Viewing Year: 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 10, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 10, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - August 10, 1990
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TABELL9 S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 trc'!'O- …, We.. p,resell August 10, 1990 thsl'ace, tw9ees ago.,apoll)t-and-figure-charJ of th!, Dow along,. with-the- 7 – following comment thereon. What is 'signIficant is the potential top formation which, if a breakout were to take place immediately, would suggest a drop to 2680 one of ' intermediate-scale proportions. Pessimists, of course, will note thst the pattern could broaden and, eventually, wind up indicating a much lower objective, Nothing like this, however, appears in the cards at the moment. The top had broadened a little before, last week, it became actual rather than potential, but it did not broaden all that much. There now exists a worst-case downside objective of 2620, but at that level, the Dow would be deep in strong support, and we would expect that support to hold for the moment at least. We are much happier, in the present instance, being a technician talking about top formations as opposed to an analyst expected to comment on the meaning of the Middle East crisis. Before that crisis occurred, it seemed that most financial comment was centering on supposed massive amounts of institutional cash available and the unlikelihood of immediate severe recession. Suddenly, we are talking about the Inevitability of renewed inflation, coupled with rising interest rates and enhanced recessionary prospects. It is a reasonable suggestion that higher oil prices are bullish for oil stocks, and those Issues, contra market, moved ahead—almost as fast as gasoline prices at the pump. It is harder to explaln the sharp declines in institutional favorites, i.e. Philip Morris falling from 51 1/2 to 42 3/4 over a two-week period or Wal-Mart Stores from 36 3/4 to 28. We were not aware that the Arabs were heavy consumers of Miller beer or regular shoppers in rural American stores. The fact is, of course, that nobody knows just exactly what the meaning of possible military Involvement in the Middle East might be. The reasoning over the past fortnight seemed to be that, In the face of uncertainty, stocks should be sold, and It was most convenient to sell those holdings that had one up-1he most. , ———,——————I- – The sudden and-unexpected' emergence of military action has a precedent. Between June 12 and July 17, 1950, the Dow, in response to the outbreak of the Korean war, dropped 13.55 over 22 trading days. By October it had recovered all of the ground lost and was to move ahead for another two and a half years. However, to return to the technical picture, let us, first of all, assess the damage so far. To date, at least, the Dow, as of Tuesday, was down 9.64, marginally the largest decline since December, 1987. It was certainly not a great deal more severe than the 9.5 drop in January of this year or the four-day drop of just over 8 last October. Such sharp declines are typical of the late stages of bull markets, a description Which, we have repeatedly suggested, can be applied to the present. Nor would we wish to bet against the possibility that, following yesterday's recovery, there might occur another leg down to the more pessimistic downside target of 2620 mentioned above. Such action would produce a 13 correction, surpassing the 10 benchmark for an intermediate-term decline. Such declines are likewise typical of mature bull markets, June 1965 being an example which readily comes to mind. The existing top, in other words, has not, to date, had a chance to broaden further and indicate lower levels than the mid 2600's, and the massive support from late 1989 and early 1990 trading remains, between current prices and the 2520 level on the Dow and the 320 level for the S P 500. Were this support to be broken, the outlook would admittedly be unpleasant, possibly involving erasure of the entire 1982-1990 advance. While this possibility must be recognized, it is not implied by the pattern as it currently stands. Allowing for the possibility of another very short-term downleg, as noted above, we would suggest that another upside attempt is then likely. Such an upswing should bring us to the vicinity, at least, of the mid-July highs, and the character of such a rally would give us a better reading than we now possess as to intermediate-term market prospects. It is, of course, possible that the 2999.75 peak reached on July 16 and 17 will turn out to be the bull-market high. The Dow's failure to penetrate 3000 may become as notorious as its 6 1/2 year failure to better 1000 after closing at 995.15 onjFebruary 9, 1966. However, even assuming this to be the case, it is worth recalling that bull markets tend to remain in the vicinity of their highs for quite some time before the worst part of a bear market occurs. 1987 was, of course, an exception, but we do not, at this point, see a pattern similar to that one. The current downswing can, of course, be seen as yet another link in the chain of evidence indicating market deterioration, and we would not disagree agree with this view. it is less certain, however, that the bull market had, with last month's rally, breathed its last. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2732.18 S P 500 (1200) 338.30 Cumulative Index (8/09/90) AWTebh . 4965.11 No statement or expressIon of Oplnton Of any other matter herern contained 1, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or IndIrectly, an offer or the sohcrtatJon of an offer to buyer sell any securrty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor 01 the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell tnc, as a corporahon and lis officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posItions or trades tn respect to any secunbes mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such post!lOn may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed to thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey. Tabell tnc. which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, maygrve adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or m any other Issue Further mlormatlon on any sec\;.mty mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 17, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 17, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - August 17, 1990
