TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543,5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987,2300 March 16. 1990 There has been 8 fair amount of comment, of late. on the subject of stock-market volume, much of it trtggll,recl.!)ythe faQ.t…!h!!L'22londay only 114.8 million shares changed hands on the NYSE. This was the n, – ''iov,.est figure for '19lHJ todate;-but it also conshtuteil' a 'record; fora'sHil longer 'perioo. 'InspectIon' reveals that the ten most recent days which saw lower volume were all associated with holidays. For non-holiday trading. Monday's figure was the lowest since September. 1988 and. with the exception of ten days in summer that year. the lowest of the entire bull market. DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE ,i ml m m m m 01to 0 0 0 0 mCOCmOOolOolCII Z…JOQ…!- . w u …, -, 1 (f) 0 oz u lLI 0 zmlIJa …., '- L As the chart above shows, the market has had to contend, of late, not only with deteriorating breadth, but with weakening volume.. The breadth weakness since August, 8 phenomenon to which we have repeatedly drawn attention in this space, shows up clearly in the daily advance/decline line, the center line on the chart. January's breadth high was nowhere close to the peaks of early summer, and breadth had, prior to recent strength, moved to a new low early this month. This is in direct contrast to the series of new highs on the DJI A. the upper line on the chart. The Bubject of this piece, however. is volume. It is our practice to smooth this figure with a 100-day moving average. which is shown as the lower, thicker line on the chart. For the 100 days ended December 22. 1987. volume averaged 205 million shares. an all-time record. As the chart shows. it dropped off to a level around 142 million shares in early 1989, and. after recovering somewhat, has posted a new low at 158.2 million shares yesterday. , This record is interesting in light of the longer-term pattern. Through the middle 1960's. volume tended to be a fairly reliable leading' indicator. It generally rose ,du-nngthe early .stages ,of ,bull markets and then peaked. with as much as a two-year lag, prior to the averages' reaching their highs. This lead-time evaporated almost to nothingness in the middle 1960's, and, since that time. volume has tended to top out around the same as the major market indices. The current upswing. therefore, may be the only one on record during which volume has topped out almost precisely at the bull-market start and continued to decline fairly steadily throughout a 62 major-cycle rise. In light of this history. it is hard to know how to construe the above phenomenon. but it is hard to call it bullish. It has tended to be a technical rule of thumb that falling prices can often occur on diminished volume but that sustained rises usually require expanding activity on the upside. Such activity in the current bull market. though. has been conspicuous by its absence. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (3/15/90) AWTebh 2717.34 340.53 4872.32 No statement or eJ(presslon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicrtatlon of an offer to buy or sell any securrty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represeT\l or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be laken bylhe subSCriber should be based on hiS own InvestigatIon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporallon and Jts officers or employees, may now have, or maylaler lake, pOSJIIOflS or trades In respect 10 any secun/Jes menllOned 111 Ihls or any future Issue, and such pDSJlJOfI may be different/rom any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may gIVe advice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thIS or In any other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned hereIn IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER RDAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987 2300 March 23, 1990 A new factor, one with which the U.S. stock market found itself temporarily unable to cope, –. – w a s -introduced '-into -thefinancial-equation-t-his-weekhat –factor;w8s a J apanesebear-o'-market. — . Such an event has been predicted by outraged bears for at least the past half-dozen years. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the NYSE was uncertain how to react when the shoe finally dropped. For statistics freaks, the Tokyo market, conventionally measured by the Nikkei Index, is a mine of not-so-trivial mformation. For example, on May 16, 1949, the day the Tokyo market reopened, the Nikkei and the Dow were at almost precisely the same level, around 176. At recent highs, the Dow had just managed to edge above 2800, The Tokyo index was just under 39,000. It is possible to note as well that, from 1974 to the end of 1989, the Nikkei has managed to increase by well over 1000. During that time, there took place no correction of greater than 20, with the single exception of a short 21 drop in sympathy with our market in October-November, 1987. Thus the current Japanese downswing—just over 23 at Thursday's elose—is that country's steepest decline in 16 years N!VKEI INDO( 10 ,)NTH .AVERAGE DOw JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE Ie '10NTH AVERAGE The chart above, presenting a long-term comparison of the New York and Tokyo markets since 1949. raises a few analytical points. Not the least of these involves calling into question the dictum that our own market and the Japanese one must move in parallel. Although they have more or less done so recently. there were a fair number of instances in the early days when the two markets managed to move in precisely opposite directions. . At the very outset, in 1949, when the U.S. market was embarking on the longest secular uptrend in its history. the Nikkei was undergoing its most severe bear market, a decline of, if you please, 51.7, unequaled on this side of the Pacific since 1929-1932, The longest decline in modern Japanese history lasted for four years, from July, 1961 through July, 1965, a period which saw the Japanese average plunge from 1829 to 1020, a 44 drop. That time period almost overlapped the great U.S. bull market of 1962-1966. In a reversal of the above comparison, American stocks saw a 35.9 decline in 1968-1970. At almost the same time that this was going on, a 102.7 rise was taking place in Japan. Now it is, of course, possible to argue that in the 1950's and 1960's the Japanese market was a relatively small component of the global picture, whereas, as of 1988', it had become the largest in'the world, surpassing the NYSE in total market value. It is,. therefore, possible to 'assume that our own market and Japan's might move more or less synchronously. They have, indeed, done so since the middle 1970's. However, the chart clearly shows that, while direction may have been more or less the same, the magnitude of moves has sharply differed. Our own market, as we know, struggled to move above 1000 during most of the 1970's, while Japan showed a steady uptrend. Both markets bottomed in 1982, but the Japanese advance was steeper and had smaller corrections than did ours. The most recent divergence was, of course, the Nikkei's rise to a new peak following October, 1987, something our own market averages have just barely managed to accomplish. It is difficult to suggest, given technical and fundamental factors, that the Japanese bear market is not likely to continue. We would be less certain, however. of a swing of the same magnitude being exported to the United States. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials 02 00) 2708.56 S & P 500 0200) 337.27 Cumulative Index (3/22/90) 4826.44 AWTebh No statement or expression of opInion or anyolher matter herein contained IS, or Islo bedeemed 10 be, directly or Indirectly, an offer orthe sohcrtatlon of an offer to buy orsel! any securrty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience 01 the subscflber While we bebeve the SOurces of our informatIOn to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informabon Delafield, Harvey, Taben Inc, as a Corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSl\lons or trades In respect to any securities mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSllion may be dlHerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other cuslomers Independently of any statements made In thiS or 11'1 any other Issue Further information on any secuflty mentioned herem IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 085435209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 March 30, 1990 There exists a body of common knowledge regarding the current bull market. One item therein is .- that-itrla-seeri-a'miirk-et of'blgstock1i-ratner-than-little,-large caps rathertJfan'smallap'i, – , , -,. listed stocks rather than OTC issues. Like much common knowledge, this bit is essentially true, but Tthhee trutathbleis aatbitrimghotre ctroamcpelsicattehde. Dow, Date DJIA S&P500 NASDAQ Val. Line S & P 500, NASDAQ Industrials, and Value Line Composite for a number of key dates during the 1987-1990 bull market. Using the common method of equating each average to 100 on the base date of October 19, 1987, it shows clearly the long-term superior performance for the Dow and S &.p, both of WhICh were, at Oct 19 1987 gDec 4 1987 Ju1 51988 Oct 91989 Nov 6 1989 Jan 2 1990 100.00 101.61 124.15 g 160.54 148.51 161.62 100.00 99.59 122.67 1i266.16 147.93 159.98 100.00 78.58 111.74 1104.60 116.88 122.72 100.00 85.52 113.80 1i12,42 120.10 123.73 Wednesday's price, up over 50 vs. a 22 rise Jan 30 1990 146.27 143.65 111.09 for the NASDAQ and 16 for the Value Line. Mar 28 1990 157.80 152.11 121.99 110.85 115.65 A closer look at the table, however, reveals an interesting fact. While the better-known averages simply tested their October levels at their December lows, the other two averages suffered drops of bear-market proportions in the two months following October 19. Measured from their highs in August, the two averages were down close to 40. The simple exercise of changing the base date Date DJIA S&P 500 NASDAQ Val.Llne in the table to December 4, 1987, results in the ———- ——- ——- ——- ——– comparison at the left. It shows that during the JDue1c 54 11998887 112020..1080 1102031070 114020..2000 113030..0070 early months of the bull market, the two averages oct 21 1988 123.59 126.68 133.12 131.45 of lesser-known stocks actually outperformed by Nov 16 1988 115.39 117.82 124.03 123.52 fairly significant amounts. The result of this NOocvt 69 . l A n 2 11996899 1990 114568..1050 159.. o6 11t.646Q60….S6…84.6.3–11146-582-..67642.18–J11454-440…. 046.364hoauvtepea.rcfto.rumallayncp.eroisY.t.lh'a-te.dthaetNo.AuStDtAheQsaImend.uasmtoruinatl s o f . – , , – , I T- – — Jan 30-1990–10.9S….—14-4.24–141.38—–129.61appreciationas…The…….Dowaftheir recent .. prlce, 8n-d—– —— Mar 28 1990 155.30 152.73 155.25 135.23 the Value Line, while trailing, is not that far behind. In mid-1988, another pattern of large-stock superiority began to develop. The two major averages went on to reach new highs in October 1988, whereas the other two failed to equal their summer tops 4 All the averages were down about the same percentage amount in October-November, but then, when the current phase of the bull market began in November 1988, a pattern of better results on the upside for the large-capitalization stocks began to emerge. Trihgehtr,esuwlhtsichof sthhiifstsarteheshobwasne indatthee ftoarbwlearadt Date DJIA S&P500 NASDAQ val.Line again. Both the Dow and S & P 500 have done Nov 16 1988 100.00 100.00 100.00 100,00 better on the upside, and yet another pattern Oct 9 1989 136.93 136.38 131.1l 124.72 has emerged, that of the NASDAQ Industrials outperforming the Value Line. This pattern has continued. Measured against its January 30 low, the Dow was, this week, up 7.88 Nov 6 1989 Jan 2 1g99g0 126.67 in 134.59 126.07 g 129.63 119.93 g 125.17 l13.68 l17.12 104.93 109.47 vs. 9.81 for the NASDAQ, and 4.33 for the Value Line. It is interesting that the reason for the better listed-stock action since late 1988 has essentially been due to larger rises on rallies. The percentage declines during short-term downswings have been about the same for all four averages. A couple of conclusions may be drawn. The first is that the recent outperformance of the over-the-counter averages vis-a-vis the Value Line may be. to a degree, another instance of the large-stock effect. The NASDAQ average, while it is, composed of a huge number of stocks, is capital weighted and. therefore, tends to reflect the action of larger issues. The Value Line average is. by contrast, computed geometrically and. therefore, gives equaL.weight to each – issue. Another conclusion is that action has been more or less normal, from a technical point of view. If one envisions the bear market as having continued to December 1987, we witnessed a typical phenomenon of secondary issues collapsing at the end of the downswing and then producing superior recovery as the next bull market began. We are now witnessing a normal, if protracted, late bull-market stage in which larger stocks normally outperform smaller ones. The final question, of course, centers around when this pattern will change. There appears. from a technical point of view. to be no indication of its doing so immediately. Based on the historical record, it would be normal for new leadership not to emerge until a cycle downswing has been completed and the next bull market begins. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (3/29/90) AWTebh 2709.68 338.88 4868.02 ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expreSSion of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or selt any security referred to Of mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve the sources of our Informallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any aCllOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Dela/leld, Harvey, Tabe!! Inc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any Mure Issue, and such poSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In this Of any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, TabeUlnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentIOned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEM8ER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 —-..-,,.-..,..OnMonday'ofthis'week-t11e- Dow 'Jorre s-lndustrIa!-AverAapgrei'lCI60,s.,1;9a9a0t'27\)O457t hisIigure –.,,–d capping a decline which had begun in mid-March and preceding a rally attempt in the latter part of last week. The aveage was, at that point, on familiar ground. It had passed through the 2700 level for the first time in the current bull market some eight months previous, on, to be precise, August 10, 1989. Had the average closed a few pennies lower on Monday, it would have moved through the 2700 level for the 13th ti!e in those eight months. All this is by way of saying that, as measured by the popular averages at least, the equity market has been doing nothing for some two-thirds of a year. The high for the period—also the Dow's all-time high—was achieved on 1990's first trading day at 2810.15. The low of the range was 2543.24 attained on January 30, delineating a spread of less than 10 112 from low to high. The 2700 level was reasonably close to the central point of that range, the average price for the period being about 2682 and the median price, 2686. On 92 of the 166 trading days in question, the DJIA closed somewhere between 2650 and 2750. It is perhaps worthwhile to trace the history of those eight months. As noted above, the average's first move through 2700 was on A,ugust 10. This followed by two days the bull-market peak for our breadth index, a peak which has not been exceeded since. (More on this subject later.) After a short pull-back, a 56-point rally on August 24 produced a newall-time high at 2734.64, exceeding the peak of August, 1987. For those of us who have forgotten that trading activity in excess of 200 'million shares is indeed attainable, it may be noted that the rally took place on 225 million shares of volume. The advance continued to 2752 on September I, and after a mild retracement, went on to its first major high on October 9 at 2791.41. We were then once more reminded of the sort of thing today's market structure is capable of producing. Four days later, the Dow had declined some 8, almost all the drop taking place on the now-famous Friday, October 13. A subsequent series of fluctuations between 2600 and 2700 in November nroduced enQ!!grhworrf-1!a -base to suggest a renewed aftack- orl- the summer's high, and the familIar year-end rally- was just that. The entire October-January advance was then retraced, the low for that advance being tested at January's bottom. As had been the case in November, a base in the 2540-2650 area, built up in February, suggested another rally attempt. That rally indeed ensued, attaining a 2755 close on March 19. We have since been confined for three weeks in a narrow range between that level and the ubiquitous figure of 2700. It is. of course, a truism that trading ranges exist ultimately to be broken, and whether this one will be breached on the up- or down-side constitutes the most vexing market question at the present moment. The position of this letter has, since last January, been that investment policy should tilt toward protection against a downside breakout at the cost of not taking full advantage of a possible upside move. This course of action is being suggested by a number of market indicators—most notably breadth—which, as noted above, peaked two days before the current trading range began. At present levels, the averages are well above the midpoint of the eight-month trading area. Our breadth index, by contrast, is close enough to its January bottom that a couple of bad days would take it to new lows. Volume action has been little better, and the downtrend for a long-term average of NYSE-volume figures, noted in this space three weeks ago, has continued. All of this is taking place during a timeframe when, cycle theory suggests, the bull market should be reaching a relatively mature stage. We should probably, continually remind ourselves that the present upswing dates from late 1987, a period which lies, at this writing, two-and-a-half years in the past. lt is, of course, possible, given today's relatively high level of market liquidity, that a further attack on previous peaks might be made. The first clue that this might be in the offing would be provided by a move out of the mini-trading-range which has lasted through March and April. a move to some 2760 on the Dow ………This would set the stage for yeLanother test of the October-Januaryhighs. – Even were such a test to take place. though, there is little to indicate that a move significantly above previous bull-market highs is in the cards. The eVIdence of market deterioration mentioned above. plus the presence. for many stocks. of major overhead supply. mitigates against sharply higher new highs. Were large numbers of issues to demonstrate the ability to move through that supply, the probabilities could be altered. We intend to await such a demonstration before recommending changed strategy. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2708.78 S & P 500 (12 00) 339.79 Cumulative Index (4/5/90) 4852.23 AWTebh No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buyor sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn and InformatIOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any securities menboned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSItion may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed 10 thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell tnc , which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS;' INC (609) 987-2300 April 12, 1990 – ,—–We. expendedsome, computertime,-thisweek .studyi1g7-1/2yearsof,price .ac.!ion..for.,..the50Q,,,,,,,…… current S & P component stocks. We calculated the individual percentage changes for each of these components for each of the 90 months since October, 1982. What we had expected to find was a sharply increasing standard deviation of individual stock returns about their mean a Standard deviation is a technical statistical term for what is essentially a Simple concept—the extent to whiCh individual components of a group vary around their average vaIuea We had noted the number of companies (banks are a recent example) which were turning in performances quite different from that of the S & P 500. We, therefore, expected to find the variation between individual returns to have increased sharply. ——– — —– —— — ——— —-Dati! St.P500 SIP Unw Roho 1 Chs Sf.. Dev Adv DC'c Brdt.h ——- — OCT 1982 133.71 137.0! 