TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 JI October 19. 1990 We have absolutely no apologies for having spent the last month on vacation in Australia. First of all. watching the stock market decline is neVer a pleasant experience. and we escaped such an experience by being away over the past four weeks. Secondly. absence often involves surprise. unexpected market behavior. This was' not tl'\ieiTItiitr!present case;–howevel;-since the 'aeterioFation -.- that occurred prior to our departure led to the expectation that the market would be lower on our return—as. indeed, it was. Among the events that took place on our holiday was the Dow's exceeding the 20 threshold we have normally used to measure cycle-magnitude bear markets. Thus. July 17. 1990 can now officially be noted as the ending date of the bull-phase which began in October 1987. and the technician's current task will be to identify the low of the bear phase of that cycle. For comparison purposes. we are listing the eleven completed market cycles from World War 11 together with the statistics for the current decline to date. There is nothing in these numbers. it must be admitted. that suggests that the current downswing is oVer. As the table shows. the decline in the downswing to date is just 21. and every bear market since 1961 has been deeper than that figure. Secondly. it STARTDJIAENDDJIA7.CHG DAYS has consumed so far only 61 trading days. a timespan which Ma'J 2'1 1'146 212. 50 act '1 1946 163 12 -23 24 '13 Jun 15 1948 1'13.16 Jun 13 1'14'1 161 60 -16 34 281 must be considered inordinately Jan 5 1953 293.79 Sop 14 1953 255 49 -13 04 176 short. There exists a natural Jut 12 1'157 520 77 act 22 1957 419 7'1 -19 39 71 tendency on the part of investors Dec 13 1'101 734 '11 Jun 26 1962 535 76 -27 10 134 to remember the most recent cycle Fe. '1 1966 '19 1 Oc t 7 1'166 744. 32 -2. 21 167 with the most clarity. and as Dec 3 1'168 985 21 Ma 26 1970 631 16 -35 '14 367 precipitous, the bear market of August – October 1987 may have ; ; .; 2 ; g . 481 362 Apr 27 1'181 1024.05 Aug 121'182 77692 -24 13 328 been. it was pleasantly short. Aug 25 1'187 2722.42 act 19 1'187 1738.74 -36 13 38 completing itself in. just 38-,.;J;U.;tI.;7,.1.;9..;'1..0,…2;'19'17..;5….0;C,.t-I..1—19'10 2365 10 -21 16 61 trading -. – – – . – – days-; .—-.— The table quite clearly shows this type of action is highly unusual. as most downswings have tended to consume more time than the 61 days the present one has occupied. Even the relative shortness of the 1957 decline is misleading since the real top can be said to have occurred over a year before. in April 1956. Absent reversal evidence. therefore. there is little reason to expect the present downswing to be over anywhere in the near term. and there is a fairly strong likelihood that it may continue some time into 1991. Reversal evidence. as Bob Simpkins noted in this space over the past four weeks. has been conspicuous by its absence. There have been to date three distinct declining phases. since the July 17 high of 2999.75. The first ended on August 23 with the Dow at 2483.42. The next important low was on September 27 at 2427.48. and after an early October rally. another new low was posted on October 11 at 2365.10. This has been the lowest figure reached to date. None of these three bottoms can be said to have demonstrated action resembling a selling climax. Only on the first of the three. back in August. was an oversold condition reached and on none of them has there taken place the kind of increased volume which one would associate with a climax decline. At best. there has been some indication. in recent market action. that the decline has lost some of its momentum. It has been pointed out. for example. that the August 23 market low market saw 707 new daily 52-week lows. while the two SUbsequent bottoms reflected new low figures less than this. 407 on September 27 and 375 on October 11. Unfortunately. a glance at the record suggests that this action is less bullish than it might appear. Indeed. in most cases. the peak number of new lows is achieved well before the average's bottom both in terms of time and of percentage drop. A notable example is the 1973-1974 decline where the highest daily new low figure achieved was 858 on May 21, 1973. The final bottom in the market occurred almost a year and a half later in December 1974. Admittedly. there were only 297 lows on that date. but the Dow had declined to 577.60. Inve'stor's also-tend -to remember-th— 1981198Ybottom as characterized by a decreasing downside momentum and fewer and fewer lows. This is indeed true. the peak new low figure having been 590 on September 28. 1981. However. the Dow was at 842.56 and did not bottom until 211 trading days later in August 1982 at 776.92. Thus. eVen if August's new low figure is never exceeded on this downswing, the market is not immune against further decline. As Bob noted last week. the most plausible downside targets are in the 2200-1950 area. which would produce an ultimate decline in the 26 to 35 range. This. as the table above shows. would be a totally conventional bear market. As these levels are approached. it would be normal to expect market comment to become more and more apocalyptic. The most plausible reason for such comment would be the structural weakness of the U.S. financial system. and it must be recalled that there is. in almost all bear markets. a plausible reason for the market to be going down. this plausibility being the most obvious at just about the time the market is reaching its low. However unpleasant they may be though. history suggests that bear markets are a perfectly normal part of cycle-market behaVior and present. at their lows. unique buying opportunities. Such will be the eventual case with the current downswing. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2478.96 ANTHONY W. TABELL S P 500 (1200) CumulatiVe Index Cl 0 /J 8/90) 309.39 4187 42 DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offeror the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any secUrity referred 10 or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subscnber While we believe the sources of our Informallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor olthe statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own investigation and Informallon Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, poSitions or trades In respect to any securttles mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such posilion may be different from any views now or hereaiter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further mformalton on any secunty mentioned herein IS available on request