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TABELL'S ,MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD; CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – August 17, 1990 ner.spendingtwo.!,,,eks.hQ!!IiIlg. aroJlndt!! 6!!.i!le,,I,,!he D9WbJoke.shaply–.-below that area on–,, Thursday afternoon and extended its decline on Friday- morning in response to the apparent escalation of the Middle East crisis. The current drop, which is worldwide, is clearly event-driven, reflecting the dependence of the world economy on Arab oil. Similar events, which took the market, and the general public, entirely by surprise, would include the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the Eisenhower heart attack, and the Kennedy assassination. Strangely, declines of this nature are often not too surprising to the technician. In a great many cases, the market, in an event-driven decline, tends to do precisely what had been suggested prior to the eVent, the outside occurrence merely providing a trigger. In the present case, the top foreshadowing the current decline was complete prior to the Kuwait invasion. That event brought about the downside breakout from that July-August formation. We noted last week that the downside target established by that top was 2620, and that level was being approached as we went to press. The market has now returned to massive support, support centering on the 2600-2700 area for the Dow. It would break below that support were it to move below the 2520 level, thus indicating a considerably lower objective. It is the present task of the technician to assess the likelihood of such a break. Before venturing on to the hazardous ground of market forecasting, it is best to start off with incontrovertible fact. The most important such fact is that the Dow closed on Monday, July 16, and again on July 17, precisely at 2999.75, a number under the 3000 level by an amount equivalent to 1/8 of a point on one of the 30 components. At that point, it was up by 72 from its level two years and nine months previous in October, 1987. Subsequent to the test of that low, in December, 1987, there occurred no intervening correction of as much as 10. What took place, simply and unequivocally, is a bull market. We state this obvious fact because it leads us to frame the proper question. Either the bull market-iinlfestlonenae-d on -JtllY-17-;-I99ll-.-or- it -did not. 'Tile -Clit-rent decline-, 'now iii tlie- vic-imty of 12, was either the beginning of a much more serious downswing, or it will turn out to have been simply an interruption in an ongoing cycle upswing. There exist persuasive arguments favoring the former alternative. The most telling of these centers around the abysmal breadth shown by the market for what is, by now, more than a year, The high for our own breadth index was scored on August 8, 1989. At that point the Dow was at 2700, slightly above its level at this moment. Breadth, of course, is markedly below its peak. During the past year, In other words, the majority of stocks in the universe available to individual investors has been moving down, masked by strength in the widely-followed market averages, This is the sort of action which, historically, has been the precursor of bear markets. The problem is, though, that the lead time of breadth on market peaks has, In the past, varied widely, having often extended to well over a year. The start of the breadth divergence which will come to be associated with the end of the 1987-199 bull market almost certainly took place a year ago. Whether that peak was foreshadowing a high in mid-July 1990, or one to occur at a later date, Is another question. Paradoxically, the fact that the Dow has now fallen by more than 10, a drop which, by standard measurements, must be considered intermediate-term, is not an argument in favor of a bear market's having begun, There have been nine identifiable bull markets since World War II, and every single one of these experienced, somewhere during its upward course, an intermediate-term correction of greater than 10. Indeed two of the bull markets, 1953-7 and 1978-81. produced no fewer than three 10-or-greater corrections before finally topping out. In many cases, corrections of this nature occurred late in the bull markets' life cycle, I.e. January-October 1960 and May-June 1965. In other cases they have occurred fairly early (November 1983-July 1984). Since there has been no previous correction in the current advance exceeding 10, it is arguable, in other words, that we are simply- experienCing the normal intermediate-term correction preceding the peak of a'bull – — market, Likewise, as we noted last week, even the hypothesis of a high having been reached in mid-July is not necessarily all that bearish. In most cases, the market, once having attained what turns out to be its peak, returns to an area relatively close to that peak before a serious break takes place. The one exception to this rule, which may give us some pause, is 1987, but that bear market does constitute a unique occurrence in the fact of an otherwise consistent historical record. Our long-term view of the cycle framework remains unchanged, and we continue to feel that the bulk of the advance from 1987 levels is behind us. It remains to be seen, though, whether the Iraqi, military incursion is necessarily Signaling the bull market's end. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2640.59 S P 500 (1200) 328.22 Cumulative Index (8/16/90) 4891.57 AWTebh No statement or expression 01 opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convemence of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our informatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securl\les menboned In thIS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , which IS registered with the SECas an Investment advIsor, may give adVice to Its Investment adViSOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 24, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 24, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - August 24, 1990