102.5 NOV 1982 138.54 144.64 11)4.4 DEC 1982 140.M 145.55 103.5 ' 13.79 10.56 20 10395 5.56 '1.41 319 113 10601 0.62 9.79 2U 193 10655 JAN 1983 lS.JO 149.95 103.2 3.03 '1. JJ 216 161 10770 fEB 1983 14B,06 155.55 105.1 3.73 8.B9 J06 124 1095.2 liAR 1983 152.96 161.4 105.5 J.79 8.JO 295 111 11106 APR 198J 164.42 172.15 104.7 KAY 1983 162.39 17.71 107.6 JUN 1983168.11 161).71 11)7.5 '6.64 8.28 82 11J90 1.48 8.23 26 204 11432 3.43 8.90 28 157 11559 JUL 1993 162.56 114.64 107.4 -3.36 7.65 118 300 11407 AUG 1983 164.0 tn.67 105.0 -1.13 8.03 193 257 11343 SEP 1981 166.07 176.1! 106.1 2.00 7.'16 302 154 11491 OCT 1963 163.55 171.03 10 .6 -2.89 8.62 164 287 11 68 NOV 1983 166.-40 178.06 107.0 4.11 7.19 3\8 131 11555 DEC 1983 16.93 175.6 106.5 -1. 36 6.67 190 26 1181 JAN t98 163.41 170.72 10-1.5 -2.80 8.12 152 307 11326 rEB 1984 157.06 160.32 102.1 -6.0910.13 85 381 11030 AR 198 159.\8 162.89 102.3 1.60 7.20 261 200 11091 APR 1984 160.05 161.74 101.1 -0.71 7. 6 228 233 1 HI86 I1AY 198 150.55 \51.22 JUH 1'i'8-i (53.18 155.!7 JUl 1984 150.66 151.6l AUG 1984 166.69 169.09 100. 1(O0L0..6 101.4 -6.50 7.69 15 390 10771 .,.Z.68 7.82 30B 155 10924 -2.3S 8.28 198 261 10861 11.52 7.79 17 11300 SEP 198 166.10 167.80 lOt. 0 -0.76 6.79 2JO 2S 11295 '—-l-,.-.,NOCoTv 1984 1984 166.09 163.58 168.84 167.15 C…..198-Ll67 24…1.l 77 JAN 1985 179.63 188.17 101. 7 102.2 1IO0-' .8 0.62 -1.00 – 9.5 7.02 27' ISS 117!.86 6.39 201 262 11325 7.a6–m-24'!l1u1! rEB 1985 181.18 189.63 104.7 0.77 6.48 '62 206 11982 KAR 1985 180.66 18'.54 103.8 -1.10 8. J3 199 274 11906 APR 1985 179.83 185.63 103.2 -1.02 6.56 201 !67 llR40 IIAY 1985 189.55 196.97 103.9 6.11 7.1t .00 72 12168 JUN 1985 191.85 199.90 104.2 JUL 1985 190.92 199.87 104.7 1.49 -0.02 6.13 7 ..\5 2eR 180 12.176 UZ 45 12253 AUG 1985 188.63 196.54 104. '2 -1. 67 7.32 189 2S1 12161 SEP 1985 lS!.08 186.53 102. -5.09 7.03 IIJ Oll He!7 OCT 1985 189.82 193.96 102.! 3.99 7.65 M7 120 1205 NOV 1985 202.17 21)8.39 103.1 DEC 1985211.28217.22 102.8 '.44 .24 6.H 6.28 W 1 12447 370 103 171 JAN 1986 211.78 220.98 10. 3 FEB 1986 226.92 238.52 105.1 1.3 7.93 7.S'l 7.95 m2!3'i' V!5 63 12818 13173 HAR 1986 238.90' 251 .fC 105.2 5.40 7.Hh J6 115 IJ..25 APR 1986 235.52 247.45 105.1 -1.57 8 .O 191 290 13326 IIAY 1986 247.35 260.66 105.4 5.34 7.25 37J 106 13593 JUN 1986 250,8 260.B9 104.0 0.09 8.59 232 !8 13577 —— — —- —-Dat.e SIPSOO SP Unw Rat.to —– – – ChJ St..Dey .—– -A-dv -D-D- Brdt.b – -\6aJUl 1986 236.12 239.80 101.6 -8.08 12.22 AUG 1986 252.93 256.35 101.4 6.90 7.88 M B SEP 1986 231.32 235.15 101.7 -8.27 7.79 8 428 13199 OCT 1986 243.98 249.86 102, .. 6.25 S,H 400 84 13515 NOV 1986 29,22 253.46 101. 7 1.44 . 6. J7 307 165 13657 DEC 1986 2-42.17 2-4J.37 100.5 -J.98 7.11 101 J78 IJJ80 JAM 1987 27-4.08 276.52 100.9 13.62 8.58 . 19 13831 FEB 1987 28,20 291.55 102.6 5.44 7.BO J58 12 141)65 liAR 1987 291.70 291.82 101.1 1.12 7.77 261 221 14105 APR 1987 288.36 289.2J JOO.3 -j. 9C 8.3 163 J2C 1J948 /lAY 1987 290.10 2';'0016 100.0 C.l3 7.J! 227 255 139!0 JUN 1987 304.00 31)2.51 9';'.5 JUL 1987 J18.66 JI7.76 ';'9.7 '4.26 6.81 97 14211 5.04 10.N6 36J 108 14466 AUG 1987 329.80 326.56 99.0 2.77 6.96 3!0 ISS 1631 SEP 1987 321.83 318.45 98.9 -2. 8 11.b6 161 32 14468 OCT 1987 251.79 235.84 93.7 -25.9.01 14.22 489 13983 NOV 19117 230.30 219.20 95.2 -7.06 9 .8 RS 400 1366B DEC 1987 2U.08 238.46 96.5 8.79 9.9 OS 8 139B9 JAM 1988 257.07 28.35 96.6 .15 10.08 338 151 IH76 rEB 1988 267.82 263.30 98.3 6.02 8.42 38S 101 IH60 HAR 1988 258.89 257.87 99.6 -2.06 8.12 16 31l 1431l APR 1988 261.33 259.37 99.3 0.58 6.53 24 233 14324 I1AY 1988 262.16 258.4-1 98.6 -0.36 6.00 218 257 1285 JUN 1988 273.50 273.41 100.0 5.79 7.82 J99 84 1600 JUL 1988 272.02 268.63 98.8 -1.75 a. JI 188 290 14498 AUG 1988 261.52 258.36 98.8 -3.82 6.50 112 375 IL35 sEP 1988 211 .ll…2.A7-'6S.-'i8'-4–s…s9..-b…..1J..-.36LlL…..B!l8a OCT 1988-278.'17 268.52 96.3– o.n- 8.2 276-190-14568– NOV 193B 273.70 260.2 95.1 .J .08 6. ,8 106 375 t299 DEC 1988 277.72 26.83 95.4 JAN 1989 297.47 280.i7 9. J 1.76 13.47 5.94 8.'16 '.11 165 56 141,45 14817 FEB 1989 288.86 275.31 95.3 -1.88 5.16 138 J117 14608 AR 1989 29-1.87 279.65 9. 8 1.58 6.92 292 191 14709 APR 1989 309.64 292.36 MY 1989 320.52 304.34 JUN 1989 317.98 OO.30 JUL 1989 346.08 323./3 94.4 95.0 94.4 93.S .'… 54 4.tO -1.3 7.80 5.66 6.l8 6.68 , .00 77 15040 'b9 92 15317 185 283 15219 39 15629 AUG 1989 351.,,5 330.82 94.t 2.19 7.01 299 185 15H3 5EP 1989 319.15 322.92 92.5 -2.39 9.11 166 320 15589 OCT 1989 30.36 305.76 89.8 -5.31 9. 7 131 355 15365 NOIJ 1989 345.99 307.34 88.8 0.52 '.24 2M4 193 15456 DEC 1989 353.40 309.94 87.7 0.85 7.34 282 206 ISJ2 JAN 19'10 J29.08 285.72 06.8 -7.82 9.0 JI 441 ISI2 rEB 1990 331.89 287.22 86.5 0.53 8.2 265 214 1193 MAR 1990 339.94 295.20 86.8 2.78 7. ')6 JJ' 153 15373 The results are shown in the table above. As the standard deviation column shows, there has been some increase, starting around last September, in the variance of the individual components a It has, however, been relatively small. What is perhaps most interesting in the table, though, is the result of a number of other calculations we were able to make, given the data at hand It was possible, for example, to construct an un weighted average of the 500 S & p components and to compare that to the S & P itself, an exercise performed in the first three columns of the table. The ratio of this average to the S & p clearly shows the relative underperformance of the unweighted index, something which has been gOlng on, roughly. since the summer of 1983. The oft-lemarked narlowness of leadership in the current market is indeed a long-term phenomenon and applies not only to the S & P 500 vs. the market, but to the S & pIS largest components vis-a-vis its smaller ones. We also were able, in our study. to calculate the number of advancing and declining stocks for each month and. from these, to calculate a breadth index for the S & P 500 components . A couple of interesting factors emerged from this-study, one being that January 1990 was a weaker month than many realized and. with 51 stocks advancing. was, in fact, the worst month in breadth terms except for October 1987 Unsurprising, but worthy of note, is the fact that this breadth index topped out back in August at the same time that conventional breadth indices did so. As we stated above, the phenomenon of narrow leadership has been widely recognized. but we do not think the fact that it is well-known changes its implications a We intend to remain cautious about the market's prospects until such time as some sort of improved breadth is able to 8ssert itself. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials 2751- 80 S & P 500 344.18 Cumulative Index (4/11/90) 4843.50 No statement or expressIon of opInion or any other matter hereIn contaIned IS. or IS to be deemed to be. directly or indirectly. an ofter or Ihe solicrlatlon of an offerto buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the COfwemence 01 the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mformatlon \0 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herem Any aCllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Informallon Delafield. Harvey. Tabellinc. as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have. or may later take. poSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue. and such pOl1lon may be dlflerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In th1S or any other Issue DelafIeld. Harvey. Taben Inc. which IS registered wrlh the SEC as an Investmentadv1sOf. may give advice to 115 Inveslment adVISOry and olher customers Independently of any statements made In th1s or In any other Issue Further information on any security mentIOned herein IS avaIlable On request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 — April 20, 1990 Almfol'J,as a throwJl'!!'Y,lal't wee!, weenti,nd thatwe had.Elculd.n .Q!lw-igh!1 ,,e1!!ge of the IVe hundred S &.P components and that this average,-since mid-1983- atleRst, -had-quitii — decisively underperformed the S & P itself. As any market analyst would, we knew intuitively that such would be the case, but, on reflection, we began to realize that this simple fact raised some fairly profound questions regarding the nature of today's stock market, questions that will probably require more than just today's letter to explore in detail. To begin with, it may be worthwhile to recall the method of computation used to produce the Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Price Index, That index is often referred to as being capital-weighted and broad-based. The former adjective is factual; the latter description, as we shall see, is open to some argument.. At any rate, the method. of computation is as follows The price of each of the 500 stocks is mUltiplied by the number of shares outstanding, resulting in, for each issue, a total market value. These 500 market values are then added together to produce a market value total, which was, as of a week ago, a fairly impressive figure in the neighborhood of 2.3 trillion. This figure is then divided by a base in order to produce the average itself. This divisor was originally calculated so as to cause the 500 original components, at their 1941-43 average prices, to produce an index of 10. The base, however, is the means used to adjust for changes in capital (Not splits. Multiplication of price by shares eliminates the need to adjust for splits.) and has, therefore, fluctuated widely over the years. The well-known result, of course, is the fact that larger (in market value) companies have heavier weights in the 500, the largest one, IBM, accounting for 2.694 of the index at recent levels. The 10 largest companies account for 18 of the average, the 20 largest for 29, the 50 largest for just under half, and the 100 largest for close to two-thirds of the average's weight. Turning this calculation around, it is possible to state that 10 of the average's fluctuation is accounted for by 5 stocks, 50 by 56 stocks, 80 by 185 stocks, 90 by 274, or – justover ,half,f-tha.issues ,and..99by435 .Sit-yfive.of-the.component8rterefore,0—–'d – little other than to produce a nice round number such as 500. In other words. while the index is certainly capital-weighted, it is possible to question just how broad-based it is. The thirty companies in the narrower Dow Jones wind up accounting for a goodly portion of the weight of the S & P. Why does Standard & Poor's (along with the proprietors of a whole host of similarly calculated indices) go to all this trouble There are a number of theoretical answers including the one that the index reflects the changing character of American industrial leadership. General Motors was, for years, the largest 'component, and now ranks 10th. Numbe nine, interestingly, is Wal-Mart Stores, well down the list not too long ago. General Electric is, currently, making a run at the top spot. Regardless of theory, however, the S & P 500 has, de facto, become the standard against which portfolio management is judged today. Billions of dollars are shifted about—all too readily, many believe—based on managementts performance vs. the 500. This is not totally unfair for those managers deploying monster amounts of money. The 500 undoubtedly represents a fair measure of the investment universe available to them. The larger-market-value companies obviously tend to be easier to purchase. A good many of the smaller S Sa P components possess a total market value less than the average single position for some institutional funds. It should be noted, however, that this is not true for the individual investor, who can afford, theoretically, to be indifferent to which of the 500 companies, or a thousand or so others, he owns. (All but eight of the components have total market values of over 100 mUlion.) The S & P 500 has, therefore, largely become a measure of what is happening to the sorts of stocks that large institutions can buy. The fact that the S & P has performed better than its unweighted cousin may, therefore, be nothing more than a reflection of the growing institutionalization of the market. It is, moreover, no accident that a great many-funds, whose horizons must perforce be limited to the upper tier of the S & P, have chosen simply to index, or to use the current, polite phrase, indulge in passive management, maintaining a portfolio which does nothing more than replicate the action of the 500. Thus, it is arguable that the growth of passive management techniques may have itself caused improved relative performance for this kind of management. This apparent paradox will be worth exploring in future issues. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2703.60 S & P 500 (1200) 337.43 Cumulative Index (04/19/90) 4813.89 AWTebh No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subSCriber Whl!e we beheve the sources of our mformatlon to be rehab!e, we m no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn and mformallOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secuntles mentioned Ifl thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafietd, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an mvestment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security menlloned herem IS available on request

