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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 17, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 17, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - December 17, 1976
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBEI'I NEW YORK STOCK eXCHANGE. INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 17, 1976 The season has arrived in which we traditionally fill this space for a fortnight with our two-part'foreeast for the-upcoming ,year,. – We,suppose-.that-thisqear ,-, more -than-any-year, ,we.. should – be tempted to discontinue the practice. We uttered in this letter, 51 weeks ago, the memorable state- ment, 1976, we think, is likely to assume the approximate shape of an 'inside year', one in which neither the 1975 high or the 1975 low is exceeded. As Tom Wolfe might say, Zap!!!. The 1975 high of 881.81 was exceeded on January 6, the third day of trading in the new year, and the Dow went on to move above 1000 on an intra day basis for the first time in February. One of our friends and valued clients has spent the year calling us Mr. Inside. Such are the perils of the forecasting busi- ness. In partial mitigation, we will note that we did underline the word approximate and went on to suggest that we suspected that the market had entered a secondary bull-market phase, not- ing that it would be quite possible to see a new peak during the next year, probably in the first half, without destroying the essential shape of the inside-year pattern. The new peak, indeed, arrived with embarrassing rapidity, but subsequent action was more or less what we had in mind, albeit that that subsequent action took place at a level 100 points higher than we suspected it would. After reaching 1000 for the first time in February, the Dow, as we all know, penetrated and repenetrated that magic level no fewer than 12 times during the rest of 1976. It further confused the issue by posting a false upside breakout to an intraday high of 1026.26 in September, holding that high for about two days and then moving to a disturbing new low of 924.04 on November 10, this breakout apparently as false as the previous one had been. As this is written, there is some evidence that a new upward move is under- way. Although the Dow is not yet in new high territory, our Cumulative Index is chalking up new peaks for 1976 and breadth, as we noted last week, is showing unusually positive action, havmg soared to .' .ct.,is iv,.JQ 7.Q.highs overthe pas.t two-eeJ!loJh. tl1e Dow .and the…& P !iOQJ1Y.!' O\ove.d s ttrply ouL of their September-November trading ranges and the year-end ralli,; is apparently underway in tradi- – tional fashion. We couched our forecast last year in terms of primary and secondary phases of a bull market. That bull market has advanced, in 1976, to the point where we must now be thinking in terms of a tertiary phase. Indeed, a new buzz word has emerged among financial writers, that buzz word being third leg. It is based on the popular belief that there are invariably three legs to a normal bull market, a belief which probably arose from a body of theory called Elliott's Wave Principle, which has long been an often-valuable forecasting tool but which is a great deal more complicated than a Simple belief in tripartite upswings. Part of the copious comment on the question of the three legs arises from the distinct and obvious shape of the bull market to date. The current upswing began, it will be recalled, from a slough of despond two years ago with the Dow having moved below 580. Over a seven-month period it rose sharply to its July, 1975 high of 881 whereupon it spent the entire second half of 1975 in a trading range between, roughly, 800 and 840. It now becomes evident, with 20/20 hindsight, that that trading range was the correction of the first leg of the advance which occupied early 1975. 1976, in turn, duplicated the previous year's performance in a way few markets, in our memory, have done. As we noted above, it moved sharply upward in an obvious second leg over the first two months of the year. It then spent from February to November, in terms of the Dow at least, doing essentially nothing. The essential difference between 1975 and 1976 was that in the latter year the upswing phase was shorter, two months instead of Six, and the subsequent sideways movement more protracted. .. Thus, the interest in the third leg.- We tfilnk it probable that such a leg has 'begun and; – , indeed, it has, in fact, done so in terms of a number of indices which, as we pOinted out above, have, as of this moment, soared to new bull market peaks. It would be a not-unusual development to see this strength continue into early 1977. What will be crucial, however, is the length and vigor of that continuance. We are dealing, let us remember, with an upward cycle now two years old which, based on the historical record of past bull markets, is, if not senility, at least advanced middle age. The extent to which the current upswing can sustain itself into 1977 will be crucial in drawing conclusions regarding the basic secular market trend. We intend to discuss this subject at some length next week. A VERY MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p. m.) S&P Composite (1200 p.m.) 984.71 104.88 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/16/76) 644.17 AWT/jb No stotfment or expression of opinion or any other motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, on offer or the sollCltotlon of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred to Of mentioned The motter IS presented merely for the conVI'!ilence of the subscriber While oNe believe the sources of our Informotlon to be reliable, we In no woy represent or guorontee the occurocy thereof nor of the stotement& mude herein Any action to be token by Ihe subscnber should be based on hiS own InVesllgatlon and information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, as a corporation, and 11& officers or employees, may now have, or moy laler toke, posiTIons or trades III respect to any securiTies menlloned III thiS or any future 1Ue, ond such position tTIoy be different from any views now or hereafter expressed III ttliS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whIch IS regltered With the SEC as on IIlvestment adVisor, tTIoy give adVice to Its IIlvestment adVIsory and olhel custotTIers Independently of any statements mode III thiS or III any other Issue further ,nformat,on on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 23, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 23, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - December 23, 1976
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER , 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCE1ON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK S1'OCK EXCHANGe, INC MEMBER AMeRICAN STOCK eXCHANGE December 23, 1976 In last week's edition of this letter, we reviewed in SOme detail market action during 1976 — – or ,. more ,properly ,.market actlon..during -thecbullcrnarket.wh.ich-began,in,late'-l974-and.hasextended/,-on- .' a number of indices at least, through this week. We tried to suggest that there were two major features of this action to consider in the formulation of a 1977 forecast. These were, first of all, that the bull market had attained an age of two years, placing it, on an historical basis, in a mature stage. The second factor to which we tried to draw attention was the shape of the bull market to date. It had consisted of two obvious upward legs, the first encompassing the first half of 1975, and the second, en compassing the first few months of 1976. Each one of these legs was followed by a rather protracted consolidation. With the recent market strength, there has developed a good deal of speculation as to whether a third leg of the bull market is now, in fact, underway. Based on the action of breadth and our Cumulative Index, as we discussed last week, we are willing to hazard a guess that such is the case and that market strength may continue at least into the early part of 1977. Beyond this, the glass becomes somewhat murky and, as we noted a week ago, all this raises some very interesting questions as to the secular market trend. Final bull-market legs, in most cas es, are not terribly exciting in terms of the market averages, and, indeed, current technical patterns suggest that this may also be the case in the pres- ent instance. The Dow has a number of possible upside counts which center around 1040. In terms of the other averages, the Utilities, one of the leading performers to date, run into heavy overhead supply at around the 110 level, not too far above the present price of 105. Only in the case of the Dow Transportation Index is it possible to read significantly higher upside targets. It should be noted, however, that although the averages seldom perform outstandingly in the late stages of bull markets, individual stocks often tum in stellar performances, and this stage becomes a time when stock selec- .tion assumes increasing,importance. — ……. 