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TABELL-S MARKET LETTER ……- 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMIlEn NAIIONAL ASSOCIAllON or Sl'CUnIlIES DEALEI1S, INC 160919U7-2JOO r– August 24. 1990 As its writer ages. this letter has. we freely admit, tended to assume an increasingly avuncular tone. We cannot. therefore, resist pointing out that we have, in 36 years of obqerving the stock market I managE(f to live th'0ugh P fpir numbr I)f lNecks r!Jh like the 19ftt one. Experience, we regret to inform our younger readers. does not make them any more pleasant. At Thursday's close. following a three-day. 170-point decline. the Dow found itself down 17.21 from an all-time high which had occurred only 27 tradmg days ago. It had. at that level. not yet reached the standard threshold we have used to test for bear markets. a 20 drop. but there exists. at this writing. little eVIdence that it will not shortly do so. No decline of the post-World-War 11 period has reached the 17 level without ultimately coming to be recognized as a major-cycle bear market. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the decline has taken place following a major breadth divergence. a patently false upside breakout which featured even narrower leaderhip and other assorted signs of technical weakness. Thus. the 2999.75 close on July 17 is likely to assume major-cycle significance. Having said this. It must be reiterated that. as pointed out above. we are on familiar ground. The sort of downside momentum which has developed since the onset of the Middle East crisis has not occurred many times in the past and is thus easy to identify. It has generally tended first to manifest itself at a point when the market was fairly close to its low in terms of time. Historically. though. it has first appeared considerably above the ultimate low. What we are saying. in other words. is not that the next few stock-market weeks are likely to be enjoyable. Indeed. just the opposite is the case. What we are suggesting Is that the current downswing. whatever level it may ultimately reach. will. before too long. have run its course. We are not attempting to be flippant in noting that it is possible to characterize severe market breaks as periods Including a large number of days when the market goes down a lot. It is not hard to quantify thIS notion. There have been. for example. no fewer than eight days over the last trading month in which the Dow ha. declined oy m')re thAn I 112. A. onp looks at the past history of cases where the number of such down days has exceeded five. one finds that they have tended to occur at points very close in time to what have come to be recognized as major market bottoms. Examples are June 4. 1962. with the Dow at 593.68 versus a June 26 low of 535.76. May 19. 1970 at 691.40 versus 631.16 on May 26. or August 23. 1974 at 686.80 versus an effective low of 587.61 on October 3. In all of these cases. the market eventually moved lower by a significant alnount. However, it did so within a relatively short tlmeframe. In the current case. the fifth 1 112 drop occurred on August 16. We are, in other words. reaching what is often known, imprecisely. as oversold territory. It is necessary. though. to amplify this comment by saying that. by many measures. we have reached such territory only lately and by other measures not yet at all. Many oversold gauges are dependent on by the breadth of market drops. and yesterday was the first day on which there occurred the number of declining issues typical of climactic action—1640 being the largest figure attained since October. 1987. It should be noted that the delay in attaining this level may be due to the fact that not until recently had oil stocks joined in the general weakness. We have not yet seen anythIng even approaching climactic volume. It has been our practice to define such volume as cases in which tradIng on a given day reaches twice its 25-day moving average. Yesterday's 250 million shares compared to an average of 180 mtllion. A volume climax would be identifiable only were activity to approach the 400-million-share level. On top of the abysmal short-term outlook. it is necessary to point to the disturbing fact of the Dow's breaking below the 2520 level. a fIgure first attalfled in October 1989 and tested in January 1990. We have been noting the Importance of this trading range. which goes back to summer a year ago. for the past two weeks. suggesting. to he honpgt, that the support it provided was likely to hold. I t has. obviously. not done so I thus raising at least the possibility that a major portion of the advance from the 1987 lows may be retraced. If this is to be the case, however, it would, in our view, most likely occur in 8 two-part bear market such as 1973-1974. This will. at least. give us a chance to assess the possibility on any rally that may occur following short-term reversal evidence. The forecast above is, necessarily. pessimistic but. it must be noted, we have been talking about the current market in terms of past major cycle bottoms and have found that, by some measures, at least, the present is quite comparable. We now know these bottoms to have been singular buying opportunities. difficult as thls was to recognize amid the gloom whlch prevailed at the time. ANTHONY W. TAJ3ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2509.65 S & P 500 (1200) 319.43 Cumulative Index (08123190) 4510.83 AWTebh No talomenl Of ClIPfOSSlon ot opinion Of any olllel maUOf herelll contatned IS or IS 10 he cJeullicillo 1m, (hrecUy Ot looueclly, an oUel 01 the whcllallon at In allt;r to buy or SLit ,my secuflly reflllwd to or menlloned 1 hlj mailer rs pfCsc(lled mercly for Ih(, coovemence of Ihc' sutJsClrl)(!r Whrle we beheve Ihe source of ourmformahon to te reliable, we 111 no way leprnsfinl or guararltee tllC accuracy Ihereul 1101 01 the talemcnts made heleln Any Clellan to bel tacn bv 1110 subscrrlof'f h()uhj Lou IJ(sed orr lils own uwesllgalron amlmformatron Delalluld, Harvey, 1 ,!Jelt Inc a, a COJPOldliGIl and lIt- ullrcCf!. 01 employeet-, nMy now Imvc, 01 mal' IWr 1,)18 pOt-illorlS or Iratlc..III ,epecl tu lny securrtles IIlt'nllorll'l1 U\ II11S 01 flOy !tllulO Issue CUI(I SUI II pOSlllon may IIC (Iltfc.enIIIOnl any views now or he(ealler expresed In this 01 ,lilY olher rsue Dulnhchl 1t.uvey 1 abell Inc whrch I iOilrteled wrth Ihe SEC as ,In tnVLtmellt mivrsOl, iliaI' give dcivlce In rls Investment advrOIy and lliller customers IncJepenrlenlly 01 any tatelllem! mncle rn IhlS 01 rn any othcr t!uc Further rnlornlllron orl any spcwrly mC!llinnLd he. ern r!. aV'IIIbl, on reqllC!1

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Tabell’s Market Letter – August 31, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – August 31, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - August 31, 1990