, .. 11' ISUE ILIL ' S lMilalRlIEV ILIEV'U'IER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC /609) 9B7-2300 April 27, 1990 Last week's most 1.6' market event must have been the penetration to a new closing .v au LOr .., ,vn , inruesdaY'stradmg-;-rniS–was ,theJowesCleveFattaiiied' bhlyutthn-;eUmr'n',,min Borne SIX weeks, at whlch time, In early March, the short-term rally to recent highs was underway. Along with the Average's drop, new lows were being posted by both daily and weekly breadth indicators. There was modest recovery in Wednesday's and Thursday's trading, but the basic pattern remains unchanged. It is, perhaps, appropriate at this time to review that pattern and state our own attitude regarding the market, which remains, as has been the case for some months, not particularly sanguine. We are not, it should be noted, apocalyptic bears. We are aware of the widely advertised prospects for financial crisis implicit in an illiquid junk bond market, failed S & L's, and collapsing real estate prices. It must be emphasized that, presently at least, there is no prospect for financial collspse built into today's technical market structure. On the other hand, the market looks—well, tired. It locks, in short, like a market which has risen better than 60 over a two-year period and is now b'eginning to show increasingly narrow leadership. It locks like a market whose most conspicuous recent technical feature is a potential double top. It looks like a market, in other words, where caution is probably the best policy .32 310. 3co 290 7, 1.0 2'8 III The above point-and-figure chart of the Standard and Poor's 500 shows, we think, the reason why we are cautious today. Despite the necessary difficutiy in identifying particular dates, we still think the point-and-figure format is the best outline of today's market pattern. Up until Point 1 on the chart, in August of last year, a major uptrend remained in effect, and there appeared to be little or nothing to worry about. At that point, however, breadth peaked, the market began to move laterally, and we had, at Point 2, the rather weird events of October 9 – 13 where a new high was followed by a collapse to new lows. Neither the decline nor the subsequent recovery was, in our view, predictable. but they contributed, nonetheless, to an emerging overall pattern. The year-end rally just barely attained a new.high at Point,,3,-in the process reaching the upside objective of the base at A-B. There followed the collapse to new lows at 322 in January, shown at Point 4. What we had by that point was a potential top, as shown at C-D, with a downside objective in the mid-280's. A new base, at E-F, then formed, but the upside target, involving a test of the old high, has, to date at least, not yet been attained. Instead, the index collided with the heavy overhead supply at 340-350 and has now pulled back. Indeed, there seems to exist, with the formation at G-H, the possibility of a test of January's low. Now, it is not impossible for new strength to emerge, and indeed a potential base in, roughly, the 320-340 area could provide the platform for a new advance. Were such improvement to take place, we would hope to be able to recognize it early enough to take advantage thereof. Until then, however. we continue to advocate a cautious market stance. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2658.55 S & P 500 (12 00) 331.31 Cumulative Index (4/26/90) 4737.17 No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer orthe sollcltallOn of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our informatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and InformallOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POSitions or trades In respect to any secuntles menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dlflerenl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , 'Nhlch IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISory and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security menlloned herein IS available on request –

, – – – – – — TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NAT/ONAl ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 May 4. 1990 …. —–'-Wehave'alwaysgatdedour 'licenseto -publish..tinclude ….nadmonishment,t9 .,stick to.thee…..,.'''…,.,., ….,…, only subject on which we can claim any expertise—the behavior of financial markets. We do permit, ourselves, however. the occasional foray into social comment, and we take this liberty to discuss the saga of Mr. Michael Milken. The New York Times attempted a summary in the initial sentence of their initial editorial—Michael Milken is a crook. It noted that Mr. Milken had. himself. admitted. in his plea, that he committed a number of acts which were clearly in violation of federal law. He will. therefore. forfeit a large sum of money and. in all probability. spend some time in jail. Period. End of story. This denouement, however, seems strangely unsatisfying. Paradoxically, it must be equally unsatisfying to Milken's most fervent admirers and to his most avid detractors. The former have already begun to view their hero as the protagonist In a kind of Greek tragedy. a great man brought down by hubris. His derogators. on the other hand. must feel the same way observers did in the 1930's when Al Capone was finally indicted for income-tax evasion. It seems obvious even at this stage that Mr. Milken's name will go down in financial histol'Y. as associated with a single phrase—Junk Bonds. It is striking, therefore that there is almost no reference to these instruments in Milken's admission of guilt. If the junk bond market provides the catalyst for the sort of financial crisis that many analysts foresee. then 6.00 million plus a jail term will not come close to repaying society for the damage caused. If this collapse fails to occur. Mr. Milken may be vindicated as the Sir Galahad (or at least the Robin Hood) that his supporters claim him to be. lt is impossible, in our view, to separate the creator from his creation. We are thus forced to consider the junk bond. As an aside, one must note that, the very name – constitutes an example of the refreshing candor often found on Wall Street. The euphemism. ,,high-yield bond. indeed exists. but it is almost never used. The more raffish title is the one alofust unIversally used by market participants. But we digress. What is to be said about junk bonds beyond the fact that