'c' .'-. – -li—; third leg is, in fact, develOPing;- it 'will bTa highly intertTng phenomenon to ob- serve. In a market letter last September, we pOinted out the fact that one of the more interesting and reliable postwar phenomena has been a cycle averaging 51 months between major market bottoms .., There have been six such recorded cycles ranging in length from 43 to 56 months, and, Since wl now are 24 months past a major bottom in December, 1974, this pattern should begin to arouse some interest. We noted in our original study that the basic difference between the two most recent such cycles and the four earller ones was that, while the trough-to-trough measurement was consistent in all cases, the four earlier cycles spent over 80 of their time advancing while the two later cycles spent only 60 of their time in an upward phase. Thus, if the current cycle were to turn out to be one of the shorter Ones and spend only 60 of its time span moving up, a market peak in early-to-mid 1977 would be a distinct possibility. This, in tum, would suggest that the market remained in the grip of the flat secular trend which we all know has been its salient feature since the mid-1960's. If, on the other hand, the present cycle were to approximate the shape of 1949-53, 1953- 57, 1957-61 or 1962-66, we could expect that 80 of its time would be spent moving ahead. Such action would postpone the occurrence of the next major top not only through 1977 but on into 1978. Thus, the most interesting time to formulate a long-range forecast is not the present mo- ment when, as we noted above, the picture is somewhat clouded, but will be sometime in the middle part of next year. If we were to manage to get that far without serious market deterioration taking place and were new upside leadership to emerge, possibly among the cyclical issues which have spent a great deal of 1976.cOl!ecting.theirI7\.-75-2dva!,!c',.ll.!uld then.be.pCl.ssibl1P !ss)1eahighly bullish'long-term prognosis. Such action would suggest that, while the inevitable bear markets might OCCur along the way, equity prices as a whole were headed for a new and higher plateau. On the other hand, deterioration in mid-to-early 1977 would suggest that we were in for a few more years of the dreary sort of action which has been characteristic of the past decade. It is, in sum, in our view, difficult to say much about 1977 other than to suggest the prob- ability of moderate strength during the first half. The fascinating thing about 1977, we think, however, is that it is likely to be the year in which the pattern for the next decade may emerge and become clear. WE WISH YOU ALL A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 986.12 ANTHONYW. TAB ELL S & P CompOSite (1200 p,m.) 104.86 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL Cumulative Index (12/22/76) 644.54 AWT/jb No statement or expression of opmlon or ony other motte herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly. an offer or the sollcltotlon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menlroned The mOiler 1 presented merely for the conver'lenCe of Ihe subscnber. White we beheve Ihe sources of our InfOfll'lO' lion to be reliable, we In no way represent or guaranlee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the Slalemenls mude herern Any achan 10 be token by Ihe subscriber should be based on hl own Invesllgollon and rnformallon Janney Montgomery SCali, Inc, as a corporal lon, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may 10ler lake, positions or trades m respect to any securl lies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such paSlhan may be dlfferen' from any views now or hereaher expressed rn thiS or any other ISSue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode m thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – December 31, 1976

Tabell’s Market Letter – December 31, 1976

Tabell's Market Letter - December 31, 1976
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIYISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, tNC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE December 31, 1976 For some years now, we have studied the familiar seasonal tendency of the stock market to stage a ,- year-end rally, and it has been the custom of this letter around the New Year to point out some of the -conclus iOns thatCan bYderived'ftomOa stu-dyOf'thfs p hen-Omerion;- We'ha vesuggested'that -an' exha us- tive study of chart patterns, since the Dow-Jones Industrial Average first was computed in 1897, in- dicated that such a rally, however miniscule, invariably had taken place. As a reference to this ex- ercise, the table on the reverse page shows the yearly percentage change of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average since 1900. A number of interesting facts about the market action of the year-end may be noted. (1) – As stated above, an identifiable year-end rally has taken place in every year since 1897. This rally often has been of great magnitude with advances as great as 28 having been recorded. It also, on occasion, has continued with only minor interruptions for as long as six months into the new year. However, on other occasions, it has been of only a few days' duration, reaching a top extreme- ly early. Thus, in 1960, 1962, 1970 and, most recently, in 1973, the rally reached a peak in the first week in January. In 1961, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1975 and 1976, it continued into February or March. (2) – There has been a persistent tendency for the rally to begin early in years when the market has been up, and late in years when the market has been down. In recent upward years, 1959, 1963, and 1967 are examples, the rally commenced from early December. In 1975 the year-end rally started early on December 5, an up year, at 818.80. This year is no exception to this rule as the year-end rally started on December 2nd,1976, at 946.45. In recent downward years, 1962, 1966, and in 1969, the rally began late in the year. (3) – The important thing to watch in connection with market action in the early months of the new C'- yearisthelOwfor the pl'evfoiiIl'DeCeinber; – ThTslow has- been- bi'Oken- infOFtYIive years ouiofthe – -.-. ….., past seventy-six. However, in twenty-six of these forty-five cases, it was broken in January and February. Since 1937, it has never been broken later than mid-March, with the exception of 1965 and 1974. Thus, if the market is able to hold above its December low for the first 2 1/2 months of the year, chances become good that this low will not be broken. For example, in 1969, 1970, and 1973, the December low was broken early in January. In 1963, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1972, and, most recently, 1975, it never was broken. 