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…… – … , TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091987-2300 August 31. 1990 — The -messagewe,attemptedto,deliver-inlast week's-Ietter wasthatfor better. or , worse, -the, , stock market found itself in familiar territory. The sort of oversold condition that was at least being approached last Thursday constituted a fairly rare occurrence. The record of market action following such occurrences led us to suggest that. in terms of time although not of level. the market might be approaching a low of some importance. We did not allow for the possibility that the time in question might be measured in minutes. since. as we went to press on Friday. the Dow was under 2500. testing its low of the previous day. Following this test. the market rallied sharply. and. Monday. following less-than-disastrous news from the Middle East. brought sharply higher opening prices. At day's end. an almost eighty-point advance had taken place. By Thursday's close. the DJIA was ahead 6 from its August 23 low and had retraced almost 150 of the 516 points it had declined in July-August. 29 of the ground lost. , If nothing else. the bounceback from the lows provides opportunity to stand back and try to place the rather strange market behavior of summer 1990 within its proper cyclical framework. With the average's having reached an all-time high less than seven weeks ago and having declined from that high by no less than 17. there are only two possible interpretations of the current cycle environment The first is that July 17 saw the high of a 1987-90 buli market and that a bear-market correction. involving the penetration of last week's lows by an unspecified but not insignificant amount wili shortly ensue. The second is that July-August constitutes simply an event-driven interruption to an ongoing advance resulting an a severe intermediate-term downswing. the aftermath of which wili ultimately be new highs for the averages. This latter eventuality appears more and more tenuous. but Its possibility is worth examining. Let us take a look at the July-August drop. It involved a 17.21 fall in the Dow over 27 trading days. dropping off fairly steadily with no interruption of as much as 2. It needs to be noted that. while 17 declines are not uncommon and downswings 18sing27d8Ssoclessare -Irequent; a 17- decline' compressed'into 27 -trading days is oi rare bird. indeed. The final phase of the 1987 drop took the average down 34 in just 11 trading days. 1946 also saw the major portion of a bear market compressed into a short period with a 19.4 fall in 25 days. 1974 produced a 21.4 drop over 26 days. and December 1973 a 20.1 fall in the same 27 days that this one has occupied. Other than those four. there have been no declines of comparable steepness since 1940. One moderately plausible argument consists of the assertion that all this is nothing more than a sample of the way things are going to be from now on. It is possible to contend that. if we can produce a 36 major bear market covering 38 days as was the case in 1987. or an 8 short-term drop within four days as In October. 1989. a 17. 27-day intermediate-term drop is certainly not out of the question. Thus. the optimist would argue. last Thursday may well have seen the downswing's low. We are inclined to think that it is far too early to advance such a suggestion. We noted in last week's letter the fact that. by last Thursday. we had entered the sort of oversold territory characteristic of past major bottoms. This is true. but the technician's life would indeed be a happy one if picking bottoms could be equated to simply measuring oversold conditions. Such conditions. unfortunately. tend to occur repeatedly on the way down during the course of major downswings as well as at the ultimate lows. and assessing the differences is the difficult part of the task. One tool for such assessment is analysis of the rebound following the market's attainment of oversold territory. By one measure. the advance from Thursday's low passes with flying colors. A rise of as much as 6 following a low indeed tends to be more characteristic of bottoms than of bear-market interruptions. Unfortunately. by most other standards. last week fails the test. Monday's 1453 advancing issues. 73 of those traded. fell short of providing reversal evidence. and volume action was. of course. abysmal. If volume is the friend of the bull.-as our colleague. Alan Shaw. has noted. the bull was certainly lonely this week. The 79-point-recovery day saw only 160 million shares traded. and the subsequent three days saw volume tail off to even lower levels. True reversal volume at this stage would be in excess of 250 million shares. and a great deal more certainly would apply if volume should approach the 400 million-share level. It would indeed be encouraging if such reversal evidence could manifest itself. preferably following a successful test of last week's bottoms. Until this takes place. though. caution should be the order of the day. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (8/30/90) AWTebh 2592.57 317.59 4679.55 No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or indirectly, an offer or the solicrtatlon of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Informallon 10 be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posilions or trades In respect to any securities menllOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Taben Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformatlon on any secunty menlloned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 07, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 07, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - September 07, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – ' –.z – – – –.– — – Septembe.r,,7 .'1990 -.. The appearance of the table below. which shows the number of times the market was up and the number of times down for each month since the first computation of the Dow in 1897. is somewhat out of season. It normally shows up in this space some time in late spring in a discussion of the summer-rally phenomenon. that rally occurring with noticeable regularity but. as we often point out. being less ubiquitous than is widely believed. One Month Periods 11897-19901 —————————— End Month ——— A–d-v-a-n-c-e-s -D-e-c-l-in–e-s Average i Chg. ————– January 59 34 1.08 February 45 48 -0.27 March 56 38 0.73 April 51 43 0.88 May 47 47 -0.24 June 49 45 0.66 July 58 36 1. 48 August 62 31 1. 65 September 36 56 -1. 28 October 50 42 -0.12 November 55 37 0.69 December 67 26 1.38 Two Month Periods 11897-19901 —————————— A–d-v-a-n-c-e-s Declines ——– Average ——- — Chg. —- 60 33 2.48 53 40 0.82 45 49 0.38 55 39 1. 67 50 44 0.75 48 46 0.39 58 36 2.14 62 31 3.39 54 38 0.44 40 52 -1. 35 54 38 0.64 64 29 1.96 TOTAL 635 483 0.55 643 475 1.14 The summer rally this year. as everyone is aware. was conspicuous by its absence. July. which. as the table shows. has a fairly strong upward bias. barely managed to eke out an I,,….,,-,..''m(aj'dnvta;hnc;e;in'o.f;-tlhee-scsQltehnaanar1'o.verAtuhg'euspt'.astw9h4ichyeparosss'esssaews' ath'1e11hi-g-dheecslitnea-iv1eirtahgee-Dpoewrcwein1tiacghe mclhlaUnegteh-oef-maonlymr-'-' the second worse August in market history. exceeded only slightly by August. 