———- TABELL'S MARKET LETTER I ——————————- 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 October 26, 1990 The sharp rally of last Thursday and Friday, which moved the Dow Industrials up some 200 points on an.intra-day basis, failedto follow. through.in thiswp;ek's .trading ,which. could .. aLbest , be '. . described as mixed. There was, in the week's action, little to suggest that the bear market, for which the low so far is 2365.10 on October 11, does not remain intact. One lonely bright spot, however, shines out on the current dreary market scene. This is the action of utility stocks, which have been dramatically outperforming the rest of the market since late last summer. The DJIA, as we noted last week, has posted 8 series of three consecutive lower lows. in late August, late September, and mid-October. There exist three corresponding lows for the Dow Utilities, but these lows show an obvious uptrend—187.94 on August 24, 195.55 on September 28, and 201.02 on October 11. On October 22, the Utility Average closed at 210.89, a level 10.44 above its August low. —-'-' ,0 2I ,,I 2 b I, I ,7, I . DOW J1JJJJIURU …..,…' IJ , ,I .J I ,., .. II II II II II II , II DOW JONES I, I ! It4DU. RI 6,L VERAbE ,-..,.-,—-1 It — 1,I '— I;1,- -.. – – I I'I,.1.. ! ., 4// I ' NV ( II 11 I II I r l' I I II II II liy II ; I !, I II II II II II I I ,I ,, , I ,I I, I, It has been suggested by many commentators that this action is builish, and it cannot be denied that it has some positive implications. These derive from the fact that, in bear markets, the Utility Average often bottoms well before the Industrials, and current utility action is, therefore, consistent with October 11 having been a bear-market low. The solid lines on the chart above show all Dow Jones Utility low points since 1949, using a 10 filter to define highs and lows, and it can readily be seen that these lows have often occurred well in advance of DJIA bottoms. There exists, however, a practical difficulty in using the Utility Average as a forecaster for the rest of the market. This Ues in the difficulty of recognizing when a low has actually occurred. We know, for exsmple, that the most recent low for the DJUA occurred in August, but it is entirely conceivable thatthis J!lW may later. 11,, exceeded. along with, presumably, low.erlevels. for the Industrials. One solution to this problem is to recognize a Utility low as having occurred only after the average has advanced by 10. This, of course, is what has occurred in the present case, and past such occurrences are noted by the dotted lines on the chart. Again, there are a significant number of cases when this action occurred in the early stages of bull markets. There have, however, been some false indications. n January, 1970, for example. the utilities had fallen 25 from their 1968 high. They then posted a rally which exceeded 10 on March 2, 1970, at which time the Dow was at 780.23. It, of course, later reached a low almost 20 lower at 631.16 the following May. A similar utility rally took place in early 1974, and the market declined throughout that year, ultimately reaching much lower levels. Good utility action at the moment. then, is basically positive, but we would await more definite evidence of market strength before relying on it in the present instance. ANTHONY W. TAIlELL Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2468.07 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. S & P 500 (1200) 307.07 Cumulative Index (10/25/90) 4250.84 AWTebh No statement or expression of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the soliCitation of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posliions or trades In respect to any securities menl10ned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 rts Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further information on any security menlloned herein IS available on request

– –….. TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 November 2, 1990 The chart below has appeared in this space many times in the past. Despite the fact that it is somewhat busy in appearance, we feel that it is a useful tool for analyzing a given market cycle in terms of Ilast history' CYCLE PERIOD (Iow-hlgh odyonce) I peak cycle date ,- J U UWUi1.'1 , H-! 1 -, J S d.cll …. 01 , 10… b.a. fllQtli;.t, ftall th. CUrt … t cych 1'Jh Toiol cycle odvonce (tU Oct 11 1990 295 6 …, 910 4t!. t1BOct '1' …. ,92 0 91 bon '3 The usefulness of the chart derives from its employment of a uniform horizontal and vertical scale for measuring a number of past cycles. The most recent cycle, measured by the Standard & Poor's 500, is shown by the zig-zag line at the lower left. Its upward phase occupied 659 trading days from December 1987 to July 1990, during which period it advanced 64. The low, so far, for the downward phase occurred on October 11, 1990, after a 20 , 62-trading-day decline. The horizontal bars at the top of the chart show the length of the ten previous cycles, measured from low to low, with a vertical tic-mark denoting the occurrence in time of each cycle's high. The percentage advance and the date of the high are also shown. It can be seen that the 64 advance of the current market is on the low side, with only 1966-1968 and 1978-1980 having moved ahead less. The upward phase's two-and-a-half year length is about in line with five of the last six cycles, although considerably shorter than the four previous ones. The tic-marks at the lower right of the chart are scaled to show the percentage decline of previous markets, all measured from this cycle's 368.95 high. We have already declined further than did 1953, 1984, and 1978, and we are down about the same amount as in 1957 and 1966. However, the fall so far has been considerably milder than 1962, 1970, 1974, 1982 or 1987. Bear markets are often short affairs and, as the dates at the bottom of the chart show, the three-month length of the pesent decline is not very unlik,, that of r. nun,ber of past bear markets. It has, however, occupied considerably less time than did 1970, 1974, 1978, or 1982. What is interesting is the gap in the length of downswings between the nine months of 1983-1984, and the year-and-a-half of 1976-1978. This would seem to suggest that there are only two plausible lengths for the current bear market. The first would suggest that it hss either bottomed already or will do so before the end of the first quarter of 1991. Failing this, it could last until early 1992. It is worth noting that the four long bear markets were a part of the flat secular trend which characterized the market from 1966 to 1982. The shorter downswings were part of the prior 1942-1966 phase, during which the market rose some 9 1/2 annually on a secular basis. Thus the markets action over the current cycle may tell us a great deal about the supercycle background. That background consists of a trading channel riSing about 14 a year. A bottom in the next few months would leave It essentially intact, whereas a longer downswing would penetrate it Dow Jones Industrials (1200) 2478.96 ANTHONY W. TABELL S P 500 (1200) 308.51 DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Cumulative Index 11/01/90 4153.16 AWTth No statement or expresston of opInion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sohcltabon of an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCflber While we beheve the sources of our information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herern Any action to be taken by the subscnber should be based on his OWlllnvestlgatlon and Information Delafteld. Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporation and LtS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades In respect to any secuntres mentioned tn thiS or any future ISsue, and such posLtlOn may be dlfferenl from any views now or hereafter expressed tn thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc ,which IS registered WIth the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may give adVice to lis Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other iSsue Further Information on any security mentioned herein IS available on request