1965, an up year, and 1974, a down year, as noted above, were unusual with the December, 1964 closing low of 857.45 being broken in June when the Dow closed at 840.59 and the December, 1973 low of 788.31 being broken in July when the Dow closed at 770.57. (4) – In years when the December low has been broken, the subsequent trend has been downward two-thirds of the time. 1962, 1966, 1969, 1973, and 1974 are typical cases. Again, 1965 was an exception. 1970, of course, was a down year in the first half. (5) – The magnitude of the rally is an important clue as to the year's market trend. For example, an advance of 10 or more from the December low has been followed by an upward or neutral market in thirty-three of the thirty-nine years that such an advance has occurred. An advance of less than 10 from the December low before an identifiable correction takes place has been followed by a downward market in twenty-five of thirty-seven years. In 1963, 1964 and 1971, the year-end rally approximated 10, and in 1972, it was 17. In 1962, 1970 and 1973, for example, it was less than this figure. (6) – The length of time in which the rally continues into the new year also is important. For ex- ample, in twenty-one years, the rally continued into March or later. In eighteen of these twenty-one . – ye a rs, t he eventual- – trend w- -as u- rT- pward..,. In 196… 4.., 197 2 , -1.975 and1976.. -. , t he y e a r – end rally,1 continued into March and in 1961, 1963, 1967 and 1971 into February. The most recent painful exception as ,-, previously noted was 1974. This year, therefore, the previous December 2nd closing low of 946.64 becomes an Important reference point to watch. On Tuesday of this week the Dew-Jones Industrial Average closed at 1000.08. The fact that this average has already advanced approximately 5.6 must be viewed constructively. If the rally continues in magnitude and continues into February or March, historically a good market year would be indicated. Dow-Jones Industrials (12/30/76) 999.09 S & P Compo (12/30/76) 106.88 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (12/29/76) 653.40 RJS/lb No statement or expression of opInion or any olner motter herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, on offer or the 50llclloIIOn of on offer 10 buy or sell any security referred 10 or menlloned The motter IS presented merely for the convef'lence of the subscriber While 'e believe the sources of Olr Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the occuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any achon to be laen by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own InvestigatIOn and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, 05 a corporation, and Its offuers or employee may now have, or moy later take. pOSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned 1fl this or ony future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be different from any views now or hereafter e;pressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. which IS registered With the SEC (15 on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVisory ond other customers Independently of any stalements made In thIS or 111 ony other Issue Further Information on any security menltoned herein IS ovollable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 07, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 07, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - January 07, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE r January 7, 1977 The stock market tried, at least in the first few days of 1977 trading, to obliterate a 79-year01d record;. As we stated'in this space-last.week -and hav,e r,eiteratedin previqusstudes, an identifiable year-end rally has taken place in every year since 1897. Stated in more precise terms, this means that there has never been a case where there has not been at least one January close higher than the highest December close subsequent to the December low. The Dow posted its December peak on the last trading day of the year at 1004.65 and then spent the first three days of January moving downward before a recovery set in in early-Thursday trading. Thus, to date, at least, the year-end rally has not been extended into 1977, something that has invariably eventuated ever since the Dow-Jones Industrial Average has been computed. We find ourselves unable to become unduly worried about this behavior. Certainly, on a short-term basis, the market, at the end of December, was in an extreme-overbought condition, and at any stage of the game profit-taking was to be expected. We still feel, as we said in our year-end forecast of two weeks ago, that the market strength will extend itself at least into the early part of the new year. As we suggested in that same letter, it is whether the market will have the ability to extend that strength into the latter part of 1977 that constitutes the major question mark facing investors at this time. One possible clue as to 'Whether the market possessed the vitality to extend the advance which began in December, 1974 would be a broadening of leadership, and such a broadening of leadership has, in past bull markets, often been characterized by strength, in the late stages, on the part of secondary, more speculative issues. Throughout the most dynamic part of the upswing to date, leadership has been provided by the basic-industry, cyclical issues, which had, by the early 1970's, become undervalued in relation to the rest of the market and which were to -enjoy dramatic profit'improvement-a-s-the1-9-74- recovery-got underwaYT'Thus-,-the Dow ,which-con tained a great many such issues, outperformed the market in the early stages. As compared to the broader S & P 500, for example, the Dow, three days after it made its low in December, 1974, was selling for 8.8 times the S & P. By the fall of 1975, a few months after the market had peaked for that year, the Dow had moved ahead to 9.78 times the S & P 500. Thus, action during this period was largely concentrated in the sort of issue contained in the Dow. The Dow's best level in relation to the S & P in 1976 was scored on March 9 when it sold for 9.88 times the 500, a figure not too different from the fall-1975 relative high and the peak level to date. Ever since the first quarter of 1976, the Dow has been declining relative to the S & P and in early December sold at only 9.25 times that average. Thus, through the first three quarters of 1975, leadership was focused on the Dow. For the last quarter of 1975 and first quarter of 1976, the Dow and S & P performed equally well, and, since the first quarter of 1976, the broader S & P has been outperforming the Dow, thus suggesting some broadening of leadership. That leadership is broadening still further is suggested by the action of our Cumulative Index relative to the S & P 500. At that index's best relative level in 1976, it sold for 6.23 times the S & P index. Throughout the rest of the year it declined moderately on a relative basiS, but the past three weeks have seen renewed strength, and it is now at 6.31 times the S & P, its best relative level since the bull market began. Since this index includes all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the weight accorded secondary issues is proportionately greater, thus suggesting that these issues may have begun to show above-average market action. A final fact which may be worthy of note is the fact that, of all indicators, the Amer- ican Stock'EXChangeValuatlon-liidex moved, as of just yesterdayc- as a-matter-of fact, to its nesr— level relative to the S & P 500 since the bull market began. Both the Amex index and the Cumulative Index moved to decisive new highs early this week while the S & P was able only to equal its previous high and the Dow remained well below it. While all this may be but a straw in the wind, it is also possible that it constitutes the first