1974. Stock-market bulls should hope that the tendency to ignore seasonal patterns continues for at least another month. As we have not'ed in this space. the most persistent seasonal tendency for the market is not the summer rally or even the well-documented year-end rally. It is the tendency toward a September decline. A breakdown of the monthly price changes for 1.118 months since 1897 reveals some interesting figures for statistics fanciers. Most are inclined to equate record-setting severe declines with either 1929 or 1987. Actually. the worst monthly decline in market history occurred in September (note the month). 1931. a 30.7 drop. The second and third worst figures were just over 23 in March. 1938 and April. 1932. October. 1987. also down around '23. was the fourth worst. and October. 1929 was next. Just as the early 1930's produced notable down months. they also produced record recoveries. History's best month was April. 1933. when. in celebration of the repeal of prohibition. the Dow advanced 40. July and August. 1932 were the next best upside months. the market moving ahead by 26.6 and 34.8. respectively. This produced an astonishing 70 gain over a two-month period. and it may well have been this upside explosion which first caused analysts to think in terms of a summer rally. Let us. however. return to September. For 92 Septembers since 1897. the Dow has been up 36 times and down 56. The average percentage change for the month has been -1.28. the worst record for any month by a considerable amount. As noted above. September. 1931 was the worst stock-market month of the century. and the best September was a 13.5 rise in 1939. Since 1969 there have been only four cases when the market moved up in September. As we said before. applying the standard tests of statistical significance reveals that a downward September is the market's stroge9t seasonal characteristic. Note that -the table above reveals the market's long-term upward bias. 635 months since 1897 have produced a market rise. and only 483 have shown declines. One would thus expect individual months to show an advancing tendency. and all but February and September do. However. fewer than 40 of all Septembers have been up months. A chi-square test indicates that the probability of such an event occurring by chance is less than one in a thousand. Likewise. the probability of finding 92 random cases with a mean of -1.28. the figure for September. also approaches the one-in-a-thousand category. No seasonal tendency is without exceptions, and September has indeed produced an up market 36 times in 92 years. However. seasonal probabilities. especially when coupled with the market's recent action, do not produce a rosy picture. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials 0200) S & P 500 0200) , Cumulative Index (09/06/90) AWTebh 2622.52 323.47 4682.65 No S1alement or expression of opinion or any other matter herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed \0 be, directly or Indirectly, an cfter ortha sohcrtallon of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to Of mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Informallon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigatIOn and Information Delaltefd, Harvey, Tabell fnc as a corporation and rts officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitIOns or trades In respect to any secutlbes menlloned n thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which S registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice \0 rts mvestment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secutlty mentioned herein IS available on request …

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 14, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 14, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - September 14, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 9872300 September 14. 1990 We are. regularly. accused of being out of the office at critical and exciting market junctures. and this accusation becomes relevant since we wlll. shortly. be embarking on a four-week vacation … '.,.- There is p' unfortunately .v,!!,1,y…litPe w,e.,cansay;by wayof,avaledictory. W,e, knowo.llythat.on July .,,, 17. a market process got underway. that process having carried theDJIA down some 17 to a low. so far. of 2483.42 on August 23. There are a number of reasons why this action should be disturbing. The beginning of the downswing. in mid July. took place 33 months after the major bottom attained in October. 1987. This is an interval totally consistent with the normal lifespan of a cycle bull market. It began after an almost-one-year breadth divergence which has been commented on by us and just about every other published technician. Under these conditions it is certainly possible to have Borne doubts as to whether August 23 will turn out to be the ultimate low of the current cycle. Under these conditions. it is generally best to avoid precipitate action and allow the market to tell its own story. This it has. in the three weeks since August 23. most assuredly not done. Our colleague. Bob Simpkins. wlll be writing this letter in our absence and he. along with the reBt of our staff. will be trying to interpret the market story as it unfoldB. What will they be looking for It may appear trite to say that. with the Dow off 17 from its high. they wlll be looking for a market bottom. It is. however. well to recall this fact. Many technical indicators are useful only at tops. An entirely different set tends to be brought into play when we try to identify market lows. It is these indicators to which we will be paying attention over the next month. The task is complicated by the fact that the nature of bottoms has changed somewhat in recent years. The standard characteristic of market lows up until the 1970's tended to be an identiftable selling climax. October. 1957 is one textbook example. The Dow closed on October 22 of that year at 419.79. off 20 from its July high. For the .ten days ended the previous day. declines had exceeded advances by an amount equal to 31 of issues traded. Volume on the climactic day was almost twice its normal level. and the Dow. over the last ten days of the period. was down almost 7. All these were normal indicators of a climactic oversold condition. Following this I,w. October 23 saw a 4-plus rally-onequally;…heavyvolufile. – -' – – ,.—.