Viewing Month: June 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 01, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 01, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - June 01, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609)987-2300 June I, 1990 We suggested last week that recent market strength could be viewed as a triumph of Bent-iment-.over'momentum..Most–Surveys–ofJ.-investorshad'indicated-''fidespreadlevelof'''''-,''''''-'-s–'I- bearishness, and this bearishness was being made manifest by record high levels of institutional cash. In a market dominated by professional investors, the worst fear of the typical participant is not the loss of money (whlch is not his, anyway), but loss of his job, In these performance-conscious days. the shortest route to unemployment is failure to participate in a rising market. This particular syndrome. we think, goes a long way toward explaining market action of the past fortnight and also why market strength, over the short-term at least, is likely to continue. Given this condition, it is logical to ask Why so much bearishness. It seems to us that pessimism is a mindset easily stimulated by recalling the most-common headlines featured in the financial press over the last year or so. It is, for example, probable that- the saga which has received the most column-inches of late is the Savings-and-Loan crisis. We have, by now, become perfectly accustomed to reading each morning how many more hundreds of billions of dollars the whole sordid mess is going to cost us. It all certainly sounds like bad news, but it is probably worthwhile, as in all such cases, to take a somewhat harder look. One observation seems appropriate to begin with. The operative phrase describing the current process seems to be 8 & L BailoutT1 It makes as much sense to say that a policeman, having apprehended the mugger who has lifted my wallet is, when he returns it to me, bailing out the robber. The bailees in this case are not the 8 & Vs, but their depositors. This distinction is not trivial since it relates to the original founding of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation back in 1933. (Yes, we know that S & Vs are insured by a different entity, but the principle is the same.) Recall that the basic princ;le of the American banking system is that the banks do not actually have your money, despite what their monthly statements tell you. They possess, on hand, in liquid form, only a small fraction of 1-.- this sum. The system ..,……'''(iepositors-lslikEily… to wisithpdrreadwicamteunde,o,n.itth-etMprseammisee-tltmhea.t- nlofilm9-o3re3, t hwaen wa esrme allOloIfriaiicitFiboacnkioift-t1je-…………..,,,……,..,,…1 dismal collapse of that system—failures begetting failures until the so-calied Bank Holiday became necessary. It was apparent, in March 1933, that the most pervasive economic problem of the many the country faced was the collapse of confidence in the banking system, and it was reasoned that the best way to restore that confidence was to use 8 sort of government seal of approval. Thus, began Federal Deposit Insurance—all the way up to the astronomical sum of 5,000. Government programs, however, have a tendency to metastasize. If a little is good, legislators reason, more must obviously be better, and deposit insurance has grown beyond the wildest dreams of its initiators—with a 100,000 limit, the extension to S & Vs, the freeing of the S & Vs to invest in all manner of exotic pieces of paper, and a host of other differences too numerous to recount here. And it now appears, Borne 60 years later, that there are some consequences which were unforeseen in 1933. The irony, though, is that deposit insurance has worked. It has succeeded in doing precisely what it was designed to do—eliminate crises of confidence of the sort which caused the disastrous bank runs of the early 1930's. It would be absolutely inconceivable to a 1930's banker that the failure of a depository institution could be announced in the newspaper on one day and that on the next day one could saunter into the lobby and observe business going on as usual—tellers chatting with customers, machines clicking away, all as if nothing had happened. A not inconsequential social goal has been accomplished. We are now discovering that it has been accomplished at some cost. We have once again relearned that most basic of all economic precepts—that there is no such thing as a free lunch. This rule does not, however, deny that there can be such a thing as a fairly decent lunch obtainable at a modest cost. This clatterprinciple,wethink,winds .. uP ,.being JosLinmuch oC today's hand;wringing over the Savings-and-Loan situation. There are, obviously, as we now discover, to our sorrow, a great many weak links in the American monetary structure. We are just beginning to perceive some of those areas of weakness. We are learning, certainly, that deposit insurance, as it is now constituted, requires significant modification. The determination of just what sorts of modification will be required is a task worthy of serious study. That task, we think, will best be carried out in an atmosphere free of hysteria about bailouts. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (5/31/90) AWTebh 2893.93 361.78 4961.62 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or IndlrecUy, an offer or the sollcrtallon of an offerlo buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our InformatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken bylhe subscffber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informalion Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, poSIIJOflS or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positron may be different from any vIews nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, TabelJ Inc, which IS reglSlered wllh the SEC as an Investment advJsor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 08, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 08, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - June 08, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 -.- June 8, 1990 —,Theabilitycof;thema rketto—breakint-o-new-hig-h ter,ritor-y-;u g gests, as;we -havenoted-Inthe.-,-,..-o-Irl-.. past couple of letters, the possibIlity of further short-term strength. The timing of this breakout is interesting since we are about to enter the July-August period of the summer rally. We are, therefore, reproducing below the customary table, covering 93 years of market history since the Dow was first computed in 1897. One Month Periods (1897-1989) Two Month Periods (18-97-1989 ) End Month Aovances Declines Average Chg Aovances Declines Average Chg. January 59 33 1.16 Februa ry 44 48 -0.29 March 55 38 0.70 Apll 51 42 0.91 May 46 47 -0.33 June 48 45 0.67 July 57 36 1. 48 August 62 30 1. 78 September 36 56 -1.28 October 50 42 -0.12 November 55 37 0.69 December 67 26 1. 38 — — —– TOTAL 630 480 0.56 60 32 53 39 44 49 54 39 49 44 47 46 57 36 62 30 54 38 40 52 54 38 64 29 — — 638 472 2.55 0.88 0.33 1. 67 0.69 0.30 2.15 3.53 0.44 -1. 35 0.64 1.96 —– 1.15 As the table indicates, of the 1110 months since 1897, 630—or 57—have been advancing '…..,…,J 1- ..–c.m-ontns-. ana481.l -or -43—have snoweaaechnes. -rhus-, -the normal expectatIon -for -any given month – would be 52-53 advances and 39-40 declines. Similar fIgures can be adduced for two-month periods. From the data above, we have been able to extract four patterns of a seasonal nature which seem to be statistically significant. The most significant one is the least known, the tendency toward a market decline in the month of September. Since 57 of all months since 1897 have been rising ones, the expectation would be a plurality of advances over declines. However, precisely the opposite is the case for September, which, in 92 years, has produced 56 declines and only 36 advances, with an average drop of 1. 28 percent. The probability of such a pattern being due to chance, a chi-square test tells us, is less than 1 in 1000. The' next most significant pattern has been the year-end rally, illustrated by 67 rising Decembers in 93 years. Our readers know that we have published an annual comment on this phenomenon around December or January of each year. Another seasonal manifestation, which we have demonstrated based on data since 1926, although we have no idea of the reason therefore, has been the fact that the direction in Which the market moves in November has appeared to be a moderately successful predictor of the market's direction for the following year. Of the four seasonal phenomena, the least significant has been the summer rally, which is due to be analyzed at this juncture. As the table shows, the 57 advances and 36 declines for July are marginally better than one would expect. August shows an even greater aberration. The percentage advances for July and August, along with that for the two-month period ending in August, are the largest figures in the table, although December-January performance is close. Despite these figures, standard tests of statistical significance suggest that the summer rally is a less reliable phenomenon than the others noted above. It has been even less reliable recently, especially in July, with five of the eight Julys since 1982 having been down months. Last year all four of the seasonal phenomena asserted themselves. July and August were both up months with July posting a huge 9.04 advance. September was one of only four down months during … – tIle year and the- ie'a'r-end rally,' although it began late, took place on schedule. Moreover, the Dow moved up in November 1989, thus forecasting the mid-1990 strength. There seems. incidentally. to have emerged in recent years a brand new tendency—the occurrence of lmportant market turning points during the summer months. Major market bottoms took place on August 12, 1982 and July 24, 1984. In the opposite direction, the top leading to the 1983 – 1984 decline began to form during the summer of 1983 and, of course, the major high for the Dow, preceding the 1987 crash, occurred on August 25, 1987. The October-December, 1987 low was a return to the normal pattern of fall reversals, however. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. AWT ebh Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2887.14 S & P 500 (1200) 361.48 Cumulative Index (617190) 5185.40 No statement or expression 01 opinion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemedto be, directly or Indirectly, an otler orthe sollcltallon of an otler to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mformabon 10 be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof no! of the statements made herem Any aclJon to be laken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , as a corporation and ItS officers or employees may now have, or may later take, positions or trades m respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posl\lon may be dlNerenl from any views now Or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give advice to lIS Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menlloned herem IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 15, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 15, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - June 15, 1990
