– – – – – – – – ———— TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 1609) 987-2300 May 25, 1990 1—-'letterAsexopurrescSolilnelaCgtulei,OhRoopbee-rttn Sritmfipekimnasr. KentotweoduJlaasato-wsoemeket. nwfnegheaXdC,itsiefvtegndaOyns tpnraiotvr,e written ry a … -I afternoon, it did, the Dow rising 60 points on the highest volume of 1990 so far. The following Monday saw a newall-time high, and this high was repeatedly extended through the 2856.26 peak achieved on Wednesday. We had, frankly, not expected this outcome. We had been drawing attention to the paradoxical situation in which market momentum was demonstrably poor. yet indicators of sentiment were highly bullish and investable cash abounded. The latter forces prevailed over the former. and the result is now history. It is tempting to call the past fortnight's action a buying panic and to compare it to similar manifestations in August 1982 and August 1984, Technical action was indeed similar in the prior instances—a long period of dullness, a week of slight improvement, and then the upside explosion. However, we think the comparison is facile. Technical events must be judged in context, and the aforementioned two cases occurred after protracted downswings. The current instance takes place following a two-and-a-ha1f-year bull market. The present situation may, we think, be placed in context by noting that, following a two-year upswing, there was an interval, or gap, of 91 trading days between the high of January 2 and the one of May 14. Gaps of this length or longer in the context of an ongoing bull market are fairly rare occurrences, having occurred only 19 times in the past 65 years. The 19 instances are outlined in the table below. FIRST HIGH SUBSEOUENT DROP O.te OJ1A End Oate , NEXT HIGH Dote Gap DJIA ULTIMATE HIGH Date Days DJIA I FEB 11 1926 162.31 MAR 30 1926 -17 AU, 3 1926 140 163.40 SEP 3 1929 919 361.17 133 AUG 14 1926 166.64 OCT 19 1926 -13 APR 21 1927 203 166.66 SEP 3 1929 705 3Bl.17 129 ..,……,…-….,..-1- I-..,…,………,,S EP..,.719J2709.-93,NO V,-.,.j-,j.9 32,,,27…MA Yd O,o-193191-6-c-76HARI09.a71-14-7-J.9 440-t\ 40..,.. JUL 16 133 106.67 OCT 21 1933 -23 JAN 30 1934 155 106.99 MAR 10 1937 934 194.40 76 FEB 5 1934 110.74 JUL 20 1934 27 MA, 4 1935 373 110.63 MAR 10 1937 555 194.40 75 JUL 14 1943 145.62 NOV 30 1943 -11 JUN 15 1944 277 145.66 MAY 29 1946 '566 212.50' 46 JUL 10 1944 150,50 SEP 14 1944 – 5 DEC 9 1944 122 151.31 MAY 29 1946 425 212.50 40 FEB 6 1947 164.49 HAi 17 1947 -12 JUL 11 1947 119 164.77 JUN 15 1946 264 193.16 5 JUL 24 1947 166.85 MAR 16 1948 -11 MAl 14 1948 231 186.60 JUN 15 1946 23 193.16 2 SEP 13 1951 276.37 NOV 24 1951 . 7 JUL 15 1952 240 276.76 JAN 5 1953 117 293.79' 6 AUG 3 1959 676.10 SEP 22 1959 . 9 DEC 31 1959 103 679.36 DEC 13 1961 491 734.91 6 JAN 5 1960 665.47 OCT 25 1960 -17 APR 10 1961 317 692.06 OEC 13 1961 171 734.91 6 MAY 14 1965 939.62 JUN 2& 1965 -II ocr 11 1965 102 942.65 FEB 9 1966 64 995.15 6 SEP 25 1967 943.06 MAR 21 1966 -12 OCT 3 1966 240 949.47 DEC 3 1966 35 965.21 4 APR 2B 1971 950.62 NOV 23 1971 16 APR 5 1972 237 954.55 JAN 11 1973 193 1051.70 10 JUL 15 1975 661.61 OCT 1 1975 11 JAN 6 1976 120 690.62 SEP 21 1976 160 1014.79 14 SEP 6 1976 907.74 APR 21 1980 -16 JUL 17 1960 466 915.10 APR 27 19&1 195 1024.05 12 NOV 29 1963 1267.20 JUL 24 1964 -16 JAN 29 1965 294 1292.62 AUG 25 1967 649 2722.42 111 JAN 2 19902810.15 JAN 30 1990 10 HAY 14 1990 91 2821.53 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 Some explanation is probably required. The first two columns show the new bull-market high which preceded the long gap. The next two show the date of the subsequent low and the percentage decline to that low. Following this is the date of the subsequent new high, the number of days in the gap between the two highs, and the closing 'Dow on that date. Finally, the last three columns give the date of the ultimate bull-market high, the number of days later it occurred, the final Dow, and the percentage advance of the terminal move. Some obvious facts can be noted. It was, first of all, common throughout the 1920's and 1930's for long gaps between highs to take place at the mid-stages of bull markets, and these gaps were regularly. followed ,bysubstantial,…advances.Simi1ar . action ..occurred inAhe last case of such a gap where, following the 1983-84 hiatus, the Dow posted a 111 adVance. The common pattern for the 1950's, howeve1, was quite different. For the ten cases between February 1947 and April 1981, the average rise in the Dow from the new high after the gap, the date analogous to May 18, was 7.3. Some of these rises were of long duration, but their percentage advance tended to be quite short. Our inclination is to believe that this pattern will hold in the present case. An upside objective of 3100 is readable, this being a rise of about 10 from the most recent high. Such an outcome would be consistent with most of the history of the post-World War II period. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (5/24190) AWTebh 2833.02 355.92 4918.31 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. No slatement or expression 01 oplmon Or any other matter herein ccntalned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presenlM merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgal10n and Information De!alield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and lIs officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poslllons or trades In respect to any securlbes menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed m thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey. Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or '1'1 any other Issue Further mformatlOn on any secuflty menllOned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609)987-2300 June I, 1990 We suggested last week that recent market strength could be viewed as a triumph of Bent-iment-.over'momentum..Most–Surveys–ofJ.