- -….. – – — -,- – '- . This pattern. a panic decline followed by an equally sharp recovery. was characteristic of pre-1980 market bottoms. Similarly characteristic was a subsequent test of the lows. a test Which. in 1957. took place on December 17 at 425.65. More recently. readers wlll recall. the 1987 low exhibited this pattern in even more extreme form—a precipitous fall on October 19 through mid-day October 20. a day and a half of an equally sharp rally on October 20 – 21. and a subsequent test of the lows in early December. . As the institutionalization of the stock market became more pronounced in the 1980's. important lows began to assume a slightly different shape. Selling panics were often absent and the fireworks. by contrast. tended to occur on the upside. emerging out of the blue following a market which had been drifting slowly lower. We have long theorized that the reason for this is that the operative fear in modern markets is that of the under-invested institutional money manager who fears lagging the Standard It Poor's 500 in a rising market. In any case. the new sort of pattern is exemplified by 1982. When the Dow reached its low at 776.92 on August 12. it had been declining slowly on desultory volume for some months. The next couple of days saw only a modest rally. indistinguishable from a host of other minor upticks that had preceded it. Finally. August 17 saw an upside explosion with an almost-5 gain. all this taking place on record-setting volume. February 1978 and July 1984 saw not dissimilar lows. The current situation. moreover. is fraught with still further ambiguity. Many of the elements of a 1960's-style climactic bottom were present on August 23. but not all were in evidence. The 10-day advance-decline total reached 30 of issues traded. but much more extreme levels had been reached in 1987. 1966. and 1962. The ten-percent. ten-day change of August 23 qualified as a deep oversold. but volume. only 1.38 times its normal level. was tepid. ' What then are the elements to look for over the coming weeks One will be the occurrence of a more easily identifiable selling climax. This should include another day (or days) of 1400 or more declining issues. with volume running somewhere in the 350-mlliion-plus range. This sort of action. followed by a snapback. would give us some indication that the process which started begun in July was, at least temporarily, over. Failing the occurrence of another climactic-type period. it would be helpful to see a test of the August lows with a demonstrated ability to hoid above the approximate-2500 level. Were this to be foliowed by upside action showing above-average breadth and volume. the technical picture would turn suddenly quite optimistic. To date. nothing of this sort has occurred. The averages. for three weeks. have held in a trading range centered around 2600 and broke out of this trading range on the downside in Friday-morning trading. This may indicate an imminent test of the lows. Obviously. the major elements of the 1990 stock-market story have yet to unfold. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2564.85 S It P 500 (12 00) 316.22 Cumulative Index (9/13/90) 4664.94 AWTebh No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer orthe soliCitation 01 an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or menliOned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscnber While we beheve the sources 01 our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herein Any aClion to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelltnc ,as a corporation and Its officers or employees may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from any views nowar hereaftere)(pressed In thiS or any other Issue Delaheld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 21, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 21, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - September 21, 1990
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.,…… TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON. NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 September 21, 1990 .—–,,———- — -, – It is called a bear market, and bear markets can take time to-co'mplete and- c'ul continue to go- lower, neither of which option is enjoyable. The decline since July 17, which ended with a climax-type oversold sell-off on August 23, posted a low to date of 2483.42 in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and this low is now in the process of being tested. With a triple-witching hour facing us today, the likelihood is that this could be happening sooner rather than later. It has been almost three years since the major market bottom of October-December, 1987. Since then, the market has advanced 72.52 to a high in July, 1990 of 2999.75 before correcting 17.21 in August. What appears to be happening is the correction of a normal bull-market cycle. It should be helpful to examine the current position of the stock market in the context of cycle theory. The chart below shows an updated version of the present position of the current major-market cycle, which we believe began on December 4, 1987 at 223.92 on the Standard Poor's 500, reaching a high of 368.95 (64.77) on July 16, 1990 and correcting to 307.06 (-16.77) on August 23, 1990. The history and shape of the previous cycles are shown by the horizontal lines at the top of the chart. The lines are drawn to the same horizontal timescale as the chart itself, and each cycle is measured from low to low. The high for each cycle is shown by a hash mark along with its date and the total percentage advance. CYCLE PERIOD (Jow-hl;h advance) I peak cycle date —— r …..-t……LL..JIW-'.w w.w..L'IlIa1 N' .. , -101131 c,c1. dy. ,…, It .. —– – -……-;—I-, n 88 n 81 n 10 n II on 12 n 13 The average length of these cycles, measured from low to low, has been approximately 46 months and appears to be shortening. The present cycle from December, 1987 to date is now 33 months old. There have been instances of cycles In the 50-55 month range. Proponents of the four-year cycle have been tested in recent years., Since we are measuring a cycle from low to low, it has been difficult to Identify recent cycles, not in terms of historical percentage advance orrdecline. but in -teriiisr-of approximate four-year identifiable periods of duration. Our -. apologies to these purists, but in order for us to properly measure recent market history, we would argue it necessary to fit the past two completed cycles into the compressed period of five years, four months as shown in the chart above (August 1982-July 1984 and July 1984-December 1987) The present action of the stock market is totally consistent with the normal lifespan of previous cycle-bull markets, both in terms of extent and duration. The immediate question facing us is, Will a test of the August 23 low turn out to be the ultimate low of the current cycle ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2522.28 S & P 500 (1200) 311.35 Cumulative Index (9/20/90) 4509.90 RJSebh Nostatement or expression 01 opinIOn or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, duectly