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., TABELL-S MARKET LETTER !l00 ALEXANDER ROAD. CN 5209. PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC 609) 987-2300 Summer is the time for sequels in the movie June 15, 1990 and we have already been treated to Another sequel time in the stock market last week, the sequel in this case being a rerun early 1987. Just when you thought it was safe to go back into the stock market. The week's activity featured such phenomena as a Tuesday market which, having done nothing all day, suddenly produced a 40-point spurt within less than an hour in the late afternoon, and a Wednesday session, during which the Dow J down only three on the day, still managed, intra-day, to move over a 45-point range. A glance at real-time charts while these events were transpiring suggested strongly that index arbitrage was once again at work. This was appropriate given the release this week of the NYSE investigation of the practice, a report not characterized by excessive reformist zeal. Program trading got yet another boost in this morning's Times, 8S Professor Burton Malkiel performed the conventional academic blessing of the technique. Given our initial impression that volatility had increased. we decided to investigate the Bubject further. This investigation revealed that contrary to impression there had been little evidence of unusual volatility in recent trading. The investigation also reminded us of a rather paradoxical conclusion that we had reached in this letter as long ago as 1982—that volatility, over the intermediate term at least, is historically bullish for the stock market. STANDARD DEVIATION OF DAILY LOG CHANGES DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE MONTHLY 1926 – DATE Our favorite volatility measurement, shown above. is a simple one. a month-to-month series showing the standard deviation of daily Dow log changes around their monthly mean. Those acquainted with statistics will instantly understand this terminology. For others. it is simply necessary to know that a log change is similar to a percentage change and that the standard deviation is a measure of variability. (The series 99, 100, 101 and 10, 100, 190 each have a mean of 100. The latter has a larger standard deviation.) The notable feature of the chart is, of course, the spurt in October, 1987 to a level above that of 1929. Eliminating this jump, one sees that the series has been characterized, since the 1940's. by occasional spikes reaching above the 1.5 level. These spikes have occurred in nine instances over a 40-year period, and of the nine, eight happened around major lows (assuming we are willing to accept the most recent case, October 1989, as such an occurrence). Current volatility. the chart reveals, remains well under early 1987 levels. This observation is confirmed by other measurements as well. For the time being. then, market action, in terms of width of swings, can be diagnosed as normal. It will be interesting to see whether an increase in volatility takes place over the near term. Such a manifestation might suggest continuation of the present upswing. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2916.58 S & P 500 (1200) 361.76 Cumulative Index (06/14/90) 5189.39 AWTebh No statement or expression ot opInion or any other mailer herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation ot an offer to buy or sen any secuflty reterred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Iniormatlon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the aCcuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own InvestJgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may tater take, pOSitions or trades 10 resped to any secuntles mentioned In thiS or any fuMe Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed III this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give advice to ItS Investment adVISOry and olher customers Independently 01 any statements made In thts or m any other ISsue Further Information on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 22, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 22, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - June 22, 1990