, .. F4' TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES OEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 .' November 9,1990 We have often, in this space, noted the difference 'between iorecasting 'and investment policy. That distinction is especially apt at the present time, and it would seem, therefore, appropriate to repeat the sermon once again. A forecast, at the present time, is an extremely risky undertaking. We can, for the moment, accept the hypothesis that we are, or were, at least as of October 11, in a bear market. On that day the Dow closed at 2365.10. Its current level Is not all that different. The questions facing the forecaster center around how far the decline might go and for how long might the market continue to fall. We have previously advanced tentative answers to these questions. We have noted that point-and-figure charts indicate two possible logical downside objectives for the Dow, the first at 2200 and the second at 1950. We noted last week that bear markets historically have been either of the long or short variety. The latter type could, conceivably, have been over in October, and should, In any case, end before early next year. The former, lengthy variety could be expected to continue throughout most of 1991. At this point the reader Is entitled to take us, rather seriously, to task. He can, quite rightly, point out that there exists a great deal of dollar difference between Dow 2200 and Dow 1950. Likewise, there are a great many potentially agonizing months between the spring of 1991 and the winter of 1991-1992. Indeed, said reader may weli ask, Why don't you simply admit that you don't know how low the market Is going OK, we admit it. However, we don't have to care. Here lies the crucial distinction between forecasting -and policy' 'We-are,- as' noted above,- by-definition' In' a '-bear-market.' The- appropriate' policy In such a market is a defensive one. We do not need to know how low or for how long the market will decline. We need only to be confident that the market will, in time, suggest the effective end of the decline by Its own action. For the market technician, this constitutes an article of faith. The bottom of a bear market is, again by definition, a major low. Major lows ha ve, in the past, almost invariably been accompanied by one or both of two phenomena, a selling climax and a takeoff rally. Prior to the late 1970's, both generally occurred. In more recent, Institutionally dominated markets, often only the latter has manifested itself. Climaxes and takeoffs are, quite simply, days on which there occurs highly unusual upside or downside action, unusual, In terms of the extent of an advance or decline, its breadth, and its accompanying volume. Such days have, to date, been conspicuous by their absence. The averages have posted three lower lows so far, August 23, September 28, and October 1l. The first of these showed some evidence of what one should be looking for—1640 declining Issues as the Dow touched its low and 1453 advances on the August 27, 80-point rally. Volume on that day was, however, a miniscule 160 million shares. The subsequent mOVe to lower levels was, therefore, not surprising. More recently, the market has railled since its mid-October low—by almost 6 to Its high at just above 2500 this Monday. Are there any signs of a takeoff on this advance There were, at best. a couple of good days, more than 1100 advances on both October 18 and 19 in the course of a 133-point rise on the Dow. Volume Increased somewhat to just over 200 million shares. However, neither the ratio of advances to declines or that of upside volume to downside volume came anywhere near the levels one should see on a strong upside day. Quite simply, in other words, the sort of action that should accompany the end of a bear market has not yet occurred. Were it to occur over the short term, we would be perfectly willing to turn optimistic. We are also willing to recognize the possibly of sensitive indicators pointing to a relatively weak, short-term rally. However. considerably more technical evidence than has so far been provided would be necessary to induce us to suggest abandoning a defensive stance. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (11/08/90 2463.12 309.66 4207.29 AWTth No statement or expressIon of oplmon Of any other matter herein contaIned IS, or IS to be deemed 10 be, directly or IndIrectly, an offer or the solicllatlon ol an offer to buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the aCCuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgatlon and Informabon Delafield, Harvey, Tabett Inc, as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, pOSlbons or trades In respect to any securities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelt Inc, which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice 10 Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Fur1her information on any secUrity menlloned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 November 16, 1990 The essential stock market conundrum remains the same one that has existed for more than a month now —whether or not we have seen the lows of the bear market which began on July 17'at Dow 3090-and,-eofer-at-least,-hss-scored-its-Iowat-2365.1Oon.October II. We have two basic figures which enable us to compare the hiatus of the current downswing to previous interruptions of major declines. First, the Dow, through Wednesday's high, h.ad advanced 8.2 from its October low over 24 trading days and, correspondingly, there have been, through yesterday, 25 days since the averages last posted a new low. No. of Longest No.of Bear Market \ No.of Largest No.of Rally. Interval 20-0ay Start -D-e-c-l-in-e- Days \Rally Days 8\ Set.Lows —— ——– ——— Intervals ——— Sep 3 1929 47.9 56 18.9 2 2 11 0 Apr 17 1930 86.0 665 35.1 28 15 103 8 liar 10 1937 49.1 317 14.8 51 5 98 1 Nov 12 1938 41. 3 1040 23.5 127 5 450 6 lIay 29 1946 23.2 93 4.2 4 2 24 2 Jun 15 1948 16.3 281 8.1 22 1 77 4 Jan 5 1953 13.0 176 5.3 42 0 53 3 Apr 6 1956 19.5 389 14.5 104 2 163 4 Dec 13 1961 27.1 134 15.0 41 0 51 1 Feb 9 1966 25.2 167 6.2 13 0 46 3 Dec 3 1968 35.9 367 7.7 54 0 87 5 Jan 11 1973 45.0 481 15.9 46 4 146 5 Sep 21 1976 26.9 362 8.7 35 1 96 4 Apr 27 1981 24.1 328 9.3 43 2 101 4 Nov 29 1983 15.6 164 5.0 18 0 30 4 Au9 25 1987 36.1 38 5.9 9 0 13 0 Ju1 17 1990 21. 