phase of renewed interest in secondary issues. Such renewed interest could go a long way toward prolonging the bull market. Dow-Jones Indus'trials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (1/6/77) AWT/jb 979.64 104.82 664.06 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreSSion of opinion Or any other matler herem contolned is, or IS 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or mdnec1ly, on offer Of the sohcltatlon of on oHer to buy or sell ony ecurlty referred to or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for Ihe convef'lence of the subscriber While we believe Ihe sources of our mformo- lion to b!! fellabl!!, we In no way r!!pres!!nl or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any action to be token by Ihe subscriber should be hosed on hiS own IOv!!sllgatlon and Informallon Janney Montgomery Seott, Inc. as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may laler toke, pOSitions or Irades In respect to any securities mentioned m thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereatrer exp'essed m thiS or any other usue Janney Montgom!!ry Scott, Inc, which IS registered with the SEC oS on mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its investment adVISOry and athel customers independently of any Ualemems mode In IhlS Of In any other Issue Further information on any secuflty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 14, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 14, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - January 14, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON NEW JERSEY 08S40 DIVISION OF MEMBER New VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe – january 14, 1977 The past two weeks of stock market action can be. characterized by two adjectives, surprising ,.,;..andconfusing .. –…. -v-.w— L..,– — – -T-'-''''''''' The element of surprise stems from the known reliabllity of the year-end rally as a seasonal pattern. It stems, also, from the relatively short memory of most investors, whose most vivid memories are of most recent stock market history, I.e., 1976 and 1975. In both years, it will be recalled, the market took off like a skyrocket at some point in December and continued upward into january and February after which it spent most of the latter part of the year dOing absolutely nothing whatsoever. Clearly, the formula for success in those two years was to be long stocks as the year began, for it was in the first quarter that the bulk of upside action was concentrated. Apparently in expectation of the same sort of thing, investors spent the entire month of December, 1976, bidding up stock prices. Thus, the surprise when the market immediately turned down as the new year began. The confuSing aspect of the market arises from the fact that the major averages, as we tried to suggest last week, are, at the moment, giving a highly distorted picture of what is really going on in the marketplace. The Dow, which moved to a closing low of 968.25 on Wednesday before rallying sharply in Thursday's trading, was on a closing basis, then 36 pOints below its December 31 high. Yet, whlle all this was going on, no fewer than 461, or more than one of every five issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange, managed to post new 1976-77 highs in the week ended january 7th. On january 12th, the day the Dow achieved its low, 44 issues were, nonetheless, able to post new one-year peaks. Almost uniformly, all major indices of market breadth and vitality continue to show positive action. In market environment such,as this one, those who love to create reasons for stock market behavior have a field day. Since it was agreed almost universally by the experts that the market was supposed to go up in the first two weeks of january, there must, so the reasoning apparently goes, be underlying factors which were not taken into account to explain why the market moved in the opposite direction. thus, two ';;-idely-cIted reasons'Ior the'market's-ffio,hng-,ioi;t last week were'i)ai'fse' in-tne wl'lol-eSaIe–'-h-.,,-, price index and 2) disappOinting earnings on the part of one of the Dow components, International Paper. As usual, we remain unimpressed by reasons of this nature. It is only necessary to look at the record to see that we have had plenty of good markets in the past in the face of rises in wholesale prices and, whlle disappointing earnings may well account for International Paper's moving down, we fall to see why this should apply to the general market, especially since, by and large, fourth quarter projections remain reasonably good. The accession of a new President, especially one such as Mr. Carter whose intentions remain somewhat enigmatic, provides a fertlle environment for the professional creators of reasons. It can be sagaciously explained, a) that the market went up because Mr. Carter's economic programs were going to stimulate the economy or, b) that it went down because the very same programs were inflationary, depending, of course, on which direction the market takes. We have no doubt that the spring of 1977 will constitute a period in which each and every move on the part of the new Administration is seized upon as a reason why the stock market is doing whatever it is, at the moment, doing. As technicians, we continue to prefer to ignore the so-called reasons for market action and allow the market to tell its own story. It is, to date, at least, despite a still rather mlld downswing in the popular averages, indicating robust good health. Quite obviously, the weakness of the first two weeks of 1977 could be the start of some sort of market deterioration. There is, however, absolutely no indication at this point that such is the case, Meanwhlle, as far as downside targets are concerned, most logical objectives center around the 960-950 area in terms of the Dow. This area was touched on an intraday basis on Wednesday,but we would not be surprised by asl1ght fuftherpenetration. Thts area'colncldes-with'fairly-strong support from'the – I October-November base. Of course, since a decline bottoming out in the 960-950 area would appear the most plausible action, there is always the possibility that the market will again do something surprising, something in the vein of the false downside breakout of last September or the non-existent january rally of the past two weeks, Such a surprise could easlly take the form of a downswing which, temporarlly at least, moved lower than expected. Absent more convincing evidence of market deterioration than has yet been seen, however, we would counsel against being panicked by such an eventuallty. Dow-jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P CompOSite (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (1/13/77) AWT/jb 972.07 103.89 662.95 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No ltotement or expreSSion of OPiniOn or any other mOiler herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicltallon of an offer to buy or sell any eunly referr 10 or mentioned The motter IS presented merely for Ihe conVef'lenCE of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guorontee the accuracy Ihereof nor of the statements mude herein 1ny action to be toen by the subSCrIber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Jonney Montgomery Scol1, Inc, OS a corporation, and Its offlcer& or employees, may now hove, or ma\, later toke, P011tlons or trades 111 re1pect to any seCurities mentioned 111 thiS or any future ,ssue, and such pOSitIOn may be different from any views now or hereafter e)rpressed 111 thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, whICh IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its ,vestment adVisory o'ld other cusomers IIldependently of any statements mode, thiS or 111 any other Issue Further Informallon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 21, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 21, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - January 21, 1977