-investorshad'indicated-''fidespreadlevelof'''''-,''''''-'-s–'I- bearishness, and this bearishness was being made manifest by record high levels of institutional cash. In a market dominated by professional investors, the worst fear of the typical participant is not the loss of money (whlch is not his, anyway), but loss of his job, In these performance-conscious days. the shortest route to unemployment is failure to participate in a rising market. This particular syndrome. we think, goes a long way toward explaining market action of the past fortnight and also why market strength, over the short-term at least, is likely to continue. Given this condition, it is logical to ask Why so much bearishness. It seems to us that pessimism is a mindset easily stimulated by recalling the most-common headlines featured in the financial press over the last year or so. It is, for example, probable that- the saga which has received the most column-inches of late is the Savings-and-Loan crisis. We have, by now, become perfectly accustomed to reading each morning how many more hundreds of billions of dollars the whole sordid mess is going to cost us. It all certainly sounds like bad news, but it is probably worthwhile, as in all such cases, to take a somewhat harder look. One observation seems appropriate to begin with. The operative phrase describing the current process seems to be 8 & L BailoutT1 It makes as much sense to say that a policeman, having apprehended the mugger who has lifted my wallet is, when he returns it to me, bailing out the robber. The bailees in this case are not the 8 & Vs, but their depositors. This distinction is not trivial since it relates to the original founding of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation back in 1933. (Yes, we know that S & Vs are insured by a different entity, but the principle is the same.) Recall that the basic princ;le of the American banking system is that the banks do not actually have your money, despite what their monthly statements tell you. They possess, on hand, in liquid form, only a small fraction of 1-.- this sum. The system ..,……'''(iepositors-lslikEily… to wisithpdrreadwicamteunde,o,n.itth-etMprseammisee-tltmhea.t- nlofilm9-o3re3, t hwaen wa esrme allOloIfriaiicitFiboacnkioift-t1je-…………..,,,……,..,,…1 dismal collapse of that system—failures begetting failures until the so-calied Bank Holiday became necessary. It was apparent, in March 1933, that the most pervasive economic problem of the many the country faced was the collapse of confidence in the banking system, and it was reasoned that the best way to restore that confidence was to use 8 sort of government seal of approval. Thus, began Federal Deposit Insurance—all the way up to the astronomical sum of 5,000. Government programs, however, have a tendency to metastasize. If a little is good, legislators reason, more must obviously be better, and deposit insurance has grown beyond the wildest dreams of its initiators—with a 100,000 limit, the extension to S & Vs, the freeing of the S & Vs to invest in all manner of exotic pieces of paper, and a host of other differences too numerous to recount here. And it now appears, Borne 60 years later, that there are some consequences which were unforeseen in 1933. The irony, though, is that deposit insurance has worked. It has succeeded in doing precisely what it was designed to do—eliminate crises of confidence of the sort which caused the disastrous bank runs of the early 1930's. It would be absolutely inconceivable to a 1930's banker that the failure of a depository institution could be announced in the newspaper on one day and that on the next day one could saunter into the lobby and observe business going on as usual—tellers chatting with customers, machines clicking away, all as if nothing had happened. A not inconsequential social goal has been accomplished. We are now discovering that it has been accomplished at some cost. We have once again relearned that most basic of all economic precepts—that there is no such thing as a free lunch. This rule does not, however, deny that there can be such a thing as a fairly decent lunch obtainable at a modest cost. This clatterprinciple,wethink,winds .. uP ,.being JosLinmuch oC today's hand;wringing over the Savings-and-Loan situation. There are, obviously, as we now discover, to our sorrow, a great many weak links in the American monetary structure. We are just beginning to perceive some of those areas of weakness. We are learning, certainly, that deposit insurance, as it is now constituted, requires significant modification. The determination of just what sorts of modification will be required is a task worthy of serious study. That task, we think, will best be carried out in an atmosphere free of hysteria about bailouts. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (5/31/90) AWTebh 2893.93 361.78 4961.62 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or IndlrecUy, an offer or the sollcrtallon of an offerlo buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our InformatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken bylhe subscffber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informalion Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSIIJOflS or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positron may be different from any vIews nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, TabelJ Inc, which IS reglSlered wllh the SEC as an Investment advJsor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 -.- June 8, 1990 —,Theabilitycof;thema rketto—breakint-o-new-hig-h ter,ritor-y-;u g gests, as;we -havenoted-Inthe.-,-,..-o-Irl-.. past couple of letters, the possibIlity of further short-term strength. The timing of this breakout is interesting since we are about to enter the July-August period of the summer rally. We are, therefore, reproducing below the customary table, covering 93 years of market history since the Dow was first computed in 1897. One Month Periods (1897-1989) Two Month Periods (18-97-1989 ) End Month Aovances Declines Average Chg Aovances Declines Average Chg. January 59 33 1.16 Februa ry 44 48 -0.29 March 55 38 0.70 Apll 51 42 0.91 May 46 47 -0.33 June 48 45 0.67 July 57 36 1. 48 August 62 30 1. 78 September 36 56 -1.28 October 50 42 -0.12 November 55 37 0.69 December 67 26 1. 38 — — —– TOTAL 630 480 0.56 60 32 53 39 44 49 54 39 49 44 47 46 57 36 62 30 54 38 40 52 54 38 64 29 — — 638 472 2.55 0.88 0.33 1. 67 0.69 0.30 2.15 3.53 0.44 -1. 35 0.64 1.96 —– 1.15 As the table indicates, of the 1110 months since 1897, 630—or 57—have been advancing '…..,…,J 1- ..–c.m-ontns-. ana481.l -or -43—have snoweaaechnes. -rhus-, -the normal expectatIon -for -any given month – would be 52-53 advances and 39-40 declines. Similar fIgures can be adduced for two-month periods. From the data above, we have been able to extract four patterns of a seasonal nature which seem to be statistically significant. The most significant one is the least known, the tendency toward a market decline in the month of September. Since 57 of all months since 1897 have been rising ones, the expectation would be a plurality of advances over declines. However, precisely the opposite is the case for September, which, in 92 years, has produced 56 declines and only 36 advances, with an average drop of 1. 