Hunt Foods potentially d 0/. 0 rough ownership of convertible debentures. CHICAGO M L UMENTS (33 1/2), largest domestic manufacturer of mu- sical instruments, has y had an outstanding market performance in recent months. However, if current e . ates of earnings growth prove true, as now seems indicated, CMI should prove an attractive commitment. FIRST CHARTER FINANCIAL (30 1/2) is the leading factor in the savings and loan indu3try, a field that now seems to have passed into a resurgent phase. With management having learned to operate successfully in tight monetary climates and real estate again on the uptrend in California, the outlook here is favorable for the foreseeable future. We also are adding the following issues to the Speculative Price Appreciation section AMERICAN MOTORS (137/8), the David of the auto industry, again is gearing up to 'do battle with the Goliaths of the industry. First quarter indications strongly suggest that fiscal 1968 could be AMO's best year in recent history. AMERICAN PHOTOCOPY (19 1/8), meeting with successful selling of its new copying machine, could be upon a new phase of profitability. Future earnings, however, do depend heavily on this one product. In view of this, the stock must be considered highly speculative and suitable only for accounts able to assume indicated risks. ELECTRONIC SPECIALTY (31 5/8) , active in the areas of smog control, space con- ditioning, plastics, controls and labor-saving devices, appears to offer attractive long-term potential. MACKE VENDING (19 1/2), although one of the smaller vending companies, has com- piled one of the best growth records. With long-term price objectives considerably above current levels, MAK should make for a worthwhile holding. Dow-Jones Ind. 863.56 Dow-Jones Rails 228.31 HARRY W. LAUBSCHER for ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. This market letter 18 published for your convenience and and IS not an offer to sell or a soIlclt,Rtion to buy any securities diSCUSsed The In- formation was obtained from sources we beheve W be rehable. but we do not guarantee Its lccuracy Wall1ton &. Co. Inc. and lUi officers. directors or emDloyeea may have an interest in or pUl'chase and sell the securltLCs referred to herem WNBOl

Walston &Co. …;…..;.,;.;;;…;..; Inc. ;;.–…;..- Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchange. OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABEll'S MARKET lETTER February 9, 1968 There is a well established school of thought among market analysts that the way to achieve investment success is through something called Contrary Opinion . The theory holds that the most profitable investment decisions are made when one tries to ascertain what the great majority of people are thinking and then, himself, takes site view. – the oppo- In practical application the theory has a number 0 f drawbacks. The first rises from the fact that the stock market is a dynamic affair, moving in broad uptrends and downtrends. It is, therefore, most of the time, actually more profitable to go along with the crowd rather than attempt to anticipate it. Another practical difficultY'is that, a great deal of the time, it is impossible, in any rational way, to ascertain just what the majority opinion is. However, recent weeks, we think, have been an exception in that we were able to de- tect what seemed to be somewhat of a standard forecast. This forecast ran more or less along the following lines. The stock market is now deeply oversold and, therefore, must have a short-term rally. However, the overall outlook is poor, and this rally will shortly re- verse itself and the market will move to new lows. The contrary opinion school would hold that, when a forecast is as unanimous as this one, it must inevitably be wrong. We must con- fess that, at this juncture, we are, ourselves, inclined to take the contrary view. Now, obviously, the forecast above could have gone wrong in one of two ways. Either the market could have gone lower without any significant advance, or a rally could have en- sued of more than short-term significance. Market events last week would lend credence to the fact that the forecast will err in the former direction. dtfline on Thursday and Friday carried the Dow-Jones Industrial Average to an int da of 34.84. This was decisively below the intra-day low of 839.40 reachedW er he qench mark a great many financial commentators have been eying 'riMMtrepi n for the past three or four weeks. It is on the subject of the t another piece of contrary thinking perhaps ought to be ofUnfortuna the game tee s beeii. one which, of late, almost everyone thinks he can play, level in both June and No mbe previously bottomed around the 840 t ye r probably one of the best advertised pieces of financial knowledge in e Y. are the dire predictions of what is supposed to occur after the 10 . . e, therefore, inclined to suggest that, under these circumstances, Frida . g of that low will have very little in the way of long-term significance. The astute rea will have noted that there appears in the paragraphs above no hint of a forecast as to where the Dow may be over the next month or two. The reason is that ther is precious little technical evidence at the moment on which to base such a forecast. The decline has been sharp and the market is, in fact, oversold. There has, however, been no evidence of the sort of market behavior that notably accompanies an important rebound. And it is