there are some 200 billion of them out there They are instruments entirely compatible with much modern financial theory. This theory denigrates the classical separation of capital gain and income. treating both as part of a total return. It argues. additionally. that above average return is achievable only by the assumption of additional risk. The junk bond. furnishing both high yield and high risk. is the perfect embodiment of this theory. Even the Times. in a follow-on editorial. came down firmly on the side of junk paper. It raised the familiar argument that such paper constitutes a means of obtaining financing for the 95 of American companies which do not enjoy high credit ratings. It sees such debt as being the savior of the entrepeneurial spirit. threatened by suffocation brought on by stodgy lending practices. Still, critics are entitled to ask, what are the consequences However noble the original intent might have been. did not junk ultimately come to be used as the fuel for takeovers and thus dissipate the energy of the financial community in paper shuffling at the cost of new investment in growth What of the failed S & Us. some of whose portfolios were loaded with high-yield paper Surely. it is argued. junk bonds are the invention of the devil and his name is Michael Milken. How will financial history treat the junk bond However uncomfortable it may be for those who favor portentious pronouncements, the answer is that we simply do not know. There exists, as noted above, largely in the hands of quasi-fiduciary investors, an enormous pile of such paper. Some has defaulted. More will default. Some will ultimately pay interest and principal on schedule. It will be years, nay decades, before we know What the ultimate return to investors in junk may be. One recalls a gentleman named Edgar Lawrence Smith Who; many years ago, penned a tome entitled. Common Stocks as Long-term Investments. Mr. Smith had the bad luck to write this piece in 1923 after which it was used for six years as an intellectual justification for ever-rising stock prices. The seol'n aimed at Smith's 81'gument after 1932 can easily be imagined. The long night of the stock market lasted 20 years. but. ironically. Smith was ultimately proved correct. Common stocks did turn out to be superior long-term investments. Whether the same will be true of junk bonds. only history will tell us. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (5/3/90) 2695.95 336.05 4737.00 AWTebh No statement or expression of opinion or any other maner herein contained IS, or 1 to be deemed to be, directly or IndIrectly, an offer or the sollCltal!on of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely fOr the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources at our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor clthe statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitIons or trades In respeCI\O any seCUrltles mentioned In thts or any future Issue, and such pOSItion may be different /rom any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Dela/leld, Harvey, Tabellinc , whdt tS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 lis Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other ISSue Further in/ormation on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER ., 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY '08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609 987-2300 , May 11, 1990 –e- – -c–A-n–occasional occupationBLh8zardof-1.he….Jechniciais a sense of frustration.. This the urge at-the Quotronfeeling has been known to–produe to scre;m ,machfne;-Please do—- something—anything! . Such frustration has been building for almost four months now; It was back in the cold days of January that the Dow achieved a newall-time high (2810.15) on the first trading day of the year. Following this, it underwent a 9 1/2 correction, the low being reached at 2543.24 on January's next-to-Iast trading day. It is now May, the dogwoods are in bloom in Princeton, New Jersey, yet those two levels have confined the market ever since. Following the January 30 low, the following earthshaking events have taken place. The Dow rose some 4 to mid-February, but by February 23 had given up three-quarters of the ground gained. A more substantial rise, to 2765.77, not that far removed from the old high, carried to April 17. Then a 4.36 decline broke the 2700 level, reaching 2645.05 on April 27. From that point, the market has been able to mount a modest rally. Of this, more later. Throughout the ,dreariness that has characterized the year so far, we have tried to point out to our readers the fact of continually weakening technical action, weakness partially masked by the relative strength for the Dow in particular and for large-capitalization companies in general. This technical deterioration, as we have noted, antedates 1990, being traceable back to August, 1989 or, at the very least, to October. It was back on August 8 that our daily breadth index scored its bull-market high. That high has not been exceeded since and the divergence—which by this time must be considered permanent—is now 190 days long. Breadth's October peak was just under that of August and its January, 1990 high significantly lower. January's low, which has held in the case of the averages, was penetrated in February by our breadth index. and a new low in that index was again scored in April. Weekly breadth, meanwhile, has more or less paralleled the daily series. Its high to date was reached during the last week of August, and both lower highs and lows have been 1.,..–…..,p-b's'tea()lrm1norwing–since. ' ' , w , On August I, 1989, there occurred 306 daily new highs, the high for the upswing from 1987. The subsequent October peak for new highs was 151, followed by a January high of 111. Yesterday's level was 46. A moderately redeeming feature is the fact that new lows—227' occurred on October 16—have. ever since. been able to hold above their levels of last fall. lt is indeed possible to recite a whole litany of statistics suggesting the narrowness of recent market leadership. t can be noted, for instance, that the Value Line Composite is down 17 from its OctOber high, the same high that was later exceeded by the Dow and one which is only a few points above where the market finds itself tOday. Thus the market climate at the end of April. Has the ensuing rally (3.53 through yesterday) improved the technical picture any The answer can only be a rather weak r'Somewhat. There has occurred, through yesterday. a string of eight days on which advances exceeded declines. True. on only one of these days did advances barely manage to exceed 1000, but let us be thankful for small favors. Indeed it should be noted