28 percent. The probability of such a pattern being due to chance, a chi-square test tells us, is less than 1 in 1000. The' next most significant pattern has been the year-end rally, illustrated by 67 rising Decembers in 93 years. Our readers know that we have published an annual comment on this phenomenon around December or January of each year. Another seasonal manifestation, which we have demonstrated based on data since 1926, although we have no idea of the reason therefore, has been the fact that the direction in Which the market moves in November has appeared to be a moderately successful predictor of the market's direction for the following year. Of the four seasonal phenomena, the least significant has been the summer rally, which is due to be analyzed at this juncture. As the table shows, the 57 advances and 36 declines for July are marginally better than one would expect. August shows an even greater aberration. The percentage advances for July and August, along with that for the two-month period ending in August, are the largest figures in the table, although December-January performance is close. Despite these figures, standard tests of statistical significance suggest that the summer rally is a less reliable phenomenon than the others noted above. It has been even less reliable recently, especially in July, with five of the eight Julys since 1982 having been down months. Last year all four of the seasonal phenomena asserted themselves. July and August were both up months with July posting a huge 9.04 advance. September was one of only four down months during … – tIle year and the- ie'a'r-end rally,' although it began late, took place on schedule. Moreover, the Dow moved up in November 1989, thus forecasting the mid-1990 strength. There seems. incidentally. to have emerged in recent years a brand new tendency—the occurrence of lmportant market turning points during the summer months. Major market bottoms took place on August 12, 1982 and July 24, 1984. In the opposite direction, the top leading to the 1983 – 1984 decline began to form during the summer of 1983 and, of course, the major high for the Dow, preceding the 1987 crash, occurred on August 25, 1987. The October-December, 1987 low was a return to the normal pattern of fall reversals, however. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWT ebh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2887.14 S & P 500 (1200) 361.48 Cumulative Index (617190) 5185.40 No statement or expression 01 opinion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemedto be, directly or Indirectly, an otler orthe sollcltallon of an otler to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mformabon 10 be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof no! of the statements made herem Any aclJon to be laken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , as a corporation and ItS officers or employees may now have, or may later take, positions or trades m respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posl\lon may be dlNerenl from any views now Or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to lIS Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menlloned herem IS available on request

., TABELL-S MARKET LETTER !l00 ALEXANDER ROAD. CN 5209. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 Summer is the time for sequels in the movie June 15, 1990 and we have already been treated to Another sequel time in the stock market last week, the sequel in this case being a rerun early 1987. Just when you thought it was safe to go back into the stock market. The week's activity featured such phenomena as a Tuesday market which, having done nothing all day, suddenly produced a 40-point spurt within less than an hour in the late afternoon, and a Wednesday session, during which the Dow J down only three on the day, still managed, intra-day, to move over a 45-point range. A glance at real-time charts while these events were transpiring suggested strongly that index arbitrage was once again at work. This was appropriate given the release this week of the NYSE investigation of the practice, a report not characterized by excessive reformist zeal. Program trading got yet another boost in this morning's Times, 8S Professor Burton Malkiel performed the conventional academic blessing of the technique. Given our initial impression that volatility had increased. we decided to investigate the Bubject further. This investigation revealed that contrary to impression there had been little evidence of unusual volatility in recent trading. The investigation also reminded us of a rather paradoxical conclusion that we had reached in this letter as long ago as 1982—that volatility, over the intermediate term at least, is historically bullish for the stock market. STANDARD DEVIATION OF DAILY LOG CHANGES DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE MONTHLY 1926 – DATE Our favorite volatility measurement, shown above. is a simple one. a month-to-month series showing the standard deviation of daily Dow log changes around their monthly mean. Those acquainted with statistics will instantly understand this terminology. For others. it is simply necessary to know that a log change is similar to a percentage change and that the standard deviation is a measure of variability. (The series 99, 100, 101 and 10, 100, 190 each have a mean of 100. The latter has a larger standard deviation.) The notable feature of the chart is, of course, the spurt in October, 1987 to a level above that of 1929. Eliminating this jump, one sees that the series has been characterized, since the 1940's. by occasional spikes reaching above the 1.5 level. These spikes have occurred in nine instances over a 40-year period, and of the nine, eight happened around major lows (assuming we are willing to accept the most recent case, October 1989, as such an occurrence). Current volatility. the chart reveals, remains well under early 1987 levels. This observation is confirmed by other measurements as well. For the time being. then, market action, in terms of width of swings, can be diagnosed as normal. It will be interesting to see whether an increase in volatility takes place over the near term. Such a manifestation might suggest continuation of the present upswing. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2916.58 S & P 500 (1200) 361.76 Cumulative Index (06/14/90) 5189.39 AWTebh No statement or expression ot opInion or any other mailer herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation ot an offer to buy or sen any secuflty reterred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Iniormatlon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the aCcuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own InvestJgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may tater take, pOSitions or trades 10 resped to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any fuMe Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed III this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and olher customers Independently 01 any statements made In thts or m any other ISsue Further Information on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