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, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW VORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE Tanuary 21, 1977 We cited in last week's letter the fact that the Wall Street Tournai chose to ascribe one -particularly bad'stock-market 'day 'a 'forfnight ago tothe-reporting'oflower'earningsby one-of,the Dow'com- ponents. On Wednesday, the Tournai's lead article was entitled Bottom Line Blues, and It named a host of companies whose fourtlHjuarter earnings were likely to be disappointing, raising, in the process, the question of what effect the disclosure of these earnings might have on the stock market. We have always had the greatest respect for the Tournai's financial reportage, but we must confess to some degree of skep- ticism as to the effect of quarter-to-quarter earnings changes as far as the stock market as a whole is concerned. Although we personally belong to that small minority of analysts whose professional special- ty is the analysis of price action, we have never felt that the huge resources devoted by the financial community to fundamental analysis were less than worthwhile. Indeed, we have always subscribed to the belief that stock prices, over the long run, are a product of a stream of future earnings and dividends. There is, however, another factor that goes into the determination of prices. That is investor confidence, which, in one sense, can be expressed by the amount the market is willing to pay at a given time for a given dollar of earnings. We think it can be documented that this latter is the more important variable in determining stock price changes over the short-to-medium term. We have buttressed this thesis by a recent study. If earnings and stock prices both change in the same direction over a given time period and the earnings change is equal to or greater than the price change, then It can be said that all of the price change can be ascribed to the change in earnings. If both price and earnings change in the same direction but the price change IS less, then only a portion of the price change can be ascribed to earnings change,and the rest must be ascribed to a change in price/ earnings ratio. If earnings and prices move in oppOSite directions, then, obvIOusly, the entire change is ,due–to acha nge-ininvestor confidence. ,Our studyexamwedthe, quaderto-,quartero priG.echange9.nthe, , ' Dow starting in 1930 and compared it with the quarter-to-quarter earnings change. In 84 of 184 quarters, changes in the P/E ratio explained 100 of the change in stock prices during the quarter. In only 47 quar- ters were earnings changes able to account for the entire price change during the quarter. On average, changes in the P/E ratio accounted for 62.7 of all quarter-to-quarter price change while earnings changes accounted for only 37.2 of quarter-to-quarter price change. The results holo good even when longer pe- riods are examined. In 22 of the past 46 years, all of the change in prices on the year has been explained by a change in multiples. As we all recall, this was especially true in the last three years, when, in 1973 and 1974, the market declined sharply in the face of rising earnings, after which It rose in 1975 in the face of sharply lower earnings. Changes In the P/E ratio have accounteo for 62.4 of the annual varia- bility of the Dow and changes in earnings only 37.6. Another way of determining the relative impact of earnings changes and P/E ratio changes on the Dow is to undertake the following exercise. Envision two hypothetical analysts whose task is to fore- cast price change over a given time period.. Suppose that,in the beginning of each period,one analyst has exact foreknowledge of what earnings are going to be for the period. However, he has no means of ascrib- ing a proper P/E to these earnings so is forced to use the P/E ratio for the prior perio,d. Let us, by contrast, take another analyst who presumes absolutely no foreknowledge of earning-sbut who somehow is able accurately to forecast the P/E ratio which will exist at the end of a given period. For his earnings estimate, he simply uses the latest twelve months earnings — in other words, assumes no earnings change whatsoever. We compared the results of the two above approaches on a quarter-to-quarter basis starting in 1930. The analyst who wasable to forecast the,P/E ratio at the end of agiven quart,er,and used I'.e, –earigs ending- at thebeginningof that quarter hadan'av'eragefo-;'cast error of 5. 62' By'contrast, 'the -, hypothetical analyst who was able to predict earnings with 100 accuracy but who applied the previous quarter's P/E ratio thereto had a forecast error of 8.15. On an annual basis, foreknowledge of the P/E ratio for the next year coupled with no foreknowledge of earnings produced an annual forecast error of 19.5. The forecast error for the oppOSite case was just under 24. All this only reinforces a point we have made for some time — that Investor confidence is a crucial ingredient in determining the intermediate-term course of stock prices. We suspect the present market has reached a point in the cycle where such will be particularly the case. We hope to have the opportunity to discuss this In future issues of this letter. Dow-Tones IndustrIals (1200 p. m.) 957.70 S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 102.81 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (1/20/77) 665.05 AWT/jb No statement or expreSSion of opinion or any other moiler herein contolned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCltotlon of on offer 10 buy or sell any seC\Jrlty reFerred to or menTioned The matter IS presented merely for the conver'!ence of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our IMforma tlon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guoronteB the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herem Any oellOn to be toen by the subSCriber should be bosed on h'5 own ,nvest.gat,on and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, os a corporation, ond Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later toe, POSitiOnS or trades In respect to ony securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, cnd such POSition mav be different from any views now or hereafter expressed rn thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery cott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, moy give adVice to Its Investment adVisory and othe. customers Independently of any statements mode In Ihl5 or In any other Issue Further information on a'ly security mentioned herein IS ovallable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – January 28, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – January 28, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - January 28, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRtNCE1'ON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE January 28, 1977 – , .