2 61 8.2 24 1 25 2 . – .— – The above table provides some statistics for 17 bear markets, beginning back in 1929 and including the current one to date. It shows, for each downswing, the start day, the extent of the decline, and the number of trading days it lasted. There have, as the table shows, been declines considerably less extensive than the current one, but, it is important to note, not many have been shorter. This is part of the reason we have felt that the downswing has longer to run. The Dow's ability to pose a 8.2 rise is, we must admit however, impressive. We have often remarked that the oft-cited bear-market rally is, largely, a mythical beast, and the table shows that a large number of the declines, since World War II at least, have never posted bear-market rallies as great or as long as this one. Furthermore, in many cases, raliies of this extent have often occured not during the course of the bear market, but in the process of base formation which followed. These figures tend to buttress the contention that the Dow could well have hit its low back in October. The lack of a new low for 25 days is less decisively bullish. The table demonstrates that many bear markets have had much longer interruptions, including five of longer than 100 trading days in length. Most past bear markets have had multiple interruptions of 20 days or longer, thus suggesting that the present decline has a bit more downside probing to do. In addition, as we noted lust week, the rally has fai!.ad to demonstrate the breadth and volume characteristics normally shown at major reversals. This action continued in this week's trading. Wednesday's rise to the rally high of 2559 produced only modestly above-average volume and fewer than 1000 advancing stocks. The rally of October-November is, then, a fairly impressive phenomenon, but, in the absence of confirming statistics, we continue to feel that caution should be the order of the day. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (11/15/90) 2535.39 317.17 4356.75 AWTth No statement or expression of opinion or any o1her mailer herem contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the sohCltatlOnof an oHerto buy or sel! any secUrity referred to or mentioned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subSCriber While we beheve Ihe sources of our Information 10 be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any acllon to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Invesllgatlon and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabel! Inc, as a corporalion and Its oHlcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, positions or trades m respect to any securities menMned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSI\!on may be dlRerent from any Views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adViSOry and other customers Independently of any statements made ' thiS or m any other Issue Further InformaMn on any secUrity mentioned herein IS available on requesl

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 November 23, 1990 There is an old joke about a husband who informed a friend that he made the big decisions in his fampy, wile his wife made the little ones. Pressed for clarificaion, he explained, I decide whether we sh6ulinnvadelraq and-whaCtodo -abOut the- budgeCdeflcit-. She decides where .we will live, what kind of car we will own, and where to send the kids to school. The fable is applicable to today's stock market. When one looks at the big picture—at the overriding issues of the day headlined in each morning's newspaper—It'is quite easy, for reasons we will expand on below, to become both angry and frustrated. It is, likewise, easy to translate that anger and frustration into a bearish attitude toward the stock market. When one takes a more parochial view and, as does the market technician, looks only at the market itself, it becomes difficult to visualize Armageddon as being immediately at hand. Our own view of the market, a view based solely on technical factors, is well-known to our readers. We think we are in a bear market. (Indeed, we can say that, by definition, we definitely were in one on October 11, when the Dow closed 20 below its July high.) Such a phenomenon, however, should hardly be regarded as a major disaster. Indeed, bear markets transpire, with a fair degree of regularity, approximately every four years. (This timetable has been slightly out of kilter lately, but that is another story.) Our ongoing lack of optimism is due, as readers know, to the total failure of most technical indicators in the course of the 8 1/2 rally off the October 11 lows, to provide us with anything resembling the kinds of signals that we would expect to accompany a major turning point. Accordingly, we think it prudent to retain the expectation that the October low will be penetrated and modestly lower levels will be attained. The point is, though, that there exists nothing in the present scenario suggesting anything worse than a run-of-the-mill cycle bear market—one which, if, as we believe, it has not already seen its lows, is not today too far from them. This technical view contrasts with the opinion of a great many pundits, who, inspecting the biggerp1ure,Jind.inJtportents of the end — -ofWesternCivilizafiori .——- – – –c — — – — There can be little doubt that there exists, in the mind of the American public, some degree of malaise. One of the more interesting announcements of the week was the release of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index for October, which managed to post the biggest three-month decline in the 44-year history of the indicator. Seventy-one percent of all respondents polled in the survey thought bad economic times were ahead. It is worth noting, however, that lows in consumer confidence generally tend to be more or less coincident with lows in the stock market. (It should also be noted, to be fair, that there is no evidence that the lows for the Sentiment Index have yet been seen.) There is ample reason for the consumer to feel the way he does. We have moved, in 1990, from euphoria over the end of the cold war and debate on how to spend the peace dividend, to a possible hot war with an enemy we did not know we had. We have been regaled with stories about the ever1!xpanding magnitude of the Savings and Loan crisis, Which, for all the concomitant chicanery, was, at heart, a real estate problem. Indeed, the most fundamental factor behind the consume!'s pessimism could well be the realization that his home, the typical consume!'s most important asset, is now likely worth considerably less than it was a year or so ago. While all this is going on, we are assured, by conservatives and liberals alike, of the wickedness of the ongoing budget deficit, and, as a result, are privileged to witness the sort of charade that accompanied