quite possible that lunatic-fringe selling brought about by the penetration of the Novem- ber lows could carry the market somewhat lower. , However, when one leaves analysis of the averages, which is easy and, at the mo- ment, confUSing, and attempts to analyze individual technical patterns of some 2,000 stocks, which is a good deal more difficult but more rewarding, two facts become crystal clear. A great many stocks-have very weak should be sold. great many others have very strong technical patterns. These shOUld be bought. We have been trying in the last three issues of this letter to pinpoint some of the stocks and groups wnich fall into-these categories and will continue to do so in future issues. We are inclined to think that investment around current levels in the more attractive stocks may well prove a good deal more rewarding during the remainder of 1968 than a good many people now expect. Dow-Jones Ind. 840.04 Dow-Jones Rails 223. 63 ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. AWTamb Thill market letter 1.8 published for your convenience and information nnd III not an offer to sell or a BOhcltation to buy any securities diSCussed Th . formation employeel'! was mlQ' obtained from sources we beliee to be rehable. but have an interest in or pUTChase and sell the securities rweeferdroedntoot guarantee helem its occuracy Walston & Co Ine d its oflI d toe In an cers. tree rs or WN.801

Walston &- Co. Inc. – – – – – . .. , , FI L /! Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchanges OVER 100 OFFICES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABELL'S MARKET LETTER February 16, 1968 From time to time this letter has had occasion to remark on something called the bull-bear syndrome, noting that the disease occasionally afflicts some market analysts and a great many investors. We have suggested that the most noticeable symptom of the 'disease is a compulsive desire to pin labels on the stock market — calling it either al a bull market or, (b) a bear market, without any room for intermediate gradations. We think that this compulsion has always been an enemy of rational thought insofar as the stock mar- ket is concerned,and we suspect that it is becoming more and more so today, For example, just how, pray, does one go about defining a bull market and a bear mar ket The most tempting thing is to saya buli' marketeXi'Stswhen a given'average let us say the Dow-Jones Industrials, advances x and, conversely, a bear market exists when said average declines y/o. All well and good. If the standard of a 20 decline in the Dow-Jones Industrial Average is utJ\ed to define a bear market, we have had four such markets in the past 25 years occurring in 1946, 1957, 1962 and most recently, in 1966. By this standard, the drop from an intra-day peak of 951. 57 in the Dow last September to an intra-day low of 826.46 this week, a decline of 13.2, does not yet qualify. There are a couple of things wrong with this kind of a definition. The first thing is that looking at the market in terms of percentage decline and percentage advance may obscure some much more important characteristics. Let us take the two most recent bear markets- 1962 and 1966. These were actually fairly similar in extent, but the characteristics, it seems to us, were quite different. By and large, a great severe debacles in 1966 came back very sharply to reach w i stocks that suffered oi),nd a year later. This included airline, office equipment, electronics, andJttPuT e e technology issues. By contrast, in 1962, a great many stocks -siderable period of time, casualties of the bear 0 remained for a conarge number of cases, have not even today, six years later, moved peaks. Thus, the two markets- both bear m!rkets by percentage during and after the fact. . ' yo Another difficulty of 1960 during which year t rule, this fails to al a standards is typified by the market of me 18 from January to October. By the 20 et, yet it was a period in which a great many issues declined to major n s. e we make the percentage required to define a bear mar- ket smaller than 20, e i urselves including such periods as the drop from August 1956 to February 1957, or t ay-July drop of 1965, periodS which very few people consider ones of major decline . Nor do bull markets admit of easier definition. It is arguable, for example, though not, we think, very cogently,that 1967 did not constitute a bull market at all since, after all, the Dow did not make a new high. This tortured bit of reasoning will come as some surprise to the holders of those mutual funds whose managers had little difficulty achieving a 50 to 100 increase in net asset value for the period. All of this leads, of course, to the problems involved in defining today's confused stoc market. We have had since last September, it seems obvious enough, a market very differ- ent than the one we enjoyed in the early part of 1967. If the 1967 period constituted a bull market, are we then to say we have now entered a bear ,market phase We a!,e, frankly, not so sure. To the holder of a whole- host o- f h-i-gh-.l.y…i–n-f-lated IIglamo- ur II issues, the last five months have constituted a real doozie of a bear market. To a great many otre r investors the results, so far, at least, have not been overly painful. Gerald Tsai, Jr., in a recent speech, forecast that 1968 would bring a whipsaw mar ket, and we are inclined to go along with this definition as being as good as any. Just how it will shape up in terms of the averages is, in fact, anybody's guess, but we are quite certain it will produce highly attractive investment opportunities in individual stocks. Dow-Jones Ind. 836. 34 Dow-Jones Rails 224.66 ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. AWTamb This market letter 18 pubhshed for your convenience and informntlOn flnd is not an off('r to sell or ,!. soheltat\on to buy any securities dLScussed. The in senformation WAS obtaIned from BOUfel'll we believe to be rehable, but we do not g'Unrantee its accuracy Walston & Co., Inc. and its officers, directora or emlo),eell may have an Intereat in or purchase and the secuTltJE'S refenoo to helcin WN801