-We attempted in this space last w.eek to advancethe.thesis.that changesin.itlvestorcon- -. fidence, symbolized by the price the market would pay for a dolla r of earning power, tended to exert a more powerful effect on the short-to-intermediate term course of stock prices than did changes in that earning power. We concluded by VOicing the suspicion that the market had entered a phase where this would be particularly the case, Certainly it has been the case over the past year. Earnings on the Dow-Jones Industrial Average hit their recession low of 75.47 in the year ended September 30, 1975, when they com- pleted an almost-25 drop from a peak of almost 100 a year earlier. Since that time, earnings re- covery has progressed nicely. The Dow earned 95.81 for the year ended September 30, 1976, and, although the recent economic slowdown may dampen December somewhat, a recovery to above the 100 level should take place shortlY,and, indeed, according to many analysts, an earnings level of 110-120 for the index is possible at some point in 1977-78. Yet in the face of all this, as we all know, the Dow has done absolutely nothing, standing today at just about the same level it stood in February, 1976, despite the fact that earnings at that time were still mired at recession levels. The entire 1976 market, therefore, can be viewed as a period in which the market evinced increasing skepticism regarding 1976-recovery earnings, being willing to pay, as the year wore on, less and less for those earnings as the earnings improved. If one charts the price/earnings ratio for the current bull market rather than the price itself, one finds that the high was attained back last February when, with the Dow at a high of 994.57, investors were willing to capitalize 75.66 of then- tra!ling-12-month earnings at 13.1 times. Ever since that time, the price/earnings ratio has been declining, and, assuming some modest earnings improvement)n thejourth…9uarter,.tr'liling earrj!I9e.. – are no;'; bi;;gvalued at a;0-;;d9—5timesat cue;;t pices .- –.- — . – – – — . – . — — There are a number of things that can be said about this phenomenon. Fust of all, it cannot be reiterated too strongly that the figure is abysmally low on an absolute historical basis. Indeed, the price/earnings ratio low for every major bear market since 1937 has been around or, in most cases well above, the current figure with the two single exceptions of 1949, when at its low, the Dow stood at 6,8 earnings and the recent bear market low, when in December, 1974, it stood at an incredible 5.8 times trailing 12-month earnings. We suspect that both these occurrences constituted water- shed lows which are unlikely soon to be repeated. What, however, are we to make of the fact that the price/earnings ratio has been tailing off now for almost a year. If we look at the experience of the 1930' s through the 1950's, it is a somewhat less-than-encouraging sign. During this period, peaks in the pie tended to be more or less coincident with market peaks. Since the 1950's, however, a new tendency seems to have emerged. In 1966, for example, the pie ratio peaked some 13 months before the Dow itself. Prior to the 1968-70 decline it peaked with a lead time of 15 months, and, in the most recent bear market, the pie ratio topped out in April, 1971, a full 21 months before the ultimate market peak m January of 1973. It is interesting to note that, in all these cases, earnings continued to rise well after the peak in multiples had been achieved. We, thus, had, in each instance, a phenomenon similar to the present one, a case where the market was placing increasingly lower multiples on improving earmngs. Another interesting factor is the extent to which multiples have traditionally declined during past bear markets. The 1966 bear market saw the Dow multipleco..n!!actrom 19.5 to 13, a 33. de- – cline— The 1968 corr-eCtioniilvolV-ed a decline-froin-I77-tiestolr.7'iimes, a drop of; -roughly;-the same magnitude. Percentage drops of even less magnitude were characteristic of the 1950's. Only the 1973-74 bear market witnessed a decline of appreciably greater size,with the pie declining 66. The interesting thing is that, at the moment, the pie ratio has already declined by some 27 from its high of a year ago. Since earnings are likely to improve in 1977, it could continue this slide without any appreciable effect on stock prices. If an investor conridence recovery then sets in, the upside effect on prices could well be quite exciting. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Compo (1200 p.m.) Cumulative Index (1/27/77) AWT/Jb 957.78 101.79 664.69 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL No statement or expreulon of opinion or any other matler herein conlalned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dorectly or indirectly, an offer or the 50llCilOlion of an offer 10 buy or sell onr. security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the canvellence of the subscriber While we belieVe the sources of our informaTion to be rei lab e, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor af the statements mude herein Any adlon to be taken by Ihe subSCriber should be based on hiS own InvestigatIOn and Informallon Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, oS a corpora lion, and lIS officers Of employee, may now have, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter e)fpressed In thiS or any other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 115 If\vestment adVisory and C1thel customers Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue Further infOrmatIOn on any seaJflty mentIOned hcraln IS available on requaSI

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 04, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 04, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - February 04, 1977
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGe February 4, 1977 The stock market definitely exhibited deteriorating action last week although that deterioration Is difficult to describe. Basically, It consisted of a continuing decline In the Dow-Jones Industrials . coupled with some mlnor.weaknessln.the broad.gene.raLrn,,-rkeLwhicJ1J1q.,,!.ntl.Li!et.,gR,t ast., .- . essentially been moving ahead In the face of a declining Dow. There Is, at the moment, no slnglelndi' cator which adequately describes the recent action of the stock market. It Is perhaps, therefore, worth while to take a look at some of the Individual components. As an Introduction to this exerCise, It Is useful to conSider various reference points. Most major market Indicators made a noticeable high sometime during last summer. In the case of the Dow- Jones Industrials, S & P 500 and the New York Stock Exchange CompOSite, that high was In September. In the case of the DOW-Jones Transportation average, the American Stock FJchange Index and our Cumula- tive Index, It was In July. Most Indicators also show a noticeable low occurring sometime during the fall, In November In the case of some Indicators, October In the case of others. All, moreover, rallied from that low up to the end of the year. Likewise, most, but not all, have formed distributional patterns since the end of the year. It Is the Interrelationship of all these various reference pOints that determines the configuration of each Individual Index's pattern and helps determine the likelihood of whether recent action constitutes major distribution or only a pause on the way to higher levels. With this In mind, let us review the major Indices. Dow-Jones Industrials .(949) This Is one of the weaker patterns. The September high barely ex- ceeded previous peaks and lasted only a few days. The November low, In tum, fairly decisively violated all previous lows so that, on the face of It, the pattern looks suspiciously toppy. We chose to disregard this action at the time since almost no other average, as of November, had a similar pattern. The rally at the end of the year failed to make new highs, and a fairly substantial distributional top was then formed. However, most downside objectives of that distribution are now being reached, and there Is minor support at present levels . . -S-&-P.50.0..(W2) .As .was.not.the case wlth;lhe.Dow.,the.Septemb.erpeak w.asa.,declslve-.ney.r hlgh.. Also In contrast to the Dow, the decline In November did not carry to a new low. The January peak .- equaled, but did not exceed, the previous high, and subsequent distribution has been minor. A decisive break below the 99 level would be required to call the pattern Into question. Dow-Jones Trans portatlon .(227) Here the co nfiguratlon Is entirely different. The July pea k continued an established uptrend,and,at the low In October, preceding by a month the low In the Industrials, down- side objectives had been reached. The rally In December car-led to a decisive new high, and the subse- quent distribution suggests a downside target of no worse than 220. Dow-Jones Utilitles.