…-. – 'U'IIHED.D.' S IRlcIE'U' D.1E'U''U'1E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 22. 1990 Two positive statements can be made about recent market action. They are as follows -' — —-,- 1.-The–Dow-is-(or-wasonJ.une.J.5.bya.,marginof7/10,ofa,pDint mT.er JuneA)aLa new. all-time high. . -. . — ,. – — — 2. The rally that got it to that pOint—which began on January 30 and whose current phase started on April 27—is probably the strongest and broadest of the last ten months. These two admissions having been made. the search for further signs of market strength becomes somewhat difficult. Let us consider the question of breadth, 8 subject we, certainly not alone among our technical colleagues. have been alluding to monotonously over the past year. The table below shows the high and low points of each discernible swing in the Dow since last August. when our breadth index reached its peak. giving for each date. the closing level for both the Dow and our computation of NYSE breadth. Date HI GHS DJIA Breadth Date LOW 5 DJIA Breadth Aug 10 1989 2712.63 Sep 1 1989 oct 9 1989 2752.09 2791.41 Oct 20 1989 2689.14 Dec 13 1989 2761.09 Jan 2 1990 2810.15 Feb 15 1990 2649.55 Mar 19 1990 2755.63 Apr 17 1990 2765.77 Jun 4 1990 2935.19- W. Jun 15 1990 2935.89 New High for Dow 1000.00 999.80 997.43 989.73 986.57 988.38 973.55 974.25 970.31 975.11 973.53 Aug 21 1987 sep 25 1989 Oct 13 1989 Nov 6 1989 Dec 20 1989 Jan 30 1990 Feb 23 1990 Ma, 22 1990 Apr 27 1990 Jun 6 1990 Jun 20 1990 2647.00 2659.19 2569.26 2582.17 2687.93 2543.24 2564.19 2695.72 2645.05 2862.38 2895.30 996.51 994.09 988.89 982.07 981. 37 969.99 969.27 971. 06 963.06 973.12 971. 43 There are, in the table, eleven rallies, six of which, including the last two, produced new bull-market peaks for the Dow. Scanning down the list for similar highs for breadth shows that. for I-Ir—t''h''I'e-must-paI t, the pea-k fur -each-rally–has'-been-'-lowerthan-the-pefor–the-'-previous-one..–T-he-,,same – has been true for lows in breadth. the nadir for this figure having been attained at the end of April. Now there has been some modest improvement in the first half of 1990. The March breadth peak was indeed better than that of February. and. more importantly. that March peak was exceeded. although only slightly. in June—hardly an astonishing achievement since the Dow by that time was 180 points higher. Although improvement has been noticeable, breadth action, considered on an absolute basis, continues to be sub-par. Indeed. another mini-divergence has begun with the failure of breadth to confirm the new peak in the averages on June 15. Individual-stock, new-high figures, another indicator of narrow leadership, have been likewise abysmal. Over the last dozen trading days, a period when the averages were straining at the leash on the upside, new highs have been restricted, for the most part. to the 20-30 range. and on four of those days there actually took place more daily lows than highs. There do, however, remain areas of potential improvement. One is the Transportation Average (1178) which. it is worth reminding ourselves. has shown action wildly different from that of the Industrials. Its peak was achieved back in September at 1532.01. The Friday-the-13th break in October was coincident with the coming apart of the UAL buyout. and. by the end of October. the DJTA was below 1200. (In the process a gap was created. the October 13th low of 1425 being 65 points above the high of the following Monday. One of the hoariest of technical chestnuts is the theory that such a gap must be filled.) In any case. by January's end. the transports had managed to post a closing low of 1031.83. a rather astonishing fall of 32. Many major bear markets have been of lesser dimension. After posting that low. the Transports returned to the 1125-1225 range. and there now exists a potential head-and-shoulders base whose upside breakout would be 1230. Were this level to be achieved, a testing of the old high would be the minimum expectation, and the implications for the -market'would'be highlYbullish. – – – — The DJ Utilities (209) find themselves showing much more tentative improvement. Since January. reflecting the bond market. this average has fallen sharply (a 14 total drop) with an especially severe downthrust in late April, since largely erased. For this indicator it would be important that the April low (around 201) hold and that continued basing take place in. roughly. the 208-220 area with, one would hope, an ultimate upside breakout. Despite strength in the major averages, the improvement for the broader market, then, can be seen, has not been all that great. It would, thus, be encouraging for such areas as the transports and utilities to demonstrate renewed strength. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6f21/90) AWTebh 2909.16 360.94 5135.95 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the SOliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgatlon and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a oorporalIOn and lIS officers or employees, may now have, 01 may lalellake, POSitionS or lTades In respecl to any seWTllIes mentIoned In fhlS OT any future Issue, and such poSllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mace In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menllOned herein IS available on request \