W—a-lslntocn.&–C-o-. Members New York Stock Exchange and Other Principal Stock and Commodity Exchange. OVER 100 OFF1CES COAST TO COAST AND OVERSEAS TABELL'S MARKET LETTER February 23, 1968 It is always well to suspect the obvious, especially so, perhaps, in the stock market. By the time the Dow-Jones Industrials reached an intra-day low of 826.46 last week, signs of an intermediate-term downtrend were clearly apparent. The Dow Theory sell signal had been given, most longer-term smoothed curves, such as 200-day Moving Averages, had turned down, the heralded November low had been penetrated and the speculative favorites of last year had been thoroughly purged. Yet, on a short-term basis, the market was obviously so thoroughly sold out that at least a respite was necessary, and, low and behold, this week brought the first half-way decent advance seen in what has so far been a dismal 1968, with an intra-day high of 857.78being reachedon.Fr.iday.. The.obviousexpectation is, of course, that the rally will run its course, peter o;t andthat the intermediate downtrend will again prevail until more conclusive signs of its demise are offered. This is, as we said above, the obvious concluSion. We suspect it. If the market is in need of further liquidation, we are inclined to think it will be completed Sooner than later. Alternatively, if the present rally can be maintained for any length of time, we suspect it wil continue farther than a great many pessimists would now seem to believe. Under these con- ditions, the standard solution is continued investment in attractive stocks such as the one reviewed below. CHICAGO MUSICAL INSTRUMENT COMPANY Current Price Current Dividend Current Yield 32 5/8 1. 00 3.00/0 Sweet music has been filling the air for the last ten years at Chicag!IllStrument Company as sales evidencma s d' . in rend. Largest manl,!- Long-Term Debt Common Stock 13,750,000 facturer of 1, 722, 900 shs. is expected to i m in the country, CMI a prime beneficiary of Sal 1968-E 67 000 000 the n the part of American youth &!l 1967 . . .611 680 OOQ. . — d 1 a is rl u or 0 ms reusmpeCentialSlC, YMguIihatsars Earn. Per Sh. 1968-E 2. Earn. Per Sh. 1967 1. 68 .V position in the retail dealers area, br u rf'about by an aggressive acquisition program to Mkt. Range 1 er with above-average internal growth. Sales over the last decade have averaged almost a 20 year-to- year improvement, e ear – gs through the fiscal year ended June 30, 1966, averaged a 23 annual gain. Whi Ie s managed to move slightly ahead in fiscal 1967, net declined due to labor disputes ea m the year at the guitar division, the company's most profitable subsidiary, a trucking strike and poor weather conditions that managed to severely delay shipments. CMI's line includes keyboard instruments with organs and pianos being sold under the Lowrey and Storey & Clark brandnames. Organ sales, which declined over the last year due to a shortage of electronic components caused by the greater demands of the color television industry are expected to undergo a resurgence in coming months. Fretted instruments are sold under the Gibson, Epiphone and Kalamazoo names. Because of the accelerating demand for guitars, CMI continues to have a substantial backlog of orders in this product area. Band instruments produced include a full line of brasses, and woodwinds manufactured by others are distributed through CMI outlets. The overseas market continues to expand. Instruments are exported to dealers lo- cated in more than 100 countries with Canada being the most important. It is. estimated that foreign volume will approxima te 10 of fiscal 1968 total sales. As living standards abroad rise, demand is expected to parallel the uptrend and constitute an increaSingly important con tribution to overall earnings. Selling at less than 20 times the estimated 2.00 a share for fiscal year ending June 30,1968, these shares appear to offer the long-term investor an attractive vehicle for capital gains and growth in dividend income. From the technical view, there has been a base built over the last year evidencing considerable downside support between 34 and 28 and indicating a price objective at 65. Recently added to the Recommended List, these shares again appear attractive for purchase. Dow-Jones Ind. 849.80 Dow-Jones Rails 225. 84 HARRY W. LAUBSCHER for ANTHONY W. TABELL WALSTON & CO. INC. HWLAWTamb This market letter Is pubhshed for your convenience and informRtion Rnd IS not an offer to sell or R sohcltation to buy any secUrities hscussed. Tbe In- formation was obtained from we beli'Ve to be rehable, but we do not guarantee Its occuracy. Walston & Co Inc. and Its officers directors or employees may bave an interest In or pUFcbase and sell the securities referred to helem.