(109) Stili another cnflguratlon. No notable Interruption of the uptrend took place last summer and fall, and the Index spent the month of January achieving new peaks while the other Indices were declining. Absolute ly no new short-term distribution currently exists. The problem for this Index will be massive overhead supply which exists just above current levels, supply which dates back to the 1971-72 period. New York Stock Exchange Composite. (55) The pattern here roughly parallels the S & P 500, not surprising due to their similar construction. A downside breakout to 52 would be disturbing In the case of this Index. American Stock Exchange Index. (113) For the past two months, this has clearly been the best per- former among the Widely-followed Indicators. After a July high and an October-November double bottom, the index spurted ahead In December to well above Its July peak. Like the Utilities, It continued to rise In January, reaching a new high just a few days ago. Cumulative Index. (662) This Index, our own construction measuring the action of all NYSE-listed stocks, shows a pattern very slm!!ar to that of the Amex Index although with somewhat less volat!!lty. The December rally carried to decisive new high territory and contlnued,albeltat a-relatively tepid pace, on Into January. No distribution has yet been formed. On a long-term baSiS, this Index has an unre- servedly bullish configuration. Ab!!lty to move above the 630 level constituted a major breakout from what appears to be a three-year base formation and suggests notably higher levels. Just how to view this configuration In the light of the action of the other Indices Is the major question at the moment. If all of the above suggests that the picture Is somewhat jumbled, we cannot help It. Unfor- tunately, such Is precisely the case. It Is certainly Impossible to say, In the light of some of the action noted above, that recent market action has been all we would like It to be. However, the picture Is also totally uncharacteristic of the sort of major deterioration which one would expect If an Imoortant top were being formed. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite iI200 p.m.) 950.63 102.14 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (2/3/77) 661.62 AWT/jb . 1 No statement or expreSSion of Opinion or any other matter herein contained 15, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or IndIrectly, on offer or the SOllCIlolion of on offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or menhoned The moller IS presenled merely for the conver-Ience of the ubscr,ber While Ne believe the sources of our mformolion to be rellOble, we m no way repreent or guarantee the accuracy thereoF nor of the sotements mude herem Any octlon to be token by the subSCriber should be bosed on hiS own mvestlgatlOn and Information Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. as a corporation, and Its officers or employees moy now have, or may later to\-e, poshlon! or Irades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posdlon may be different from any views now or hereafter c)lpressed In 11-11 or any other IHue Janney Montgomery Scali, Inc, which IS reglsle'ed With Ihe SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and othel customers mdependently of any satemenls mode m thiS or In any oher Issue Further Information on any seClJrlty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 11, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 11, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - February 11, 1977
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC MEMBER AMERtCAN STOCK eXCHANGE February 11, 1977 THE VESTAL VIRGINS REVISITED .. – …. rq..,… Orthe FinI.Qne-Decision – – – …. -;— —– -.-'.- -…. .- –. -…. Over thirty years of publication, this letter, we will be the first to admit, has issued its share of iC comments and forecasts that were less than helpful to its readers. We were lucky enough, however, some four years ago, to take rather violent exception with the then-fashionable one-decision school of invest- ment management — the theory which held that above-average investment results could be achieved simply by buying and holding that minority of issues with unbroken growth records, regardless of the price being paid. The collapse of the growth favorites in 1973-74 is now history and the painful experience of watch- ing these issues becoming the downside leaders of that bear market is now undeniably etched in the minds of investors. That bear market, however, came to an end over two years ago, and the bull market of 1974- 197 has ensued. It is, perhaps, time for another look at the record. To this end, we have constructed an index based on equal investment made at the 1973 high in thirteen growth favorites. () (To eliminate bias, we used a list that was actually chosen in mid-1973). Using the 1973 high for each issue as a base equaling 100, the index declined at the low of 1974 to 34.72, a drop of over 65. This compares to a 45 drop in the Dow-Jones Industrials and a 48 drop in the S & P 500. The initial bounce-back was fairly sharp, and the index doubled in early 1975, recovering to 72.98, although this performance was not a great deal better than either that of the Dew or the S & P. Since the recovery high, however, whlle the general market has been holding reasonably steady, most of the stocks in the Index have been selling off rather sharply from their recovery peaks. The Index now stands at approximately 48.34 indicating that almost two-thirds of the advance since the 1974 lows has now been given up. The Dow at this moment stands 10 below Its all-time high and some 64 above Its 1974 nadir. Comparable figures show the S & Pare 15 down from Its peak and 62 up from Its low. The growth stocks Index, by contrast, Is still more than 50 below Its all-time high and now up less than 40 from Its bottom. ,. Nor is anjfsJgl)–Q.Lrlief,i)LsIg/lt. Jj1eJellivestrengthof the gr9j11Tj!jY9rttes haJee,,-almot — uniformly subpar In recent months, and many of them have recently broken ouron tiie downside -of fairly – — substantial distributional top formations. Indeed, two of the thirteen stocks In our list are now below their 1974 lows, and a number of others are close. The dogged proponent of the one-decision theory, assuming one still exists, has not only been decimated in the late bear market, he has missed the entire subsequent bull market as well. How long can this all go on Unfortunately, excesses in one direction tend to correct themselves via excesses in the opposite direction. That growth stocks were ridiculously overvalued In 1973 Is now obvious. As the one-decision theory ultimately begins to writhe In its final deaththroes, they may become equally undervalued. At Its 1973 high, our growth stock Index sold at an astronomical 53.4 times trailing l2-months earnings — 3.4 times the multiple which then existed on the Dow and 2.85 times the multiple on the S & P. At the tall end of the 1973-74 bear market, this disparity had narrowed, but only partially. The growth stock multiple of 15.5 times earnings at that low was 2.65 times the Dow and 2.2 times the S & P. Two years later, growth stocks earnings have continued to Improve. (Indeed, every one of the thirteen issues will show earnings In 1976 well above 1972-74 levels). However, the multiple Is only 16.3 times, 1.7 times the Dow and 1.6 times the S & P 500. In our original 1973 critique of growth stock Investment, we said, It should be made clear that what is being said here Implies no criticism whatever of the fundamental merits of recognized growth Issues, suggests that they should not sell at some premium over other Issues or affirms that they cannot under any circumstances be attractive purchase candidates. The question, at the moment, Is whether that premium Is yet suffiCiently eroded. Technical work at the moment would suggest that such Is not the case, Were,however, the growth index to come close to its 1974 low (and remember somelssuesarRal- – …… 1 ready there) and general stock market levels to remain unchanged, the growth stock premium over the rest of the market would have about disappeared. This would be a state of affairs comparably ludicrous to the fifty-plus times earnings of four years ago. The point at which the last growth stock advocates gave up the ghost would coincide with the point at which the Issues finally became again attractive for purchase. The 13 stocks are – Eastman Kodak Polaroid Corp Avon Products Burroughs Corp IBM Int!. Flavor & Frag Proctor & Gamble Sea rs Roebuck Coca Cola Disney Prod Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) Johnson & Johnson McDonalds Corp 931. 