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…-. – 'U'IIHED.D.' S IRlcIE'U' D.1E'U''U'1E1Rl 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 22. 1990 Two positive statements can be made about recent market action. They are as follows -' — —-,- 1.-The–Dow-is-(or-wasonJ.une.J.5.bya.,marginof7/10,ofa,pDint mT.er JuneA)aLa new. all-time high. . -. . — ,. – — — 2. The rally that got it to that pOint—which began on January 30 and whose current phase started on April 27—is probably the strongest and broadest of the last ten months. These two admissions having been made. the search for further signs of market strength becomes somewhat difficult. Let us consider the question of breadth, 8 subject we, certainly not alone among our technical colleagues. have been alluding to monotonously over the past year. The table below shows the high and low points of each discernible swing in the Dow since last August. when our breadth index reached its peak. giving for each date. the closing level for both the Dow and our computation of NYSE breadth. Date HI GHS DJIA Breadth Date LOW 5 DJIA Breadth Aug 10 1989 2712.63 Sep 1 1989 oct 9 1989 2752.09 2791.41 Oct 20 1989 2689.14 Dec 13 1989 2761.09 Jan 2 1990 2810.15 Feb 15 1990 2649.55 Mar 19 1990 2755.63 Apr 17 1990 2765.77 Jun 4 1990 2935.19- W. Jun 15 1990 2935.89 New High for Dow 1000.00 999.80 997.43 989.73 986.57 988.38 973.55 974.25 970.31 975.11 973.53 Aug 21 1987 sep 25 1989 Oct 13 1989 Nov 6 1989 Dec 20 1989 Jan 30 1990 Feb 23 1990 Ma, 22 1990 Apr 27 1990 Jun 6 1990 Jun 20 1990 2647.00 2659.19 2569.26 2582.17 2687.93 2543.24 2564.19 2695.72 2645.05 2862.38 2895.30 996.51 994.09 988.89 982.07 981. 37 969.99 969.27 971. 06 963.06 973.12 971. 43 There are, in the table, eleven rallies, six of which, including the last two, produced new bull-market peaks for the Dow. Scanning down the list for similar highs for breadth shows that. for I-Ir—t''h''I'e-must-paI t, the pea-k fur -each-rally–has'-been-'-lowerthan-the-pefor–the-'-previous-one..–T-he-,,same – has been true for lows in breadth. the nadir for this figure having been attained at the end of April. Now there has been some modest improvement in the first half of 1990. The March breadth peak was indeed better than that of February. and. more importantly. that March peak was exceeded. although only slightly. in June—hardly an astonishing achievement since the Dow by that time was 180 points higher. Although improvement has been noticeable, breadth action, considered on an absolute basis, continues to be sub-par. Indeed. another mini-divergence has begun with the failure of breadth to confirm the new peak in the averages on June 15. Individual-stock, new-high figures, another indicator of narrow leadership, have been likewise abysmal. Over the last dozen trading days, a period when the averages were straining at the leash on the upside, new highs have been restricted, for the most part. to the 20-30 range. and on four of those days there actually took place more daily lows than highs. There do, however, remain areas of potential improvement. One is the Transportation Average (1178) which. it is worth reminding ourselves. has shown action wildly different from that of the Industrials. Its peak was achieved back in September at 1532.01. The Friday-the-13th break in October was coincident with the coming apart of the UAL buyout. and. by the end of October. the DJTA was below 1200. (In the process a gap was created. the October 13th low of 1425 being 65 points above the high of the following Monday. One of the hoariest of technical chestnuts is the theory that such a gap must be filled.) In any case. by January's end. the transports had managed to post a closing low of 1031.83. a rather astonishing fall of 32. Many major bear markets have been of lesser dimension. After posting that low. the Transports returned to the 1125-1225 range. and there now exists a potential head-and-shoulders base whose upside breakout would be 1230. Were this level to be achieved, a testing of the old high would be the minimum expectation, and the implications for the -market'would'be highlYbullish. – – – — The DJ Utilities (209) find themselves showing much more tentative improvement. Since January. reflecting the bond market. this average has fallen sharply (a 14 total drop) with an especially severe downthrust in late April, since largely erased. For this indicator it would be important that the April low (around 201) hold and that continued basing take place in. roughly. the 208-220 area with, one would hope, an ultimate upside breakout. Despite strength in the major averages, the improvement for the broader market, then, can be seen, has not been all that great. It would, thus, be encouraging for such areas as the transports and utilities to demonstrate renewed strength. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (6f21/90) AWTebh 2909.16 360.94 5135.95 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the SOliCitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgatlon and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a oorporalIOn and lIS officers or employees, may now have, 01 may lalellake, POSitionS or lTades In respecl to any seWTllIes mentIoned In fhlS OT any future Issue, and such poSllion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements mace In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security menllOned herein IS available on request \

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Tabell’s Market Letter – June 29, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – June 29, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - June 29, 1990