that a similar string of updays has managed to occur in every stock-market year since breadth figures have been compiled. However, this is the first time the market has been able to do it in 1990 so far. Little comfort. as noted above, can be derived from new-high statistics. but new lows have essentially dried up since May began. The market has thus been able to manage a fairly decent short-term rally, one which has thrust well into the overhead supply at the 2700-2760 area. The prospects for the rally's continuance appear to be mixed. On the plus side, it must be noted that the market's late weakness has been accompanied by highly bullish readings m indicators of market sentiment. Bearish market letter writers abound. and mutual funds find themselves sitting on record amounts of cash. Despite the narrow leadership, specialists have been increasingly reluctant to short stock into strength. A by-product of a rally at this stage, especially if it carries to new highs, might'be weJl accompanied by an increase in bullish sentiment and a decline in institutional cash to levels more characteristic of a market top. Given the ongoing long-term technical weakness. it is difficult at this paint to envision an advance of major proportions. Dow Jones Industrials 02 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (5/10/90) AWTebh 2763.29 345.59 4801.74 ANTHONY W TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Nostatementor expressIon 01 op!nton or any other matter hereIn contaIned IS, or IS to bedeemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, an offeror the soliCItation of an offer to buy or sell any secuflly referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenienCe of the subscnbet While we beheve the sources of our mformallon to be reliable, we In no way represenl or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any acllOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own mvestlgallOn Bnd mformatlon Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a corporation and liS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any secunbes menlloned In thiS or any future Issue, and such positIon may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell tnc , whIch IS regIstered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further InformatIOn on any security mentioned hereIn IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD. CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 May 18. 1990 Please do something—anything!. Anthony W. Tabell. May 11. 1990. 12 noon. …..1- – -l'his,statement-wriHefl…last-'week-has-. .nq' fro; 'H' .1. market for most of the year …. As we know, the Dow Jones Industrial Average 'reached a new all-time high of 2810.15 on the first trading day of this year and was followed by a correction of 9.50 in the short period of 20 trading days. reaching a low of 2543.24 on January 30. Since that low. the DJIA had, been contained within this trading range. Contained, that is, until last Friday afternoon when, in fact, the market began to do somethinglt The enthusiasm of bond prices surging and interest rates falling for most of the past two weeks. suggesting the economy and/or inflation is not as strong as it might be. spilled over into the stock market. and it took flight. The DJIA closed up 63.07 points on increased volume of 234 million shares. This was followed on Monday by an advance of 19.95 points to a new. all-time high in the Dow of 2821.53. breaking out on the upside of the consolidation area that has contained the market since the first part of the year. Utilizing point-and-figure analysis. it is possible to project an upside objective on the DJIA of 3100. or approximately 10. Both the New York Stock Exchange Industrials and the Standard & Poor's Industrials reflect similar percentage moves. Having waited for approximately four months for this event to occur, however, we should not assume that. by breaking out on the upside from this trading area. all of our problems are solved. What. in fact. has changed' Short-term volume and breadth have shown improvement. but it is still too early to justify a major transformation in these series. Another problem that continues to be with us is the narrowness of the recent leadership. While the DJIA has gone on to a new. all-time high. the Value Line Composite is down 13.2 from its October 9 high of 278.98 and 6.38 since the first of the year. reflecting poor relative strength. 1 Year SaP 500 Return – 1 Year Value lIne Return An interesting way to show this disparity is to compare the Standard & Poor's 500. a capital-weighted Bverage.of.500.stocks. to the Value.Line Composite. an unweighted !'verage of 1700 stocks. The chart above shows the12-mOlith return of the S & P 500 minus the 12-month return of the Value Line Composite. In simplest terms, when the difference in returns is above the zero line. the S & P 500 is acting relatively better than the Value Line Composite. What is interesting to observe is that since 1984 there has been a significant shift in return of stocks. There are a number of possible reasons for the concentration of positive returns in the S 8& P 500—institutionalization of the market. index funds. and, more recently, program trading. Regardless of the reasons, there still exists a concentration in large-capitalization, high- quality stocks (S & P 500) versus the broader sector of the stock market (Value Line). Has there been a major fundamental change in the stock market and will this continue. or will the broader sector of the stock market begin to again participate The answer will help us determine the importance of recent improved market action. ROBERT J. SIMPKINS. JR. DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2816.44 S & P 500 (1200) 352.84 Cumulative Index (5/17/90) 4877.75 No statementor expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, dlrectty or rndrrectly, an olferorthe soltcrtabon 01 an offer to buy or selt any secllnty referred to or menlloned The matter rs presented merely for the convenience of the subscnOOr Whrle we beheve the SOUfces of our rnformabon to be reltable, we In no way represent Of guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber shOUld be based On hrs own tfwestrgatlon and information Delafreld, Harvey, TaOOIt Inc, as a corporatron and liS offrcers Or employees, may now have, or may tater take, pOSllrons or trades rn respect to any secuntles mentroned In thrs or any future rssue, and such posrtlon may be different from any VIews now or hereafter expressed In thrs or any other Issue Delafreld, Hatvey, Tabelllflc , whrch rs regrstered wtfh the SEC as an Inveslmefll adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securrty menboned herein IS available on request