passage of the recent tax law. With great good sense, the consumer continues to demonstrate that the portion of the deficit about which he is most concerned is his rising tax bill, an expression of opinion we in the state of New Jersey were two weeks ago, particularly privileged to witness. There is, under these conditions, little reason to be surprised that pessimism still exists among market forecasters and, as evidenced by institutional cash levels, money managers. The point is, however, that technical factors, while not arguing for immediately higher prices, do not seem to suggest the sorts of economic disaster apparently expected by the more extreme prophets of doom and gloom. Indeed, the current deterioration of sentiment looks very much, to the market historian, as the sort of thing that tends to take place around bear market lows. ANTHONY W. TABELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (11/21/90) 2549.50 315.70 4338.76 AWTth No statement Of expression of oplnton or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dlreclly or mdlrectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any securrty referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our mformatlon to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subscriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc, as a corporatIOn and ItS ollicers or employees, may now have, or may later take, POSitions or trades In respect to any seCUrities mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such position may be different from any views nowor hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered with the SEC as an Investment adVISor, may gIVe adVice to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Information on any secuflty mentIOned herein IS available on request -e

,, TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEM8ER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (6091 987-2300 November 30, 1990 ;nAs forecar,!, we arE! wrollg often enough to be allowed, on occasion, to beg our readers' indulgence for rilco-tinting instance-where we -were right -(iiortofY;- Back in July -1982, this space contained a discussion of the residential real estate market, and, in discussing that market, we used the following language Let us consider a process which has emerged from time to time in almost all markets in which assets are traded. (1) The price of the asset in question rises sharply for a protracted period. (2) It gradually becomes the general expectation that this price rise will continue into the indefinite future. (3) Advancing prices continue to the point where there is absolutely no economic jUstification for purchase of the asset on an investment basis other than the expectation that it can be later sold at a higher price (the greater-fool theory). (4) Increasing willingness to finance the purchase of the asset with borrowed money becomes manifest. (5) The interest rate for said borrowed money eventually reaches astronomical figures. tiThe above series of descriptions, applied on a widespread, pervasive, and nationwide basis, fit two markets that come readily to mind — common stocks in 1929 and residential real estate in the late 1970's. Now the reason we qualified the correctness of the forecast above is that it was, to say the least, a tad early. The real estate market has been slow for some years now, but, even at current prices, the Census Bureau Price Index for new homes remains some 28 above its level at the time the forecast was made, which means. of course, that housing prices in many areas have more than doubled. Nonetheless, weakness is now sufficiently widespread to have reached the front page of the Wall Street Journal which, this Wednesday, discussed falling prices for houses in California—a market, where, we noted back in 1982, the housing market rivalled Disneyland in exhibiting fantasy. The most amusing sentence in the Journal article noted that buyers in a recent development now allege that the builder has a 'moral obligation' to make sure they don't lose money on their homes. Those of us familiar with markets do not find this' attitude surprising, having, many times, – — confrontetlinvestors -whoseemea-to IeelTJiaCtneyposseSSed- a–GOagiverrMglit-to -becomerich-by mean-s – of the stock market. The entire history of the market for housing was, up until a couple of years ago, one of gradually rising expectations which inevitably, at their peak, became unrealistic. The important thing to note here is that we are looking at a market phenomenon, an example of collective, not individual, action. This, it seems to us, is especially important to recall when considering the Savings & Loan crisis which, we noted last week, is, essentially, a real estate phenomenon. It is certainly true that the S & L debacle produced its quota of rogues and scoundrels, but the phenomenon of financiers bribing legislators is at least as old as the South Sea Bubble. The stories in the press about individual swindlers may serve to sell newspapers, but the basic S & L problem was a universal, collective expectation that real estate prices would continue to rise and inflated loan values were therefore appropriate. The key question, of course, is Where do we go from here Those of us involved with the stock market are familiar with what happened when a credit-fueled expansion in equities was taken apart in 1930-1932. It is worth noting here that the real estate market is quite different from the stock market, in, at least, the respect that one cannot live in a stock certificate. The ultimate unwinding of the recent price inflation will probably manifest itself, not in the collapse of prices under forced liquidation, but in a contraction of activity such as we have already begun to experience. We thus see housing starts now down to the lowest level since (interestingly) 1982. We have not changed the opinion we expressed in 1982 that the eventual resolution to an over-priced real estate market will not take the form of price collapse, but of contraction of future price increases to a rate probably not in excess of inflation. Inevitably there will be those who, as the weaker real estate market continues, will want to project this weakness onto the economy as a whole and, of course, onto the stock market. It is this sort of pessimism that we discussed in last week's letter, noting the fact that the technical stock market outlook was, if not exciting, not all that disastrous. We concluded our piece eight years ago with the statement, It is furthermore a truism that none of the descriptions applied to real estate .are currently applicable to equities — they have not been rising; they are historically cheap; there exists no universal expectation of significantly higher prices; and their holding is financed only to a limited extent by borrowed money. The long-term investment implications, it seems to us, are obvious. Despite the equity price rise of the 1980's that description remains today, we think, not too far off the mark. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (12 00) Cumulative Index (11/29/90) AWTth 2518.32 315.94 4155.29 ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL IN C. No Slalement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or IS to be deemed to be, directly or Indirectly, an offer or the solicitation of an offerlc buy or sell any security referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely for the convenience of the subsCriber While we believe the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action 10 be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investlgallon and mformaliOn Delafield, Harvey, labelllnc, as a corporation and Its officers or employees. may now have, or may later take, posllIOns or trades In respect to any secufilies mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such pOSition may be different from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delaffeld, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered wrth the SEC as an Investment advisor, may give adVice to ItS Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further Informabon on any setUrity mentioned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 December 7, 1990 We are not impressed. We would dearlylove to find, in the stock markers current behavior, some evidence that it had, in October, tak-en a -meaningfuf turn-to the upside; – Instead the -peace rally, whiGh -brought-most -, averages to new post-october highs in late-Wednesday and early-Thursday trading, fizzled out after yesterdays first half-hour. The whole affair gave one the impression of a market that might have been being manipulated by Saddam Hussein. It seems to us obligatory, after almost two months. to either fish or cut bait as regards the question of whether October 11, 1990, with the Dow at 2365.10, was a major cycle low. A meaningful bear-market rally is, as we have noted in the past, largely a mythical beast. The current move, a 10.4 advance for the Dow covering 38 trading days, is about as long and extensive as these things get. We may find ourselves dragged to the optimistic side by future evidence of an important turn having occurred in October, but we are not convinced by the evidence shown to date. Assessment of the markers current mood reveals, it seems to us, a nagging fear that a bull market may somehow sneak up on us. This fear runs counter to past experience, which suggests that bull markets do not arrive quietly, but announce themselves, early in the game, with rolls of drums and blares of trumpets, It may, in this connection, be constructive to examine the arrival of the last three major upswings—in 1982, 1984, and 1987. Following the August 12, 1982 low, three days of moderate firmness produced an advance of 4.9 on August 17. This is equiValent, at today's level, to an approximately-127-point rise for the DJIA. There were, on that day, 1564 advancing issues, and the 92 million shares of volume, approximately twice previous normal levels, were followed by 132 million shares changing hands on August 18. Some 96 of the 17th's volume was on the upside and, despite the fact that the market had been going down all year, 108 new highs for the year were achieved, foilowed by 208 on the 18th and tailies in excess of 200 for four straight days the following week. New lows became non-existent, this figure dropping under ten and remaining there for five months foilowing August 23. — Sometwo years later,JnJuly,,-nd August 1984, what has variously been described as a premature bear market and a major intermediate-term decline, came–to an -end-. l'he-low- tooKpiace-.oil-July- 24. –.. –.. at 1086.57 for the Dow. The first major rally, on August 2, saw a 2.8 rise for the average (72 points in today's terms) and 1490 advancing issues. Volume, which had, through July, regularly been under the 100 -million-share level, reached 236 million shares the following day, 88 of it on the upside. By August 3, daily new highs had reached over 100 and total daily new lows remained under 20 from August through December. , We all, of course, remember October 19, 1987 since it was, of course, the largest one-day decline in stock market history. We tend to remember October 21, 1987 (the largest advance in 54 years) less clearly. The Dow, on that day, rose 186 points or 10.2. An astounding 1756 issues advanced, and there were 1611 advances a week or so later. Volume on the day of the rally, while under the record setting levels of the two prior days, was almost 450 million shares, a figure that has not been equaled Since, and 94 of it was on the upside. Due to the extended steepness and breadth of the decline, new-high-Iow figures did not improve, in this case, until well into 1988. Contrast these markets' fireworks with what October and November 1990 have been able to bring forth so far. The largest percentage change posted since October 11 has been 2.78 achieved by the 51-pOint rise on November 12. That was also the best day for breadth, so far, with 1163 advancing iSBues. and there have been. since October, only eight instances of advancing stocks reaching double digits. There were just 1087 advancing issues (with almost 500 declines) this Wednesday. Volume has indeed improved someWhat, of late, having attained 205 million shares on Wednesday and increased to 256 million shares on Thursday. This constitutes about a 50 increase over the roughly 160 million shares that daily volume has been running. At no time during the two months foilowing October 11 have we seen upside volume running in excess of 81 of the total. Until Thursday there had been oniy one day since October when daily new highs exceeded new lows, and even yesterday there were 33 new lows. These mediocre numbers are simply not the sort of thing that nurm6.11y characterhcs turni1b' pointe.. Now there has. of course. been the rare case of a bull market arriving stealthily and unannounced, the most recent example having occurred in February-March 1978. That advance, however. was unusual in a number of ways, in that. in the first two years of its life. it. managed. at best. to move a bare 22 off its low and had returned to within a couple of percentage points of that low in March, 1980. None of this is to say that market action has not improved somewhat. The point -and -figure charts are producing upside breakouts, but one is forced to question these breakouts in light of the fact that. at the week's high level. most indices were encountering heavy overhead supply. This supply will. of course, eventually be penetrated. Our question is whether this prospect is a likelihood for the near future. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TAB ELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) 2589.36 S l P 500 (12 00) 328.25 Cumulative Index (12/06/90) 4537.17 AWTth No statement or expression of opinion or any other matter herein contained IS, or is to be deemed to be, dlrectiy or Indirectly, an oHer or the sollcltauon 01 an oHer to buy or sell any seCUrity referred to or mentioned The matter IS presented merely lor the convenience 01 the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Information to be rehable, we In no way represent or guaranlee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herein Any action to be taken by the subSCriber shoufd be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabell Inc , as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posrtlons or trades In respect 10 any secunlles mentioned In thiS or any future ,;,sue, and such position may be dlNerent from any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS registered With the SEC as an Investment adVisor, may give adVice to rts Investment adVISOry and other customers Independentiy of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Fur1her Information on any secUrity mentIOned herein IS available on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 1 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 December 14. 1990 Long-time readers are well aware of the fact that this letter tends to be a slave to tradition. For more year.s thanl!e cal'e to count. the lasLth!,eesus.oL.!!acb.year have..consistedof (1) a review of the year just passed. (2) a forecast for the upcoming -year. and (3) a discussion -o( (h seasonal phenomenon of the year-end really. In accordance with this tradition. the subject of this week's piece will be an overview of the stock market year. 1990. To begin with. it was a down year. At its current level. around 2600. the Dow was below its December 29. 1989 close of 2753.20. although. admittedly. not by all that much. It has arrived at its present level. however. by a somewhat circuitous route. 1990's year-end rally ended on the first trading day of the year. when the average posted an almost 60-point gain to close at 2810.15. The entire month of January was occupied by the steepest decline in over two years. an intermediate-term correction of 9 1/2. which dropped the index to 2543.24. However. by mid-July all the ground lost and then some was regained. In one of those numerological quirks beloved of market historians. the Dow's close was 2999.75 on two successive days. July 16 and July 17. the average reaching above the magic 3000 level on an Intra-day basis. but never managing to clos,e there. It has still not done so. The slide which followed produced a 20 decline in the major averages. with the low. 2365.10. reached on October U. The two months since that date have seen a rather desultory recovery. the Dow having recouped some 40 of the ground lost as of this week's high. This less-than-startling 1990 action needs. of course. to be put into context. It came following what had been. in 1988 and 1989. two rather good years. Essentially. the last three years of market action consisted of a 72 advance from October 19. 1987. to July 17. 1990. followed by a correction from July to October. What needs to be stressed about this pattern is just how boringly conventional it is. The percentage advance of 72 is almost identical to that of March. 1978 to November. 1980 (62). October. 1974 to September. 1976 (73). and May. 1970 to January. 1973 (74). Bull markets ending in 1961 and 1966 posted similar advances. Likewise. the 33-month length of the upswing. – – – Our- teaaltdhaorueghares-liwgehltllyawoanrethtehasfh-owret side. is not all that unlike previous upward cycles. are -rir-rit6elievers inlliepremise thattfie sfook–'–market ;—— – exhibits cyclical behavior. We have been able to identify some 25 completed cycles since the Dow was first computed in 1886. These cycles. measured from low to low. have averaged 46 months in length and have thus been given the common appellation four year cycle. It is only necessary to repeat the dates of major market lows in the modern era—June 1949. September 1953. December 1957. June 1962. October'1966. May 1970. December 1974. March 1978. Auust 1982—to see how ubiquitous this particular pattern has been. Admittedly. there has been of late. some difficulty in interpretation. As recently as August 1982. it will be recalled. the Dow was as low as 776. By August 1987. it had advanced 250 over 5 years. after which It declined 36 in two months. It is hard to know whether to term this a 62-month. abnormally long market cycle. or to break it up into two unusually short cycles. calling the 16 drop of November 1983 to July 1984 a cycle bear market. It does not really matter. It is patently obvious that October 1987 constituted a major low point. 38 months have passed since that date. 1990. In other words. fits precisely into the four-year-cycle pattern. The first six months of the year capped a 2 1/2-year-long advance. and the decline so far has produced the 20 drop qualifying it as a bear market. The only thing that remains to complete the context is the question of whether the bear market ended two months ago. or whether it might continue into next year. Both the extent and the length of the decline so far remain somewhat below average. but the hypothesis of a low's having occurred in mid-October is not that wildly out of line with past behavior. It must be also noted that a still further decline into early 1991 would be even less out of line with market history. but that is a proper subject for next week's letter. We would be remiss were we not to include, in this review of the past few years, some discussion of the behavior of secondary stocks. The Value Line Composite. as good a proxy as any for these stocks. was. in June 1983. at 208.51. The Dow at that time was in the mid 1200's. The Value Line is now around 196, lower than it was over seven years ago. The DJIA has, oVer the same period, more than dOUbled. The past year. and indeed a large part of the last decade. have constituted of a major bear market for smaller stocks. especially if this action is considered relative to that of the larger companies included in the Dow and the S & P 500. This statistic !l'ay be as important to a year-end review as is the action of the averages discussed above. This. then. will be the context for our forecast next week. a bull market completed in mid-1990. a subsequent bear market which mayor may not be over, and ongoing inferior price action for secondary stocks. Whether these particular attributes will remain or disappear in 1991 will be the subject of next week's letter. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD. HARVEY. TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (12 00) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (12/13/90) AWTjb 2587.38 326.11 4546.18 No statement or expressIon of oplmon or any other matter hereIn contaIned IS, or IS to be deemed to be, dIrectly or Indirectly, an offer or the sohcltatlOn of an offer to buy or sell any secunty relerred to or mentIOned The matter IS presented merely for the convemence of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our InlormatlOn to be rehable, we 10 no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made hereIn Any aCllOn to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hIS own InvestlgallOn and mformallOn Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, as a corporatIon and ItS offIcers or employees, may now have, or may later take, posItIons or trades In respect to any securitIes mentioned In thIS or any future Issue, and such pOSlllon may be dJfferent from any vIews now or hereafter expressed 10 thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabellinc , which IS regIstered WIth the SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may gIve adVIce to Its mvestment adviSOry and other customers mdependently of any statements made 10 thIS or In any other Issue Further informatIon on any security mentioned herein IS avallable on request