52 100.64 Xerox ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (2/10/77) 659.55 AWT/lb No statement or expression of opinion or ony other matter herein contaIned '5, or 15 to be deemed to be, directly or mdH('ctly, an offer or the soliCitation of on offer to bvy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The motler IS presented merely for the converlenc! of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the subscnber should be bol!d on hl5 own InvestIgation ond Informolron Janney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as 0 corporotoon, ond It5 off,,.ers or employees, may now hove, or may laler loke, poSitIons or trodes In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or ony future Issue, ond such position may be dlffere'lt from any views now Or hereafter expressed In '''115 or ony other Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as on Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment odvlry and other CUtomer Independently of any statements mode In thiS or In any other Issue. further Informahan on ony secvllty mentioned herein '5 oValloble on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – February 18, 1977

Tabell’s Market Letter – February 18, 1977

Tabell's Market Letter - February 18, 1977
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—————————————- —————- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 909 STATE ROAD. PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 081540 DIVISION OF MEMBER NEW YOPIK STOCK eXCHANOE. INC. MEMBER AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANQE February 18, 1977 The stock market is about to enjoy an anniversary of sorts,although little note thereof has been taken in the financial press. It is just about a year since February 24, 1976, on which day our daily-bre-adth index' reached th-ehlgh which climaxed-the't';io-month surge'thatushe'red in that-year, -a' , high which was not to be exceeded unt1l1ast December. On the same day the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, for the first time In the current bull market, touched 1000 on an intraday basis. Since that time, as we are all aware, the popular averages have essentially moved sideways. Harry Truman made a good deal of political capital out of what he called a do-nothing Congress. We are shortly about to celebrate the first birthday of the do-nothing stock market. When one looks beyond the averages, however, the stock market story of the past year is a bit more interesting. We maintain a year's worth of price history for a representative list of 282 Issues, including the 30 Dow components and the largest components of the S & P 500. An analysis of the performance of these issues between February 18, 1976, just a year ago today, and February 9, 1977, produces some interesting observations. Overall, the performance of the list is about what one would expect. For the period in question, the S & P 500 is just about unchanged and the Dow is down some 4.6. The average per- formance for the group as a whole is a 2.75 loss, and the median issue on the list shows a 3 loss. 150 of the 282 stocks outperformed the Dow and 124 bettered the performance of the S & P. The follow- ing table lists the 10 top performers on the list. 2-9-77 2-18-76 Gain Santa Fe International 49 3/4 25 1/2 95.10 Mesa Petroleum 36 3/4 23 3/8 57.22 Boeing Occidental Petroleum – – .- – Teledyne – —- – – -.—…— 40 1/4 24 3/8 60- 26 1/4 16 1/4 39 3i4 53.33 51.54 50.94- Ex-Cell-O 25 3/4 17 5/8 46.10 Atlantic Richfield 56 5/8 40 7/8 38.53 Great Western Financial 22 1/4 16 1/8 37.98 Standard Oil California 41 1/4 30 1/8 36.93 St. Louis-San Francisco RaHway 44 1/2 32 3/4 35.88 The above issues constitute a fair microcosm of the better-performing issues as a whole. As can be seen, five are energy-related companies, and there is one aerospace company, one interest- sensitive issue and one railroad. When we look at the top fifty performing issues on the year, we find that these groups, plus public utilities, account for better than half the list. The fifty top performers include 19 energy-related companies, 4 companies that can be categorized as interest-sensitive, 4 utilities and 3 rails. These fifty Issues had a median gain of 26.65 and the lowest gain among the fifty was 17. When one moves dow'! to the bottom fifty issues in the list, some consistency also be- comes apparent. The performance of these issues ranges from a 20 loss to a 62 loss, and the me- dian decline was 25. Liberally sprinkled throughout this category are the blllon dollar growth issues which we discussed last week. Twenty of the fifty worst performing issues can be classified as be- longing to this category. Also fairly well represented among the poorer performers are the basic- industry stocks which had been the leaders of the bull market up until early last year. Seven of the fifty worst performers fallinto this group. It should be remembered, however, th!'Uhe doymswi'!g in these issues constitutes a correction after a sharp advance, while in the case of the growth stocks it was a continuing decline. Finally, it is interesting to compare the stocks with the list of the favorite fifty stocks of investment companies compiled by Vickers Associates. Six of these were among the top 50 per- formers including three among the top ten. However, ten of the worst fifty performing issues were al- so In the Vickers list. If nothing else, our analysis suggests that the stock market over the past year has been one of infinite variety and not just a casual sideways drift. The wide gulf between the performance of the various issues underscores, we think, the continuing importance of stock selection. Dow-Jones Industrials (1200 p.m.) 939.08 ANTHONYW. TABELL S & P Composite (1200 p.m.) 100.42 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL Cumulative Index (2/17/77) 658.09 AWT/jb No statement 01 expreSSion of opinion or ony other mOler herem contolned IS, or is 10 be deemed 10 be, directly or 'I'\dlrectly, on offer or the oll(llollon of on offer 10 buy or sell ony security referred 10 or menl10ned The molter IS presented merely for Ihe convellenaJ of the sub5trlber. While we beheve Ihe 50Uroo of our Informa lion to be reliable, we 10 no way represent or guo'onlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements mude herein Any action to be token by the ubscflber should be bosed on hiS own Invetlgotlon and Informotlon Jonney Montgomery Scoll, Inc, as a corporation, and Its officers or employees, may now hoye, or may later toke, positions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslhon may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In th or any oiher Issue Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc, which IS regiSTered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lIs Investment adYlsory and other customers mdependently of any statements mode m thiS or In any other Issue Furlher information on any seC1.lfIty mentioned herem IS available on request

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