or Indirectly, an offer or the sohCltalion of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred 10 or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our .nformallon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee Ihe accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscrrber should be based on h.s own Investigation and Informat.on Delafceld, Harvey. Tabel1 Inc ,as a corporation and .ts officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, pos.t.ons or trades.n respect to any seCUrities mentIOned In thiS or any future Issue, and such poslt.on may be d.fferent from any vtews now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabel1 Inc ,WhiCh IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may gIVe adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers .ndependently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informat.on on any secLlrrty ment.oned herein IS ava.lable on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – September 28, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – September 28, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - September 28, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, eN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 September 28. 1990 As suggested lastweek the Dow .JonesI!1dustrillL Average penetrated sooner rather than later the August 23 low of 2483.42. posting a closing low on Thu'rsday of 2427.47—a correction to date of 19.08 from the July 17 high earlier this year. Examination of broader-based averages such as the Value Line Index (-24.88) and the NASDAQ Composite Index (-27.64) over the same time period does little to dissuade the investor of the severity of the decline. The market. having quickly answered for us the question posed last week. Will a test of the August 23 low turn out to be the ultimate low of the current cycle. should now be asked by us two obvious questions. First. How far will the decline go. and secondly. How long will the decline continue. The answer to the first part may be shown by measuring the past nine declines since the post-war period that were larger DJ II DAYS X CHANGE THIS SWING than 19. the decline in the market through Thursday. These percentage swings are shown in the table at right. together with the number of trading days in each period. 5 29 46 6 13 49 4 6 56 10 22 57 212 50 161 60 521 05 419. 79 0.00 -23 95 222.43 -19 43 a 857 1807 389 The average decline of these nine previous 12 13 61 734.91 75.07 periods is 29.32. This translates. in 6 26 62 535 76 -27 10 terms of the DJIA. to a correction of 880 2 9 66 995.15 85 75 points. and. if taken from the July 1990 10 7 66 high of 2999.75. would indicate a decline 12 368 5 26 70 744 32 985.21 631 16 -25.21 32.36 -35 94 il1 t\l. DJ!…A to .l!'..e2100 levl……..! a.!..e 1 1 L73 1051. 70, 66. 63 almost two-thirds of' the way toward that 12 -6 74 – 577 '60- 45 08- 1043 134 913 167 518 367 665 – 481—- objective. The 50-point-unit point-andfigure chart of the DJIA is helpful in putting this potential correction into perspective. The top formation. which. obviously. has broken out on the downside. indicates an objective in the 2200-1950 area. coincident with strong support present from the 1987 low. At this time. 9 21 76 2 28 78 4 27 81 8 12 82 8 25 87 1 9 27 90 1014.79 742 12 1024 05 776.92 2722.42 . ; 2427.48 75 69 -26.87 37 99 -24 13 250.41 -; ; -19 08 452 362 798 328 1273 38 693 51 it would appear that this support should limit the downside risk to this area. The second of the above questions is more difficult to answer because of the different types of market bottoms that have occurred in the past. The average number of trading days for the nine declines is 347. Assuming that there are 21 trading days in a month. the average length of the previous corrections would be approximately 16 months. Therefore. it is possible to extend in time the length of the present decline from the July 1990 high into the fall of 1991. However. it is. of course, not that easy. For example, the October 1987 decline lasted less than two months, and the June 1962 decline lasted a little more than six months before the low was reached. In both cases, these corrections were classical selling climaxes from an oversold condition and were over quickly. What we should expect, short term. in the market is a rally from its current. oversold condition. After- such a rally is completed, a test of the market's eventual low. -which we may have experienced this week. should be watched closely. Based on past market declines, for this process to be completed, we could expect a lower market some time into next year. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (9/27/90) AWTebh 2418.56 298.15 4295.62 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dtrectly or tndtreClly, an offer or the soltcltatton of an offer to buy or sell any secunty relerred to or menttoned The matter tS presented merely for the conventence of the subscrtber Whtle we believe the sources 01 our mlormalJon 10 be rellable, we tn no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made hereIn Any actton to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hts own tnvesllga\!on and InformaliOn DelafJeld, Harvey, Tabellinc ,as a corporallon and Its offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posItIons or trades In respect 10 any secunlles mentIoned In thIS or any future Issue, and such posrtlon may be dIfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed In thIS or any olher Issue DelafIeld, Harvey, Taben Inc, whIch IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVice 10 ItS Investmenl adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any securrty menltoned herelf'llS available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 05, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 05, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - October 05, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 ——- ———————'– October 5, 1990 The expected rally earlier this week from a short-term oversold condition has done little to change the longer term outlook of the stock market. After breaking the August 23 low of 2483.42, the DJIA has rallied ninety points (3.68) and, lacking conviction, now appears to be in the process of testing the recent low of 2427.48 posted just one week ago. The stock market continues to search for a level necessary to establish a major market low. However, improvement in many underlining components needed for such a market bottom still seems to be missing, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that evidence for such a search may be found at lower levels. DOW JONES INDUSTRIAl. VERA Two of these important