TABELL'S MARKET LETTER 600 ALEXANDER ROAD, CN 5209, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08543-5209 MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC (609) 987-2300 – – — – —-. – – -' – – . –December 21, 1990-;, Our 1991 forecast should hardly be surprising to regular readers of this letter, since we have, essentially, been reiterating it for the past two months. Essentially, that forecast calls for the market to move lower in the early part of 1991, at least testing and, in all probability, breaking the October 1990 low. Once this unpleasantness is out of the way, we would look for a major bottom and the inception of a cycle bull market that should carry, not only through the latter half of 1991, but well beyond. Asked for the time and level of this bottom, we would hazard an educated guess, subject to revision, of sometime in the first quarter at approximately 2150 on the Dow. Let us briefly enumerate some of the factors which argue in favor of this forecast. It should be noted, first of all, that the drop from July through October of 1990 lasted for only 61 trading days, barely 2 1/2 months. With the sole exception of 1987, every bear market in this century has lasted longer. Additionally, such markets have involved a decline greater than the 20 the Dow has dropped so far. Moreover, as we have pointed out almost weekly in this space, there has been an almost total lack so far of the sort of selling-climax or takeoff-rally type of behavior which has, historically, characterized the transition from bear to bull markets. Finally, the point-and-figure pattern for the average suggests the strong possibility of the 2150 downside objective referred to above. Other reasons exist, but these will suffice. There exist, of course, alternative scenarios. The most obvious such alternative is the bullish one, this, unsurprisingly being the one that most investors would like to see turn out to be correct. This interpretation holds that the market did, indeed, bottom on October 11, and that a new bull market, of which the 11.18 advance through December 20 is a part, began at that time. If such is the case, of course, 1991 should turn out to be an entire rising year with an eventual move to well above the 3000 level. – – !!!-his vicw-is …\Je ….tllink ,-excce1ivc–!J-7'ctimictic. wcdocurr.nted- ccmc-!easone-fc! ocur-feeling- — —— – – thus in the technical factors noted above. There are, in addition, some economic arguments. It is now almost universally agreed (although not yet officially announced) that the U.S. economy is in a recession. We have, as technicians, been pointing out for years that the market leads the economy rather than the other way around, and we would expect the present market to bottom well before the end of the current economic contraction is reached. It would be unusual, however, for the market to reach its low almost at the outset of the recession. which would be the case were October 11 to turn out to have been a bear-market bottom. By early next year, though, the market, always prescient, should be able to see around the corner of what will then be a widely publicized recession. Thus our forecast. Yet another alternative outcome for 1991 would be a further extension of the bear market to lower levels with the decline occupying most of the upcoming year. We are willing to concede this one as a possibility. (The most bearish possible downside objective for the Dow is 1850, and we have noted that the market's failure to bottom in the first quarter would suggest the downswing's extension to year-end.) We are, however, unable to see any convincing reason why almost all of the advance from 1987 should be wiped out. There exists still a fourth possible scenario and, paradoxically, this is the one we find the most worrisome. This is the prospect of a sort of mini-upswing, approaching the 3000 level but exceeding it marginally, if at all. The point-and-figure pattern for the S & P 500, indeed, suggests just such an outcome, although the heavy overhead supply just above current levels diminishes its credibility. Such an eventuality could produce a major top significantly larger than the one which now exists. We may be forced, reluctantly, to pay more attention to this possibility at a later date, but it should at this point, we think, be regarded only as a tiny storm cloud on a distant horizon. It must be emphasized that our preferred forecast is. ree.lly. a bullish cne. probably the most bullish for the long term of all the alternatives discussed above. It calls for lower prices over the near term to be sure, but the prices we forecast are not all that different from lows already attained. It contrasts with disaster scenarios involving a major credit contraction and looks only for the continuation of a highly conventional bear market that should, fairly soon, reach a low, undoubtedly at the time the gloom-and-doom predictions become most visible. That low should constitute a major buying opportunity for common stocks. ANTHONY W. TAB ELL DELAFIELD, HARVEY, TABELL INC. Dow Jones Industrials (1200) S & P 500 (1200) Cumulative Index (12/20/90) 2638.86 330.61 4845.72 AWTjb No statement or expression 01 opInion or any other mailer herem contained IS, or Is to be deemed to be, directly or mdlrectly, an offer or the sohcltallon of an offer to buy or sell any security relerred 10 or menllOned The mailer IS presented merely for the convenience of the subscnber While we beheve the sources of our Informallon to be reliable, we In no way represent or guarantee the accuracy thereof nor of the statements made herem Any action to be taken by the subSCriber should be based on hiS own Investigation and Information Delafield, Harvey, Tabe!! tnc as a corporation and ItS officers or employees, may now have, or may later lake, POSitIOns or trades In respect to any securlbes mentioned In thiS or any future Issue, and such POSition may be dlfferentlrom any views now or hereafter expressed In thiS or any other Issue Delafield, Harvey, Tabelllnc, which IS registered With Ihe SEC as an Investment adVIsor, may gIVe adVIce to Its Investment adVISOry and other customers Independently of any statements made In thiS or In any other Issue Further informatIOn on any secuflty mentioned herein IS available on request