1IBUED..D..'S IRlIE1 D.. l e T T I E R 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 29, 1990 -Thet()pic -of.-stoek-index''f-utures..ha.s.,….once–again .become–8.,..fontp8.ge-8ubiect… as…,,801onB commence to argue over the proper regulatory authority for these instruments. This argument is frequently viewed as a battle between bureaucrats for turf, and there is, admittedly, this element. Only a bureaucratic mind is capable of the sort of sophistry which equates pork bellies with the S & P 500. The issue is, however, a great deal deeper than this and should be viewed in such a context. Back when we entered the securities business, we were pressed by some of our more serious-minded acquaintances to justify the social utility of our newly chosen profession. We did not (and do not) consider this a difficult task. We began by noting that the prevailing economic system in the United States was something called capitalism and that. as the name implied, a salient feature thereof was the existence of a complex melange of private institutions devoted to assembling, from national savings, the capital needed for American industry. The assemblage of such capital—securities underwriting—we viewed as the primary function of the securities industry. For this function properly to be fulfilled, it was necessary that there exist a secondary market for. securities, providing liquidity to primary buyers, much as does a used car market for primary buyers of autos. It was to this secondary market that we chose to devote what turned out to be a lifetime of study. Much water has since passed under the bridge. Securities underwriting at that time conjured up images of tombstone ads, and its practitioners seemed to be mostly gentlemen of good family dressed in conservative suits. all of whom had attended the same schools. The atmosphere is quite different today as one can learn by reading Tom Wolfe. Indeed, investment banking, as it is currently practiced. Buggests to us that we should have carried our original argument back one step farther, noting that finanCing itself should be viewed as a function ancillary to the production of goods and services. It seems probable that, in many cases. this particular cart has been placed before the horse in recent years But we –I—-,,digress. . . . .. – .. Let us, once more, follow the chain. Industry requires financing; financing requires a mechanism for primary securities distribution; such a mechanism requires a secondary market. The central question raised by derivative products is the question of whether yet another layer—a market in which the risks inherent in securities are swapped around without trading the securities themselves—is now required for the system to function efficiently. That such a layer can exist is obvious, attested to by the fact that it is largely out there and a source of substantial profit for many people. One of the characteristics of a technologically sophisticated society is that it must distinguish between can be done and should be done. In any case, we think. the ancillary nature of derivative products should be kept in mind, and the regUlatory goal ought to be making them a useful component of a larger system. It is commonplace. especially in academic circles, to defend the emergence of derivatives as a manifestation of the free market, thus implicitly suggesting that skeptics are somehow against free enterprise. We yield to no one in our enthusiasm for markets as institutions, and we sport our Adam Smith necktie at least once a month. We suspect, however, that the sort of market perfection desperately sought after by academics in the securities markets is by and large a chimera. That markets allocate resources efficiently over time cannot be denied. That they can develop mechanisms which, over the short run, can be destabilizing seems equally obvious. October 19, 1987 was not the product of a random walk. What we are suggesting here is that the index-futures debate is unlikely to be resolved by ideological posturing about free markets or by defense of profitable territory. The public is likely best to be served by the realization that securities and their derivative cousins all exist as cogs within a much larger piece of machinery and that a pragmatic . nut.s..;and.boJts. approach aimedat facilitating. the efficient functioning of that mahinery is likely to be productive. This, it seems to us, ought to be the goal of regulation and constitutes, really. the key issue in the present debate. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (06/28/90) 2886.39 357.78 5114.26 AWTebh No statement or expression ofOpinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclfy or Indlrectiy, an offer or lfle SoliCitation of an offer to buy or seU any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subSCriber White we believe the sources 01 our InformaMn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereot nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect 10 any secuntles mentioned In this or any Mure Issue, and such poSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelltnc ,WhiCh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor may give advice to ItS Investment advIsory and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further InformaMn on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609J 987-2300 July 6, 1990 – — . , -As -the -markebremain8ired -ina-sort-of4llini-doldTUaused-brthe-oecurrence-ofB. – – .. mid-week July 4th, it may be appropriate to review our thinking regarding technical action as it has evolved OVer the past few years. Such a review can just as well begin with a simple fact. That fact is that point-and-figure analysis of the Dow Jones Industrial Average has, since early 1989, suggested a long-term price target of 3400. A few comments on the figure are in order. It is derived from a measurement of the base pattern formed by the Dow subsequent to the October, 1987 break. After the meltdown-Monday low of 1738.74 was reached the average spent the remainder of 1987 and all of 1988 in an upwardly biased trading range which, In a series of successive highs, had probed as far as the mid-2100's by sutumn. The 1988-1989 year-end rally took the form of a decisive upside breakout from that base, reaching to almost the 2350 level In February before any sort of significant correction took place. The second factor which must be noted Is that the target is not all that exciting. Its importance will be exaggerated since, if attained, it will, along the way, involve the reaching of yet another level ending in three zeros. The date of this great event will thus achieve the same celebrity accorded January 18. 1966 and January 8. 