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1IBUED..D..'S IRlIE1 D.. l e T T I E R 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 June 29, 1990 -Thet()pic -of.-stoek-index''f-utures..ha.s.,….once–again .become–8.,..fontp8.ge-8ubiect… as…,,801onB commence to argue over the proper regulatory authority for these instruments. This argument is frequently viewed as a battle between bureaucrats for turf, and there is, admittedly, this element. Only a bureaucratic mind is capable of the sort of sophistry which equates pork bellies with the S & P 500. The issue is, however, a great deal deeper than this and should be viewed in such a context. Back when we entered the securities business, we were pressed by some of our more serious-minded acquaintances to justify the social utility of our newly chosen profession. We did not (and do not) consider this a difficult task. We began by noting that the prevailing economic system in the United States was something called capitalism and that. as the name implied, a salient feature thereof was the existence of a complex melange of private institutions devoted to assembling, from national savings, the capital needed for American industry. The assemblage of such capital—securities underwriting—we viewed as the primary function of the securities industry. For this function properly to be fulfilled, it was necessary that there exist a secondary market for. securities, providing liquidity to primary buyers, much as does a used car market for primary buyers of autos. It was to this secondary market that we chose to devote what turned out to be a lifetime of study. Much water has since passed under the bridge. Securities underwriting at that time conjured up images of tombstone ads, and its practitioners seemed to be mostly gentlemen of good family dressed in conservative suits. all of whom had attended the same schools. The atmosphere is quite different today as one can learn by reading Tom Wolfe. Indeed, investment banking, as it is currently practiced. Buggests to us that we should have carried our original argument back one step farther, noting that finanCing itself should be viewed as a function ancillary to the production of goods and services. It seems probable that, in many cases. this particular cart has been placed before the horse in recent years But we –I—-,,digress. . . . .. – .. Let us, once more, follow the chain. Industry requires financing; financing requires a mechanism for primary securities distribution; such a mechanism requires a secondary market. The central question raised by derivative products is the question of whether yet another layer—a market in which the risks inherent in securities are swapped around without trading the securities themselves—is now required for the system to function efficiently. That such a layer can exist is obvious, attested to by the fact that it is largely out there and a source of substantial profit for many people. One of the characteristics of a technologically sophisticated society is that it must distinguish between can be done and should be done. In any case, we think. the ancillary nature of derivative products should be kept in mind, and the regUlatory goal ought to be making them a useful component of a larger system. It is commonplace. especially in academic circles, to defend the emergence of derivatives as a manifestation of the free market, thus implicitly suggesting that skeptics are somehow against free enterprise. We yield to no one in our enthusiasm for markets as institutions, and we sport our Adam Smith necktie at least once a month. We suspect, however, that the sort of market perfection desperately sought after by academics in the securities markets is by and large a chimera. That markets allocate resources efficiently over time cannot be denied. That they can develop mechanisms which, over the short run, can be destabilizing seems equally obvious. October 19, 1987 was not the product of a random walk. What we are suggesting here is that the index-futures debate is unlikely to be resolved by ideological posturing about free markets or by defense of profitable territory. The public is likely best to be served by the realization that securities and their derivative cousins all exist as cogs within a much larger piece of machinery and that a pragmatic . nut.s..;and.boJts. approach aimedat facilitating. the efficient functioning of that mahinery is likely to be productive. This, it seems to us, ought to be the goal of regulation and constitutes, really. the key issue in the present debate. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (06/28/90) 2886.39 357.78 5114.26 AWTebh No statement or expression ofOpinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclfy or Indlrectiy, an offer or lfle SoliCitation of an offer to buy or seU any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subSCriber White we believe the sources 01 our InformaMn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereot nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and information Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect 10 any secuntles mentioned In this or any Mure Issue, and such poSition may be different from any Views now or hereafter expressed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelltnc ,WhiCh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment advisor may give advice to ItS Investment advIsory and other customers Independently 01 any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further InformaMn on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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