components, daily advanceldecline data and daily NYSE volume, have done little to support the thesis that conditions for a major market low are at hand. Daily breadth continues to deteriorate. As the chart above shows, the stock market high on July 17 at 2999.75 was clearly not confirmed by a corresponding high in market breadth, the center line in the chart. In fact, going back to the October, 1989 high in the DJIA, the daily advanceldecline line also failed to confirm this high in the market. These non-confirmations have been mentioned often, ad nauseam, by this letter over the past few months, and there still appears to be no improvement in sight. Assuming volume Is a function for the demand for stocks, a sustained rise in the market should be supported by a comparable rise In volume. This is shown by utilizing a 100-day moving average of daily volume, the lower, thicker line on the chart, which reflects the current position of this series. For the 100 days ended December 18, 1987, volume averaged over 205 million shares, an ail-time record. Since then, as the chart shows, it has turned down reaching a low level of 142 million shares in January, 1989 and heince then recovered te 11 current level of 160 million shares. With daily volume under 100 million shares in early September, it is hard to see anything approaching the climatic volume levels of 400 million that were experienced in October, 1987 and October, 1989. Because it would be improbable for a major bull market to commence against a declining trend in volume, it becomes important to watch for improving daily volume. RJScg Dow Jones Industrials 02 00) S P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (014190) 2502.23 309.73 4370.76 ROBERT J. SIMPKINS, JR. DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. No statement or expresSIon of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer orthe solICitatIOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty referred to or mentioned The matler IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscriber While we beheve Ihe sources of our informatIOn to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor oltha statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own investigation and In'ormatlon Delafield, Harvey TabeUlnc ,as a corporation and ItS officers Of employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSItions or trades In respect to any securilles mentIOned In this or any future Issue, and suph position may be different from any views now or hereafter e)(preSsed In this or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS regIStered wrth the SEC as an Investment advisor, may gIVe adVice to ItS If\vestment advIsory and other customers Independently of any statements made In this or In any other Issue Further Information on any security mentioned herein 15 available on request

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Tabell’s Market Letter – October 12, 1990

Tabell’s Market Letter – October 12, 1990

Tabell's Market Letter - October 12, 1990
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TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 October 12, 1990 The -Dow J6nes-Imiustriai-Avera-ge,- sinc1!reaching -its-high -on-July -17 – at -2999.75, has, in- the relatively short period of 61 trading days, corrected Itself 21.16 through Thursday of this week. The correction has been done in identifiable stages and is, perhaps. instructive to review. The initial decline of 17.21 to the August 23 low of 2483.42 (27 trading days) was followed by a 6 advance (4 trading days). A second decline, which penetrated the August low, of 7.79 to the September 27 low of 2427.48 (20 trading days) was followed by an advance of 3.97 (7 trading days). This in turn was followed by a third correction, which penetrated the September low, of 6.29 to the October 11 low of 2365.10 (3 trading days to date). What is apparent from this process is the inability of this event-driven stock market to sustain any meaningful rally from short-term oversold conditions that were present at the time each low was reached. In other words, every time the market attempts to reverse the present downtrend, selling pressure reappears, and the downtrend continues. At what level will this decline finally reach a major-cycle bear market low A logical long-term downside objective, with which this letter has been comfortable, continues to be the 2200-1950 area of the DJIA. This figure is derived from the 50-paint-unit chart on the DJIA shown on the —right.– B tional top area of 1989-summer 1990, the above-mentioned objectives can be determined. COincidentally, these objectives are also in the strong support area from the previous base formed between 101 InULl lAiI .'. !I) POtU IIIIll October 1987 and fall 1988. Analysis of the five-point-unit chart on the below of the Standard 10 Poor's 425 confirms the extent of the potential correction in the stock market. The recent downside breakout indicating an objective of 270 would bring the SloP 425 into strong support in the middle of a comparable 300-250 area. The scenario outlined above is, of course, very logical to us. It should not be entirely unexpected for a market that has risen 72.52 over a two-and-a-half year period to correct itself within the framework of the '00 suggested correction to the 2200-1950 area in the DJIA, a un … .. . potential decline of approximately 25-33. But logic does not always apply to the stock market, and what we must still allow for is the possibility of an eventual break of the major support areas in these two market averages, an unnoticed event that has already taken place in the Japanese NIKKEI Average and The Value Line Composite. ROBERT J, SIMPKINS, JR. Dow Jones Industrials 0200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (10/11/90) RJS ebh 2400.99 295.73 4158.02 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. No stalementor expression 01 Opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offerto buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we believe the sources of our mformaliOn to be reliable, we mno way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be laken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own IIwestlgalion and InformaliOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSitions or trades In respecllo any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be dlffersnl from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to liS Investment adVISOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made In thiS Of In any other Issue Further Information on any S8cunty menboned herein IS available on request

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