1987, which occasioned the first penetrations of 1000 and 2000 respectively. With the Dow at around 2900, however, it would still involve an upward move of only 20 from current levels, and the advance would be less than a third of the total move from the 1987 lows. In any case, the objective exists and twenty-twenty hindsight suggests that it probably would have been appropriate to halt analysis at that elementary level last year. However, as the 1989 advance progressed, It became possible to raise a fairly crucial question, i.e. whether or not the target was due to be attained on the then-current cycle. Consider the situation as we approached the end of 1989. The bull market had, by ,—,.,——th-,e'Qt attained its seco.nd blr.thdaYJThis wasnot,..par.ticularlyancient,)ly-normal.,'e'……..——..o—I four-yearcycle, bul1mark-efBtaiuiards-but It certainly fell -Into the time frame within which a top might be foreseen. Meanwhile, the evidence of highly restricted leadership, the most widely noted feature of market action over the last nine months, was beginning to manifest Itself with a vengeance. There followed the mini-crash of October 13, 1989. Shortly thereafter, in contrast with what had taken place in 1988-89, the 1989 year-end rally aborted on the first day of the year, having achieved, on that day only, a new cycle (and all-time) high. There followed, in January 1990, the steepest correction of the bull market to date. ' We confess to then having questioned, under the Influence of the aforementioned factors, the viability of the upswing, and having harbored the suspicion that attainment of the Dow's ultimate price target would have to await a full-scale, bear-market correction. It was not, Immediately at any rate, to be. The January low held, the market moved sideways to April, and May featured a new upthrust, which ultimately moved above the 2950 level on June 5th. Close scrutiny of that rally's underpinnings suggested some improvement in technical action, but It was hardly decisive. It remains to ponder the meaning of action from June to date. The market was essentislly unable to better the June 5th high on a series of attempts through mid-June. The last week of that month saw a fall below the 2900 level and a series of closes In the 2860-2840 range. A rally back to the 2900's preceded the holiday, but this aborted, at least temporarily, yesterday. The bullish argument is buttressed, in our view, by the continued existence of the 3400 objective, still out there after a year and a half. This target is, Ironically, made more plausible by the weakest feature of the market, the ongoing narrow leadership, basically still confined to blue-chip, Dow-type Issues. The bearish case remains a potentlal one. 2820-2800 for the Dow would be significant on the downside, completing a putative top whose ultimate shape and target 'remain unclear. Currently, the worst that can be foreseen from such a top would be move back to support around 2700-2600 which could well be followed by a renewed thrust to new highs later in the summer. At the moment, It seems to us, no clear-cut signals are being given. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2895.54 S & P 500 (1200) 357.19 Cumulative Index (7/5/90) 5121.25 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer orthe soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nOr of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and InfOrmation Delafield, Harvey, Taben Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEM8ER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 July 20, 1990 Wh-,,inthi.!'SRa9JLOyerthe'years, consistently complained about the media's fascination with round numbers. 'We were thusPreparedfor- an OlitbursCof Iiype as tfieDow liit 30000'–a,,'-' – extra-special round number, since it ends in three zeros rather than the usual two. The expected fireworks, however, turned out to be a fizzle, as the market, not surprisingly it turns out, indulged in some rather bizarre behavior. As a preliminary to this discussion, it is necessary to explain the various figures generated by the computation of a market average each day. There is, of course, the close, and there are also available intra-day high and low figures. These statistics, it should be noted, are arrived at by taking the daily highs and lows of each of the average's components and are thus purely theoretical, since those highs and lows never occur at the same time. More recently, with advanced monitoring equipment, tick-by-tick figures for the daily high and low are available, but the historical record for these is lacking. In any case, the Dow, which had moved ahead some 37 pOints on July 12, to 2970, extended that rally on Friday morning and, at around 2 p.m., first penetrated the 3000 level. It pulled back sharply at the close, however, to finish at 2980, having, in the process, achieved the first intra-day peak above 3000. Starting Monday morning, a solid upward progression began, and the magic mark was again breached by noon, with a level around 3008 attained at 3 o'clock. A sell-off ensued, however, and a last-minute rally fell short, producing a close of 2999.75, to date, at least, the average's highest closing figure. On Tuesday, the market moved ahead early and the intra-day figure of 3024.26 on that day stands, so far, as the record. There followed a pull-back and another last-minute rally which aborted in the final five minutes, leaving the Dow unchanged from the previous day, one-quarter of a point below 3000. Another approach was made late Thursday and, as this is written, a further flirtation with 3000 is taking place. It occurred to us, as all of this was going on, that we recalled similar hesitations at round-number levels in the past. Accordingly, we undertook a semi-recreational search of our data … – b ank–toobserve4he–Dow' s-4enavior-'9.s…..it-d'-irst–attained-each-even- h u ndI!edlevel …,B tarting .Lin 1946 .–li- (It had, of course, been as high as 386 in the 1920's, but we started our investigation post-World War ll.) It turned out that a fairly long gap between the aVerage's first attaining such a figure on intra-day basis and finally managing to close there was a not-uncommon occurrence. The following table lists the date of the first intra-day and the first closing high above each even-hundred level to date. In only three cases, in 1946 at 200, 1956 at 500, and 1987 at 2100, did both a high and closing penetration take place on the same day. Level First Rlgh First Close Level First High First Close Level Flrst Hlgh Fust Close 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 JAN 11 1946 MAR 51954 DEX 21 1954 MAR 12 1956 JAN 21 1959 APR 11 1961 ml 17 1964 JlIN 19 1965 JlIN IB 1966 JAN 12 1983 JAN 11 1946 MAR 11 1954 00 29 1954 MAR 12 1956 ml 20 1959 171961 ml 28 1964 Jl\N 28 1965 10114 1972 ml 24 1983 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100 Am 2119B3 JAN 30 19B5 101 5 19B5 00 5 19B5 FEll 3 19B6 FEll 21 1986 MAR 18 1986 Jal 25 1986 JAN 7 1987 JAN 19 19B7 Am 26 19B3 20 19B5 101 6 19B5 00 11 19B5 FEll 6 1986 FEll 27 19B6 MAR 20 1986 JUL 1 1986 JAN B 19B7 JAN 19 19B7 2200 2300 2400 2500 2600 2700 2800 2900 3000 Jl\N 23 19B7 MAR 11 19B7 Am 3 19B7 JUL 15 19B7 1\00 6 1987 1\00 7 19B9 err 61989 30 1990 JUL 13 1990 ml 5 19B7 MAR 20 19B7 Am 6 19B7 JUL 17 19B7 1\00 10 19B7 1\00 10 1989 Jl\N 21990 JW 1 1990 11717177117 The most notable case of such a hesitation, of course. accompanied the Dow's first dalliance with the 1000 level. This event was, at the time, invested with an incredible amount of social significance. There was even a Broadway musical entitled, How Now. Dow Jones in which, as we recall, the hero could not wed the heroine until the 1000 level was attained, an event which duly took place in the grand finale. The intra-day figure for the DJIA was above 1000 on both January 18-19 and February 9-10, 1966. On each of these occasions, however, it failed to close above 1000, and the latter occasion proved to be the high of the 1962-1966 bull market. It was not until November 14, 1972 that the index was first able to actually close above the 1000 level, a gap of 6 1/2 years between the intra-day penetration and the closing one.. This, of course. is a consummation devoutly not to be wished for in the present case. There were other notable hesitations. As the table shows, an intra-day peak of 1300 was first attained in January, 1985, and a corresponding closing figure not until May. However, the Dow had been at the 1296 intra-day level as early as November 30, 1983, and the gap between that date and the first 1300-close was a year and a half. Now we are not sure any of the above has any significance, and we are certainly making no such claim for it here. Markets, however. result from the collective action of participants, and those participants are human beings with a normal fascination for easily remembered round numbers. In this light, the behavior of the market as such numbers have been attained seems moderately interesting. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials 02 00) 2999.01 S & P 500 (12 00) 365.60 Cumulative Index (07/19/90) 5164.53 AWTebh No statement or expresslC1\ of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the Sohcltatlon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be rehable. we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey. Tabel1 Inc, as a corporatIOn and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrfrons or trades Ifl respect to any securitIeS mentioned In thiS or any luture Issue, and such POSlllOfl may be different Irom any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delalleld, Harvey, Tabe!llnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In thiS or In any other ISsue Further Information on any security mentioned herem IS available on request ….

U' / B I E n.n. ' S JRl Ct lEV n.1EU'''U'IE 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987 -2300 July 27, 1990 with the Dow's having spent the week bumping against the its failure close above that figure, the DJIA provided us with another round number, a Monday-mornirig decline which, at its worst level, exceeded 100 points. What was unusual about this action was not the extent of the decline, but its suddenness. along with the equally sudden recovery of half the loss on Monday afternoon. We would be tempted to call this volatility were we not assured by the academic community that volatility is only a figment of Qur imagination. As noted above. the extent of the decline was minor. The Dow was down 3.17 over four days and there have been, for the record. 23 larger declines since the bull market began in October, 1987 and 10 larger ones since the onset of its current' phase in November. 1988. The drop will assume importance only to the extent that it is part of a larger pattern. It is probably worthwhile, therefore, to view the recent market 3\0 pattern as it has been manifested on point-and-figure charts. The one at left. a 50-point chart of the Dow should be the favorite of the bulls. It illustrates perfectly the base formed between October. 1987 and fall. 1988. Measured across A-B. the upside objective of that base is 3400. IQOO The existence of this objective, as we have been notmg, has constituted the background for market analysis over the last year and a half. The 50-point chart, however, is too condensed to show the nearer-term picture on the Dow and for right. The chart encompasses action since the October. 1989 break. and its salient feature is the base at A-B. also indicating a higher intermedIate-term upside target at 3100. As can be seen, the recent decline, shown by the arrow on the chart, is insignificant. What is significant is the potential top formation, now 2100 limited to C-D, which, if a breakout were to 1000 take place immediately. would suggest a drop to 2680. a decline of a bit over 10—one of 8XJ intermediate-scale proportions. Pessimists, of course. will note that the pattern could broaden into the familiar head-and-shoulders and, eventually, wind up indicating a much lower objective, one which might move through the massive support at. approximately. the 2800-2600 level. Nothing like this. however. appears in the cards at the moment. The pattern for the S & P 500. shown at left. on a two-point basis. is similar. the A-B base suggesting 388. an upside move similar to one projected for the Dow The interesting difference in the two averages is in the recent IIIIi formation. 'The S &; P made only a marginal new 2'I1I!!!!IIIlIIII!l!!!!I 1 – higli on the June-upswing–;and' the 'formation has EE some of the characteristics of a potential double top. Again. hke the Dow. a downside breakout would bring the S & P mto strong support. the 334 objective being in the middle of the 340-322 support area. It would require an ultimate break of that support to cause major concern. A pattern for potential weakness does. indeed, exist, and Vigilance, as always, will be necessary. Last week's decline. though. did little to alter the basic market picture. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (7/26/90) AWTebh 2915.10 354.42 4879.06 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offeror the solicltallOn 01 an offer to buy or se1l any securIty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely fOr the convenience of the subscnber WhIle we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any actIon 10 be taken by the subscrIber should be based on hiS own InvestIgation and InformatIon Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, postllons Ot trades In respect to any securtlles menboned In thIS or any future Issue, and such poslilon may be dIfferent Irom any views now or herealter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , whIch IS regIstered with the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may gIve adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further InformatIon on any securtty men1lOned herein IS avaIlable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 August 3. 1990 . – -..—-FriClay morfling'S-a'Cti(m'–Cl1n-be-interpr'etea.-as-'-a– dowITsrCle brealtour'from early' summer'sO-to'-p-;;If – . confirmed. it would suggest, as we noted last week. the first intermediate-term correction of the bull market. It is difficult so far to envision a worse scenario. J The date on this letter has. for us at least. some degree of significance. It has been 20 years, to the day, since Monday, August 3, 1970, on which date Delafield, Harvey, Tabell first opened its doors. We assure our readers that this letter is not going to be a history of our firm, a saga. we fully realize. of highly parochial interest. The anniversary. however, did stimulate us to think about some of the changes in financial markets that have taken place over what is. in historical terms, a relatively short timespan. This rumination concluded that things had both changed and stayed the same. an observation true for both financial markets and the world at large. One thing that has. of course, changed over 20 years is the level of stock prices. On the Friday prior to DHT's first day, the Dow had closed at 734.12. That figure was—when 100 points meant something—up just over that amount from what we now know to have been the low of the 1968-70 bear market. The average, propitiously, was to tack on another 200 paints in the ensuing nine months. and the bull market would continue through January. 1973. Another figure for which 1970 levels seem incredibly low by today's standards is NYSE volume. The final volume on our opening day was 7,650.000 shares and had. throughout the summer, been under 10 million on most days. (We were about to have only the sixth 20 million-share day in history a month later.) As noted above, some things do not change. One such phenomenon is the emergence of cries of woe from the financial community as volume enters a declining phase. A headline in The New York Times over our pre-opening weekend read Tape Watchers Dwindle as Prices Sagll , and Sunday's business section announced Most Brokers Face Financial Trouble. Although this pessimism soon evaporated as the bull market got underway, there was some degree of prescience in it. Next to the ad noting Delafield. Harvey. Tabell's formation in the Times. there appeared a tombstone annouUllin snme CRlifnrniR municiPllls. It-listed 18 underwriters drawn from among the be6.t..nll!rul,,-S-t. – in the-industry. Of-the 18. 6 remaln–in business today. . – – –….. -. That 20-year-old newspaper had some headlines that could have appeared currently. They -'ieoussed Middle East peace talks and noted that these talks were being stalled by Iraqi intransigence. Other items would appear out of place. such as the many store ads for Gimbels. E. J. Korvette, and B. Altman. So would the real estate classified ad offering a four-bedroom colonial home in the heart of Princeton for 52,500. A scan of the financial section for that 1970 day shows a number of items missing. It begins with the familiar tables showing prices on the New York and American Stock Exchanges. Following this, there was a fairly extensive list of OTe quotations—quotations, not prices, NASDAQ's ability to report actual sales being well out in the future. Missing was the page-full of options prices. The small section devoted to commodities trading was restricted to—surprise—commodities, with no mention of index futures and similar instruments. Action In foreign stock markets, now a closely watched indicator, was given short shrift. One sentence was devoted to the Tokyo market. (The Nikkei was around 2100.) There was, interestingly. in Sunday's Times an edltorial envisioning all the wonderful things that the United States could do with its 466 million trade surplus. ;'.lrther reflection recalls many other alterations to the financial climate since our debUt. T'ixed commssions were. at that time, still in effect, and Mayday. 1975 was still five years into the future. 1970 was the heyday of the professional investor and those of us who served him. fAdam Smith's' The Money Game was the Bonfire of the Vanities of its day, and the excitement on the l'all Street scene had not yet moved to the investment banking area. this arena, as we noted a few weeks ago, still being populated by well-dressed. well-bred gentlemen who tended to take long lunches. Junk bonds were as yet unheard of. Not only the industry as a whole but the subject of this letter. technical analysis, has changed in many ways since )97(). Many.indicators that today are widely followed did not ,-then eXIst. The opposite is, of course, also the case. Remember the attention devoted to odd-lot statistics Yet for all of this, there remain constants. Technical analysis is the study of markets, and markets are made by human beings. Today. just as 20 years ago or 20 decades ago. human emotions have remained the same. We expect that they will continue to do so and that technical analysis will still be useful in future markets. which, undoubtedly, will change dramatically In somw aspect but in many ways remain as they always have been. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2808.17 S & P 500 (1200) 345.44 Cumulative Index (812190) 5014.02 AWTebh No statement or expression 01 opinIOn or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the sollClfallOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subsCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any aellOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own Investigation and mformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may tater take, poSitions or trades 10 respect \0 any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllOn may be drtferentfrom any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, labelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to ItS IOvestmenl adVISOry and other customers IOdependenlly of any statemenls made 10 thiS or m any other Issue Further mformallon on any security menllOned herem IS available on request